CHIONGBIAN VS DE LEON

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2007 January 31, 1949
WILLIAM CHIONGBIAN, petitioner,
vs.
ALFREDO DE LEON, in his capacity as Commissioner of Customs, JOSE GALLOFIN, in his
capacity as Collector of Customs of the Port of Cebu, and VICENTE DE LA CRUZ, in his
capacity as General Manager of the Philippine Shipping Administration, respondents:
PHILIPPINE SHIPOWNERS' ASSOCIATION,intervenor.
Taada, Pelaez & Teehankee, Pandatun, Arches & Sayo, and De Santos, Herrera & Delfino for
petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Lucas Lacson for respondents.
Roxas, Picazo & Mejia for intervenor.
Mariano Jesus Cuenco, Miguel Cuenco and Nicolas Belmonte as amici curiae.
MORAN, C.J .:
This is a petition seeking to permanently prohibit respondent Customs Officials from cancelling the
registration certificates of petitioner's vessels, and respondent Philippine Shipping Administration
from rescinding the sale of three vessels to petitioner. The primary basis for respondents' and
intervenor's acts is the allegation that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and therefore not qualified by
law to operate and own vessels of Philippine registry. The Philippine Shipping Administration also
alleges that petitioner violated the contract of sale of three vessels executed between them, on the
ground of misrepresentation, petitioner having alleged in said contract that his father was a
naturalized Filipino citizen. The Philippine Shipowners' Association was later allowed to intervene
and it filed its answer against the petitioner.
The entire case hinges on whether or not petitioner William Chiongbian is a Filipino citizen, and this
Court holds that he is one.
Article IV of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SEC. 2. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.
In 1925, Victoriano Chiongbian, a Chinese citizen and father of the herein petitioner William
Chiongbian, was elected to and held the office of municipal councilor of the town of Plaridel,
Occidental Misamis. This fact is sufficiently established by the evidence submitted to this Court; by
the findings of the National Bureau of Investigation cited in Opinion No. 27, s. 1948, of the Secretary
of Justice; and as admitted by respondents in their pleadings. It is also shown and admitted that at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution, petitioner William Chiongbian was still a minor.
it is conclusive that upon the adoption of the Constitution, Victoriano Chiongbian, father of herein
petitioner, having been elected to a public office in the Philippines before the adoption of the
Constitution, became a Filipino citizen by virtue of Article IV, section 1, subsection 2 of the
Constitution. William Chiongbian, the herein petitioner, who was then a minor, also became a
Filipino citizen by reason of subsection 3 (Article IV) of the Constitution, his father having become a
Filipino citizen upon the adoption of said Constitution. This is also in conformity with the settled rule
of our jurisprudence that a legitimate minor child follows the citizenship of his father.
It is argued by respondent that this privilege of citizenship granted by subsection 2 (Article IV,
Constitution) is strictly personal and does not extend to the children of the grantee. In support of this
contention they offer two principal arguments. Firstly, that this subsection was adopted by the
Constitutional Convention merely to grant Filipino citizenship to Delegate Caram and thus obviate
the possibility of a non-Filipino signing the Constitution as one of its framers. Secondly, it is argued
that the original draft of said subsection 2 contained the phrase "and their descendants," which
was deleted from the final draft, thus showing that this privilege of citizenship was intended to be
strictly personal to the one who had been elected to public office and did not extend to his
descendants.
With regard to the first argument, it may be said that the members of the Constitutional Convention
could not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without
considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not
willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself
alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great document. They adopted said
provision fully cognizant of the transmissive essence of citizenship as provided in subsection 3. Had
it been their intention to curtail the transmission of citizenship in such a particular case, they would
have so clearly stated.
The second argument of respondents is similarly untenable. The mere deletion of the phrase "and
their descendants," is not determinative of any conclusion. It could have been done because the
learned framers of our Constitution considered it superfluous, knowing full well that the meaning of
such a phrase was adequately covered by subsection 3. Deletion in the preliminary drafts of the
Convention are, at best, negative guides, which cannot prevail over the positive provisions of the
finally adopted Constitution.
Respondents' allegation that the petitioner violated the contract of sale with the Philippine Shipping
Administration on the ground of misrepresentation, petitioner having alleged in said contract that his
father was a naturalized Filipino, is without merit. Such was not a deliberate misrepresentation but
an error. which any person not versed in the law is prone to commit. It is clear that petitioner merely
meant that his father was a Filipino citizen by operation of law and not by birth.
In view of all the foregoing, the petition for the issuance of the writ of prohibition is hereby granted
and respondent Customs officials are hereby enjoined from cancelling the registration certificates of
petitioner's vessels and respondent Philippine Administration is hereby enjoined from rescinding the
sale of the three vessels made to petitioner. No costs. It is ordered.

