WATER CODE:

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1067 December 31, 1976 ARTICLES 5, 6, 7, 8

CHAPTER II
OWNERSHIP OF WATERS
Article 5. The following belong to the State:
(a) Rivers and their natural beds;
(b) Continuous or intermittent waters of springs and brooks running in their
natural beds and the beds themselves;
(c) Natural lakes and lagoons;
(d) All other categories of surface waters such as water flowing over lands, water
from rainfall whether natural, or artificial, and water from agriculture runoff,
seepage and drainage;
(e) Atmospheric water;
(f) Subterranean or ground waters; and,
(g) Seawater.
Article 6. The following waters found on private lands belong to the State:
(a) Continuous or intermittent waters rising on such lands;
(b) Lakes and lagoons naturally occuring on such lands;
(c) Rain water falling on such lands;
(d) Subterranean or ground waters; and,
(e) Water in swamps and marshes.
The owner of the land where the water is found may use the same for domestic
purposes without securing a permit, provided that such use shall be registered, when
required by the Council. The Council, however, may regulate such when there is
wastage, or in times of emergency.


Article 7. Subject to the provisions of this Code, any person who captures or collects
water by means of cisterns, tanks, or pools shall have exclusive control over such water
and the right to dispose of the same.
Article 8. Water legally appropriated shall be subject to the control of the appropriator
from the moment it reaches the appropriator's canal or aqueduct leading to the place
where the water will be used or stored and, thereafter, so long as it is being beneficially
used for the purposes for which it was appropriated.
CASES
Digests and Fulltexts

ISAGUIRRE v DE LARA - DIGEST
Facts:
Alejandro de Lara was the original applicant-claimant for a Miscellaneous Sales
Application over a parcel of land identified as portion of Lot 502, Guianga Cadastre, filed
with the Bureau of Lands with an area of 2,342 square meters. Upon his death, his wife
respondent Felicitas de Lara, as claimant, succeeded Alejandro de Lara. The
Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources amended the sales application to
cover only 1,600 square meters. By virtue of a decision rendered by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, a subdivision survey was made and the area was
further reduced to 1,000 square meters. On this lot stands a two-story residential-
commercial apartment declared for taxation purposes in the name of respondents sons
Apolonio and Rodolfo, both surnamed de Lara.
Respondent obtained several loans from the Philippine National Bank. When she
encountered financial difficulties, respondent approached petitioner Cornelio M.
Isaguirre, who was married to her niece, for assistance. A document denominated as
Deed of Sale and Special Cession of Rights and Interests was executed by
respondent and petitioner, whereby the former sold a 250 square meter portion of Lot
No. 502, together with the two-story commercial and residential structure standing
thereon, in favor of petitioner, for and in consideration of the sum of P5,000.
Apolonio and Rodolfo de Lara filed a complaint against petitioner for recovery of
ownership and possession of the two-story building. However, the case was dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner filed a sales application over the subject property on
the basis of the deed of sale. His application was approved, resulting in the issuance of


Original Certificate of Title, in the name of petitioner. Meanwhile, the sales application of
respondent over the entire 1,000 square meters of subject property (including the 250
square meter portion claimed by petitioner) was also given due course, resulting in the
issuance of Original Certificate of Title, in the name of respondent.
Due to the overlapping of titles, petitioner filed an action for quieting of title and
damages with the RTC of Davao City against respondent. After trial on the merits, the
trial court rendered judgment, in favor of petitioner, declaring him to be the lawful owner
of the disputed property. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts
decision, holding that the transaction entered into by the parties, as evidenced by their
contract, was an equitable mortgage, not a sale. The appellate courts decision was
based on the inadequacy of the consideration agreed upon by the parties, on its finding
that the payment of a large portion of the purchase price was made after the execution
of the deed of sale in several installments of minimal amounts; and finally, on the fact
that petitioner did not take steps to confirm his rights or to obtain title over the property
for several years after the execution of the deed of sale. As a consequence of its
decision, the appellate court also declared Original Certificate issued in favor of
petitioner to be null and void. This Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals,
we denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Respondent filed a motion for execution with the trial court, praying for the immediate
delivery of possession of the subject property, which motion was granted. Respondent
moved for a writ of possession. Petitioner opposed the motion, asserting that he had the
right of retention over the property until payment of the loan and the value of the
improvements he had introduced on the property. The trial court granted respondents
motion for writ of possession. The trial court denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Consequently, a writ of possession, together with the Sheriffs Notice to
Vacate, was served upon petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the mortgagee in an equitable mortgage has the right to retain
possession of the property pending actual payment to him of the amount of
indebtedness by the mortgagor.
Ruling:
A mortgage is a contract entered into in order to secure the fulfillment of a principal
obligation. Recording the document, in which it appears with the proper Registry of


Property, although, even if it is not recorded, the mortgage is nevertheless binding
between the parties, constitutes it. Thus, the only right granted by law in favor of the
mortgagee is to demand the execution and the recording of the document in which the
mortgage is formalized. As a general rule, the mortgagor retains possession of the
mortgaged property since a mortgage is merely a lien and title to the property does not
pass to the mortgagee. However, even though a mortgagee does not have possession
of the property, there is no impairment of his security since the mortgage directly and
immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor
may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted. If the
debtor is unable to pay his debt, the mortgage creditor may institute an action to
foreclose the mortgage, whether judicially or extrajudicially, whereby the mortgaged
property will then be sold at a public auction and the proceeds there from given to the
creditor to the extent necessary to discharge the mortgage loan. Apparently, petitioners
contention that to require him to deliver possession of the Property to respondent prior
to the full payment of the latters mortgage loan would be equivalent to the cancellation
of the mortgage is without basis. Regardless of its possessor, the mortgaged property
may still be sold, with the prescribed formalities, in the event of the debtors default in
the payment of his loan obligation.
A simple mortgage does not give the mortgagee a right to the possession of the
property unless the mortgage should contain some special provision to that effect.
Regrettably for petitioner, he has not presented any evidence, other than his own
gratuitous statements, to prove that the real intention of the parties was to allow him to
enjoy possession of the mortgaged property until full payment of the loan.
The trial court correctly issued the writ of possession in favor of respondent. Such writ
was but a necessary consequence of affirming the validity of the original certificate of
title in the name of respondent Felicitas de Lara, while at the same time nullifying the
original certificate of title in the name of petitioner Cornelio Isaguirre. Possession is an
essential attribute of ownership; thus, it would be redundant for respondent to go back
to court simply to establish her right to possess subject property.

ISAGUIRRE v DE LARA - FULLTEXT
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION


G.R. No. 138053 May 31, 2000

CORNELIO M. ISAGUIRRE, petitioner,
vs.
FELICITAS DE LARA, respondent.

GONZAGA-REYES, J .:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, petitioner Cornelio M. Isaguirre assails the October 5, 1998 decision
1
of the
Court of Appeals
2
and its Resolution promulgated on March 5, 1999.
The antecedent facts of the present case are as follows:
Alejandro de Lara was the original applicant-claimant for a Miscellaneous Sales
Application over a parcel of land identified as portion of Lot 502, Guianga Cadastre, filed
with the Bureau of Lands on January 17, 1942 and with an area of 2,324 square meters.
Upon his death, Alejandro de Lara was succeeded by his wife respondent Felicitas
de Lara, as claimant. On November 19, 1954, the Undersecretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources amended the sales application to cover only 1,600 square meters.
Then, on November 3, 1961, by virtue of a decision rendered by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources dated November 19, 1954, a subdivision survey was
made and the area was further reduced to 1,000 square meters. On this lot stands a
two-story residential-commercial apartment declared for taxation purposes under TD
43927 in the name of respondent's sons Apolonio and Rodolfo, both surnamed de
Lara.
Sometime in 1953, respondent obtained several loans from the Philippine National
Bank. When she encountered financial difficulties, respondent approached petitioner
Cornelio M. Isaguirre, who was married to her niece, for assistance. On February 10,
1960, a document denominated as "Deed of Sale and Special Cession of Rights and
Interests" was executed by respondent and petitioner, whereby the former sold a 250
square meter portion of Lot No. 502, together with the two-story commercial and
residential structure standing thereon, in favor of petitioner, for and in consideration of
the sum of P5,000.
Sometime in May, 1968, Apolonio and Rodolfo de Lara filed a complaint against
petitioner for recovery of ownership and possession of the two-story building.
3
However,
the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
On August 21, 1969, petitioner filed a sales application over the subject property on the
basis of the deed of sale. His application was approved on January 17, 1984, resulting


in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. P-11566 on February 13, 1984, in the
name of petitioner. Meanwhile, the sales application of respondent over the entire 1,000
square meters of subject property (including the 250 square meter portion claimed by
petitioner) was also given due course, resulting in the issuance of Original Certificate of
Title No. P-13038 on June 19, 1989, in the name of respondent.
4

