debulgado vs csc 237 scra 184

Facts:
Petitioner Rogelio R. Debulgado is the incumbent Mayor of the City of San Carlos, Negros Occidental. On 1 October 1992, petitioner Mayor
appointed his wife, petitioner Victoria T. Debulgado, as General Services Officer, that is, as head of the Office of General Services
1
of the City
Government of San Carlos.
Petitioner Victoria was one of three (3) employees of the City Government who were considered for the position of General Services Officer. Before
her promotion in 1992, she had been in the service of the City Government for about thirty-two (32) years. She joined the City Government on 3
January 1961 as Assistant License Clerk.
On 1 October 1992, petitioner Victoria assumed the new post, and commenced discharging the functions, of General Services Officer of San Carlos
City and receiving the regular salary attached to that position.
On 16 December 1992, public respondent Civil Service Commission ("Commission") received a letter
3
from Congressman Tranquilino B. Carmona of
the First District of Negros Occidental, calling attention to the promotional appointment issued by petitioner Mayor in favor of his wife.
From the report submitted by Director Jesse J. Caberoy of the Iloilo City-CSRO No. 6, the Commission found that petitioner Mayor was the lawful
husband of the appointee, petitioner Victoria, the two (2) having been married sometime in 1964.
Acting on the report of Director Caberoy, the Commission, in its Resolution No. 93-1427 dated 13 April 1993, recalled the approval issued by
Director Escobia and disapproved the promotion of petitioner Victoria to the position of General Services Officer of San Carlos City upon the
ground that that promotion violated the statutory prohibition against nepotic appointments.
A motion was filed but The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Commission on 21 July 1993.
The basic contention of petitioners is that the prohibition against nepotic appointments is applicable only to original appointments and not to
promotional appointments
Issue: (1) to determine whether a promotional appointment is covered by the legal prohibition against nepotism, or whether that prohibition applies only to
original appointments to the Civil Service;
(2) to determine whether the Commission had gravely abused its discretion in recalling and disapproving the promotional appointment given to petitioner
Victoria after the Commission, through Director Escobia, had earlier approved that same appointment, without giving an opportunity to petitioner Victoria to
explain her side on the matter.
Ruling: The prohibitory norm against nepotism in the public service is set out in Section 59, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (also known as
E.O. No. 292). Section 59 reads as follows:
Sec. 59. Nepotism (1) All appointments in the national, provincial, city and municipal governmentsor in any branch or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations,made in favor of a relative of the appointing or
recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over him, are hereby
prohibited.
As used in this Section the word "relative" and members of the family referred to are those related within the third degree either of
consanguinity or of affinity.
(2) The following are exempted from the operation of the rules on nepotism: (a) persons employed in a confidential capacity, (b)
teachers, (c) physicians, and (d) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines: Provided, however, That in each particular instance full
report of such appointment shall be made to the Commission.
The restriction mentioned in subsection (1) shall not be applicable to the case of a member of any family who, after his or her
appointment to any position in an office or bureau, contracts marriage with someone in the same office or bureau, in which event the
employment or retention therein of both husband and wife may be allowed.
(3) In order to give immediate effect to these provisions, cases of previous appointment which are in contravention hereof shall be
corrected by transfer and pending such transfer, no promotion or salary increase shall be allowed in favor of the relative or relatives who
were appointed in violation of these provisions. (Emphasis supplied).
A textual examination of Section 59 at once reveals that the prohibition was cast in comprehensive and unqualified terms. Firstly, it explicitly covers
"all appointments", without seeking to make any distinction between differing kinds or types of appointments. Secondly, Section 59 covers all appointments
to the national, provincial, city andmunicipal government, as well as any branch or instrumentality thereof and all government owned or controlled
corporations. Thirdly, there is a list of exceptions set out in Section 59 itself, but it is a short list:
Section 1, Rule V of the Omnibus Implementing Rules, As used in these Rules, any action denoting movement or progress of personnel in the civil serviceshall
be known as personnel action.
Section 1, Rule VII of the same Rules also bears upon our inquiry:
Sec. 1. The following constitute personnel actions: original appointment, appointment through certification, promotion, transfer, reinstatement,
reemployment, detail, secondment, demotion and separation.
Under the abovequoted provisions of the Implementing Rules, both an original appointment and a promotion are particular species of personnel action.
The original appointment of a civil service employee and all subsequent personnel actions undertaken by or in respect of that employee such as promotion,
transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, etc., must comply with the Implementing Rules including, of course, the prohibition against nepotism in Rule XVIII.
To the extent that all personnel actions occurring after an original appointment, require the issuance of a new appointment to another position (or to the
original position in case of reinstatement), we believe that such appointment must comply with all applicable rules and prohibitions, including the statutory
and regulatory prohibition against nepotism. To limit the thrust of the prohibition against nepotism to the appointment issued at the time of initial entry into
the government service, and to insulate from that prohibition appointments subsequently issued when personnel actions are thereafter taken in respect of
the same employee, would be basically to render that prohibition, in the words of Laurel V, etc. v. Civil Service Commission,
11
"meaningless and toothless."
The subsequent marriage of one to the other of petitioners did not retroactively convert the original appointment of petitioner Victoria into a
prohibited nepotic one. It is the promotional appointment issued by petitioner Mayor to petitioner Victoria in 1 October 1982 that is at stake.
The purpose of Section 59 which shines through the comprehensive and unqualified language in which it was cast and has remained for decades, is precisely
to take out of the discretion of the appointing and recommending authority the matter of appointing or recommending for appointment a relative. In other
words, Section 59 insures the objectivity of the appointing or recommending official by preventing that objectivity from being in fact tested. The importance
of this statutory objective is difficult to overstress in the culture in which we live and work in the Philippines, where family bonds remain, in general,
compelling and cohesive.
II
The recall or withdrawal by the Commission of the approval which had been issued by one of its Field Officers, Director Escobia, was accordingly lawful and
appropriate, the promotional appointment of petitioner Victoria being void "from the beginning." The approval issued by Director Escobia did not, as it could
not, cure the intrinsic vice of that appointment.
lim-arce vs arce 205 scra 21
Facts:
Complainant, who is the wife of respondent Arce, alleged that sometime in July 1988, while she was searching for their camera in the aparador in
their house, she accidentally discovered several letters, telegrams, pictures, etc. neatly placed underneath the paper cover of the drawer which has
always been locked but happened to be opened (sic) that day. The letters and telegrams were all addressed to respondent Arce and allegedly
written by respondent Barbasa who therein intimately call (sic) herself "Mama" and complainant's husband as "Papa."
Complainant informs that in an effort to hide their true identity in some of their communications, respondents use their respective maternal
surnames.
After the discovery, complainant confronted respondent Arce who then promised to stop his illicit relations with respondent Barbasa. Despite this
promise, however, respondent Arce continued his illicit affair. This allegedly affected complainant physically and mentally, causing her eventual
confinement in a hospital.
According to complainant, after her hospitalization, she found her children staying with her relatives and no longer in their conjugal home because
her husband had maltreated them. Her husband also announced openly to his family that he was not leaving his mistress since they were having a
harmonious relationship.
Complainant further alleges that in one occasion, she went to the court premises to get her husband's pay check upon his order and while there,
complainant saw respondent Barbasa in the library and she looked at her from a distance. When complainant's husband arrived home that day, he
accused complainant of putting respondent Barbasa to great shame, and when complainant denied the accusation, respondent Arce allegedly
boxed her.
1

