Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-30389 December 27, 1972
PEDRO LEE HONG HOK, SIMEON LEE HONG HOK, ROSITA LEE HONG HOK and LEONCIO LEE HONG
HOK,petitioners,
vs.
ANIANO DAVID, THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR
OF LANDS and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Augusto A. Pardalis for petitioners.
Luis General, Jr. for respondent Aniano David.
Office of the Solicitor General for other respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:p
Petitioners
1
in this appeal by certiorari would have us reverse a decision of respondent Court of Appeals
affirming a lower court judgment dismissing their complaint to have the Torrens Title
2
of respondent
Aniano David declared null and void. What makes the task for petitioners quite difficult is that their
factual support for their pretension to ownership of such disputed lot through accretion was rejected by
respondent Court of Appeals. Without such underpinning, they must perforce rely on a legal theory,
which, to put it mildly, is distinguished by unorthodoxy and is therefore far from persuasive. A grant by
the government through the appropriate public officials
3
exercising the competence duly vested in
them by law is not to be set at naught on the premise, unexpressed but implied, that land not otherwise
passing into private ownership may not be disposed of by the state. Such an assumption is at war with
settled principles of constitutional law. It cannot receive our assent. We affirm.
The decision of respondent Court of Appeals following that of the lower court makes clear that there is
no legal justification for nullifying the right of respondent Aniano David to the disputed lot arising from
the grant made in his favor by respondent officials. As noted in the decision under review, he "acquired
lawful title thereby pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application in accordance with which an order of
award and for issuance of a sales patent was made by the Director of Lands on June 18, 1958, covering
Lot 2892 containing an area of 226 square meters, which is a portion of Lot 2863 of the Naga Cadastre.
On the basis of the order of award of the Director of Lands the Undersecretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources issued on August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to which
OCT No. 510 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga City to defendant-appellee Aniano David on
October 21, 1959. According to the Stipulation of Facts, since the filing of the sales application of Aniano
David and during all the proceedings in connection with said application, up to the actual issuance of the
sales patent in his favor, the plaintiffs-appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse claim thereto.
This is fatal to them because after the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate
certificate of title based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under
the operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein.... Under Section 38 of
Act 496 any question concerning the validity of the certificate of title based on fraud should be raised
within one year from the date of the issuance of the patent. Thereafter the certificate of title based
thereon becomes indefeasible.... In this case the land in question is not a private property as the
Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have always sustained the
public character thereof for having been formed by reclamation.... The only remedy therefore, available
to the appellants is an action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud. In this case we do not see any
fraud committed by defendant-appellant Aniano David in applying for the purchase of the land involved
through his Miscellaneous Sales Application No. MSA-V-26747, entered in the records of the Bureau of
Lands [Miscellaneous Sales] Entry No. V-9033, because everything was done in the open. The notices
regarding the auction sale of the land were published, the actual sale and award thereof to Aniano David
were not clandestine but open and public official acts of an officer of the Government. The application
was merely a renewal of his deceased wife's application, and the said deceased occupied the land since
1938."
4

On such finding of facts, the attempt of petitioners to elicit a different conclusion is likely to be attended
with frustration. The first error assigned predicated an accretion having taken place, notwithstanding its
rejection by respondent Court of Appeals, would seek to disregard what was accepted by respondent
Court as to how the disputed lot came into being, namely by reclamation. It does not therefore call for
any further consideration. Neither of the other two errors imputed to respondent Court, as to its
holding that authoritative doctrines preclude a party other than the government to dispute the validity
of a grant and the recognition of the indefeasible character of a public land patent after one year, is
possessed of merit. Consequently, as set forth at the outset, there is no justification for reversal.
1. More specifically, the shaft of criticism was let loose by petitioner aimed at this legal proposition set
forth in the exhaustive opinion of then Justice Salvador Esguerra of the Court of Appeals, now a member
of this Court: "There is, furthermore, a fatal defect of parties to this action. Only the Government,
represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring
an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent (Lucas vs. Durian, 102 Phil.
1157; Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carlo, G.R. No. L-12485, July 31, 1959). This was not done by
said officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that the patent and title issued
for the land involved are void since they are not the registered owners thereof nor had they been
declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga Cadastre after claiming it as their private
property. The cases cited by appellants are not in point as they refer to private registered lands or public
lands over which vested rights have been acquired but notwithstanding such fact the Land Department
subsequently granted patents to public land applicants."
5
Petitioner ought to have known better. The
above excerpt is invulnerable to attack. It is a restatement of a principle that dates back to Maninang v.
Consolacion,
6
a 1908 decision. As was there categorically stated: "The fact that the grant was made by
the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformity with the law or not is a question
which the government may raise, but until it is raised by the government and set aside, the defendant
can not question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the
government."
7
The above citation was repeated ipsissimis verbis in Salazar v. Court of Appeals.
8
Bereft
as petitioners were of the right of ownership in accordance with the findings of the Court of Appeals,
they cannot, in the language of Reyes v. Rodriguez,
9
"question the [title] legally issued."
10
The second
assignment of error is thus disposed of.
2. As there are overtones indicative of skepticism, if not of outright rejection, of the well-known
distinction in public law between the government authority possessed by the state which is
appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty, and its capacity to own or acquire property, it is
not inappropriate to pursue the matter further. The former comes under the heading of imperium and
the latter of dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the state in
its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other
natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution. Dean Pound did
speak of the confusion that existed during the medieval era between such two concepts, but did note
the existence of res publicae as a corollary to dominium."
11
As far as the Philippines was concerned,
there was a recognition by Justice Holmes in Cario v. Insular Government,
12
a case of Philippine origin,
that "Spain in its earlier decrees embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the
Crown...."
13
That was a manifestation of the concept of jura regalia,
14
which was adopted by the
present Constitution, ownership however being vested in the state as such rather than the head thereof.
What was stated by Holmes served to confirm a much more extensive discussion of the matter in the
leading case of Valenton v. Murciano,
15
decided in 1904. One of the royal decrees cited was
incorporated in the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias
16
in these words: "We having acquired full
sovereignty over the Indies and all lands, territories, and possessions not heretofore ceded away by our
royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is our
will that all lands which are held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us according as
they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys audiences, and
governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures, and commons in those places which
are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present condition, but also their future and their
probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage,
confirming them in what they now have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may
remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish."
17

It could therefore be affirmed in Montano v. Insular Government"
18
that "as to the unappropriated
public lands constituting the public domain the sole power of legislation is vested in
Congress, ..."
19
They continue to possess that character until severed therefrom by state grant.
20
Where,
as in this case, it was found by the Court of Appeals that the disputed lot was the result of reclamation,
its being correctly categorized as public land is undeniable.
21
What was held in Heirs of Datu Pendatun v.
Director of Lands
22
finds application. Thus: "There being no evidence whatever that the property in
question was ever acquired by the applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from the
Spanish Government or by possessory information title or by any other means for the acquisition of
public lands, the property must be held to be public domain."
23
For it is well-settled "that no public land
can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government."
24
It is
indispensable then that there be a showing of a title from the state or any other mode of acquisition
recognized by law.
25
The most recent restatement of the doctrine, found in an opinion of Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, follows:
26
"The applicant, having failed to establish his right or title over the northern portion of
Lot No. 463 involved in the present controversy, and there being no showing that the same has been
acquired by any private person from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, the property is
and remains part of the public domain."
27
To repeat, the second assignment of error is devoid of merit.
3. The last error assigned would take issue with this portion of the opinion of Justice Esguerra:
"According to the Stipulation of Facts, since the filing of the sales application of Aniano David and during
all the proceedings in connection with said application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in
his favor, the
plaintiffs-appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse claim thereto. This is fatal to them
because after the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a
public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under the operation of Republic Act
496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein ... Under Section 38 of Act 496 any question
concerning the validity of the certificate of title based on fraud should be raised within one year from
the date of the issuance of the patent. Thereafter the certificate of title based thereon becomes
indefeasible ..."
28
Petitioners cannot reconcile themselves to the view that respondent David's title is
impressed with the quality of indefeasibility. In thus manifesting such an attitude, they railed to accord
deference to controlling precedents. As far back as 1919, in Aquino v. Director of
Lands,
29
Justice Malcolm, speaking for the Court, stated: "The proceedings under the Land Registration
Law and under the provisions of Chapter VI of the Public Land Law are the same in that both are against
the whole world, both take the nature of judicial proceedings, and for both the decree of registration
issued is conclusive and final."
30
Such a view has been followed since then.
31
The latest case in point
is Cabacug v. Lao.
32
There is this revealing excerpt appearing in that decision: "It is said, and with reason,
that a holder of a land acquired under a free patent is more favorably situated than that of an owner of
registered property. Not only does a free patent have a force and effect of a Torrens Title, but in
addition the person to whom it is granted has likewise in his favor the right to repurchase within a
period of five years."
33
It is quite apparent, therefore, that petitioners' stand is legally indefensible.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of January 31, 1969 and its resolution of
March 14, 1969 are affirmed. With costs against petitioners-appellants.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ.,
concur.

Footnotes
1 Petitioners are Pedro Lee Hong Hok, Simeon Lee Hong Hok, Rosita Lee Hong Hok and
Leoncio Lee Hong Hok.
2 Original Certificate of Title No. 510 of the Registry of Naga City.
3 The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Lands were
likewise named respondents.
4 Decision Appendix A, Brief for the Petitioners, 54-56.
5 Ibid, 56-57.
6 12 Phil. 342.
7 Ibid, 349.
8 87 Phil. 456 (1950).
9 62 Phil. 771 (1936).
10 Ibid, 776.
11 Cf. 3 Pound, Jurisprudence, 108-109 (1959).
12 212 US 449 (1909).
13 Ibid, 458.
14 Cf. Radin, Law Dictionary, 288 (1955).
15 3 Phil. 537.
16 Law I, Title 12, Book 4.
17 3 Phil. 537, 542-543.
18 12 Phil. 572 (1909).
19 Ibid, 579. Cf. Insular Government v. Aldecoa & Co., 19 Phil. 505, (1911); Ankron v.
Government of the Philippine Islands, 40 Phil. 10 (1919).
20 Cf. Archbishop of Manila v. Director of Lands, 27 Phil. 245 (1914).
21 Cf. Aragon v. Insular Government, 19 Phil. 223 (1911); Francisco v. Government, 28
Phil. 505 (1914); Government v. Cabangis 53 Phil. 112 (1929).
22 59 Phil. 600 (1934).
23 Ibid, 603.
24 Padilla v. Reyes, 60 Phil. 967, 969 (1934).
25 Cf. Reyes v. Rodriguez, 62 Phil. 771 (1936).
26 Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, L-29575, April 30, 1971, 38 Phil. 634.
27 Ibid, 639.
28 Decision, Appendix A to Brief for Petitioners, 54-55.
29 39 Phil. 850 (1919).
30 Ibid, 858.
31 Cf. Manalo v. Lukban, 48 Phil. 973, (1924); El Hogar Filipino v. Olviga, 60 Phil. 17
(1934); Republic of the Philippines v. Abacite, L-15415, April 26, 1961, 1 SCRA 1076;
Panimdim v. Director of Lands, L-19731, July 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 628; Director of Lands v.
The Court of Appeals, L-17696, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA 71; Antonio v. Barroga, L-23769,
April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 357; Dela Cruz v. Reano, L-29792, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 585.
32 L-27036, November 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 92.
33 Ibid, 96.



