Due to the overlapping of titles, petitioner filed an action for quieting of title and
damages with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City against respondent on May 17,
1990. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 20124-90. After trial on the merits, the
trial court rendered judgment on October 19, 1992, in favor of petitioner, declaring him
to be the lawful owner of the disputed property. However, the Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court's decision, holding that the transaction entered into by the parties, as
evidenced by their contract, was an equitable mortgage, not a sale.
5
The appellate
court's decision was based on the inadequacy of the consideration agreed upon by the
parties, on its finding that the payment of a large portion of the "purchase price" was
made after the execution of the deed of sale in several installments of minimal amounts;
and finally, on the fact that petitioner did not take steps to confirm his rights or to obtain
title over the property for several years after the execution of the deed of sale. As a
consequence of its decision, the appellate court also declared Original Certificate of
Title No. P-11566 issued in favor of petitioner to be null and void. On July 8, 1996, in a
case docketed as G.R. No. 120832, this Court affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals and on September 11, 1996, we denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
On May 5, 1997, respondent filed a motion for execution with the trial court, praying for
the immediate delivery of possession of the subject property, which motion was granted
on August 18, 1997. On February 3, 1998, respondent moved for a writ of possession,
invoking our ruling in G.R. No. 120832. Petitioner opposed the motion, asserting that he
had the right of retention over the property until payment of the loan and the value of the
improvements he had introduced on the property. On March 12, 1998, the trial court
granted respondent's motion for writ of possession. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied by the trial court on May 21, 1998. Consequently, a writ of
possession dated June 16, 1998, together with the Sheriff's Notice to Vacate dated July
7, 1998, were served upon petitioner.
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction to
annul and set aside the March 12, 1998 and May 21, 1998 orders of the trial court,
including the writ of possession dated June 16, 1998 and the sheriff's notice to vacate
dated July 7, 1998.
6

The appellate court summarized the issues involved in the case as follows: (1) whether
or not the mortgagee in an equitable mortgage has the right to retain possession of the
property pending actual payment to him of the amount of indebtedness by the
mortgagor; and (b) whether or not petitioner can be considered a builder in good faith
with respect to the improvements he made on the property before the transaction was
declared to be an equitable mortgage.


The Court of Appeals held that petitioner was not entitled to retain possession of the
subject property. It said that
. . . the mortgagee merely has to annotate his claim at the back of the
certificate of title in order to protect his rights against third persons and
thereby secure the debt. There is therefore no necessity for him to actually
possess the property. Neither should a mortgagee in an equitable
mortgage fear that the contract relied upon is not registered and hence,
may not operate as a mortgage to justify its foreclosure. In Feliza Zubiri
v. Lucio Quijano, 74 Phil 47, it was ruled "that when a contract . . . is held
as an equitable mortgage, the same shall be given effect as if it had
complied with the formal requisites of mortgage. . . . by its very nature the
lien thereby created ought not to be defeated by requiring compliance with
the formalities necessary to the validity of a voluntary real estate
mortgage, as long as the land remains in the hands of the petitioner
(mortgagor) and the rights of innocent parties are not affected.
Proceeding from the foregoing, petitioner's imagined fears that his lien
would be lost by surrendering possession are unfounded.
In the same vein, there is nothing to stop the mortgagor de Lara from
acquiring possession of the property pending actual payment of the
indebtedness to petitioner. This does not in anyway endanger the
petitioner's right to security since, as pointed out by private respondents,
the petitioner can always have the equitable mortgage annotated in the
Certificate of Title of private respondent and pursue the legal remedies for
the collection of the alleged debt secured by the mortgage. In this case,
the remedy would be to foreclose the mortgage upon failure to pay the
debt within the required period.
It is unfortunate however, that the Court of Appeals, in declaring the
transaction to be an equitable mortgage failed to specify in its Decision the
period of time within which the private respondent could settle her
account, since such period serves as the reckoning point by which
foreclosure could ensue. As it is, petitioner is now in a dilemma as to how
he could enforce his rights as a mortgagee. . . .
Hence, this Court, once and for all resolves the matter by requiring the trial
court to determine the amount of total indebtedness and the period within
which payment shall be made.
Petitioner's claims that he was a builder in good faith and entitled to reimbursement for
the improvements he introduced upon the property were rejected by the Court of
Appeals. It held that petitioner knew, or at least had an inkling, that there was a defect
or flaw in his mode of acquisition. Nevertheless, the appellate court declared petitioner
to have the following rights:


. . . He is entitled to reimbursement for the necessary expenses which he
may have incurred over the property, in accordance with Art. 526 and Art.
452 of the Civil Code. Moreover, considering that the transaction was
merely an equitable mortgage, then he is entitled to payment of the
amount of indebtedness plus interest, and in the event of non-payment to
foreclose the mortgage. Meanwhile, pending receipt of the total amount of
debt, private respondent is entitled to possession over the disputed
property.
The case was finally disposed of by the appellate court in the following manner:
WHERFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED, and this case is ordered
remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for further
proceedings, as follows:
1) The trial court shall determine
a) The period within which the mortgagor must pay his total amount of
indebtedness.
b) The total amount of indebtedness owing the petitioner-mortgagee plus
interest computed from the time when the judgment declaring the contract
to be an equitable mortgage became final.
c) The necessary expenses incurred by petitioner over the property.
7

On March 5, 1999, petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate
court.
8
Hence, the present appeal wherein petitioner makes the following assignment of
errors:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN NOT RULING THAT THE RTC ACTED WITHOUT
OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION OR WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING
A WRIT OF POSSESSION IN FAVOR OF
RESPONDENT.
A.1 The RTC patently exceeded the scope of
its authority and acted with grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the immediate delivery of
possession of the Property to respondent as
said order exceeded the parameters of the final
and executory decision and constituted a
variance thereof.


B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED
TO THE POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY PRIOR
TO THE PAYMENT OF RESPONDENT'S
MORTGAGE LOAN.
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN RULING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT A
BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH.
D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO
INTEREST COMPUTED ONLY FROM THE TIME
WHEN THE JUDGMENT DECLARING THE
CONTRACT TO BE AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE
BECAME FINAL.
9

Basically, petitioner claims that he is entitled to retain possession of the subject property
until payment of the loan and the value of the necessary and useful improvements he
made upon such property.
10
According to petitioner, neither the Court of Appeals'
decision in G.R. CV No. 42065 nor this Court's decision in G.R. No. 120832 ordered
immediate delivery of possession of the subject property to respondent.
The dispositive portion of the March 31, 1995 decision of the Court of Appeals in G.R.
CV No. 42065, which was affirmed by this Court, provides that
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered: (1) dismissing the
complaint; (2) declaring the "Document of Sale and Special Cession of
Rights and Interests" (Exhibit B) dated February 10, 1960, to be an
equitable mortgage not a sale; (3) upholding the validity of OCT No. P-
13038 in the name of Felicitas de Lara; and (3) declaring null and
void OCT No. P-11566 in the name of plaintiff Cornelio Isaguirre. All other
counterclaims for damages are likewise dismissed. Costs against the
appellee.
11

Petitioner argues that the abovementioned decision merely settled the following
matters: (1) that the transaction between petitioner and respondent was not a sale but
an equitable mortgage; (2) that OCT No. P-13038 in the name of respondent is valid;
and (3) that OCT No. P-11566 in the name of petitioner is null and void. Since the
aforementioned decision did not direct the immediate ouster of petitioner from the
subject property and the delivery thereof to respondent, the issuance of the writ of
possession by the trial court on June 16, 1998 constituted an unwarranted modification
or addition to the final and executory decision of this Court in G.R. No. 120832.
12



We do not agree with petitioner's contentions. On the contrary, the March 31, 1995
decision of the appellate court, which was affirmed by this Court on July 8, 1996, served
as more than adequate basis for the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of
respondent since these decisions affirmed respondent's title over the subject property.
As the sole owner, respondent has the right to enjoy her property, without any other
limitations than those established by
law.
1
Corollary to such right, respondent also has the right to exclude from the
possession of her property any other person to whom she has not transmitted such
property.
14

It is true that, in some instances, the actual possessor has some valid rights over the
property enforceable even against the owner thereof, such as in the case of a tenant or
lessee.
15
Petitioner anchors his own claim to possession upon his declared status as a
mortgagee. In his Memorandum, he argues that
4.8 It was respondent who asserted that her transfer of the Property to
petitioner was by way of an equitable mortgage and not by sale. After her
assertion was sustained by the Courts, respondent cannot now ignore or
disregard the legal effects of such judicial declaration regarding the nature
of the transaction.
xxx xxx xxx
4.13 Having delivered possession of the Property to petitioner as part of
the constitution of the equitable mortgage thereon, respondent is not
entitled to the return of the Property unless and until the mortgage loan is
discharged by full payment thereof. Petitioner's right as mortgagee to
retain possession of the Property so long as the mortgage loan remains
unpaid is further supported by the rule that a mortgage may not be
extinguished even though then mortgagor-debtor may have made partial
payments on the mortgage loan:
Art. 2089. A pledge or mortgage is indivisible, even though
the debt may be divided among the successors in interest of
the debtor or the creditor.
Therefore, the debtor's heir who has paid a part of the debt
cannot ask for the proportionate extinguishment of the
pledge or mortgage as long as the debt is not completely
satisfied.
Neither can the creditor's heir who has received his share of
the debt return the pledge or cancel the mortgage, to the
prejudice of the other heirs who have not been paid.
(Emphasis supplied.)