It appears, however, that respondent Arce filed an application for his early retirement under Republic Act No. 6683 and which was approved by the
Court En Banc in its resolution dated April 20, 1989.
2
Upon the recommendation of then Court Administrator Meynardo A. Tiro,
3
the Court
dismissed the complaint for being moot and academic in its resolution dated July 4, 1990, it appearing that respondent had already retired from
the service on April 20, 1989, with the approval of the Court, and that the complaint was filed on April 21, 1989.
4

the case to Executive Judge Pedro S. Espina of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City for investigation, report and recommendation
Barbasa was dismissed for being guilty of immorality.
Issue: WON the the dismissal is valid.
Ruling: On July 31, 1991, the Court referred the matter to the Office of the
Court Administrator for re-evaluation, report and recommendation.
12
In a memorandum submitted by Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A. Bernad, dated
October 29, 1991, respondent Barbasa was recommended for dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all retirement privileges and with prejudice to
reinstatement in the national and local governments, as well as in any instrumentality or agency including government-owned or controlled corporations. It
is pointed out therein that the documentary evidence cannot but yield the conclusion that an illicit relationship existed between respondents since 1984;
that respondent Barbasa's letters to her co-respondent are in the nature of endearing messages addressed to a lover and not, as she pretends, to a
respected elder or friend; and that she now lives with her co-respondent in Paway, Palo, Leyte.
13

