Part 3 Pre-emNployment Cases

PART 3 PRE-EMPLOYMENT
ROSA C. RODOLFO, Petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Petitioner was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati for illegal recruitment alleged to have been committed as follows:
That in or about and during the period from August to September 1984, in Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused representing herself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment
abroad, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to VILLAMOR ALCANTARA,
NARCISO CORPUZ,
1
NECITAS R. FERRE, GERARDO H. TAPAWAN and JOVITO L. CAMA, without first securing the required license or
authority from the Ministry of Labor and Employment.
2

After trial on the merits, Branch 61 of the Makati RTC rendered its Judgment on the case,
3
the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES ABOVE CONSIDERED, the Court finds the accused ROSA C. RODOLFO as GUILTY of the offense of ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT and hereby sentences her [to] a penalty of imprisonment of EIGHT YEARSand to pay the costs.
4
(Underscoring supplied)
In so imposing the penalty, the trial court took note of the fact that while the information reflected the commission of illegal recruitment in large
scale, only the complaint of the two of the five complainants was proven.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals correctly synthesized the evidence presented by the parties as follows:
[The evidence for the prosecution] shows that sometime in August and September 1984, accused-appellantapproached private
complainants Necitas Ferre and Narciso Corpus individually and invited them to apply for overseas employment in Dubai. The accused-appellant
being their neighbor, private complainants agreed and went to the formers office. This office which bore the business name "Bayside Manpower
Export Specialist" was in a building situated at Bautista St. Buendia, Makati, Metro Manila. In that office, private complainants gave certain
amounts to appellant for processing and other fees. Ferre gave P1,000.00 as processing fee (Exhibit A) and another P4,000.00 (Exhibit B).
Likewise, Corpus gave appellant P7,000.00 (Exhibit D). Appellant then told private complainants that they were scheduled to leave for Dubai on
September 8, 1984. However, private complainants and all the other applicants were not able to depart on the said date as their employer
allegedly did not arrive. Thus, their departure was rescheduled to September 23, but the result was the same. Suspecting that they were being
hoodwinked, private complainants demanded of appellant to return their money. Except for the refund ofP1,000.00 to Ferre, appellant was not
able to return private complainants money. Tired of excuses, private complainants filed the present case for illegal recruitment against the
accused-appellant.
To prove that accused-appellant had no authority to recruit workers for overseas employment, the prosecution presented Jose Valeriano, a
Senior Overseas Employment Officer of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), who testified that accused-appellant was neither
licensed nor authorized by the then Ministry of Labor and Employment to recruit workers for overseas employment.
For her defense, appellant denied ever approaching private complainants to recruit them for employment in Dubai. On the contrary, it was
the private complainants who asked her help in securing jobs abroad. As a good neighbor and friend, she brought the private complainants to
the Bayside Manpower Export Specialist agency because she knew Florante Hinahon,
5
the owner of the said agency. While accused-appellant
admitted that she received money from the private complainants, she was quick to point out that she received the same only in trust for delivery
to the agency. She denied being part of the agency either as an owner or employee thereof. To corroborate appellants testimony, Milagros
Cuadra, who was also an applicant and a companion of private complainants, testified that appellant did not recruit them. On the contrary, they
were the ones who asked help from appellant. To further bolster the defense, Eriberto C. Tabing, the accountant and cashier of the agency,
testified that appellant is not connected with the agency and that he saw appellant received money from the applicants but she turned them over
to the agency through either Florantino Hinahon or Luzviminda Marcos.
6
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In light thereof, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court but modified the penalty imposed due to the trial courts failure to apply
the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The appellate court thus disposed:
WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the appeal, this Court DISMISSES it and AFFIRMS the appealed Decision EXCEPT the penalty x x x which is
hereby changed to five (5) years as minimum to seven (7) years as maximum with perpetual disqualification from engaging in the business of
recruitment and placement of workers.
7
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration having been denied,
8
the present petition was filed, faulting the appellate court
I
x x x IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE COMPLAINING WITNESSES, [AND]
II
x x x IN FINDING THE PETITIONER-ACCUSED GUILTY WHEN THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE HER GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
9
Petitioner bewails the failure of the trial court and the Court of Appeals to credit the testimonies of her witnesses, her companion Milagros
Cuadra, and Eriberto C. Tabing who is an accountant-cashier of the agency.
Further, petitioner assails the trial courts and the appellate courts failure to consider that the provisional receipts she issued indicated that the
amounts she collected from the private complainants were turned over to the agency through Minda Marcos and Florante Hinahon. At any rate,
she draws attention to People v. Seoron
10
wherein this Court held that the issuance or signing of receipts for placement fees does not make a
case for illegal recruitment.
11

The petition fails.
Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code, the legal provisions applicable when the offense charged was committed,
12
provided:
ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. (a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be
undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. x x x
Article 39. Penalties. x x x x
(c) Any person who is neither a licensee nor a holder of authority under this Title found violating any provision thereof or its implementing rules
and regulations shall, upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four years nor more than eight years or a fine
of not less than P20,000 nor more than P100,000 or both such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court;
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
The elements of the offense of illegal recruitment, which must concur, are: (1) that the offender has no valid license or authority required by law
to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) that the offender undertakes any activity within the meaning of recruitment
and placement under Article 13(b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code.
13
If another element is present
that the accused commits the act against three or more persons, individually or as a group, it becomes an illegal recruitment in a large scale.
14

Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines "recruitment and placement" as "[a]ny act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for
profit or not." (Underscoring supplied)
That the first element is present in the case at bar, there is no doubt. Jose Valeriano, Senior Overseas Employment Officer of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, testified that the records of the POEA do not show that petitioner is authorized to recruit workers for
overseas employment.
15
A Certification to that effect was in fact issued by Hermogenes C. Mateo, Chief of the Licensing Division of POEA.
16

Petitioners disclaimer of having engaged in recruitment activities from the very start does not persuade in light of the evi dence for the
prosecution. In People v. Alvarez, this Court held:
Appellant denies that she engaged in acts of recruitment and placement without first complying with the guidelines issued by the Department of
Labor and Employment. She contends that she did not possess any license for recruitment, because she never engaged in such activity.
We are not persuaded. In weighing contradictory declarations and statements, greater weight must be given to the positive testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses than to the denial of the defendant. Article 38 (a) clearly shows that illegal recruitment is an offense that is essentially
committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority. Anon-licensee means any person, corporation or entity to which the labor secretary has
not issued a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement; or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked or
cancelled by the POEA or the labor secretary. A license authorizes a person or an entity to operate a private employment agency, while authority
is given to those engaged in recruitment and placement activities.
x x x x
That appellant in this case had been neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment was certified by Veneranda C.
Guerrero, officer-in-charge of the Licensing and Regulation Office; and Ma. Salome S. Mendoza, manager of the Licensing Branch both of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. Yet, as complainants convincingly proved, she recruited them for jobs in Taiwan.
17
(Italics in
the original; underscoring supplied)
The second element is doubtless also present. The act of referral, which is included in recruitment,
18
is "the act ofpassing along or forwarding of
an applicant for employment after an initial interview of a selected applicant for employment to a selected employer, placement officer or
bureau."
19
Petitioners admission that she brought private complainants to the agency whose owner she knows and her acceptance of fees
including those for processing betrays her guilt.
That petitioner issued provisional receipts indicating that the amounts she received from the private complainants were turned over to
Luzviminda Marcos and Florante Hinahon does not free her from liability. For the act of recruitment may be "for profit or not." It is sufficient that
the accused "promises or offers for a fee employment" to warrant conviction for illegal recruitment.
20
As the appellate court stated:
x x x Sec. 13(b) of P.D. 442 [The Labor Code] does not require that the recruiter receives and keeps the placement money for himself or herself.
For as long as a person who has no license to engage in recruitment of workers for overseas employment offers for a fee an employment to two
or more persons, then he or she is guilty of illegal recruitment.
21

Parenthetically, why petitioner accepted the payment of fees from the private complainants when, in light of her claim that she merely brought
them to the agency, she could have advised them to directly pay the same to the agency, she proferred no explanation.
On petitioners reliance on Seoron,
22
true, this Court held that issuance of receipts for placement fees does not make a case for illegal
recruitment. But it went on to state that it is "rather the undertaking of recruitment activities without the necessary license or authority" that makes
a case for illegal recruitment.
23

A word on the penalty. Indeed, the trial court failed to apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law which also applies to offenses punished by special
laws.
Thus, Section 1 of Act No. 4103 (An Act to Provide for an Indeterminate Sentence and Parole for All Persons Convicted of Certain Crimes by the
Courts of the Philippine Islands; To Create A Board of Indeterminate Sentence and to Provide Funds Therefor; and for Other Purposes)
provides:
SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum
term prescribed by the same. (As amended by Act No. 4225) (Underscoring supplied)
While the penalty of imprisonment imposed by the appellate court is within the prescribed penalty for the offense, its addition of "perpetual
disqualification from engaging in the business of recruitment and placement of workers" is not part thereof. Such additional penalty must thus be
stricken off.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals areAFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in
that the accessory penalty imposed by it consisting of "perpetual disqualification from engaging in the business of recruitment and placement of
workers" is DELETED. Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ (at large), KARL REICHL, and YOLANDA GUTIERREZ DE REICHL, accused,
KARL REICHL and YOLANDA GUTIERREZ DE REICHL, accused-appellants
PUNO, J .:
This is an appeal from the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Batangas City in Criminal Case Nos. 6428, 6429, 6430, 6431, 6432, 6433,
6434, 6435, 6436, 6437, 6438, 6439, 6528, 6529, 6530 and 6531 finding accused-appellants, Spouses Karl Reichl and Yolanda Gutierrez de
Reichl guilty of five (5) counts of estafa and one (1) count of syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment.
1

In April 1993, eight (8) informations for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment and eight (8) informations for estafa were filed against
accused-appellants, spouses Karl and Yolanda Reichl, together with Francisco Hernandez. Only the Reichl spouses were tried and convicted by
the trial court as Francisco Hernandez remained at large.1wphi1.nt
The evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of private complainants; a certification from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) that Francisco Hernandez, Karl Reichl and Yolanda Gutierrez Reichl in their personal capacities were neither licensed
nor authorized by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment;
2
the receipts for the payment made by private complainants; and two
documents signed by the Reichl spouses where they admitted that they promised to secure Austrian tourist visas for private complainants and
that they would return all the expenses incurred by them if they are not able to leave by March 24, 1993,
3
and where Karl Reichl pledged to
refund to private complainants the total sum of P1,388,924.00 representing the amounts they paid for the processing of their papers.
4