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-43938 April 15, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT), petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) and JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44081 April 15, 1988
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORIA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all surnamed DE
LA ROSA, represented by their father JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44092 April 15, 1988
ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORlA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all surnamed DE
LA ROSA, represented by their father, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may be found in the bowels of the
earth even if the land where the discovery is made be private.
1
In the cases at bar, which have been
consolidated because they pose a common issue, this doctrine was not correctly applied.
These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February 11, 1965, by
Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo.
The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots and covered by plan Psu-
225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children
by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964.
2

The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge
Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the Philippines, through
the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9.
3

In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject land
by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the
Liberation. She testified she was born in the land, which was possessed by her parents under claim of
ownership.
4
Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 in 1961 from his mother, Bella Alberto, who declared that
the land was planted by Jaime and his predecessors-in-interest to bananas, avocado, nangka and
camote, and was enclosed with a barbed-wire fence. She was corroborated by Felix Marcos, 67 years old
at the time, who recalled the earlier possession of the land by Alberto's father.
5
Balbalio presented her
tax declaration in 1956 and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964,
6
Alberto his tax declaration in
1961 and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964.
7

Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on
September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in September
1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual,
continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as evidenced by its construction of
adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its geological mappings, geological samplings and trench side
cuts, and its payment of taxes on the land.
8

For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and
Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January
2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased from these locators
on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous and exclusive possession
of the said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels,
and its payment of annual taxes thereon.
9

The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance with Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of 1902
which provided that:
SEC. 21. All valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the philippine Islands both
surveyed and unsurveyed are hereby declared to be free and open to exploration,
occupation and purchase and the land in which they are found to occupation and
purchase by the citizens of the United States, or of said islands.
The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to be
registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated
February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
10

The trial court * denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of
possession and ownership of the land sought to be registered.
11
The applicants appealed to the
respondent court, * which reversed the trial court and recognized the claims of the applicant, but
subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims.
12
In other words, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the
sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.
Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right of ownership. The
Republic has filed its own petition for review and reiterates its argument that neither the private
respondents nor the two mining companies have any valid claim to the land because it is not alienable
and registerable.
It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at that time. The
Court of Appeals correctly declared that:
There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are within the June Bug mineral claims of
Benguet and the "Fredia and Emma" mineral claims of Atok. The June Bug mineral claim
of plaintiff Benguet was one of the 16 mining claims of James E. Kelly, American and
mining locator. He filed his declaration of the location of the June Bug mineral and the
same was recorded in the Mining Recorder's Office on October 14, 1909. All of the Kelly
claims ha subsequently been acquired by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. Benguet's evidence
is that it had made improvements on the June Bug mineral claim consisting of mine
tunnels prior to 1935. It had submitted the required affidavit of annual assessment.
After World War II, Benguet introduced improvements on mineral claim June Bug, and
also conducted geological mappings, geological sampling and trench side cuts. In 1948,
Benguet redeclared the "June Bug" for taxation and had religiously paid the taxes.
The Emma and Fredia claims were two of the several claims of Harrison registered in
1931, and which Atok representatives acquired. Portions of Lots 1 to 5 and all of Lots 6
to 9 are within the Emma and Fredia mineral claims of Atok Big Wedge Mining Company.
The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma mineral claims of Atok
having been perfected prior to the approval of the Constitution of the Philippines of
1935, they were removed from the public domain and had become private properties of
Benguet and Atok.
It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under
consideration was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the
Government of the Commonwealth was inaugurated; and according to
the laws existing at that time, as construed and applied by this court
in McDaniel v. Apacible and Cuisia (42 Phil. 749), a valid location of a
mining claim segregated the area from the public domain. Said the court
in that case: The moment the locator discovered a valuable mineral
deposit on the lands located, and perfected his location in accordance
with law, the power of the United States Government to deprive him of
the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the located claim
was gone, the lands had become mineral lands and they were exempted
from lands that could be granted to any other person. The reservations
of public lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral perfected
locations; and, of course, if a valid mining location is made upon public
lands afterwards included in a reservation, such inclusion or reservation
does not affect the validity of the former location. By such location and
perfection, the land located is segregated from the public domain even
as against the Government. (Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337; Van
Mess v. Roonet, 160 Cal. 131; 27 Cyc. 546).
"The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to
segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator
the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefor
upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law.
Where there is a valid location of a mining claim, the area becomes
segregated from the public domain and the property of the locator." (St.
Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650; 655; 43
Law ed., 320, 322.) "When a location of a mining claim is perfected it
has the effect of a grant by the United States of the right of present and
exclusive possession, with the right to the exclusive enjoyment of all the
surface ground as well as of all the minerals within the lines of the claim,
except as limited by the extralateral right of adjoining locators; and this
is the locator's right before as well as after the issuance of the patent.
While a lode locator acquires a vested property right by virtue of his
location made in compliance with the mining laws, the fee remains in
the government until patent issues."(18 R.C.L. 1152) (Gold Creek Mining
Corporation v. Hon. Eulogio Rodriguez, Sec. of Agriculture and
Commerce, and Quirico Abadilla, Director of the Bureau of Mines, 66
Phil. 259, 265-266)
It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for as held in the
Gold Creek Mining Corp. Case, for all physical purposes of ownership, the owner is not
required to secure a patent as long as he complies with the provisions of the mining
laws; his possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is as good as though
secured by patent.
We agree likewise with the oppositors that having complied with all the requirements of
the mining laws, the claims were removed from the public domain, and not even the
government of the Philippines can take away this right from them. The reason is obvious.
Having become the private properties of the oppositors, they cannot be deprived
thereof without due process of law.
13

Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution against the
alienation of all lands of the public domain except those agricultural in nature for this was made subject
to existing rights. Thus, in its Article XIII, Section 1, it was categorically provided that:
SEC. 1. All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and other natural
resources of the Philipppines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the government established under this Constitution. Natural resources
with the exception of public agricultural lands, shall not be alienated, and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploitation, development or utilization of any of the
natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding 25 years, except as to water
rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which case beneficial use may be the measure and the
limit of the grant.
Implementing this provision, Act No. 4268, approved on November 8, 1935, declared:
Any provision of existing laws, executive order, proclamation to the contrary
notwithstanding, all locations of mining claim made prior to February 8, 1935 within
lands set apart as forest reserve under Sec. 1826 of the Revised Administrative Code
which would be valid and subsisting location except to the existence of said reserve are
hereby declared to be valid and subsisting locations as of the date of their respective
locations.
The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws then in
force removed it from the public domain.
14
By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the
land, against even the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or
the obtention of a patent over it.
15
As the land had become the private property of the locators, they
had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok.
It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property was subject to the "vicissitudes of
ownership," or even to forfeiture by non-user or abandonment or, as the private respondents aver, by
acquisitive prescription. However, the method invoked by the de la Rosas is not available in the case at
bar, for two reasons.
First, the trial court found that the evidence of open, continuous, adverse and exclusive possession
submitted by the applicants was insufficient to support their claim of ownership. They themselves had
acquired the land only in 1964 and applied for its registration in 1965, relying on the earlier alleged
possession of their predecessors-in-interest.
16
The trial judge, who had the opportunity to consider the
evidence first-hand and observe the demeanor of the witnesses and test their credibility was not
convinced. We defer to his judgment in the absence of a showing that it was reached with grave abuse
of discretion or without sufficient basis.
17

Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of the de la Rosas had really been in
possession of the subject property, their possession was not in the concept of owner of the mining
claim but of the property asagricultural land, which it was not. The property was mineral land, and they
were claiming it as agricultural land. They were not disputing the lights of the mining locators nor were
they seeking to oust them as such and to replace them in the mining of the land. In fact, Balbalio
testified that she was aware of the diggings being undertaken "down below"
18
but she did not mind,
much less protest, the same although she claimed to be the owner of the said land.
The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of interest" between the owners of the
surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a well-known
principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything
underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height.
19
Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is
classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to separate claims of title. This
is also difficult to understand, especially in its practical application.
Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on the land while the
mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because he may interfere
with the operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy the crops above. How
deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner, go without encroaching on each other's rights?
Where is the dividing line between the surface and the sub-surface rights?
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half
agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely
mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was originally
classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral and completely mineral once the
mining claims were perfected.
20
As long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or
underneath, it did not cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was
enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the surface.
What must have misled the respondent court is Commonwealth Act No. 137, providing as follows:
Sec. 3. All mineral lands of the public domain and minerals belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development or utilization, shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations, or associations, at least 60% of the capital of which is
owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the
time of the inauguration of government established under the Constitution.
SEC. 4. The ownership of, and the right to the use of land for agricultural, industrial,
commercial, residential, or for any purpose other than mining does not include the
ownership of, nor the right to extract or utilize, the minerals which may be found on or
under the surface.
SEC. 5. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals included
within all areas for which public agricultural land patents are granted are excluded and
excepted from all such patents.
SEC. 6. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals included
within all areas for which Torrens titles are granted are excluded and excepted from all
such titles.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the benefit of
the State, not of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in
public and even private land devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or (for) any
purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are
discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals
without the permission of the State to which such minerals belong.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land could be
used for both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that once
minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time, such use
may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its
sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private
party, including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining
operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to
just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings.
21

Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their
respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the
alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at
the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to the private
respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them
and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated April 30, 1976, is SET ASIDE and that of the trial
court dated March 11, 1969, is REINSTATED, without any pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Sec. 4, Commonwealth Act No. 137.
2 Original Records, Land Registration Case No. 146, pp. 1-4.
3 Ibid., pp. 33, 68, 241.
4 TSN, May 5, 1966, p. 61.
5 TSN, May 3, 1967, pp. 89-115.
6 Original Records, Exhs. "J," p. 24, "K," p. 26.
7 Original Record, Exhs. "I," p. 22, "K," p. 26.
8 Exhs. "8 (a-e)," "9 (a-e)," "9 (f-g)," "7," and "11."
9 Exh. "5," Atok; Exh. "6," Atok, Rollo (G.R. No. 44081), Annex "B," pp. 76-82.
10 Original Records, Land Registration Case No. 146, p, 291.
* Judge Feliciano Belmonte, CFI of Baguio, Benguet.
11 Ibid., p. 325.
** Leuterio J., ponente, with Vasquez and Escolin, JJ.
12 Rollo (GR No. 43938), pp. 38-51.
13 Ibid., pp. 40-42.
14 McDaniel v. Apacible, 42 Phil. 749; Salacot Mining Co. v. Rodriguez, 67 Phil. 97;
Salacot Mining v. Apacible, 67 Phil. 110; Benguet, Inc. v. Republic, 143 SCRA 466.
15 The respondents may claim, however, that inasmuch as a patent has not been issued
to the petitioner, he has acquired no property right in said mineral claims. But the
Supreme Court of the United States, in the cases of Union Oil Co. v. Smith (249 U.S. 337),
and St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co. (171 U.S. 650), held that even
without a patent, the possessory right of a locator after discovery of minerals upon the
claim is a property right in the fullest sense, unaffected by the fact that the paramount
title to the land is in the United State. McDaniel v. Apacible, supra; Salacot Mining Co. v.
Rodriguez, supra.
16 Original Records, pp. 1-4.
17 Tan Hong v. Hon. Parades, G.R. No. 78627, Jan. 29, 1988; Pio Padilla v. CA, G.R. No.
75577, Jan. 29, 1988; Verdant Acres v. Ponciano Hernandez, G.R. No. 51352, Jan. 29,
1988; People v. Ancheta, 148 SCRA 178; People v. Delavin, 148 SCRA 257; People v.
Alcantara, 151 SCRA 326.
18 TSN, Oct. 18, 1966, p. 79.
19 Article 437, new Civil Code.
20 Sec. 1, Presidential Legislative Act No. 4268.
21 Consolidated Mines Administrative Order, May 17, 1975, Secs. 10 & 11, as amended
by Mines Adrministrative Order No. MRD-15.










Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2746 December 6, 1906
MATEO CARIO, Petitioner-Appellant , vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, Respondent-Appellee.

WILLARD, J.:
The appellant, on the 23d of June, 1903, by his attorney in fact, Metcalf A. Clarke, filed a petition in the
Court of Land Registration asking that he be inscribed as the owner of a tract of land in the municipality
of Baguio, in the province of Benguet, containing 146 hectares. The Government of the Philippine
Islands, appeared in the Court of Land Registration and opposed the petition. The Government of the
United States that the land was part of the military reservation of Baguio. Judgment was entered in the
Court of Land Registration in favor of the petitioner, from which judgment the respondents appealed in
accordance with the law then in force to the Court of First Instance of the province of Benguet. The case
was therein tried de novo, and judgment was entered dismissing the petition. The petitioner has
brought the case here by bill of exceptions.
The petitioner presented no documentary evidence of title, except a possessory information obtained in
1901. By the provisions of the Mortgage Law, under which this possessory information was obtained (art.
394), it produced only those effects which the laws give to mere possession.
The petition not having shown any title from the Government, and the land being agricultural, the case
is governed by the decisions of this court in the cases of Valenton et al. vs. Murciano
1
(2 Off. Gaz.,
434); Cansino et al. vs. Valdez et al.
2
(4 Off. Gaz., 488); and Tiglao vs. The Insular Government
3
(4 Off.
Gaz., 747). In these cases it was held that the mere possession of land such as that in controversy in
this case would give the possessor and title thereto as against the Government; in other words, that
the statute of limitations did not run against the State in reference to its agricultural lands.
The petitioner, however, insists that although the statute of limitations as such did not run against the
Government of Spain in the Philippine Islands, yet a grant is to be conclusively presumed from
immemorial use and occupation. To say that the presumption of a grant is presumption of law is, in our
opinion, simply to say that it amounts to a statute of limitations; and for a court to hold that the statute
of limitations does not run against the Government as to its public agricultural lands, and at the same
time to hold that if a person has been in possession of such lands for thirty years it is conclusively
presumed that the Government has given him a deed therefor, would be to make two rulings directly
inconsistent with each other.
Considered as a presumption of fact, the contention could not be sustained in this particular case. Here
the surrounding circumstances are incompatible with the existence of a grant, It is known that for nearly
three hundred years all attempts to convert the Igorots of the Province of Benguet to the Christian
religion completely failed, and that during that time they remained practically in the same condition as
they were when the Islands were first occupied by the Spaniards. To presume as a matter of fact that
during that time, and down to at least 1880, the provisions of the laws relating to the grant, adjustment,
and sale of public were taken advantage of by these deeds from the Government for these lands would
be to presume something which did not exist. The appellant says in his brief (p.10):
The Igorot, no less than the American Indian, is an aborigine, and is equally ignorant of the forms of law
and procedure necessary to protect his interests.
There is, moreover, in the case evidence that in 1894 the petitioner sought to obtain title from the
Government in accordance with the laws then in force. In 1901 he made a contract with Metalcalf A.
Clarke, by the terms of which he agreed to sell the land to Clarke for 6,000 pesos when he obtained title
thereto from the Government, and this contract he does not say that he is the owner, but simply that he
is in possession thereof. The court below found that the land is now worth upwards of P50,000.
The possession of the land has not been of such a character as to require the presumption of a grant. No
one has lived upon it for many years. It was never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except
insignificant portions thereof, and since the insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been used
by the petitioner for any purpose.
The petitioner relies upon the case of the United States vs. Chaves (159 U.S., 452) and the case of The
United States vs.Chaves (175 U.S., 509). In the case of Hays vs. The United States (175 U.S. 248) the
court said at page 261;
But this presumption is subject to the limitation that where title is claimed from a deed which is shown
to be void, it will not be presumed that there was an independent grant (Smith vs. Highbee, 12 Vermont,.
113), or where surrounding circumstances are inconsistent with the theory of a grant.
(Townsend vs. Downer, 32 Vermont, 183).
The substance of this doctrine is that lapse of time any be treated as helping out the presumption of a
grant, but where a void grant is shown, it affords no presumption that another valid grant was made.
Nor does such presumption arise if the surrounding circumstances are incompatible with the existence
of a grant. In this case under consideration we can not find any evidence which justifies us in believing
that a legal grant can have been made, and under those circumstances we can not consider possession
since the date of the treaty as dispensing with the requirement that the title, if not perfect at that time,
was one which the claimant would have a lawful right to make perfect had the territory not been
acquired by the United States.
In the case of Chaves vs. The United States (175 U.S., 552) the court made the following statement at
page 562:
Finally, it distinctly appears that the possession of the parties is insufficient in length of time to prove a
valid title. In United States vs. Chaves (159 U.S., 452) the possession was under the claim of a grant
made by the governor of New Mexico to the alleged grantees. The grant had been lost, but it had been
seen and read by witnesses, and its existence had been proved by evidence sufficient, as we stated in
the opinion (p. 460), to warrant the finding of the court below that the complainants title was derived
from the Republic of Mexico, and was complete and perfect at the date when the United States
acquired sovereignty in the territory of New Mexico, within which the land was situated. We do not
question the correctness to the remarks made by Mr. Justice Shiras in regard to evidence of possession
and the presumptions which may under certain circumstances drawn as to the existence of a grant.
We do not deny the right of the duty of a court to presume its existence in a proper case, in order to
quiet a title and to give to long continued possession the quality of a rightful possession under a legal
right. We recognized and enforced such a rule in the case of United States vs. Chaves decided at this
term. in which the question is involved. We simply say in this case that the possession was not a
duration long enough to justify any such inference.
There is no proof of any valid grant, but on the contrary the evidence offered by the plaintiff himself and
upon which the bases the title that he asks the court to confirm, shows the existence of a grant from a
body which had no legal power to make it, and which, therefore, conveyed no title whatever to its
grantee, and the evidence is, as given by the plaintiff himself, that it was under this grant alone that
possession of the lands was taken. We can not presume (within the time involved in this case) that any
other and valid grant was ever made. The possession of the plaintiff and of his grantors up to the time of
the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, in 1848, had not been long enough to presume a grant.
(Crispin vs. United States, 168 U.S., 208; Hayes vs. United States, 170 U.S., 637, 649, 653; Haysvs. The
United States, ante 248.) The possession subsequently existing, we can not notice. Same authorities.
As we understand it, it is well settled in the United States that prescription does not run against the
Government as to its public lands in other words, that if a person desires to obtain title to the public
lands of the United States situated within the boundaries of the States, he must do so in the way
pointed out by the law. We do not understand that a person in possession of unsurveyed public lands in
the State of Minnesota, for example, whose ancestors had occupied that the land for fortyh years, could
maintain in court a claim that he was the legal owner of the lands by granted the land to his ancestors, a
presumption founded not upon any proceedings taken in the General Land Office to acquire a patent
thereto, but upon the mere possession for that length of time.
The same is true of the public lands of Spain in the Philippine Islands. In the case of Valenton et al. vs.
Marciano it was said:
While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a
sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper
administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State remained the absolute
owner.
But in any event, and whatever the law may be elsewhere, it seems clear that this doctrine of
presumptive grant can not apply to the Philippines in view of the Spanish legislation for the Indies. From
time to time there were promulgated laws which required the person in possession of public lands to
exhibit their titles or grants thereto. If these titles or grants were found to be good, they were confirmed,
but if they were not, or if the persons had no grants or titles at all, they were evicted from the land.
For example, in Law 14, title 12, 4, Recompilation of the Laws of the Indies, it is stated:
We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of pretrial courts designate, at such
times as shall to them most expedient, a suitable period within which all possessors of tracts, farms,
plantations, and estates shall exhibit to them and to the court officers appointed by them for this
purpose their title deeds thereto. And those who are in possession by virtue of proper deeds and
receipts or by virtue of just prescriptive rights shall be protected, and all the rest shall be restored to us
to be disposed of at our will.
In the Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754, it was provided -
that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the date of promulgation and publication of
said order, shall have occupied royal lands, whether or not the same shall be cultivated or tenanted,
may, either in person or through their attorneys or representatives, appear and exhibit to said
subdelegates the titles and patents by virtue of which said lands are occupied. Said subdelegates will
designate as the period within which documents must be presented a term sufficient in length and
proportionate to the distance the interested party may have to travel for the purpose of making the
presentation. Said subdelegates will at the same time warn the parties interested that in term
designated, without a just and valid reason therefor, they will be deprived of and evicted from their
lands, and they will be granted to others.
In the regulations of June 25, 1880, it was provided as follows:
ART. 8. If the interested parties shall not ask an adjustment of the lands whose possession they are
unlawfully enjoining within the time of one year, or, the adjustment having been granted by the
authorities, they shall fail to fulfill their obligation in connection with the compromise, by paying the
proper sum into the treasury, the latter will, by virtue of the authority vested in it, reassert the
ownership of the Stated over the lands, and will, after fixing the whole thereof, proceed to sell at public
auction that part of the same which, either because it may have been reduced to cultivation or is not
located within the forest zone, is not deemed advisable to preserve as State forest reservations.
4

In the royal decree of the 13th of February, 1894, published in the Official Gazzette of Manila of the 17th
of April, 01894, it is provided in article 4 as follows:
ART. 4. The title to all agricultural lands which were capable of adjustment (composicion) under the royal
decree of the 25th of June, 1880, but the adjustments of which decree in the Gaceta de Manila, will
revert to the State. Any claim to such lands by those who might have applied for the adjustment of the
same, but who have not done so as the above mentioned date, will not avail them in any way or at any
time.
In view of these provisions of the law, it seems to us impossible to say that as to the public agricultural
lands in the Philippines there existed a conclusive presumption after a lapse of thirty or any other
number of years that the Government of Spain had granted to the possessor thereof a legal title thereto.
The plaintiff is not entitled to the benefits of paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, the Public Land
Act, for the reason that act is not applicable to the Province of Benguet. The judgment of the court
below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.
After the expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered accordingly and ten days thereafter the
case be returned to the court below for execution. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson and Tracey, JJ., concur.
Mapa, J., concurs in the result.



Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-48321 August 31, 1946
OH CHO, applicant-appellee,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Roman Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Rafael Amparo for appellant.
Vicente Constantino for appellee.
Ferrier, Gomez and Sotelo and J. T. Chuidian as amici curiae.
PADILLA, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment decreeing the registration of a residential lot located in the
municipality of Guinayangan, Province of Tayabas in the name of the applicant.
The opposition of the Director of Lands is based on the applicant's lack of title to the lot, and on his
disqualification, as alien, from acquiring lands of the public domain.
The applicant, who is an alien, and his predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to filing of the application for registration on January 17,
1940.
The Solicitor General reiterates the second objection of the opponent and adds that the lower court,
committed an error in not declaring null and void the sale of the lot to the applicant.
The applicant invokes the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), or should it not be applicable to the case,
then he would apply for the benefits of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141).
The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be confirmed under the Land
Registration Act. He failed to show that he or any of his predecessors in interest had acquired the lot
from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, under the laws, orders and decrease promulgated
by the Spanish Government in the Philippines, or by possessory information under the Mortgaged Law
(section 19, Act 496). All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by
grant below to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in
the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such
possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that
it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest. (Cario vs. Insular Government, 212
U.S., 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594.) The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest
possession of the lot by his first predecessors in interest begun in 1880.
As the applicant failed to show title to the lot, the next question is whether he is entitled to decree or
registration of the lot, because he is alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain
(sections 48, 49, C.A. No. 141).
As the applicant failed to show the title to the lot, and has invoked the provisions of the Public Land Act,
it seems unnecessary to make pronouncement in this case on the nature or classifications of the sought
to be registered.
It may be argued that under the provisions of the Public Land Act the applicant immediate predecessor
in interest would have been entitled to a decree of registration of the lot had they applied for its
registration; and that he having purchased or acquired it, the right of his immediate predecessor in
interest to a decree of registration must be deemed also to have been acquired by him. The benefits
provided in the Public Land Act for applicant's immediate predecessors in interest should comply with
the condition precedent for the grant of such benefits. The condition precedent is to apply for the
registration of the land of which they had been in possession at least since July 26, 1894. This the
applicant's immediate predecessors in interest failed to do. They did not have any vested right in the lot
amounting to the title which was transmissible to the applicant. The only right, if it may thus be called, is
their possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their predecessors in interest, may be availed of by a
qualified person to apply for its registration but not by a person as the applicant who is disqualified.
It is urged that the sale of the lot to the applicant should have been declared null and void. In a suit
between vendor and vendee for the annulment of the sale, such pronouncement would be necessary, if
the court were of the opinion that it is void. It is not necessary in this case where the vendors do not
even object to the application filed by the vendee.
Accordingly, judgment is reversed and the application for registration dismissed, without costs.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado and Bengzon, JJ., concur.


Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring:
Oh Cho, a citizen of the Republic of China, purchased in 1938 from Antonio, Luis and Rafael Lagdameo a
parcel of land located in the residential district of Guinayangan, Tayabas, which has been in the
continuous, public, and adverse possession of their predecessors in interest as far back as 1880. on June
17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for the registration of said parcel of land. The Director of Lands opposed the
application because, among other grounds, the Constitution prohibits aliens from acquiring public or
private agricultural lands.
One of the witnesses for the applicant, on cross-examination, expressly admitted that the land in
question is susceptible of cultivation and may be converted into an orchard or garden. Rodolfo Tiquia,
inspector of the Bureau of Lands, testifying as a witness for the government, stated that the land,
notwithstanding the use to which it is actually devoted, is agricultural land in accordance with an
opinion rendered in 1939 by the Secretary of Justice. The pertinent part of said opinion, penned by
Secretary Jose Abad Santos, later Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, is as follows:
1. Whether or not the "public agricultural land" in section 1, Article XII, of the Constitution may
be interpreted to include residential, commercial or industrial lots for purposes of their
disposition.
1. Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain in the Philippines
into agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic classification adopted since the enactment
of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. At the time of the adoption
of the Constitution of the Philippines, the term "agricultural public lands" had, therefor,
acquired a technical meaning in our public laws. The Supreme Court of the Philippines in the
leading case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that the phrase "agricultural
public lands" means those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither timber nor
mineral lands. This definition has been followed by our Supreme Court in many subsequent
cases. (Montano vs. Ins. Gov't 12 Phil., 572, 574; Santiago vs. Ins. Gov't., 12, Phil., 593; Ibaes de
Aldecoa vs. Ins. Gov't., 13 Phil., 159; Ins. Gov't., vs. Aldecoa & Co., 19 Phil., 505, 516
Mercado vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 32 Phil., 271, 276; Molina 175, 181;
Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560, 564; and Ankron vs. Government of the Philippines,
40 Phil., 10, 14.)
Residential, commercial or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to be
included in one or more of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral, of
necessity, therefore, they must be classified as agricultural.
Viewed from the another angle, it has been held that in determining whether lands are
agricultural or not, the character of the lands is the test (Odell vs. Durant 62 N. W., 524;
Lerch vs. Missoula Brick & Tile Co., 123 p., 25). In other words, it is the susceptibility of the land
to cultivation for agricultural or not (State vs. Stewart, 190, p.,129).
Judge Pedro Magsalin, of the Court First Instance of Tayabas, rendered a decision on August 15, 1940,
overruling the opposition without must explanation and decreeing the registration prayed for the
applicant. The Director of Lands appealed from the decision, and the Solicitor General appearing for
appellant, maintains that the applicant, not being a citizen of the Philippines, is disqualified to buy or
acquire the parcel of land in question and that the purchase made in question and that the purchase
made in 1938 is null and void.
This is the question squarely reversing to us for decision. The majority, although reversing the lower
court's decision and dismissing the application with we agree, abstained from the declaring null and void
the purchase made by Oh Cho in 1938 as prayed for the appellant. We deem it necessary to state our
opinion on the important question raised, it must be squarely decided.
The Solicitor General argued in his brief as follows:
I. The lower court erred decreeing the registration of the lot in question in favor of the applicant
who, according to his own voluntary admission, is a citizen of the Chinese Republic.
(a) The phrase "agricultural land" as used in the Act of the Congress of July 1, 1902, in the Public
Land Act includes residential lots.
In this jurisdiction lands of public domain suitable for residential purposes are considered
agricultural lands under the Public Land Law. The phrase "agricultural public lands" has well
settled judicial definition. It was used for the first time in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
known as the Philippine Bill. Its means those public lands acquired form Spain which are neither
mineral nor timber lands (Mapa vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil., 572; Ibaes de
Aldecoa vs. Insular Government 13 Phil., 159; Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 175;
Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560; Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 40
Phil., 10). In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, supra, the Supreme Court, in defining the
meaning and scope of that phrase from the context of the sections 13 and 15 of that Act, said:
The phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined by the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which
phrase is also to be found in several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926) means those public
lands acquired from Spain which are neither mineral timber lands.
x x x x x x x x x
"We hold that there is to be found in the act of Congress a definition of the phrase
"agricultural public lands," and after careful consideration of the question we are
satisfied that only definition which exists in said Act is the definition adopted by the
court below. Section 13 say that the Government shall "make and rules and regulations
for the lease, sale, or other dispositions of public lands other than timber or mineral
lands," To our minds that is only definition that can be said to be given agricultural
lands. In other words, that the phrase "agricultural lands" as used in Act No. 926 means
those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. . . ."
Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, 178, 182, emphasis added.)
"This phrase "agricultural public lands" was subsequently used in Act No. 926, which is the first
public land law of the Philippines. As therein used, the phrase was expressly given by the
Philippine Commission the same meaning intended for it by Congress as interpreted in the case
of Mapa vs. Insular Government, supra. This is a self-evident from a reading of section 1, 10, 32,
and 64 (subsection 6 of Act No. 926). Whenever the phrase "agricultural public lands" is used in
any of said sections, it is invariably by the qualification "as defined by said Act of Congress of July
first, nineteen hundred and two."
"More specially, in the case of Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, supra, the Supreme
Court held that a residential or building lot, forming part of the public domain, is agricultural
land, irrespective of the fact that it is not actually used for purposes of agriculture for the simple
reason that it is susceptible of cultivation and may be converted into a rural estate, and because
when a land is not mineral or forestal in its nature it must necessarily be included within the
classification of a agricultural land. Because of the special applicability of the doctrine laid down
in said case, we quote at some length from the decision therein rendered:
"The question set up in these proceedings by virtue of the appeal interposed by counsel for Juan
Ibaez de Aldecoa, is whether or not a parcel of land that is susceptible of being cultivated, and
ceasing to be agricultural land, was converted into a building lot, is subject to the legal
provisions in force regarding Government public lands which may be alienated in favor of
private individuals or corporations. . . .
x x x x x x x x x
"Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may
converted into a field, and planted with all kinds of vegetation ; for this reason, where
land is not mining or forestal in its nature, it must necessarily be included within the
classification of agriculture land, not because it is actually used for the purposes of
agriculture, but because it was originally agricultural and may again become so under
other circumstances; besides the Act of Congress (of July 1, 1902) contains only three
classifications, and makes no special provision with respect to building lots or urban land
that have ceased to be agricultural land. . . .
x x x x x x x x x
"From the language of the foregoing provisions of the law, it is deduced that, with the
exception of those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by
State or by the sovereign nation are public in character, and per se alienable and,
provided they are not destine to the use of public in general or reserved by the
Government in accordance with law, they may be acquired by any private or juridical
person; and considering their origin and primitive state and the general uses to which
they are accorded, they are called agricultural lands, urbans lands and building lots
being included in this classification for the purpose of distinguishing rural and urban
estates from mineral and timber lands; the transformation they may have undergone is
no obstacle to such classification as the possessors thereof may again convert them into
rural estates." (Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government 13 Phil., 161, 163 164, 165,
166; emphasis added.).
(b) Under the Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act), the
phrase (Public Land Act), the phrase "public agricultural land" includes lands of
the public domain suitable for residential purposes.
"Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution, reads as follows:
"All agricultural timber, and mineral lands of the public domain waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by
such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant lease, or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources,
with the exception of publicagricultural land, shall not be alienated . . ." (Emphasis
added.).
"Under the above-quote provision, the disposition exploitation, development or utilization of
the natural resources, including agricultural lands of the public domain is limited to citizens of
the Philippines or to the corporations or associations therein mentioned. It also clearly appears
from said provision that natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, are not
subject to alienation.
"On November 7, 1936, or more than one year after the adoption of the Constitution,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, known as the Public Land Act, was approved. Under this Act the
lands of the public have been classified into three divisions: (a) alienable or disposable, (b)
timber, and (c) mineral lands. The lands designated alienable or disposable correspond to lands
designated in the Constitution as public agricultural lands, because under section 1, Article XII,
public agricultural lands are the only natural resources of the country which are the only natural
resources of the country which are subject to alienation or deposition.
"Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 provide that the alienable or disposable public lands
shall be classified, according to use or purposes to which they are destined, into a agricultural,
residential, commercial, industrial, etc., lands. At first blush it would seem that under this
classification residential land is different from agricultural land. The difference however, is more
apparent than real. 'Public agricultural land ' as that phrase is used in the Constitution means
alienable lands of the public domain and therefore this phrase is equivalent to the lands
classified by the Commonwealth Act No. 141 as alienable or disposable. The classification
provided in section 9 is only for purposes administration and disposition, according to the
purposes to which said lands are especially adopted. But notwithstanding this of all said lands
are essentially agricultural public lands because only agricultural public lands are subject to
alienation or disposition under section 1, Article XII of the Constitution. A contrary view would
necessarily create a conflict between Commonwealth Act No. 141 and section 1 of Article XII of
the Constitution, and such conflict should be avoided , if possible, and said Act construed in the
light of the fundamental provisions of the Constitution and in entire harmony therewith.
"Another universal principles applied in considering constitutional question is, that an
Act will be so construed, if possible, as to avoid conflict with the Constitution, although
such a construction may not be the most obvious or natural one. "The Court may resort
to an implication to sustain a statute, but not to destroy it." But the courts cannot go
beyond the province of legitimate construction, in order to save a statute; and where
the meaning is plain, words cannot to be read into it or out of it for that purpose." ( 1
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, pp. 135, 136.)