xxx xxx xxx
4.14 To require petitioner to deliver possession of the Property to
respondent prior to the full payment of the latter's mortgage loan would be
equivalent to the cancellation of the mortgage. Such effective cancellation
would render petitioner's rights ineffectual and nugatory and would
constitute unwarranted judicial interference.
xxx xxx xxx
4.16 The fact of the present case show that respondent delivered
possession of the Property to petitioner upon the execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale and Special Cession of Rights and Interest dated 10
February 1960. Hence, transfer of possession of the Property to petitioner
was an essential part of whatever agreement the parties entered into,
which, in this case, the Supreme Court affirmed to be an equitable
mortgage.
xxx xxx xxx
4.19 Petitioner does not have the mistaken notion that the mortgagee
must be in actual possession of the mortgaged property in order to secure
the debt. However, in this particular case, the delivery of possession of the
Property was an integral part of the contract between petitioner and
respondent. After all, it was supposed to be a contract of sale. If delivery
was not part of the agreement entered into by the parties in 1960, why did
respondent surrender possession thereof to petitioner in the first place?
4.20 Now that the Courts have ruled that the transaction was not a sale
but a mortgage, petitioner's entitlement to the possession of the Property
should be deemed as one of the provisions of the mortgage, considering
that at the time the contract was entered into, possession of the Property
was likewise delivered to petitioner. Thus, until respondent has fully paid
her mortgage loan, petitioner should be allowed to retain possession of
the subject property.
16

Petitioner's position lacks sufficient legal and factual moorings.
A mortgage is a contract entered into in order to secure the fulfillment of a principal
obligation.
17
It is constituted by recording the document in which it appears with the
proper Registry of Property, although, even if it is not recorded, the mortgage is
nevertheless binding between the parties.
18
Thus, the only right granted by law in favor
of the mortgagee is to demand the execution and the recording of the document in
which the mortgage is formalized.
19
As a general rule, the mortgagor retains
possession of the mortgaged property since a mortgage is merely a lien and title to the
property does not pass to the mortgagee.
20
However, even though a mortgagee does


not have possession of the property, there is no impairment of his security since the
mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed,
whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it
was constituted.
21
If the debtor is unable to pay his debt, the mortgage creditor may
institute an action to foreclose the mortgage, whether judicially or extrajudicially,
whereby the mortgaged property will then be sold at a public auction and the proceeds
therefrom given to the creditor to the extent necessary to discharge the mortgage loan.
Apparently, petitioner's contention that "[t]o require [him] . . . to deliver possession of the
Property to respondent prior to the full payment of the latter's mortgage loan would be
equivalent to the cancellation of the mortgage" is without basis. Regardless of its
possessor, the mortgaged property may still be sold, with the prescribed formalities, in
the event of the debtor's default in the payment of his loan obligation.
Moreover, this Court cannot find any justification in the records to uphold petitioner's
contention that respondent delivered possession of the subject property upon the
execution of the "Deed of Sale and Special Cession of Rights and Interests" on
February 10, 1960 and that the transfer of possession to petitioner must therefore be
considered an essential part of the agreement between the parties. This self-serving
assertion of petitioner was directly contradicted by respondent in her
pleadings.
22
Furthermore, nowhere in the Court of Appeals' decisions promulgated on
March 31, 1995 (G.R. CV No. 42065) and on October 5, 1998 (G.R. SP No. 48310), or
in our own decision promulgated on July 8, 1996 (G.R. No. 120832) was it ever
established that the mortgaged properties were delivered by respondent to petitioner.
In Alvano v. Batoon,
2
this Court held that "[a] simple mortgage does not give the
mortgagee a right to the possession of the property unless the mortgage should contain
some special provision to that effect." Regrettably for petitioner, he has not presented
any evidence, other than his own gratuitous statements, to prove that the real intention
of the parties was to allow him to enjoy possession of the mortgaged property until full
payment of the loan.
Therefore, we hold that the trial court correctly issued the writ of possession in favor of
respondent. Such writ was but a necessary consequence of this Court's ruling in G.R.
No. 120832 affirming the validity of the original certificate of title (OCT No. P-13038) in
the name of respondent Felicitas de Lara, while at the same time nullifying the original
certificate of title (OCT No. P-11566) in the name of petitioner Cornelio Isaguirre.
Possession is an essential attribute of ownership; thus, it would be redundant for
respondent to go back to court simply to establish her right to possess subject property.
Contrary to petitioner's claims, the issuance of the writ of possession by the trial court
did not constitute an unwarranted modification of our decision in G.R. No. 120832, but
rather, was a necessary complement thereto.
24
It bears stressing that a judgment is not
confined to what appears upon the face of the decision, but also those necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto.
25

With regard to the improvements made on the mortgaged property, we confirm the
Court of Appeals' characterization of petitioner as a possessor in bad faith. Based on


the factual findings of the appellate court, it is evident that petitioner knew from the very
beginning that there was really no sale and that he held respondent's property as mere
security for the payment of the loan obligation. Therefore, petitioner may claim
reimbursement only for necessary expenses; however, he is not entitled to
reimbursement for any useful
expenses
26
which he may have incurred.
27

Finally, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, this case should be remanded
to the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for a determination of the total amount of the
loan, the necessary expenses incurred by petitioner, and the period within which
respondent must pay such amount.
28
However, no interest is due on the loan since
there has been no express stipulation in writing.
29

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 5, 1998
and its Resolution dated March 5, 1999 are hereby AFFIRMED. Respondent is entitled
to delivery of possession of the subject property. This case is hereby REMANDED to
the trial court for determination of the amount of the loan, the necessary expenses
incurred by petitioner and the period within which the respondent must pay the same.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., is on leave.


GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES v CA DIGEST
Facts:
In February 1982, the spouses Manuel and Cynthia Jose contracted with German
Management and Services, Inc. for the latter to develop their landholdings into a
residential subdivision. The spouses also executed a special power of attorney to that
effect.
German Management started the project in February 1983, however, German
Management discovered that the land was being possessed by Ernest0 Villeza et al
who were the farmers tilling the said land at that time. German Management spoke with
Villeza et al but the farmers refused to vacate the land as the farmers claimed that they
have been occupying the land for twelve years.
Nevertheless, German Management went on to develop the property and demolished
the properties of the farmers without acquiring a court order. In turn, Villeza et al filed a
case of forcible entry against German Management. In its defense, German
Management invoked the Doctrine of Self-help which provides that:
The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the
enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be


reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical
invasion or usurpation of his property. (Article 429, Civil Code)

Issue:
Whether or not the doctrine of self-help is applicable in this case.

Ruling :
No. The Doctrine of Self-help is not applicable because at the time when German
Management excluded the farmers, theres no longer an actual or threatened unlawful
physical invasion or usurpation. That actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion by
the farmers have already lapsed 12 years ago when they began occupying the said
land. In fact, they were already peaceably farming the land.
What should have been the remedy by German Management?
German Management should have filed either accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria to lawfully eject the farmers.
But the farmers are not the real owners and in fact, the spouses Jose have a lawful title
over the land?
Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable
quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Further,
there is now a presumption of ownership in favor of the farmers since they are the ones
occupying the said property. They can only be ejected either by accion publiciana or
accion reivindicatoria through which the spouses Joses better right may be proven.

GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES v CA FULLTEXT

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 76217 September 14, 1989
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO VILLEZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-76216 September 14, 1989
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ORLANDO GERNALE, respondents.


Alam, Verano & Associates for petitioner.
Francisco D. Lozano for private respondents.

