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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 143047 July 14, 2004
RICARDO S. INDING, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN

CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure for the nullification of the September 23, 1999 Resolution1 of the
Sandiganbayan (Second Division), which denied the petitioner's omnibus motion
with supplemental motion, and its Resolution dated April 25, 2000, denying the
petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of the same.
The Antecedents
On January 27, 1999, an Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan charging
petitioner Ricardo S. Inding, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan
City, with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019,2committed as
follows:
That from the period 3 January 1997 up to 9 August 1997 and for sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Dapitan City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused Ricardo S. Inding, a high-ranking public
officer, being a Councilor of Dapitan City and as such, while in the performance of
his official functions, particularly in the operation against drug abuse, with evident
bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally, faked buy-bust operations against alleged pushers or users to enable him
to claim or collect from the coffers of the city government a total amount
of P30,500.00, as reimbursement for actual expenses incurred during the alleged
buy-bust operations, knowing fully well that he had no participation in the said
police operations against drugs but enabling him to collect from the coffers of the
city government a total amount of P30,500.00, thereby causing undue injury to the
government as well as the public interest.3
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 25116 and raffled to the Second
Division of the Sandiganbayan.
On June 2, 1999, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion4 for the dismissal of the
case for lack of jurisdiction over the officers charged or, in the alternative, for the
referral of the case either to the Regional Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court for
appropriate proceedings. The petitioner alleged therein that under Administrative
Order No. 270 which prescribes the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991, he is a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Dapitan City with Salary Grade (SG) 25. He asserted that under Republic Act No.
7975, which amended Presidential Decree No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan exercises
original jurisdiction to try cases involving crimes committed by officials of local
government units only if such officials occupy positions with SG 27 or higher, based
on Rep. Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the "Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989." He contended that under Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, the RTC, not the Sandiganbayan, has
original jurisdiction over the crime charged against him. The petitioner urged the
trial court to take judicial notice of Adm. Order No. 270.
In its comment on the omnibus motion, the Office of the Special Prosecutor asserted
that the petitioner was, at the time of the commission of the crime, a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte, one of those
public officers who, by express provision of Section 4 a.(1)(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by Rep. Act No. 7975,5 is classified as SG 27. Hence, the Sandiganbayan,
not the RTC, has original jurisdiction over the case, regardless of his salary grade
under Adm. Order No. 270.
On September 23, 1999, the respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying
the petitioner's omnibus motion. According to the court, the Information alleged that
the petitioner has a salary grade of 27. Furthermore, Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975,
which amended Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, provides that the petitioner, as a member
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City, has a salary grade of 27.6
On October 27, 1999, the petitioner filed a Supplemental Motion to his omnibus
motion,7 citing Rep. Act No. 8294 and the ruling of this Court in Organo v.
Sandiganbayan,8 where it was declared that Rep. Act No. 8249, the latest
amendment to the law creating the Sandiganbayan, "collated the provisions on the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan," and that "the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan as a trial court was made to depend not on the penalty imposed by
law on the crimes and offenses within its jurisdiction but on the rank and salary
grade of accused government officials and employees."
In the meantime, the petitioner was conditionally arraigned on October 28, 1999 and
entered a plea of not guilty.9
On November 18, 1999, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Sandiganbayan's September 23, 1999 Resolution.10 The motion was, however,
denied by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution promulgated on April 25, 2000.11
Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, contending as
follows:
A. That Republic Act [No.] 8249 which took effect last 05 February 1997 made the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as a trial court depend not only on the penalty
imposed by law on the crimes and offenses within its jurisdiction but on the rank and
salary grade of accused government officials and employees.
B. That the ruling of the Supreme Court in "Lilia B. Organo versus The
Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines," G.R. No. 133535, 09 September
1999, settles the matter on the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as a trial
court which is over public officials and employees with rank and salary grade 27 and
above.
The petitioner contends that, at the time the offense charged was allegedly
committed, he was already occupying the position of Sangguniang
Panlungsod Member I with SG 25. Hence, under Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249,
amending Rep. Act No. 7975, it is the RTC and not the Sandiganbayan that has
jurisdiction over the offense lodged against him. He asserts that under Adm. Order
No. 270,12 Dapitan City is only a component city, and the members of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod are classified as Sangguniang Panlungsod Members I
with SG 25. Thus, Section 4 a.(1)(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of
Rep. Act No. 7975, and retained by Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249, does not apply
to him.
On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
contend that Section 4 a.(1)(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep.
Act No. 7975, expressly provides that the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction
over violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended, committed by the members of
theSangguniang Panlungsod, without qualification and regardless of salary grade.