AMORES VS HRET
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 189600 June 29, 2010
MILAGROS E. AMORES, Petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and EMMANUEL JOEL J.
VILLANUEVA,Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J .:
Via this petition for certiorari, Milagros E. Amores (petitioner) challenges the Decision of May 14,
2009 and Resolution No. 09-130 of August 6, 2009 of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (public respondent), which respectively dismissed petitioners Petition for Quo Warranto
questioning the legality of the assumption of office of Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva (private
respondent) as representative of the party-list organization Citizens Battle Against Corruption
(CIBAC) in the House of Representatives, and denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
In her Petition for Quo Warranto
1
seeking the ouster of private respondent, petitioner alleged that,
among other things, private respondent assumed office without a formal proclamation issued by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC); he was disqualified to be a nominee of the youth sector of
CIBAC since, at the time of the filing of his certificates of nomination and acceptance, he was
already 31 years old or beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No.
7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act; and his change of affiliation from CIBACs
youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector was not effected at least six
months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections so as to be qualified to represent the new sector under
Section 15 of RA No. 7941.
Not having filed his Answer despite due notice, private respondent was deemed to have entered a
general denial pursuant to public respondents Rules.
2

As earlier reflected, public respondent, by Decision of May 14, 2009,
3
dismissed petitioners Petition
for Quo Warranto, finding that CIBAC was among the party-list organizations which the COMELEC
had partially proclaimed as entitled to at least one seat in the House of Representatives through
National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 07-60 dated July 9, 2007. It also found the
petition which was filed on October 17, 2007 to be out of time, the reglementary period being 10
days from private respondents proclamation.
Respecting the age qualification for youth sectoral nominees under Section 9 of RA No. 7941, public
respondent held that it applied only to those nominated as such during the first three congressional
terms after the ratification of the Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter
registered exclusively as representing the youth sector, which CIBAC, a multi-sectoral organization,
is not.
In the matter of private respondents shift of affiliation from CIBACs youth sector to its overseas
Filipino workers and their families sector, public respondent held that Section 15 of RA No. 7941 did
not apply as there was no resultant change in party-list affiliation.
Her Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution No. 09-130 dated August 6,
2009,
4
petitioner filed the present Petition for Certiorari.
5

Petitioner contends that, among other things, public respondent created distinctions in the
application of Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 that are not found in the subject provisions,
fostering interpretations at war with equal protection of the laws; and NBC Resolution No. 07-60,
which was a partial proclamation of winning party-list organizations, was not enough basis for private
respondent to assume office on July 10, 2007, especially considering that he admitted receiving his
own Certificate of Proclamation only on December 13, 2007.
In his Comment,
6
private respondent avers in the main that petitioner has not substantiated her
claims of grave abuse of discretion against public respondent; and that he became a member of the
overseas Filipinos and their families sector years before the 2007 elections.
It bears noting that the term of office of party-list representatives elected in the May, 2007 elections
will expire on June 30, 2010. While the petition has, thus, become moot and academic, rendering of
a decision on the merits in this case would still be of practical value.
7

