Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 80391 February 28, 1989
SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, petitioner,
vs.
CONTE MANGELIN, SALIC ALI, SALINDATO ALI, PILIMPINAS CONDING, ACMAD TOMAWIS,
GERRY TOMAWIS, JESUS ORTIZ, ANTONIO DELA FUENTE, DIEGO PALOMARES, JR., RAUL
DAGALANGIT, and BIMBO SINSUAT, respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioner petitioner.
Makabangkit B. Lanto for respondents.

SARMIENTO, J .:
The acts of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII are assailed in this petition. The antecedent
facts are as follows:
1. On September 24, 1986, petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was appointed as a
member of the Sangguniang Pampook, Regional Autonomous Government, Region
XII, representing Lanao del Sur.
2. On March 12, 1987 petitioner was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative
Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly for brevity).
3. Said Assembly is composed of eighteen (18) members. Two of said members,
respondents Acmad Tomawis and Pakil Dagalangit, filed on March 23, 1987 with the
Commission on Elections their respective certificates of candidacy in the May 11,
1987 congressional elections for the district of Lanao del Sur but they later withdrew
from the aforesaid election and thereafter resumed again their positions as members
of the Assembly.
4. On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the
Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited Mr. Xavier
Razul, Pampook Speaker of Region XI, Zamboanga City and the petitioner in his
capacity as Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII, in a letter which reads:
The Committee on Muslim Affairs well undertake consultations and
dialogues with local government officials, civic, religious organizations
and traditional leaders on the recent and present political
developments and other issues affecting Regions IX and XII.
The result of the conference, consultations and dialogues would
hopefully chart the autonomous governments of the two regions as
envisioned and may prod the President to constitute immediately the
Regional Consultative Commission as mandated by the Commission.
You are requested to invite some members of the Pampook
Assembly of your respective assembly on November 1 to 15, 1987,
with venue at the Congress of the Philippines. Your presence,
unstinted support and cooperation is (sic) indispensable.
5. Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a telegram to Acting Secretary
Johnny Alimbuyao of the Assembly to wire all Assemblymen that there shall be no
session in November as "our presence in the house committee hearing of Congress
take (sic) precedence over any pending business in batasang pampook ... ."
6. In compliance with the aforesaid instruction of the petitioner, Acting Secretary
Alimbuyao sent to the members of the Assembly the following telegram:
TRANSMITTING FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE
TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM SPEAKER LIMBONA QUOTE
CONGRESSMAN JIMMY MATALAM CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS REQUESTED ME TO ASSIST
SAID COMMITTEE IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSED
AUTONOMY ORGANIC NOV. 1ST TO 15. HENCE WERE ALL
ASSEMBLYMEN THAT THERE SHALL BE NO SESSION IN
NOVEMBER AS OUR PRESENCE IN THE HOUSE COMMITTEE
HEARING OF CONGRESS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER ANY
PENDING BUSINESS IN BATASANG PAMPOOK OF MATALAM
FOLLOWS UNQUOTE REGARDS.
7. On November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner's
advice, with the following assemblymen present:
1. Sali, Salic
2. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)
3. Dagalangit, Rakil
4. Dela Fuente, Antonio
5. Mangelen, Conte
6. Ortiz, Jesus
7. Palomares, Diego
8. Sinsuat, Bimbo
9. Tomawis, Acmad
10. Tomawis, Jerry
After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized
to preside in the session. On Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all
Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative, hence, the chair declared said
seat of the Speaker vacant. 8. On November 5, 1987, the session of the Assembly
resumed with the following Assemblymen present:
1. Mangelen Conte-Presiding Officer
2. Ali Salic
3. Ali Salindatu
4. Aratuc, Malik
5. Cajelo, Rene
6. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)
7. Dagalangit, Rakil
8. Dela Fuente, Antonio
9. Ortiz, Jesus
10 Palomares, Diego
11. Quijano, Jesus
12. Sinsuat, Bimbo
13. Tomawis, Acmad
14. Tomawis, Jerry
An excerpt from the debates and proceeding of said session reads:
HON. DAGALANGIT: Mr. Speaker, Honorable Members of the House, with the
presence of our colleagues who have come to attend the session today, I move to
call the names of the new comers in order for them to cast their votes on the
previous motion to declare the position of the Speaker vacant. But before doing so, I
move also that the designation of the Speaker Pro Tempore as the Presiding Officer
and Mr. Johnny Evangelists as Acting Secretary in the session last November 2,
1987 be reconfirmed in today's session.
HON. SALIC ALI: I second the motions.
PRESIDING OFFICER: Any comment or objections on the two motions presented?
Me chair hears none and the said motions are approved. ...
Twelve (12) members voted in favor of the motion to declare the seat of the Speaker
vacant; one abstained and none voted against.
1

Accordingly, the petitioner prays for judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that-
(a) This Petition be given due course;
(b) Pending hearing, a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction be issued
enjoining respondents from proceeding with their session to be held on November 5,
1987, and on any day thereafter;
(c) After hearing, judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held by
respondents of their session on November 2, 1987 as null and void;
(d) Holding the election of petitioner as Speaker of said Legislative Assembly or
Batasan Pampook, Region XII held on March 12, 1987 valid and subsisting, and
(e) Making the injunction permanent.
Petitioner likewise prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable.
2

Pending further proceedings, this Court, on January 19, 1988, received a resolution filed by the
Sangguniang Pampook, "EXPECTING ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA FROM MEMBERSHIP OF THE
SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK AUTONOMOUS REGION XII,"
3
on the grounds, among other things,
that the petitioner "had caused to be prepared and signed by him paying [sic] the salaries and
emoluments of Odin Abdula, who was considered resigned after filing his Certificate of Candidacy for
Congressmen for the First District of Maguindanao in the last May 11, elections. . . and nothing in the
record of the Assembly will show that any request for reinstatement by Abdula was ever made . . ."
4
and
that "such action of Mr. Lim bona in paying Abdula his salaries and emoluments without authority from the
Assembly . . . constituted a usurpation of the power of the Assembly,"
5
that the petitioner "had recently
caused withdrawal of so much amount of cash from the Assembly resulting to the non-payment of the
salaries and emoluments of some Assembly [sic],"
6
and that he had "filed a case before the Supreme
Court against some members of the Assembly on question which should have been resolved within the
confines of the Assembly,"
7
for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot
and academic".
8

The first question, evidently, is whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending litigation) has
made the case moot and academic.
We do not agree that the case has been rendered moot and academic by reason simply of the
expulsion resolution so issued. For, if the petitioner's expulsion was done purposely to make this
petition moot and academic, and to preempt the Court, it will not make it academic.
On the ground of the immutable principle of due process alone, we hold that the expulsion in
question is of no force and effect. In the first place, there is no showing that the Sanggunian had
conducted an investigation, and whether or not the petitioner had been heard in his defense,
assuming that there was an investigation, or otherwise given the opportunity to do so. On the other
hand, what appears in the records is an admission by the Assembly (at least, the respondents) that
"since November, 1987 up to this writing, the petitioner has not set foot at the Sangguniang
Pampook."
9
"To be sure, the private respondents aver that "[t]he Assemblymen, in a conciliatory gesture,
wanted him to come to Cotabato City,"
10
but that was "so that their differences could be threshed out and
settled."
11
Certainly, that avowed wanting or desire to thresh out and settle, no matter how conciliatory it
may be cannot be a substitute for the notice and hearing contemplated by law.
While we have held that due process, as the term is known in administrative law, does not absolutely
require notice and that a party need only be given the opportunity to be heard,
12
it does not appear
herein that the petitioner had, to begin with, been made aware that he had in fact stood charged of graft
and corruption before his collegues. It cannot be said therefore that he was accorded any opportunity to
rebut their accusations. As it stands, then, the charges now levelled amount to mere accusations that
cannot warrant expulsion.
In the second place, (the resolution) appears strongly to be a bare act of vendetta by the other
Assemblymen against the petitioner arising from what the former perceive to be abduracy on the
part of the latter. Indeed, it (the resolution) speaks of "a case [having been filed] [by the petitioner]
before the Supreme Court . . . on question which should have been resolved within the confines of
the Assemblyman act which some members claimed unnecessarily and unduly assails their integrity
and character as representative of the people"
13
an act that cannot possibly justify expulsion. Access
to judicial remedies is guaranteed by the Constitution,
14
and, unless the recourse amounts to malicious
prosecution, no one may be punished for seeking redress in the courts.
We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past acts of the petitioner indeed
warrant his removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so minded, to commence proper
proceedings therefor in line with the most elementary requirements of due process. And while it is
within the discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their acts
are nonetheless subject to the moderating band of this Court in the event that such discretion is
exercised with grave abuse.
It is, to be sure, said that precisely because the Sangguniang Pampook(s) are "autonomous," the
courts may not rightfully intervene in their affairs, much less strike down their acts. We come,
therefore, to the second issue: Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are
now constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is the extent
of self-government given to the two autonomous governments of Region IX and XII?
The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII by Presidential
Decree No. 1618
15
promulgated on July 25, 1979. Among other things, the Decree established "internal
autonomy"
16
in the two regions "[w]ithin the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity
of the Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution,"
17
with legislative and executive machinery to
exercise the powers and responsibilities
18
specified therein.
It requires the autonomous regional governments to "undertake all internal administrative matters for
the respective regions,"
19
except to "act on matters which are within the jurisdiction and competence of
the National Government,"
20
"which include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) National defense and security;
(2) Foreign relations;
(3) Foreign trade;
(4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and quasi-banking, and
external borrowing,
(5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of all natural
resources;
(6) Air and sea transport
(7) Postal matters and telecommunications;
(8) Customs and quarantine;
(9) Immigration and deportation;
(10) Citizenship and naturalization;
(11) National economic, social and educational planning; and
(12) General auditing.
21

In relation to the central government, it provides that "[t]he President shall have the power of general
supervision and control over the Autonomous Regions ..."
22

Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make
local governments "more responsive and accountable,"
23
"and ensure their fullest development as
self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development
and social progress."
24
At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing
local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general
supervision"
25
over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law."
26
He
has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
27

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of
local governments units declare to be autonomous . In that case, the autonomous government is
free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.
According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in
that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.
28

But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy Muslim Mindanao under the 1987
Constitution involves, truly, an effort to decentralize power rather than mere administration is a
question foreign to this petition, since what is involved herein is a local government unit constituted
prior to the ratification of the present Constitution. Hence, the Court will not resolve that controversy
now, in this case, since no controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the proper time and in the
proper case.
Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two senses, thus:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines
are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. Here shall be autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao ,and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
29

Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
30

xxx xxx xxx
See. 15. Mere shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution
and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines.
31

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X,
sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the
effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class
is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and
the Department of Local Government).
32
If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is
autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the
same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if
it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination
of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that
they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central
government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates
that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous
Regions."
33
In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge
chiefly administrative services, thus:
SEC. 7. Powers of the Sangguniang Pampook. The Sangguniang Pampook shall
exercise local legislative powers over regional affairs within the framework of national
development plans, policies and goals, in the following areas:
(1) Organization of regional administrative system;
(2) Economic, social and cultural development of the Autonomous Region;
(3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial programs for the Autonomous Region;
(4) Infrastructure development for the Autonomous Region;
(5) Urban and rural planning for the Autonomous Region;
(6) Taxation and other revenue-raising measures as provided for in this Decree;
(7) Maintenance, operation and administration of schools established by the
Autonomous Region;
(8) Establishment, operation and maintenance of health, welfare and other social
services, programs and facilities;
(9) Preservation and development of customs, traditions, languages and culture
indigenous to the Autonomous Region; and
(10) Such other matters as may be authorized by law,including the enactment of
such measures as may be necessary for the promotion of the general welfare of the
people in the Autonomous Region.
The President shall exercise such powers as may be necessary to assure that
enactment and acts of the Sangguniang Pampook and the Lupong Tagapagpaganap
ng Pook are in compliance with this Decree, national legislation, policies, plans and
programs.
The Sangguniang Pampook shall maintain liaison with the Batasang Pambansa.
34

Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in
question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.
Briefly, the petitioner assails the legality of his ouster as Speaker on the grounds that: (1) the
Sanggunian, in convening on November 2 and 5, 1987 (for the sole purpose of declaring the office of
the Speaker vacant), did so in violation of the Rules of the Sangguniang Pampook since the
Assembly was then on recess; and (2) assuming that it was valid, his ouster was ineffective
nevertheless for lack of quorum.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true
that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or
adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook,"
35
but it provides likewise that "the
Speaker may, on [sic] his discretion, declare a recess of "short intervals."
36
Of course, there is
disagreement between the protagonists as to whether or not the recess called by the petitioner effective
November 1 through 15, 1987 is the "recess of short intervals" referred to; the petitioner says that it is
while the respondents insist that, to all intents and purposes, it was an adjournment and that "recess" as
used by their Rules only refers to "a recess when arguments get heated up so that protagonists in a
debate can talk things out informally and obviate dissenssion [sic] and disunity.
37
The Court agrees with
the respondents on this regard, since clearly, the Rules speak of "short intervals." Secondly, the Court
likewise agrees that the Speaker could not have validly called a recess since the Assembly had yet to
convene on November 1, the date session opens under the same Rules.
38
Hence, there can be no
recess to speak of that could possibly interrupt any session. But while this opinion is in accord with the
respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called
the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could. do so. In the second place, the invitation
tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible
reason for the intermission sought. Thirdly, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not
appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they
opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances,
we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.
It does not appear to us, moreover, that the petitioner had resorted to the aforesaid "recess" in order
to forestall the Assembly from bringing about his ouster. This is not apparent from the pleadings
before us. We are convinced that the invitation was what precipitated it.
In holding that the "recess" in question is valid, we are not to be taken as establishing a precedent,
since, as we said, a recess can not be validly declared without a session having been first opened.
In upholding the petitioner herein, we are not giving him a carte blanche to order recesses in the
future in violation of the Rules, or otherwise to prevent the lawful meetings thereof.
Neither are we, by this disposition, discouraging the Sanggunian from reorganizing itself pursuant to
its lawful prerogatives. Certainly, it can do so at the proper time. In the event that be petitioner
should initiate obstructive moves, the Court is certain that it is armed with enough coercive remedies
to thwart them.
39

In view hereof, we find no need in dwelling on the issue of quorum.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Sangguniang Pampook,
Region XII, is ENJOINED to (1) REINSTATE the petitioner as Member, Sangguniang Pampook,
Region XII; and (2) REINSTATE him as Speaker thereof. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin,
Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 120865-71 December 7, 1995
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE HERCULANO TECH, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 70,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BINANGONAN RIZAL; FLEET DEVELOPMENT, INC. and
CARLITO ARROYO; THE MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B.
PACIS, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE AURELIO C. TRAMPE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 163,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG; MANILA MARINE LIFE BUSINESS RESOURCES, INC.
represented by, MR. TOBIAS REYNALD M. TIANGCO; MUNICIPALITY OF TAGUIG, METRO
MANILA and/or MAYOR RICARDO D. PAPA, JR., respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ALEJANDRO A. MARQUEZ, PRESIDING JUDGE,
BRANCH 79, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; GREENFIELD VENTURES
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and R. J. ORION DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA
VEGA, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH
162, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA; IRMA FISHING & TRADING
CORP.; ARTM FISHING CORP.; BDR CORPORATION, MIRT CORPORATION and TRIM
CORPORATION; MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B.
PACIS, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A. MARAVE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 78,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; BLUE LAGOON FISHING CORP. and ALCRIS
CHICKEN GROWERS, INC.; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE
LA VEGA, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A. MARAVE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 78,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; AGP FISH VENTURES, INC., represented by
its PRESIDENT ALFONSO PUYAT; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR
WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE EUGENIO S. LABITORIA, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH
161, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA; SEA MAR TRADING CO. INC.;
EASTERN LAGOON FISHING CORP.; MINAMAR FISHING CORP.; MUNICIPALITY OF
BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS,respondents.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J .:
It is difficult for a man, scavenging on the garbage dump created by affluence and profligate
consumption and extravagance of the rich or fishing in the murky waters of the Pasig River and the
Laguna Lake or making a clearing in the forest so that he can produce food for his family, to
understand why protecting birds, fish, and trees is more important than protecting him and keeping
his family alive.
How do we strike a balance between environmental protection, on the one hand, and the individual
personal interests of people, on the other?
Towards environmental protection and ecology, navigational safety, and sustainable development,
Republic Act No. 4850 created the "Laguna Lake Development Authority." This Government Agency
is supposed to carry out and effectuate the aforesaid declared policy, so as to accelerate the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities
and towns, in the act clearly named, within the context of the national and regional plans and policies
for social and economic development.
Presidential Decree No. 813 of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos amended certain sections of
Republic Act No. 4850 because of the concern for the rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the
suburbs and the lakeshore towns of Laguna de Bay, combined with current and prospective uses of
the lake for municipal-industrial water supply, irrigation, fisheries, and the like. Concern on the part of
the Government and the general public over: the environment impact of development on the
water quality and ecology of the lake and its related river systems; the inflow of polluted water from
the Pasig River, industrial, domestic and agricultural wastes from developed areas around the lake;
the increasing urbanization which induced the deterioration of the lake, since water quality studies
have shown that the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same; and the
floods in Metropolitan Manila area and the lakeshore towns which will influence the hydraulic system
of Laguna de Bay, since any scheme of controlling the floods will necessarily involve the lake and its
river systems, likewise gave impetus to the creation of the Authority.
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4850 was amended to read as follows:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the national policy to
promote, and accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake
area and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns hereinafter referred to as the
region, within the context of the national and regional plans and policies for social
and economic development and to carry out the development of the Laguna Lake
region with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and
control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the
prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution.
1

Special powers of the Authority, pertinent to the issues in this case, include:
Sec. 3. Section 4 of the same Act is hereby further amended by adding thereto seven
new paragraphs to be known as paragraphs (j), (k), (l), (m), (n), (o), and (p) which
shall read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(j) The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, to
engage in fish production and other aqua-culture projects in Laguna
de Bay and other bodies of water within its jurisdiction and in
pursuance thereof to conduct studies and make experiments,
whenever necessary, with the collaboration and assistance of the
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, with the end in view of
improving present techniques and practices. Provided, that until
modified, altered or amended by the procedure provided in the
following sub-paragraph, the present laws, rules and permits or
authorizations remain in force;
(k) For the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities
in Laguna de Bay,the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
issue new permit for the use of the lake waters for any projects or
activities in or affecting the said lake including navigation,
construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals
and the like, and to impose necessary safeguards for lake quality
control and management and to collect necessary fees for said
activities and projects: Provided, That the fees collected for fisheries
may be shared between the Authority and other government
agencies and political sub-divisions in such proportion as may be
determined by the President of the Philippines upon recommendation
of the Authority's Board: Provided, further, That the Authority's Board
may determine new areas of fishery development or activities which it
may place under the supervision of the Bureau of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources taking into account the overall development plans
and programs for Laguna de Bay and related bodies of
water: Provided, finally, That the Authority shall subject to the
approval of the President of the Philippines promulgate such rules
and regulations which shall govern fisheries development activities in
Laguna de Bay which shall take into consideration among others the
following: socio-economic amelioration of bonafide resident fishermen
whether individually or collectively in the form of cooperatives,
lakeshore town development, a master plan for fishpen construction
and operation, communal fishing ground for lake shore town
residents, and preference to lake shore town residents in hiring
laborer for fishery projects;
(l) To require the cities and municipalities embraced within the region
to pass appropriate zoning ordinances and other regulatory measures
necessary to carry out the objectives of the Authority and enforce the
same with the assistance of the Authority;
(m) The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, to
exercise water rights over public waters within the Laguna de Bay
region whenever necessary to carry out the Authority's projects;
(n) To act in coordination with existing governmental agencies in
establishing water quality standards for industrial, agricultural and
municipal waste discharges into the lake and to cooperate with said
existing agencies of the government of the Philippines in enforcing
such standards, or to separately pursue enforcement and penalty
actions as provided for in Section 4 (d) and Section 39-A of this
Act: Provided, That in case of conflict on the appropriate water quality
standard to be enforced such conflict shall be resolved thru the NEDA
Board.
2