They argue that when Congress approved Rep. Act No. 7975 and Rep. Act No. 8249,
it was aware that not all the positions specifically mentioned in Section 4,
subparagraph (1) were classified as SG 27, and yet were specifically included
therein, viz:
It is very clear from the aforecited provisions of law that the members of
the sangguniang panlungsod are specifically included as among those falling within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
A reading of the aforesaid provisions, likewise, show that the qualification as to
Salary Grade 27 and higher applies only to such officials of the executive branch
other than the regional director and higher and those specifically enumerated. To
rule, otherwise, is to give a different interpretation to what the law clearly is.
Moreover, had there been an intention to make Salary Grade 27 and higher as the
sole factor to determine the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan then
the lawmakers could have simply stated that the officials of the executive branch, to
fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should have been
occupying the positions with a Salary Grade of 27 and higher. But the express
wordings in both RA No. 7975 and RA No. 8249 specifically including the members
of the sangguniang panlungsod, among others, as those within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only means that the said sangguniang members
shall be within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the said court regardless of their
Salary Grade.
In this connection too, it is well to state that the lawmakers are very well aware that
not all the positions specifically mentioned as those within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan have a Salary Grade of 27 and higher. Yet, the
legislature has explicitly made the officials so enumerated in RA No. 7975 and RA
No. 8249 as falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
because of the nature of these officials' functions and responsibilities as well as the
power they can wield over their respective area of jurisdiction.13
The threshold issue for the Court's resolution is whether the Sandiganbayan has
original jurisdiction over the petitioner, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Dapitan City, who was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Court rules in the affirmative.
Rep. Act No. 7975, entitled "An Act to Strengthen the Functional and Structural
Organization of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for that Purpose Presidential Decree
No. 1606," took effect on May 16, 1995. Section 2 thereof enumerates the cases
falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, Rep. Act
No. 7975 was amended by Rep. Act No. 8249, entitled "An Act Further Defining the
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for the Purpose Presidential Decree
No. 1606, as Amended, Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes." The
amendatory law took effect on February 23, 1997 and Section 4 thereof enumerates
the cases now falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
For purposes of determining which of the two laws, Rep. Act No. 7975 or Rep. Act
No. 8249, applies in the present case, the reckoning period is the time of the
commission of the offense.14 Generally, the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal
case is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action,
not at the time of the commission of the crime.15 However, Rep. Act No. 7975, as
well as Rep. Act No. 8249, constitutes an exception thereto as it expressly states that
to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of
Rep. Act No. 3019, the reckoning period is the time of the commission of the
offense. This is plain from the last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of
these two provisions which reads:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise [exclusive]16 original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, [Book II]17 of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal
accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether
in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:

In this case, as gleaned from the Information filed in the Sandiganbayan, the crime
charged was committed from the period of January 3, 1997 up to August 9, 1997.
The applicable law, therefore, is Rep. Act No. 7975. Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975
expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as defined in Section 4 of P.D. No.
1606, thus:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:18
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code,19where one or more of the principal accused
are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department
heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;20
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;21
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors
in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.22
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding
to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or
PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent,
exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129.23
A plain reading of the above provision shows that, for purposes of determining the
government officials that fall within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in
cases involving violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII
of the Revised Penal Code, Rep. Act No. 7975 has grouped them into five categories,
to wit:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher. . .
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
With respect to the first category, i.e., officials of the executive branch with SG 27 or
higher, Rep. Act No. 7975 further specifically included the following officials as
falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department
heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors
in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
The specific inclusion of the foregoing officials constitutes an exception to the
general qualification relating to officials of the executive branch as "occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher,
of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989." In other words,
violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 committed by officials in the executive branch with
SG 27 or higher, and the officials specifically enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4
a.(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975,regardless of
their salary grades, likewise fall within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Had it been the intention of Congress to confine the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan to violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 only to officials in the executive
branch with SG 27 or higher, then it could just have ended paragraph (1) of Section 4
a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, with the phrase
"officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989." Or the category in paragraph (5) of the same
provision relating to "[a]ll other national and local officials classified as Grade '27'
and up under the Compensation and Classification Act of 1989" would have
sufficed. Instead, under paragraph (1) of Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended
by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, Congress included specific officials, without any
reference as to their salary grades. Clearly, therefore, Congress intended these
officials, regardless of their salary grades, to be specifically included within the
Sandiganbayan's original jurisdiction, for had it been otherwise, then there would
have been no need for such enumeration. It is axiomatic in legal hermeneutics that
words in a statute should not be construed as surplusage if a reasonable construction
which will give them some force and meaning is possible.24
That the legislators intended to include certain public officials, regardless of their
salary grades, within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is apparent from
the legislative history of both Rep. Acts Nos. 7975 and 8249. In his sponsorship
speech of Senate Bill No. 1353, which was substantially adopted by both Houses of
Congress and became Rep. Act No. 7975, Senator Raul S. Roco, then Chairman of
the Committee on Justice and Human Rights, explained:
Senate Bill No. 1353 modifies the present jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan such
that only those occupying high positions in the government and the military fall
under the jurisdiction of the court.