FERNAN, C.J .:
Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, USA are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Inarawan, San
Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of 232,942 square meters and covered by TCT No.
50023 of the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal issued on September 11, 1980
which canceled TCT No. 56762/ T-560. The land was originally registered on August 5,
1948 in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal as OCT No. 19, pursuant to a
Homestead Patent granted by the President of the Philippines on July 27, 1948, under
Act No. 141.
On February 26, 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney
authorizing petitioner German Management Services to develop their property covered
by TCT No. 50023 into a residential subdivision. Consequently, petitioner on February
9,1983 obtained Development Permit No. 00424 from the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission for said development. Finding that part of the property was
occupied by private respondents and twenty other persons, petitioner advised the
occupants to vacate the premises but the latter refused. Nevertheless, petitioner
proceeded with the development of the subject property which included the portions
occupied and cultivated by private respondents.
Private respondents filed an action for forcible entry against petitioner before the
Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, alleging that they are mountainside farmers of
Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal and members of the Concerned Citizens of
Farmer's Association; that they have occupied and tilled their farmholdings some twelve
to fifteen years prior to the promulgation of P.D. No. 27; that during the first week of
August 1983, petitioner, under a permit from the Office of the Provincial Governor of
Rizal, was allowed to improve the Barangay Road at Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro,
Antipolo, Rizal at its expense, subject to the condition that it shag secure the needed
right of way from the owners of the lot to be affected; that on August 15, 1983 and
thereafter, petitioner deprived private respondents of their property without due process
of law by: (1) forcibly removing and destroying the barbed wire fence enclosing their
farmholdings without notice; (2) bulldozing the rice, corn fruit bearing trees and other
crops of private respondents by means of force, violence and intimidation, in violation of
P.D. 1038 and (3) trespassing, coercing and threatening to harass, remove and eject
private respondents from their respective farmholdings in violation of P.D. Nos. 316,
583, 815, and 1028.
1



On January 7,1985, the Municipal Trial Court dismissed private respondents' complaint
for forcible entry.
2
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch LXXI
sustained the dismissal by the Municipal Trial Court.
3

Private respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On July
24,1986, said court gave due course to their petition and reversed the decisions of the
Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court.
4

The Appellate Court held that since private respondents were in actual possession of
the property at the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents
have a right to commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or
illegality of possession.
5
Petitioner moved to reconsider but the same was denied by
the Appellate Court in its resolution dated September 26, 1986.
6

Hence, this recourse.
The issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals denied due process to
petitioner when it reversed the decision of the court a quo without giving petitioner the
opportunity to file its answer and whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a
forcible entry case against petitioner.
7

We affirm. The Court of Appeals need not require petitioner to file an answer for due
process to exist. The comment filed by petitioner on February 26, 1986 has sufficiently
addressed the issues presented in the petition for review filed by private respondents
before the Court of Appeals. Having heard both parties, the Appellate Court need not
await or require any other additional pleading. Moreover, the fact that petitioner was
heard by the Court of Appeals on its motion for reconsideration negates any violation of
due process.
Notwithstanding petitioner's claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to develop
the subject property, private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a
forcible entry case against petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is
merely a quieting process and never determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not
involved.
8

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time petitioner entered the property,
private respondents were already in possession thereof . There is no evidence that the
spouses Jose were ever in possession of the subject property. On the contrary, private
respondents' peaceable possession was manifested by the fact that they even planted
rice, corn and fruit bearing trees twelve to fifteen years prior to petitioner's act of
destroying their crops.
Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of
title it presented, such evidence does not responsively address the issue of prior actual
possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of the actual
condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be


turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror.
9
Thus, a party who can prove prior
possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever
may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he
has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by
a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
10

Both the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court have rationalized petitioner's
drastic action of bulldozing and destroying the crops of private respondents on the basis
of the doctrine of self-help enunciated in Article 429 of the New Civil Code.
11
Such
justification is unavailing because the doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the
time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar. When
possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the
recovery of property. This is clear from Article 536 of the Civil Code which states, "(I)n
no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a
possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or right to
deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if
the holder should refuse to deliver the thing."
WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to DENY the instant petition. The decision of the
Court of Appeals dated July 24,1986 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurs in the result.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

CAISIP v PEOPLE DIGEST
Facts:
The complainant Gloria Cabalag is the wife of Marcelino Guevarra who cultivated a
parcel of land known as Lot 105-A of Hacienda Palico situated in sitio Bote-bote, barrio
Tampisao, Nasugbu, Batangas. The said parcel of land used to be tenanted by the
deceased father of the complainant. Hacienda Palico is owned by Roxas y Cia. and
administered by Antonio Chuidian. The overseer of the said hacienda is Felix Caisip,
one of the accused herein.
On May 17, 1958 Roxas y Cia filed a forcible entry case against Guevarra. The court
decided in favour of Roxas y Cia and issued a writ of execution. The return of the writ
showed that possession of Lot 105-A was turned over to the owner thru Caisip and that
Guevarra and Cabalag were given 20 days from June 6, 1959 to vacate the premises. It


also appears in the record that due to the tenacious attitude of Cabalag, Caisip sought
the help of policemen Federico Villadelrey and Ignacio Rojales.
On June 17, 1959, Cabalag was seen weeding the portion of Lot 105-A which was a
ricefield. Caisip approached her and bade her to leave but Cabalag refused to do so
claiming that she and her husband has a right over the property. She having stuck to
this attitude, even when he threatened to call the police, Caisip went to his co-
defendants, Sgt. Rojales and Cpl. Villadelrey, both of the local police, who were some
distance away, and brought them with him. Rojales told Gloria, who was then in a
squatting position, to stop weeding. As Gloria insisted on her right to stay in said lot,
Rojales grabbed her right hand and, twisting the same, wrested therefrom the trowel
she was holding. Thereupon, Villadelrey held her left hand and, together with Rojales,
forcibly dragged her. The appellants maintain that the Court of Appeals erred in not
finding that their acts are justified under Article 429 of the Civil Code.
Issue:
Whether Article 429 of the Civil Code applies in the present case.
Ruling:
Article 429 is inapplicable, Cabalag was given 20 days from June 6, 1959 within which
to vacate the premises. Cabalag did not, on June 17, 1959 or within said period
invade or usurp said lot. She had merely remained in possession thereof, even though
the hacienda owner may have become its co-possessor. Appellants did not repel or
prevent in actual or threatened . . . physical invasion or usurpation. They expelled
Gloria from a property of which she and her husband were in possession.
It is urged, that, by weeding and refusing to leave Lot 105-A, Gloria had committed a
crime in the presence of the policemen, despite the aforementioned 20-day period,
which, appellants claim, the sheriff had no authority to grant. This contention is
manifestly untenable, because: (1) said period was granted in the presence of the
hacienda owners representative, appellant Caisip, who, by not objecting thereto, had
impliedly consented to or ratified the act performed by the sheriff; 2) Gloria and her
husband were thereby allowed to remain, and had, in fact, remained, in possession of
the premises, perhaps together with the owner of the hacienda or his representative,
Caisip; (3) the act of removing weeds from the ricefield was beneficial to its owner and
to whomsoever the crops belonged, and, even if they had not authorized it, does not
constitute a criminal offense; and (4) although Gloria and her husband had been
sentenced to vacate the land, the judgment against them did not necessarily imply that
they, as the parties who had tilled it and planted thereon, had no rights, of any kind
whatsoever, in or to the standing crops, inasmuch as necessary expenses shall be


refunded to every possessor, and the cost of cultivation, production and upkeep has
been held to partake of the nature of necessary expenses.
It is, accordingly, clear that appellants herein had, by means of violence, and without
legal authority therefor, prevented the complainant from doing something not prohibited
by law, (weeding and being in Lot 105-A), and compelled her to do something against
her will (stopping the weeding and leaving said lot), whether it be right or wrong,
thereby taking the law into their hands, in violation of Art. 286 of the Revised Penal
Code.


CAISIP v PEOPLE FULLTEXT

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-28716 November 18, 1970
FELIX CAISIP, IGNACIO ROJALES and FEDERICO VILLADELREY, petitioners,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Godofredo F. Trajano and Rafael A. Francisco for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G.
Ibarra and Solicitor Conrado T. Limcaoco for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J .:
This case is before Us upon petition of defendants Felix Caisip, Ignacio Rojales and
Federico Villadelrey, for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed that of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, convicting them of the crime of
Grave Coercion, with which they are charged, and sentencing each to four (4) months