The Court adopts the issues framed by public respondent, to wit: (1) whether petitioners Petition for
Quo Warranto was dismissible for having been filed unseasonably; and (2) whether Sections 9 and
15 of RA No. 7941 apply to private respondent.
On the first issue, the Court finds that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
considering petitioners Petition for Quo Warranto filed out of time. Its counting of the 10-day
reglementary period provided in its Rules
8
from the issuance of NBC Resolution No. 07-60 on July 9,
2007 is erroneous.
To be sure, while NBC Resolution No. 07-60 partially proclaimed CIBAC as a winner in the May,
2007 elections, along with other party-list organizations,
9
it was by no measure a proclamation of
private respondent himself as required by Section 13 of RA No. 7941.
Section 13. How Party-List Representatives are Chosen. Party-list representatives shall be
proclaimed by the COMELEC based on the list of names submitted by the respective parties,
organizations, or coalitions to the COMELEC according to their ranking in said list.
AT ALL EVENTS, this Court set aside NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency v. COMELEC
10
after revisiting the formula for allocation of
additional seats to party-list organizations.
Considering, however, that the records do not disclose the exact date of private respondents
proclamation, the Court overlooks the technicality of timeliness and rules on the merits. Alternatively,
since petitioners challenge goes into private respondents qualifications, it may be filed at anytime
during his term.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the
time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once
any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.
11

On the second and more substantial issue, the Court shall first discuss the age requirement for
youth sector nominees under Section 9 of RA No. 7941 reading:
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of
the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the
election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to
represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five
(25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty
(30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of
thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
The Court finds no textual support for public respondents interpretation that Section 9 applied only
to those nominated during the first three congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution
or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter registered exclusively as representing the youth
sector.
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application.
12

As the law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the youth sector must at least be twenty-
five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election, so it must be that a
candidate who is more than 30 on election day is not qualified to be a youth sector nominee. Since
this mandate is contained in RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act, it covers ALL youth sector
nominees vying for party-list representative seats.
As petitioner points out, RA No. 7941 was enacted only in March, 1995. There is thus no reason to
apply Section 9 thereof only to youth sector nominees nominated during the first three congressional
terms after the ratification of the Constitution in 1987. Under this interpretation, the last elections
where Section 9 applied were held in May, 1995 or two months after the law was enacted. This is
certainly not sound legislative intent, and could not have been the objective of RA No. 7941.
There is likewise no rhyme or reason in public respondents ratiocination that after the third
congressional term from the ratification of the Constitution, which expired in 1998, Section 9 of RA
No. 7941 would apply only to sectoral parties registered exclusively as representing the youth
sector. This distinction is nowhere found in the law. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire
debemus. When the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish.
13

Respecting Section 15 of RA No. 7941, the Court fails to find even an iota of textual support for
public respondents ratiocination that the provision did not apply to private respondents shift of
affiliation from CIBACs youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector as
there was no resultant change in party-list affiliation. Section 15 reads:
Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list representative who changes
his political party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if
he changes his political party orsectoral affiliation within six (6) months before an election, he shall
not be eligible for nomination as party-list representative under his new party or organization.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
What is clear is that the wording of Section 15 covers changes in both political party and sectoral
affiliation. And the latter may occur within the same party since multi-sectoral party-list organizations
are qualified to participate in the Philippine party-list system. Hence, a nominee who changes his
sectoral affiliation within the same party will only be eligible for nomination under the new sectoral
affiliation if the change has been effected at least six months before the elections. Again, since the
statute is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. This is the plain meaning rule or verba legis, as expressed in the maxim
index animi sermo or speech is the index of intention.
14

It is, therefore, beyond cavil that Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to private respondent.
The Court finds that private respondent was not qualified to be a nominee of either the youth sector
or the overseas Filipino workers and their families sector in the May, 2007 elections.
The records disclose that private respondent was already more than 30 years of age in May, 2007, it
being stipulated that he was born in August, 1975.
15
Moreover, he did not change his sectoral
affiliation at least six months before May, 2007, public respondent itself having found that he shifted
to CIBACs overseas Filipino workers and their families sector only on March 17, 2007.
16
1avvphi1
That private respondent is the first nominee of CIBAC, whose victory was later upheld, is of no
moment. A party-list organizations ranking of its nominees is a mere indication of preference, their
qualifications according to law are a different matter.
It not being contested, however, that private respondent was eventually proclaimed as a party-list
representative of CIBAC and rendered services as such, he is entitled to keep the compensation and
emoluments provided by law for the position until he is properly declared ineligible to hold the
same.
17

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 14, 2009 and Resolution No. 09-
130 dated August 6, 2009 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal are SET ASIDE.
Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva is declared ineligible to hold office as a member of the House of
Representatives representing the party-list organization CIBAC.
SO ORDERED.