To more effectively perform the role of the Authority under Republic Act No. 4850, as though
Presidential Decree No. 813 were not thought to be completely effective, the Chief Executive, feeling
that the land and waters of the Laguna Lake Region are limited natural resources requiring judicious
management to their optimal utilization to insure renewability and to preserve the ecological balance,
the competing options for the use of such resources and conflicting jurisdictions over such uses
having created undue constraints on the institutional capabilities of the Authority in the light of the
limited powers vested in it by its charter, Executive Order No. 927 further defined and enlarged the
functions and powers of the Authority and named and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces
encompassed by the term "Laguna de Bay Region".
Also, pertinent to the issues in this case are the following provisions of Executive Order No. 927
which include in particular the sharing of fees:
Sec 2. Water Rights Over Laguna de Bay and Other Bodies of Water within the Lake
Region: To effectively regulate and monitor activities in the Laguna de Bay region,
the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permit for the use of all surface
water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region including navigation,
construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
For the purpose of this Executive Order, the term "Laguna de Bay Region" shall refer
to the Provinces of Rizal and Laguna; the Cities of San Pablo, Pasay, Caloocan,
Quezon, Manila and Tagaytay; the towns of Tanauan, Sto. Tomas and Malvar in
Batangas Province; the towns of Silang and Carmona in Cavite Province; the town of
Lucban in Quezon Province; and the towns of Marikina, Pasig, Taguig, Muntinlupa,
and Pateros in Metro Manila.
Sec 3. Collection of Fees. The Authority is hereby empowered to collect fees for the
use of the lake water and its tributaries for all beneficial purposes including but not
limited to fisheries, recreation, municipal, industrial, agricultural, navigation, irrigation,
and waste disposal purpose; Provided, that the rates of the fees to be collected, and
the sharing with other government agencies and political subdivisions, if necessary,
shall be subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines upon
recommendation of the Authority's Board, except fishpen fee, which will be shared in
the following manner; 20 percent of the fee shall go to the lakeshore local
governments, 5 percent shall go to the Project Development Fund which shall be
administered by a Council and the remaining 75 percent shall constitute the share of
LLDA. However, after the implementation within the three-year period of the Laguna
Lake Fishery Zoning and Management Plan, the sharing will be modified as
follows: 35 percent of the fishpen fee goes to the lakeshore local governments, 5
percent goes to the Project Development Fund and the remaining 60 percent shall be
retained by LLDA; Provided, however, that the share of LLDA shall form part of its
corporate funds and shall not be remitted to the National Treasury as an exception to
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1234. (Emphasis supplied)
It is important to note that Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 813 defined the term "Laguna Lake"
in this manner:
Sec 41. Definition of Terms.
(11) Laguna Lake or Lake. Whenever Laguna Lake or lake is used in this Act, the
same shall refer to Laguna de Bay which is that area covered by the lake water when
it is at the average annual maximum lake level of elevation 12.50 meters, as referred
to a datum 10.00 meters below mean lower low water (M.L.L.W). Lands located at
and below such elevation are public lands which form part of the bed of said lake.
Then came Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the
Laguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions of this law to mean that the newly passed law gave
municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal
waters because R.A. 7160 provides:
Sec. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges.
(a) Municipalities shall have the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in the
municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefor in accordance with the
provisions of this Section.
(b) The Sangguniang Bayan may:
(1) Grant fishing privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussel or
other aquatic beds or bangus fry areas, within a definite zone of the
municipal waters, as determined by it; . . . .
(2) Grant privilege to gather, take or catch bangus fry, prawn fry
or kawag-kawag or fry of other species and fish from the municipal
waters by nets, traps or other fishing gears to marginal fishermen free
from any rental fee, charges or any other imposition whatsoever.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 447. Power, Duties, Functions and Compensation. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
(XI) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code, grant exclusive
privileges of constructing fish corrals or fishpens, or the taking or
catching of bangus fry, prawn fry orkawag-kawag or fry of any
species or fish within the municipal waters.
xxx xxx xxx
Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen
permits. Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens and fishcages to
the consternation of the Authority. Unregulated fishpens and fishcages, as of July, 1995, occupied
almost one-third of the entire lake water surface area, increasing the occupation drastically from
7,000 hectares in 1990 to almost 21,000 hectares in 1995. The Mayor's permit to construct fishpens
and fishcages were all undertaken in violation of the policies adopted by the Authority on fishpen
zoning and the Laguna Lake carrying capacity.
To be sure, the implementation by the lakeshore municipalities of separate independent policies in
the operation of fishpens and fishcages within their claimed territorial municipal waters in the lake
and their indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits have already saturated the lake area with fishpens,
thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Authority served notice to the general public that:
In compliance with the instructions of His Excellency PRESIDENT FIDEL V. RAMOS
given on June 23, 1993 at Pila, Laguna pursuant to Republic Act 4850 as amended
by Presidential Decree 813 and Executive Order 927 series of 1983 and in line with
the policies and programs of the Presidential Task Force on Illegal Fishpens and
Illegal Fishing, the general public is hereby notified that:
1. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay
Region, which were not registered or to which no application for registration and/or
permit has been filed with Laguna Lake Development Authority as of March 31, 1993
are hereby declared outrightly as illegal.
2. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures so declared as illegal
shall be subject to demolition which shall be undertaken by the Presidential Task
Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing.
3. Owners of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures declared as
illegal shall, without prejudice to demolition of their structures be criminally charged in
accordance with Section 39-A of Republic Act 4850 as amended by P.D. 813 for
violation of the same laws. Violations of these laws carries a penalty of imprisonment
of not exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding Five Thousand Pesos or both at the
discretion of the court.
All operators of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures declared as
illegal in accordance with the foregoing Notice shall have one (1) month on or before
27 October 1993 to show cause before the LLDA why their said fishpens, fishcages
and other aqua-culture structures should not be demolished/dismantled.
One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to the concerned owners of the illegally
constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their
respective structures within 10 days from receipt thereof, otherwise, demolition shall be effected.
Reacting thereto, the affected fishpen owners filed injunction cases against the Authority before
various regional trial courts, to wit: (a) Civil Case No. 759-B, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, Binangonan, Rizal, filed by Fleet Development, Inc. and Carlito
Arroyo; (b) Civil Case No. 64049, for Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 162, Pasig, filed by
IRMA Fishing and Trading Corp., ARTM Fishing Corp., BDR Corp., MIRT Corp. and TRIM Corp.; (c)
Civil Case No. 566, for Declaratory Relief and Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 163, Pasig,
filed by Manila Marine Life Business Resources, Inc. and Tobias Reynaldo M. Tianco; (d) Civil Case
No. 556-M, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal,
filed by AGP Fishing Ventures, Inc.; (e) Civil Case No. 522-M, for Prohibition, Injunction and
Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, filed by Blue Lagoon and Alcris Chicken
Growers, Inc.; (f) Civil Case No. 554-, for Certiorari and Prohibition, Regional Trial Court, Branch 79,
Morong, Rizal, filed by Greenfields Ventures Industrial Corp. and R.J. Orion Development Corp.; and
(g) Civil Case No. 64124, for Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Pasig, filed by SEA-MAR
Trading Co., Inc. and Eastern Lagoon Fishing Corp. and Minamar Fishing Corporation.
The Authority filed motions to dismiss the cases against it on jurisdictional grounds. The motions to
dismiss were invariably denied. Meanwhile, temporary restraining order/writs of preliminary
mandatory injunction were issued in Civil Cases Nos. 64124, 759 and 566 enjoining the Authority
from demolishing the fishpens and similar structures in question.
Hence, the herein petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, G.R. Nos. 120865-71, were filed
by the Authority with this court. Impleaded as parties-respondents are concerned regional trial courts
and respective private parties, and the municipalities and/or respective Mayors of Binangonan,
Taguig and Jala-jala, who issued permits for the construction and operation of fishpens in Laguna de
Bay. The Authority sought the following reliefs,viz.:
(A) Nullification of the temporary restraining order/writs of preliminary injunction
issued in Civil Cases Nos. 64125, 759 and 566;
(B) Permanent prohibition against the regional trial courts from exercising jurisdiction
over cases involving the Authority which is a co-equal body;
(C) Judicial pronouncement that R.A. 7610 (Local Government Code of 1991) did not
repeal, alter or modify the provisions of R.A. 4850, as amended, empowering the
Authority to issue permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in
Laguna de Bay and that, the Authority the government agency vested with exclusive
authority to issue said permits.
By this Court's resolution of May 2, 1994, the Authority's consolidated petitions were referred to the
Court of Appeals.
In a Decision, dated June 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Authority's consolidated
petitions, the Court of Appeals holding that: (A) LLDA is not among those quasi-judicial agencies of
government whose decision or order are appealable only to the Court of Appeals; (B) the LLDA
charter does vest LLDA with quasi-judicial functions insofar as fishpens are concerned; (C) the
provisions of the LLDA charter insofar as fishing privileges in Laguna de Bay are concerned had
been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991; (D) in view of the aforesaid repeal, the
power to grant permits devolved to and is now vested with their respective local government units
concerned.
Not satisfied with the Court of Appeals decision, the Authority has returned to this Court charging the
following errors:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PROBABLY COMMITTED AN ERROR
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY IS
NOT A QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCY.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR
WHEN IT RULED THAT R.A. 4850 AS AMENDED BY P.D. 813 AND E.O. 927
SERIES OF 1983 HAS BEEN REPEALED BY REPUBLIC ACT 7160. THE SAID
RULING IS CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES AND JURISPRUDENCE
OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE POWER TO ISSUE FISHPEN PERMITS IN LAGUNA
DE BAY HAS BEEN DEVOLVED TO CONCERNED (LAKESHORE) LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNITS.
We take a simplistic view of the controversy. Actually, the main and only issue posed is: Which
agency of the Government the Laguna Lake Development Authority or the towns and
municipalities comprising the region should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its
environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned?
Section 4 (k) of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 813, and Section 2 of Executive Order No. 927, cited above,
specifically provide that the Laguna Lake Development Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
issue permits for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said
region, including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and
the like. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, has
granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters.
The Sangguniang Bayan may grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other
aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a definite zone of the municipal waters.
We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not necessarily repeal the aforementioned
laws creating the Laguna Lake Development Authority and granting the latter water rights authority
over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.
The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which categorically
expressly repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the
part of the legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws
should be made clear and expressed.
It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority constitutes a
special law. Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, is a general law. It is basic
in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be
construed to have repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special
statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute,
general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest,
although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the
special law."
3

Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should
prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The special law is
to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a
contrary conclusion. This is because implied repeals are not favored and as much as possible, effect
must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or
altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication.
4

Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the Authority should prevail over the Local
Government Code of 1991.
Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority, which are environmental
protection, navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is every indication that the
legislative intent is for the Authority to proceed with its mission.
We are on all fours with the manifestation of petitioner Laguna Lake Development Authority that
"Laguna de Bay, like any other single body of water has its own unique natural ecosystem. The 900
km lake surface water, the eight (8) major river tributaries and several other smaller rivers that drain
into the lake, the 2,920 km basin or watershed transcending the boundaries of Laguna and Rizal
provinces, greater portion of Metro Manila, parts of Cavite, Batangas, and Quezon provinces,
constitute one integrated delicate natural ecosystem that needs to be protected with uniform set of
policies; if we are to be serious in our aims of attaining sustainable development. This is an
exhaustible natural resource a very limited one which requires judicious management and
optimal utilization to ensure renewability and preserve its ecological integrity and balance."
"Managing the lake resources would mean the implementation of a national policy geared towards
the protection, conservation, balanced growth and sustainable development of the region with due
regard to the inter-generational use of its resources by the inhabitants in this part of the earth. The
authors of Republic Act 4850 have foreseen this need when they passed this LLDA law the
special law designed to govern the management of our Laguna de Bay lake resources."
"Laguna de Bay therefore cannot be subjected to fragmented concepts of management policies
where lakeshore local government units exercise exclusive dominion over specific portions of the
lake water. The garbage thrown or sewage discharged into the lake, abstraction of water therefrom
or construction of fishpens by enclosing its certain area, affect not only that specific portion but the
entire 900 km of lake water. The implementation of a cohesive and integrated lake water resource
management policy, therefore, is necessary to conserve, protect and sustainably develop Laguna de
Bay."
5

The power of the local government units to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for revenue
purposes. This is evident from the fact that Section 149 of the New Local Government Code
empowering local governments to issue fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of
Republic Act No. 7160 under the heading, "Specific Provisions On The Taxing And Other Revenue
Raising Power Of Local Government Units."
On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for fishpens, fishcages and other
aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the
Laguna de Bay region (Section 2, Executive Order No. 927) and for lake quality control and
management.
6
It does partake of the nature of police power which is the most pervasive, the least
limitable and the most demanding of all State powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the
charter of the Authority which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the Local
Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures in the Laguna de Bay area. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 927 provides for the proper
sharing of fees collected.
In respect to the question as to whether the Authority is a quasi-judicial agency or not, it is our
holding that, considering the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4850 and Section 4 of
Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, and the ruling of this Court in Laguna Lake Development
Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 304, 306, which we quote:
xxx xxx xxx
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides
for another forum. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a
specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No.
4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared national
policy of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the
Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities
of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate
provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of
human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological
disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant of power and
authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to
protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of
pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In
carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among
others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects
proposed by local government offices/agencies within the region, public corporations,
and private persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects are
related to those of the LLDA for the development of the region.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . . While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such
powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an
administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the
exercise of its express powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers
under its charter, as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution
cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and
desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless"
paper agency.
there is no question that the Authority has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial
body in respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a "cease and desist order" and on
matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures in Laguna de Bay. The Authority's pretense, however, that it is co-equal to the
Regional Trial Courts such that all actions against it may only be instituted before the Court
of Appeals cannot be sustained. On actions necessitating the resolution of legal questions
affecting the powers of the Authority as provided for in its charter, the Regional Trial Courts
have jurisdiction.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the
Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended. Thus, the Authority has
the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to
the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by
its charter vested on it.
Removal from the Authority of the aforesaid licensing authority will render nugatory its avowed
purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake Region. Otherwise stated, the abrogation of
this power would render useless its reason for being and will in effect denigrate, if not abolish, the
Laguna Lake Development Authority. This, the Local Government Code of 1991 had never intended
to do.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for prohibition, certiorari and injunction are hereby granted, insofar as
they relate to the authority of the Laguna Lake Development Authority to grant fishing privileges
within the Laguna Lake Region.
The restraining orders and/or writs of injunction issued by Judge Arturo Marave, RTC, Branch 78,
Morong, Rizal; Judge Herculano Tech, RTC, Branch 70, Binangonan, Rizal; and Judge Aurelio
Trampe, RTC, Branch 163, Pasig, Metro Manila, are hereby declared null and void and ordered set
aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The Municipal Mayors of the Laguna Lake Region are hereby prohibited from issuing permits to
construct and operate fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures within the Laguna Lake
Region, their previous issuances being declared null and void. Thus, the fishing permits issued by
Mayors Isidro B. Pacis, Municipality of Binangonan; Ricardo D. Papa, Municipality of Taguig; and
Walfredo M. de la Vega, Municipality of Jala-jala, specifically, are likewise declared null and void and
ordered cancelled.
The fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures put up by operators by virtue of permits
issued by Municipal Mayors within the Laguna Lake Region, specifically, permits issued to Fleet
Development, Inc. and Carlito Arroyo; Manila Marine Life Business Resources, Inc., represented by,
Mr. Tobias Reynald M. Tiangco; Greenfield Ventures Industrial Development Corporation and R.J.
Orion Development Corporation; IRMA Fishing And Trading Corporation, ARTM Fishing
Corporation, BDR Corporation, Mirt Corporation and Trim Corporation; Blue Lagoon Fishing
Corporation and ALCRIS Chicken Growers, Inc.; AGP Fish Ventures, Inc., represented by its
President Alfonso Puyat; SEA MAR Trading Co., Inc., Eastern Lagoon Fishing Corporation, and
MINAMAR Fishing Corporation, are hereby declared illegal structures subject to demolition by the
Laguna Lake Development Authority.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 129093 August 30, 2001
HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA, and HON. CALIXTO CATAQUIZ,petitioners,
vs.
HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAO and TONY CALVENTO, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J .:
For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision 1 dated February 10, 1997 of the Regional Trial
Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 93, enjoining petitioners from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna and its subsequent Order 2 dated April 21, 1997 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install
Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor's permit to open the
lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 which was issued on September 18, 1995. The ordinance
reads:
ISANG KAPASIYAHAN TINUTUTULAN ANG MGA "ILLEGAL GAMBLING" LALO NA ANG LOTTO SA LALAWIGAN NG
LAGUNA
SAPAGKA'T, ang sugal dito sa lalawigan ng Laguna ay talamak na;
SAPAGKA'T, ang sugal ay nagdudulot ng masasamang impluwensiya lalo't higit sa mga kabataan;
KUNG KAYA'T DAHIL DITO, at sa mungkahi nina Kgg. Kgd. Juan M. Unico at Kgg. Kgd. Gat-Ala A. Alatiit, pinangalawahan ni
Kgg. Kgd. Meliton C. Larano at buong pagkakaisang sinangayunan ng lahat ng dumalo sa pulong;
IPINASIYA, na tutulan gaya ng dito ay mahigpit na TINUTUTULAN ang ano mang uri ng sugal dito sa lalawigan ng Laguna lalo't
higit ang Lotto;
IPINASIYA PA RIN na hilingin tulad ng dito ay hinihiling sa Panlalawigang pinuno ng Philippine National Police (PNP) Col.
[illegible] na mahigpit na pag-ibayuhin ang pagsugpo sa lahat ng uri ng illegal na sugal sa buong lalawigan ng Laguna lalo na ang
"Jueteng".
3

As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order. In the said complaint, respondent Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for
the following reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to refrain from implementing or
enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the
operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.
On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Pao, promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing or
enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants, their agents and representatives are hereby enjoined from implementing or
enforcing resolution or kapasiyahan blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Laguna prohibiting the operation of the
lotto in the province of Laguna.
SO ORDERED.
4

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was subsequently denied in an Order dated April 21, 1997, which reads:
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by defendants Jose D. Lina, Jr. and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, thru
counsel, with the opposition filed by plaintiff's counsel and the comment thereto filed by counsel for the defendants which were
duly noted, the Court hereby denies the motion for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
5

On May 23, 1997, petitioners filed this petition alleging that the following errors were committed by the respondent trial court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENJOINING THE PETITIONERS FROM IMPLEMENTING KAPASIYAHAN BLG. 508, T. 1995 OF
THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF THE LOTTO IN THE PROVINCE OF
LAGUNA.
II
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE ARGUMENT POSITED BY THE PETITIONERS THAT BEFORE ANY
GOVERNMENT PROJECT OR PROGRAM MAY BE IMPLEMENTED BY THE NATIONAL AGENCIES OR OFFICES, PRIOR
CONSULTATION AND APPROVAL BY THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS CONCERNED AND OTHER CONCERNED
SECTORS IS REQUIRED.
Petitioners contend that the assailed resolution is a valid policy declaration of the Provincial Government of Laguna of its vehement objection
to the operation of lotto and all forms of gambling. It is likewise a valid exercise of the provincial government's police power under the
General Welfare Clause of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.
6
They also maintain that
respondent's lotto operation is illegal because no prior consultations and approval by the local government were sought before it was
implemented contrary to the express provisions of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of R.A. 7160.
7

For his part, respondent Calvento argues that the questioned resolution is, in effect, a curtailment of the power of the state since in this case
the national legislature itself had already declared lotto as legal and permitted its operations around the country.
8
As for the allegation that no
prior consultations and approval were sought from the sangguniang panlalawigan of Laguna, respondent Calvento contends this is not
mandatory since such a requirement is merely stated as a declaration of policy and not a self-executing provision of the Local Government
Code of 1991.
9
He also states that his operation of the lotto system is legal because of the authority given to him by the PCSO, which in turn
had been granted a franchise to operate the lotto by Congress.
10

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the State, contends that the Provincial Government of Laguna has no power to prohibit a form
of gambling which has been authorized by the national government.
11
He argues that this is based on the principle that ordinances should not
contravene statutes as municipal governments are merely agents of the national government. The local councils exercise only delegated
legislative powers which have been conferred on them by Congress. This being the case, these councils, as delegates, cannot be superior to
the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. The OSG also adds that the question of whether gambling should be
permitted is for Congress to determine, taking into account national and local interests. Since Congress has allowed the PCSO to operate
lotteries which PCSO seeks to conduct in Laguna, pursuant to its legislative grant of authority, the province's Sangguniang
Panlalawigan cannot nullify the exercise of said authority by preventing something already allowed by Congress.
The issues to be resolved now are the following: (1) whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna
and the denial of a mayor's permit based thereon are valid; and (2) whether prior consultations and approval by the
concerned Sanggunian are needed before a lotto system can be operated in a given local government unit.
The entire controversy stemmed from the refusal of Mayor Cataquiz to issue a mayor's permit for the operation of a lotto outlet in favor of
private respondent. According to the mayor, he based his decision on an existing ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto in the province
of Laguna. The ordinance, however, merely states the "objection" of the council to the said game. It is but a mere policy statement on the
part of the local council, which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve as a valid ground to prohibit the operation of the lotto system in the
province of Laguna. Even petitioners admit as much when they stated in their petition that:
5.7. The terms of the Resolution and the validity thereof are express and clear. The Resolution is a policy declaration of the
Provincial Government of Laguna of its vehement opposition and/or objection to the operation of and/or all forms of gambling
including the Lotto operation in the Province of Laguna.
12

As a policy statement expressing the local government's objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the local government's
autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national government's. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does
not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the
assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.
The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the national government through an Act of Congress. Republic Act 1169, as
amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 42, is the law which grants a franchise to the PCSO and allows it to operate the lotteries. The pertinent
provision reads:
SECTION 1. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, hereinafter designated
the Office, shall be the principal government agency for raising and providing for funds for health programs, medical assistance
and services and charities of national character, and as such shall have the general powers conferred in section thirteen of Act
Numbered One thousand four hundred fifty-nine, as amended, and shall have the authority:
A. To hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities, in such frequency and manner, as shall
be determined, and subject to such rules and regulations as shall be promulgated by the Board of Directors.
This statute remains valid today. While lotto is clearly a game of chance, the national government deems it wise and proper to permit it.
Hence, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, a local government unit, cannot issue a resolution or an ordinance that would seek to
prohibit permits. Stated otherwise, what the national legislature expressly allows by law, such as lotto, a provincial board may not disallow by
ordinance or resolution.
In our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated
power coming from Congress. As held in Tatel vs. Virac,
13
ordinances should not contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress. The
reasons for this is obvious, as elucidated inMagtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp.
14

Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers
conferred upon them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise
powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress,
from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the
breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control.
Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of
so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the state, and the corporation
could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to
phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature (citing Clinton vs. Ceder Rapids, etc. Railroad Co., 24 Iowa 455).
Nothing in the present constitutional provision enhancing local autonomy dictates a different conclusion.
The basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new
provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here
confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our
previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to
withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local
government units of the power to tax (citing Art. X, Sec. 5, Constitution), which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and
large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or
violate it.
15

Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being so, any form of autonomy granted to local governments will necessarily
be limited and confined within the extent allowed by the central authority. Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987
Constitution simply means "decentralization". It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio".
16

To conclude our resolution of the first issue, respondent mayor of San Pedro, cannot avail of Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of the
Provincial Board of Laguna as justification to prohibit lotto in his municipality. For said resolution is nothing but an expression of the local
legislative unit concerned. The Board's enactment, like spring water, could not rise above its source of power, the national legislature.
As for the second issue, we hold that petitioners erred in declaring that Sections 2 (c) and 27 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991, apply mandatorily in the setting up of lotto outlets around the country. These provisions state:
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. . . .
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with
appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community
before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions.
SECTION 27. Prior Consultations Required. No project or program shall be implemented by government authorities unless the
consultations mentioned in Section 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is
obtained; Provided, that occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless, appropriate
relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
From a careful reading of said provisions, we find that these apply only to national programs and/or projects which are to be implemented in
a particular local community. Lotto is neither a program nor a project of the national government, but of a charitable institution, the PCSO.
Though sanctioned by the national government, it is far fetched to say that lotto falls within the contemplation of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of the
Local Government Code.
Section 27 of the Code should be read in conjunction with Section 26 thereof.
17
Section 26 reads:
SECTION 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological Balance. - It shall be the duty of every
national agency or government-owned or controlled corporation authorizing or involved in the planning and implementation of any
project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of crop land, range-land,
or forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant species, to consult with the local government units, nongovernmental
organizations, and other sectors concerned and explain the goals and objectives of the project or program, its impact upon the
people and the community in terms of environmental or ecological balance, and the measures that will be undertaken to prevent
or minimize the adverse effects thereof.
Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be interpreted to mean projects and programs whose effects are among
those enumerated in Section 26 and 27, to wit, those that: (1) may cause pollution; (2) may bring about climatic change; (3) may cause the
depletion of non-renewable resources; (4) may result in loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover; (5) may eradicate certain animal or
plant species from the face of the planet; and (6) other projects or programs that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people
residing in the locality where these will be implemented. Obviously, none of these effects will be produced by the introduction of lotto in the
province of Laguna.
Moreover, the argument regarding lack of consultation raised by petitioners is clearly an afterthought on their part. There is no indication in
the letter of Mayor Cataquiz that this was one of the reasons for his refusal to issue a permit. That refusal was predicated solely but
erroneously on the provisions of Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, Taon 1995, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna.
In sum, we find no reversible error in the RTC decision enjoining Mayor Cataquiz from enforcing or implementing the Kapasiyahan Blg. 508,
T. 1995, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna. That resolution expresses merely a policy statement of the Laguna provincial board. It
possesses no binding legal force nor requires any act of implementation. It provides no sufficient legal basis for respondent mayor's refusal
to issue the permit sought by private respondent in connection with a legitimate business activity authorized by a law passed by Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna enjoining the petitioners
from implementing or enforcing Resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995, of the Provincial Board of Laguna is hereby AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 91649 May 14, 1991
ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND LORENZO SANCHEZ,petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), respondent.
H.B. Basco & Associates for petitioners.
Valmonte Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioners.
Aguirre, Laborte and Capule for respondent PAGCOR.