Private complainant Narcisa Hernandez, a teacher, was first to testify for the prosecution. She stated that Francisco Hernandez introduced her to
the spouses Karl and Yolanda Reichl at the residence of a certain Hilarion Matira at Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City. At the time, she also saw
the other applicants Melanie Bautista, Estela Manalo, Edwin Coleng, Anicel Umahon, Analiza Perez and Maricel Matira. Karl and Yolanda Reichl
told Narcisa that they could find her a job as domestic helper in Italy. They, however, required her to pay the amount ofP150,000.00 for the
processing of her papers and travel documents. She paid the fee in three installments. She paid the first installment of P50,000.00 on July 14,
1992, the second installment of P25,000.00 on August 6, 1992 and the third in the amount of P75,000.00 on December 27, 1992. She gave the
money to Francisco Hernandez in the presence of the Reichl spouses at Matira's residence. Francisco Hernandez issued a receipt for the first
and second installment
5
but not for the third. Narcisa was scheduled to leave on December 17, 1992 but was not able to do so. Karl Reichl
explained that she would get her transit visa to Italy in Austria, but she could not yet leave for Austria because the hotels were fully booked at
that time because of the Christmas season. Narcisa's departure was again scheduled on January 5, 1993, but it still did not push through.
Narcisa stated that they went to Manila several times supposedly to obtain a visa from the Austrian Embassy and Karl Reichl assured her that
she would be able to leave once she gets her visa. The accused set the departure of Narcisa and that of the other applicants several times but
these proved to be empty promises. In March 1993, the applicants met with the three accused at the residence of private complainant Charito
Balmes and asked them to refund the payment if they could not send them abroad. The meeting resulted in an agreement which was reduced
into writing and signed by Karl Reichl. Mr. Reichl promised to ensure private complainants' departure by April, otherwise, they would return their
payment.
6

Private complainant Leonora Perez also gave the following testimony: In July 1992, her sister, Analiza Perez, introduced her to Francisco
Hernandez at their residence in Dolor Subdivision, Batangas City. Francisco Hernandez convinced her to apply for a job in Italy. When she
accepted the offer, Francisco Hernandez told her to prepare P150,000.00 for the processing of her papers. In August 1992, Leonora, together
with her sister and Francisco Hernandez, went to Ramada Hotel in Manila to meet with Karl and Yolanda Reichl. At said meeting, Leonora
handed her payment of P50,000.00 to Yolanda Reichl. Yolanda assured her that she would be able to work in Italy. Francisco Hernandez and
the Reichl spouses told Leonora to wait for about three weeks before she could leave. After three weeks, Francisco Hernandez invited Leonora
and the other applicants to the house of Hilarion Matira in Batangas City to discuss some matters. Francisco Hernandez informed the applicants
that their departure would be postponed to December 17, 1992. December 17 came and the applicants were still unable to leave as it was
allegedly a holiday. Yolanda and Karl Reichl nonetheless assured Leonora of employment as domestic helper in Italy with a monthly salary of
$1,000.00. Francisco Hernandez and the Reichl spouses promised the applicants that they would leave for Italy on January 5, 1993. Some time
in January 1993, Francisco Hernandez went to the residence of Leonora and collected the sum of P50,000.00 purportedly for the plane fare.
Francisco issued a receipt for the payment. When the applicants were not able to leave on the designated date, Francisco Hernandez and the
spouses again made another promise. Tired of the recruiters' unfulfilled promises, the applicants decided to withdraw their application. However,
Karl Reichl constantly assured them that they would land a job in Italy because he had connections in Vienna. The promised employment,
however, never materialized. Thus, Karl Reichl signed a document stating that he would refund the payment made by the applicants plus interest
and other expenses. The document was executed and signed at the house of one of the applicants, Charito Balmes, at P. Zamora St., Batangas
City.
7

Janet Perez, Leonora's sister, corroborated the latter's testimony that she paid a total amount of P100,000.00 to the three accused.
8

Private complainant Charito Balmes told a similar story when she testified before the court. She said that Francisco Hernandez convinced her to
apply for the job of domestic helper in Italy and required her to pay a fee ofP150,000.00. He also asked her to prepare her passport and other
papers to be used to secure a visa. On November 25, 1992, she gave P25,000.00 to Francisco Hernandez. They proceeded to Kumintang
Ibaba, Batangas City and Francisco Hernandez introduced her to his business partners, spouses Karl and Yolanda Reichl. Francisco Hernandez
turned over the payment to the spouses so that they could secure a visa for her. The Reichl spouses promised her an overseas job. They said
she and the other applicants would leave on December 17, 1992. On December 11, 1992, Charito paid the amount of P70,300.00 to Francisco
Hernandez in the presence of the Reichls. Francisco Hernandez again handed the money to the spouses. On February 16, 1993, Charito
paid P20,000.00 to Francisco Hernandez who delivered the same to the spouses. Francisco Hernandez did not issue a receipt for the payment
made by Charito because he told her that he would not betray her trust. Like the other applicants, Charito was not able to leave the country
despite the numerous promises made by the accused. They gave various excuses for their failure to depart, until finally the Reichls told the
applicants that Karl Reichl had so many business transactions in the Philippines that they would not be able to send them abroad and that they
would refund their payment instead. Hence, they executed an agreement which was signed by Karl Reichl and stating that they would return the
amounts paid by the applicants. The accused, however, did not comply with their obligation.
9

Mrs. Elemenita Bautista, the mother of private complainant Melanie Bautista, also took the witness stand. She stated that in May 1992, Melanie
applied for an overseas job through Francisco Hernandez. Francisco Hernandez told her to prepare P150,000.00 to be used for the processing
of her papers and plane ticket. On June 26, 1992, Melanie made the initial payment of P50,000.00 to Francisco Hernandez who was then
accompanied by Karl and Yolanda Reichl.
10
Upon receipt of the payment, Francisco Hernandez gave the money to Yolanda Reichl. Melanie
made two other payments: one on August 6, 1992 in the amount of P25,000.00,
11
and another on January 3, 1993 in the amount
of P51,000.00.
12
Three receipts were issued for the payments.
13

Rustico Manalo, the husband of private complainant Estela Abel de Manalo, testified that his wife applied for the job of domestic helper abroad.
In June 1992, Francisco Hernandez introduced them to Karl and Yolanda Reichl who were allegedly sending workers to Italy. Rustico and his
wife prepared all the relevant documents, i.e., passport, police clearance and marriage contract, and paid a total placement fee
of P130,000.00.
14
They paidP50,000.00 on June 5, 1992, P25,000.00 on August 8, 1992, and P55,000.00 on January 3, 1993. The payments
were made at the house of Hilarion Matira and were received by Francisco Hernandez who, in turn, remitted them to the Reichl spouses.
Francisco Hernandez issued a receipt for the payment. The Reichls promised to take care of Estela's papers and to secure a job for her abroad.
The Reichls vowed to return the payment if they fail on their promise. As with the other applicants, Estela was also not able to leave the
country.
15

The defense interposed denial and alibi.
Accused-appellant Karl Reichl, an Austrian citizen, claimed that he entered the Philippines on July 29, 1992. Prior to this date, he was in various
places in Europe. He came to the country on July 29, 1992 to explore business opportunities in connection with the import and export of beer
and sugar. He also planned to establish a tourist spot somewhere in Batangas. Upon his arrival, he and his wife, Yolanda Reichl, stayed at the
Manila Intercontinental Hotel. On August 3, 1992, they moved to Manila Midtown Hotel. They stayed there until August 26, 1992. After they left
Manila Midtown Hotel, they went to another hotel in Quezon City. Karl Reichl returned to Vienna on September 19, 1992.
16

Mr. Reichl stated that he first met Francisco Hernandez through a certain Jimmy Pineda around August 1992 at Manila Midtown Hotel. Francisco
Hernandez was allegedly looking for a European equipment to be used for the quarrying operation of his friend. Before accepting the deal, he
made some research on the background of the intended business. Realizing that said business would not be viable, Karl Reichl advised
Francisco Hernandez to instead look for a second-hand equipment from Taiwan or Japan. He never saw Francisco Hernandez again until he left
for Vienna in September 1992.
17

Karl Reichl returned to the Philippines on October 21, 1992. Francisco Hernandez allegedly approached him and sought his help in securing
Austrian visas purportedly for his relatives. Karl Reichl refused and told him that he was planning to stay permanently in the Philippines. On one
occasion, Francisco Hernandez invited him to an excursion at Sombrero Island. Francisco Hernandez told him that he would also bring some of
his relatives with him and he would introduce him to them. There he met Narcisa Hernandez and Leonora Perez. Leonora Perez, together with
Francisco Hernandez, later went to see Mr. Reichl at the house of his in-laws at No. 4 Buenafe Road, Batangas City and asked him if he could
help her obtain an Austrian visa. Karl Reichl, however, was firm on his refusal.
18

In his testimony before the trial court, Karl Reichl denied any knowledge about Francisco Hernandez's recruitment activities. He said that
Francisco Hernandez merely told him that he wanted to help his relatives go to Europe. He further denied that he promised pri vate complainants
that he would give them overseas employment.
19
As regards the document where Mr. Reichl undertook to pay P1,388,924.00 to private
complainants, he claimed that he signed said document under duress. Francisco Hernandez allegedly told him that private complainants would
harm him and his family if he refused to sign it. He signed the document as he felt he had no other option.
20

Yolanda Gutierrez de Reichl corroborated the testimony of her husband and denied the charges against her. She claimed that she was in Manila
on the dates alleged in the various informations, thus, she could not have committed the acts charged therein. Yolanda Reichl further stated that
she did not know of any reason why private complainants filed these cases against her and her husband. She said that several persons were
harassing her and pressuring her to pay private complainants the sum of at least P50,000.00.
21