The deputy court administrator likewise opines that "(a)lthough respondent Arce is also guilty of immorality, it is unfortunate that the proper penalty cannot
be imposed upon him, for he has already retired from the service and has collected his retirement benefits. Hence, the case against him is now moot and
academic."
14

There is no iota of doubt, on the basis of the evidence presented, that respondents Arce and Barbasa are guilty of the detestable acts complained of.
Time and again we have stressed adherence to the principle that public office is a public trust. All government officials and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. This
constitutional mandate should always be in the minds of all public servants to guide them in their actions during their entire tenure in the government
service.
15
The good of the service and the degree of morality which every official and employee in the public service must observe, if respect and confidence
are to be maintained by the Government in the enforcement of the law, demand that no untoward conduct on his part, affecting morality, integrity and
efficiency while holding office should be left without proper and commensurate sanction, all attendant circumstances taken into account.
16

The exacting standards of ethics and morality imposed upon court employees and judges are reflective of the premium placed on the image of the courts of
justice. In the words of Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma:
The image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat,
from the judge to the least and lowest of its personnel hence, it becomes the imperative sacred duty of each and everyone in the court
to maintain its good name and standing as a true temple of justice.
17

Under Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 817, which provided for the organization of the Civil Service Commission, and Memorandum Circular No. 30,
Series of 1989 of the Civil Service Commission, disgraceful and immoral conduct is punishable by dismissal.
WHEREFORE, respondent CARMEN A. BARBASA, is hereby ordered DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice
to reinstatement in the national and local governments, as well as in any governmental instrumentality or agency including government-owned or controlled
corporations. This resolution is immediately executory. Let a copy of this resolution be entered in the personal records of respondents.
bince vs comelec 218 scra 782
Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent were among the candidates in the synchronized elections of 11 May 1992 for the two (2) seats in the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Pangasinan allotted to its Sixth Legislative District under COMELEC Resolution No. 2379 in
relation to Section 3 of R.A. No. 7166. 3

Ten (10) municipalities, including San Quintin, Tayug and San Manuel, comprise the said district.

During the canvassing, on 21 May 1992, by the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) of the Certificates of Canvass (COCs) for these ten (10)
municipalities, private respondent objected to the inclusion of the COC for San Quintin. This was the only COC that was contested.
Accordingly, the COCs for the remaining nine (9) municipalities were included in the canvass. The PBC thereafter overruled the objection,
prompting the private respondent to appeal the ruling to the COMELEC, which docketed the same as SPC No. 92-208. On 6 June 1992, the
COMELEC en banc promulgated therein a resolution which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

1. That the actual number of votes obtained by candidate Alfonso C. Bince in the municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan is 1,055 votes
whereas petitioner/appellant Atty. Emiliano S. Micu obtained 1,535 votes for the same municipality.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Accordingly, the Provincial Board of Canvassers for the province of Pangasinan is directed to CREDIT in favor of petitioner/appellant Atty.
Emiliano S. Micu with 1,535 votes and candidate Alfonso C. Bince with 1,055 votes in the municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan." 4

PBC ruled to to allow the Municipal Board of Canvassers of the municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan, to correct the Statement
of Votes and Certificates of Canvass." 7 Petitioner seasonably appealed this ruling to the COMELEC which docketed the appeal as SPC No. 92-
384.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
PBC stating therein that "the Board found the petitions for corrections meritorious and ruled to allow the MBCs of Tayug and San Manuel to
correct their respective Statement of Votes and, subsequently, their Certificates of Canvass with respect to the votes" of the petitioner and
private Respondent. 9 The report also discloses that on that same date, the herein private respondent filed with the PBC a Motion To Continue
Canvass and To Proclaim Winner. 10
If if these corrections will not be considered, candidate Alfonso Bince, Jr. will win by one (1) vote." 12
On 21 July 1992, the PBC, with Atty. Asperin dissenting, promulgated a resolution 17 proclaiming herein petitioner as the second duly elected
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Pangasinan, representing its Sixth Legislative District, with a lead of one (1) vote
over the private Respondent.
On 29 July 1992, the respondent COMELEC en banc, by the affirmative vote of the Chairman and six (6) Members
The dispositive portion. To ANNUL the proclamation dated 21 July 1992, by the said Provincial Board of Canvassers
3. To DIRECT the Provincial Board of Canvassers to reconvene immediately and proclaim the winning candidate for the second position of the
Provincial Board; 6th District of Pangasinan, on the basis of the completed and corrected Certificates of Canvass submitted by the Municipal
Boards of Canvassers of all the municipalities in the 6th District of Pangasinan, in accordance with law." 22
Issue: WON the Comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling: Respondent COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in annulling the petitioners proclamation without the
requisite due notice and hearing, thereby depriving the latter of due process. Moreover, there was no valid correction of the SOVs and COCs for the
municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel to warrant the annulment of the petitioners proclamation.
The PBC thus had every reason to believe that the phrase "completed and corrected" COCs could only refer to the nine (9) COCs for the nine
municipalities, the canvass for which was completed on 21 May 1992, and that of San Quintin, respectively. Verily, the above resolution is vague
and ambiguous.