PARAS, J .:p
A TV ad proudly announces:
"The new PAGCOR responding through responsible gaming."
But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because
A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It waived the Manila City
government's right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law;
B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has intruded into the local
government's right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined
principle of local autonomy;
C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR conducted gambling, while
most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices;
D. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free
enterprise and privatization. (p. 2, Amended Petition; p. 7, Rollo)
In their Second Amended Petition, petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the declared national policy of the "new restored
democracy" and the people's will as expressed in the 1987 Constitution. The decree is said to have a "gambling objective" and therefore is
contrary to Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of Article VIII and Section 3 (2) of Article XIV, of the present Constitution (p. 3, Second
Amended Petition; p. 21, Rollo).
The procedural issue is whether petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers (petitioner Basco being also the Chairman of the Committee
on Laws of the City Council of Manila), can question and seek the annulment of PD 1869 on the alleged grounds mentioned above.
The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D. 1067-A dated January 1, 1977 and was
granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B also dated January 1, 1977 "to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines." Its operation was originally conducted in the well known floating casino "Philippine Tourist."
The operation was considered a success for it proved to be a potential source of revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-economic projects,
thus, P.D. 1399 was passed on June 2, 1978 for PAGCOR to fully attain this objective.
Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and centralize all games of
chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law, under the following declared policy
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to centralize and integrate all games
of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law in order to attain the following objectives:
(a) To centralize and integrate the right and authority to operate and conduct games of chance into one corporate entity
to be controlled, administered and supervised by the Government.
(b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation, including sports gaming pools,
(basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of amusement and recreation including games of chance,
which may be allowed by law within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and which will: (1) generate sources of
additional revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-civic projects, such as flood control programs, beautification,
sewerage and sewage projects, Tulungan ng Bayan Centers, Nutritional Programs, Population Control and such other
essential public services; (2) create recreation and integrated facilities which will expand and improve the country's
existing tourist attractions; and (3) minimize, if not totally eradicate, all the evils, malpractices and corruptions that are
normally prevalent on the conduct and operation of gambling clubs and casinos without direct government involvement.
(Section 1, P.D. 1869)
To attain these objectives PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines. Under its Charter's repealing clause, all laws,
decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, inconsistent therewith, are accordingly repealed, amended or modified.
It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of government revenue, next to the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of
Customs. In 1989 alone, PAGCOR earned P3.43 Billion, and directly remitted to the National Government a total of P2.5 Billion in form of
franchise tax, government's income share, the President's Social Fund and Host Cities' share. In addition, PAGCOR sponsored other socio-
cultural and charitable projects on its own or in cooperation with various governmental agencies, and other private associations and
organizations. In its 3 1/2 years of operation under the present administration, PAGCOR remitted to the government a total of P6.2 Billion. As
of December 31, 1989, PAGCOR was employing 4,494 employees in its nine (9) casinos nationwide, directly supporting the livelihood of
Four Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Four (4,494) families.
But the petitioners, are questioning the validity of P.D. No. 1869. They allege that the same is "null and void" for being "contrary to morals,
public policy and public order," monopolistic and tends toward "crony economy", and is violative of the equal protection clause and local
autonomy as well as for running counter to the state policies enunciated in Sections 11 (Personal Dignity and Human Rights), 12 (Family)
and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II, Section 1 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution.
This challenge to P.D. No. 1869 deserves a searching and thorough scrutiny and the most deliberate consideration by the Court, involving as
it does the exercise of what has been described as "the highest and most delicate function which belongs to the judicial department of the
government." (State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144; Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323).
As We enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the government We need not be
reminded of the time-honored principle, deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence, that a statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption must
be indulged in favor of its constitutionality. This is not to say that We approach Our task with diffidence or timidity. Where it is clear that the
legislature or the executive for that matter, has over-stepped the limits of its authority under the constitution, We should not hesitate to wield
the axe and let it fall heavily, as fall it must, on the offending statute (Lozano v. Martinez, supra).
In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, et al, 59 SCRA 54, the Court thru Mr. Justice Zaldivar underscored the
. . . thoroughly established principle which must be followed in all cases where questions of constitutionality as obtain in
the instant cases are involved. All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute
alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not
render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld
and the challenger must negate all possible basis; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy or
expediency of a statute and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation
should be adopted. (Danner v. Hass, 194 N.W. 2nd 534, 539; Spurbeck v. Statton, 106 N.W. 2nd 660, 663; 59 SCRA
66; see also e.g. Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734, 739 [1970]; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30, 55
[1978]; and Heirs of Ordona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, 241-242 [1983] cited in Citizens Alliance for Consumer
Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521, 540)
Of course, there is first, the procedural issue. The respondents are questioning the legal personality of petitioners to file the instant petition.
Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to
determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that
they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this
petition. (Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371)
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, We hold that the same is
satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an
immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. And even if, strictly speaking they are not covered
by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the
impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of
several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were involving only an indirect and general interest
shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that
"the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must technicalities of procedure." We have since then applied the exception in many other cases.
(Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343).
Having disposed of the procedural issue, We will now discuss the substantive issues raised.
Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But the prohibition of gambling does not mean that the Government
cannot regulate it in the exercise of its police power.
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." (Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, 487) As defined, it consists
of (1) an imposition or restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has
been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. (Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v.
Drilon, 163 SCRA 386).
Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for
an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuming the greatest benefits. (Edu v. Ericta, supra)
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the charter. Along with the taxing power and
eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to
perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary
power of the state "to govern its citizens". (Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 323, 1978). The police power of the State is a power co-
extensive with self-protection and is most aptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." (Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil.
660, 708) It is "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers." (Smith Bell & Co. v. National, 40 Phil. 136) It is a dynamic force that
enables the state to meet the agencies of the winds of change.
What was the reason behind the enactment of P.D. 1869?
P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to "regulate and centralize thru an appropriate institution all games of
chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law" (1st whereas clause, PD 1869). As was subsequently proved, regulating and
centralizing gambling operations in one corporate entity the PAGCOR, was beneficial not just to the Government but to society in general.
It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the cash strapped Government. It provided funds for social impact projects and subjected
gambling to "close scrutiny, regulation, supervision and control of the Government" (4th Whereas Clause, PD 1869). With the creation of
PAGCOR and the direct intervention of the Government, the evil practices and corruptions that go with gambling will be minimized if not
totally eradicated. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of PD 1896.
Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees; that the exemption
clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of the principle of local autonomy. They must be referring to Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts
PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any "tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of
whatever nature, whether National or Local."
(2) Income and other taxes. a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise as well as fees,
charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local, shall be assessed and collected under this franchise
from the Corporation; nor shall any form or tax or charge attach in any way to the earnings of the Corporation, except a
franchise tax of five (5%) percent of the gross revenues or earnings derived by the Corporation from its operations
under this franchise. Such tax shall be due and payable quarterly to the National Government and shall be in lieu of all
kinds of taxes, levies, fees or assessments of any kind, nature or description, levied, established or collected by any
municipal, provincial or national government authority (Section 13 [2]).
Their contention stated hereinabove is without merit for the following reasons:
(a) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes (Icard v. City of Baguio, 83 Phil. 870; City of
Iloilo v. Villanueva, 105 Phil. 337; Santos v. Municipality of Caloocan, 7 SCRA 643). Thus, "the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent
to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it" (Medina v. City of Baguio, 12 SCRA 62). Its "power to tax" therefore must always
yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the "inherent power to tax" (Bernas, the
Revised [1973] Philippine Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983 ed. p. 445).
(b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that "municipal corporations are mere creatures
of Congress" (Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No. 7909, January 18, 1957) which has the power to "create and abolish municipal corporations" due to
its "general legislative powers" (Asuncion v. Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5 SCRA 541). Congress, therefore, has the power of
control over Local governments (Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No. 9124, July 2, 1950). And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to
tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
(c) The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As early as 1975, the power of local governments
to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the
National Government, thus:
Sec. 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the authority of chartered cities and other local
governments to issue license, permit or other form of franchise to operate, maintain and establish horse and dog race
tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling is hereby revoked.
Sec. 2. Hereafter, all permits or franchises to operate, maintain and establish, horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and
other forms of gambling shall be issued by the national government upon proper application and verification of the
qualification of the applicant . . .
Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue "licenses or permits" for the operation of gambling. Necessarily, the power
to demand or collect license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of "licenses or permits" is no longer vested in the City of Manila.
(d) Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled
corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. In addition to its corporate
powers (Sec. 3, Title II, PD 1869) it also exercises regulatory powers thus:
Sec. 9. Regulatory Power. The Corporation shall maintain a Registry of the affiliated entities, and shall exercise all
the powers, authority and the responsibilities vested in the Securities and Exchange Commission over such affiliating
entities mentioned under the preceding section, including, but not limited to amendments of Articles of Incorporation
and By-Laws, changes in corporate term, structure, capitalization and other matters concerning the operation of the
affiliated entities, the provisions of the Corporation Code of the Philippines to the contrary notwithstanding, except only
with respect to original incorporation.
PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an
agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from
local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government.
The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in any manner control the operation of
constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the federal government. (MC
Culloch v. Marland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579)
This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over local governments.
Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire absence of power on the part of the
States to touch, in that way (taxation) at least, the instrumentalities of the United States (Johnson v. Maryland, 254 US
51) and it can be agreed that no state or political subdivision can regulate a federal instrumentality in such a way as to
prevent it from consummating its federal responsibilities, or even to seriously burden it in the accomplishment of them.
(Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140, emphasis supplied)
Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru extermination of what local authorities may perceive to be
undesirable activities or enterprise using the power to tax as "a tool for regulation" (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US 42).
The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the "power to destroy" (Mc Culloch v. Maryland, supra) cannot be allowed to defeat
an instrumentality or creation of the very entity which has the inherent power to wield it.
(e) Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by P.D. 1869. This is a pointless argument.
Article X of the 1987 Constitution (on Local Autonomy) provides:
Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees,
and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic
policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government. (emphasis
supplied)
The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which Congress may provide by law. Since PD
1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains
as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is
consistent with the principle of local autonomy.
Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization" (III Records of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission, pp. 435-436, as cited in Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does not
make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio."
Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has
substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of government, such as the government under the Philippine
Constitution, local governments can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be
an imperium in imperio. Local government in such a system can only mean a measure of decentralization of the
function of government. (emphasis supplied)
As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what may be delegated to local government units remains a matter of policy, which
concerns wisdom. It is therefore a political question. (Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 539).
What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the sole
prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local governments.
As gambling is usually an offense against the State, legislative grant or express charter power is generally necessary to
empower the local corporation to deal with the subject. . . . In the absence of express grant of power to
enact, ordinance provisions on this subject which are inconsistent with the state laws are void. (Ligan v. Gadsden, Ala
App. 107 So. 733 Ex-Parte Solomon, 9, Cals. 440, 27 PAC 757 following in re Ah You, 88 Cal. 99, 25 PAC 974, 22 Am
St. Rep. 280, 11 LRA 480, as cited in Mc Quinllan Vol. 3 Ibid, p. 548, emphasis supplied)
Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution, because "it legalized PAGCOR conducted
gambling, while most gambling are outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices" (p. 82, Rollo).
We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal
protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as
long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law does not have to operate in equal
force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December
21, 1989).
The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules
shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847). The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in
law as though they were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827).
Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is not clearly explained in the petition.
The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D 449) horse racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes,
lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the
applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.
If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to
which it might have been applied. (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827)
The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not mean that all occupations called by the same name must
be treated the same way; the state may do what it can to prevent which is deemed as evil and stop short of those
cases in which harm to the few concerned is not less than the harm to the public that would insure if the rule laid down
were made mathematically exact. (Dominican Hotel v. Arizona, 249 US 2651).
Anent petitioners' claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the "avowed trend of the Cory Government away from monopolies and crony economy
and toward free enterprise and privatization" suffice it to state that this is not a ground for this Court to nullify P.D. 1869. If, indeed, PD 1869
runs counter to the government's policies then it is for the Executive Department to recommend to Congress its repeal or amendment.
The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is and not what the law should be.
Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of government and of the
people themselves as the repository of all state power. (Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256).
On the issue of "monopoly," however, the Constitution provides that:
Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint
of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed. (Art. XII, National Economy and Patrimony)
It should be noted that, as the provision is worded, monopolies are not necessarily prohibited by the Constitution. The state must still decide
whether public interest demands that monopolies be regulated or prohibited. Again, this is a matter of policy for the Legislature to decide.
On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personality Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13
(Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are
merely statements of principles and, policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to
clearly define and effectuate such principles.
In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement
through the courts. They were rather directives addressed to the executive and the legislature. If the executive and the
legislature failed to heed the directives of the articles the available remedy was not judicial or political. The electorate
could express their displeasure with the failure of the executive and the legislature through the language of the ballot.
(Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2)
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality (Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387; Salas v. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734;
Peralta v. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30; Abbas v. Comelec, 179 SCRA 287). Therefore, for PD 1869 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be
clear and beyond reasonable doubt. (Peralta v. Comelec, supra) Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof,
unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a declaration. Otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by
petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of P.D. 1869, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The
dismissal of this petition is therefore, inevitable. But as to whether P.D. 1869 remains a wise legislation considering the issues of "morality,
monopoly, trend to free enterprise, privatization as well as the state principles on social justice, role of youth and educational values" being
raised, is up for Congress to determine.
As this Court held in Citizens' Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521
Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137 has, in any case, in its favor the presumption
of validity and constitutionality which petitioners Valmonte and the KMU have not overturned. Petitioners have not
undertaken to identify the provisions in the Constitution which they claim to have been violated by that statute. This
Court, however, is not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the assailed legislation may possibly offend some
provision of the Constitution. The Court notes, further, in this respect that petitioners have in the main put in question
the wisdom, justice and expediency of the establishment of the OPSF, issues which are not properly addressed to this
Court and which this Court may not constitutionally pass upon. Those issues should be addressed rather to the political
departments of government: the President and the Congress.
Parenthetically, We wish to state that gambling is generally immoral, and this is precisely so when the gambling resorted to is excessive. This
excessiveness necessarily depends not only on the financial resources of the gambler and his family but also on his mental, social, and
spiritual outlook on life. However, the mere fact that some persons may have lost their material fortunes, mental control, physical health, or
even their lives does not necessarily mean that the same are directly attributable to gambling. Gambling may have been the antecedent,but
certainly not necessarily the cause. For the same consequences could have been preceded by an overdose of food, drink, exercise, work,
and even sex.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ.,
concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 135962 March 27, 2000
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent.
PUNO, J .:
Not infrequently, the government is tempted to take legal shortcuts solve urgent problems of the people. But even when government is
armed with the best of intention, we cannot allow it to run roughshod over the rule of law. Again, we let the hammer fall and fall hard on the
illegal attempt of the MMDA to open for public use a private road in a private subdivision. While we hold that the general welfare should be
promoted, we stress that it should not be achieved at the expense of the rule of law.
Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-Air Village Association,
Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City.
Respondent BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting
respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. The notice reads:
SUBJECT: NOTICE of the Opening of Neptune Street to Traffic.
Dear President Lindo,
Please be informed that pursuant to the mandate of the MMDA law or Republic Act No. 7924 which requires the Authority to
rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of persons, Neptune Street shall be
opened to vehicular traffic effective January 2, 1996.
In view whereof, the undersigned requests you to voluntarily open the points of entry and exit on said street.
Thank you for your cooperation and whatever assistance that may be extended by your association to the MMDA personnel who
will be directing traffic in the area.
Finally, we are furnishing you with a copy of the handwritten instruction of the President on the matter.
Very truly yours,
PROSPERO I. ORETA
Chairman
1

On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue
would be demolished.
On January 2, 1996, respondent instituted against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 136, Makati City, Civil Case No. 96-001
for injunction. Respondent prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of
Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order the following day.
On January 23, 1996, after due hearing, the trial court denied issuance of a preliminary injunction.
2
Respondent questioned the denial before
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39549. The appellate court conducted an ocular inspection of Neptune Street
3
and on February 13,
1996, it issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the MMDA's proposed action.
4

On January 28, 1997, the appellate court rendered a Decision on the merits of the case finding that the MMDA has no authority to order the
opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the
City Council of Makati by ordinance. The decision disposed of as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the challenged Order dated January 23, 1995, in Civil Case No. 96-001, is SET ASIDE
and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued on February 13, 1996 is hereby made permanent.
For want of sustainable substantiation, the Motion to Cite Roberto L. del Rosario in contempt is denied.
5

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
6

The Motion for Reconsideration of the decision was denied on September 28, 1998. Hence, this recourse.
Petitioner MMDA raises the following questions:
I
HAS THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (MMDA) THE MANDATE TO OPEN NEPTUNE STREET TO
PUBLIC TRAFFIC PURSUANT TO ITS REGULATORY AND POLICE POWERS?
II
IS THE PASSAGE OF AN ORDINANCE A CONDITION PRECEDENT BEFORE THE MMDA MAY ORDER THE OPENING OF
SUBDIVISION ROADS TO PUBLIC TRAFFIC?
III
IS RESPONDENT BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC. ESTOPPED FROM DENYING OR ASSAILING THE AUTHORITY OF
THE MMDA TO OPEN THE SUBJECT STREET?
IV
WAS RESPONDENT DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS DESPITE THE SEVERAL MEETINGS HELD BETWEEN MMDA AND THE
AFFECTED EEL-AIR RESIDENTS AND BAVA OFFICERS?
V
HAS RESPONDENT COME TO COURT WITH UNCLEAN HANDS?
7

Neptune Street is owned by respondent BAVA. It is a private road inside Bel-Air Village, a private residential subdivision in the heart of the
financial and commercial district of Makati City. It runs parallel to Kalayaan Avenue, a national road open to the general public. Dividing the
two (2) streets is a concrete perimeter wall approximately fifteen (15) feet high. The western end of Neptune Street intersects Nicanor Garcia,
formerly Reposo Street, a subdivision road open to public vehicular traffic, while its eastern end intersects Makati Avenue, a national road.
Both ends of Neptune Street are guarded by iron gates.
Petitioner MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with
police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. One of these basic services is traffic management which involves the
regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and welfare of the general public. It is alleged that the police power
of MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court.
8
From the premise that it has
police power, it is now urged that there is no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to the public.
9

Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make,
ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant
to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.
10
The power is
plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general
welfare.
11

It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature.
12
It cannot be exercised by any group or body of
individuals not possessing legislative power.
13
The National Legislature, however, may delegatethis power to the President and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units.
14
Once delegated, the agents
can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
15

A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs."
16
The
Local Government Code of 1991 defines a local government unit as a "body politic and corporate."
17
one endowed with powers as a
political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory.
18
Local government
units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.
19
They are also the territorial and political subdivisions of the state.
20

Our Congress delegated police power to the local government units in the Local Government Code of 1991. This delegation is found in
Section 16 of the same Code, known as the general welfare clause, viz:
Sec. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall
ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right
of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment
among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
21

Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies. The legislative body of the provincial government is
the sangguniang panlalawigan, that of the city government is the sangguniang panlungsod, that of the municipal government is
the sangguniang bayan, and that of the barangay is thesangguniang barangay. The Local Government Code of 1991 empowers
the sangguniang panlalawigan,sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or municipality, as the case may be], and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code
and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the [province, city municipality] provided under the Code . . . "
22
The same Code gives
the sangguniang barangay the power to "enact ordinances as may be necessary to discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law or
ordinance and to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants thereon."
23

Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units i.e., twelve (12) cities and five (5) municipalities,
namely, the cities of Caloocan, Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon, Muntinlupa, Las Pinas, Marikina, Paranaque and
Valenzuela, and the municipalities of Malabon, Navotas, Pateros, San Juan and Taguig. With the passage of Republic Act (R. A.)
No. 7924
24
in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and administrative region" and the Administration
of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA.
25

"Metro-wide services" are those "services which have metro-wide impact and transcend local political boundaries or entail huge expenditures
such that it would not be viable for said services to be provided by the individual local government units comprising Metro Manila."
26
There
are seven (7) basic metro-wide services and the scope of these services cover the following: (1) development planning; (2) transport and
traffic management; (3) solid waste disposal and management; (4) flood control and sewerage management; (5) urban renewal, zoning and
land use planning, and shelter services; (6) health and sanitation, urban protection and pollution control; and (7) public safety. The basic
service of transport and traffic management includes the following:
(b) Transport and traffic management which include the formulation, coordination, and monitoring of policies, standards, programs
and projects to rationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares, and promotion
of safe and convenient movement of persons and goods; provision for the mass transport system and the institution of a system to
regulate road users;administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic
education programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metropolitan Manila;"
27

In the delivery of the seven (7) basic services, the MMDA has the following powers and functions:
Sec. 5. Functions and powers of the Metro Manila Development Authority. The MMDA shall:
(a) Formulate, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium and long-term plans and programs for the delivery of metro-
wide services, land use and physical development within Metropolitan Manila, consistent with national development objectives and
priorities;
(b) Prepare, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium-term investment programs for metro-wide services which shall
indicate sources and uses of funds for priority programs and projects, and which shall include the packaging of projects and
presentation to funding institutions;
(c) Undertake and manage on its own metro-wide programs and projects for the delivery of specific services under its jurisdiction,
subject to the approval of the Council. For this purpose, MMDA can create appropriate project management offices;
(d) Coordinate and monitor the implementation of such plans, programs and projects in Metro Manila; identify bottlenecks and
adopt solutions to problems of implementation;
(e) The MMDA shall set the policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate the implementation of all
programs and projects concerning traffic management, specifically pertaining to enforcement, engineering and education. Upon
request, it shall be extended assistance and cooperation,including but not limited to, assignment of personnel, by all other
government agencies and offices concerned;
(f) Install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic
rules and regulations, whether moving or non-moving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the
enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of RA 4136 and PD 1605 to the contrary notwithstanding. For this
purpose, the Authority shall impose all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center, and may
deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed security guards, or members of non-
governmental organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to such conditions and requirements as the
Authority may impose; and
(g) Perform other related functions required to achieve the objectives of the MMDA, including the undertaking of delivery of basic
services to the local government units, when deemed necessary subject to prior coordination with and consent of the local
government unit concerned.
The implementation of the MMDA's plans, programs and projects is undertaken by the local government units, national government
agencies, accredited people's organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector as well as by the MMDA itself. For this
purpose, the MMDA has the power to enter into contracts, memoranda of agreement and other arrangements with these bodies for the
delivery of the required services Metro Manila.
28

The governing board of the MMDA is the Metro Manila Council. The Council is composed of the mayors of the component 12 cities and 5
municipalities, the president of the Metro Manila Vice-Mayors' League and the president of the Metro Manila Councilors' League.
29
The
Council is headed by Chairman who is appointed by the President and vested with the rank of cabinet member. As the policy-making body of
the MMDA, the Metro Manila Council approves metro-wide plans, programs and projects, and issues the necessary rules and regulations for
the implementation of said plans; it approves the annual budget of the MMDA and promulgate the rules and regulations for the delivery of
basic services, collection of service and regulatory fees, fines and penalties. These functions are particularly enumerated as follows:
Sec. 6. Functions of the Metro Manila Council.
(a) The Council shall be the policy-making body of the MMDA;
(b) It shall approve metro-wide plans, programs and projects and issue rules and regulations deemed necessary by the MMDA to
carry out the purposes of this Act;
(c) It may increase the rate of allowances and per diems of the members of the Council to be effective during the term of the
succeeding Council. It shall fix the compensation of the officers and personnel of the MMDA, and approve the annual budget
thereof for submission to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM);
(d) It shall promulgate rules and regulations and set policies and standards for metro-wide application governing the delivery of
basic services, prescribe and collect service and regulatory fees, and impose and collect fines and penalties.
Clearly, the scope of the MMDA's function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic services. One of these is transport and traffic
management which includes the formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and projects to rationalize the existing transport
operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares and promotion of the safe movement of persons and goods. It also covers
the mass transport system and the institution of a system of road regulation, the administration of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic
engineering services and traffic education programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic violations.
Under the service, the MMDA is expressly authorized "to set the policies concerning traffic" and "coordinate and regulate the implementation
of all traffic management programs." In addition, the MMDA may "install and administer a single ticketing system," fix, impose and collect
fines and penalties for all traffic violations.
It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation,
preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924
that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power.
Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to
"enact ordinances, approve resolutions appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as
termed in the charter itself, "development authority."
30
It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with
the various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient
and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually
summed up in the charter itself, viz:
Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. . . . .
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exerciseregulatory and supervisory
authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of the local government
units concerning purely local matters.
31

Petitioner cannot seek refuge in the cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court
32
where we upheld a zoning ordinance issued by
the Metro Manila Commission (MMC), the predecessor of the MMDA, as an exercise of police power. The first Sangalang decision was on
the merits of the petition,
33
while the second decision denied reconsideration of the first case and in addition discussed the case of Yabut
v. Court of Appeals.
34

Sangalang v. IAC involved five (5) consolidated petitions filed by respondent BAVA and three residents of Bel-Air Village against other
residents of the Village and the Ayala Corporation, formerly the Makati Development Corporation, as the developer of the subdivision. The
petitioners sought to enforce certain restrictive easements in the deeds of sale over their respective lots in the subdivision. These were the
prohibition on the setting up of commercial and advertising signs on the lots, and the condition that the lots be used only for residential
purposes. Petitioners alleged that respondents, who were residents along Jupiter Street of the subdivision, converted their residences into
commercial establishments in violation of the "deed restrictions," and that respondent Ayala Corporation ushered in the full
commercialization" of Jupiter Street by tearing down the perimeter wall that separated the commercial from the residential section of the
village.
35

The petitions were dismissed based on Ordinance No. 81 of the Municipal Council of Makati and Ordinance No. 81-01 of the Metro Manila
Commission (MMC). Municipal Ordinance No. 81 classified Bel-Air Village as a Class A Residential Zone, with its boundary in the south
extending to the center line of Jupiter Street. The Municipal Ordinance was adopted by the MMC under the Comprehensive Zoning
Ordinance for the National Capital Region and promulgated as MMC Ordinance No. 81-01. Bel-Air Village was indicated therein as bounded
by Jupiter Street and the block adjacent thereto was classified as a High Intensity Commercial Zone.
36