After assessing the evidence presented by the parties, the trial court rendered a decision convicting accused-appellants of one (1) count of
illegal recruitment in large scale and six (6) counts of estafa. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused spouses KARL REICHL and YOLANDA GUTIERREZ REICHL -
1. NOT GUILTY of the crime of syndicated and large-scale illegal recruitment as charged in the above-mentioned Criminal
Cases Nos. 6435, 6437 and 6529;
2. NOT GUILTY of the crime of estafa as charged in the above-mentioned Criminal Cases Nos. 6434, 6436 and 6528;
3. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of syndicated and large-scale illegal recruitment, as charged, in the above-
mentioned Criminal Cases Nos. 6429, 6431, 6433, 6439 and 6531;
4. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, as charged, in the above-mentioned Criminal Cases Nos. 6428,
6430, 6432, 6438 and 6530.
The Court hereby imposes upon the accused-spouses KARL REICHL and YOLANDA GUTIERREZ REICHL the following sentences:
1. For the 5 offenses, collectively, of syndicated and large-scale illegal recruitment in Criminal Cases Nos. 6429, 6431, 6433, 6438 and
6531, to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and to pay a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00);
2. In Criminal Case No. 6428, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, to suffer the indeterminate sentence of Six (6)
Years of prision correctional, as minimum to Sixteen (16) Years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complai nant
Narcisa Hernandez in the amount ofP150,000.00;
3. In Criminal Case No. 6430, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, to suffer the indeterminate sentence of six (6)
years of prision correctional as minimum to eleven (11) years of prision mayor, as maximum and to indemnify the complainant Leonora
Perez in the amount of P100,000.00;
years of prision correctional as minimum to sixteen (16) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum and to indemnify the complai nant
Melanie Bautista in the amount of P150,000.00;
years of prision correctional as minimum to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to indemnify the complainant
Estela Abel de Manalo in the amount ofP130,000.00;
years or prision correctional as minimum to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to indemnify the complainant
Charito Balmes in the amount of P121,300.00; and
7. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED."
Accused-appellants appealed from the decision of the trial court. They raise the following errors:
"1. The trial court erred in finding accused-appellant Karl Reichl guilty of the crimes of estafa and illegal recruitment committed by
syndicate and in large scale based on the evidence presented by the prosecution which miserably failed to establish guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
2. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of illegal recruitment on a large scale by cummulating five
separate cases of illegal recruitment each filed by a single private complainant.
3. The trial court erred in rendering as a matter of course an automatic guilty verdict against accused-appellant for the crime of estafa
after a guilty verdict in a separate crime for illegal recruitment. It is submitted that conviction in the latter crime does not ipso facto result
in conviction in the former."
22

The appeal is bereft of merit.
Article 38 of the Labor Code defines illegal recruitment as "any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article
34 of (the Labor Code), to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority." The term "recruitment and placement" refers to any act
of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, including referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not, provided that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
23
The law imposes a higher
penalty when the illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate or in large scale as they are considered an offense involving economic
sabotage. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or
confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme. It is deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
24

In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants engaged in activities that fall within the
definition of recruitment and placement under the Labor Code. The evidence on record shows that they promised overseas employment to
private complainants and required them to prepare the necessary documents and to pay the placement fee, although they did not have any
license to do so. There is illegal recruitment when one who does not possess the necessary authority or license gives the impression of having
the ability to send a worker abroad.
25

Accused-appellants assert that they merely undertook to secure Austrian visas for private complainants, which act did not constitute illegal
recruitment. They cite the document marked at Exhibit "J" stating that they promised to obtain Austrian tourist visas for private complainants. We
are not convinced. Private complainants Narcisa Hernandez, Leonora Perez and Charito Balmes categorically stated that Karl and Yolanda
Reichl told them that they would provide them overseas employment and promised them that they would be able to leave the country on a
specified date. We do not see any reason to doubt the truthfulness of their testimony. The defense has not shown any ill motive for these
witnesses to falsely testify against accused-appellants if it were not true that they met with the Reichl spouses and the latter represented
themselves to have the capacity to secure gainful employment for them abroad. The minor lapses in the testimony of these witnesses pointed
out by accused-appellants in their brief do not impair their credibility, especially since they corroborate each other on the material points, i.e., that
they met with the three accused several times, that the three accused promised to give them overseas employment, and that they paid the
corresponding placement fee but were not able to leave the country. It has been held that truth-telling witnesses are not always expected to give
error-free testimonies considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory.
26
Moreover, it was shown that Karl Reichl signed a
document marked as Exhibit "C" where he promised to refund the payments given by private complainants for the processing of their papers.
We are not inclined to believe Mr. Reichl's claim that he was forced by Francisco Hernandez to sign said document. There is no showing,
whether in his testimony or in that of his wife, that private complainants threatened to harm them if he did not sign the document. Mr. Reichl is an
educated man and it cannot be said that he did not understand the contents of the paper he was signing. When he affixed his signature thereon,
he in effect acknowledged his obligation to ensure the departure of private complainants and to provide them gainful employment abroad. Such
obligation arose from the promise of overseas placement made by him and his co-accused to private complainants. The admission made by
accused-appellants in Exhibit "J" that they promised to obtain Austrian visas for private complainants does not negate the fact that they also
promised to procure for them overseas employment. In fact, in Exhibit "J", accused-appellants admitted that each of the private complainants
paid the amount of P50,000.00. However, in Exhibit "C", which was executed on a later date, accused-appellants promised to refund to each
complainant an amount exceeding P150,000.00. This is an acknowledgment that accused-appellants received payments from the complainants
not only for securing visas but also for their placement abroad.
Accused-appellants' defense of denial and alibi fail to impress us. The acts of recruitment were committed from June 1992 until January 1993 in
Batangas City. Karl Reichl was in Manila from July 29, 1992 until September 19, 1992, and then he returned to the Philippines and stayed in
Batangas from October 21, 1992. Yolanda Reichl, on the other hand, claimed that he was in Manila on the dates alleged in the various
informations. It is of judicial notice that Batangas City is only a few hours' drive from Manila. Thus, even if the spouses were staying in Manila, it
does not prevent them from going to Batangas to engage in their recruitment business. Furthermore, it appears that the three accused worked
as a team and they conspired and cooperated with each other in recruiting domestic helpers purportedly to be sent to Italy. Francisco Hernandez
introduced Karl and Yolanda Reichl to the job applicants as his business partners. Karl and Yolanda Reichl themselves gave assurances to
private complainants that they would seek employment for them in Italy. Francisco Hernandez remitted the payments given by the applicants to
the Reichl spouses and the latter undertook to process the applicants' papers. There being conspiracy, each of the accused shall be equally
liable for the acts of his co-accused even if he himself did not personally take part in its execution.
Accused-appellants argue that the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellants of illegal recruitment in large scale by cummulating the
individual informations filed by private complainants. The eight informations for illegal recruitment are worded as follows:
Criminal Case No. 6429
"That on or about July 14, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Hilltop, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are non-licensees
nor holders of authority from the Department of Labor and Employment or any other authorized government entity, conspiring and
confederating together, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in syndicated and large scale recruitment and
placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering and promising for a fee to one Narcisa Autor de Hernandez and to
more than three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Narcisa Autor de Hernandez relying on these
misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency,
to said accused, which acts constitute a violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law."
"That on or about July 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Dolor Subdivision, Batangas City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are non-licensees nor holders of authority
from the Department of Labor and Employment or any other authorized government entity, conspiring and confederating together, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in syndicated and large scale recruitment and placement activities by
enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering and promising for a fee to one Leonora Perez y Atienza and to more than three other persons,
job placement abroad, by reason of which said Leonora Perez y Atienza relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the
amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said accused, which acts constitute a violation
of the said law.
Contrary to Law."
"That on or about June 26, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Hilltop, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City,
placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering and promising for a fee to one Melanie Bautista y Dolor and to more
than three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Melanie Bautista y Dolor relying on these misrepresentations,
paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said accused,
which acts constitute a violation of the said law.1wphi1.nt
Contrary to Law."
"That on or about July 12, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Hilltop, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City,
placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering and promising for a fee to one Annaliza Perez y Atienza and to more
than three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Annaliza Perez y Atienza relying on these misrepresentations,
paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND (P160,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said accused,
which acts constitute a violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law.
"That on or about August 15, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Hilltop, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City,
placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering and promising for a fee to one Edwin Coling y Coling and to more than
three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Edwin Coling y Coling relying on these misrepresentations, paid
and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said accused, which
acts constitute a violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law."
"That on or about June 5, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Hilltop, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City,
placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering and promising for a fee to one Estela Abel de Manalo and to more than
three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Estela Abel de Manalo relying on these misrepresentations, paid
and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY THOUSAND (P130,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said accused, which
Contrary to Law."
"That on or about July 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Brgy. Sta. Rita Karsada, Batangas City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are non-licensees nor holders of
authority from the Department of Labor and Employment or any other authorized government entity, conspiring and confederating
together, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in syndicated and large scale recruitment and placement
activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering and promising for a fee to one Anicel Umahon y Delgado and to more than three
other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Anicel Umahon y Delgado relying on these misrepresentations, paid
and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY THOUSAND (P130,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said accused, which
Contrary to Law."
"That on or about November 25, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at No. 40 P. Zamora Street, Batangas City,
placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering and promising for a fee to one Charito Balmes y Cantos and to more
than three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Charito Balmes y Cantos relying on these misrepresentations,
paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P121,300.00), Philippine
Currency, to said accused, which acts constitute a violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law."
We note that each information was filed by only one complainant. We agree with accused-appellants that they could not be convicted for illegal
recruitment committed in large scale based on several informations filed by only one complainant. The Court held in People vs. Reyes:
27

"x x x When the Labor Code speaks of illegal recruitment 'committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group,' it
must be understood as referring to the number of complainants in each case who are complainants therein, otherwise, prosecuti ons for
single crimes of illegal recruitment can be cummulated to make out a case of large scale illegal recruitment. In other words, a conviction
for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons whether
individually or as a group."
28