and one (1) day of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of P200.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, not to exceed one-third of the principal penalty, as
well as one-third of the costs.
As set forth in the trial court's decision, the background of the present case is this:
The complainant Gloria Cabalag is the wife of Marcelino Guevarra who
cultivated a parcel of land known as Lot 105-A of Hacienda Palico situated
in sitio Bote-bote, barrio Tampisao, Nasugbu, Batangas. The said parcel
of land used to be tenanted by the deceased father of the complainant.
Hacienda Palico is owned by Roxas y Cia. and administered by Antonio
Chuidian. The overseer of the said hacienda is Felix Caisip, one of the
accused herein. Even before the occurrence of the incident presently
involved, there had been a series of misunderstandings and litigations
involving the complainant and her husband, on one hand, and the men of
Hacienda Palico on the other.
It appears that on December 23, 1957, Marcelino Guevarra filed an action
with the Court of Agrarian Relations seeking recognition as a lawful tenant
of Roxas y Cia. over lot No. 105-A of Hacienda Palico. In a decision dated
February 22, 1958, the Court of Agrarian Relations declared it has no
jurisdiction over the case, inasmuch as Guevarra is not a tenant on the
said parcel of land. An appeal was taken by Guevarra to the Supreme
Court, but the appeal was dismissed in a resolution dated April 10, 1958.
On May 17, 1958, Roxas y Cia. filed an action against Marcelino Guevarra
in the justice of the peace court of Nasugbu, Batangas, for forcible entry,
praying therein that Guevarra be ejected from the premises of Lot No.
105-A. After due hearing, the said Court in a decision dated May 2, 1959
ordered Guevarra to vacate the lot and to pay damages and accrued
rentals. A writ of execution was issued by Justice of the Peace Rodolfo A.
Castillo of Nasugbu, which was served on Guevarra on June 6, 1959, and
the return of which was made by Deputy Sheriff Leonardo R. Aquino of
this Court on June 23, 1959 (Exhibit "10"). The writ recites among other
things that the possession of the land was delivered to the Roxas y Cia.
thru Felix Caisip, the overseer, and Guevarra was given twenty days from
June 6, 1959 within which to leave the premises.
The record before Us does not explain why said decision was executed. According to
the complainant, her husband's counsel had appealed from said decision. The justice of
the peace who rendered it, Hon. Rodolfo Castillo, said that there really had been an
attempt to appeal, which was not given due course because the reglementary period
therefor had expired; that a motion to reconsider his order to this effect was denied by
him; and that a second motion for reconsideration was "still pending consideration," and
it was October 19, 1959 when such testimony was given.


Continuing the narration of the antecedent facts, His Honor, the Trial Judge, added:
On June 15, 1959, some trouble occurred between the complainant and
Caisip regarding the cutting of sugar cane on Lot 105-A. The following day
June 16, 1959, the complainant allegedly again entered the premises of
Lot 105-A and refused to be driven out by Felix Caisip. Due to the
aforementioned incidents, Gloria Cabalag was charged in the justice of the
peace court of Nasugbu, Batangas, with grave coercion for the incident of
June 15, 1959, docketed in the said court as Criminal Case No. 968
(Exhibit "3"); and with the crime of unjust vexation for the incident of June
16, 1959, docketed in the said court as Criminal Case No. 970. Both
cases, however, were filed only on June 25, 1959.
In other words, these criminal cases, Nos. 968 and 970, against Gloria Cabalag, were
filed eight (8) days after the incident involved in the case at bar. It is, also, noteworthy
that both cases were on motion of the prosecution, filed after a reinvestigation
thereof provisionally dismissed, on November 8, 1960, by the Court of First Instance
of Batangas, upon the ground "that the evidence of record ... are insufficient to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt." The decision of said court, in the
case at bar, goes on to say:
It further appears that due to the tenacious attitude of Gloria Cabalag to
remain in the premises, Caisip sought the help of the chief of police of
Nasugbu who advised him to see Deputy Sheriff Aquino about the matter.
The latter, however, informed Caisip that he could not act on the request
to eject Gloria Cabalag and to stop her from what she was doing without a
proper court order. Caisip then consulted Antonio Chuidian, the hacienda
administrator, who, in turn, went to the chief of police and requested for
the detail of policemen in sitio Bote-bote. The chief of police, acting on
said request, assigned the accused Ignacio Rojales and Federico
Villadelrey, police sergeant and police corporal, respectively, of the
Nasugbu Police Force, to sitio Bote-bote.
1

On June 17, 1959, at about 5:00 p.m., Gloria Cabalag was seen weeding the portion of
Lot 105-A which was a ricefield. Appellant Caisip approached her and bade her to
leave, but she refused to do so, alleging that she and her husband had the right to stay
there and that the crops thereon belong to them. She having stuck to this attitude, even
when he threatened to call the police, Caisip went to his co-defendants, Sgt. Rojales
and Cpl. Villadelrey, both of the local police, who were some distance away, and
brought them with him. Rojales told Gloria, who was then in a squatting position, to stop
weeding. As Gloria insisted on her right to stay in said lot, Rojales grabbed her right
hand and, twisting the same, wrested therefrom the trowel she was holding. Thereupon,
Villadelrey held her left hand and, together with Rojales, forcibly dragged her northward
towards a forested area, where there was a banana plantation as Caisip stood
nearby, with a drawn gun.


Inasmuch as Gloria shouted "Ina ko po! Ina ko po!"
2
her neighbors, Librada Dulutan,
followed, soon later, by Francisca Andino, came and asked the policemen why they
were dragging her. The policemen having answered that they would take Gloria to town
which was on the west Francisca Andino pleaded that Gloria be released, saying
that, if their purpose was as stated by them, she (Gloria) would willingly go with them.
By this time, Gloria had already been dragged about eight meters and her dress, as well
as her blouse
3
were torn. She then agreed to proceed westward to the municipal
building, and asked to be allowed to pass by her house, within Lot 105-A, in order to
breast-feed her nursing infant, but, the request was turned down. As they passed, soon
later, near the house of Zoilo Rivera, head of the tenant organization to which she was
affiliated, in the barrio of Camachilihan, Gloria called out for him, whereupon, he went
down the house and accompanied them to the municipal building. Upon arrival thereat,
Rojales and Villadelrey turned her over to the policeman on duty, and then departed.
After being interrogated by the chief of police, Gloria was, upon representations made
by Zoilo Rivera, released and allowed to go home.
The foregoing is the prosecution's version. That of the defense is to the effect that, upon
being asked by the policemen to stop weeding and leave the premises, Gloria, not only
refused to do so, but, also, insulted them, as well as Caisip. According to the defense,
she was arrested because of the crime of slander then committed by her. Appellants
Rojales and Villadelrey, moreover, testified that, as they were heading towards the
barrio of Camachilihan, Gloria proceeded to tear her clothes.
His Honor, the Trial Judge, accepted, however, the version of the prosecution and found
that of the defense unworthy of credence. The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals,
which fully concurred in this view, are "final," and our authority to review on certiorari its
appealed decision is limited to questions purely of law.
4
Appellants maintain that the
Court of Appeals has erred: (1) in not finding their acts "justified under Article 429 of the
New Civil Code"; (2) in holding that the 20-day period of grace given to Marcelino
Guevarra and his wife, Gloria Cabalag, by the sheriff, to vacate Lot 105-A, was valid
and lawful; (3) in finding that the elements of the crime of grave coercion are present in
the case at bar; and (4) in finding appellants guilty as charged. This pretense is clearly
untenable.
Art. 429 of our Civil Code, reading:
The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any
person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may
use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an
actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his
property.
upon which appellants rely is obviously inapplicable to the case at bar, for,
having been given 20 days from June 6, 1959, within which to vacate Lot
105-A, complainant did not, on June 17, 1959 or within said period
invade or usurp said lot. She had merely remained in possession thereof,


even though the hacienda owner may have become its co-possessor.
Appellants did not "repel orprevent in actual or threatened ...
physical invasion or usurpation." They expelled Gloria from a property of
which she and her husband were in possession even before the action for
forcible entry was filed against them on May 17, 1958, despite the fact that
the Sheriff had explicitly authorized them to stay in said property up to
June 26, 1959, and had expressed the view that he could not oust them
therefrom on June 17, 1959, without a judicial order therefor.
It is urged, that, by weeding and refusing to leave Lot 105-A, Gloria had committed a
crime in the presence of the policemen, despite the aforementioned 20-day period,
which, appellants claim, the sheriff had no authority to grant. This contention is
manifestly untenable, because: (1) said period was granted in the presence of the
hacienda owner's representative, appellant Caisip, who, by not objecting thereto, had
impliedly consented to or ratified the act performed by the sheriff; (2) Gloria and her
husband were thereby allowed to remain, and had, in fact, remained, in possession of
the premises, perhaps together with the owner of the hacienda or his representative,
Caisip; (3) the act of removing weeds from the ricefield was beneficial to its owner and
to whomsoever the crops belonged, and, even if they had not authorized it, does not
constitute a criminal offense; and (4) although Gloria and her husband had been
sentenced to vacate the land, the judgment against them did not necessarily imply that
they, as the parties who had tilled it and planted thereon, had no rights, of any kind
whatsoever, in or to the standing crops, inasmuch as "necessary expenses shall be
refunded to every possessor,"
5
and the cost of cultivation, production and upkeep has
been held to partake of the nature of necessary expenses.
6

It is, accordingly, clear that appellants herein had, by means of violence, and without
legal authority therefor, prevented the complainant from "doing something not prohibited
by law," (weeding and being in Lot 105-A), and compelled her "to do something against"
her will (stopping the weeding and leaving said lot), "whether it be right or wrong,"
thereby taking the law into their hands, in violation of Art. 286 of the Revised Penal
Code.
7