We ruled that since both Ordinances recognized Jupiter Street as the boundary between Bel-Air Village and the commercial district, Jupiter
Street was not for the exclusive benefit of Bel-Air residents. We also held that the perimeter wall on said street was constructed not to
separate the residential from the commercial blocks but simply for security reasons, hence, in tearing down said wall, Ayala Corporation did
not violate the "deed restrictions" in the deeds of sale.
We upheld the ordinances, specifically MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, as a legitimate exercise of police power.
37
The power of the MMC and
the Makati Municipal Council to enact zoning ordinances for the general welfare prevailed over the "deed restrictions".
In the second Sangalang/Yabut decision, we held that the opening of Jupiter Street was warranted by the demands of the common good in
terms of "traffic decongestion and public convenience." Jupiter was opened by the Municipal Mayor to alleviate traffic congestion along the
public streets adjacent to the Village.
38
The same reason was given for the opening to public vehicular traffic of Orbit Street, a road inside the
same village. The destruction of the gate in Orbit Street was also made under the police power of the municipal government. The gate, like
the perimeter wall along Jupiter, was a public nuisance because it hindered and impaired the use of property, hence, its summary abatement
by the mayor was proper and legal.
39

Contrary to petitioner's claim, the two Sangalang cases do not apply to the case at bar. Firstly, both involved zoning ordinances passed by
the municipal council of Makati and the MMC. In the instant case, the basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is contained in the
notice of December 22, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent BAVA, through its president. The notice does not cite any ordinance or law,
either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street.
Petitioner MMDA simply relied on its authority under its charter "to rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and
convenient movement of persons." Rationalizing the use of roads and thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall within the scope of transport
and traffic management. By no stretch of the imagination, however, can this be interpreted as an express or implied grant of ordinance-
making power, much less police power.
Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although the MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, an
examination of Presidential Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the latter possessed greater powers which were not
bestowed on the present MMDA.
Metropolitan Manila was first created in 1975 by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 824. It comprised the Greater Manila Area composed of the
contiguous four (4) cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay and Caloocan, and the thirteen (13) municipalities of Makati, Mandaluyong, San Juan,
Las Pinas, Malabon, Navotas, Pasig, Pateros, Paranaque, Marikina, Muntinlupa and Taguig in the province of Rizal, and Valenzuela in the
province of Bulacan.
40
Metropolitan Manila was created as a response to the finding that the rapid growth of population and the increase of
social and economic requirements in these areas demand a call for simultaneous and unified development; that the public services rendered
by the respective local governments could be administered more efficiently and economically if integrated under a system of central planning;
and this coordination, "especially in the maintenance of peace and order and the eradication of social and economic ills that fanned the
flames of rebellion and discontent [were] part of reform measures under Martial Law essential to the safety and security of the State."
41

Metropolitan Manila was established as a "public corporation" with the following powers:
Sec. 1. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila. There is hereby created a public corporation, to be known as the Metropolitan
Manila, vested with powers and attributes of a corporation including the power to make contracts, sue and be
sued, acquire, purchase, expropriate, hold, transfer and dispose of property and such other powers as are necessary to carry out
its purposes. The Corporation shall be administered by a Commission created under this Decree.
42

The administration of Metropolitan Manila was placed under the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) vested with the following powers:
Sec. 4. Powers and Functions of the Commission. The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:
1. To act as a central government to establish and administer programs and provide services common to the area;
2. To levy and collect taxes and special assessments, borrow and expend money and issue bonds, revenue certificates, and other
obligations of indebtedness. Existing tax measures should, however, continue to be operative until otherwise modified or repealed
by the Commission;
3. To charge and collect fees for the use of public service facilities;
4. To appropriate money for the operation of the metropolitan government and review appropriations for the city and municipal
units within its jurisdiction with authority to disapprove the same if found to be not in accordance with the established policies of
the Commission, without prejudice to any contractual obligation of the local government units involved existing at the time of
approval of this Decree;
5. To review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances, resolutions and acts of cities and municipalities within Metropolitan Manila;
6. To enact or approve ordinances, resolutions and to fix penalties for any violation thereof which shall not exceed a fine of
P10,000.00 or imprisonment of six years or both such fine and imprisonment for a single offense;
7. To perform general administrative, executive and policy-making functions;
8. To establish a fire control operation center, which shall direct the fire services of the city and municipal governments in the
metropolitan area;
9. To establish a garbage disposal operation center, which shall direct garbage collection and disposal in the metropolitan area;
10. To establish and operate a transport and traffic center, which shall direct traffic activities;
11. To coordinate and monitor governmental and private activities pertaining to essential services such as transportation, flood
control and drainage, water supply and sewerage, social, health and environmental services, housing, park development, and
others;
12. To insure and monitor the undertaking of a comprehensive social, economic and physical planning and development of the
area;
13. To study the feasibility of increasing barangay participation in the affairs of their respective local governments and to propose
to the President of the Philippines definite programs and policies for implementation;
14. To submit within thirty (30) days after the close of each fiscal year an annual report to the President of the Philippines and to
submit a periodic report whenever deemed necessary; and
15. To perform such other tasks as may be assigned or directed by the President of the Philippines.
The MMC was the "central government" of Metro Manila for the purpose of establishing and administering programs providing services
common to the area. As a "central government" it had the power to levy and collect taxes and special assessments, the power to charge and
collect fees; the power to appropriate money for its operation, and at the same time, review appropriations for the city and municipal units
within its jurisdiction. It was bestowed the power to enact or approve ordinances, resolutions and fix penalties for violation of such ordinances
and resolutions. It also had the power to review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances, resolutions and acts of any of the four (4) cities and
thirteen (13) municipalities comprising Metro Manila.
P.D. No. 824 further provided:
Sec. 9. Until otherwise provided, the governments of the four cities and thirteen municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila shall
continue to exist in their present form except as may be inconsistent with this Decree. The members of the existing city and
municipal councils in Metropolitan Manila shall, upon promulgation of this Decree, and until December 31, 1975, become
members of the Sangguniang Bayan which is hereby created for every city and municipality of Metropolitan Manila.
In addition, the Sangguniang Bayan shall be composed of as many barangay captains as may be determined and chosen by the
Commission, and such number of representatives from other sectors of the society as may be appointed by the President upon
recommendation of the Commission.
x x x x x x x x x
The Sangguniang Bayan may recommend to the Commission ordinances, resolutions or such measures as it may adopt;
Provided, that no such ordinance, resolution or measure shall become effective, until after its approval by the Commission; and
Provided further, that the power to impose taxes and other levies, the power to appropriate money and the power to pass
ordinances or resolutions with penal sanctions shall be vested exclusively in the Commission.
The creation of the MMC also carried with it the creation of the Sangguniang Bayan. This was composed of the members of the component
city and municipal councils, barangay captains chosen by the MMC and sectoral representatives appointed by the President.
The Sangguniang Bayan had the power to recommend to the MMC the adoption of ordinances, resolutions or measures. It was the MMC
itself, however, that possessed legislative powers. All ordinances, resolutions and measures recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan were
subject to the MMC's approval. Moreover, the power to impose taxes and other levies, the power to appropriate money, and the power to
pass ordinances or resolutions with penal sanctions were vested exclusively in the MMC.
Thus, Metropolitan Manila had a "central government," i.e., the MMC which fully possessed legislative police powers. Whatever legislative
powers the component cities and municipalities had were all subject to review and approval by the MMC.
After President Corazon Aquino assumed power, there was a clamor to restore the autonomy of the local government units in Metro Manila.
Hence, Sections 1 and 2 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution provided:
Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as herein provided.
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
The Constitution, however, recognized the necessity of creating metropolitan regions not only in the existing National Capital Region but also
in potential equivalents in the Visayas and Mindanao.
43
Section 11 of the same Article X thus provided:
Sec. 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in
Section 10 hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own
local executives and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be
limited to basic services requiring coordination.
Constitution itself expressly provides that Congress may, by law, create "special metropolitan political subdivisions" which shall be subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected; the jurisdiction of this subdivision shall be limited
to basic services requiring coordination; and the cities and municipalities comprising this subdivision shall retain their basic services requiring
coordination; and the cities and municipalities comprising this subdivision shall retain their basic autonomy and their own local executive and
legislative assemblies.
44
Pending enactment of this law, the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution gave the President of the Philippines
the power to constitute the Metropolitan Authority, viz:
Sec. 8. Until otherwise provided by Congress, the President may constitute the Metropolitan Authority to be composed of the
heads of all local government units comprising the Metropolitan Manila area.
45

In 1990, President Aquino issued Executive Order (E. O.) No. 392 and constituted the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA). The powers and
functions of the MMC were devolved to the MMA.
46
It ought to be stressed, however, that not all powers and functions of the MMC were
passed to the MMA. The MMA's power was limited to the "delivery of basic urban services requiring coordination in Metropolitan
Manila."
47
The MMA's governing body, the Metropolitan Manila Council, although composed of the mayors of the component cities and
municipalities, was merely given power of: (1) formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination and
consolidation; and (2) promulgation resolutions and other issuances, approval of a code of basic services and the exercise of its rule-making
power.
48

Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became primarily responsible for the governance of their respective political
subdivisions. The MMA's jurisdiction was limited to addressing common problems involving basic services that transcended local
boundaries. It did not have legislative power. Its power was merely to provide the local government units technical assistance in the
preparation of local development plans. Any semblance of legislative power it had was confined to a "review [of] legislation proposed by the
local legislative assemblies to ensure consistency among local governments and with the comprehensive development plan of Metro Manila,"
and to "advise the local governments accordingly."
49

When R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a "special development and administrative region" and the MMDA a "special
development authority" whose functions were "without prejudice to the autonomy of the affected local government units." The character of
the MMDA was clearly defined in the legislative debates enacting its charter.
R.A. No. 7924 originated as House Bill No. 14170/11116 and was introduced by several legislators led by Dante Tinga, Roilo Golez and
Feliciano Belmonte. It was presented to the House of Representatives by the Committee on Local Governments chaired by Congressman
Ciriaco R. Alfelor. The bill was a product of Committee consultations with the local government units in the National Capital Region (NCR),
with former Chairmen of the MMC and MMA,
50
and career officials of said agencies. When the bill was first taken up by the Committee on
Local Governments, the following debate took place:
THE CHAIRMAN [Hon. Ciriaco Alfelor]: Okay, Let me explain. This has been debated a long time ago, you know. It's a special . . .
we can create a special metropolitan political subdivision.
Actually, there are only six (6) political subdivisions provided for in the Constitution: barangay, municipality, city, province, and we
have the Autonomous Region of Mindanao and we have the Cordillera. So we have 6. Now. . . . .
HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman. In the case of the Autonomous Region, that is also specifically mandated by
the Constitution.
THE CHAIRMAN: That's correct. But it is considered to be a political subdivision. What is the meaning of a political subdivision?
Meaning to say, that it has its own government, it has its own political personality, it has the power to tax, and all governmental
powers: police power and everything. All right. Authority is different; because it does not have its own government. It is only a
council, it is an organization of political subdivision, powers, "no, which is not imbued with any political power.
If you go over Section 6, where the powers and functions of the Metro Manila Development Authority, it is purely coordinative. And
it provides here that the council is policy-making. All right.
Under the Constitution is a Metropolitan Authority with coordinative power. Meaning to say, it coordinates all of the different basic
services which have to be delivered to the constituency. All right.
There is now a problem. Each local government unit is given its respective . . . as a political subdivision. Kalookan has its powers,
as provided for and protected and guaranteed by the Constitution. All right, the exercise. However, in the exercise of that power, it
might be deleterious and disadvantageous to other local government units. So, we are forming an authority where all of these will
be members and then set up a policy in order that the basic services can be effectively coordinated. All right.
Of course, we cannot deny that the MMDA has to survive. We have to provide some funds, resources. But it does not possess
any political power. We do not elect the Governor. We do not have the power to tax. As a matter of fact, I was trying to intimate to
the author that it must have the power to sue and be sued because it coordinates. All right. It coordinates practically all these
basic services so that the flow and the distribution of the basic services will be continuous. Like traffic, we cannot deny that. It's
before our eyes. Sewerage, flood control, water system, peace and order, we cannot deny these. It's right on our face. We have to
look for a solution. What would be the right solution? All right, we envision that there should be a coordinating agency and it is
called an authority. All right, if you do not want to call it an authority, it's alright. We may call it a council or maybe a management
agency.
x x x x x x x x x
51

Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to
promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDA's functions. There is no grant of authority to enact
ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. This was explicitly stated in the last Committee
deliberations prior to the bill's presentation to Congress. Thus:
THE CHAIRMAN: Yeah, but we have to go over the suggested revision. I think this was already approved before, but it was
reconsidered in view of the proposals, set-up, to make the MMDA stronger. Okay, so if there is no objection to paragraph "f". . .
And then next is paragraph "b," under Section 6. "It shall approve metro-wide plans, programs and projects and issue ordinances
or resolutions deemed necessary by the MMDA to carry out the purposes of this Act." Do you have the powers? Does the
MMDA... because that takes the form of a local government unit, a political subdivision.
HON. [Feliciano] BELMONTE: Yes, I believe so, your Honor. When we say that it has the policies, it's very clear that those
policies must be followed. Otherwise, what's the use of empowering it to come out with policies. Now, the policies may be in the
form of a resolution or it may be in the form of a ordinance. The term "ordinance" in this case really gives it more teeth, your
honor. Otherwise, we are going to see a situation where you have the power to adopt the policy but you cannot really make it stick
as in the case now, and I think here is Chairman Bunye. I think he will agree that that is the case now. You've got the power to set
a policy, the body wants to follow your policy, then we say let's call it an ordinance and see if they will not follow it.
THE CHAIRMAN: That's very nice. I like that. However, there is a constitutional impediment.1wphi1 You are making this MMDA a
political subdivision. The creation of the MMDA would be subject to a plebiscite. That is what I'm trying to avoid. I've been trying to
avoid this kind of predicament. Under the Constitution it states: if it is a political subdivision, once it is created it has to be subject
to a plebiscite. I'm trying to make this as administrative. That's why we place the Chairman as a cabinet rank.
HON. BELMONTE: All right, Mr. Chairman, okay, what you are saying there is . . . . .
THE CHAIRMAN: In setting up ordinances, it is a political exercise, Believe me.
HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: Mr. Chairman, it can be changed into issuances of rules and regulations. That would be . . . it shall also be
enforced.
HON. BELMONTE: Okay, I will . . . .
HON. LOPEZ: And you can also say that violation of such rule, you impose a sanction. But you know, ordinance has a different
legal connotation.
HON. BELMONTE: All right, I defer to that opinion, your Honor.
THE CHAIRMAN: So instead of ordinances, say rules and regulations.
HON. BELMONTE: Or resolutions. Actually, they are actually considering resolutions now.
THE CHAIRMAN: Rules and resolutions.
HON. BELMONTE: Rules, regulations and resolutions.
52

The draft of H. B. No. 14170/11116 was presented by the Committee to the House of Representatives. The explanatory note to the bill stated
that the proposed MMDA is a "development authority" which is a "national agency, not a political government unit."
53
The explanatory note
was adopted as the sponsorship speech of the Committee on Local Governments. No interpellations or debates were made on the floor and
no amendments introduced. The bill was approved on second reading on the same day it was presented.
54

When the bill was forwarded to the Senate, several amendments were made.1wphi 1 These amendments, however, did not affect the nature of the
MMDA as originally conceived in the House of Representatives.
55

It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a
"special metropolitan political subdivision" as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. The creation of a "special metropolitan
political subdivision" requires the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."
56
R. A. No.
7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the people,
but appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his function is to perform such other duties
as may be assigned to him by the President,
57
whereas in local government units, the President merely exercises supervisory authority. This
emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA.
Clearly then, the MMC under P.D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA under R.A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no
power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local government units, acting through their respective legislative
councils, that possess legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any
ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the
respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling. We desist from ruling on the other issues as they are unnecessary.
We stress that this decision does not make light of the MMDA's noble efforts to solve the chaotic traffic condition in Metro Manila. Everyday,
traffic jams and traffic bottlenecks plague the metropolis. Even our once sprawling boulevards and avenues are now crammed with cars
while city streets are clogged with motorists and pedestrians. Traffic has become a social malaise affecting our people's productivity and the
efficient delivery of goods and services in the country. The MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation system
but unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of a private street
in a private subdivision without any legal warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of the rule of
law.1wphi1.nt
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39549 are affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 93252 August 5, 1991
RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 93746 August 5,1991
MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LUIS SANTOS, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Local Government, NICANOR M. PATRICIO, in his capacity
as Chief, Legal Service of the Department of Local Government and SALVADOR CABALUNA JR., respondents.
G.R. No. 95245 August 5,1991
RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Local
Government, respondents.
Nicolas P. Sonalan for petitioner in 93252.
Romeo A. Gerochi for petitioner in 93746.
Eugenio Original for petitioner in 95245.

SARMIENTO, J .:p
The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President (acting through the Secretary of Local Government), to suspend and/or
remove local officials.
The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and a member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod thereof (G.R. No.
93746), respectively.
The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in number, filed against him by various city officials
sometime in 1988, on various charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct,
intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention.
1
The personalities involved are Joceleehn
Cabaluna, a clerk at the city health office; Salvador Cabaluna, her husband; Dr. Felicidad Ortigoza,
Assistant City Health Officer; Mansueto Malabor, Vice-Mayor; Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German
Gonzales, Larry Ong, and Eduardo Pefia Redondo members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod; and
Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod. The complaints against the Mayor are set forth in the opinion of the
respondent Court of Appeals.
2
We quote:
xxx xxx xxx
In her verified complaint (Annex A), Mrs. Cabaluna, a clerk assigned to the City Health, Office of Iloilo City charged that
due to political reasons, having supported the rival candidate, Mrs. Rosa 0. Caram, the petitioner City Mayor, using as
an excuse the exigency of the service and the interest of the public, pulled her out from rightful office where her
qualifications are best suited and assigned her to a work that should be the function of a non-career service employee.
To make matters worse, a utility worker in the office of the Public Services, whose duties are alien to the complainant's
duties and functions, has been detailed to take her place. The petitioner's act are pure harassments aimed at luring her
away from her permanent position or force her to resign.
In the case of Dra. Felicidad Ortigoza, she claims that the petitioner handpicked her to perform task not befitting her
position as Assistant City Health Officer of Iloilo City; that her office was padlocked without any explanation or
justification; that her salary was withheld without cause since April 1, 1988; that when she filed her vacation leave, she
was given the run-around treatment in the approval of her leave in connivance with Dr. Rodolfo Villegas and that she
was the object of a well-engineered trumped-up charge in an administrative complaint filed by Dr. Rodolfo Villegas
(Annex B).
On the other hand, Mansuelo Malabor is the duly elected Vice-Mayor of Iloilo City and complainants Rolando Dabao,
Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong and Eduardo Pefia Pedondo are members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod
of the City of Iloilo. Their complaint arose out from the case where Councilor Larry Ong, whose key to his office was
unceremoniously and without previous notice, taken by petitioner. Without an office, Councilor Ong had to hold office at
Plaza Libertad, The Vice-Mayor and the other complainants sympathized with him and decided to do the same.
However, the petitioner, together with its fully-armed security men, forcefully drove them away from Plaza Libertad.
Councilor Ong denounced the petitioner's actuations the following day in the radio station and decided to hold office at
the Freedom Grandstand at Iloilo City and there were so many people who gathered to witness the incident. However,
before the group could reach the area, the petitioner, together with his security men, led the firemen using a firetruck in
dozing water to the people and the bystanders.
Another administrative case was filed by Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod, appointed by former mayor Rosa O. Caram.
On March 13, 1988, without the benefit of charges filed against him and no warrant of arrest was issued, Erbite was
arrested and detained at the City Jail of Iloilo City upon orders of petitioner. In jail, he was allegedly mauled by other
detainees thereby causing injuries He was released only the following day.
3

The Mayor thereafter answered
4
and the cases were shortly set for hearing. The opinion of the Court of Appeals
also set forth the succeeding events:
xxx xxx xxx
The initial hearing in the Cabaluna and Ortigoza cases were set for hearing on June 20-21, 1988 at the Regional Office
of the Department of Local Government in Iloilo City. Notices, through telegrams, were sent to the parties (Annex L)
and the parties received them, including the petitioner. The petitioner asked for a postponement before the scheduled
date of hearing and was represented by counsel, Atty. Samuel Castro. The hearing officers, Atty. Salvador Quebral and
Atty. Marino Bermudez had to come all the way from Manila for the two-day hearings but was actually held only on
June 20,1988 in view of the inability and unpreparedness of petitioner's counsel.
The next hearings were re-set to July 25, 26, 27,1988 in the same venue-Iloilo City. Again, the petitioner attempted to
delay the proceedings and moved for a postponement under the excuse that he had just hired his counsel.
Nonetheless, the hearing officers denied the motion to postpone, in view of the fact that the parties were notified by
telegrams of the scheduled hearings (Annex M).
In the said hearings, petitioner's counsel cross-examined the complainants and their witnesses.
Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a preventive suspension order on August 11, 1988 to
last until October 11,1988 for a period of sixty (60) days.
Then the next investigation was set on September 21, 1988 and the petitioner again asked for a postponement to
September 26,1988. On September 26, 1988, the complainants and petitioner were present, together with their
respective counsel. The petitioner sought for a postponement which was denied. In these hearings which were held in
Mala the petitioner testified in Adm. Case No. C-10298 and 10299.
The investigation was continued regarding the Malabor case and the complainants testified including their witnesses.
On October 10, 1988, petitioner's counsel, Atty. Original moved for a postponement of the October 24, 1988 hearing to
November 7 to 11, 1988 which was granted. However, the motion for change of venue as denied due to lack of funds.
At the hearing on November 7, 1988, the parties and counsel were present. Petitioner reiterated his motion to change
venue and moved for postponement anew. The counsel discussed a proposal to take the deposition of witnesses in
Iloilo City so the hearing was indefinitely postponed. However, the parties failed to come to terms and after the parties
were notified of the hearing, the investigation was set to December 13 to 15, 1988.
The petitioner sought for another postponement on the ground that his witnesses were sick or cannot attend the
investigation due to lack of transportation. The motion was denied and the petitioner was given up to December 14,
1988 to present his evidence.
On December 14,1988, petitioner's counsel insisted on his motion for postponement and the hearing officers gave
petitioner up to December 15, 1988 to present his evidence. On December 15, 1988, the petitioner failed to present
evidence and the cases were considered submitted for resolution.
In the meantime, a prima facie evidence was found to exist in the arbitrary detention case filed by Pancho Erbite so the
respondent ordered the petitioner's second preventive suspension dated October 11, 1988 for another sixty (60) days.
The petitioner was able to obtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 33 of Iloilo City. The second preventive suspension was not enforced.
5

Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition against the respondent Secretary of Local
Government (now, Interior) in the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. Presently,
he instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 16417, an action for prohibition, in the respondent Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days,
the third time in twenty months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor as acting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon
commenced CA-G.R. SP No. 20736 of the Court of Appeals, a petition for prohibition,
6
(Malabor it is to be noted, is one of the
complainants, and hence, he is interested in seeing Mayor Ganzon ousted.)
On September 7, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 16417. On July 5, 1990, it likewise
promulgated a decision, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 20736. In a Resolution dated January 24, 1990, it issued a Resolution certifying the
petition of Mary Ann Artieda, who had been similary charged by the respondent Secretary, to this Court.
On June 26,1990, we issued a Temporary Restraining Order, barring the respondent Secretary from implementing the suspension orders,
and restraining the enforcement of the Court of Appeals' two decisions.
In our Resolution of November 29, 1990, we consolidated all three cases. In our Resolutions of January 15, 1991, we gave due course
thereto.
Mayor Ganzon claims as a preliminary (GR No. 93252), that the Department of Local Government in hearing the ten cases against him, had
denied him due process of law and that the respondent Secretary had been "biased, prejudicial and hostile" towards him
7
arising from
his (Mayor Ganzon's) alleged refusal to join the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino party
8
and the running
political rivalry they maintained in the last congressional and local elections;
9
and his alleged refusal to
operate a lottery in Iloilo City.
10
He also alleges that he requested the Secretary to lift his suspension
since it had come ninety days prior to an election (the barangay elections of November 14,
1988),
11
notwithstanding which, the latter proceeded with the hearing and meted out two more suspension
orders of the aforementioned cases.
12
He likewise contends that he sought to bring the cases to Iloilo City
(they were held in Manila) in order to reduce the costs of proceeding, but the Secretary rejected his
request.
13
He states that he asked for postponement on "valid and justifiable"
14
grounds, among them,
that he was suffering from a heart ailment which required confinement; that his "vital"
15
witness was also
hospitalized
16
but that the latter unduly denied his request.
17