This, however, does not serve to lower the penalty imposed upon accused-appellants. The charge was not only for illegal recruitment committed
in large scale but also for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a
group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise
or scheme defined under the first paragraph of Article 38 of the Labor Code. It has been shown that Karl Reichl, Yolanda Reichl and Francisco
Hernandez conspired with each other in convincing private complainants to apply for an overseas job and giving them the guaranty that they
would be hired as domestic helpers in Italy although they were not licensed to do so. Thus, we hold that accused-appellants should be held
liable for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate which is also punishable by life imprisonment and a fine of one hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) under Article 39 of the Labor Code.
Finally, we hold that the prosecution also proved the guilt of accused-appellants for the crime of estafa. A person who is convicted of illegal
recruitment may, in addition, be convicted of estafa under Art. 315 (2) of the Revised Penal Code provided the elements of estafa are present.
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by any person who defrauds another by using a fi ctitious name,
or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of
similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. The offended party must have relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means of the accused-appellant and as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damages.
29
It has been proved
in this case that accused-appellants represented themselves to private complainants to have the capacity to send domestic helpers to Italy,
although they did not have any authority or license. It is by this representation that they induced private complainants to pay a placement fee
of P150,000.00. Such act clearly constitutes estafa under Article 315 (2) of the Revised Penal Code.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.Cost against appellants.SO ORDERED.
VINTA MARITIME CO., INC. and ELKANO SHIP MANAGEMENT, INC., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and LEONIDES C. BASCONCILLO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J .:
To justify an employee's dismissal, the employer has the burden of proving the presence of just cause and due process. An illegally dismissed
worker whose employment is for a fixed period is entitled to payment of his salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract.
The Case
These rules of long standing are invoked by the Court in resolving this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
seeking the reversal of the Decision dated September 13, 1993 and the Resolution dated November 23, 1993 of the National Labor Relations
Commission in NLRC CA No. 000309 [POEA Case No. (M) 87-05-327].
On April 20, 1987, Leonides C. Basconcillo, herein private respondent, filed a complaint
1
with the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) Workers' Assistance and Adjudication Office for illegal dismissal against Vinta Maritime Co., Inc. and Elkano Ship
Management, Inc., herein petitioners. In their answer,
2
petitioners alleged that private respondent was dismissed for his gross negligence and
incompetent performance as chief engineer of the M/V Boracay, as exemplified by the following recorded incidents:
3.1.a. During a maneuver of the Vessel, [private respondent] closed off the operating air valve to the bridge
control system despite the large sign on the valve itself-"DO NOT CLOSE".
3.1.b. During a standby period, there was a loss of the main sea water pressure because the suction strainer
was blocked by ice. [Private respondent's] failure to change over the sea suctions resulted in the
overheating of the main engine and the auxiliaries, which forced the Vessel to stop.
3.1.c. In another instance, complainant assured that the fuel situation of the Vessel was in order. But when
the fuel figures were verified, it was discovered that there were only five (5) tons of fuel left before the next
bunkering, leaving thus, no margin for safety. Because of this, an unscheduled bunkering operation in Oslo
had to be done, contrary to instructions.
3.1.d. As part of the safety procedures in the Vessel, it is necessary that all items of safety equipment be
tested every week and a report entered in the engine room logbook. [Private respondent] was instructed and
under duty to test the engine room fire alarms by activating each one individually with a heat or smoke
source depending on its type. It was, however, discovered later that [private respondent] miserably failed to
do this . . . .
3.1.e. [Private respondent] as [c]hief [e]ngineer miserably failed to instill discipline among the engine room
personnel who are under his direct supervision, causing unrest among them and lack of respect for him and
resulting in the disruption of the smooth operations of the Vessel.
3.2. Contrary to [private respondent's] allegations, he was given fair warning and enough opportunity to explain his side in the
foregoing incidents, not to mention all the chances given to him to improve his substandard work performance before he was
dismissed. Because of his gross negligence and his failure to perform the duties for which he was hired, [petitioners] had no
other choice than to terminate his services for cause pursuant to management's prerogative to terminate an employee
because of "gross and habitual neglect . . . of his duties" (Article 283, Labor Code).
Private respondent rebutted these allegations in his position paper, stating: (1) it would be childish for an experienced chief engineer to close the
operating air valve to the bridge; a low level of starting air is caused by excessive and continuous use thereof during maneuvering, and such
malfunction is due to the pilot's error; (2) the loss of main water pressure due to the formation of ice on the suction strainer occurred because the
sea water inlet was clogged; private respondent, who was at the engine room, contacted the master of the vessel, who was then asleep, to stop
the engine and change the sea valve to activate the sea water pressure; during the same incident, it was also found that the other valve did not
fully open by remote control; (3) private respondent denied that the fuel figures reached only five tons as demonstrated by the low-level alarm
which, while set at ten cubic meters, did not set off even until the next bunkering of the ship; it was Peter Robinson, the ship superintendent, who
panicked and caused the unscheduled bunkering operation in Oslo; (4) private respondent conducted safety equipment-testing religiously, but
admitted that in one instance he did not test the equipment with a heat or smoke source, upon Robinson's advice that the alarm would upset the
pilot and the crew who were then resting; (5) private respondent denied that there was unrest among the engine personnel, averring that, on the
contrary, they cooperated and signed the guidelines which the former issued to them; and (6) he denied having been given a chance to explain
his side regarding the mentioned incidents, the truth being that he was surprised when he was told of his dismissal.
3
Petitioners filed their
position paper and supporting documents which however failed to rebut private respondent's allegations.
4

Despite an unopposed motion for hearing
5
filed by private respondent, the POEA considered the case submitted for resolution by mutual
agreement of the parties after submission of their respective position papers and supporting documents. In his decision dated March 9, 1990,
POEA Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso ruled that private respondent was illegally dismissed. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as
follows:
6

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondents are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, herein complainant the
amount of SEVENTEEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE US DOLLARS (US$17,875.00) or its peso
equivalent at the time of actual payment, representing his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract at
US$1,787.50 per month.
All other claims are hereby DISMISSED.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission
7
("Respondent Commission," for brevity) affirmed the POEA:
8

Accordingly, the decision of the POEA Administrator is hereby AFFIRMED en toto.
Respondent Commission denied the motion for reconsideration in the challenged Resolution:
9

After due consideration of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents-appellants Vinta Maritime Co., Inc/Elkano Ship
Management, Inc. on October 22, 1993, from the Decision of September 13, 1993, the Commission (Second Division)
RESOLVED to deny the same for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
10

The Facts
The facts of this case are undisputed. The solicitor general relates the following circumstances leading to the complaint:
11

This case arose from a complaint for illegal dismissal by private respondent herein, Leonides O. Basconcillo, against petitioner
companies, . . . Vinta Maritime Company, Incorporation and the El Kano Ship Management Incorporated, before the POEA
Adjudication Office.
On February 13, 1987, private respondent, a licensed Marine Engineer since 1970, was hired as Chief Engineer for "M.V.
Boracay" by the shipping company, . . . Vinta Maritime Company, Incorporated, thru its accredited manning agent, the Elkano
Ship Management, Inc.
The crew contract for his employment was effective for a fixed duration of one (1) year, with a stipulated monthly basic pay of
$1,375.00 U.S. Dollars, and fixed overtime pay of $402.50 U.S. Dollars a month, or a total of $1,787.50 U.S. Dollars per
month, with an additional 21/2 days leave a month. So on February 18, 1987, private respondent joined the vessel at the port
of Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and assumed his duties and responsibilities as Chief Engineer.
On April 2, 1987, or barely three (3) months after boarding the vessel, private respondent was informed by Captain Jose B.
Orquinaza, the ship's Master, that he was relieved of his duties per recommendation of the Marine Superintendent, Mr. Peter
Robinson, due to his poor performance (Annex "G," Petition). He was in effect terminated from the service. This came after
private respondent had a verbal altercation with Robinson, a British national, regarding the discipline or lack thereof of the
Filipino crew under private respondent's supervision. No inquiry or investigation, however, regarding his supposed
incompetence or negligence was ever conducted; neither was private respondent furnished with a notice or memorandum
regarding the cause of his dismissal.
Private respondent was made to disembark at the port of Oslo, Norway, and immediately repatriated to the country. Contrary
to his perceived incompetence, private respondent's Seamen's Book contained the following entries:
Conduct "Very good"
Ability "Very good"
Remarks "Highly Recommended" (Annex "F," p. 5, Petition)
Assignment of Errors
In their memorandum, petitioners submit that Respondent Commission gravely abused its discretion by:
12

a. Rendering the assailed resolution and decisions without a full-blown trial on the merits, and
b. Disregarding the evidence for the petitioners and ruling that the company illegally dismissed Basconcillo.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit. The petitioners failed to prove the elements of a valid dismissal, namely: (1) just cause and (2) due process.
First Issue: Trial is Not Indispensable in
Administrative Due Process
Petitioners claim that Respondent Commission gravely abused its discretion in upholding the POEA's decision, which was based on the position
papers and documents submitted by the parties in view of a motion for trial which remained unacted upon. They insist that a hearing was an
indispensable condition before a judgment could be rendered in this case. We do not agree. Although bound by law and practice to observe due
process, administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers are nonetheless free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements. As
applied to these proceedings, due process requires only an opportunity to explain one's side.
13

In labor cases, this Court has consistently held that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or a
right to be heard. The requirements of due process are deemed to have been satisfied when parties are given the opportunity to submit position
papers.
14
The holding of an adversarial trial is discretionary on the labor arbiter and the parties cannot demand it as a matter of right.
15
More
often than not, a litigant may be heard more creditably through pleadings than through oral arguments. In administrative proceedings, technical
rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense.
16
Due process was designed to afford an opportunity to be heard, and an actual verbal hearing need not always be held.
17
The
necessity of conducting a hearing is addressed to the sound discretion of the labor arbiter.
These rules equally apply to cases filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Adjudication Office. Section 6 of Rule III, Book
VII of the POEA Rules and Regulations of 1991
18
categorically states that proceedings before a POEA hearing officer is non-litigious, although
they
are still subject to the requirements of due process.
19
Under the POEA Rules in force
20
at the time the complaint was filed, summary judgments
in which the pleadings, affidavits and evidence submitted are sufficient to render a decision are allowed under Section 4.
21
Where the
parties fail to agree on an amicable settlement and summary judgment is not appropriate, a judgment based on position papers may be resorted
to under Section 5.
22
Where there are complicated factual issues involved which cannot be resolved through such means, the hearing officer
may direct the parties to submit suggested written clarificatory questions to be propounded to the party concerned.
23

