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Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest:

Carino V. Insular Government (1909)

FACTS: On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cario went to the Court of Land Registration to petition his
inscription as the owner of a 146 hectare land hes been possessing in the then municipality of
Baguio. Mateo only presented possessory information and no other documentation. The State
opposed the petition averring that the land is part of the US military reservation. The CLR ruled in
favor of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo lost. Mateo averred that a grant should be given to
him by reason of immemorial use and occupation as in the previous case Cansino vs Valdez &
Tiglao vs Government.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for
some time.
HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is still
the absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine). Further, Mateos possession of the land has
not been of such a character as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for
many years. It was never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions
thereof, and since the insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been used by the petitioner
for any purpose.
While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a
possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof
before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the
State remained the absolute owner.

FACTS:
Carino is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet, where the land lies filed for writ of error
because the CFI and SC dismissed his petition for application
For more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris, April 11, 1899, he and his ancestors had
held the land as recognized owners by the Igorots. (grandfather maintain fences for holding
cattle>father had cultivated parts andused parts for pasturing cattle>he used it for pasture)
1893-1894 & 1896-1897: he made an application but with no avail
1901: petition alleging ownership under the mortgage law and the lands were registered to
him but process only established possessory title.
Even if the applicant have title, he cannot have it registered, because the Philippine
Commission's Act No. 926, of 1903, excepts the Province of Benguet among others from its
operation

ISSUE: W/N Carino has ownership and is entitled to registration.
HELD: YES. Petition Granted.
Land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not always, public land.
Spanish Law: "Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be
sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription." For
cultivated land, 20 years, uninterrupted, is enough. For uncultivated, 30.
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Applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such proceedings against
him or his father ever was made.
Every native who had not a paper title is not a trespasser.
There must be a presumption against the government when a private individual claims
property as his or her own. It went so far as to say that the lands will be deemed private
absent contrary proof.

Oh Cho V. Director Of Lands (1946)
FACTS:
Oh Cho is appealing from the rejection of his application based on disqualification as alien
(Chinese) from acquiringlands of the public domain.
He had open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to filing of
the application for registration on January 17, 1940
ISSUE: W/N Oh Cho entitled to decree or registration of the lot.

HELD: NO.
GR: All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant
below to the public domain
Exception: in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time
immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been
part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish
conquest. (Cario v. Insular Government) - not applicable since only from 1880
His immediate possesor failed to comply with the condition precedent to apply for the
registration of the land of which they had been in possession at least since July 26, 1894 so
what was transferred to Oh Cho is merely possesory right which cannot ripen
to ownership by prescription (aliens disqualified to own by prescription)

FACTS: Oh Cho, a Chinese citizen, purchased from the Lagdameos a parcel of land in Tayabas,
which they openly, continuously and adversely possessed since 1880. On January 17, 1940, Oh
Cho applied for registration of this land. The Solicitor General opposed on the ground that Oh
Cho lacked title to said land and also because he was an alien.
ISSUEs: Whether or not Oh Cho had title
Whether or not Oh Cho is entitled to a decree of registration
HELD: Oh Cho failed to show that he has title to the lot, which may be confirmed under the Land
Registration Act.All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by
grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have
been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial,
for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public
domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest. The applicant
does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor
in interest began in 1880.Under the Public Land Act, Oh Cho is not entitled to a decree of
registration of the lot, because he is an alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public
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domain.Oh Cho's predecessors in interest would have been entitled toa decree of registration
had they applied for the same. The application for the registration of the land was a condition
precedent, which was not complied with by the Lagmeos. Hence, the most they had was mere
possessory right, not title. This possessory right was what was transferred to Oh Cho, but since
the latter is an alien, the possessory right could never ripen to ownership by prescription. As an
alien, Oh Cho is disqualified from acquiring title over public land by prescription.