As proposed by the Committee, the Sandiganbayan shall exercise original
jurisdiction over cases assigned to it only in instances where one or more of the
principal accused are officials occupying the positions of regional director and higher
or are otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher by the Compensation and
Classification Act of 1989, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity at the
time of the commission of the offense. The jurisdiction, therefore, refers to a certain
grade upwards, which shall remain with the Sandiganbayan.
The President of the Philippines and other impeachable officers such as the justices
of the Supreme Court and constitutional commissions are not subject to the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan during their incumbency.
The bill provides for an extensive listing of other public officers who will be subject
to the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It includes, among others,
Members of Congress, judges and justices of all courts.25
More instructive is the sponsorship speech, again, of Senator Roco, of Senate Bill
No. 844, which was substantially adopted by both Houses of Congress and became
Rep. Act No. 8249. Senator Roco explained the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in
Rep. Act No. 7975, thus:
SPONSORSHIP OF SENATOR ROCO

By way of sponsorship, Mr. President we will issue the full sponsorship speech to
the members because it is fairly technical may we say the following things:
To speed up trial in the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 7975 was enacted for that
Court to concentrate on the "larger fish" and leave the "small fry" to the lower courts.
This law became effective on May 6, 1995 and it provided a two-pronged solution to
the clogging of the dockets of that court, to wit:
It divested the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over public officials whose salary
grades were at Grade "26" or lower, devolving thereby these cases to the lower
courts, and retaining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only over public officials
whose salary grades were at Grade "27" or higher and over other specific public
officials holding important positions in government regardless of salary grade;26
Evidently, the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) Section 4 a.(1) of P.D. No. 1606,
amended Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, were specifically included within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because the lawmakers considered them
"big fish" and their positions important, regardless of their salary grades.
This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that some of the officials enumerated
in (a) to (g) are not classified as SG 27 or higher under the Index of Occupational
Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades issued by the Department of Budget and
Management in 1989, then in effect at the time that Rep. Act No. 7975 was
approved. For example:
Category New Position Title Grade
16. FOREIGN RELATIONS SERVICE
Foreign Service
Foreign Service Officer, Class II27 2328
Foreign Service Officer, Class I29 2430

18. EXECUTIVE SERVICE
Local Executives
City Government Department Head I 2431
City Government Department Head II 2632

Provincial Government Department Head 2533

City Vice Mayor I 26
City Vice Mayor II 28
City Mayor I 2834
City Mayor II 30
19. LEGISLATIVE SERVICE
Sangguniang Members
Sangguniang Panlungsod Member I 25
Sangguniang Panlungsod Member II 27
Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member 2635
Office of the City and Provincial
Prosecutors36

Prosecutor IV 29
Prosecutor III 28
Prosecutor II 27
Prosecutor I 26
Noticeably, the vice mayors, members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and
prosecutors, without any distinction or qualification, were specifically included in
Rep. Act No. 7975 as falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Moreover, the consuls, city department heads, provincial department heads and
members of theSangguniang Panlalawigan, albeit classified as having salary grades
26 or lower, were also specifically included within the Sandiganbayan's original
jurisdiction. As correctly posited by the respondents, Congress is presumed to have
been aware of, and had taken into account, these officials' respective salary grades
when it deliberated upon the amendments to the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, Congress passed into law Rep. Act No. 7975, specifically including
them within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. By doing so, it obviously
intended cases mentioned in Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2
of Rep. Act No. 7975, when committed by the officials enumerated in (1) (a) to (g)
thereof, regardless of their salary grades, to be tried by the Sandiganbayan.
Indeed, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that the intent of the legislature
is the controlling factor in the interpretation of a statute.37 From the congressional
records and the text of Rep. Acts No. 7975 and 8294, the legislature undoubtedly
intended the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4 a.(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by the aforesaid subsequent laws, to be included within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which provides that if the
accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27, the proper trial court has
jurisdiction,38 can only be properly interpreted as applying to those cases where the
principal accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27 and not among those
specifically included in the enumeration in Section 4 a. (1)(a) to (g). Stated
otherwise, except for those officials specifically included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to
(g), regardless of their salary grades, over whom the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction,
all other public officials below SG 27 shall be under the jurisdiction of the proper
trial courts "where none of the principal accused are occupying positions
corresponding to SG 27 or higher." By this construction, the entire Section 4 is given
effect. The cardinal rule, after all, in statutory construction is that the particular
words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing
the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole.39 And
courts should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of a statute, if at
all possible. Ut magis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be sought which
gives effect to the whole of the statute its every word.40
In this case, there is no dispute that the petitioner is a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Dapitan City and he is charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of Rep.