Applied to this particular case, it is undeniable that petitioners were given their chance to be heard. Their answer, position paper and supporting
documents had become parts of the records and were considered accordingly by the POEA administrator and by the Respondent Commission
in rendering their respective decisions.
Furthermore, petitioners did not deem it necessary to ask the POEA Adjudication Office to conduct a hearing. It was the private respondent who
moved for a full-blown trial. Although they did not oppose the motion, they did not concur with it either. Their silence was not an assent to the
motion or an argument showing its necessity. Rather, it was an eloquent statement that the position paper they submitted sufficiently covered all
the issues. On the other hand, private respondent's Motion for Decision, dated November 10, 1989, indubitably shows his waiver of his earlier
requested hearing.
24
This motion was similarly unopposed by petitioners. So too, petitioners' present insistence on the necessity of a hearing is
weakened by the fact that their memorandum before this Court failed to specify the matters which would have required a hearing.
In all, the Court concurs with the POEA administrator and Respondent Commission that a verbal hearing was dispensable. Petitioners' belated
insistence is a veiled attempt to reopen an otherwise decided case. Aside from being late, this attempt is purely dilatory, designed to
unnecessarily prolong the resolution of the case. The Court holds that petitioners were not denied due process. No grave abuse of discretion
was committed by Respondent Commission.
Second Issue: Private Respondent Was Illegally Dismissed
Where there is no showing of a clear, valid, and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law considers the matter a case of illegal
dismissal. Verily, the burden is on the employer to prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause.
25
For an employee's dismissal
to be valid, (1) the dismissal must be for a valid cause and (2) the employee must be afforded due process.
26
Article 282 of the Labor Code lists
the following causes for termination of employment by the employer: (1) serious misconduct or willful disobedience of lawful orders in connection
with his or her work, (2) gross and habitual neglect of duties, (3) fraud or willful breach of trust, (4) commission of a cri me or an offense against
the person of the employer or his immediate family member or representative, and (5) analogous cases.
27

The absence of a valid cause for termination in this case is parent. Petitioners allege that private respondent was dismissed because of his
incompetence, enumerating incidents in proof thereof. However, this is contradicted by private respondent's seaman's book which states that his
discharge was due to an "emergency leave." Moreover, his alleged incompetence is belied by the remarks made by petitioners in the same book
that private respondent's services were "highly recommended" and that his conduct and ability were rated "very good." Petitioners' allegation that
such remark and ratings were given to private respondent as an accommodation for future employment fails to persuade. The Court cannot
consent to such an accommodation, even if the allegation were true, as it is a blatant misrepresentation. It cannot exculpate petitioners based on
such (mis)representation. When petitioners issued the accommodation, they must have known its possible repercussions. They cannot be
allowed to turn against their representation.
As correctly argued by the solicitor general in his comment, it was incumbent upon the petitioners to clearly establish that the discharge was for
a just cause before they could legitimately terminate the private respondent's services. However, they miserably failed in this respect.
28
The
alleged incidents of incompetence were unsupported by relevant and convincing evidence. The affidavits of Robinson and Capt. Jose B.
Orquinaza, who caused private respondent's dismissal and recommendation, are highly suspicious and do not in any way prove that the alleged
incidents showing private respondent's incompetence were ever investigated and proven,
29
as they were sufficiently rebutted by the entries in
the seaman's book.
30
Mere allegations are not synonymous with proof.
Further, the POEA administrator and the Respondent Commission have cleared the private respondent of such charges, noting that he
sufficiently rebutted them. Petitioners, on the other hand, presented no adequate evidence or argument to tilt the weight of the evidence in their
favor. Without factual basis are their contentions which are as follows: (1) private respondent had been inactive and unemployed for five years
prior to his employment with petitioners; and (2) developments in ship technology, equipment and damage control measures, during the five
years he was unemployed, gravely affected his expertise. Petitioners failed to specify these alleged advanced equipment and measures. Neither
did they explain that the instances where private respondent allegedly endangered the ship and its crew involved any of these advanced
equipment and measures. The Court sees no justification to depart from the well-settled rule that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies
like the Respondent Commission, which have acquired expertise in the matters entrusted to their jurisdiction, are accorded by the Supreme
Court not only respect but even finality if they are supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind would accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
31

Petitioners, in our view, failed to rebut the following observations of the Respondent Commission:
32

After perusing the records of this case, we arrived at the conclusion that the Honorable POEA Administrator committed no
reversible error in finding that the dismissal of the complainant herein was illegal and violative of the contract of employment.
[Petitioners'] allegation that [private respondent] was validly terminated because of inefficiency on the basis of their
consultant's report would not merit [o]ur judicial approval because of the following reasons:
First, it was [petitioners] themselves who hired and contracted the services of [private respondent], presumably after
considering his years of experience and records of performance, otherwise, it would not have entered into a one year contract
of employment with [private respondent]. It is highly unthinkable that [a] company like them would be so naive as to be
hoodwink[ed] into hiring somebody who is not an expert and does not know anything. Not if [w]e are to consider that they ply
international routes and capable of offering such princely benefits as they did to [private respondent].
Second, the report of their British consultant is suspect to being one made out of vengeance, what with the altercation that
transpired between them immediately prior to the preparation of the report. . . . But more importantly, the detailed report (See,
p. 125 of Rollo), said consultant['s report] was to [o]ur mind substantially rebutted by complainant one after the other in his
position paper dated October 2, 1987 (See, pp. 109 to 112 of Rollo). As such, the same could not have carried much weight.
There is no question therefore that complainant was dismissed without any justifiable cause.
Due process, the second element for a valid dismissal, requires notice and hearing.
33
Before the employee can be dismissed under Article 282,
the Code requires the service of a written notice containing a statement of the cause(s) of termination and giving said employee ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. A notice of termination in writing is further required if the employee's dismissal is decided
upon.
34
The employer must furnish the worker with two written notices before termination of employment can be legally effected: (1) notice
which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought and (2) subsequent notice which informs the
employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him. The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due
process, and neither of these elements can be eliminated without running afoul of the constitutional guaranty.
35

Using these legal criteria, we hold that private respondent was illegally dismissed. No notice was ever given to him prior to his dismissal. This
fact alone disproves petitioners' allegation that "private respondent was given fair warning and enough opportunity to explai n his side [regarding]
the incidents that led to his dismissal." These requisites cannot be replaced as they are not mere technicalities, but requirements of due process
to which every employee is entitled to ensure that the employer's prerogative to dismiss is not exercised arbitrarily.
36

Illegally dismissed workers are entitled to the payment of their salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of their employment where the
employment is for a definite period.
37
Conformably, the administrator and the Respondent Commission properly awarded private respondent
salaries for the period beginning April 9, 1987, the date of his illegal dismissal, until February 18, 1988, the expiration of his contract.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The challenged Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ASIAN CENTER FOR CAREER AND EMPLOYMENT SYSTEM AND SERVICES, INC. (ACCESS), petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and IBNO MEDIALES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J .:
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner ASIAN CENTER FOR CAREER & EMPLOYMENT SYSTEM & SERVICES, INC. (ACCESS) seeks
to modify the monetary awards against it in the Decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), dated October 14, 1997,
a case for illegal dismissal.
The records disclose that petitioner hired respondent IBNO MEDIALES to work as a mason in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, with a monthly
salary of 1,200 Saudi Riyals (SR). The term of his contract was two (2) years, from February 28, 1995 until February 28, 1997.
On May 26, 1996, respondent applied with petitioner for vacation leave with pay which he earned after working for more then a year. His
application for leave was granted. While en route to the Philippines, his co-workers informed him that he has been dismissed from service. The
information turned out to be true.
On June 17, 1996, respondent filed a complaint with the labor arbiter for illegal dismissal, non-payment of overtime pay, refund of
transportation fare, illegal deductions, non-payment of 13
th
month pay and salary for the unexpired portion of his employment contract.
On March 17, 1997, the labor arbiter found petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal.
[1]
The dispositive portion reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the illegality of complainants dismissal and ordering the
respondent ACCESS and/or ABDULLAH LELINA to pay the complainant the amount of SR 13,200 representing complainants
payment for the unexpired portion of his contract and refund of the illegality deducted amount less P5,000.00, the legally allowed
placement fee.
Respondent are further ordered to pay attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the judgment award or the amount of
SR 1,320, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
All other issues are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERD. (emphasis supplied)
It is noteworthy, however, that in the body of his decision, the labor arbiter applied Section 10 R.A. 8042,
[2]
the law relative to the
protection of Filipino overseas-workers, and computed private respondents salary for the unexpired portion of his contract as follows: SR1,200 x
3 months = SR3,600.
On appeal by petitioner, the NLRC affirmed the factual findings of the labor arbiter but modified the appealed decision by deleting the
order of refund of excessive placement fee for lack of jurisdiction.
[3]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration with respect to the labor arbiters award of SR13,200 in the dispositive portion of the decision,
representing respondents salary for the unexpired portion of his contract. invoking Section 10 R.A. 8042. Petitioner urged that its liability for
respondents salary is for only three (3) months. Petitioner claimed that it should pay only SR 3.600 (SR 1,200 x 3 months) for the unexpired
portion of respondents employment and SR360 (10% of SR3,600) for attorneys fees.
[4]

The NLRC denied petitioners motion. It ruled that R.A. 8042 does not apply as respondents employment which started in February
1995 occurred prior to its effectivity on July 15, 1995.
[5]

Hence, this petition for certiorari.
In the case at bar, petitioners illegal dismissal from service is no longer disputed. Petitioner merely impugns the monetary awards granted
by the NLRC to private respondent. It submits that although the unexpired portion of private respondents employment contract is eight (8)
months,
[6]
it is liable to pay respondent only three (3) months of his basic salary, pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. 8042, or SR1,200 (monthly
salary) multiplied by 3 months, for a total of SR3,600. Petitioner claims that the NLRC erred in ruling that as private respondents employment
started only on February 28, 1995, R.A. 8042, which took effect on July 15, 1995, would not apply to his case. Petitioner argues that it is not the
date of employment but the date of dismissal which should be considered in determining the applicability of R.A. 8042. Petitioner prays that
the award in the NLRC Decision dated October 14, 1997, be changed to SR3,600 instead of 13,200 and that the award of attorneys fees
be deleted.
We affirm with modifications.
As a rule, jurisdiction is determined by the law at the time of the commencement of the action.
[7]
In the case at bar, private respondents
cause of action did not accrue on the date of his date of his employment or on February 28, 1995. His cause of action arose only from the-time
he was illegally dismissed by petitioner from service in June 1996, after his vacation leave expired. It is thus clear that R.A. 8042 which took
effect a year earlier in July 1995 applies to the case at bar.
Under Section 10 of R.A. 8042, a worker dismissed from overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause is entitled to his
salary for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
In the case at bar, the unexpired portion of private respondents employment contract is eight (8) months. Private respondent should
therefore be paid his basic salary corresponding to three (3) months or a total of SR3,600.
[8]