Mayor Ganzon's primary argument (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) is that the Secretary of Local Government is devoid, in any event, of any
authority to suspend and remove local officials, an argument reiterated by the petitioner Mary Ann Rivera Artieda (G.R. No. 93746).
As to Mayor Ganzon's charges of denial of due process, the records do not show very clearly in what manner the Mayor might have been
deprived of his rights by the respondent Secretary. His claims that he and Secretary Luis-Santos were (are) political rivals and that his
"persecution" was politically motivated are pure speculation and although the latter does not appear to have denied these contentions (as he,
Mayor Ganzon, claims), we can not take his word for it the way we would have under less political circumstances, considering furthermore
that "political feud" has often been a good excuse in contesting complaints.
The Mayor has failed furthermore to substantiate his say-so's that Secretary Santos had attempted to seduce him to join the administration
party and to operate a lottery in Iloilo City. Again, although the Secretary failed to rebut his allegations, we can not accept them, at face
value, much more, as judicial admissions as he would have us accept them
18
for the same reasons above-stated and
furthermore, because his say so's were never corroborated by independent testimonies. As a responsible
public official, Secretary Santos, in pursuing an official function, is presumed to be performing his duties
regularly and in the absence of contrary evidence, no ill motive can be ascribed to him.
As to Mayor Ganzon's contention that he had requested the respondent Secretary to defer the hearing on account of the ninety-day ban
prescribed by Section 62 of Batas Blg. 337, the Court finds the question to be moot and academic since we have in fact restrained the
Secretary from further hearing the complaints against the petitioners.
19

As to his request, finally, for postponements, the Court is afraid that he has not given any compelling reason why we should overturn the
Court of Appeals, which found no convincing reason to overrule Secretary Santos in denying his requests. Besides, postponements are a
matter of discretion on the part of the hearing officer, and based on Mayor Ganzon's above story, we are not convinced that the Secretary
has been guilty of a grave abuse of discretion.
The Court can not say, under these circumstances, that Secretary Santos' actuations deprived Mayor Ganzon of due process of law.
We come to the core question: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President's alter ego, can suspend and/or remove
local officials.
It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution
20
no longer allows the President, as the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local officials. According to
both petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to strengthen self-rule by local government units and
second, by deleting the phrase
21
as may be provided by law to strip the President of the power of control
over local governments. It is a view, so they contend, that finds support in the debates of the
Constitutional Commission. The provision in question reads as follows:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with
respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall
ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
22

It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution, which we quote:
Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general
supervision over all Local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
23

The petitioners submit that the deletion (of "as may be provided by law") is significant, as their argument goes, since: (1) the power of the
President is "provided by law" and (2) hence, no law may provide for it any longer.
It is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under question, the Secretary of Local Government acted in consonance with the specific
legal provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, we quote:
Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing. Within seven days after the complaint is filed, the Minister of local Government, or the
sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the respondent to submit his verified answer within seven
days from receipt of said complaint, and commence the hearing and investigation of the case within ten days after
receipt of such answer of the respondent. No investigation shall be held within ninety days immediately prior to an
election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed with the said period. If preventive suspension has been
imposed prior to the aforesaid period, the preventive suspension shall be lifted.
24

Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of Local Government if
the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official,
or by the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official.
(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when there is reasonable ground to
believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is strong,
when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. In all cases, preventive
suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension.
(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the
continuation of the proceedings against him until its termination. However ' if the delay in the proceedings of the case is
due to his fault, neglect or request, the time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension.
25

The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three questions: (1) Did the 1987 Constitution, in deleting the phrase "as may be provided
by law" intend to divest the President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and/or remove local officials? (2) Has the Constitution
repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code? (3) What is the significance of the change in the constitutional language?
It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the
legislature of its right or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local
officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments'
autonomy from congress and to break Congress' "control" over local government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the
sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline.
Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local government units, as in the federal governments of the United
States of America (or Brazil or Germany), although Jefferson is said to have compared municipal corporations euphemistically to "small
republics."
26
Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the
legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitution and as the "supervision clause" itself
suggest-is to wean local government units from over-dependence on the central government.
It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-executing, but subject to, among other things, the passage of a
local government code,
27
a local tax law,
28
income distribution legislation,
29
and a national representation
law,
30
and measures
31
designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of
autonomy, the Constitution places the local government under the general supervision of the Executive. It
is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions
for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the
existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President. Thus:
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable
local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative,
and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities and resources, and
provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of
local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.
32

As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to stress, sub silencio, the objective of the framers to
strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional control of its affairs, as observed by the Court of Appeals, like the power of local
legislation.
33
The Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the
President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively,
the Constitution contains no prohibition.
The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes
the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because
legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority as this Court has held,
34
thus:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that in the case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz., No. 6 p. 2884, this Court had occasion to discuss the
scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the power
of control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control
and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. Thus in that case the
Court has made the following digression: "In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority
of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may
take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the
power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of
his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." But from this pronouncement it cannot be
reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the
power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, as postulated in Section 64(c) of
the Revised Administrative Code. ...
35

xxx xxx xxx
"Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the latter."
36
"Supervision" on the other hand
means "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties.
37
As we held,
38
however, "investigating" is not inconsistent with "overseeing", although it is a
lesser power than "altering". The impression is apparently exacerbated by the Court's pronouncements in
at least three cases,Lacson v. Roque,
39
Hebron v. Reyes,
40
and Mondano v. Silvosa,
41
and possibly, a
fourth one, Pelaez v. Auditor General.
42
In Lacson, this Court said that the President enjoyed no control
powers but only supervision "as may be provided by law,"
43
a rule we reiterated in Hebron, and Mondano.
In Pelaez, we stated that the President "may not . . . suspend an elective official of a regular municipality
or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding
provincial board."
44
However, neither Lacson nor Hebron nor Mondano categorically banned the Chief
Executive from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control powers, but
because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority. Thus, according to Lacson:
The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend municipal officers is without doubt not well
taken. Removal and suspension of public officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper
construction subject to constitutional limitations.
45

In Hebron we stated:
Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified by law, the same must be deemed
mandatory and adhered to strictly, in the absence of express or clear provision to the contrary-which does not et with
respect to municipal officers ...
46

In Mondano, the Court held:
... The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the
provincial governor who is authorized to "receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal
officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final
judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude." And if the charges are serious, "he shall submit written charges
touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by
registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the
board, if in his opinion the charge by one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question." Section 86 of the
Revised Administration Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over
the administration of ... municipalities ... . If it be construed that it does and such additional power is the same authority
as that vested in the Department Head by section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, then such additional
power must be deemed to have been abrogated by Section 110(l), Article VII of the Constitution.
47

xxx xxx xxx
In Pelaez, we stated that the President can not impose disciplinary measures on local officials except on appeal from the provincial board
pursuant to the Administrative Code.
48

Thus, in those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend/remove) it was not because we did not think that the
President can not exercise it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power elsewhere. But in those cases ii which
the law gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining him.
49

The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of the Constitutional Commission to defeat the President's
powers. The Court believes that the deliberations are by themselves inconclusive, because although Commissioner Jose Nolledo would
exclude the power of removal from the President,
50
Commissioner Blas Ople would not.
51

The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the Local Government Code, Batas Blg. 37. As we said,
"supervision" and "removal" are not incompatible terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger expression of local
autonomy under the new Charter. We have indeed held that in spite of the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and
effect.
52

As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through
a system of decentralization."
53
The Constitution as we observed, does nothing more than to break up the
monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political
adherents, to "liberate the local governments from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not
meant to end the relation of partnership and inter-dependence between the central administration and
local government units, or otherwise, to user in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a
radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and
for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self- government.
As we observed in one case,
54
decentralization means devolution of national administration but not power to the
local levels. Thus:
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and
accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners
in the pursuit of national development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the
burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general
supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over
their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments
units declared to be autonomous, In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape
its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of
power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the
central authorities but to its constituency.
55

The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit another matter. What bothers the Court, and what indeed
looms very large, is the fact that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of
suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima faciefindings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public office
(assuming that Mayor Ganzon is guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make him serve 600 days of suspension, which
is effectively, to suspend him out of office. As we held:
56

2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of office does not expire until 1986.
Were it not for this information and the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this while in the full discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor.
He was elected precisely to do so. As of October 26, 1983, he has been unable to. it is a basic assumption of the
electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the services of elective officials of their
choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded against administratively or, as in
this instance, criminally. In either case, Ms culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is
entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance,
however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in
the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by
him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga They were deprived of the
services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted
continuance of this preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial
of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order of suspension
should be lifted.
57

The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the above reasons,
58
and so also, because it is out of
the ordinary to have a vacancy in local government. The sole objective of a suspension, as we have
held,
59
is simply "to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his
influence and authority over possible witnesses"
60
or to keep him off "the records and other evidence.
61

It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local official. Under the Local Government
Code, it can not exceed sixty days,
62
which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is
otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their
purpose in a shorter span.
Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the accused is held to insure his presence at the trial. In both
cases, the accused (the respondent) enjoys a presumption of innocence unless and until found guilty.
Suspension finally is temporary and as the Local Government Code provides, it may be imposed for no more than sixty days. As we
held,
63
a longer suspension is unjust and unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than tyranny.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to
make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his suspension permanent.
It is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite of the fact that the Mayor's guilt has not been proven. Worse, any absolution will be for
naught because needless to say, the length of his suspension would have, by the time he is reinstated, wiped out his tenure considerably.
The Court is not to be mistaken for obstructing the efforts of the respondent Secretary to see that justice is done in Iloilo City, yet it is hardly
any argument to inflict on Mayor Ganzon successive suspensions when apparently, the respondent Secretary has had sufficient time to
gather the necessary evidence to build a case against the Mayor without suspending him a day longer. What is intriguing is that the
respondent Secretary has been cracking down, so to speak, on the Mayor piecemeal apparently, to pin him down ten times the pain, when
he, the respondent Secretary, could have pursued a consolidated effort.
We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the
opinion that the Secretary of Interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.
The Court is aware that only the third suspension is under questions, and that any talk of future suspensions is in fact premature. The fact
remains, however, that Mayor Ganzon has been made to serve a total of 120 days of suspension and the possibility of sixty days more is
arguably around the corner (which amounts to a violation of the Local Government Code which brings to light a pattern of suspensions
intended to suspend the Mayor the rest of his natural tenure. The Court is simply foreclosing what appears to us as a concerted effort of the
State to perpetuate an arbitrary act.
As we said, we can not tolerate such a state of affairs.
We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer the duration of his third suspension and lifting, for the purpose, the Temporary
Restraining Order earlier issued. Insofar as the seven remaining charges are concerned, we are urging the Department of Local
Government, upon the finality of this Decision, to undertake steps to expedite the same, subject to Mayor Ganzon's usual remedies of
appeal, judicial or administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, we are precluding the Secretary from meting out further
suspensions based on those remaining complaints, notwithstanding findings of prima facie evidence.
In resume the Court is laying down the following rules:
1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of administration, not of power, in which local officials remain
accountable to the central government in the manner the law may provide;
2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism;
3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was meant but to deny legislative control over local
governments; it did not exempt the latter from legislative regulations provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental premise of
autonomy;
4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose
disciplinary action against local officials;
5. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation" does not signify "control" (which the President does not have);
6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon. may serve the suspension so far ordered, but may no longer be suspended for the offenses he
was charged originally; provided:
a) that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to his fault, neglect or request, (the time
of the delay) shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension. [Supra, sec. 63(3)]
b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the petitioner commits
another or other crimes and abuses for which proper charges are filed against him by the
aggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension shall not be a bar to his being preventively
suspended again, if warranted under subpar. (2), Section 63 of the Local Government Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued is LIFTED. The suspensions
of the petitioners are AFFIRMED, provided that the petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made to serve future suspensions on
account of any of the remaining administrative charges pending against him for acts committed prior to August 11, 1988. The Secretary of
Interior is ORDERED to consolidate all such administrative cases pending against Mayor Ganzon.
The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann Rivera Artieda, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994
MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,
vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION,respondents.
Aquilino G. Pimentel, Jr. and Associates for petitioners.
R.R. Torralba & Associates for private respondent.

CRUZ, J .:
There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily
denounced the project. The religious elements echoed the objection and so did the women's groups and the youth. Demonstrations were led
by the mayor and the city legislators. The media trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of the city.
The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan
de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., one of the herein private
respondents, renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season.
The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No.
3353 reading as follows:
ORDINANCE NO. 3353
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS PERMIT AND CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS
PERMIT TO ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS PREMISES OR PORTION
THEREOF FOR THE OPERATION OF CASINO.
BE IT ORDAINED by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro, in session assembled that:
Sec. 1. That pursuant to the policy of the city banning the operation of casino within its territorial jurisdiction, no
business permit shall be issued to any person, partnership or corporation for the operation of casino within the city
limits.
Sec. 2. That it shall be a violation of existing business permit by any persons, partnership or corporation to use its
business establishment or portion thereof, or allow the use thereof by others for casino operation and other gambling
activities.
Sec. 3. PENALTIES. Any violation of such existing business permit as defined in the preceding section shall
suffer the following penalties, to wit:
a) Suspension of the business permit for sixty (60) days for the first offense
and a fine of P1,000.00/day
b) Suspension of the business permit for Six (6) months for the second
offense, and a fine of P3,000.00/day
c) Permanent revocation of the business permit and imprisonment of One
(1) year, for the third and subsequent offenses.
Sec. 4. This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days from publication thereof.
Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93 reading as follows:
ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO AND PROVIDING PENALTY FOR VIOLATION
THEREFOR.
WHEREAS, the City Council established a policy as early as 1990 against CASINO under its Resolution No. 2295;
WHEREAS, on October 14, 1992, the City Council passed another Resolution No. 2673, reiterating its policy against
the establishment of CASINO;
WHEREAS, subsequently, thereafter, it likewise passed Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of Business
Permit and to cancel existing Business Permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises
or portion thereof for the operation of CASINO;
WHEREAS, under Art. 3, section 458, No. (4), sub paragraph VI of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Rep. Act
7160) and under Art. 99, No. (4), Paragraph VI of the implementing rules of the Local Government Code, the City
Council as the Legislative Body shall enact measure to suppress any activity inimical to public morals and general
welfare of the people and/or regulate or prohibit such activity pertaining to amusement or entertainment in order to
protect social and moral welfare of the community;
NOW THEREFORE,
BE IT ORDAINED by the City Council in session duly assembled that:
Sec. 1. The operation of gambling CASINO in the City of Cagayan de Oro is hereby prohibited.
Sec. 2. Any violation of this Ordinance shall be subject to the following penalties:
a) Administrative fine of P5,000.00 shall be imposed against the proprietor, partnership or corporation undertaking the
operation, conduct, maintenance of gambling CASINO in the City and closure thereof;
b) Imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year or a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 or both
at the discretion of the court against the manager, supervisor, and/or any person responsible in the establishment,
conduct and maintenance of gambling CASINO.
Sec. 3. This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days after its publication in a local newspaper of general circulation.
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their
challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit
their enforcement.
1
Reconsideration of this decision was denied on July 13, 1993.
2

Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor are now before us in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
3
They aver that
the respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that:
1. Under existing laws, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro does not have the power and
authority to prohibit the establishment and operation of a PAGCOR gambling casino within the City's territorial limits.
2. The phrase "gambling and other prohibited games of chance" found in Sec. 458, par. (a), sub-par. (1) (v) of R.A.
7160 could only mean "illegal gambling."
3. The questioned Ordinances in effect annul P.D. 1869 and are therefore invalid on that point.
4. The questioned Ordinances are discriminatory to casino and partial to cockfighting and are therefore invalid on that
point.
5. The questioned Ordinances are not reasonable, not consonant with the general powers and purposes of the
instrumentality concerned and inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.
6. It had no option but to follow the ruling in the case of Basco, et al. v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, 197
SCRA 53 in disposing of the issues presented in this present case.
PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and
sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. In Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation,
4
this Court
sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits of the entity to the national
economy as the third highest revenue-earner in the government, next only to the BIR and the Bureau of
Customs.
Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local
Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in
Section 16 as follows:
Sec. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of
culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the
development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and
preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
In addition, Section 458 of the said Code specifically declares that:
Sec. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The Sangguniang Panlungsod, as the legislative
body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city
and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as
provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city government, and in this
connection, shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose appropriate
penalties for habitual drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy,
prostitution, establishment and maintenance of houses of ill
repute,gambling and other prohibited games of chance, fraudulent devices
and ways to obtain money or property, drug addiction, maintenance of drug
dens, drug pushing, juvenile delinquency, the printing, distribution or
exhibition of obscene or pornographic materials or publications, and such
other activities inimical to the welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the
city;
This section also authorizes the local government units to regulate properties and businesses within their territorial limits in the interest of the
general welfare.
5

The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions, the Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos because they
involve games of chance, which are detrimental to the people. Gambling is not allowed by general law and even by the Constitution itself.
The legislative power conferred upon local government units may be exercised over all kinds of gambling and not only over "illegal gambling"
as the respondents erroneously argue. Even if the operation of casinos may have been permitted under P.D. 1869, the government of
Cagayan de Oro City has the authority to prohibit them within its territory pursuant to the authority entrusted to it by the Local Government
Code.
It is submitted that this interpretation is consonant with the policy of local autonomy as mandated in Article II, Section 25, and Article X of the
Constitution, as well as various other provisions therein seeking to strengthen the character of the nation. In giving the local government units
the power to prevent or suppress gambling and other social problems, the Local Government Code has recognized the competence of such
communities to determine and adopt the measures best expected to promote the general welfare of their inhabitants in line with the policies
of the State.
The petitioners also stress that when the Code expressly authorized the local government units to prevent and suppress gambling and other
prohibited games of chance, like craps, baccarat, blackjack and roulette, it meant allforms of gambling without distinction. Ubi lex non
distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos.
6
Otherwise, it would have expressly excluded from the scope of their
power casinos and other forms of gambling authorized by special law, as it could have easily done. The
fact that it did not do so simply means that the local government units are permitted to prohibit all kinds of
gambling within their territories, including the operation of casinos.
The adoption of the Local Government Code, it is pointed out, had the effect of modifying the charter of the PAGCOR. The Code is not only a
later enactment than P.D. 1869 and so is deemed to prevail in case of inconsistencies between them. More than this, the powers of the
PAGCOR under the decree are expressly discontinued by the Code insofar as they do not conform to its philosophy and provisions, pursuant
to Par. (f) of its repealing clause reading as follows:
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative
regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly.
It is also maintained that assuming there is doubt regarding the effect of the Local Government Code on P.D. 1869, the doubt must be
resolved in favor of the petitioners, in accordance with the direction in the Code calling for its liberal interpretation in favor of the local
government units. Section 5 of the Code specifically provides:
Sec. 5. Rules of Interpretation. In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply:
(a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt,
any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair
and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit
concerned;
xxx xxx xxx
(c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to local government
units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community; . . .
(Emphasis supplied.)
Finally, the petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically harmful and cite various provisions of the Constitution and several decisions of
this Court expressive of the general and official disapprobation of the vice. They invoke the State policies on the family and the proper
upbringing of the youth and, as might be expected, call attention to the old case of U.S. v. Salaveria,
7
which sustained a municipal
ordinance prohibiting the playing of panguingue. The petitioners decry the immorality of gambling. They
also impugn the wisdom of P.D. 1869 (which they describe as "a martial law instrument") in creating
PAGCOR and authorizing it to operate casinos "on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines."
This is the opportune time to stress an important point.
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of
the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It
is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether
or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus,
it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its
own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits
of conflicting theories.
8
That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that questions regarding
the wisdom, morality, or practicibility of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved
only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of
government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide, they are answerable only
to their own conscience and the constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts of
justice.
The only question we can and shall resolve in this petition is the validity of Ordinance No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City. And we shall do so only by the criteria laid down by law and not by our own
convictions on the propriety of gambling.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions
9
has held that to be valid, an ordinance must
conform to the following substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress,
among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not
prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The petitioners are less than accurate in claiming that the Code could have excluded such games
of chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of the section is clear and unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or
phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is associated. Accordingly, we conclude that
since the word "gambling" is associated with "and other prohibited games of chance," the word should be read as referring to only illegal
gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed.
We could stop here as this interpretation should settle the problem quite conclusively. But we will not. The vigorous efforts of the petitioners
on behalf of the inhabitants of Cagayan de Oro City, and the earnestness of their advocacy, deserve more than short shrift from this Court.
The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they
prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. The petitioners have an ingenious
answer to this misgiving. They deny that it is the ordinances that have changed P.D. 1869 for an ordinance admittedly cannot prevail against
a statute. Their theory is that the change has been made by the Local Government Code itself, which was also enacted by the national
lawmaking authority. In their view, the decree has been, not really repealed by the Code, but merely "modified pro tanto" in the sense that
PAGCOR cannot now operate a casino over the objection of the local government unit concerned. This modification of P.D. 1869 by the
Local Government Code is permissible because one law can change or repeal another law.
It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words. While insisting that the decree has only been "modifiedpro tanto," they are actually
arguing that it is already dead, repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because the Code has shorn PAGCOR of all power to
centralize and regulate casinos. Strictly speaking, its operations may now be not only prohibited by the local government unit; in fact, the
prohibition is not only discretionary but mandated by Section 458 of the Code if the word "shall" as used therein is to be given its accepted
meaning. Local government units have now no choice but to prevent and suppress gambling, which in the petitioners' view includes both
legal and illegal gambling. Under this construction, PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to regulate or centralize as they must all be
prohibited by the local government units pursuant to the mandatory duty imposed upon them by the Code. In this situation, PAGCOR cannot
continue to exist except only as a toothless tiger or a white elephant and will no longer be able to exercise its powers as a prime source of
government revenue through the operation of casinos.
It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) of the repealing clause, conveniently discarding the rest of the provision which
painstakingly mentions the specific laws or the parts thereof which are repealed (or modified) by the Code. Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one
of them. A reading of the entire repealing clause, which is reproduced below, will disclose the omission:
Sec. 534. Repealing Clause. (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the "Local Government Code,"
Executive Order No. 112 (1987), and Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are hereby repealed.
(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other decrees, orders, instructions, memoranda and issuances
related to or concerning the barangay are hereby repealed.
(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939 regarding hospital fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of
Republic Act. No. 5447 regarding the Special Education Fund; Presidential Decree No. 144 as amended by
Presidential Decree Nos. 559 and 1741; Presidential Decree No. 231 as amended; Presidential Decree No. 436 as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential Decree Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136
are hereby repealed and rendered of no force and effect.
(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it governs locally-funded projects.
(e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this
Code: Sections 2, 16, and 29 of Presidential Decree No. 704; Sections 12 of Presidential Decree No. 87, as amended;
Sections 52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended; and Section 16 of
Presidential Decree No. 972, as amended, and
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative
regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly.
Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such
intention. In Lichauco & Co. v. Apostol,
10
this Court explained:
The cases relating to the subject of repeal by implication all proceed on the assumption that if the act of later date
clearly reveals an intention on the part of the lawmaking power to abrogate the prior law, this intention must be given
effect; but there must always be a sufficient revelation of this intention, and it has become an unbending rule of
statutory construction that the intention to repeal a former law will not be imputed to the Legislature when it appears
that the two statutes, or provisions, with reference to which the question arises bear to each other the relation of
general to special.
There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D. 1869. On the contrary, as the private respondent points out, PAGCOR is
mentioned as the source of funding in two later enactments of Congress, to wit, R.A. 7309, creating a Board of Claims under the Department
of Justice for the benefit of victims of unjust punishment or detention or of violent crimes, and R.A. 7648, providing for measures for the
solution of the power crisis. PAGCOR revenues are tapped by these two statutes. This would show that the PAGCOR charter has not been
repealed by the Local Government Code but has in fact been improved as it were to make the entity more responsive to the fiscal problems
of the government.
It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against another in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must
exert every effort to reconcile them, remembering that both laws deserve a becoming respect as the handiwork of a coordinate branch of the
government. On the assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but
to give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. This is possible in the case before us. The proper resolution of the problem at hand is
to hold that under the Local Government Code, local government units may (and indeed must) prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling
within their territories except only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception reserved in such laws must be read into the Code,
to make both the Code and such laws equally effective and mutually complementary.
This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of gambling, to wit, the illegal and those authorized by law. Legalized
gambling is not a modern concept; it is probably as old as illegal gambling, if not indeed more so. The petitioners' suggestion that the Code
authorizes them to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the distinction between these two forms of gambling without a clear indication
that this is the will of the legislature. Plausibly, following this theory, the City of Manila could, by mere ordinance, prohibit the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office from conducting a lottery as authorized by R.A. 1169 and B.P. 42 or stop the races at the San Lazaro
Hippodrome as authorized by R.A. 309 and R.A. 983.
In light of all the above considerations, we see no way of arriving at the conclusion urged on us by the petitioners that the ordinances in
question are valid. On the contrary, we find that the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has the character and force of a statute, as well as
the public policy expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain games of chance despite the prohibition of gambling in general.
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of
the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national
lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest
that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by
mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes
into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may
abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and
if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal
corporations in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the
corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature.
11