Act No. 3019. Members of the Sangguniang Panlungsodare specifically included as
among those within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in Section 4 a.(1)
(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975,41 or even
Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 824942 for that matter. The Sandiganbayan, therefore, has
original jurisdiction over the petitioner's case docketed as Criminal Case No. 25116.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated September 23, 1999 and April 25, 2000 are
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, and Tinga,
JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 125066. July 8, 1998]
ISABELITA REODICA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:
On the evening of 17 October 1987, petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a van
along Doa Soledad Avenue, Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro
Manila. Allegedly because of her recklessness, her van hit the car of complainant
Norberto Bonsol. As a result, complainant sustained physical injuries, while the
damage to his car amounted to P8,542.00.
Three days after the incident, or on 20 October 1987, the complainant filed an
Affidavit of Complaint[1] against petitioner with the Fiscals Office.
On 13 January 1988, an information[2] was filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati (docketed as Criminal Case No. 33919) charging petitioner with
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical
Injury. The information read:
The undersigned 2nd Asst. Fiscal accuses Isabelita Reodica of the crime of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of October, 1987 in the Municipality of Paraaque,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovementioned accused, Isabelita Velasco Reodica, being then the driver and/or
person in charge of a Tamaraw bearing plate no. NJU-306, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and operate the same in a
reckless, careless, negligent and imprudent manner, without regard to traffic laws,
rules and regulations and without taking the necessary care and precaution to avoid
damage to property and injuries to person, causing by such negligence, carelessness
and imprudence the said vehicle to bump/collide with a Toyota Corolla bearing plate
no. NIM-919 driven and owned by Norberto Bonsol, thereby causing damage
amounting to P8,542.00, to the damage and prejudice of its owner, in the
aforementioned amount of P8,542.00.
That as further consequence due to the strong impact, said Norberto Bonsol suffered
bodily injuries which required medical attendance for a period of less that nine (9)
days and incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the same period
of time.
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.
On 31 January 1991, the RTC of Makati, Branch 145, rendered a
decision[3] convicting petitioner of the quasi offense of reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property with slight physical injuries, and sentencing her:
[t]o suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, and to pay the
complainant, Norberto Bonsol y Atienza, the sum of Thirteen Thousand Five
Hundred Forty-Two (P13,542), Philippine Currency, without subsidiary impairment
in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.[4]
The trial court justified imposing a 6-month prison term in this wise:
As a result of the reckless imprudence of the accused, complainant suffered slight
physical injuries (Exhs. D, H and I). In view of the resulting physical injuries, the
penalty to be imposed is not fine, but imprisonment (Gregorio, Fundamental of
Criminal Law Review, Eight Edition 1988, p. 711). Slight physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence is now punished with penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period (People v. Aguiles, L-11302, October 28, 1960, cited in Gregorios book, p.
718).[5]
As to the sum of P13,542.00, this represented the cost of the car repairs (P8,542.00)
and medical expenses (P5,000.00).
Petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the
case as CA-G.R. CR No. 14660. After her motions for extension of time to file her
brief were granted, she filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal for Probation Purposes,
and to Suspend, Ex Abundanti Cautela, Period for Filing Appellants
Brief. However, respondent Court of Appeals denied this motion and directed
petitioner to file her brief.[6]
After passing upon the errors imputed by petitioner to the trial court, respondent
Court of Appeals rendered a decision[7] on 31 January 1996 affirming the appealed
decision.
Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration[8] raising new issues, thus:
NOW THAT AN ACQUITTAL SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE, MAY WE REVISIT THE
PENALTY AND MOVE THAT IT BE REVIEWED AND SET ASIDE SINCE IT
IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED TO BE ERROR TO COMPLEX DAMAGE TO
PROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, AS BOTH ARE LIGHT
OFFENSES, OVER WHICH THE RESPONDENT COURT HAD NO
JURISDICTION AND EVEN ASSUMING SUCH JURISDICTION, IT CANNOT
IMPOSE A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.[9]
. . . . . . . . .
REVERSAL OF THE DECISION REMAINS POSSIBLE ON GROUNDS OF
PRESCRIPTION OR LACK OF JURISDICTION.[10]
In its Resolution of 24 May 1996, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration for lack of merit, as well as her supplemental motion for
reconsideration. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court premised on the following grounds:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED JANUARY 31, 1996
AND MORE SO ITS RESOLUTION DATED MAY 24, 1996, ARE CONTRARY
TO LAW AND GROSSLY ERRONEOUS IN THAT THEY IMPOSED A
PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW FOR THE
CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN SLIGHT PHYSICAL
INJURIES, ON THE BASIS OF A CLERICAL ERROR IN A SECONDARY
SOURCE.