We note that this same computation was made by the labor arbiter in the body of his decision.
[9]
Despite said computation in the body of
the decision, however, the labor arbiter awarded higher sum (SR13,200) in thedispositive portion.
The general rule is that where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion or the fallo and the body of the decision,
the fallo controls. This rule rests on the theory that the fallo is the final order while the opinion in the body is merely a statement ordering
nothing. However, where the inevitable conclusion from the body of the decision is so clear as to show that there was a mistake in the
dispositive portion, the body of the decision will prevail.
[10]

We find that the labor arbiters award of a higher amount in the dispositive portion was clearly an error for there is nothing in the text of the
decision which support the award of said higher amount. We reiterate that the correct award to private respondent for the unexpired portion of
his employment contract is SR3,600.
We come now to the award of attorneys fees in favor of private respondent. Article 2208 of the Civil Code allows attorneys fees to be
awarded when its claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an
unjustified act or omission of the party for whom it is sought. Moreover, attorneys fees are recoverable when there is sufficient showing of bad
faith.
[11]
The Labor Code,
[12]
on the other hand, fixes the attorneys fees that may be recovered in an amount which should not exceed 10% of
the total amount of wages awarded.
In the case at bar, petitioners bad faith in dismissing private respondent is manifest. Respondent was made to believe that he would
be temporarily leaving Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, for a 30-day vacation leave with pay. However, while on board the plane back to the
Philippines, his co-employees told him that he has been dismissed from his job as he was given only a one-way plane ticket by petitioner. True
enough, private respondent was not allowed to return to his jobsite in Jeddah after his vacation leave. Thus, private respondent was
compelled to file an action for illegal dismissal with the labor arbiter and hence entitled to an award of attorneys fees.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the public respondent National Labor Relations Commission, dated October 14, 1997, is
AFFIRMED with modifications: petitioner is ordered to pay private respondent IBNO MEDIALES the peso equivalent of the amounts of
SR3,600 for the unexpired portion of his employment contract, and SR360 for attorneys fees. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, HEARING OFFICER CHERYL
AMPIL and MA. LOURDES A. ZARAGOZA, respondents.

FELICIANO, J .:
This Petition for certiorari and Prohibition seeks to set aside the Decision dated 19 March 1987 of the public respondent Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA), in POEA Case No. L-86-01-026.
The pertinent facts follow:
Manuel Zaragoza had been an employee of petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. ("Eastern") for several years, having served as engineer on
board several of Eastern's vessels since 1973. At the time of his death on 18 September 1983, Manuel Zaragoza was in Kakogawa, Japan
serving as Chief Engineer of the M/V Eastern Meteor, a vessel then owned by Freesia Shipping Company S.A. and chartered by Eastern. A
Death Certificate
1
issued by Dr. Masayuki Inoue of the Kakogawa Hospital stated that Zaragoza's death had been caused by "myocardial
infarction."
On 17 December 1985, Manuel Zaragoza's widow, private respondent Ma. Lourdes A. Zaragoza, filed with the public respondent POEA a formal
Complaint
2
(docketed as POEA Case No. L-86-01-026) against Eastern, after the latter allegedly had refused to act favorably on the widow's
claim for gratuity arising from the death of her husband. Mrs. Zaragoza alleged that the M/V Eastern Meteor having been registered with
the Ministerio de Hacienda y Tesoro of the Republic of Panama at the time of her husband's death, she was entitled to receive from Eastern
death benefits in the amount of P100,000.00 as provided under Memorandum Circular No. 71 issued on 18 November 1981 by the former
National Seamen Board. Moral damages or P50,000.00 and attorney's fees were likewise sought by the widow.
In its Answer,
3
Eastern alleged, among other things, that no cause of ac ' petition existed against it as the company had already paid Mrs.
Zaragoza a cash benefit of P12,000.00 for the death of her husband and an amount of P5,000.00 for funeral expenses. Eastern further denied
having incurred any additional liability under NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71, alleging that "[the M/V Eastern Meteor] had been then also
considered a vessel of the Philippine registry." Eastern assailed the jurisdiction of the POEA over the complaint, asserti ng that the company "is
not engaged in overseas employment even as [it] admits that [its] vessels are ocean-going vessels."
On 19 March 1987, public respondent POEA rendered a Decision
4
requiring petitioner to pay to private respondent Mrs. Zaragoza P88,000.00
as the unpaid balance of her deceased husband's death benefits, and dismissing the claim for moral damages for want of jurisdiction.
From this judgment, Eastern came directly to this Court. We issued a Temporary Restraining Order on 8 April 1987.
5

A preliminary point was raised by the Solicitor General in his Comment
6
on the Petition, that Eastern had failed to exhaust administrative
remedies in this case i.e., that petitioner Company did not interpose an appeal with the National Labor Relations Commission before coming to
this Court on certiorari. Inasmuch, however, as the petition at bar raises questions essentially legal in nature, we do not consider the same as
having been prematurely filed with this Court.
7

We address first the issue of jurisdiction. Petitioner Company does not deny that Manuel Zaragoza was its employee at the time of his death on
18 September 1983. Petitioner would contend, however, that the company had neither been nor acted as an "overseas employer" of Manuel
Zaragoza, and that the latter had never been its "overseas employee." Hence, petitioner concludes, private respondent's claim for death benefits
should have been filed with the Social Security System, not with the POEA.
The argument does not persuade. Applicable here and petitioner admits this in its Petition is Executive Order No. 797 (promulgated 1 May
1982), which abolished the former National Seamen Board and created in its place the present Philippine Overseas Employment Administration.
Section 4 (a) of Executive Order No. 797 expressly provides that the POEA "shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases,
including money claims, involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for
overseas employment, including seamen. " This provision is clarified substantially in the Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment issued
by the POEA, Section 1 (d), Rule 1, Book VI of which provides that "claims for death, disability and other benefits arising out of [overseas]
employment" fall within the POEA's original and exclusive jurisdiction. The following definitions contained in Section 1, Rule II, Book I of said
POEA Rules and Regulations are also useful:
g. Contract Worker-means any person working or who has worked overseas under a valid employment contract and shall
include seamen.
xxx xxx xxx
x. Overseas Employment-means employment of a worker outside the Philippines, including employment on board vessels
plying international waters, covered by a valid employment contract.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
We note that the statute and the relevant regulations refer to employment of Filipino workers overseas, i.e., outside the Philippines. The statute
and regulations do not limit their coverage to non-Filipino employers. Filipinos working overseas share the same risks and burdens whether their
employers be Filipino or foreign.
Neither party disputes that Manuel Zaragoza, at the time of his death, was covered by an existing contract of employment with Eastern and that
the deceased was at that time employed as a seaman (Chief Engineer) on board the M/V Eastern Meteor, which vessel-then chartered by
Eastern-was engaged in plying ocean routes, outside Philippine waters and which, at the time of Zaragoza's demise, was berthed in a foreign
port (Japan). In addition, the record shows that Eastern submitted its shipping articles to public respondent POEA for processing, formalization
and approval,
8
apparently in recognition of POEA!s regulatory authority over overseas employment under Executive Order No. 797. While not in
itself conclusive proof of employment by Eastern of people overseas, nevertheless, this latter circumstance strongly suggests that Eastern must
have regarded itself as engaged in such employment, otherwise, it would not have found it necessary or useful to submit its shipping articles to
the POEA. We hold that the complaint of private respondent widow of Manuel Zaragoza falls well within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
public respondent POEA.
9