This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the
Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains
control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to
create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable
innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax,
12
which cannot now be
withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local
government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.
The Court understands and admires the concern of the petitioners for the welfare of their constituents and their apprehensions that the
welfare of Cagayan de Oro City will be endangered by the opening of the casino. We share the view that "the hope of large or easy gain,
obtained without special effort, turns the head of the workman"
13
and that "habitual gambling is a cause of laziness and
ruin."
14
In People v. Gorostiza,
15
we declared: "The social scourge of gambling must be stamped out. The
laws against gambling must be enforced to the limit." George Washington called gambling "the child of
avarice, the brother of iniquity and the father of mischief." Nevertheless, we must recognize the power of
the legislature to decide, in its own wisdom, to legalize certain forms of gambling, as was done in P.D.
1869 and impliedly affirmed in the Local Government Code. That decision can be revoked by this Court
only if it contravenes the Constitution as the touchstone of all official acts. We do not find such
contravention here.
We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines, remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified by the Local Government Code, which empowers the
local government units to prevent or suppress only those forms of gambling prohibited by law.
Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere
ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting
the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy
motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against the
petitioners. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 132988. July 19, 2000]
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR., petitioner, vs. Hon. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Hon. EMILIA
BONCODIN in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management, respondents.
ROBERTO PAGDANGANAN, intervenor.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J .:
The Constitution vests the President with the power of supervision, not control, over
local government units (LGUs). Such power enables him to see to it that LGUs and
their officials execute their tasks in accordance with law. While he may issue advisories
and seek their cooperation in solving economic difficulties, he cannot prevent them from
performing their tasks and using available resources to achieve their goals. He may not
withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the law. Thus, the withholding of
a portion of internal revenue allotments legally due them cannot be directed by
administrative fiat.
The Case

Before us is an original Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking (1) to annul
Section 1 of Administrative Order (AO) No. 372, insofar as it requires local government
units to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent of their authorized regular
appropriations for non-personal services; and (2) to enjoin respondents from
implementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion of their internal revenue
allotments.
On November 17, 1998, Roberto Pagdanganan, through Counsel Alberto C. Agra,
filed a Motion for Intervention/Motion to Admit Petition for Intervention,
[1]
attaching
thereto his Petition in Intervention
[2]
joining petitioner in the reliefs sought. At the time,
intervenor was the provincial governor of Bulacan, national president of the League of
Provinces of the Philippines and chairman of the League of Leagues of Local
Governments. In a Resolution dated December 15, 1998, the Court noted said Motion
and Petition.
The Facts and the Arguments

On December 27, 1997, the President of the Philippines issued AO 372. Its full text,
with emphasis on the assailed provisions, is as follows:
"ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 372
ADOPTION OF ECONOMY MEASURES IN GOVERNMENT FOR FY 1998
WHEREAS, the current economic difficulties brought about by the peso
depreciation requires continued prudence in government fiscal management
to maintain economic stability and sustain the country's growth momentum;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that all government agencies adopt cash
management measures to match expenditures with available resources;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do
hereby order and direct:
SECTION 1. All government departments and agencies, including state
universities and colleges, government-owned and controlled
corporations and local governments units will identify and implement
measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year by
at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non-personal
services items, along the following suggested areas:
1. Continued implementation of the streamlining policy on organization and staffing by
deferring action on the following:
a. Operationalization of new agencies;
b. Expansion of organizational units and/or creation of positions;
c. Filling of positions; and
d. Hiring of additional/new consultants, contractual and casual personnel,
regardless of funding source.
2. Suspension of the following activities:
a. Implementation of new capital/infrastructure projects, except
those which have already been contracted out;
b. Acquisition of new equipment and motor vehicles;
c. All foreign travels of government personnel, except those
associated with scholarships and trainings funded by grants;
d. Attendance in conferences abroad where the cost is charged to
the government except those clearly essential to Philippine
commitments in the international field as may be determined by
the Cabinet;
e. Conduct of trainings/workshops/seminars, except those
conducted by government training institutions and agencies in the
performance of their regular functions and those that are funded
by grants;
f. Conduct of cultural and social celebrations and sports activities,
except those associated with the Philippine Centennial celebration
and those involving regular competitions/events;
g. Grant of honoraria, except in cases where it constitutes the only
source of compensation from government received by the person
concerned;
h. Publications, media advertisements and related items, except
those required by law or those already being undertaken on a
regular basis;
i. Grant of new/additional benefits to employees, except those
expressly and specifically authorized by law; and
j. Donations, contributions, grants and gifts, except those given by
institutions to victims of calamities.
3. Suspension of all tax expenditure subsidies to all GOCCs and LGUs
4. Reduction in the volume of consumption of fuel, water, office supplies, electricity
and other utilities
5. Deferment of projects that are encountering significant implementation problems
6. Suspension of all realignment of funds and the use of savings and reserves
SECTION 2. Agencies are given the flexibility to identify the specific sources
of cost-savings, provided the 25% minimum savings under Section 1 is
complied with.
SECTION 3. A report on the estimated savings generated from these
measures shall be submitted to the Office of the President, through the
Department of Budget and Management, on a quarterly basis using the
attached format.
SECTION 4. Pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development
Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount
equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to local government units
shall be withheld.
SECTION 5. The Development Budget Coordination Committee shall conduct a
monthly review of the fiscal position of the National Government and if necessary,
shall recommend to the President the imposition of additional reserves or the lifting
of previously imposed reserves.
SECTION 6. This Administrative Order shall take effect January 1, 1998 and shall
remain valid for the entire year unless otherwise lifted.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 27
th
day of December, in the year of our Lord,
nineteen hundred and ninety-seven."
Subsequently, on December 10, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada issued AO 43,
amending Section 4 of AO 372, by reducing to five percent (5%) the amount of internal
revenue allotment (IRA) to be withheld from the LGUs.
Petitioner contends that the President, in issuing AO 372, was in effect exercising
the power of control over LGUs. The Constitution vests in the President, however, only
the power of generalsupervision over LGUs, consistent with the principle of local
autonomy. Petitioner further argues that the directive to withhold ten percent (10%) of
their IRA is in contravention of Section 286 of the Local Government Code and of
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, providing for the automatic release to each of
these units its share in the national internal revenue.
The solicitor general, on behalf of the respondents, claims on the other hand that
AO 372 was issued to alleviate the "economic difficulties brought about by the peso
devaluation" and constituted merely an exercise of the President's power of supervision
over LGUs. It allegedly does not violate local fiscal autonomy, because it
merely directs local governments to identify measures that will reduce their total
expenditures for non-personal services by at least 25 percent. Likewise, the withholding
of 10 percent of the LGUs IRA does not violate the statutory prohibition on the
imposition of any lien or holdback on their revenue shares, because such withholding is
"temporary in nature pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development
Coordination Committee of the emerging fiscal situation."
The Issues

The Petition
[3]
submits the following issues for the Court's resolution:
"A. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion [in]
ordering all LGUS to adopt a 25% cost reduction program in violation of the
LGU[']S fiscal autonomy
"B. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion
in ordering the withholding of 10% of the LGU[']S IRA"
In sum, the main issue is whether (a) Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs"
LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent; and (b) Section 4 of the same
issuance, which withholds 10 percent of their internal revenue allotments, are valid
exercises of the President's power of general supervision over local governments.
Additionally, the Court deliberated on the question whether petitioner had the locus
standi to bring this suit, despite respondents' failure to raise the issue.
[4]
However, the
intervention of Roberto Pagdanganan has rendered academic any further discussion on
this matter.
The Court's Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.
Main Issue:

Validity of AO 372

Insofar as LGUs Are Concerned

Before resolving the main issue, we deem it important and appropriate to define
certain crucial concepts: (1) the scope of the President's power of general supervision
over local governments and (2) the extent of the local governments' autonomy.
Scope of President's Power of Supervision Over LGUs

Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the President's power over local
governments to one of general supervision. It reads as follows:
"Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision
over local governments. x x x"
This provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. In Mondano v.
Silvosa,
[5]
the Court contrasted the President's power of supervision over local
government officials with that of his power of control over executive officials of the
national government. It was emphasized that the two terms -- supervision and control --
differed in meaning and extent. The Court distinguished them as follows:
"x x x In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If
the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step
as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other
hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."
[6]

In Taule v. Santos,
[7]
we further stated that the Chief Executive wielded no more
authority than that of checking whether local governments or their officials were
performing their duties as provided by the fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot
interfere with local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their
authority. "Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere
oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such
body,"
[8]
we said.
In a more recent case, Drilon v. Lim,
[9]
the difference between control and
supervision was further delineated. Officers in control lay down the rules in the
performance or accomplishment of an act. If these rules are not followed, they may, in
their discretion, order the act undone or redone by their subordinates or even decide to
do it themselves. On the other hand, supervision does not cover such
authority. Supervising officials merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they
themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or
replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or redone,
but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of
execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the
rules are followed.
Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the
President.
[10]
The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter
egos. As such, they are subject to the power of control of the President, at whose will
and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed,
suspended or reversed.
[11]
In contrast, the heads of political subdivisions are elected by
the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the electorate, to whom they are
directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the Presidents
supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of
their legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not withhold or alter any
authority or power given them by the Constitution and the law.
Extent of Local Autonomy

Hand in hand with the constitutional restraint on the President's power over local
governments is the state policy of ensuring local autonomy.
[12]

In Ganzon v. Court of Appeals,
[13]
we said that local autonomy signified "a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization." The grant of autonomy is intended to "break up the monopoly of the
national government over the affairs of local governments, x x x not x x x to end the
relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and
local government units x x x." Paradoxically, local governments are still subject to
regulation, however limited, for the purpose of enhancing self-government.
[14]

Decentralization simply means the devolution of national administration, not power,
to local governments. Local officials remain accountable to the central government as
the law may provide.
[15]
The difference between decentralization of administration and
that of power was explained in detail in Limbona v. Mangelin
[16]
as follows:
"Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization
of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central
government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order
to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local
governments 'more responsive and accountable,'
[17]
and 'ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national
development and social progress.'
[18]
At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises
'general supervision'
[19]
over them, but only to 'ensure that local affairs are administered according to
law.'
[20]
He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his
own.
[21]

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of
political power in the favor of local government units declared to be
autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its
own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power
amounts to 'self-immolation,' since in that event, the autonomous government
becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency."
[22]

Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not
completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous
regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political
subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly
responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social
development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic
growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the
programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a
common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the
President and Congress. As we stated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp.,
Inc., municipal governments are still agents of the national government.
[23]

The Nature of AO 372

Consistent with the foregoing jurisprudential precepts, let us now look into the
nature of AO 372. As its preambular clauses declare, the Order was a "cash
management measure" adopted by the government "to match expenditures with
available resources," which were presumably depleted at the time due to "economic
difficulties brought about by the peso depreciation." Because of a looming financial
crisis, the President deemed it necessary to "direct all government agencies, state
universities and colleges, government-owned and controlled corporations as well as
local governments to reduce their total expenditures by at least 25 percent along
suggested areas mentioned in AO 372.
Under existing law, local government units, in addition to having administrative
autonomy in the exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Fiscal
autonomy means that local governments have the power to create their own sources of
revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released by the national
government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their
own priorities. It extends to the preparation of their budgets, and local officials in turn
have to work within the constraints thereof. They are not formulated at the national
level and imposed on local governments, whether they are relevant to local needs and
resources or not. Hence, the necessity of a balancing of viewpoints and the
harmonization of proposals from both local and national officials,
[24]
who in any case are
partners in the attainment of national goals.
Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule out any manner of national
government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs,
fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. Significantly, the President, by
constitutional fiat, is the head of the economic and planning agency of the
government,
[25]
primarily responsible for formulating and implementing continuing,
coordinated and integrated social and economic policies, plans and programs
[26]
for the
entire country. However, under the Constitution, the formulation and the
implementation of such policies and programs are subject to "consultations with the
appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and local government units." The
President cannot do so unilaterally.
Consequently, the Local Government Code provides:
[27]

"x x x [I]n the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public
sector deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the
recommendation of [the] Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the Interior and
Local Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to
consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the
presidents of the liga, to make the necessary adjustments in the internal
revenue allotment of local government units but in no case shall the allotment
be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue
taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year x x x."
There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local
fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2)
consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and (3) the
corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior
and Local Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in
the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of
national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one.
Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with these requisites before
the issuance and the implementation of AO 372. At the very least, they did not even try
to show that the national government was suffering from an unmanageable public
sector deficit. Neither did they claim having conducted consultations with the different
leagues of local governments. Without these requisites, the President has no authority
to adjust, much less to reduce, unilaterally the LGU's internal revenue allotment.
The solicitor general insists, however, that AO 372 is merely directory and has been
issued by the President consistent with his power of supervision over local
governments. It is intended only to advise all government agencies and
instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic
stability in the country, which is facing economic difficulties. Besides, it does not contain
any sanction in case of noncompliance. Being merely an advisory, therefore, Section 1
of AO 372 is well within the powers of the President. Since it is not a mandatory
imposition, the directive cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control.
While the wordings of Section 1 of AO 372 have a rather commanding tone, and
while we agree with petitioner that the requirements of Section 284 of the Local
Government Code have not been satisfied, we are prepared to accept the solicitor
general's assurance that the directive to "identify and implement measures x x
x that will reduce total expenditures x x x by at least 25% of authorized regular
appropriation" is merely advisory in character, and does not constitute a mandatory or
binding order that interferes with local autonomy. The language used, while
authoritative, does not amount to a command that emanates from a boss to a subaltern.
Rather, the provision is merely an advisory to prevail upon local executives to
recognize the need for fiscal restraint in a period of economic difficulty. Indeed, all
concerned would do well to heed the President's call to unity, solidarity and teamwork to
help alleviate the crisis. It is understood, however, that no legal sanction may be
imposed upon LGUs and their officials who do not follow such advice. It is in this light
that we sustain the solicitor general's contention in regard to Section 1.
Withholding a Part of LGUs' IRA

Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal
autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal
revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution.
[28]
The Local Government
Code
[29]
specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned
within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or
holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose."
[30]
As
a rule, the term "shall" is a word of command that must be given a compulsory
meaning.
[31]
The provision is, therefore, imperative.
Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding, effective January 1, 1998, of
10 percent of the LGUs' IRA "pending the assessment and evaluation by the
Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation" in the
country. Such withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law. Although
temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback, which means "something held back or
withheld, often temporarily."
[32]
Hence, the "temporary" nature of the retention by the
national government does not matter. Any retention is prohibited.
In sum, while Section 1 of AO 372 may be upheld as an advisory effected in times
of national crisis, Section 4 thereof has no color of validity at all. The latter provision
effectively encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local governments. Concededly, the
President was well-intentioned in issuing his Order to withhold the LGUs IRA, but the
rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out within the
parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be carried
out by legal methods.
Refutation of J ustice Kapunan's Dissent

Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan dissents from our Decision on the grounds that,
allegedly, (1) the Petition is premature; (2) AO 372 falls within the powers of the
President as chief fiscal officer; and (3) the withholding of the LGUs IRA is implied in
the President's authority to adjust it in case of an unmanageable public sector deficit.
First, on prematurity. According to the Dissent, when "the conduct has not yet
occurred and the challenged construction has not yet been adopted by the agency
charged with administering the administrative order, the determination of the scope and
constitutionality of the executive action in advance of its immediate adverse effect
involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of judicial function."
This is a rather novel theory -- that people should await the implementing evil to
befall on them before they can question acts that are illegal or unconstitutional. Be it
remembered that the real issue here is whether the Constitution and the law are
contravened by Section 4 of AO 372, not whether they are violated by the acts
implementing it. In the unanimous en banc case Taada v. Angara,
[33]
this Court held
that when an act of the legislative department is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the duty of this Court. By the mere
enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is
said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt
act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to
awaken judicial duty. Said the Court:
"In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the
duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. 'The question thus posed is judicial
rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the
supremacy of the Constitution is upheld.'
[34]
Once a 'controversy as to the application or
interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court x x x , it becomes a legal issue
which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.'
[35]

x x x x x x x x x
"As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases,
[36]
it will not
shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that
involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer,
agency, instrumentality or department of the government."
In the same vein, the Court also held in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of
Energy:
[37]

"x x x Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
but also the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of government. The courts, as guardians of the
Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute
enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental
law. Where the statute violates the Constitution, it is not only the right but the
duty of the judiciary to declare such act unconstitutional and void."
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme
is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the
laws, as in the present case, settling the dispute becomes the duty and the
responsibility of the courts.
Besides, the issue that the Petition is premature has not been raised by the parties;
hence it is deemed waived. Considerations of due process really prevents its use
against a party that has not been given sufficient notice of its presentation, and thus has
not been given the opportunity to refute it.
[38]

Second, on the President's power as chief fiscal officer of the country. Justice
Kapunan posits that Section 4 of AO 372 conforms with the President's role as chief
fiscal officer, who allegedly "is clothed by law with certain powers to ensure the
observance of safeguards and auditing requirements, as well as the legal prerequisites
in the release and use of IRAs, taking into account the constitutional and statutory
mandates."
[39]
He cites instances when the President may lawfully intervene in the fiscal
affairs of LGUs.
Precisely, such powers referred to in the Dissent have specifically been authorized
by law and have not been challenged as violative of the Constitution. On the other
hand, Section 4 of AO 372, as explained earlier, contravenes explicit provisions of the
Local Government Code (LGC) and the Constitution. In other words, the acts alluded to
in the Dissent are indeed authorized by law; but, quite the opposite, Section 4 of AO
372 is bereft of any legal or constitutional basis.
Third, on the President's authority to adjust the IRA of LGUs in case of an
unmanageable public sector deficit. It must be emphasized that in striking down
Section 4 of AO 372, this Court is not ruling out any form of reduction in the IRAs of
LGUs. Indeed, as the President may make necessary adjustments in case of an
unmanageable public sector deficit, as stated in the main part of this Decision, and in
line with Section 284 of the LGC, which Justice Kapunan cites. He, however, merely
glances over a specific requirement in the same provision -- that such reduction is
subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and, more
importantly, with the presidents of the leagues of local governments.
Notably, Justice Kapunan recognizes the need for "interaction between the national
government and the LGUs at the planning level," in order to ensure that "local
development plans x x x hew to national policies and standards." The problem is that
no such interaction or consultation was ever held prior to the issuance of AO 372. This
is why the petitioner and the intervenor (who was a provincial governor and at the same
time president of the League of Provinces of the Philippines and chairman of the
League of Leagues of Local Governments) have protested and instituted this
action. Significantly, respondents do not deny the lack of consultation.
In addition, Justice Kapunan cites Section 287
[40]
of the LGC as impliedly authorizing
the President to withhold the IRA of an LGU, pending its compliance with certain
requirements. Even a cursory reading of the provision reveals that it is totally
inapplicable to the issue at bar. It directs LGUs to appropriate in their annual budgets
20 percent of their respective IRAs for development projects. It speaks of no positive
power granted the President to priorly withhold any amount. Not at all.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Respondents and their successors are
hereby permanently PROHIBITED from implementing Administrative Order Nos. 372
and 43, respectively dated December 27, 1997 and December 10, 1998, insofar as local
government units are concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., see dissenting opinion.
Purisima, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., join J. Kapunan in his dissenting opinion.
DISSENTING OPINION

KAPUNAN, J .:
In striking down as unconstitutional and illegal Section 4 of Administrative Order No.
372 ("AO No. 372"), the majority opinion posits that the President exercised power of
control over the local government units ("LGU), which he does not have, and violated
the provisions of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, which states:
SEC. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law,
in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
and Section 286(a) of the Local Government Code, which provides:
SEC. 286. Automatic Release of Shares. - (a) The share of each local
government unit shall be released, without need of any further action, directly
to the provincial, city, municipal or barangay treasurer, as the case may be, on
a quarterly basis within five (5) days after the end of each quarter, and which
shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the
national government for whatever purpose.
The share of the LGUs in the national internal revenue taxes is defined in Section
284 of the same Local Government Code, to wit:
SEC. 284. Allotment of Internal Revenue Taxes. - Local government units
shall have a share in the national internal revenue taxes based on the
collection of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year as follows:
(a) On the first year of the effectivity of this Code, thirty percent (30%);
(b) On the second year, thirty-five (35%) percent; and
(c) On the third year and thereafter, forty percent (40%).
Provided, That in the event that the national government incurs an
unmanageable public sector deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby
authorized, upon the recommendation of Secretary of Finance, Secretary of
Interior and Local Government and Secretary of Budget and Management,
and subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of
Congress and the presidents of the liga, to make the necessary adjustments
in the internal revenue allotment of local government units but in no case shall
the allotment be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national
internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal
year: Provided, further, That in the first year of the effectivity of this Code, the
local government units shall, in addition to the thirty percent (30%) internal
revenue allotment which shall include the cost of devolved functions for
essential public services, be entitled to receive the amount equivalent to the
cost of devolved personal services.
x x x
The majority opinion takes the view that the withholding of ten percent (10%) of the
internal revenue allotment ("IRA") to the LGUs pending the assessment and evaluation
by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation as
called for in Section 4 of AO No. 372 transgresses against the above-quoted provisions
which mandate the "automatic" release of the shares of the LGUs in the national
internal revenue in consonance with local fiscal autonomy. The pertinent portions of AO
No. 372 are reproduced hereunder:
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 372

ADOPTION OF ECONOMY MEASURES IN GOVERNMENT FOR FY 1998
WHEREAS, the current economic difficulties brought about by the peso
depreciation requires continued prudence in government fiscal management
to maintain economic stability and sustain the countrys growth momentum;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that all government agencies adopt cash
management measures to match expenditures with available resources; NOW
THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do
hereby order and direct:
SECTION 1. All government departments and agencies, including x x x local
government units will identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will
reduce total appropriations for non-personal services items, along the
following suggested areas:
x x x
SECTION 4. Pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development
Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation the amount
equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to local government units
shall be withheld.
x x x
Subsequently, on December 10, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada issued
Administrative Order No. 43 (AO No. 43), amending Section 4 of AO No. 372, by
reducing to five percent (5%) the IRA to be withheld from the LGUs, thus:
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 43