A IN THE CASE OF PEOPLE V. AGUILAR,[11] THE SAME CASE WHERE
THE COURT A QUO BASED ITS FINDING OF A PENALTY WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, WHAT WAS
STATED IN THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF SAID CASE IS THAT THE PENALTY
FOR SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES THROUGH RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE
IS ARRESTO MENOR AND NOT ARRESTO MAYOR. IT IS GRAVE ERROR
FOR THE RESPONDENT COURT TO PUNISH PETITIONER MORE THAN
SHE SHOULD OR COULD BE PUNISHED BECAUSE OF A CLERICAL
ERROR COPIED FROM A SECONDARY SOURCE.
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT COMPLEXED THE CRIME OF RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES IMPOSING A SINGLE EXCESSIVE PENALTY IN ITS
ELLIPTICAL RESOLUTION OF MAY 24, 1996.
C. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION NOTWITHSTANDING THE
DEFENSE OF PRESCRIPTION AND LACK OF JURISDICTION.
Anent the first ground, petitioner claims that the courts below misquoted not only the
title, but likewise the ruling of the case cited as authority regarding the penalty for
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Concretely, the title of the case
was not People v. Aguiles, but People v. Aguilar; while the ruling was that the
penalty for such quasi offense was arresto menor not arresto mayor.
As regards the second assigned error, petitioner avers that the courts below should
have pronounced that there were two separate light felonies involved, namely: (1)
reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries; and (2) reckless imprudence with
damage to property, instead of considering them a complex crime. Two light
felonies, she insists, do not rate a single penalty ofarresto mayor or
imprisonment of six months, citing Lontok v. Gorgonio,[12] thus:
Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries,
damage to property amounting to P10,000.00 and slight physical injuries, a chief of
police did not err in filing a separate complaint for the slight physical injuries and
another complaint for the lesiones menos graves and damage to property (Arcaya vs.
Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365).
. . . . . . . . .
The case of Angeles vs. Jose, 96 Phil. 151, cited by investigating fiscal, is different
from the instant case because in that case the negligent act resulted in the offenses
of lesiones menos graves and damage to property which were both less grave
felonies and which, therefore, constituted a complex crime.
In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones
leves through reckless imprudence should have been charged in a separate
information.
She then suggests that at worst, the penalties of two light offenses, both imposable
in their maximum period and computed or added together, only sum up to 60 days
imprisonment and not six months as imposed by the lower courts.
On the third assigned error, petitioner insists that the offense of slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence, being punishable only by arresto menor, is a
light offense; as such, it prescribes in two months. Here, since the information was
filed only on 13 January 1988, or almost three months from the date the vehicular
collision occurred, the offense had already prescribed, again citing Lontok, thus:
In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones
leves through reckless imprudence should have been charged in a separate
information. And since, as a light offense, it prescribes in two months, Lontoks
criminal liability therefor was already extinguished (Arts. 89[5], 90 and 91, Revised
Penal Code in relation to sec. 2[e] and [f], Rule 117, Rules of Court). The trial court
committed a grave abuse of discretion in not sustaining Lontoks motion to quash
that part of the information charging him with that light offense.
Petitioner further claims that the information was filed with the wrong court, since
Regional Trial Courts do not deal with arresto menor cases. She submits that
damage to property and slight physical injuries are light felonies and thus covered by
the rules on summary procedure; therefore, only the filing with the proper
Metropolitan Trial Court could have tolled the statute of limitations, this time
invoking Zaldivia v. Reyes.[13]
In its Comment filed on behalf of public respondents, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) agrees with petitioner that the penalty should have been arresto
menor in its maximum period, instead of arresto mayor, pursuant to Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code.
As to the second assigned error, the OSG contends that conformably with Buerano v.
Court of Appeals,[14] which frowns upon splitting of crimes and prosecution, it was
proper for the trial court to complex reckless imprudence with slight physical
injuries and damage to property because what the law seeks to penalize is the single
act of reckless imprudence, not the results thereof; hence, there was no need for two
separate informations.
To refute the third assigned error, the OSG submits that although the Municipal Trial
Court had jurisdiction to impose arresto menor for slight physical injuries, the
Regional Trial Court properly took cognizance of this case because it had the
jurisdiction to impose the higher penalty for the damage to property, which was a
fine equal to thrice the value of P8,542.00. On this score, the OSG cites Cuyos v.
Garcia.[15]
The OSG then debunks petitioners defense of prescription of the crime, arguing that
the prescriptive period here was tolled by the filing of the complaint with the fiscals
office three days after the incident, pursuant to People v. Cuaresma[16] and Chico v.