Petitioner cannot be deprived of his office without due process of law. Although public office is not property under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of
the Constitution, 25 and one cannot acquire a vested right to public office, 26 it is, nevertheless, a protected right. 27 Due process in proceedings
before the respondent COMELEC, exercising its quasi-judicial functions, requires due notice and hearing, among others. Thus, although the
COMELEC possesses, in appropriate cases, the power to annul or suspend the proclamation of any candidate, 28 We had ruled in Farias v.
Commission on Elections, 29 Reyes v. Commission on Elections 30 and Gallardo v. Commission on Elections 31 that the COMELEC is without power
to partially or totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and hearing.
Furthermore, the said motion to annul proclamation was treated by the respondent COMELEC as a Special Case (SPC) because its ruling therein was
made in connection with SPC No. 92-208 and SPC No. 92-384. Special Cases under the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE involve the pre-
proclamation controversies. 32 We have categorically declared in Sarmiento v. Commission on Elections 33 that pursuant to Section 3, Article IX-C
of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite
disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that
motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc."cralaw virtua1aw library

the Commission en banc does not have jurisdiction to hear and decide pre-proclamation cases at the first instance. Such cases should first be
referred to a division.

Hence, the COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to decide on the aforesaid motion to annul the proclamation; consequently, its 29 July 1992
Resolution is null and void. For this reason too, the COMELEC en banc Resolution of 6 June 1992 in SPC No. 92-208 resolving the private
respondents appeal from the ruling of the PBC with respect to the COC of San Quintin is similarly void.

2. It is to be noted, as correctly stressed by the petitioner, that there are no valid corrected Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass for
Tayug and San Manuel; thus, any reference to such would be clearly unfounded. While it may be true that on 24 June 1992, the PBC, acting on
simultaneous petitions to correct the SOVs and COCs for Tayug and San Manuel, ordered the MBCs for these two (2) municipalities to make the
appropriate corrections in the said SOVs and their corresponding COCs, none of the members of said Boards convened to actually implement the
order. Such failure could have been due to the appeal seasonably interposed by the petitioner to the COMELEC or the fact that said members
simply chose not to act thereon. As already adverted to, the so-called "corrected" Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass consist of sheets
of paper signed by the respective Election Registrars of Tayug 34 and San Manuel. 35 These are not valid corrections because the Election
Registrars, as Chairmen of the MBCs cannot, by themselves, act for their respective Boards. Section 225 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg.
881) provides that" [A] majority vote of all the members of the board of canvassers shall be necessary to render a decision." That majority means at
least two (2) of the three (3) members constituting the Board. 36 As to why the Election Registrars, in their capacities as Chairmen, were the only
ones who prepared the so-called correction sheets, is beyond Us. There is no showing that the other members of the Boards were no longer
available. Since they are from the Province of Pangasinan, they could have been easily summoned by the PBC to appear before it and effect the
corrections on the Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass.
For being clearly inconsistent with the intention and official stand of respondent COMELEC, private respondents theory of termination under the
second paragraph of Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166, and the consequent affirmance of the ruling of the PBC ordering the correction of the number of
votes, must necessarily fail.