AMENDING ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 372 DATED 27 DECEMBER
1997 ENTITLED "ADOPTION OF ECONOMY MEASURES IN
GOVERNMENT FOR FY 1998"
WHEREAS, Administrative Order No. 372 dated 27 December 1997 entitled
"Adoption of Economy Measures in Government for FY 1998" was issued to
address the economic difficulties brought about by the peso devaluation in
1997;
WHEREAS, Section 4 of Administrative Order No. 372 provided that the
amount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to local
government units shall be withheld; and,
WHEREAS, there is a need to release additional funds to local government
units for vital projects and expenditures.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, President of the
Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do
hereby order the reduction of the withheld Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) of
local government units from ten percent to five percent.
The five percent reduction in the IRA withheld for 1998 shall be released
before 25 December 1998.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 10th day of December, in the year of our
Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety eight.
With all due respect, I beg to disagree with the majority opinion.
Section 4 of AO No. 372 does not present a case ripe for adjudication. The
language of Section 4 does not conclusively show that, on its face, the constitutional
provision on the automatic release of the IRA shares of the LGUs has been violated.
Section 4, as worded, expresses the idea that the withholding is merely temporary
which fact alone would not merit an outright conclusion of its unconstitutionality,
especially in light of the reasonable presumption that administrative agencies act in
conformity with the law and the Constitution. Where the conduct has not yet occurred
and the challenged construction has not yet been adopted by the agency charged with
administering the administrative order, the determination of the scope and
constitutionality of the executive action in advance of its immediate adverse effect
involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of judicial function.
Petitioners have not shown that the alleged 5% IRA share of LGUs that was temporarily
withheld has not yet been released, or that the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) has refused and continues to refuse its release. In view thereof, the Court
should not decide as this case suggests an abstract proposition on constitutional issues.
The President is the chief fiscal officer of the country. He is ultimately responsible
for the collection and distribution of public money:
SECTION 3. Powers and Functions. - The Department of Budget and Management
shall assist the President in the preparation of a national resources and expenditures
budget, preparation, execution and control of the National Budget, preparation and
maintenance of accounting systems essential to the budgetary process, achievement of
more economy and efficiency in the management of government operations,
administration of compensation and position classification systems, assessment of
organizational effectiveness and review and evaluation of legislative proposals having
budgetary or organizational implications.
1

In a larger context, his role as chief fiscal officer is directed towards "the nation's efforts
at economic and social upliftment"
2
for which more specific economic powers are
delegated. Within statutory limits, the President can, thus, fix "tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the government,
3
as he is also
responsible for enlisting the country in international economic agreements.
4
More than
this, to achieve "economy and efficiency in the management of government operations,"
the President is empowered to create appropriation reserves,
5
suspend expenditure
appropriations,
6
and institute cost reduction schemes.
7

As chief fiscal officer of the country, the President supervises fiscal development in
the local government units and ensures that laws are faithfully executed.
8
For this
reason, he can set aside tax ordinances if he finds them contrary to the Local
Government Code.
9
Ordinances cannot contravene statutes and public policy as
declared by the national govemment.
10
The goal of local economy is not to "end the
relation of partnership and inter-dependence between the central administration and
local government units,"
11
but to make local governments "more responsive and
accountable" [to] "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and
make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social
progress."
12

The interaction between the national government and the local government units is
mandatory at the planning level. Local development plans must thus hew to "national
policies and standards
13
as these are integrated into the regional development plans for
submission to the National Economic Development Authority. "
14
Local budget plans and
goals must also be harmonized, as far as practicable, with "national development goals
and strategies in order to optimize the utilization of resources and to avoid duplication in
the use of fiscal and physical resources."
15

Section 4 of AO No. 372 was issued in the exercise by the President not only of his
power of general supervision, but also in conformity with his role as chief fiscal officer of
the country in the discharge of which he is clothed by law with certain powers to ensure
the observance of safeguards and auditing requirements, as well as the legal
prerequisites in the release and use of IRAs, taking into account the constitutional
16
and
statutory
17
mandates.
However, the phrase "automatic release" of the LGUs' shares does not mean that
the release of the funds is mechanical, spontaneous, self-operating or reflex. IRAs must
first be determined, and the money for their payment collected.
18
In this regard,
administrative documentations are also undertaken to ascertain their availability, limits
and extent. The phrase, thus, should be used in the context of the whole budgetary
process and in relation to pertinent laws relating to audit and accounting requirements.
In the workings of the budget for the fiscal year, appropriations for expenditures are
supported by existing funds in the national coffers and by proposals for revenue raising.
The money, therefore, available for IRA release may not be existing but merely
inchoate, or a mere expectation. It is not infrequent that the Executive Department's
proposals for raising revenue in the form of proposed legislation may not be passed by
the legislature. As such, the release of IRA should not mean release of absolute
amounts based merely on mathematical computations. There must be a prior
determination of what exact amount the local government units are actually entitled in
light of the economic factors which affect the fiscal situation in the country. Foremost of
these is where, due to an unmanageable public sector deficit, the President may make
the necessary adjustments in the IRA of LGUs. Thus, as expressly provided in Article
284 of the Local Government Code:
x x x (I)n the event that the national government incurs an
unmanageable public sector deficit, the President of the Philippines is
hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of Secretary of
Finance, Secretary of Interior and Local Government and Secretary of
Budget and Management and subject to consultation with the
presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of
the "liga," to make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue
allotment of local government units but in no case shall the allotment
be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal
revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year.
x x x.
Under the aforecited provision, if facts reveal that the economy has sustained or will
likely sustain such "unmanageable public sector deficit," then the LGUs cannot assert
absolute right of entitlement to the full amount of forty percent (40%) share in the IRA,
because the President is authorized to make an adjustment and to reduce the amount
to not less than thirty percent (30%). It is, therefore, impractical to immediately release
the full amount of the IRAs and subsequently require the local government units to
return at most ten percent (10%) once the President has ascertained that there exists
an unmanageable public sector deficit.
By necessary implication, the power to make necessary adjustments (including
reduction) in the IRA in case of an unmanageable public sector deficit, includes the
discretion to withhold the IRAs temporarily until such time that the determination of the
actual fiscal situation is made. The test in determining whether one power is necessarily
included in a stated authority is: "The exercise of a more absolute power necessarily
includes the lesser power especially where it is needed to make the first power
effective."
19
If the discretion to suspend temporarily the release of the IRA pending such
examination is withheld from the President, his authority to make the necessary IRA
adjustments brought about by the unmanageable public sector deficit would be
emasculated in the midst of serious economic crisis. In the situation conjured by the
majority opinion, the money would already have been gone even before it is determined
that fiscal crisis is indeed happening.
The majority opinion overstates the requirement in Section 286 of the Local
Government Code that the IRAs "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may
be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose" as proof that no
withholding of the release of the IRAs is allowed albeit temporary in nature.
It is worthy to note that this provision does not appear in the Constitution. Section 6,
Art X of the Constitution merely directs that LGUs "shall have a just share" in the
national taxes "as determined by law" and which share shall be automatically released
to them. This means that before the LGUs share is released, there should be first a
determination, which requires a process, of what is the correct amount as dictated by
existing laws. For one, the Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code allows
deductions from the IRAs, to wit:
Article 384. Automatic Release of IRA Shares of LGUs:
x x x
(c) The IRA share of LGUs shall not be subject to any lien or hold back
that may be imposed by the National Government for whatever purpose
unless otherwise provided in the Code or other applicable laws and loan
contract on project agreements arising from foreign loans and international
commitments, such as premium contributions of LGUs to the Government
Service Insurance System and loans contracted by LGUs under foreign-
assisted projects.
Apart from the above, other mandatory deductions are made from the IRAs prior to
their release, such as: (1) total actual cost of devolution and the cost of city-funded
hospitals;
20
and (2) compulsory contributions
21
and other remittances.
22
It follows,
therefore, that the President can withhold portions of IRAs in order to set-off or
compensate legitimately incurred obligations and remittances of LGUs.
Significantly, Section 286 of the Local Government Code does not make mention of
the exact amount that should be automatically released to the LGUs. The provision
does not mandate that the entire 40% share mentioned in Section 284 shall be
released. It merely provides that the "share" of each LGU shall be released and which
"shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national
government for whatever purpose." The provision on automatic release of IRA share
should, thus, be read together with Section 284, including the proviso on adjustment or
reduction of IRAs, as well as other relevant laws. It may happen that the share of the
LGUs may amount to the full forty percent (40%) or the reduced amount of thirty percent
(30%) as adjusted without any law being violated. In other words, all that Section 286
requires is the automatic release of the amount that the LGUs are rightfully and
legally entitled to, which, as the same section provides, should not be less than thirty
percent (30%) of the collection of the national revenue taxes. So that even if five
percent (5%) or ten percent (10%) is either temporarily or permanently withheld, but the
minimum of thirty percent (30%) allotment for the LGUs is released pursuant to the
President's authority to make the necessary adjustment in the LGUS' share, there is still
full compliance with the requirements of the automatic release of the LGUs' share.
Finally, the majority insists that the withholding of ten percent (10%) or five percent
(5%) of the IRAs could not have been done pursuant to the power of the President to
adjust or reduce such shares under Section 284 of the Local Government Code
because there was no showing of an unmanageable public sector deficit by the national
government, nor was there evidence that consultations with the presiding officers of
both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the various leagues had taken place
and the corresponding recommendations of the Secretary of Finance, Secretary of
Interior and Local Government and the Budget Secretary were made.
I beg to differ. The power to determine whether there is an unmanageable public
sector deficit is lodged in the President. The President's determination, as fiscal
manager of the country, of the existence of economic difficulties which could amount to
"unmanageable public sector deficit" should be accorded respect. In fact, the
withholding of the ten percent (10%) of the LGUs' share was further justified by the
current economic difficulties brought about by the peso depreciation as shown by one of
the "WHEREASES" of AO No. 372.
23
In the absence of any showing to the contrary, it
is presumed that the President had made prior consultations with the officials thus
mentioned and had acted upon the recommendations of the Secretaries of Finance,
Interior and Local Government and Budget.
24