Isidro.[17]
In her Reply to the Comment of the OSG, petitioner expressed gratitude and
appreciation to the OSG in joining cause with her as to the first assigned
error. However, she considers the OSGs reliance on Buerano v. Court of
Appeals[18] as misplaced, for nothing there validates the complexing of the crime
of reckless imprudence with physical injuries and damage to property; besides, in
that case, two separate informations were filed -- one for slight and serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence and the other for damage to property through
reckless imprudence. She then insists that in this case, following Arcaya v.
Teleron[19] and Lontok v. Gorgonio,[20] two informations should have been
filed. She likewise submits that Cuyos v. Garcia[21]would only apply here on the
assumption that it was proper to complex damage to property through reckless
imprudence with slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Chico v.
Isidro[22] is likewise inapposite, for it deals with attempted homicide, which is not
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Petitioner finally avers that People v. Cuaresma[23] should not be given retroactive
effect; otherwise, it would either unfairly prejudice her or render nugatory the en
banc ruling in Zaldivia[24]favorable to her.
The pleadings thus raise the following issues:
I. Whether the penalty imposed on petitioner is correct.
II. Whether the quasi offenses of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property in the amount of P8,542.00 and reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries are light felonies.
III. Whether the rule on complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code applies to the quasi offenses in question.
IV. Whether the duplicity of the information may be questioned for the first time
on appeal.
V. Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the offenses in
question.
VI. Whether the quasi offenses in question have already prescribed.
I. The Proper Penalty.
We agree with both petitioner and the OSG that the penalty of six months of arresto
mayor imposed by the trial court and affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals is
incorrect. However, we cannot subscribe to their submission that the penalty
of arresto menor in its maximum period is the proper penalty.
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence,
shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony,
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony,
the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if
it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum
period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which
would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less
serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in
damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging
from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but
which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.
A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who,
by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done
maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion,
without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those
provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the courts shall
impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the
period which they may deem proper to apply.
According to the first paragraph of the aforequoted Article, the penalty for reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, a light felony, is arresto menor in its
maximum period, with a duration of 21 to 30 days. If the offense of slight physical
injuries is, however, committed deliberately or with malice, it is penalized
with arresto menor under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, with a duration of 1
day to 30 days. Plainly, the penalty then under Article 266 may be either lower than
or equal to the penalty prescribed under the first paragraph of Article 365. This
being the case, the exception in the sixth paragraph of Article 365 applies. Hence,
the proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is
public censure, this being the penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor.[25]
As to reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount
of P8,542.00, the third paragraph of Article 365, which provides for the penalty of
fine, does not apply since the reckless imprudence in this case did not result
in damage to property only. What applies is the first paragraph of Article 365, which
provides for arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods (1 month and 1 day
to 4 months) for an act committed through reckless imprudence which, had it been
intentional, would have constituted a less grave felony. Note that if the damage to
the extent of P8,542.00 were caused deliberately, the crime would have been
malicious mischief under Article 329 of the Revised Penal Code, and the penalty
would then be arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1
day to 6 months which is higher than that prescribed in the first paragraph of Article
365). If the penalty under Article 329 were equal to or lower than that provided for
in the first paragraph, then the sixth paragraph of Article 365 would apply, i.e., the
penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto menor in its maximum period
to arresto mayor in its minimum period or imprisonment from 21 days to 2
months. Accordingly, the imposable penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property to the extent of P8,542.00 would be arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods, which could be anywhere from a minimum of 1
month and 1 day to a maximum of 4 months, at the discretion of the court, since the
fifth paragraph of Article 365 provides that in the imposition of the penalties therein
provided the courts shall exercise their sound discretion without regard to the rules
prescribed in article 64.
II. Classification of the Quasi Offense in Question.
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo), but likewise by means of
fault (culpa). There is deceit when the wrongful act is performed with deliberate
intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence,
lack of foresight or lack of skill.[26]
As earlier stated, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is
punishable by public censure only. Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal
Code defines light felonies as infractions of law carrying the penalty of arresto
menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both. Since public censure is classified
under Article 25 of the Code as a light penalty, and is considered under the graduated
scale provided in Article 71 of the same Code as a penalty lower than arresto menor,
it follows that the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries
is a light felony.
On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting in damage to property is, as
earlier discussed, penalized with arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods. Since arresto mayoris a correctional penalty under Article 25 of the Revised
Penal Code, the quasi offense in question is a less grave felony not a light felony as
claimed by petitioner.
III. Applicability of the Rule on Complex Crimes.
Since criminal negligence may, as here, result in more than one felony, should
Article 48 of the Revised Code on complex crimes be applied? Article 48 provides
as follows:
ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. -- When a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is necessary a means for committing
the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period.
Clearly, if a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two or more grave or less
grave felonies, a complex crime is committed. However, in Lontok v.