Appellant Caisip argues that, not having used violence against the complaining witness,
he should be acquitted of the charge. In this connection, His Honor, the Trial Judge,
correctly observed:
... While it is true that the accused Caisip did not lay hands on the
complainant, unlike the accused Rojales and Villadelrey who were the
ones who used force against Gloria, and while the Court is also inclined to
discredit the claim of the complainant that Felix Caisip drew a gun during
the incident, it sufficiently appears from the record that the motivation and
inducement for the coercion perpetrated on the complainant came from
the accused Caisip. It was his undisguised and particular purpose to
prevent Gloria from entering the land and working on the same. He was
the one who first approached Gloria with this objective in mind, and tried


to prevent her from weeding the land. He had tried to stop Gloria from
doing the same act even the day previous to the present incident. It was
Caisip who fetched the policemen in order to accomplish his purpose of
preventing Gloria from weeding the land and making her leave the
premises. The policemen obeyed his bidding, and even when the said
policemen were already over-asserting their authority as peace officers,
Caisip simply stood by without attempting to stop their abuses. He could
be hardly said to have disapproved an act which he himself induced and
initiated.
8

In other words, there was community of purpose between the policemen and Caisip, so
that the latter is guilty of grave coercion, as a co-conspirator, apart from being a
principal by induction.
9

In the commission of the offense, the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior
strength
10
and disregard of the respect due the offended party, by reason of her
sex,
11
were present, insofar as the three appellants herein are concerned. As regards
appellants Rojales and Villadelrey, there was the additional aggravating circumstance of
having taken advantage of their positions as members of the local police force. Hence,
the penalty of imprisonment meted out to appellants herein, which is the minimum of the
maximum prescribed in said Art. 286,
12
and the fine imposed upon them, are in
accordance with law.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
defendants-appellants. It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ.,
concur.
Dizon, J., is on leave.
Makasiar and Villamor, JJ., took no part.

SPOUSES CUSTUDIO v CA DIGEST
Facts:
Pacifico Mabasa owns a property behind the properties of spouses Cristino and Brigida
Custodio and spouses Lito and Ma. Cristina Santos. The passageway leading to
Mabasas house passes through the properties of the Custodios and the Santoses.
Sometime in 1981, the spouses Lito and Ma. Cristina Santos built a fence around their
property. This effectively deprived Mabasa passage to his house. Mabasa then sued
the Custodios and the Santoses to compel them to grant his right of way with damages.


Mabasa claims that he lost tenants because of the blockade done by the families in
front. The trial court ruled in favor of Mabasa. It ordered the Custodios and the Santoses
to give Mabasa a permanent easement and right of way and for Mabasa to pay just
compensation. The Santoses and the Custodios appealed. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court. However, the CA modified the ruling by awarding
damages in favor of Mabasa (Actual damages: P65k, Moral damages: P30k, Exemplary
damages: P10k).
Issue:
Whether or not the grant of damages by the CA is proper.
Ruling:
No. The award is not proper. This is an instance of damnum absque injuria.
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion
of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and
damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.
Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm
was not the result of a violation of a legal duty.
In this case, it is true that Mabasa may have incurred losses (damage) when his tenants
left because of the fence made by the Santoses. However, when Santos built the fence,
he was well within his right. He built the fence inside his property. There was no existing
easement agreement, either by contract or by operation of law, on his property. Hence,
Santos has all the right to build the fence. It was only after the judgment in the trial court
that the easement was created which was even conditioned on the payment of Mabasa
of the just compensation. Santos did not commit a legal injury against Mabasa when he
built the fence, therefore, there is no actionable wrong as basis for the award of
damages. In this case, the damage has to be borne by Mabasa.
SPOUSES CUSTUDIO v CA FULLTEXT
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 116100 February 9, 1996
SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPOUSES LITO and MARIA
CRISTINA SANTOS,petitioners,
vs.


COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. MABASA and REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, BRANCH 181, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
REGALADO, J .:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision of respondent Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 29115, promulgated on November 10, 1993, which affirmed with
modification the decision of the trial court, as well as its resolution dated July 8, 1994
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
1

On August 26, 1982, Civil Case No. 47466 for the grant of an easement of right of way
was filed by Pacifico Mabasa against Cristino Custodio, Brigida R. Custodio, Rosalina
R. Morato, Lito Santos and Maria Cristina C. Santos before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig and assigned to Branch 22 thereof.
2

The generative facts of the case, as synthesized by the trial court and adopted by the
Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Perusing the record, this Court finds that the original plaintiff Pacifico Mabasa
died during the pendency of this case and was substituted by Ofelia Mabasa, his
surviving spouse [and children].
The plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon
situated at Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Tagig, Metro Manila. The
plaintiff was able to acquire said property through a contract of sale with spouses
Mamerto Rayos and Teodora Quintero as vendors last September 1981. Said
property may be described to be surrounded by other immovables pertaining to
defendants herein. Taking P. Burgos Street as the point of reference, on the left
side, going to plaintiff's property, the row of houses will be as follows: That of
defendants Cristino and Brigido Custodio, then that of Lito and Maria Cristina
Santos and then that of Ofelia Mabasa. On the right side (is) that of defendant
Rosalina Morato and then a Septic Tank (Exhibit "D"). As an access to P. Burgos
Street from plaintiff's property, there are two possible passageways. The first
passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20 meters distan(t)
from Mabasa's residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in between
the previously mentioned row of houses. The second passageway is about 3
meters in width and length from plaintiff Mabasa's residence to P. Burgos Street;
it is about 26 meters. In passing thru said passageway, a less than a meter wide
path through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in length, has to be traversed.
When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants occupying
the remises and who were acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as
tenants. However, sometime in February, 1982, one of said tenants vacated the
apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa went to see the premises, he saw that


there had been built an adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower
in width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Santoses along
their property which is also along the first passageway. Defendant Morato
constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way that
the entire passageway was enclosed. (Exhibit "1-Santoses and Custodios, Exh.
"D" for plaintiff, Exhs. "1-C", "1-D" and "1-E") And it was then that the remaining
tenants of said apartment vacated the area. Defendant Ma. Cristina Santos
testified that she constructed said fence because there was an incident when her
daughter was dragged by a bicycle pedalled by a son of one of the tenants in
said apartment along the first passageway. She also mentioned some other
inconveniences of having (at) the front of her house a pathway such as when
some of the tenants were drunk and would bang their doors and windows. Some
of their footwear were even lost. . . .
3
(Emphasis in original text; corrections in
parentheses supplied)
On February 27, 1990, a decision was rendered by the trial court, with this dispositive
part:
Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Ordering defendants Custodios and Santoses to give plaintiff permanent
access ingress and egress, to the public street;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendants Custodios and Santoses the sum of
Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000) as indemnity for the permanent use of the
passageway.
The parties to shoulder their respective litigation expenses.
4

Not satisfied therewith, therein plaintiff represented by his heirs, herein private
respondents, went to the Court of Appeals raising the sole issue of whether or not the
lower court erred in not awarding damages in their favor. On November 10, 1993, as
earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the judgment of the
trial court with modification, the decretal portion of which disposes as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION only insofar as the herein grant of damages to plaintiffs-
appellants. The Court hereby orders defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffs-
appellants the sum of Sixty Five Thousand (P65,000) Pesos as Actual Damages,
Thirty Thousand (P30,000) Pesos as Moral Damages, and Ten Thousand
(P10,000) Pesos as Exemplary Damages. The rest of the appealed decision is
affirmed to all respects.
5

On July 8, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
6
Petitioners then took the present recourse to us, raising two issues,


namely, whether or not the grant of right of way to herein private respondents is proper,
and whether or not the award of damages is in order.
With respect to the first issue, herein petitioners are already barred from raising the
same. Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private
respondents the right of way, hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the
adjudication therein. With the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners,
the issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest.
For failure to appeal the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, petitioners
cannot obtain any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the trial
court. That decision of the court below has become final as against them and can no
longer be reviewed, much less reversed, by this Court. The rule in this jurisdiction is that
whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee who has not himself appealed
may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than what was
granted in the decision of the lower court. The appellee can only advance any argument
that he may deem necessary to defeat the appellant's claim or to uphold the decision
that is being disputed, and he can assign errors in his brief if such is required to
strengthen the views expressed by the court a quo. These assigned errors, in turn, may
be considered by the appellate court solely to maintain the appealed decision on other
grounds, but not for the purpose of reversing or modifying the judgment in the appellee's
favor and giving him other affirmative reliefs.
7

However, with respect to the second issue, we agree with petitioners that the Court of
Appeals erred in awarding damages in favor of private respondents. The award of
damages has no substantial legal basis. A reading of the decision of the Court of
Appeals will show that the award of damages was based solely on the fact that the
original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when
the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the closure of the passageway.
However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to
recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of
action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff
therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a
cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury
caused by a breach or wrong.
8

There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion
of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and
damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.
Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm
was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often
called damnum absque injuria.
9

In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he
must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant


owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the
person causing it.
10
The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise
that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the
breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may
be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there should be tort liability merely because
the plaintiff suffered some pain and suffering.
11

Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions which cause
damage or loss to another but which violate no legal duty to such other person, and
consequently create no cause of action in his favor. In such cases, the consequences
must be borne by the injured person alone. The law affords no remedy for damages
resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong.
12

In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act
must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria.
13
If, as may
happen in many cases, a person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his
person or property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which
the law does not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.
14

In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to
the claim of private respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the
principle of abuse of right. In order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article
21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that the following requisites concur:
(1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or
injury to the plaintiff.
15

The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their
right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law
recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other
limitations than those established by law.
16
It is within the right of petitioners, as owners,
to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that "(e)very
owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or
dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted
thereon."
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes.
There was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or
by contract. The fact that private respondents had no existing right over the said
passageway is confirmed by the very decision of the trial court granting a compulsory
right of way in their favor after payment of just compensation. It was only that decision
which gave private respondents the right to use the said passageway after payment of
the compensation and imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in
the exercise of said right.


Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and
their act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform
in the employment and exercise of said right. To repeat, whatever injury or damage may
have been sustained by private respondents by reason of the rightful use of the said
land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria.
17

A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, according to
his pleasure, for all the purposes to which such property is usually applied. As a general
rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own
property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage
or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque
injuria.
18
When the owner of property makes use thereof in the general and ordinary
manner in which the property is used, such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this
case, nobody can complain of having been injured, because the incovenience arising
from said use can be considered as a mere consequence of community life.
19

The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action
will lie,
20
although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been
invaded.
21
One may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though
the means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in the
latter's favor. An injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The
courts can give no redress for hardship to an individual resulting from action reasonably
calculated to achieve a lawful means.
22

WHEREFORE, under the compulsion of the foregoing premises, the appealed decision
of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
judgment of the trial court is correspondingly REINSTATED.
Romero and Puno, JJ., concur.
Mendoza, J., took no part.
ANDAMO v IAC DIGEST
Facts:
Petitioner spouses Andamo owned a parcel of land situated in Biga Silang, Cavite which
is adjacent to that of private respondent corporation, Missionaries of Our lady of La
Salette, Inc. Within the land of the latter, waterpaths and contrivances, including an
artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners land,
caused a young man to drown, damagaed petitioners crops and plants, washed away
costly fences, endangered the livesofthepetitioners and their laborers and some other
destructions.
This prompted petitioner spouses to file a criminal action for destruction by means of
inundation under Article 324 of the RPC and a civil action for damages.


Issue:
Whether petitioner spouses Andamo can claim damages for destruction caused by
respondents waterpaths and contrivances on the basis of Articles 2176 and 2177 of the
Civil Code on quasi-delicts.
Ruling:
Yes. A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is
one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of
a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond;
and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. 11
Clearly, from petitioners complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by
respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is
therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these
waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes
fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.
It must be stressed that the use of ones property is not without limitations. Article 431 of
the Civil Code provides that the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a
manner as to injure the rights of a third person. SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON
LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which
require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe
upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to
build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained
using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and
can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or
damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification
for the injury or damage suffered.
ADAMO v IAC - FULLTEXT
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990
NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners,
vs.


INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and
MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents.
Lope E. Adriano for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for private respondent.

FERNAN, C.J .:
The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is whether a
corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and
contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent
land, can be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil
Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently of
the criminal case.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land
situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent,
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an
artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land,
caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away
costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and
stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, docketed as Criminal Case No. TG-
907-82, before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay City), against
Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutill
o Mallillin, officers and directors of herein respondent corporation, for destruction by
means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action against respondent
corporation, this time a civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-748, for damages with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the same court.
1

On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint and
opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Hearings were conducted
including ocular inspections on the land. However, on April 26, 1984, the trial court,
acting on respondent corporation's motion to dismiss or suspend the civil action, issued


an order suspending further hearings in Civil Case No, TG-748 until after judgment in
the related Criminal Case No. TG-907-82.
Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss filed on June 22, 1984, the trial
court issued on August 27, 1984 the disputed order dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748
for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case
was still unresolved. Said order was anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III
of the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the
same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been
commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered
in the criminal action."
2

Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
3

On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil Cases Division,
promulgated a decision
4
affirming the questioned order of the trial court.
5
A motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution
dated May 19, 1986.
6

Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-748 in accordance
with Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners contend that the trial
court and the Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 since it is
predicated on a quasi-delict. Petitioners have raised a valid point.
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts
alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action.
7
The purpose of an action
or suit and the law to govern it, including the period of prescription, is to be determined
not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by
the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.
8
The nature of an action is not
necessarily determined or controlled by its title or heading but the body of the pleading
or complaint itself. To avoid possible denial of substantial justice due to legal
technicalities, pleadings as well as remedial laws should be liberally construed so that
the litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their respective claims.
9

Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No.
TG-748:
4) That within defendant's land, likewise located at Biga (Biluso), Silang,
Cavite, adjacent on the right side of the aforesaid land of plaintiffs,
defendant constructed waterpaths starting from the middle-right portion
thereof leading to a big hole or opening, also constructed by defendant,
thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence situated on the
right side of its cemented gate fronting the provincial highway, and
connected by defendant to a man height inter-connected cement culverts
which were also constructed and lain by defendant cross-wise beneath the
tip of the said cemented gate, the left-end of the said inter-connected


culverts again connected by defendant to a big hole or opening thru the
lower portion of the same concrete hollowblocks fence on the left side of
the said cemented gate, which hole or opening is likewise connected by
defendant to the cemented mouth of a big canal, also constructed by
defendant, which runs northward towards a big hole or opening which was
also built by defendant thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks
fence which separates the land of plaintiffs from that of defendant (and
which serves as the exit-point of the floodwater coming from the land of
defendant, and at the same time, the entrance-point of the same
floodwater to the land of plaintiffs, year after year, during rainy or stormy
seasons.
5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just beside the land
of plaintiffs, defendant also constructed an artificial lake, the base of which
is soil, which utilizes the water being channeled thereto from its water
system thru inter-connected galvanized iron pipes (No. 2) and
complimented by rain water during rainy or stormy seasons, so much so
that the water below it seeps into, and the excess water above it
inundates, portions of the adjoining land of plaintiffs.
6) That as a result of the inundation brought about by defendant's
aforementioned water conductors, contrivances and manipulators, a
young man was drowned to death, while herein plaintiffs suffered and will
continue to suffer, as follows:
a) Portions of the land of plaintiffs were eroded and
converted to deep, wide and long canals, such that the same
can no longer be planted to any crop or plant.
b) Costly fences constructed by plaintiffs were, on several
occasions, washed away.
c) During rainy and stormy seasons the lives of plaintiffs and
their laborers are always in danger.
d) Plants and other improvements on other portions of the
land of plaintiffs are exposed to destruction. ...
10

A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one
under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a
quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond;
and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
11



Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent
corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an
assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the
damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence
which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.
In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio,
12
the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176
of the Civil Code and held that "any person who without due authority constructs a bank
or dike, stopping the flow or communication between a creek or a lake and a river,
thereby causing loss and damages to a third party who, like the rest of the residents, is
entitled to the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of
an indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party.
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the
property subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners'
complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain
damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation.
Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners,
the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or
negligence, and the causal connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-
existing contractual obligation between the parties make a clear case of a quasi
delict or culpa aquiliana.
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of
the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a
manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON
LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which
require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe
upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to
build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained
using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and
can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or
damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification
for the injury or damage suffered.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by
his act or omission constituting fault or negligence, thus:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this chapter.
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary


or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal
act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided
that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also
criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary.
13

The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states:
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding
article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first
sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of
criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter
is a distinct and independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of
ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from
criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extra-
contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of
Spain ...
14

In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals,
15
this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its
own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a
distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for
quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may
produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for
quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or
conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in
the event of an acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil
action arose did not exist, in which case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry
with it the extinction of the civil liability.
In Azucena vs. Potenciano,
16
the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action
is entirely independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil
Code. There can be no logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action
contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution whether it
be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent character of the
civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court affirming the order of dismissal of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite,
Branch 18 (Tagaytay City) dated August 17, 1984 is hereby REVERSED and SET


ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to reinstate Civil Case No. TG-748 entitled "Natividad
V. Andamo and Emmanuel R. Andamo vs. Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette Inc."
and to proceed with the hearing of the case with dispatch. This decision is immediately
executory. Costs against respondent corporation.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 125018 April 6, 2000
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CRISPIN E. LAT, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J .:
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. (REMMAN), and CRISPIN E. LAT are adjoining
landowners in Barangay Bugtong Na Pulo, Lipa City. The land of Lat containing an area
of 1.8 hectares is agricultural and planted mostly with fruit trees while REMMAN
occupies a land area of fifteen (15) hectares six (6) hectares of which are devoted to its
piggery business. REMMAN's land is one and a half (1 1/2) meters higher in elevation
than that of respondent Lat.
Sometime in July 1984 Lat noticed that REMMAN's waste disposal lagoon was already
overflowing and inundating one-fourth (1/4) of Lat's plantation. He made several
representations with REMMAN but they fell on deaf ears. On 14 March 1985, after
almost one (1) hectare of Lat's plantation was already inundated with water containing
pig manure, as a result of which the trees growing on the flooded portion started to
wither and die, Lat filed a complaint for damages with preliminary mandatory injunction
against REMMAN. Lat alleged that the acidity of the soil in his plantation increased
because of the overflow of the water heavy with pig manure from REMMAN's piggery
farm.
REMMAN denied all the allegations of Lat and raised as an affirmative defense that
measures such as the construction of additional lagoons were already adopted to


contain the waste water coming from its piggery to prevent any damage to the adjoining
estates.
After conducting an ocular inspection and evaluating the evidence of both parties the
Regional Trial Court found that indeed REMMANs waste disposal lagoon overflowed
with the contaminated water flooding one (1) hectare of Lat's plantation. The waste
water was ankle-deep and caused death and destruction to one (1) jackfruit tree, fifteen
(15) coconut trees, one hundred twenty-two (122) coffee trees, and an unspecified
number of mango trees, bananas and vegetables. As a consequence, the trial court
ordered REMMAN to indemnify Lat P186,975.00 for lost profits for three (3) crop years
and P30,000.00 as attorney's fees.
1

The decision of the court a quo was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.
2

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari REMMAN prays that we pass upon the findings
of the trial court as well as of the appellate court. REMMAN insists that factual findings
of lower courts may be passed upon, reviewed and reversed: (a) when the conclusion is
a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (b) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave
abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e)
when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (f)
when the conclusions of the Court of Appeals are not supported by the evidence on
record; (g) when facts of substance were overlooked which, if correctly considered,
might have changed the outcome of the case; and, (h) when the findings of the Court of
Appeals are not in accord with what reasonable men would readily accept are the
correct inferences from the evidence extant in the records.
3

Indeed, in the abovementioned instances, the factual milieu of a particular case may be
passed upon, reversed or modified by this Court. But examination of the record reveals
that all the above instances are unavailing. From this point of view alone the instant
petition is dismissible. Nevertheless, we shall discuss them hereunder to dispose finally
of the contentions of REMMAN.
First, REMMAN argues that its liability for the damages suffered by Lat was not clearly
established.
We disagree. During the ocular inspection conducted by the lower court where
representatives of both parties were present, it was established that the waste water
containing pig manure was continuously flowing from REMMAN's piggery farm to Lat's
plantation. The water was ankle-deep and flooded one (1) hectare of Lat's plantation.
The overflow of the "acidic, malodorous and polluted water" continued from June 1984
to March 1985 thus destroying one (1) jackfruit tree, fifteen (15) coconut trees, one
hundred an twenty-two (122) coffee trees, and an unspecified number of mango trees,
bananas and vegetables.
4



In addition, the appellate court found that there was indeed negligence on the part of
REMMAN which directly caused the damage to the plantation of Lat. Thus
. . . Negligence was clearly established. It is uncontroverted that the land of
appellee was flooded on account of the overflow of acidic, malodorous and
polluted water coming from the adjacent piggery farm of appellant sometime in
May 1984. This resulted in the impairment of the productivity of appellee's land
as well as the eventual destruction and death of several fruit trees, such as
coconuts, coffee, jackfruits, bananas and other plants . . . . Appellant cannot
avoid liability because their negligence was the proximate cause of the damage.
Appellee's property was practically made a catch-basin of polluted water and
other noxious substances emptying from appellant's piggery which could have
been prevented had it not been for the negligence of appellant arising from its:
(a) failure to monitor the increases in the level of water in the lagoons before,
during and after the heavy downpours which occurred during the rainy months of
1984; (b) failure to augment the existing lagoons prior to the incident,
notwithstanding the fact that at the time of the flooding, the piggery had grown to
a capacity of 11,000 heads, and considering that it was reasonably forseeable
that the existing waste disposal facilities were no longer adequate to accomodate
the increasing volume of waste matters in such a big farm; and more importantly,
(c) the repeated failure to comply with their promise to appellee.
5

Second, REMMAN argues that the trial court as well as the Court of Appeals should not
have rejected its request for the production of Lat's income tax returns. According to
REMMAN had Lat's income tax returns been produced, the issue of the alleged
damages suffered by Lat would have been settled.
This argument is moot, if not trite. For this matter has been laid to rest when we affirmed
the Court of Appeals' decision in an earlier case involving the same parties.
6
In
sustaining the trial court's quashal of the subpoenaduces tecum previously issued
compelling Lat to produce his income tax returns for the years 1982-1986, the appellate
court explained that the production of the income tax returns would not necessarily
serve to prove the special and affirmative defenses set up by REMMAN nor rebut Lat's
testimony regarding the losses he sustained due to the piggery. The tax returns per
se could not reflect the total amount of damages suffered by Lat, as income losses from
a portion of the plantation could be offset by any profit derived from the rest of the
plantation or from other sources of income. Conversely, losses incurred from other
sources of income would be totally unrelated to the income from the particular portion of
the plantation flooded with waste matter coming from REMMAN's piggery.
7

Third, REMMAN contends that the damages allegedly sustained by Lat have not been
satisfactorily established.1wphi1
We a not convinced. The factual findings of the court a quo rightly support its
conclusions on this respect


Coming now to the issue of damages, We find appellant's allegations not well-
taken. Appellant contends that actual and compensatory damages require
evidentiary proof, and there being no evidence presented as to the necessity of
the award for damages, it was erroneous for the lower court to have made such
award. It must be remembered that after the ocular inspection, the court a
quo rendered an inventory of dead and rotten trees and plants found in
appellee's property. Appellee also testified on the approximate annual harvest
and fair market value thereof. Significantly, no opposition or controverting
evidence was presented by appellant on the matter. Hence, appellant is bound
thereby and cannot now be heard to complain. As correctly held by the court a
quo:
An ocular inspection has been conducted by the trial court. The inventory
of the trees damaged and the itemized valuation placed therein by private
respondent after the ocular inspection which is not rebutted by the
petitioner, is the more accurate indicator of the said amount prayed for as
damages. If the valuation is indeed unreasonable, petitioner should
present controverting evidence of the fair market value of the crops
involved. The trial court held that the private respondent himself had been
subjected to extensive cross and re-cross examination by the counsel for
the petitioner on the amount of damages.
8

Finally, REMMAN complains that the damages, if any, were due to a fortuitous
event.
Again, we cannot agree with petitioner. We defer instead to the findings opinions
expressed by the lower courts
Even assuming that the heavy rains constituted an act of God, by reason of their
negligence, the fortuitous event became humanized, rendering appellants liable
for the ensuing damages. In National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 233
SCRA 649 (1993), the Supreme Court held:
Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force
majeure to escape liability for the loss or damage sustained by private
respondents since they, the petitioners, were guilty of negligence. This
event then was not occasioned exclusively by an act of God or force
majeure; a human factor negligence or imprudence had intervened.
The effect then of the force majeure in question may be deemed to have,
even if only partly, resulted from the participation of man. Thus, the whole
occurrence was thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the
rules applicable to acts of God.
As regards the alleged natural easement imposed upon the property of appellee,
resort to pertinent provisions of applicable law is imperative. Under the Civil
Code, it is provided:


Art. 637. Lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which naturally
and without the intervention of man descend from the higher estates, as
well as the stones or earth which they carry with them.
The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede
this easement; neither can the owner of the higher estate make works
which will increase the burden.
A similar provision is found in the Water Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 1067),
which provides:
Art. 50. Lower estates are obliged to receive the water which naturally and
without the intervention of man flow from the higher estates, as well as the
stone or earth which they carry with them.
The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede
this natural flow, unless he provides an alternative method of drainage;
neither can the owner of the higher estate make works which will increase
this natural flow.
As worded, the two (2) aforecited provisions impose a natural easement upon the
lower estate to receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of
man descend from higher states. However, where the waters which flow from a
higher state are those which are artificially collected in man-made lagoons, any
damage occasioned thereby entitles the owner of the lower or servient estate to
compensation.
9

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, it is crystal clear that REMMAN is directly
accountable to Lat for the damages sustained by him. The negligence of REMMAN in
maintaining the level of waste water in its lagoons has been satisfactorily established.
The extent of damages suffered by Lat remains unrebutted; in fact, has been proved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 19 October 1995 Decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court-Br. 16, Lipa City, holding petitioner
Remman Enterprises, Inc. (REMMAN) liable to private respondent Crispin E. Lat for
damages and to indemnify the latter P186,975.00 for lost profits for three (3) crop years
and P30,000.00 as attorneys fees, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.