Lee Hong Hok vs David, G.R. No. L-30389, Dec. 27, 1972

FACTS: This is regarding a piece of land which Aniano David acquired lawful title thereto,
pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application. After approval of his application, the Director of
Lands issued an order of award and issuance of sales patent, covering said lot by virtue of which
the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent.
The Register of Deeds then issued an original certificate of title to David. During all this time, Lee
Hong Kok did not oppose nor file any adverse claim.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lee Hong Hok may question the government grant

HELD: Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to
a void patent. This was not done by said officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who
cannot claim that the patent and title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the
registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings
after claiming it as their private property.
The fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in
conformity with the law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is raised
by the government and set aside, the defendant cannot question it. The legality of the grant is a
question between the grantee and the government. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals
of January 31, 1969 and its resolution of March 14, 1969 are affirmed.
Distinction between IMPERIUM and DOMINIUM
Only the government can question a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a
government grant.

FACTS:
This is regarding a piece of land which Aniano David acquired lawful title thereto, pursuant to his
miscellaneous sales application. After approval of his application, the Director of Lands issued an
order of award and issuance of sales patent, covering said lot by virtue of which the
Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent. The
Register of Deeds then issued an original certificate of title to David.
During all this time, Lee Hong Kok did not oppose nor file any adverse claim.

ISSUE:
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Whether or not Lee Hong Kok may question the government grant

HELD:

Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a
void patent. This was not done by said officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot
claim that the patent and title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the
registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings
after claiming it as their private property.

The fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in
conformity with the law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is raised
by the government and set aside, the defendant cannot question it. The legality of the grant is a
question between the grantee and the government.

IMPERIUM vs. DOMINIUM:

The government authority possessed by the State which is appropriately embraced int eh concept
of sovereignty comes under the heading of imperium; its capacity to own or acquire property
under dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the State in
its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and
other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution.

Republic vs. CA
Republic of the Philippines, Benguet & Atok vs. Court of Appeals & De La Rosa
G.R. No. L-43938, April 15, 1988

Doctrine: The owner of a piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything
underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. The rights over the land are
indivisible and the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must
be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural.

Facts: These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on
February 11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children,
Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was
divided into 9 lots and covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were
sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto,
respectively, in 1964.
The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big
Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9.
In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject
land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly
after the Liberation.
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Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it
on September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in
September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet
had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as
evidenced by its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its geological
mappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts, and its payment of taxes on the land.
For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma
and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and
recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were
purchased from these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in
open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by its annual
assessment work on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes
thereon.
The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to
be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217
dated February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under
the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
The trial court denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of
possession and ownership of the land sought to be registered.
The applicants appealed to the respondent court, which reversed the trial court and recognized
the claims of the applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining
claims. In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over
the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of
their mining claims. Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior
right of ownership.

Issue: Whether respondent courts decision, i.e. the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the
land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their
mining claim, is correct.

Held: No. Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question
by virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of
1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject
to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been
transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be
shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.
It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at
that time. Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution
against the alienation of all lands of the public domain except those agricultural in nature for this
was made subject to existing rights. The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to
mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it from the public domain. By such act, the
locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the government, without need of
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any further act such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. As the land
had become the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they
did, to Benguet and Atok. The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is no conflict of
interest between the owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This
is rather doctrine, for it is a well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only
to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable
height. Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on
the surface, subject to separate claims of title. This is also difficult to understand, especially in its
practical application.
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half
agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either
completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land
which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral and
completely mineral once the mining claims were perfected. As long as mining operations were
being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so and become agricultural, even
if only partly so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were
unlawfully occupying the surface.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the
benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that
may be found in public and even private land devoted to agricultural, industrial, commercial,
residential or (for) any purpose other than mining. Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural
land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to
extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State to which such minerals
belong.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land
could be used for both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct
interpretation is that once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is
being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the
minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral
land and may not be used by any private party, including the registered owner thereof, for any
other purpose that will impede the mining operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss
sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws or
in appropriate expropriation proceedings.