Gorgonio,[27] this Court declared that where one of the resulting offenses in
criminal negligence constitutes a light felony, there is no complex crime, thus:
Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is light, there is no complex
crime. The resulting offenses may be treated as separate or the light felony may be
absorbed by the grave felony. Thus, the light felonies of damage to property and
slight physical injuries, both resulting from a single act of imprudence, do not
constitute a complex crime. They cannot be charged in one information. They are
separate offenses subject to distinct penalties (People vs. Turla, 50 Phil. 1001; See
People vs. Estipona, 70 Phil. 513).
Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries,
damage to property amounting to P10,000 and slight physical injuries, a chief of
police did not err in filing a separate complaint for the slight physical injuries and
another complaint for the lesiones menos graves and damage to property [Arcaya vs.
Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365].
Hence, the trial court erred in considering the following felonies as a complex crime:
the less grave felony of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the
amount of P8,542.00 and the light felony of reckless imprudence resulting in
physical injuries.
IV. The Right to Assail the Duplicity of the Information.
Following Lontok, the conclusion is inescapable here, that the quasi offense of
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries should have been charged in
a separate information because it is not covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code. However, petitioner may no longer question, at this stage, the duplicitous
character of the information, i.e., charging two separate offenses in one information,
to wit: (1) reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property; and (2) reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries. This defect was deemed waived by
her failure to raise it in a motion to quash before she pleaded to the
information.[28] Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more
offenses are charged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to
object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are
charged and proved and impose on him the penalty for each of them.[29]
V. Which Court Has Jurisdiction Over the
Quasi Offenses in Question.
The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be determined by the law in force at the
time of the institution of the action, unless the statute expressly provides, or is
construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its
enactment.[30]
At the time of the filing of the information in this case, the law in force was Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980. Section 32(2)[31]thereof provided that except in cases falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and of the
Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts
(MTCs), and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) had exclusive original
jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four
years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both fine
and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof.
The criminal jurisdiction of the lower courts was then determined by the duration of
the imprisonment and the amount of fine prescribed by law for the offense
charged. The question thus arises as to which court has jurisdiction over offenses
punishable by censure, such as reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
injuries.
In Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan,[32] this Court found that a lacuna existed in the law as
to which court had jurisdiction over offenses penalized with destierro, the duration of
which was from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years, which was co-extensive with prision
correccional. We then interpreted the law in this wise:
Since the legislature has placed offenses penalized with arresto mayor under the
jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts, and since by Article 71 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 217, it
has placed destierro below arresto mayor as a lower penalty than the latter, in the
absence of any express provision of law to the contrary it is logical and reasonable to
infer from said provisions that its intention was to place offenses penalized
with destierro also under the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts
and not under that of courts of first instance.
Similarly, since offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding 4 years and 2
months were within the jurisdictional ambit of the MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs, it
follows that those penalized with censure, which is a penalty lower than arresto
menor under the graduated scale in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code and with a
duration of 1 to 30 days, should also fall within the jurisdiction of said courts. Thus,
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries was cognizable by said
courts.
As to the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount
of P8,542.00, the same was also under the jurisdiction of MeTCs, MTCs or MCTCs
because the imposable penalty therefor was arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods -- the duration of which was from 1 month and 1 day to 4 months.
Criminal Case No. 33919 should, therefore, be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on
the part of the RTC of Makati.
VI. Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question.
Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence resulting in
slight physical injuries, being a light felony, prescribes in two months. On the other
hand, reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount
of P8,542.00, being a less grave felony whose penalty is arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods, prescribes in five years.
To resolve the issue of whether these quasi offenses have already prescribed, it is
necessary to determine whether the filing of the complaint with the fiscals office
three days after the incident in question tolled the running of the prescriptive period.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. -- The period of prescription
shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing
of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such
proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are
unjustifiably stopped by any reason not imputable to him. (emphasis supplied)
Notably, the aforequoted article, in declaring that the prescriptive period shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, does not distinguish
whether the complaint is filed for preliminary examination or investigation only or
for an action on the merits.[33] Thus, in Francisco v. Court of
Appeals[34] and People v. Cuaresma,[35] this Court held that the filing of the
complaint even with the fiscals office suspends the running of the statute of
limitations.
We cannot apply Section 9[36] of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides
that in cases covered thereby, such as offenses punishable by imprisonment not
exceeding 6 months, as in the instant case, the prosecution commences by the filing
of a complaint or information directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC without need
of a prior preliminary examination or investigation; provided that in Metropolitan
Manila and Chartered Cities, said cases may be commenced only by
information. However, this Section cannot be taken to mean that the prescriptive
period is interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information directly with
said courts.
It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive
law. Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the
exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights.[37] Hence, in case of conflict between the Rule on Summary
Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails.