"In view of the fact that more than one than one year after the adoption of the Constitution the
National Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, which a
compilation of the laws relative to the lands of the public domain and the amendments thereto,
form to the Constitution.
"Where the legislature has revised a statute after a Constitution has been adopted, such
a revision is to be regarded as a legislative construction that the statute so revised
conforms to the Constitution." (59 C.J., 1102; emphasis added.)
"By the way of illustration, let us supposed that a piece or tract of public land has been classified
pursuant to section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as residential land. If, by reason of this
classification, it is maintained that said land has ceased to be agricultural public land, it will no
longer be subject to alienation or disposition by reason of the constitutional provision that only
agricultural lands are alienable; and yet such residential lot is alienable under section 58, 59, and
60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations
mentioned in section 1, Article XII of the Constitution. Therefore, the classification of public
agricultural lands into various subdivisions is only for purposes of administration, alienation or
disposition, but it does not destroy the inherent nature of all such lands as a public agricultural
lands.
"(c) Judicial interpretation of doubtful clause or phrase use in the law, controlling.
"The judicial interpretation given to the phrase "public agricultural land" is a sufficient authority
for giving the same interpretation to the phrase as used in subsequent legislation, and this is
especially so in view of the length of time during which this interpretation has been maintained
by the courts. On this point Sutherland has the following to say:
"When a judicial interpretation has once been put upon a clause, expressed in a vague
manner by the legislature, and difficult to be understood, that ought of itself to be
sufficient authority for adopting the same construction. Buller J., said: "We find solemn
determination of these doubtful expressions in the statute, and as that now put another
construction has since prevailed, there is no reason why we should now put another
construction of the act on account of any suppose change of convenience." This rule of
construction will hold good even if the court be opinion that the practical erroneous; so
that if the matter were res integra the court would adopt a different construction. Lord
Cairns said: "I think that with regard to statutes ... it is desirable not so much that the
principle of the decision should be capable at all times of justification, as that the law
should be settled, and should, when once settled, be maintained without any danger of
vacillation or uncertainty. "Judicial usage and practice will have weight, and when
continued for a long time will be sustained though carried beyond the pair purport of
the statute."(II Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, pp. 892, 893.) .
"An important consideration affecting the weight of contemporary judicial construction
is the length of time it has continued. It is adopted, and derives great force from being
adopted, soon after the enactment of the law. It may be, and is presumed, that the
legislative sense of its policy, and of its true scope and meaning, permeates the judiciary
and controls its exposition. Having received at that time a construction which is for the
time settled, accepted, and thereafter followed or acted upon, it has the sanction of the
of the authority appointed to expound the law, just and correct conclusions, when
reached, they are, moreover, within the strongest reasons on which founded the maxim
of stare decisis. Such a construction is public given, and the subsequent silence of the
legislature is strong evidence of acquiescence, though not conclusive. . . . (II Lewis
Sutherland Statutory Construction, pp. 894, 895.)
"Furthermore, when the phrase "public agricultural land" was used in section 1 of Article XII of
the Constitution, it is presumed that it was so used with the same judicial meaning therefor
given to it and therefor the meaning of the phrase, as used in the Constitution, includes
residential lands and another lands of the public domain, but excludes mineral and timber lands.
"Adoption of provisions previously construed ad. Previous construction by Courts.
Where a statute that has been construed by the courts of the last resort has been
reenacted in same, or substantially the same, terms, the legislature is presumed to have
been familiar with its construction, and to have adopted it is part of the law, unless a
contrary intent clearly appears, or a different construction is expressly provided for; and
the same rule applies in the construction of a statute enacted after a similar or cognate
statute has been judicially construed. So where words or phrases employed in a new
statute have been construed by the court to have been used in a particular sense in a
previous statute on the same subject, or one analogous to it, they are presumed, in the
a absence of clearly expressed intent to the contrary, to be used in the same sense in
the statute as in the previous statute." (59 C.J., 1061-1063.).
"Legislative adoption of judicial construction. In the adoption of the code, the
legislature is presumed to have known the judicial construction which have been placed
on the former statutes; and therefore the reenactment in the code or general revision
of provisions substantially the same as those contained in the former statutes is a
legislative adoption of their known judicial constructions, unless a contrary intent is
clearly manifest. So the fact that the revisers eliminated statutory language after it had
been judicially construed shows that they had such construction in view." (59 C. J.,
1102.)
"II. The lower court erred in not declaring null and void the sale of said land to the appellant
(appellee).
"Granting that the land in question has ceased to be a part of the lands of the public domain by
reason of the long continuous,, public adverse possession of the applicant's predecessors in
interest, and that the latter had performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
and were entitled to a certificate of title under section 48, subsection (b), of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, still the sale of said land of December 8, 1938, to the applicant as evidenced by Exhibits
B and C, was null and void for being contrary to section 5, Article XII of the Constitution, which
reads as follows:
"Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred
or assignedexcept to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain of the Philippines."
"The applicant, being a Chinese citizen, is disqualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain (section 1, Article XII of the Constitution; section 12, 22, 23, 33, 44, 48, Commonwealth
Act No. 141 ), and consequently also disqualified to buy and acquire private agriculture land.
"In view of the well settled judicial meaning of the phrase public agricultural land,' as
hereinbefore demonstrated, the phrase 'private agricultural land,' as used in the above quoted
provision, can only mean land of private ownership, whether agricultural, residential,
commercial or industrial. And this necessarily so, because the phrase 'agricultural land used in
the Constitution and in the Public Land Law must be given the same uniform meaning to wit,
any land of the public domain or any land of private ownership, which is neither mineral or
forestal.
"A word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the
statute, unless a different intention appears. ... Where words have being long used in a
technical sense and have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning, and have
been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute
in which they are used, the rule of construction requires that the words used in such
statute should be construed according to the sense may vary from the strict literal
meaning of the words." (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction., p. 758.) .
"This interpretation is in harmony with the nationalistic policy, spirit and purpose of our
Constitution and laws, to wit, `to conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation,' as
solemnly enunciated in the preamble to the Constitution.
"A narrow and literal interpretation of the phrase 'private agriculture land' would impair and
defeat the nationalistic aim and general policy of our laws and would allow a gradual, steady,
and unlimited accumulation in alien hands of a substantial portion of our patrimonial estates, to
the detriment of our national solidarity, stability, and independence. Nothing could prevent the
acquisition of a great portion or the whole of a city by subjects of a foreign power. And yet a city
or urban area is more strategical than a farm or rural land.
"The mere literal construction of section in a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed
to the intention of the legislature apparent by the statute; and if the words are
sufficiently flexible to admit of some other construction it is to be adopted to effectuate
that intention. The intent prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if possible be so
read as to conform to the spirit of the act. While the intention of the legislature must be
ascertained from the words used to express it, the manifest reason and the obvious
purpose of the law should not be sacrificed to a liberal interpretation of such words." (II
Sutherland, Stat. Construction, pp. 721, 722.)
"We conclude, therefore, that the residential lot which the applicant seeks to register in his
name falls within the meaning of private agricultural land as this phrase is used in our
Constitution and, consequently, is not subject to acquisition by foreigners except by hereditary
succession."
The argument hold water. It expresses a correct interpretation of the Constitution and the real intent of
the Constitutional Convention.
One of our fellow members therein, Delegate Montilla, said:
The constitutional precepts that I believe will ultimately lead us to our desired goal are; (1) the
complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources; (2) the nationalization of our
commerce and industry compatible with good international practices. With the complete
nationalization of our lands and natural resources it is to be understood that our God-given
birthright should be one hundred per cent in Filipino hands. ... Lands and natural resources are
immovable and as such can be compared to the vital organs of a person's body, the lack of
possession of which may cause instant death or the shortening of life. If we do not completely
nationalize these two of our most important belongings, I am afraid that the time will come
when we shall be sorry for the time we were born. Our independence will be just a mockery, for
what kind of independence are we going to have if a part of our country is not in our hands but
in those of foreigner? (2 Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 592.).
From the same book of Delegate Aruego, we quote:
The nationalization of the natural resources of the country was intended (1) to insure their
conservation for Filipino posterity; (2) to serve as an instrument of national defense, helping
prevent the extension into the country of foreign control through peaceful economic
penetration; and (3) to prevent making the Philippines a source of international conflict with the
consequent danger to its internal security and independence.
x x x x x x x x x
. . . In the preface to its report, the committee on nationalization and preservation of lands and
other natural resources said;
"International complications have often resulted from the existence of alien ownership of land
and natural resources in a weak country. Because of this danger, it is best that aliens should be
restricted in the acquisition of land and other natural resources. An example is afforded by the
case of Texas. This state was originally province of Mexico. In order to secure its rapid
settlements and development, the Mexican government offered free land to settlers in Texas.
Americans responded more rapidly than the Mexicans, and soon they organized a revolt against
Mexican rule, and then secured annexation to the United States. A new increase of alien
landholding in Mexico has brought about the desire a prevent a repetition of the Texas affair.
Accordingly the Mexican constitution of 1917 contains serious limitation on the right of aliens to
hold lands and mines in Mexico. The Filipinos should profit from this example."
x x x x x x x x x
It was primarily for these reasons that the Convention approved readily the proposed principle
of prohibiting aliens to acquire, exploit, develop, or utilize agricultural, timber, and mineral lands
of the public domain, waters minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines. For the same reasons the
Convention approved equally readily the proposed principle of prohibiting the transfer of
assignment to aliens of private agricultural land, save in the case of hereditary succession. (2
Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, pp. 604, 605, 606.).
All the foregoing show why we, having been a member of the Constitutional Convention, agree with