We come to the issue regarding the amount of death benefits for which Eastern may be held liable to private respondent. In assessing such
amount, the POEA relied upon Memorandum Circular No. 71 (effective 1 December 1981) issued by the now defunct National Seamen Board
(NSB):
SECTION D. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS DURING THE, TERM OF THE CONTRACT.
1. In case of total and permanent disability or death of the seaman during the term of his contract, the company II pay the
,seaman or his beneficial the amount of:
P100,000.00-for masters and Chief Engineers
75,000.00 - for other officers
50,000.00 - for ratings
over and above the benefits which are provided for abd are the liabilities of the Philippine government under the Philippine
laws. Provided that when the employment of a seaman is also covered by a collective bargaining agreement or death/disability
insurance which provides for higher benefits than those enumerated above, in which case, the seaman or his
heirs/beneficiaries may elect under what scheme he is they are claiming. Recovery under one scheme is a bar to any farther
recovery; except where there is a clear showing in the collective bargaining agreement and/or death/disability insurance that
benefits provided for in the collective bargaining agreement and death/disability insurance are separate and distinct from the
abovementioned benefits. The exact amount of insurance that each seaman is covered under this contract are as stipulated in
Column J of Appendix 2 of this contract. In addition to the above, the expenses for hospitalization of the seaman shall be
borne by the employer.
2. In lieu of paragraph 1 above, the liability of [an] employer of a Philippine registered vessel (exceptforeign- owned vessels
bareboat-chartered to a Philippine shipping company) shall be governed by existing Philippine Laws over and above the
benefits granted [under] Philippine laws on social security and employees' compensation benefits provided that the Philippine
registered vessel and any vessel bareboat- chartered to a Philippine Shipping Company shall be manned by full Filipino crews.
(Emphasis and brackets supplied).
It is the argument of Eastern here that NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71 collides with the public law principle of non-delegation of legislative
power. Eastern also argues that assuming the validity of the Circular, its provisions (specifically paragraph 1) do not cover Eastern.
These arguments again do not persuade. Concerning the alleged unconstitutionality of NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71, Article 20 of the
Labor Code before its repeal by Executive Order No. 797, provided in salient part:
Art. 20. National Seamen Board.-A National Seamen Board is hereby created which shall develop and maintain a
comprehensive program for Filipino seamen employed overseas. It shall have the power and duty:
xxx xxx xxx
2. To regulate and supervise the activities of agents or representatives of shipping companies in the hiring of seamen for
overseas employment; and secure the best possible terms of employment for contract seamen workers and secure
compliance therewith;
xxx xxx xxx.
(Emphasis supplied)
The question of validity of the delegation of quasi-legislative power in favor of NSB's successor, respondent POEA, embodied in the article
quoted above, was addressed and resolved in the affirmative by the Court inEastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, et al.
10
On the authority of this case, we hold that NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71 was issued in a valid exercise by the NSB
of its "power and duty ... [to] secure the best possible terms of employment for contract seamen workers and [to] secure compliance therewith."
We consider next petitioner's argument that it is not covered by the provisions of NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71. Eastern submitted in
evidence Certificate of Philippine Register Nos. ICGD-78-0428 dated 28 December 1978
11
and ICGD-84-0288 dated 7 August 1984
12
to show
that this M/V Eastern Meteor was registered with the Philippine Coast Guard in 1978 and again in 1984. Eastern further maintained that
M/V Eastern Meteor had always been fully manned by a Philippine crew. The record also shows, however, that this vessel was at the same time
also registered in the Republic of Panama as evidenced by the Patente Permanente de Navegacion Servicio Internacional Nos. 7708-77 (dated
31 March 1977)
13
and 770877-A (dated 27 February 1987).
14
Petitioner had in fact paid taxes to the Panamanian government in 1978, 1979
1981, 1982 and 1983,
15
presumably because the M/V Eastern Meteor was during those years operating under a valid Panamanian navigation
license. It, therefore, appears that at the time of the death of Manuel Zaragoza, the Eastern Meteor was both foreign-owned and foreign-
registered on one hand and upon the other band, simultaneously registered in the Philippines. Interpreting Section D of Memorandum Circular
No. 71, it appears clear that paragraph 1 covers Philippine seamen working in foreign-registered ships while paragraph 2 applies to Philippine
seamen working on Philippine-registered vessels. The parenthetical phrase "except foreign-owned vessels bareboat-chartered to a Philippine
shipping company" in paragraph 2 precisely covers the situation of the Eastern Meteor, that is, a foreign-owned vessel registered in a foreign
country (Panama), with a second registration in the Philippines; such a vessel is excepted from coverage by paragraph 2, and hence covered by
paragraph 1 instead. If the MN Eastern Meteor had been registered only in Panama, there would have been no question that it was covered by
paragraph 1 of NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71. It is well- known that foreign-owned and foreign-registered vessels have frequently also
secured Philippine registration where the interest or convenience of the owners dictated such second or dual registration. The effect of the
parenthetical phrase in paragraph 2 is, as already indicated, to bring such dual-registered vessel within the scope not of paragraph 2, but of
paragraph 1. The fact that POEA Memorandum Circular No. 6 (Series of 1986) in upgrading death benefits (P250,000.00 for master and chief
engineers) specified that such upgraded benefits "shall be applicable to all Filipino seamen on board any ocean-going vessel provided the cause
of action occurs on March 1, 1986 and thereafter" suggests to us the correctness of our above reading of NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71.
The underlying regulatory policy, as we see it, is that Filipino seamen working on ocean-going vessels should receive the same wages and
benefits, without regard to the nationality or nationalities of the vessels on which they serve. We hold that the POEA correctly held private
respondent Mrs. Zaragoza entitled to the benefits given to Philippine seamen under the provisions of Section D. paragraph 1 of NSB
Memorandum Circular No. 71, i.e. (1) P100,000.00 death benefit, and in addition, (2) death and related benefits provided under applicable
ordinary laws of the Philippines administered by the Social Security System.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the Decision of the POEA in POEA Case No. L-86-01-026 is hereby AFFIRMED.
The Temporary Restraining Order of 8 April 1987 is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
JESUS DE JESUS, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Philippine National
Railways), respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J .:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission which affirmed the decision of the Government Service
Insurance System denying the claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, of petitioner Jesus de Jesus, surviving spouse of the
late Ester P. de Jesus.
On April 13, 1945, Ester P. de Jesus was employed by the Philippine National Railways (PNR) as a telephone operator assigned at its San
Fernando, Pampanga railway station. She was transferred in 1964 to the switchboard 'of the PNR Hospital at Caloocan City. De Jesus worked
every other day during the night shift, for continuous periods of 16 hours starting from 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m. of the following day.
From November 10, 1978 to April 5, 1979, she was hospitalized four times at the PNR hospital. Her attending physician, Dr. Juan Pineda, Chief
of Clinics, PNR hospital, diagnozed her ailments as chronic pyelonephritis, diabetes mellitus, anemia and modular pulmonary metastases which
is also known as lung cancer.
According to Dr. Pineda, the ailments of Mrs. de Jesus started sometime in August, 1978 when she experienced progressive loss of weight and
sudden loss of appetite accompanied by body weakness and easy fatigability with no other accompanying signs and symptoms except frequent
urination. Despite medications, no improvement was noted and she soon complained of non-productive cough and mild lumbar pains. On
December 8, 1978, after more than 33 years of service and at the age of 55 years she applied for retirement under Commonwealth Act 186, as
amended by Republic Act 1616 and Republic Act 4968 which was approved effective March 1, 1979. Retirement benefits were thereafter given
under Retirement Gratuity No. 65520. Ester P. de Jesus died of her ailments on June 20, 1979. Petitioner Jesus de Jesus, the deceased's
husband, filed a claim for death benefits under P.D. 626, as amended, on August 17, 1979. The claim was denied by the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) on the ground that the deceased's ailments were not occupational diseases under the Labor Code. According to the
GSIS
Diabetes mellitus is a hereditary disorder of carbohydrate metabolism due to inadequate production of insulin by the pancreas.
Contributing factors for its occurrence are obesity, excessive consumption of sugar and fat disorders of endocrine glands and
most important, hereditary. Symptoms include excessive thirst and urination, itching, hunger, weakness and loss of weight.
Anemia is a condition in which the normal amount of red blood cans is reduced. This may be a complication of the above
diseases.
Chronic pyelonephritis is a slowly progressive infection in the renal pelvis and parenchyma frequently bilateral. It is associated
with some obstructive lesions such as kidney stones and structural abnormalities in the renal tract.
Moreover, there is also no showing that your position as telephone operator in the Philippine National Railways, Manila, had
increased the risks of contracting said ailments.
This decision was affirmed on review by the Employees' Compensation Commission on January 15, 1981.
Hence, the instant petition.
Since the ailments of the deceased, as found by her attending physician, manifested themselves in 1978 or beyond January 1, 1975, the law
governing the petitioner's claim is the New Labor Code (Art. 208, P.D. 442, as amended).
Under Article 167 (L) of the New Labor Code and Section I (b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, for the sickness
and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the
Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the
working conditions.
In this case, it is the petitioner's contention that the condition of the deceased's work increased the risk of her contracting the diseases which
caused her death.
After a careful examination of the case, we find the petitioner's claim without merit. The petitioner has failed to prove by competent evidence that
the risk of contracting said diseases was indeed increased by the working conditions concomitant with the deceased's employment.
In affirming the GSIS' decision, the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission cited the following medical discussions to negate causal
relation of the deceased's work to her ailments.
Nodular pulmonary metastases' is a phenomenon which results from infection with tumor emboli carried by the peripheral
veins. Sarcomas, hypernephromas, melanomas and tumors of the breast, thyroid, and pancreas seem to find the lung an
especially favorable site for the growth of metastases. On x-ray, nodular pulmonary metastases may appear as a solitary
'cannonball' nodule, multiple nodules, or military dissemination known as lymphangitis carcinomatosis. Dyspnea and pleuritic
pain are the cardinal symptoms of lung metastases. (Reference: Harrison, T.R. Principles of Internal Medicine, McGraw Hill
N.Y.: 5th Edition, 1966, pp. 945-946). On the other hand, 'anemia' is a condition in which the amount of blood in the body is
decrease From a practical standpoint, the term means a reduction in the number of and the amount of hemoglobin per unit of
blood. The Medical Division of this Commission discusses the etiologic classification of - as follows: '(1) loss of blood, (2)
deficiency of factors in is; (3) excessive construction of red corpuscles; (a) Congenital -or hereditary, (b) Acquired; (1) infection
(2) chronic diseases; (3) plumbism following irradiation, drug sensitivity; (4) endocrine deficiencies; (5) myelophthisic anemia;
(6) hypersplenism (7) Idiopathic bone marrow failure; (c) miscellaneous hypersideremic anemias. Reference: Harrison,
T.R.: Principles of Internal Medicine; McGraw Hill N.Y. 5th edition, 1966, p. 153.'
The decedent's other aliments, namely: diabetes mellitus and chronic pyelonephritis are likewise not traceable to her
employment and employment conditions. 'Diabetes mellitus', according to medical science is:
A hereditary or developmental disorder of carbohydrate metabolism due to an absolute or relative insufficiency of the action of
insulin appearing at any age as hyperglycemia, glycosuria, polyuria, polydipsia, polyphagia, pruritus weakness and weight
loss. Etiology and incidence: Insufficient insulin action from causes still unknown is responsible for most cases of diabetes
mellitus. Decreased effectiveness of insulin, which may or may not be associated with the presence of antagonist to insulin, is
probably of greater etiologic importance than is an inadequate production of insulin by the B-cells of the islets of Langerhans.
Although the exact cause of diabetes has not been found, some contributory factors are recognized. Hereditary is important,
since there is a familiar history of diabetes in as many as 50% of cases. Obesity has been indicted. Disorders of endocrine
glands other than the pancreas may be associated with the development of diabetes mellitus. Infection is a common precursor
to the appearance or exacerbation of the disease, probably making a latent diabetes manifest. Pancreatitis, pancreatic tumors
and hemochromatosis are responsible for occasional cases of diabetes. In certain persons who may be more susceptible to
the eventual development of diabetes (e.g. strong positive family history) the use of certain drugs may be associated with the
appearance of overt diseases. Such drugs include adrenocortical steroids and thiazide diuretics.
Reference: Lyght, C.E.: The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy, M.S.D.; N.J. llth ed., 1966,. pp- 325-326.
Chronic pyelonephritis refers to a slowly progressing infection in the renal pelvis and parenchyma frequently bilateral The
condition may have its origin in an acute pyelonephritis in childhood, especially in females, or during pregnancy. In males, it is
usually associated with some obstructive lesion, such as renal calculi or prostatic hypertrophy. The common etiologic agent i s
the colon bacillus, P. vulgaris, or a related organism. Less frequently, one of the gram-positive cocci may be responsible.
Reference: C.E. Lyght: The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy, M.S., N.J. 1lth ed., p. 255.
On the other hand, the petitioner alleges that the deceased's continuous night shift duties coupled with the offensive odor of some medicine and
dirty linens that were dumped regularly near her office, afflicted her weakening lungs and induced the development of lung cancer and anemia.
To bolster his claim, he submits a clinical history of the deceased and a letter certification both prepared by Dr. Juan Pineda, who was the
attending physician of the deceased,
We regret to note, however, that the allegations have not been substantiated by the petitioner. While this court has always maintained that the
strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation (Neri v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 127 SCRA 672), the basic
rule that a mere allegation is not evidence (Topweld Manufacturing, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 44944, August 9, 1985; Lagasca v.
de Vera, 79 Phil. 376) should not be disregarded.
As to the medical view of Dr. Pineda, his endorsement that the deceased's working condition "contributed immeasurably to the insidious
development of her lung lesion" and that her 11 unusual and prolonged working hours finally sapped her strength leading to physical exhaustion"
which, together with diabetes and anemia, provided a "groundwork for pulmonary metastases" (Rollo, p. 16), implies aggravation of the disease
rather than its direct causation.
We are, therefore, powerless under the law to reject the respondents' view that the diseases which the deceased suffered are not caused by
employment. As the medical authorities reveal, those ailments are common to all mankind whether employed or unemployed, and if employed,
irregardless of the nature of the employment.
Under the old Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, which provided for the concepts of "presumption of compensability" and
"aggravation" it was possible to stretch the work related nature of an ailment beyond seemingly rational limits.
In this case, however, there is no dispute that the governing law is the New Labor Code, which according to settled jurisprudence (Sulit v.
Employees' Compensation Commission, 98 SCRA 483; Armena v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 122 SCRA 851; Felipe U. Erese v.
Employees' Compensation Commission, GSIS, Metro Manila, G.R. No. L45662, August 20, 1985), discarded the aforesaid concepts to restore a
sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employee's rights to receive reparation for work-
connected death or disability.
The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by the contributions of employers based on the salaries of their employees. The injured
worker does not have to litigate his right to compensation. No employer opposes his claim. There is no notice of injury nor requirement of
controversion. The sick worker simply files a claim with a new neutral Employees' Compensation Commission which then determines on the
basis of the employee's supporting papers and medical evidence whether or not compensation may be paid. The payment of benefits is more
prompt. The cost of administration is low. The amount of death benefits has also been doubled.
On the other hand, the employer's duty is only to pay the regular monthly premiums to the scheme. It does not look for insurance companies to
meet sudden demands for compensation payments or set up its own funds to meet these contingencies. It does not have to defend itself from
spuriously documented or long past claims.
The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen's compensation. The Commission administers and settles claims
from a fund under its exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the compensation process and it has no control, as in the past, over
payment of benefits. The open ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered claimant suffering from an
occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.
Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules on presumption of compensability and controversion cease
to have importance. The lopsided situation of an employer versus one employee, which called for equalization through the various rules and
concepts favoring the claimant, is now absent.
The Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund was established after actuarial studies and on the basis of the provisions of the new
law. I commiserate with the claimant but compassion should be for all beneficiaries and not specific claimants. If we endanger the stability and
liquidity of the Fund through orders compelling payment of benefits where the law never intended such benefits to be paid, we are not
compassionate. We endanger the scheme.
WHEREFORE, we hold that the decision appealed from should be, as it is, hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.
INTERORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES, INC., FIRCROFT SHIPPING CORPORATION and TIMES SURETY & INSURANCE CO.,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and CONSTANCIA PINEDA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J .:
Are the local crewing or manning agent and its foreign principal (the shipowner) liable for the death of a Filipino seaman-employee who, after
having been discharged, was killed in transit while being repatriated home?
The instant petition
1
seeks the reversal and/or modification of the Resolution
2
dated March 30, 1994 of public respondent National Labor
Relations Commission
3
dismissing the appeals of petitioners and affirming the decision dated November 16, 1992
4
of Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) Administrator Felicisimo C. Joson, which ordered
that.
5