Therefore, even assuming hypothetically that there was effectively a deduction of
five percent (5%) of the LGUs' share, which was in accordance with the President's
prerogative in view of the pronouncement of the existence of an unmanageable public
sector deficit, the deduction would still be valid in the absence of any proof that the
LGUs' allotment was less than the thirty percent (30%) limit provided for in Section 284
of the Local Government Code.
In resume, the withholding of the amount equivalent to five percent (5%) of the IRA
to the LGUs was temporary pending determination by the Executive of the actual share
which the LGUs are rightfully entitled to on the basis of the applicable laws, particularly
Section 284 of the Local Government Code, authorizing the President to make the
necessary adjustments in the IRA of LGUs in the event of an unmanageable public
sector deficit. And assuming that the said five percent (5%) of the IRA pertaining to the
1998 Fiscal Year has been permanently withheld, there is no showing that the amount
actually released to the LGUs that same year was less than thirty percent (30%) of the
national internal revenue taxes collected, without even considering the proper
deductions allowed by law.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 100710 September 3, 1991
BENJAMIN P. ABELLA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ADELINA Y. LARRAZABAL, respondents.
G.R. No. 100739 September 3, 1991
ADELINA Y. LARRAZABAL, petitioner,
vs.
COMMSSION ON ELECTIONS and SILVESTRE DE LA CRUZ, respondents.
Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. for petitioner in 100739.
Cesar A. Sevilla for petitioner in 100710.
Panganiban, Benitez, Baninaga & Bautista for private respondent S. de la Cruz.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J .:p
The main issue in these consolidated petitions centers on who is the rightful governor of the province of Leyte 1) petitioner Adelina
Larrazabal (G.R. No. 100739) who obtained the highest number of votes in the local elections of February 1, 1988 and was proclaimed as
the duly elected governor but who was later declared by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) "... to lack both residence and
registration qualifications for the position of Governor of Leyte as provided by Art. X, Section 12, Philippine Constitution in relation to Title II,
Chapter I, Sec. 42, B.P. Blg. 137 and Sec. 89, R.A. No. 179 and is hereby disqualified as such Governor"; 2) petitioner Benjamin Abella
(G.R. No. 100710), who obtained the second highest number of votes for the position of governor but was not allowed by the COMELEC to
be proclaimed as governor after the disqualification of Larrazabal; or 3) Leopoldo E. Petilla, the vice-governor of the province of. Leyte.
This is the fourth time that the controversy relating to the local elections in February 1, 1988 for governor of the province of Leyte is elevated
to this Court. The antecedent facts of these cases are stated in the earlier consolidated cases of BENJAMIN P. ABELLA and SILVESTRE T.
DE LA CRUZ, petitioners, v. ADELINA INDAY LARRAZABAL, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF LEYTE and COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents (G.R. Nos. 87721-30) and BENJAMN P. ABELLA and SILVESTRE T. DE LA CRUZ, petitioners v. ADELINA
LARRAZABAL and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents (G. R. No. 88004) 180 SCRA 509 [1989]), to wit:
The Court has ordered the consolidation of G.R. Nos 87721-30 and G.R. No. 88004 involving the same parties and the
same election in 1988 for the office of provincial governor of Leyte. Challenged in the petitions for certiorari are the
resolutions of the respondent Commission on Elections dismissing the pre-proclamation and disqualification cases filed
by the herein petitioners against private respondent Adelina Larrazabal.
Petitioner Benjamin P. Abella was the official candidate of the Liberal Party for provincial governor of Leyte in the local
election held on February 1, 1988. The private respondent is the wife of Emeterio V. Larrazabal, the original candidate
of the Lakas ng Bansa-PDP-Laban who was disqualified by the Commission on Elections on January 18, 1988, for lack
of residence. (G.R. No. 88004, Rollo, pp. 102-104) (He filed a petition for certiorari to challenge this resolution. He,
however, filed an urgent ex-parte motion to withdraw petition which was granted in a resolution dated January 21, 1988
and the case was dismissed. [G.R. No. 81313]) On January 31, 1988, the day before the election, she filed her own
certificate of candidacy in substitution of her husband. (Ibid., p. 48) The following day, at about 9:30 o'clock in the
morning, Silvestre de la Cruz, a registered voter of Tacloban City, filed a petition with the provincial election supervisor
of Leyte to disqualify her for alleged false statements in her certificate of candidacy regarding her residence. (Id., pp.
113-118) This was immediately transmitted to the main office of the Commission on Elections, which could not function,
however, because all but one of its members had not yet been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. De la
Cruz then came to this Court, which issued a temporary restraining order on February 4, 1988, enjoining the provincial
board of canvassers of Leyte 'from proclaiming Adelina Larrazabal as the winning candidate for the Office of the
Governor in the province of Leyte, in the event that she obtains the winning margin of votes in the canvass of election
returns of said province.' (Id., p. 179) On March 1, 1988, the Commission on Elections having been fully constituted, we
remanded the petition thereto for appropriate action, including maintenance or lifting of the Court's temporary
restraining order of February 4, 1988. (Id. pp. 182-184)
In the meantime, petitioner Abella, after raising various verbal objections (later duly reduced to writing) during the
canvass of the election returns, seasonably elevated them to the Commission on Elections in ten separate appeals
docketed as SPC Nos. 88-627 to 88627-I. Pending resolution of these cases, Abella intervened on March 7, 1988 in
the disqualification case, docketed as SPC No. 88-546, and the following day filed a complaint, with the Law
Department of the COMELEC charging the private respondent with falsification and misrepresentation of her residence
in her certificate of candidacy. On March 22, 1988, the public respondent consolidated the pre-proclamation and
disqualification cases with the Second Division.
On February 3, 1989, this Division unanimously upheld virtually all the challenged rulings of the provincial board of
canvassers, mostly on the ground that the objection raised were merely formal and did not affect the validity of the
returns or the ballots, and ordered the proclamation of the winner after completion of the canvass. (G.R. Nos. 87721-
30, Rollo, pp. 18-50) On that same date, the disqualification case was also dismissed by a 2-1 decision, and the matter
was referred to the Law Department for 'preliminary investigation for possible violation of Section 74 of the Omnibus
Election Code. ' (G.R. Nos. 88004, Rollo, pp. 26-40)
The motion for reconsideration of the resolution on the pre-proclamation cases was denied by the COMELEC en
banc on April 13, 1989, with no dissenting vote. (G.R. Nos. 87721-30, Rollo, pp. 51-56) These cases are the subject of
G.R. Nos. 87721-30, where we issued on April 18, 1989, another temporary restraining order to the provincial board of
canvassers of Leyte to CEASE and DESIST from resuming the canvass of the contested returns and/or from
proclaiming private respondent Adelina Larrazabal Governor of Leyte.
The motion for reconsideration of the resolution on the qualification case was also denied by the COMELEC en
banc on May 4, 1989, but with three commissioners dissenting. (G.R. No. 88004, Rollo, pp 47-61; penned by
Commissioner Abueg, Jr., with Commissioners Africa Rama, and Yorac, dissenting) The dismissal of this case is the
subject of G.R. No. 88004. (at pp. 511-513)
Disposing of the consolidated petitions, this Court rendered judgment as follows:
1. In G.R.Nos. 87721-30, the decision dated February 3, 1989, the resolution dated April 13, 1989, are affirmed and the
petition is DISMISSED.
2. In G.R. No. 88004, the decision dated February 3,1989, and the resolution dated May 4, 1989, are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Respondent Commission on Elections is ORDERED to directly hear and decide SPC Case No. 88-546
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, with authority to maintain or lift our temporary restraining order of April
18, 1989, according to its own assessment of the evidence against the private respondent.
The parties are enjoined to resolve this case with all possible speed, to the end that the Governor of Leyte may be
ascertained and installed without further delay. (p. 520)
In view of these rulings, the COMELEC, upon motion of Larrazabal, lifted its temporary restraining order against her proclamation paving
Larrazabal's proclamation and her assumption to the Office of Governor of Leyte while the hearings in the disqualification case (SPC No. 88-
546) continued.
On February 14, 1991, the second division in a 2-1 vote rendered a decision disqualifying Larrazabal as governor.
On July 18, 1991, the Commission en banc issued a resolution which denied Larrazabal's motion to declare decision void and/or motion for
reconsideration and affirmed the second division's decision. In the same resolution, the Commission disallowed Abella's proclamation as
governor of Leyte.
Hence, these petitions.
We treat the various Comments as Answers and decide the petitions on their merits.
Acting on a most urgent petition (motion) for the issuance of a restraining order filed by petitioner Larrazabal, this Court issued a temporary
restraining order on August 1, 1991.
xxx xxx xxx
... [E]ffective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering the respondent on on Elections to
CEASE and DESIST from enforcing, implementing and executing the decision and resolution, respectively dated
February 14, 1991 and July 18, 1991.
It appearing that despite the filing of this petition before this Court and during its pendency, the incumbent Vice-
Governor of Leyte Hon. Leopoldo E. Petilla, took his oath as Provincial Governor of Leyte and assumed the
governorship as contained in his telegraphic message, pursuant to COMELEC resolution SPC No. 88-546,
promulgated on July 18, 1991, the Court further Resolved to ORDER Hon. Leopoldo E. Petilla to MAINTAIN the status
quo ante then prevailing and/or existing before the filing of this petition and to DESIST from assuming the office of the
Governor and from discharging the duties and functions thereof. (Rollo-100739, p. 204)
In G.R. No. 100739, petitioner Larrazabal professes that the COMELEC completely disregarded our pronouncement in G.R. No. 88004 in
that instead of acting on SPC Case No. 88-546 under section 78 of the Election Code, the COMELEC proceeded with a disqualification case
not contemplated in G.R. No. 88004.
The argument is not meritorious.
The questioned decision and resolution of the COMELEC conform with this Court's decision in G.R. No. 88004.
Initially, herein respondent Silvestre T. de la Cruz (Benjamin P. Abella, petitioner in G.R. No. 100710 was allowed to intervene in the case)
filed a petition with the COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Larrazabal from running as governor of Leyte on the ground that she
misrepresented her residence in her certificate of candidacy as Kananga, Leyte. It was alleged that she was in fact a resident of Ormoc City
like her husband who was earlier disqualified from running for the same office. The COMELEC dismissed the petition and referred the case
to its Law Department for proper action on the ground that the petition was a violation of Section 74 of the Election Code and, pursuant to it
rules, should be prosecuted as an election offense under Section 262 of the Code.
This Court reversed and set aside the COMELEC's ruling, to wit:
The Court holds that the dismissal was improper. The issue of residence having been squarely raised before it, it
should not have been shunted aside to the Law Department for a roundabout investigation of the private respondent's
qualification through the filing of a criminal prosecution, if found to be warranted, with resultant disqualification of the
accused in case of conviction. The COMELEC should have opted for a more direct and speedy process available
under the law, considering the vital public interest involved and the necessity of resolving the question of the earliest
possible time for the benefit of the inhabitants of Leyte.
In the view of the Court, the pertinent provision is Section 78 in relation to Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646.
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due
course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due
notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
Section 6 of R.A. 6646 states as follows:
Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not
be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his
guilt is strong. ...
xxx xxx xxx
The above-stressed circumstances should explain the necessity for continuing the investigation of the private
respondent's challenged disqualification even after the election notwithstanding that such matter is usually resolved
before the election. Independently of these circumstances, such proceedings are allowed by Section 6 of RA. 6646 if
for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified ...
In fine, the Court directed the COMELEC to determine the residence qualification of petitioner Larrazabal in SPC Case No. 88-546.
Concomitant with this directive would be the disqualification of petitioner Larrazabal in the event that substantial evidence is adduced that
she really lacks the residence provided by law to qualify her to run for the position of governor in Leyte.
In line with the Court's directive, the COMELEC conducted hearings in SPC Case No. 88-546 to resolve the qualification of Larrazabal on the
basis of two (2) legal issues raised by Silvestre T. de la Cruz namely, Larrazabal's lack of legal residence in the province of Leyte and her not
being a registered voter in the province, as required by Title II, Chapter I, Section 42, B.P. Blg. 337, in relation to Article X, Section 12 of the
Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 42. Qualification. (1) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-three years of
age on election day, a qualified voter registered as such in the barangay, municipality, city or province where he
proposes to be elected, a resident therein for at least one year at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy,
and able to read and write English, Pilipino, or any other local language or dialect.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters prohibit their
voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of component cities
within a province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective
provincial officials.
The position of petitioners De la Cruz and Abena was that respondent Larrazabal is neither a resident nor a registered voter of Kananga,
Leyte as she claimed but a resident and registered voter of Ormoc City, a component city of the province of Leyte but independent of the
province pursuant to Section 12, Article X of the Constitution thereby disqualifying her for the position of governor of Leyte. They presented
testimonial as well as documentary evidence to prove their stance.
On the other hand, respondent Larrazabal maintained that she was a resident and a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte. She, too presented
testimonial as well as documentary evidence to prove her stand.
The COMELEC ruled against the respondent, now petitioner Larrazabal.
In its questioned decision and resolution, the COMELEC found that petitioner Larrazabal was neither a resident of Kananga, Leyte nor a
registered voter thereat. With these findings, the COMELEC disqualified the petitioner as governor of the province of Leyte.
The petitioner, however, avers that the COMELEC decision is erroneous when it relied on the provisions of the Family Code to rule that the
petitioner lacks the required residence to qualify her to run for the position of governor of Leyte. She opines that under "the Election Law, the
matter of determination of the RESIDENCE is more on the principle of INTENTION, the animus revertendi rather than anything else."
In this regard she states that ... "her subsequent physical transfer of residence to Ormoc City thereafter, did not necessarily erased (sic) or
removed her Kananga residence, for as long as she had the ANIMUS REVERTENDIevidenced by her continuous and regular acts of
returning there in the course of the years, although she had physically resided at Ormoc City." (Petition, Rollo, p. 40)
As can be gleaned from the questioned decision, the COMELEC based its finding that the petitioner lacks the required residence on the
evidence of record to the effect that despite protestations to the contrary made by the petitioner, she has established her residence at Ormoc
City from 1975 to the present and not at Kananga, Leyte. Her attempt to purportedly change her residence one year before the election by
registering at Kananga, Leyte to qualify her to ran for the position of governor of the province of Leyte clearly shows that she considers
herself already a resident of Ormoc City. In the absence of any evidence to prove otherwise, the reliance on the provisions of the Family
Code was proper and in consonance with human experience. The petitioner did not present evidence to show that she and her husband
maintain separate residences, she at Kananga, Leyte and her husband at Ormoc City. The second division of the COMELEC in its decision
dated February 14, 1991 states:
xxx xxx xxx
But there is the more fundamental issue of residence. The only indications of a change of residence so far as
respondent is concerned are: the address indicated in the application for cancellation filed by respondent indicating her
postal address as Kananga, Leyte, the annotation in her Voter's affidavit for Precinct No. 15 that her registration was
cancelled due to lack of residence; the testimony of Anastacia Dasigan Mangbanag that she entered into a contract of
lease with option to buy with the spouses Emeterio and Inday Larrazabal over two parcels of land the witness owned in
Mahawan, Kananga, Leyte; that she sees the spouses in the leased house in Kananga, that she was informed by Inday
Larrazabal that the spouses had decided to buy their property because she wanted to beautify the house for their
residence. She attached as annex the written contract signed by her and the spouses; and the testimony of Adolfo
Larrazabal Exh. "10" cousin of the spouses that 'at a family meeting ... the political plan of the Larrazabal clan was
discussed, among which were (sic) the problem of Terry's residence in Ormoc City' and that it was decided in said
meeting ... that Inday Larrazabal, wife of Terry, will transfer her Ormoc Registration as a voter to Kananga, Leyte (so)
she will be able to vote for Terry and also help me in my candidacy; that they have been staying in Kananga, very often
as they have properties in Lonoy and a house in Mahawan.
The references to residence in the documents of cancellation and registration are already assessed for their evidentiary
value in relation to the documents themselves above. The question must therefore be addressed in relation to the
testimony of Anastacia Dasigan Mangbanag and Adolfo V. Larrazabal. The gist of the testimonies is that they leased
properties in Mahawan, Leyte and that they are seen in the house on the land leased. But the contract of lease with
option to purchase itself indicates as to where the legal residence of the Jarrazabal is. The pertinent portion states:
SPS EMETERIO V. LARRAZABAL AND ADELINA Y. LARRAZABAL, both of legal age, Filipino, andresidents of Ormoc
City, Philippines, hereinafter referred to as the LESSEES.
The acknowledgment also indicates that Emeterio V. Larrazabal presented his Residence Certificate No. 155774914
issued in Ormoc City.
The testimony of Adolfo Larrazabal reenforces this conclusion. It admits, as of the second or third week of November,
that the residence of Emeterio Larrazabal was Ormoc City and that Inday Larrazabal was going to transfer her
registration so she may be able to vote for him.
For the purpose of running for public office, the residence requirement should be read as legal residence or domicile,
not any place where a party may have properties and may visit from time to time.
The Civil Code is clear that '[F]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural
persons is the place of their habitual residence.
Arts. 68 and 69 of the Family Code, E.O. No. 209 also provide as follows:
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court
shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live
abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such
exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.
Husband and wife as a matter of principle live together in one legal residence which is their usual place of abode.
(COMELEC decision, pp. 21-23; Rollo 100710, pp. 67-69; Emphsis supplied)
As regards the principle of ANIMUS REVERTENDI we ruled in the case of Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954]):
xxx xxx xxx
... [M]ere absence from one's residence or origin-domicile-to pursue studies, engage in business, or practice his
avocation, is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence.' ... The determination of a persons
legal residence or domicile largely depends upon intention which may be inferred from his acts, activities and
utterances. The party who claims that a person has abandoned or left his residence or origin must show and prove pre-
ponderantly such abandonment or loss.
xxx xxx xxx
... A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for 'greener pastures' as the saying goes, to improve his life, and
that, of course, includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is
to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot
but for professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from the place of his
professional or business activities; so there he registers as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not
willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government especially in national
elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin, has not
forsaken him. ... (at pp. 297-300)
In the instant case, there is no evidence to prove that the petitioner temporarily left her residence in Kananga, Leyte in 1975 to pursue any
calling, profession or business. What is clear is that she established her residence in Ormoc City with her husband and considers herself a
resident therein. The intention of animus revertendi not to abandon her residence in Kananga, Leyte therefor, is nor present. The fact that
she occasionally visits Kananga, Leyte through the years does not signify an intention to continue her residence therein. It is common among
us Filipinos to often visit places where we formerly resided specially so when we have left friends and relatives therein although for intents
and purposes we have already transferred our residence to other places.
Anent the issue of whether or not the petitioner is a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, the petitioner insists that she is such a registered
voter based on the following antecedents: 1) She cancelled her registration in Ormoc City on November 25, 1987, and 2) she then
transferred her registration to Kananga, Leyte on November 25, 1987 by registering thereat and 3) she later voted on election day (February
1, 1988) in Kananga, Leyte.
Despite the insistence of the petitioner, the evidence shows that her supposed cancellation of registration in Ormoc City and transfer of
registration in Kananga, Leyte, is not supported by the records. As the COMELEC stated:
The train of events, which led to respondent's g of her certificate of candidacy on the basis of her registration started on
November 25, 1987, when she allegedly filed all application for cancellation of registration Exh. "2-B". Subsequent to
this request, her voter's affidavit in Precinct 15, Ormoc City with Serial No. 0918394 J was annotated with the words
'cancelled upon application of the voter due to transfer of residence.' Thereafter, she registered in Precinct No. 17,
Mahawan, Kananga, Leyte on November 28,1987 which registration was contained in Voter's Affidavit with Serial No.
0190840-J The cancellation of registration was submitted to the Board of Election Inspectors on January 9, 1988
(Revision Day) on the submission of the sworn application at 4:30 p.m. allegedly by a clerk from the Election
Registrar's Office with only the poll clerk and the third member because the Chairman of the Board of Election
Inspectors allegedly left earlier and did not come back. Exh. "3-B".
We find the version pressed by respondent unworthy of belief. The story is marked by so many bizarre cirumtances not
consistent with the ordinary course of events or the natural behavior of persons. Among these are:
(1) The application for cancellation of registration by respondent Adelina Y. Larrazabal happened to be misplaced by a
clerk in the Election Registrar's Office for Ormoc City so it was not sent to the Board of Election Inspectors in a sealed
envelope;
(2) The 'inadverterment' (sic) misplacement was discovered only on January 9,1988;
(3) The voter's affidavit was delivered by itself without any endorsement or covering letter from the Election Registrar or
anybody else;
(4) The election clerk delivered the application for cancellation only towards the last hour of the revision day, allegedly
at 4:30 P.M., January 9, 1988;
(5) All the members of the Board of Election Inspectors had already signed the Minutes indicating that no revision of
the voter's list was made as of 5:00 PM
(6) The poll clerk and the third member prepared another minutes stating that the election clerk had delivered the
application for cancellation at 4:30 P.M. without any reference to the minutes they had previously signed;
(7) Emeterio Larrazabal, who was supposed to have registered in Precinct 17, Mahawan, Kananga, was supposed to
have filled up an application for cancellation of his registration in Precinct No. 15, Ormoc City at Precinct 17 concurrent
with his registration. His application for cancellation was never submitted in evidence.
(8) The serial number of the voter's affidavits of the spouses Larrazabal in Precinct No. 17 are far removed from the
serial numbers of the other new registrants in November 28, 1987 in the same precinct.
The most telling evidence is the list of voters (Form 2-A), Exh. "G", that the Chairman and the poll clerk had written in
Part II of the same, closed by the signatures of both officials showing that there were only nine (9) additional registered
voters in Precinct 17, Mahawan, Kananga, Leyte, namely, Bantasan, Merly; Conie; Limosnero Anita; Limosnero W;
Pame Virginia; Savenario, Analiza; Verallo, Ofelia; Basan, Juanita; and Acgang Bonifacio. This is consistent with the
list of new voters after the November 28, 1987 for Precinct No. 17, Mahawan, Kananga, Leyte submitted by the
Election of Kananga to the National Central File of the Commission per certification of the Chief, National Central File
Division on January 25, 1988 dated January 25, 1988, Exh. 'C'. The affidavits submitted by the Election Registrar to the
Commission could only have come from the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct No. 17, after the November 28,
1987 registration, for the Election Registrar could not have had the affidavits of these new registrants apart from those
supplied by the Precinct itself. Why were not the affidavits of the Larrazabals included? Was this part of the incredibly
bizarre series of inadvertence and neglect that spanned Ormoc City and Kananga? This also explains the certification
dated January 29, 1988, of the Election Registrar of Kananga that as of that date Mrs. Adelina Larrazabal was not a
registered voter in any of the' precincts in Kananga. Exh. "L". It was only on February 15, 1988, or two weeks after the
election day that the same Registrar certified for the first time that there were two voters lists, the first without the
names of the Larrazabals and the second, which appeared only after February 1, submitted by the Chairman of the
Board for Precinct 17 which contained the spouses Larrazabals' names.
It might also be stressed that one set of voter's list Exh. "G" had the signature of both the Chairman, poll clerk and third
member of the board, while the one which appeared later which included the names of the Larrazabal had the
signature only of the Chairman. Exh. "I".
From the certification of the National Central Files, it appears that the Serial Nos. of the newly registered voters were
as follows: 0189821-J 018922-J 0189823-J 0189824-J 0189825-J 0189826-J 0189827-J 0189828-J 0189839-J The
alleged registration of Emeterio V. Larrazabal and Adelina Y. Larrazabal are inexplicably effected through voter's
affidavits with Serial Nos. 0190893J and 01 90840-J. These serial numbers are traced per record of the Commission to
Precinct No. 6, municipality of Kananga, Leyte. Per official Project of precincts on file with the Commission, Precinct
No. 6 is a poblacion precinct located in Kananga, Municipal High School Building. How these documents came to be
used in Precinct No. 17 in Barangay Mahawan and only by the Larrazabals has never been explained.
It also takes a lot of straining to believe the story about the effort to cancel registration on November 25, 1987, which
application surfaced before the Board of Election inspectors for Precinct No. 15, Ormoc City only on January 9, 1988,
Revision Day. As pointed out by Petitioner, it is absurd that it would only be on Revision Day, normally set aside for the
purpose of receiving inclusion and exclusion orders from the courts, that the application for cancellation would be
coincidentally found and delivered to the Board of Election Inspectors for Precinct 15. Furthermore, the entire
membership of the Board of Inspectors for said precinct, signed a Minutes, Exh. "3-A" which indicates that no order of
inclusion or exclusion was received from any court and that the board proceeded with the numbering of a total 229
voters for the precinct. The Minutes also indicates that the Board adjourned at 5:00 p.m. Exh. "3-B" which was
supposedly prepared after Exh. "3-A" signed only by the poll clerk and third member indicates that at 4:30 P.M. an
unidentified clerk from the Election Registrar's Office arrived with the application for cancellation of Vilma Manzano and
Adelina Larrazabal.
It also appears that on November 28, 1987, the Board of Election Inspectors for Precinct 15, Ormoc City prepared the
list of voters for said precinct, Exh. 'N' where the name of Adelina Y. Larrazabal appears as voter No. 96 and Emeterio
V. Larrazabal is listed as Voter No. 98. At the back of the list there is a certification that there was no voter which was
included by court order and that to voters, one Montero and one Salvame were excluded by virtue of such order. As of
January 29, 1988, when the certified true copy of the Voter's List for Precinct 15 was furnished the petitioner, no
additional entry was reflected on the list which would show what transpired on January 9, 1988, as alleged by the
Election Registrar for Ormoc City and the poll clerk and third member of the board of inspectors that a cancellation was
effected. It taxes credulity therefore, to lend belief to Exh. "2-C", when was issued by the City Registrar for Ormoc only
on February 1, 1990, which for the first time showed handwritten annotations of cancellation of the registration of
Adelina Larrazabal and Vilma Manzano by witnesses Gratol and Patonog. If this evidence did not exist at the time of
the entry which purports to have been on January 9, 1988, this evidence could have been used to confront within
Carolina Quezon when she testified and identified Exh. "N" on April 14, 1988. In fact if these entries indicating (sic)
were made, they would have been evident in Exh. 'W. The failure to confront Quezon with the entries and the late
submission of Exh. "2-C" can only lead to two conclusions: these entries did not exist as of January 29, 1988 when the
certification of the list of voters was made and that they were annotated in the voter's list after that date. This is
consistent with Exh. "P" which was issued on February 11, 1988.
The relative weight of the parties' evidence supports petitioner's thesis that respondent was not a registered voter in
Precinct No. 17, Brgy. Mahawan, Kananga, Leyte, and, that she and her husband Emeterio Larrazabal continued to be
registered voters in Precinct No. 15, Ormoc City. (Rollo, pp. 62-67; COMELEC decision, pp. 22-27)
The Court is bound by these factual findings as they are supported by substantial evidence:
In Aratuc v. Commission on Elections (88 SCRA 251), speaking of the need to preserve the 'independence and all the
needed concomitant powers' of the Commission on Elections, Justice Antonio P. Barredo declared that it is but proper
that the Court should accord the greatest measures of presumption of regularity to its course of action ... to the end it
may achieve its designed place in the democratic fabric of our government ... (Abella v. Larrazabal, supra)
Failing in her contention that she is a resident and registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, the petitioner poses an alternative position that her
being a registered voter in Ormoc City was no impediment to her candidacy for the position of governor of the province of Leyte.
Section 12, Article X of the Constitution provides:
Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from
voting for provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a
province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial
officials.
Section 89 of Republic Act No. 179 creating the City of Ormoc provides:
Election of provincial governor and members of the Provincial Board of the members of the Provincial Board of the
Province of Leyte The qualified voters of Ormoc City shall not be qualified and entitled to vote in the election of the
provincial governor and the members of the provincial board of the Province of Leyte.
Relating therefore, section 89 of R.A. 179 to section 12, Article X of the Constitution one comes up with the following conclusion: that Ormoc
City when organized was not yet a highly-urbanned city but is, nevertheless, considered independent of the province of Leyte to which it is
geographically attached because its charter prohibits its voters from voting for the provincial elective officials. The question now is whether or
not the prohibition against the 'city's registered voters' electing the provincial officials necessarily mean, a prohibition of the registered voters
to be elected as provincial officials.
The petitioner citing section 4, Article X of the Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with
respect to component cities and municipalities and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays, shall
ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
submits that "while a Component City whose charter prohibits its voters from participating in the elections for provincial office, is indeed
independent of the province, such independence cannot be equated with a highly urbanized city; rather it is limited to the administrative
supervision aspect, and nowhere should it lead to the conclusion that said voters are likewise prohibited from running for the provincial
offices." (Petition, p. 29)
The argument is untenable.
Section 12, Article X of the Constitution is explicit in that aside from highly-urbanized cities, component cities whose charters prohibit their
voters from voting for provincial elective officials are independent of the province. In the same provision, it provides for other component
cities within a province whose charters do not provide a similar prohibition. Necessarily, component cities like Ormoc City whose charters
prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials are treated like highly urbanized cities which are outside the supervisory power
of the province to which they are geographically attached. This independence from the province carries with it the prohibition or mandate
directed to their registered voters not to vote and be voted for the provincial elective offices. The resolution in G.R. No. 80716 entitled Peralta
v. The Commission on Elections, et al. dated December 10, 1987 applies to this case. While the cited case involves Olongapo City which is
classified as a highly urbanized city, the same principle is applicable.
Moreover, Section 89 of Republic Act 179, independent of the constitutional provision, prohibits registered voters of Ormoc City from voting
and being voted for elective offices in the province of Leyte. We agree with the COMELEC en banc that "the phrase 'shall not be qualified
and entitled to vote in the election of the provincial governor and the members of the provincial board of the Province of Leyte' connotes two
prohibitions one, from running for and the second, from voting for any provincial elective official." (Resolution En Banc, p. 6)
The petitioner takes exception to this interpretation. She opines that such interpretation is "wrong English" since nowhere in the provision is
there any reference to a prohibition against running for provincial elective office. She states that if the prohibition to run was indeed intended,
the provision should have been phrased "Shall not be qualified TO RUN in the election FOR provincial governor." A comma should have
been used after the word qualified and after the word "vote" to clearly indicate that the phrase "in the election of the provincial governor" is
modified separately and distinctly by the words "not qualified" and the words "not entitled to vote." (Petition, p. 19)
The Court finds the petitioner's interpretation fallacious.
In the case of Mapa v. Arroyo (175 SCRA 76 [1989]) this Court interpreted Section 20 of Presidential Decree No. 957 in relation to the
conjunction and, to wit:
Time of Completion. Every owner or developer shall construct and provide the facilities, improvements,
infrastructures and other forms of development, including water supply and lighting facilities, which are offered and
indicated in the approved subdivision or condominium plans. ...
The Court ruled:
We further reject petitioner's strained and tenuous application of the called doctrine of last antecedent in the
interpretation of Section 20 and, correlatively, of Section 21. He would thereby have the enumeration of 'facilities,
improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development' interpreted to mean that the demonstrative Phrase
'which are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision plans, etc,' refer only to 'other forms of development' and
not to 'facilities, improvements and infrastructures.' While this subserves his purpose, such bifurcation whereby the
supposed adjectives phrase is set apart from the antecedent words, is illogical and erroneous. The complete and
applicable rule is ad proximum antedecens flat relationisi impediatursentencia (See Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., 57
citing Brown v. Brown, Delta 3 Terry 157, 29 A. 2d 149, 153) Relative words refer to the nearest antecedent, unless it
be prevented by the context. In the present case, the employment of the word 'and' between 'facilities, improvements,
infrastructures' and 'other forms of development,' far from supporting petitioner's theory, enervates it instead since it is
basic in legal hermeneutics that and is not meant to separate words but is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or
union. (at pp. 81-83)
Applying these principles to the instant case, the conjunction and between the phrase shall not be qualified andentitled to vote refer to two
prohibitions as ruled by the COMELEC in relation to the demonstrative phrase "in the election of the provincial governor and the members of
the provincial board of the Province of Leyte."
Finally, the petitioner contends that the February 14, 1991 decision of the COMELEC's second division is null and void on the ground that on
that date, the term of Commissioner Andres Flores, one of the signatories of the majority opinion (vote was 2-1) had already expired on
February 2, 1991. (Commissioner Flores was nominated by the President on January 30, 1988 and was confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments on February 15, 1988. His term of office was fixed by the President for three years from February 15, 1988 to February 15,
1991.)
The petitioner postulates that the President has no power to fix the terms of office of the Commissioners of the COMELEC because the
Constitution impliedly fixes such terms of office. With regards to Commissioner Flores, the petitioner professes that Flores' term of three (3)
years expired on February 2, 1991 based in section 1(2), Article IX, C, of the Constitution, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold
office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Any
appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. In relation to the Transitory Provision of the 1987
Constitution (Article XVIII) particularly Section 15 thereof, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
The incumbent Members of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit
shall continue in office for one year after the ratification of this Constitution, unless they are sooner removed for cause
or become incapacitated to discharge The duties of their office or appointed to a new term thereunder. In no case shall
any Member serve longer than seven years including service before the ratification of this Constitution.
There is no need to pass upon this constitutional issue raised by the petitioner. The Court ruled in the case ofAlger Electric, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals (135 SCRA 37 [1985]):
xxx xxx xxx
... This Court does not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the
case. If there exists some other ground based on statute or general law or other grounds of construction, we decide the
case on a non-constitutional determination. (See Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283; Siler v. Louisville & Nashville
R. Co. 213 U.S. 175; Berea College v. Kentucky 211 U.S. 45.) (at p. 45)
Even if we concede that Commissioner Flores' term expired on February 2, 1991, we fail to see how this could validate the holding of an
elective office by one who is clearly disqualified from running for that position and the continued exercise of government powers by one
without legal authority to do so. The powers of this Court are broad enough to enjoin the violation of constitutional and statutory provisions by
public officers especially where, as in this case, we merely affirm the decision of the COMELEC en banc promulgated at a time when
Commissioner Flores was no longer a member.
Moreover, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the decision of the second division of COMELEC would still be valid under the de
facto doctrine.
Commissioner Flores was appointed for a three-year term from February 15, 1988 to February 15, 1991. In these three years he exercised
his duties and functions as Commissioner. Granting in the absence of a statute expressly stating when the terms of the COMELEC Chairman
and members commence and expire, that his term expired on February 2, 1991 to enable a faithful compliance with the constitutional
provision that the terms of office in the COMELEC are on a staggered basis commencing and ending at fixed intervals, his continuance in
office until February 15, 1991 has a color of validity. Therefore, all his official acts from February 3, 1991 to February 15, 1991, are
considered valid. The Court ruled in the case of Leyte Acting Vice-Governor Aurelio D. Menzon v. Leyte Acting Governor Leopoldo E. Perilla,
et al. G.R. No. 90762, May 20, 1991:
And finally, even granting that the President, acting through the Secretary of Local Government, possesses no power
to appoint the petitioner, at the very least, the petitioner is a de facto officer entitled to compensation.
There is no denying that the petitioner assumed the Office of the Vice-Governor under color of a known appointment.
As revealed by the records, the petitioner was appointed by no less than the alter ego of the President, the Secretary of
Local Government, after which he took his oath of office before Senator Alberto Romulo in the Office of Department of
Local Government Regional Director Res Salvatierra. Concededly, the appointment has the color of validity.
Petitioner Benjamin P. Abella in G.R. No. 100710 obtained the second highest number of votes, next to Larrazabal in the local elections of
February 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte. The COMELEC en banc, after affirming the February 14, 1991 decision of its second division
disqualifying arrazabal as governor disallowed Abella from assuming position of governor in accordance with section 6, Republic Act No.
6646 and the rulings in the cases ofFrivaldo v. Commission on Elections (174 SCRA 245 [1989]) and Labo, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections (176 SCRA 1 [1989]).
Abella claims that the Frivaldo and Labo cases were misapplied by the COMELEC. According to him these cases are fundamentally different
from SPC No. 88-546 in that the Frivaldo and Labo cases were petitions for a quowarranto filed under section 253 of the Omnibus Code,
contesting the eligibility of the respondents after they had been proclaimed duly elected to the Office from which they were sought to be
unseated while SPC No. 88-546 which was filed before proclamation under section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code sought to deny due
course to Larrazabal's certificate of candidacy for material misrepresentations and was seasonably filed on election day. He, therefore, avers
that since under section 6 of Republic Act 6646 it is provided therein that:
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes case for him shall not be
counted.
the votes cast in favor of Larrazabal who obtained the highest number of votes are not considered counted making her a non-candidate, he,
who obtained the second highest number of votes should be installed as regular Governor of Leyte in accordance with the Court's ruling in
G.R. No. 88004.
The petitioner's arguments are not persuasive.
While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed
before Larrazabal could be proclaimed the fact remains that the local elections of February 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with
Larrazabal considered as a bona-fide candidate. The voters of the province voted for her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified
candidate for the position of governor. Her votes were counted and she obtained the highest number of votes. The net effect is that the
petitioner lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. In the Frivaldo and Labo cases, this is precisely the reason why the
candidates who obtained the second highest number of votes were not allowed to assume the positions vacated by Frivaldo the
governorship of Sorsogon, and Labo, the position of mayor in Baguio City. The nature of the proceedings therefore, is not that compelling.
What matters is that in the event a candidate for an elected position who is voted for and who obtains the highest number of votes is
disqualified for not possessing the eligibility requirements at the time of the election as provided by law, the candidate who obtains the
second highest number of votes for the same position can not assume the vacated position. It should be stressed that in G.R. No. 88004, the
Court set aside the dismissal of SPC No. 88-546, and directed the COMELEC to conduct hearings to determine whether or not Larrazabal
was qualified to be a candidate for the position of governor in the province of Leyte. This is the import of the decision in G.R. No. 88004.
Thus, the Court ruled in the case of Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace
the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes
in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections, (137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In
that case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was
disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregard as stray. In effect, the second placer won
by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the Court then, (Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar,
Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay and Aquino, JJ., concurring.) with three dissenting
(Teehankee, Acting C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.) and another two reserving their vote. (Plana and
Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.) One was on official leave. (Fernando, C.J.)
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of the earlier case of
Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435) which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which
reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio v. Paredes, (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members of
the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente, with Teehankee, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la
Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concurring) without any dissent, although one reserved his vote, (Makasiar, J.)
another took no part, (Aquino, J.) and two others were on leave. (Fernando, C.J. and Concepcion, Jr., J.) There the
Court held:
... it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to
suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a
winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively
declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest
number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican
forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared
carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20
Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be
disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the
candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the
elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid the
vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However the absence of a statute which clearly
asserts a contrary politics and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere
belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void
or meaningless. (at pp. 20-21)
In sum, the Court does not find any reason to reverse and set aside the questioned decision and resolution of the COMELEC. The
COMELEC has not acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the second division of the Commission on Elections dated
February 14, 1991 and the questioned Resolution en banc of the Commission dated July 18, 1991 are hereby AFFIRMED. The temporary
restraining order issued on August 1, 1991 is LIFTED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Fernan , C.J., took no part.
Feliciano and Sarmiento, JJ., is on leave.