Solicitor General's position and concur in the result in this case, although we would go as far as the
outright pronouncement that the purchase made by appelle is null and void.
BRIONES, M., con quien estan conformes PARAS y TUASON, MM., disidente:
El solicitante en este expediente pide el registro del solar de que se trata como terreno de propiedad
privada, y tan solo con caracter supletorio invoca las disposiciones del capitulo 8. de la Ley No. 2874
sobre terrenos publicos (Pieza de Excepciones, pag. 3.)
Por su parte el Director de Terrenos se opone a la solicitud en virtud de tres fundamentos, a saber: (1)
porque ni el solicitante ni sus predecesores en interes pueden demonstrar titulo suficiente sobre dicha
parcela de terreno, no habiendose adquirido la misma ni por titulo de composicion con el Estado bajo la
soberania de Espaa, ni por titulo de informacion posesoria bajo el Real Decreto de 13 de Febrero de
1894; (2) porque el citado solar es una porcion de los terrenos de dominio publico pertenecientes al
Commonwealth de Filipinas; (3) porque siendo el solicitante un ciudadano chino, no esta capacitado
bajo las disposiciones de la Constitucion de Filipinas para adquirir terrenos de caracter publico o privado
(idem, pags. 5 y 6).
Tanto el solicitante como el Director de Terrenos practicaron sus pruebas ante un arbitro nombrado por
el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Tayabas. Con vista de tales pruebas, el Juez Magsalin, del referido
Juzgado, dicto sentencia a favor del solicitante, de la cual transcribimos las siguientes porciones
pertinentes:
La representacion del opositor Director de Terrenos trata de probar por medio del testimonio
del Inspector del Buro de Terrenos que, el terreno objeto de la solicitud es parte del dominio
publico y ademas el solicitante es ciudadano chino, pero dicho testigo afirmo que el terreno
objeto de la presente solicitud es un solar situado dentro de la poblacion del municipio de
Guinayanga, Tayabas, y en el mismo existe una casa de materiales fuertes y careciendo de
merito esta oposicion debe desestimarse la misma.
Por tanto, previa desestimacion de la oposicion del Director de Terrenos, se adjudica con sus
mejoras la parcela de terreno objeto de la presente solicitud descrito en el plano Psu-109117, a
favor del solicitante Oh Cho, ciudadano chino, mayor de edad, casado con Yee Shi, y residente
en el municipio de Guinayanga, Tayabas, Islas Filipinas. (Decision, pag. 8, Record on Appeal.)
De lo transcrito se infiere de una manera forzosa lo siguiente: (a) que el tribunal inferior desestimo de
plano la oposicion del Director de Terrenos fundada en el supuesto de que el solar cuestionado es parte
del dominio publico; (b) que el mismo tribunal rechazo el otro fundamento de la oposicion, esto es, que
siendo el solicitante ciudadano chino esta incapacitado bajo nuestra Constitucion para adquirir terreno,
ya publico, ya privado, aunque sea un solar de caracter urbano; (c) que, segun el fallo del Juez a quo, no
siendo publico el terreno cuestionado, es necesariamente terreno privado.
El Director de Terrenos, no estando conforme con la sentencia, apelo de ella para ante el Tribunal de
Apelacion y hace en su alegato dos sealamientos de error, ninguno de los cuales pone en tela de juicio
la calidad de privado del terreno cuestionado. El apelante no plantea ninguna cuestion de hecho;
plantea solo una cuestion de derecho. Por eso que en la reconstitucion de este expediente el original
se quemo durante la guerra no ha habido necesidad de incluir las notas taquigraficas ni las pruebas
documentales, y de hecho hemos considerado y decidido este asunto sin dichas notas y pruebas. El
abogado Constantino, del apelado, en la audiencia para la reconstitucion de los autos, hizo esta
manifestacion; "In view also of the fact that the questions involved here are only questions of law, this
representation waives the right to present the evidence presented in the trial court . . . ." Por su parte, el
Procurador General, al explanar el caso en representacion del apelante Director de Terrenos, principia
su alegato con la siguiente declaracion:
This appeal is a test case. There are now several cases of exactly the same nature pending in the
trial courts.
Whether or not an alien can acquire a residential lot and register it in his name is
the only question raised in this appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas
which sustained the affirmance and decreed the registration of the said property in favor of the
applicant who, by his own voluntary admission, is a citizen of the Chinese Republic. This
question is raised in connection with the constitutional provision that no private agricultural
land shall be transferred or assigned to foreigners except in cases of hereditary succession. (Pags.
1, 2, alegato del apelante.)
Habiendose apelado de la sentencia para ante el Tribunal de Apelacion por que se elevo este asunto al
Tribunal Supremo, ante el cual ya estaba pendiente aun antes de la guerra, y sin resolverse durante la
ocupacion japonesa? La razon no consta especificamente en autos, pero como no se trata de una alzada
del Tribunal de Apelacaion a la Corte Suprema, la unica explicacion que cabe es que aquel, la percatarse
de que en la apelacion no se planteaba mas que una cuestion de derecho, ordeno, como era de rigor, el
traslado del asunto a esta Corte por ser de su jurisdiccion y competencia.
Hemos estimado necesario sentar las anteriores premisas porque las mismas sirven de base a la
argumentacion que a seguida vamos a desenvolver para fundamentar esta disidencia.
I. De lo expuesto resulta evidente que el Director de Terrenos se ha opuesto al registro solicitado, entre
otros fundamentos, porque el terreno es publico; que el tribunal inferior ha desestimado este
fundamento por "carecer de merito," fallando que el terreno es privado; que el Director de Terrenos, en
su apelacion ante nosotros, no cuestiona esta conclusion del Juez a quo, sino que dando por admitido
que el terreno es de propiedad privada, arguye, sin embargo, que bajo la seccion 5, Articulo XII de la
Constitucion de Filipinas el solicitante, por ser extranjero, no puede adquirir terreno agricula privado,
estando incluido en este concepto un solar urbano como el de que se trata en este expediente.
Planteado el asunto en tales terminos puede esta Corte considerar y resolver un punto no contendido
entre las partes un punto que esta firme y definitivamente resuelto y no es objeto de apelacion?
Dicho de otra manera: puede esta Corte, como hace la mayoria en su opinion, revocar una conclusion
del tribunal-inferior que no esta discutida en el alegato del apelante? Podemos, en buena ley procesal,
declarar publico el terreno en cuestion por nuestra propia iniciativa, cuando el mismo Procurador
General, que representa al Estado, admite en su alegato el caracter privado del solar, y solo suscita una
cuestion, de derecho, a saber: que bajo nuestra Constitucion ningun acto traslativo de dominio a favor
de un extranjero es valido, asi se trata de predio urbano, porque la frase "terreno agricola privado" qe se
contiene en la Constitucion abarca no solo las fincas rusticas sino tambien las urbanas? Y, sobre todo,
podemos, en equidad y justicia, considerar y revisar un punto que no solo no esta discutido por las
partes, pues lo dan por admitido y establecido, sino que es de derecho y dehecho al propio tiempo?
Que base tenemos para hacerlo cuando no tenemos delante las pruebas tanto testificales como
documentales? Nuestra contestacion es, en absoluto, negativo.
La competencia de esta Corte para revisar las sentencias de los tribunales inferiores, de las cuales se ha
interpuesto apelacion, se basa en el principio de que dicha competencia, en su ejercicio, tiene que
limitarse a las cuestiones controvertidas, y esto se determina mediante el sealamiento de errores que
el apelante hace en su alegato. El articulo 19 del antiguo reglamento de los procedimientos en este
Tribunal Supremo decia en su primer parrafo lo siguiente:
Anexo al alegato del apelante y en pliego separado, se acompaara una relacion de los errores
de derecho que han de discutirse. La especificacion de cada uno de estos errores se hara por
parrafos separados, con toda claridad, de una manera concisa, y sin incurrir en repeticiones, y
seran numerados por orden correlativo.
El articulo 20 del mismo reglamento preceptuaba:
Ningun error de derecho fuera del relativo a competencia sobre la materia de un litigio, sera
tomado en consideracion como no se halle puntualizado en la relacion de los errores y
presentado como uno de los fundamentos en el alegato.
Interpretando estas disposiciones reglamentarias, la Corte hizo en el asunto de Santiago contra Felix (24
Jur. Fil., 391), los siguientes pronunciamientos doctrinales:
1. APELACION; EFECTO DE DEJAR DE PRESENTAR RELACION DE ERRORES; REGLA FIRMEMENTE
ESTABLECIDA. Es regla establecida por la jurisprudencia de los Tribunales de estas Islas, en
virtud de repetidas y uniformes sentencias de esta Corte, la de que si en una apelacione el
recurrente dejare de hacer sealamiento de los errores en que haya incurrido el Tribunal
inferior, y se limitare a discutir cuestiones de hecho en general, no es posible que este Tribunal
pueda considerar ni revisar la resolucion adversa a la parte apelante, por el motivo de haberse
dictado contra la ley y el peso de las pruebas, sino que es necesario que se seale y se
especifique el error o errores que determinaron la decision apelada que el apelante califica de
ilegal e injusta.
2. Id.; Id.; Regla Igual a la Adoptada por los Tribunales de los Estados Unidos. Igual doctrina
legal se halla en observancia en los Tribunales de los Estados Unidos de America del Norte, toda
vez que una manifestacion general de que el Juzgado erro en dictar sentencia a favor de una de
las partes, no es suficiente como base para que la Corte pueda revisar la sentencia apelada, pues
que a no ser que la apreciacion hecha por un Juez de los hechos alegados y probados en juicio
sea manifestamente contraria al resultado y peso de las pruebas, el Tribunal de alzada suela
aceptar el juicio y criterio del Juez sobre las cuestiones de hecho, y no procede revocar sin
motivo fundado la sentencia apelada. (Enriquez contraEnriquez, 8 Jur. Fil., 574; Capellania de
Tambobong contra Antonio, 8 Jur. Fil., 693; Paterno contra la Ciudad de Manila, 17 Jur. Fil., 26)"
(Santiago contra Felix, 24 Jur. Fil., 391.)
Esta doctrina se reitero posteriormente en los siguientes asuntos: Tan Me Nio contra Administrador de
Aduanas, 34 Jur. Fil., 995, 996; Hernaez contra Montelibano, 34 Jur. Fil., 1011.
La regla 53, seccion 6, del actual reglamento de los tribunales, dispone lo siguiente:
SEC. 5. Questions that may be decided. No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over
the subject matter will be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors and properly
argued in the brief, save as the court, at its option, may notice plain errors not specified, and
also clerical errors.
No se dira que la cuestion de si el terreno cuestionado es publico o privado, considerada y resuelta por
la mayoria en su decision sin previo sealamiento de error ni apropiada argumentacion en el alegato del
Procurador General, esta comprendida entre las salvedades de que habla la regla arriba transcrita
porque ni afecta a la jurisdiccion sobre la materia del litigio, ni es un "plain error," o "clerical error."
Se notara que en el antiguo reglamento no habia eso de "plain errors not specified" (errores patentes o
manifiestos no especificados en el alegato). Pero cabe invocar esta reserva en el caso que nos ocupa
Indudablemente que no, por las siguientes razones: (a) los autos no demuestran que el Juez a
quo cometio un error patente y manifiesto al declarar en su sentencia que el terreno no es publico sino
privado; no tenemos mas remedio que aceptar en su faz la conclusion del Juez sentenciador sobre este
respecto por la sencilla razon de que no tenemos ante nosotros las pruebas ni testificales ni
documentales, y, por tanto, no hay base para revisar, mucho menos para revocar dicha conclusion,
habiendose interpretado esta reserva en el sentido de que solo se puede tomar "conocimiento judicial
del error palpable con vista de los autos y procedimientos"; (b) aun admitiendo por un momento, a los
efectos de la argumentacion, que Su Seoria el Juez padecio error palpable al sentar dicha conclusion,
como quiera que el Procurador General no suscita la cuestion en su alegato debe entenderse que ha
renunciado a su derecho de hacerlo, optando por fundamentar su caso en otros motivos y razones; por
tanto, no estamos facultados para considerar motu proprio el supuesto error, pues evidentemente no se
trata de un descuido u oversight del representante del Estado, sino de una renuncia deliberada, y la
jurisprudencia sobre el particular nos dice que "el proposito subyacente, fundamental de la reserva en la
regla es el de prevenir el extravio de la justicia en virtud de un descuido." He aqui algunas autoridades
pertinentes:
Purpose of exception as to plain errors. The proviso in the rule requiring assignments of error,
permitting the court, at its option, to notice a plain error not assigned, "was and in intended, in
the interest of justice, to reserve to the appellate court the right, resting in public duty, to take
cognizance of palpable error on the face of the record and proceedings, especially such as clearly