The foregoing considered, the proclamation of the private respondent on 13 August 1992 by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan is
null and void.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged resolution of the respondent Commission on Elections of 29 July 1992 and the
proclamation of the private respondent on 13 August 1992 as the second Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Pangasinan,
representing its Sixth Legislative District, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and respondent Commission on Elections is DIRECTED to resolve the
pending incidents conformably with the foregoing disquisitions and pronouncements.
aguila vs genato 103 scra 380
Facts:
Petitioners David Aguila and Edita Bueno are the Deputy Administrator and Director for Cooperative Development, respectively, of the National
Electrification Administration (NEA).
Petitioner Evelito Elento is the Acting General Manager of MOELCI II, while petitioners Ressurrection Inting, Antonio Lim and Wilfredo Cabardo, are members
of its Board of Directors.
Private respondent Dominador B. Borje, representing the North District of Ozamiz City, was elected Director of MOELCI II, to hold office as such for three
years starting March 25, 1979.
Section 21 of Presidential Decree No. 269 (second paragraph) provides:
The provision of any law or regulation to the contrary notwithstanding, an officer or employee of the government shag be eligible for
membership in any cooperative if he meets the qualifications therefor and he shall not be precluded from being elected to or holding any
Position therein, or from receiving such compensation or fee in relation thereto as may be authorized by the by-laws; Provided That
elective officers of the government, except barrio captains and councilors, shall be ineligible to become officers and/or directors of any
cooperative, ... (emphasis supplied)
On 4 January 1980, private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Ozamiz City in the 30
January 1980 local elections.
Should respondent be elected, he shall be considered as resigned.
On 3 March 1980, private respondent filed a Petition for "Prohibition, mandamus & Construction of Legal Provisions with Preliminary Injunction and
Damages" against petitioners before the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch II
Respondent won the election. On 10 May 1980, the Board of Directors of MOELCI II held a special meeting and passed Resolution No. 121, S-80,
implementing NEA Circular No. 18 and declaring private respondent's position as member of the Board of Directors of MOELCI II vacant.
On 6 June 1980, upon a Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Judge set aside the Order of the vacation Judge, dated 8 May 1980, in effect reviving the
Restraining Order, on the ground that, as "councilor" of Ozamiz City, section 21 of PD No. 269 itself exempts private respondent from the prohibition
imposed on elective officials to become Directors of electric cooperatives.
Issue: WON the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling: We find that respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in issuing the various Restraining Orders, the last of
which was dated 6 June 1980. Private respondent has shown no clear and explicit right to the position of Director of MOELCI IIand is, therefore, not entitled
to a Restraining Order, which partook of the nature of a mandatory Injunction, commanding as it did that private respondent be retained in his position as
such Director. By having been elected member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Ozamiz City, private respondent rendered himself ineligible to continue
serving as a Director of MOELCI IIby virtue of the clear mandate of PD No. 269 providing that except for "barrio captains and councilors", elective officials are
ineligible to become officers and/or directors of any cooperative. It is clear to us that the term barrio modifies both captains and councilors. Further, the
MOELCI II, by-laws explicitly state that no person can remain a member of the Board if he "holds an elective office above the level of barrio captain.
Private respondent's argument that PD 269 (sec. 21) does not prohibit Board members of a cooperatives from continuing in their position prior to their
election, and that pursuant to section 24 of PD No. 269 he is entitled, as Director, to hold office for the term for which he is erected and until his successor is
elected and qualified," is untenable. Eligibility to an office should be construed as of a continuing nature and must exist at the commencement of the term
and during occupancy of the office. The fact that private respondent may have been qualified at the time he assumed the Directorship is not sufficient to
entitle him to continue holding office, if during the continuance of his incumbency he ceases to be qualified. Private respondent was qualified to become a
director of MOELCI II at the time of the commencement of his term, but his election as member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Ozamiz City, and his
subsequent assumption of office, disqualified him to continue as such.
Moreover, it should be recalled that when respondent Judge issued the Restraining Order of 6 June 1980. NEA Memorandum Circular No. 18 had already
been implemented by the MOELCI Board in the latter's Resolution No. 121, passed on 10 May 1980, declaring the position of private respondent, as Director,
vacant. Strictly speaking, therefore, there was no longer any position which private respondent could retain.

Facts:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on 22 January 1988, and assumed office in due time. On 27 October 1988, the
league of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Comelec
a petition for the annulment of Frivaldos election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United
States on 20 January 1983. Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he
had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was merely forced upon himself as a means
of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictators agents abroad. He also argued that the challenge to his title should be
dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed within 10 days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the
Omhibus Election Code.

Issue:
Whether Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on 18 January 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.