Neither does Zaldivia control in this instance. It must be recalled that what was
involved therein was a violation of a municipal ordinance; thus, the applicable law
was not Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, but Act. No. 3326, as amended,
entitled An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by
Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall
Begin to Run. Under Section 2 thereof, the period of prescription is suspended only
when judicial proceedings are instituted against the guilty party. Accordingly, this
Court held that the prescriptive period was not interrupted by the filing of the
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, as such did not constitute a
judicial proceeding; what could have tolled the prescriptive period there was only the
filing of the information in the proper court.
In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal Code,
Article 91 thereof and the rulings in Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the
prescriptive period for thequasi offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of
the complaint with the fiscals office three days after the vehicular mishap and
remained tolled pending the termination of this case. We cannot, therefore, uphold
petitioners defense of prescription of the offenses charged in the information in this
case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14660 is SET ASIDE as the
Regional Trial Court, whose decision was affirmed therein, had no jurisdiction over
Criminal Case No. 33919.
Criminal Case No. 33919 is ordered DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 102342 July 3, 1992
LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, petitioner, vs. HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity
as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region,
Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
The Court is asked to determine the applicable law specifying the prescriptive period
for violations of municipal ordinances.
The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's
permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of
Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal.
The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. 1 The referral-complaint of
the police was received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May
30, 1990. 2 The corresponding information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court
of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. 3
The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had
prescribed, but the motion was denied. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of
Rizal, the denial was sustained by the respondent judge. 4
In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner first argues that the
charge against her is governed by the following provisions of the Rule on Summary
Procedure:
Sec. 1. Scope This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the
following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
B. Criminal Cases:
1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
2. Violations of rental law;
3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offenses
charged does not exceed six months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or
otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 9. How commenced. The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the
scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information filed directly in
court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation:
Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manila and chartered cities, such cases
shall be commenced only by information; Provided, further, That when the offense
cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the corresponding complaint shall be signed and
sworn to before the fiscal by the offended party.
She then invokes Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods
of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances
and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," reading as follows:
Sec. 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules: . . . Violations penalized by
municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing
violations of law not included in the Penal Code. (Emphasis supplied)
Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the
two-month statutory period from the date of the alleged commission of the offense,
the charge against her should have been dismissed on the ground of prescription.
For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended
upon the filing of the complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor. Agreeing with the respondent judge, the Solicitor General also invokes
Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, providing as follows:
Sec. 1. How Instituted For offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure
in special cases, the institution of criminal action shall be as follows:
a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, by filing the
complaint with the appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite
preliminary investigation therein;
b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the complaint directly with the said courts,
or a complaint with the fiscal's office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other
chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal.
In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the
offense charged. (Emphasis supplied.)
Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent maintains that the filing of the
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor comes under the phrase "such
institution" and that the phrase "in all cases" applies to all cases, without distinction,
including those falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure.
The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was an adoption of the following
dictum in Francisco v. Court of Appeals: 5
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench
and Bar, this Court has re-examined the question and, after mature consideration, has
arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established
by the decisions holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even
if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and
does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the
court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits.
Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription "shall be interrupted by the
filing of the complaint or information" without distinguishing whether the complaint
is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action
on the merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed
may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial
step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured
party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his
control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the
prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30, 1983, two
months before the promulgation of the Rule on Summary Procedure on August 1,
1983. On the other hand, Section 1 of Rule 110 is new, having been incorporated
therein with the revision of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985,
except for the last paragraph, which was added on October 1, 1988.
That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the
rule on summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section
does not apply to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in
all cases" appearing in the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the
Section, that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
This interpretation conforms to the canon that words in a statute should be read in
relation to and not isolation from the rest of the measure, to discover the true
legislative intent.
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses
it covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the
charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of
Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the
obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of
not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand
pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory
or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided,
however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence
they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not
exceed twenty thousand pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information
shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or
preliminary investigation." 6 Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent
the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However,
the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not
the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the
running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed
in court and not on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says
that the period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are
"judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they
include administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as
the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary
Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former
should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act. No. 3326
and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because
this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the
Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right. 7
Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant to observe that the
decision would have been conformable to Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense
involved was grave oral defamation punishable under the Revised Penal Code
witharresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period. By contrast, the prosecution in the instant case is for violation of a municipal
ordinance, for which the penalty cannot exceed six months, 8 and is thus covered by
the Rule on Summary Procedure.
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if
the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not,
he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late.
However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules
beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The
remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to
prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.
Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner
commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months
thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was
not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial
proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information
with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2,
1990, after the crime had already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged Order dated October
2, 1991 is SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 90-089 in the Municipal Trial Court of
Rodriguez, Rizal, is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of prescription. It is so
ordered.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino,
Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

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