demonstrate that the suitor has no cause of action." Santaella vs. Otto F. Lange Co. (155 Fed.,
719, 724; 84 C. C. A., 145).
The rules does not intend that we are to sift the record and deal with questions which are of
small importance, but only to notice errors which are obvious upon inspection and of a
controlling character. The underlying purpose of this reservation in the rule is to prevent the
miscarriage of justice from oversight. Mast vs.Superior Drill Co. (154 Fed., 45, 51; 83 C. C. A. 157).
II. Hasta aqui hemos desarrollado nuestra argumentacion bajo el supuesto de que la calidad de privado
del terreno litigioso no es controversia justiciable en esta instancia por no estar suscitada la cuestion en
el alegato del Procurador General ni ser materia de disputa entre las partes en la apelacion pendiente
ante nosotros; por lo que, consiguientemente, no estamos facultados para revisar, mucho menos
revocar motu proprio la conclusion del tribunal a quo sobre el particular. Ahora vamos a laborar bajo
otro supuesto el de que el Procurador General haya hecho el correspondiente sealamiento de error
y la cuestion este, por tanto, propiamente planteada ante esta Corte Suprema para los efectos de la
revision. La pregunta naturalmente en orden es la siguiente: cometio error el Juez a quo al declarar y
conceptuar como privado el terreno en cuestion, o es, por el contrario, acertada su conclusion a este
respecto? Somos de opinion que el Juez no cometio error, que el terreno de que se trata reune las
condiciones juridicas necesarias para calificarlo como privado y diferenciarlo de una propiedad de
dominio publico, y que, por tanto, el solicitante tiene sobre la propiedad un titulo confirmable bajo las
disposiciones de la Ley de Registro de Terrenos No. 496.
Afirmase en la decision de la mayoria que el solicitante no ha podido demostrar que el o cualquiera de
sus causantes en derecho adquirio el lote del Estado mediante compra o concesion bajo las leyes,
ordenanzas y decretos promulgados por el Gobierno Espaol en Filipinas, o en virtud de los tramites
relativos a informacion posesoria bajo la ley hipotecaria en tiempo de Espaa. De esto la mayoria saca la
conclusion de que el terreno cuestionado no es privado porque, segun su criterio, "todos los terrenos
que no fueron adquiridos del Gobierno (Gobierno Espaol, se quiere decir), ya mediante compra, ya por
concesion, pertenecen al dominio publico"; y citando como autoridad el asunto clasico de
Cario contra el Gobierno Insular la ponencia no admite mas excepcion a la regla que el caso en que un
terreno ha estado en la posesion del ocupante y de sus predecesores en interes desde tiempo
inmemorial, pues semejante posesion justificaria la presuncion de que el terreno nunca habia sido parte
del dominio publico, o que habia sido propiedad privada aun antes de la conquista espaola."
Lo que, en primer lugar, no parece correcto es la seguridad con que en la ponencia se afirma que el
terreno no se adquirio bajo la soberania espaola en virtud de cualquiera de los modos conocidos en la
legislacion de entonces, pues como no tenemos delante las pruebas, no hay naturalmente manera de
comprobar la certeza de la proposicion. Si se tiene en cuenta que el Director deTerrenos se opuso a la
solicitud de registro por el fundamento de que el terreno es de dominio publico, y que el tribunal
inferior desestimo este fundamento, la presuncion es que la calidad de privado del terreno se probo
satisfactoriamente, presuncion que queda robustecida si se considera que el Procurador General, al
sostener la apelacion del Gobierno, no discute ni cuestiona en su alegato la conclusion de que el referido
terreno es de propiedad particular.
Por otro lado, la mayoria parece dar un caracter demasiado absoluto y rigido a la proposicion de que
"todos los terrenos que no fueron adquiridos del Gobierno (en tiempo de Espaa), mediante compra o
por concesion, pertenecen al dominio publico." Interpretando estrictamente la ley, esta Corte Suprema
denego el registro solicitado en el celebre asunto de Cario contra el Gobierno Insular que cita la
mayoria en su opinion, por eso mismo que se acentua en la ponencia por el fundamento de que
Cario no pudo demostrar titulo de compra, concesion o informacion posesoria expedido por el
Gobierno en tiempo de Espaa, siendo por consiguiente el terreno parte del dominio publico. Pero al
elevarse el asunto en grado de apelacion a la Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos, la misma revoco la
sentencia de esta Corte, declarando el terreno como propiedad privada y decretando su registro a
nombre del solicitante. En la luminosa ponencia del Magistrado Holmes se sientan conclusiones que
proclama el espiritu liberal de aquel gran jurista y reafirman con vigor democratico los derechos de
propiedad de los nativos de estas Islas sobre sus predios en contra del concepto y teoria feudales de que
la Corona de Espaa era la duea absoluta hasta del ultimo palmo de tierra y de que ningun habitante
podia ser dueo de nada, a menos que tuviese en sus manos un titulo o papel expedido por aquel
Gobierno. He aqui lo que dice el Magistrado Holmes:
We come, then, to the question on which the case was decided below namely, whether the
plaintiff owns the land. The position of government, shortly stated, is that Spain assumed,
asserted, and had title to all the land in the Philippines except so far it saw fit to permit private
titles to be acquired; that there was no prescripcion against the Crown, and that, if there was, a
decree of June 25, 1880, required registration within a limited time to make the title good; that
the plaintiff's land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not always, public land;
that the United States succeeded to the title of Spain, and so that the plaintiff has no rights that
the Philippine Government is bound to respect.
If we suppose for the moment that the government's contention is so far correct that the Crown
of Spain in form asserted a title to this land at the date of the treaty of Paris, to which the
United States succeeded, it is not to be assumed without argument that the plaintiff's case is at
an end. It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees,"embodied the universal feudal theory that all
lands were held from the Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of conquering nations toward
people not recognized as entitled to the treatment accorded to those in the same zone of
civilization with themselves. It is true, also that, in legal theory, sovereignty is absolute, and that,
as against foreign nations, the United States may assert, as Spain asserted, absolute power. But
it does not follow that, as against the inhabitants of the Philippines, the United States asserts
that Spain had such power. When theory is left on one side, sovereignty is a question of strength,
and may vary in degree. How far a new sovereign shall insist upon the theoretical relation of the
subjects to the head in the past, and how far it shall recognize actual facts, are matters for it to
decide. (U. S. Supreme Court Reports, Vol. 212, p. 596.)
Mas adelante se dice lo siguiente en la citada sentencia de la Corte Suprema Federal:
It is true that, by section 14, the Government of the Philippines is empowered to enact rules and
prescribe terms for perfecting titles to public lands were some, but not all, spanish conditions
has been fulfilled, and to issue patents to natives for not more than 16 hectares of public lands
actually occupied by the native or his ancestors before August 13, 1898. But this section perhaps
might be satisfied if confined to cases where the occupation was of land admitted to be public
land, and had not continued for such a length of time and under such circumstances as to give
rise to the understanding that the occupants were owners at that date. We hesitate to suppose
that it was intended to declare every native who had not a paper title a trespasser, and to set
the claims of all the wilder tribes afloat.
x x x x x x x x x
If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover such clear proof that
it was bas by that law as to satisfy us that he does not own the land. To begin with, the older
decrees and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate pretty clearly
that the natives were recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. In other
words, Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines into
trespassers or even into tenants at will. For instance, Book 4, title 12, Law 14 of the Recopilacion
de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a contrary conclusion in Valenton vs. Murciano (3 Phil., 537),
while it commands viceroys and others, when it seems proper, to call for the exhibition of grants,
directs them to confirm those who hold by good grants or justa prescripcion. It is true that it
begins by the characteristic assertion of feudal overlordship and the origin of all titles in the King
or his predecessors. That was theory and discourse. The fact was that titles were admitted to
exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain beyond this recognition in their books.
Prescription is mentioned again in the royal cedula of October 15, 1754, cited in (3 Phil., 546):
"Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall
show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription." It may be that this means
possession from before 1700; but, at all events, the principle is admitted. As prescription, even
against Crown lands, was recognized by the laws of Spain, we see no sufficient reason for
hesitating to admit that it was recognized in the Philippines in regard to lands over which Spain
had only a paper sovereignty.
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 attributes title to those "who may prove"
possession for the necessary time, and we do not overlook the argument that this means may
prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have
recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to
convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger,
if he had read every word of it. The words "may prove" (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of
the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There
are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for
want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, as
not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier
law. The royal decree of February 13, 1894, declaring forfeited titles that were capable of
adjustment under the decree of 1880, for which adjustment had not been sought, should not be
construed as a confiscation, but as the withdrawal of a privilege. As a matter of fact, the
applicant never was disturbed. This same decree is quoted by the court of land registration for
another recognition of the common-law prescription of thirty years as still running against
alienable Crown land.
x x x x x x x x x
. . . Upon a consideration of the whole case we are of opinion that law and justice require that
the applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived of what, by the
practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined
interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain. (U. S. Supreme Court Reports, Vol. 212, pp.
597-599.)
Resulta evidente de la jurisprudencia sentada en el citado asunto de Cario contra el Gobierno Insular
que cualquiera que fuese la teoria acerca del superdominio feudal que la Corona de Espaa asumia
sobre todos los terrenos en Filipinas, en la practica y en la realidad se reconocia que el mero lapso de
tiempo en la posesion (20 o 30 aos, segun el caso) podia establecer y de hecho establecia derechos
privados de propiedad por justaprescripcion, y el titulo presuntivo asi adquirido era para todos los
efectos equivalente a una concesion expresa o un titulo escrito expedido por el Gobierno. Pero de todas
maneras parafraseando lo dicho por el Magistrado Holmes aun suponiendo que Espaa tenia
semejante soberania o superdominio feudal sobre todas las tierras en este archipielago, y que contra
otras naciones los Estados Unidos, al suceder a Espaa, afirmaria dicha suberania, de ello no se sigue
que contra los habitantes de Filipinas el Gobierno americano (ahora la Republica filipina) tomaria la
posicion de que Espaa tenia tal poder absoluto. Historicamente se sabe que el cambio de soberania
tuvo el efecto de liquidar muchas instituciones y leyes espaolas que vinieron a ser obsoletas, arcaicas
en el nuevo estado de cosas, e incompatibles con el espiritu del nuevo regimen. No habia ninguna razon
para que este cambio no produjese tambien sus saludables efectos en las normas juridicas del regimen
de la propiedad sobre la tierra. Parafraseando otra vez al Magistrado Holmes, y aplicando la doctrina al
presente caso, no hay razon por que, medinate "una refinada interpretacion de una casi olvidada ley de
Espaa," se considere como terreno publico lo que evidentemente, bajo todos los conceptos y normas,
es un terreno privado.
La jurisprudencia sentada en el asunto de Cario contra el Gobierno Insular ha venido a establecer la
norma, la autoridad basica en los asuntos de registro ante nuestros tribunales. Al socaire de su sentido y
tendencia genuinamente liberal se han registrado bajo el sistema Torrens infinidad de terrenos privados.
En casos mucho menos meritorios que el que nos ocupa se ha reconocido por nuestros tribunales el