Held:
The Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over the question as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of the members of the Congress and elective provincial and city officials. However, the decision on Frivaldos citizenship has already been made by the
COMELEC through its counsel, the Solicitor General, who categorically claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. The Solicitors stance is assumed to have bben taken
by him after consultation with COMELEC and with its approval. It therefore represents the decision of the COMELEC itself that the Supreme Court may
review. In the certificate of candidacy filed on 19 November 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention
of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the certification
from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate
General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to
greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary nor do they claim to have been coerced to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. Still, if he
really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo should have done so in accordance with the laws of our
country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or
by repatriation. He failed to take such categorical acts. Rhe anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance
to another country cannot be permitted. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule
limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibilityQualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption
of office but during the officers entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. Frivaldo is disqualified
from serving as governor of Sorsogon.
G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996]
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996]
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections.
On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with the Comelec praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding
any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines," and that his Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the
Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution granting the petition.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted
for during the elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a Certificate of Votes was issued showing the following votes obtained
by the candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
RaulR.Lee 53,304
Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed a (supplemental) petition praying for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.
In an orderdated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition "only on June 29, 1995," the Comelec en bane directed "the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon
on June 29,1995 x x x." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June 30,1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged
that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725
which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted." As such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of
the Comelec) x x x was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the
proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor x x x." In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec, the Vice-Governor not Lee
should occupy said position of governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed Resolution holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of
votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest number of votes, and having
reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 is qualified to hold the office of
governor of Sorsogon".
Issues: 1. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the
governorship of Sorsogon NO!
2. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing jurisprudence? -NO!
Held:
1.)
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No.
104654 was in connection with the 1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is final and can no longer be changed.
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with finality. This is because a person may
subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose.
"Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative
authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again, as the occasion
demands."
2.) Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for the following reasons:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC, "the fact remains that he (Lee) was not the choice of the sovereign will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC,
Lee is "a second placer, just that, a second placer."
"The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of
votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office."
Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably re-acquired his citizenship and inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes in
the 1995 elections, henot Lee should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently erroneous and should now be corrected.
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CONCLUSION OF THE COURT
In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is
proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to the present,
not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly granted and
thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial or curative nature of the law granting him a new right to resume his political status and the
legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of having been forced to give up his citizenship and political aspiration as his means of escaping a
regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of the date of his application therefor, during the pendency of which he was stateless,
he having given ' up his U. S. nationality.
Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of office of governor, and should have
been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is
deemed to have been validated as of said date as well. The foregoing, of course, are precisely consistent with our holding that lack of the citizenship
requirement is not a continuing disability or disqualification to run for and hold public office. And once again, we emphasize herein our previous rulings
recognizing the Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations.
This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people,
for in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Otherwise
stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will. Consistently, we have held:
"x x x (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated
by mere technical objections (citations omitted)."
The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, defense and refuge, in deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has
repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the
possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the
will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully
challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and
legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to the
very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably
failed.
In Frivaldo's case, it would have been technically easy to find fault with his cause. The Court could have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of his
repatriation and hold him still ineligible due to his failure to show his citizenship at the time he registered as a voter before the 1995 elections. Or, it could
have disputed the factual findings of the Comelec that he was stateless at the time of repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual citizenship as a
disqualification "from running for any elective local position." But the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal
technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate development of the social edifice. Thus,
the Court struggled against and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order to evoke substantial justice in
the larger social context consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation approximating venerability in Philippine political life. Concededly, he sought American
citizenship only to escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt about his loyalty and dedication to this
country. At the first opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought to serve his people once more. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for
him three times. He took an oath of allegiance to this Republic every time he filed his certificate of candidacy and during his failed naturalization bid. And
let it not be overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to re-assume his nationality of birth despite several legal set-backs speak more
loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming intention and burning desire to re-embrace his native Philippines even
now at the ripe old age of 81 years. Such loyalty to and love of country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this Court of justice and equity.
Mortals of lesser mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was assured of a life of ease and plenty as a citizen of the most powerful country in the
world. But he opted, nay, single-mindedly insisted on returning to and serving once more his struggling but beloved land of birth. He therefore deserves
every liberal interpretation of the law which can be applied in his favor. And in the final analysis, over and above Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people
of Sorsogon most certainly deserve to be governed by a leader of their overwhelming choice.



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