caracter o condicion de propiedad privada de los terrenos sobre que versaban las solicitudes,
aplicandose no las habilitadoras y supletorias clausulas de las leyes sobre terrenos publicos
primeramente la Ley No. 926, despues la No. 2874, y finalmente la No. 141 del Commonwealth sino
las disposiciones mas estrictas de la Ley No. 496 sobre registro de terrenos privados, bajo el sistema
Torrens. No existe motivo para que esa tendencia liberal y progresiva sufra una desviacion en el
presente caso.
Pero aun bajo la legislacion espaola interpretada estrictamente, creemos que el terreno en cuestion es
tan privado como el terreno en el asunto de Cario, si no mas. Segun la sentencia del inferior el unido
dato para este examen, pues ya se ha dicho repetidas veces que no tenemos delante las pruebas "el
terreno objeto de la presente solicitud era primitivamente de Capitana Gina y que esta estuvo en
posesion desde el ao 1880, despues paso a ser de Francisco Reformado hasta el ao 1885, mas tarde o
sea en 1886 fue de Claro Lagdameo, a la muerte de este le sucedio en la posesion su viuda Fortunata
Olega de Lagdameo, esta en 1929 lo vendio a sus tres hijos Antonio, Luis y Rafael appellidados
Lagdameo, segun los Exhibitos F y G, y estos ultimos a su vez lo vendieron en 1938 al solicitante Oh Cho,
segun los Exhibitos B 1-y C-1." " ... Este terreno es un solar residencial dentro de la poblacion del
municipio de Guinayangan, Tayabas, y en el mismo existe una casa de materiales fuertes que ocupa casi
todo el terreno ..." (Pieza de Excepciones, pag. 8).
Como se ve, por lo menos desde 1880 habia un conocido propietario y poseedor del terreno la
Capitana Gina. Ahora bien, coincide que el 25 de Junio de aquel ao que precisamente cuando se
expidio el Decreto "para el ajuste y adjudicacion de los terrenos realengos ocupados indebidamente por
individuos particulares en las Islas Filipinas." Si bien es cierto que el objeto del Decreto o ley era el
ordenar que se cumpliesen y practicasen los procedimientos de ajuste y registro descritos en el mismo, y
en tal sentido el requirir que cada cual obtuviese un documento de titulo o, en su defecto, perder su
propiedad. Tambien es cierto que en el Decreto se expresaban ciertas salvedades que paracian denotar
que estos tramites formanes no eran de rigurosa aplicacion a todo el mundo. Una de dicha salvedades,
por ejemplo, proveia (articulo 5) que, para todos los efectos legales, "todos aquellos que han estado en
posesion por ciento periodo de tiempo serian considerados como dueos para terreno cultivado, 20
20 aos sin interrupcion, es suficiente, y para terreno no cultivado, 30 aos." Y el articulo 6 dispone que
"las partes interesadas no incluidas en los dos articulos anteriores (los articulos que reconocen la
prescripcion de 20 y 30 aos) podran legalizar su posesion, y consiguientemente adquirir pleno dominio
sobre dichos terrenos, mediante procedimientos de ajuste y adjudicacion tramitados de la siguiente
manera." Esta ultima disposicion parece indicar, por sus terminos, que no es aplicable a aquellos que ya
han sido declarados dueos en virtud del simple transcurso de cierto lapso de tiempo (Vease Cario
contra Gobierno Insular, supra, 598).
No consta en la sentencia del inferior que Capitana Gina se haya acogido a las disposiciones del referido
Decreto de 25 de Junio de 1880, obteniendo un documento de titulo para legalizar su posesion, pero
tampoco consta positivamente lo contrario, pues no tenemos ante nosotros las pruebas. Pero aun
suponiendo que no se hayan cumplido los tramites formales prescritos en el Decreto, de ello no se sigue
que el terreno no era ya privado entonces, pues la presuncion es que no hubo menester de semejante
formalidad porque la Capitana Gina o sus causantes en derecho ya habian sido declarados dueos del
predio por el mero transcurso de un lapso de tiempo, a tenor de las salvedades de que se ha hecho
mencion. Esta presuncion es tanto mas logica cuanto que el articulo 8 del Decreto proveia para el caso
de partes que no solicitaban dentro del plazo de un ao el ajuste y adjudicacion de terrenos de cuya
posesion disfrutaban indebidamente, y conminaba que el Tesoro "reasumira el dominio del Estado
sobre los terrenos" y vendera en subasta la parte que no se reserva para si; y no solo no consta en autos
que la posesion de Capitata Gina o de sus causahabientes en derecho se haya considerado jamas como
ilegal o que el Estao y sus agentes hayan adoptado y practicado contra ellos las diligencias y
procedimientos de que trata el cittado articulo 8 del Decreto, sino que, por el contrario, consta en la
sentencia que desde Capitana Gina en 1880 hubo sucesivas transmisiones de derechos primeramente a
Francisco Reformado en 1885 y despues a Claro Lagdameo en 1886, y a la muerte de este ultimo a su
viuda Fortunata Olega de Lagdameo, de quien pase el titulo en virtud de compraventa a sus hijos
Antonio, Luis y Rafael apellidados Lagdameo, y la ultima transaccion sobre el solar tuvo lugar en fecha
bastante reciente, en 1938, cuando los ultimamente nombrados lo vendieron a Oh Cho el solicitante en
el presente expediente de registro. De todo lo cual se deduce que el solar en cuestion fue considerado
siempre como propiedad privada por lomenos alli donde la memoria alcanza desde 1880 hasta que
fenecio la soberania americana en Filipinas, y que ni el Estado ni sus agentes se entrometieron jamas en
el hecho de su posesion exclusiva, continua y publica a titulo de dueo por diferentes personas no solo
bajo el Decreto de 25 de Junio de 1880 tantas veces mencionado, sino aun bajo el Decreto de 13 de
Febrero de 1894 (informacion posesoria) que fue practicamente el ultimo decreto expedido en las
postrimerias de la soberania espaola en relacion con el ajuste y adjudicacion de terrenos realengos o
publicos. Y no se diga que ello habria sido por inadvertencia de las autoridades, particularmente del
Fisco, porque tratandose de un solar situado en la misma poblacion de Guinayangan, uno de los pueblos
mas antiguos de la provincia de Tayabas, es indudable que si no reuniera las condiciones y requisitos
para ser conceptuado como propiedad privada y la posesion de sus ocupantes sucesivos fuese indebida
e ilegal, ya los agentes del Fisco y Tesoro lo hubiesen prestamente confiscado a tenor del articulo 8 ya
citado del Decreto de 25 de Junio de 1880 (Vease Cario contra Gobierno Insular, ut supra 598.) El que
nada de esto haya acontecido es la mejor prueba de que en tiempo de Espaa los diferentes y sucesivos
ocupantes de este solar ya tenian titulo dominical perfecto, y es sencillamente absurdo, ridiculo que
ahora, al cabo de 66 aos, se declare publico el terreno; y todo por que y para que para rendir
sometimiento, repitiendo de nuevo la sutil ironia del Magistrado Homles, a la "refinada interpretacion
de una casi olvidada ley de Espana." Y resulta mas la futilidad de este tardio tributo a un anacronismo, a
una momia juridica de un pasado cada vez mas remoto, si se considera que cuando el Magistrado
Homes pronuncio su sentencia a todas luces libera y progresiva (23 de Enero de 1909) estabamos tan
solo a escasamente 10 aos desde la caida de la soberania espaola en Filipinas mientras que ahora que
se intenta una radical desviacion del surco trazado por la solida reja de dicha sentencia estamos ya casi a
medio siglo de distancia, con pleno dominio republicano sobre el territorio nacional. Esto no debiera
preocuparnos si no fuese porque esta decision de ahora puede ser interpretada como una abrogacion
de tantos precedentes moldeados en la turquesa de la doctrina holmesiana, y al propio tiempo como la
demarcacion del punto de partida de una nueva ruta en nuestra jurisprudencia sobre registro de
terrenos.
Sin embargo, en la opinion de la mayoria se dice que el solicitante no puede alegar con exito que su lote
es terreno privado porque la posesion de su primer predecessor (Capitana Gina) comenzo solo en 1880,
mientras que en el asunto de Cario contra El gobierno Insular, es exige como requisito la posesion
desde tiempo inmemorial, posesion que, segun la mayoria. "justificaria la presuncion de que el terreno
nunca habia sido parte del dominio publico, o que habia sido propiedad privada aun antes de la
conquista espaola." No parece sino que se quiere sealar una fecha, un ao, como norma para
determinar la inmemorialidad del comienzo posesorio. Pero que fecha, que ao seria este? 1870, '60,
'50? No seria suficiente v. gr. 1875, '65, o '55? En el asunto de Cario la fecha conocida y recordada de
la posesion inicial podia fijarse alrededor de la mitad del siglo pasado, o sea 1849, pues segun las
pruebas, Cario y sus antecesores habian poseido el terreno algo mas de 50 aos hasta el tratado de
Paris Abril 11, 1899. En el presente caso, desde Capitana Gina hasta que el solicitante presento su
solicitud de registro el 17 de Enero, 1940, habian transcurrido 60 aos; de suerte que en cuanto al
tiempo de la posesion ambos casos son identicos. Con una ventaja a favor del presente caso, a saber:
mientras en el asunto de Cario las tierras objeto de la solicitud eran pasto, en gran parte, y solo
cultivadas unas cuantas porciones, en el que nos ocupa el lote es urbano, sino en uno de los pueblos
mas antiguos de Filipinas, con una casa de materiales fuertes enclavada en el. Es innegabl que la
posesion de un solar urbano es mas concreta, mas terminante y mas adversa a todo el mundo, sin
excluir el Estado.
Pero aun limitandonos a la posesion bajo la soberania espaola para los efectos de la calificacion del
terreno como propiedad privada, todavia se puede sosener que el presente caso es tan bueno si no
mejor que el de Cario. En el asunto de Cario el punto de partida conocido es alrededor de 1849; en el
nuestro, 1880, en que comenzo la posesion de Capitana Gina, segun la sentencia apelada. Pero esto no
quiere decir que antes de Capitana Gina el solar no fuese ya finca urbana, habida por algun otro como
propiedad particular. Hay que tener en cuenta que se trata de un solar ubicado en la poblacion de
Guinayangan, uno de los mas antiguos en Tayabas. No tenemos delante la fecha exacta de la fundacion
de dicho pueblo, y no tenemos tiempo ahora para hacer investigacion historica. Pero afortunadamente
hemos logrado salvar de la devastacion causada por la reciente guerra una parte sustancial de nuestra
biblioteca privada, y uno de los libros salvados es el celebrado Diccionario Geografico, Estadistico e
Historico de las Islas Filipinas publicado en Madrid por Fr. Manuel Buzeta y Fr. Felipe Bravo en 1950,
segun el pie de imprenta, de dos volumenes. En el 2. tomo, pp. 70 y 71, se da una descripcion del
pueblo de Guinayanga, con buena copia de datos historicos, geograficos, sociales y economicos.
Comienza la descripcion de esta manera: "Pueblo con cura y gobernadorcillo, en la Isla de Luzon,
provincia de Tayabas, dioc, de Nueva caceres"; . . "tiene como unas 1,500 casas, en general de sencilla
construccion, distinguiendose como de mejor fabrica la casa parroquial y la llamada tribunal de justicia,
donde esta la carcel. ." Considerando que podemos tomas conocimiento judicial de que en tiempo de
Espaa el municipio y la parroquia eran la culminacion de un lento y largo proceso de civilizacion y
cristianizacion, podemos, por tanto, presumir que mucho antes de 1850 50, 70 o 100 aos el
pueblo de Guinayangan ya era una unidad geografiva, civil y espiritual, en toda regla, y con caracteres
definitivos de viabilidad urbana. Tambien cabe perfectamente presumir que sus habitantes poseian sus
respectivos solares a titulo de dueos, al igual que lo que ocurria en otros municipios debidamente
organizados. No cabe presumir que el Estado les permitiera ocupar indebidamente sus solares, sin que
tomase contra ellos la accion de que habla el articulo 8 del referido Decreto de 25 de Junio de 1880; y ya
hemos visto que no consta en autos que el solar en cuestion haya sido jamas confiscado por los agentes
del Fisco o Tesoro, o declarada ilegal la posesion sobre el mismo, a tenor de lo ordenado en el
mencionado Decreto. Asi que desde cualquier angulo que se vea el presente asunto, cae perfectamente
bajo las normas de posesion inmemorial establecidas en el asunto de Cario.
III. Demostrado ya que el terreno en cuestion es privado, resulta forzosa la conclusion de que el
solicitante tiene derecho a que se confirme su titulo bajo las disposiciones de la Ley de Registro de
Terrenos No. 496, de acuerdo con el sistema Torrens. Es doctrina firmemente establecida en esta
jurisdiccion que un extranjero tiene perfecto derecho a que se registre a su nombre un terreno privado,
bajo el sistema Torrens, y que las disposiciones de la ley de terrenos publicos son inaplicables a terrenos
privados (veanse Agari contra Gobierno de las Islas Filipinas, 42 Jur. Fil., 150; Tan
Yungquip contra Director de Terrenos, 42 Jur. Fil., 134; Central Capiz contra Ramirez, 40 Jur. Fil., 926). En
el primer asunto citado el solicitante era un japones llamado Ichisuke Agari y la solicitud se estimo por
tratarse de un terreno privado, adquirido en tiempo de Espaa mediant composicion con el estado. En
el segundo asunto el solicitante era un chino y se estimo la solicitud por la misma razon, habiendose
probado una posesion conocida y recordada de 30 a 40 aos con anteriorida a la presentacion de la
solicitud, es decir, un tiempo mas corto que el del presente caso. Lo propio sucedio en el tercer asunto
citado, siendo espaoles los dueos de la finca. Confirmese, por tanto, la sentencia apelada.