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, respondents are hereby jointly and severally held liable to pay the
complainant the following amounts:
1. P130,000.00 as death compensation benefits.
2. P18,000.00 as burial expenses.
The Facts
The proceedings below originated as a claim for death compensation benefits filed by Constancia Pineda as heir of her deceased son, seaman
Jeremias Pineda, against Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. and its foreign principal, Fircroft Shipping Corporation and the Times Surety and
Insurance Co., Inc. The following facts were found by the POEA Administrator:
6

As can be gathered from the records of the case, it was alleged that deceased seaman, Jeremias Pineda was contracted to
work as Oiler on board the vessels, "MV Amazonia", owned and operated by its foreign principal, Fircroft Shipping Corporation
for a period of nine (9) months with additional three (3) months upon mutual consent of both parties with a monthly basic
salary of US$276.00 plus fixed overtime rate of US$83.00 and a leave pay of 2 1/2 days per month; that on October 2, 1989,
he met his death when he was shot by a Thai Policeman in Bangkok, Thailand; that considering that the deceased seaman
was suffering from mental disorders aggravated by threats on his life by his fellow seamen, the Ship Captain should not have
allowed him to travel alone.
xxx xxx xxx
In its Answer/Position Paper, respondent agency averred that deceased seaman signed a contract of employment as Oiler for
a period of nine (9) months with additional three (3) months upon mutual consent of both parties with a monthly salary of
US$276.00, fixed overtime rate of US$83.00; that on December 21, 1988, deceased seaman jointed the vessels MV
Amazonia and proceeded to discharge his duties as Oiler; that on September 28, 1989, he finished his contract and was
discharged from the port of Dubai for repatriation to Manila; that his flight schedule from Dubai to the Philippines necessitated
a stopover at Bangkok, Thailand, and during said stopover he disembarked on his own free will and failed to join the
connecting flight to Hongkong with final destination to Manila; that on October 5, 1990, it received a fax transmission from the
Department of Foreign Affairs to the effect that Jeremias Pineda was shot by a Thai Officer on duty on October 2, 1989 at
around 4:00 P.M.; that the police report submitted to the Philippine Embassy in Bangkok confirmed that it was Pineda who
"approached and tried to stab the police sergeant with a knife and that therefore he was forced to pull out his gun and shot
Pineda"; that they are not liable to pay any death/burial benefits pursuant to the provisions of Par. 6, Section C. Part II, POEA
Standard Format of Employment which state(s) that "no compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, (in)capacity,
disability or death resulting from a willful (sic) act on his own life by the seaman"; that the deceased seaman died due to his
own willful (sic) act in attacking a policeman in Bangkok who shot him in self-defense.
After the parties presented their respective evidence, the POEA Administrator rendered his decision holding petitioners liable for death
compensation benefits and burial expenses.
Petitioners appealed the POEA decision to the public respondent. In a Decision dated March 30, 1994, public respondent upheld the POEA.
Thus, this recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari per Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The Issues
The petitioners made the following "assignment of errors":
Respondent NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion in ruling that herein petitioners are liable for death compensation
benefits despite the fact that there is no direct evidence proving that Pineda was mentally sick at the time of repatriation.
Respondent NLRC committed a serious error of law in not upholding the provisions of Par. 6, Section C, Part II of the POEA
standard format Contract of Employment.
Respondent NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion in finding for compensability of Pineda's death when respondents
(should read "petitioners") have proven that his death was not work-connected.
The principal issue in this case is whether the petitioners can be held liable for the death of seaman Jeremias Pineda.
The petitioners challenge the factual bases of the NLRC Decision, and argue that there was "no evidence, whether documentary or testimonial,
that the deceased Pineda, at the time of his repatriation was not in full control of his mental faculties", and that "there (was) no showing that
seaman Pineda acted strangely when he disembarked from the vessel" in Dubai where he was discharge, and from which point he flew to
Bangkok without any untoward incident during the entire trip. They thus insist that they were under no obligation to have Pineda accompanied
home when he was discharged at the end of the contract term of nine months, that they were in no position to control the deceased's
movements and behavior after he was repatriated and therefore should not be held answerable for the deceased's own voluntary acts, and that
the deceased could have, while in Bangkok, ingested some drugs or other mindaltering substance resulting in his aggressive behavior and
untimely demise.
The Court's Ruling
Procedural and Substantive Defects
At the outset, we note that the petition suffers from serious procedural defects that warrant its being dismissed outright. Petitioners acted
prematurely, not having filed any motion for reconsideration with the public respondent before bringing the instant petition to this Court. This
constitutes a fatal infirmity.
. . . The unquestioned rule in this jurisdiction is that certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the acts of public respondent. In the instant case, the plain and
adequate remedy expressly provided by the law was a motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision, based on palpable
or patent errors, to be made under oath and filed within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the questioned decision.
7

(T)he filing of such a motion is intended to afford public respondent an opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error
attributed to it by way of a re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case. Petitioner's inaction or negligence under
the circumstances is tantamount to a deprivation of the right and opportunity of the respondent Commission to cleanse itself of
an error unwittingly committed or to vindicate itself of an act unfairly imputed. . . .
8

. . . And for failure to avail of the correct remedy expressly provided by law, petitioner has permitted the subject Resolution to
be come final and executory after the lapse of the ten day period within which to file such motion for reconsideration.
9

But even if the aforesaid procedural defect were to be overlooked, the instant petition nevertheless suffers from serious substantive flaws. The
petition assails the Resolution of the respondent Commission as lacking factual and legal bases to support the same. A petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will lie only in cases where a grave abuse of discretion or an act without or in excess of
jurisdiction is clearly shown to have been committed by the respondent Commission, and this Court's jurisdiction to review decisions or
resolutions of the respondent NLRC does not include a correction of its evaluation of the evidence.
10
Moreover, it is a fundamental rule that the
factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the respondent NLRC, if supported by substantial evidence, are generally accorded not only great
respect but even finality, and are binding upon this Court, unless the petitioner is able to clearly demonstrate that respondent Commission had
arbitrarily disregarded evidence before it or had misapprehended evidence to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion if such evidence
had been properly appreciated.
11

First Issue: No Direct Evidence of Mental State?
At any rate, even disregarding for the nonce the substantive as well as procedural defects discussed above, a judicious review of the records of
this case turns up no indication whatsoever that the respondent Commission committed any grave abuse or acted beyond or without jurisdiction.
On the contrary, the petitioners contention that the assailed Resolution has no factual and legal bases is belied by the adoption with approval by
the public respondent of the findings of the POEA Administrator, which recites at length the reasons for holding that the deceased Pineda was
mentally sick prior to his death and concomitantly, was no longer in full control of his mental faculties.
First, a word about the evidence supporting the findings of the POEA Administrator. We have held that claims of overseas workers against their
foreign employers should not be subjected to the rules of evidence and procedure that courts usually apply to other complainants who have
more facility in obtaining the required evidence to prove their demands.
12
Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that in cases filed
before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies (like the POEA), a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, i.e.,
that amount of evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
13
In this instance, seaman Pineda, who was
discharged in Dubai, a foreign land, could not reasonably be expected to immediately resort to and avail of psychiatric exami nation, assuming
that he was still capable of submitting himself to such examination at that time, not to mention the fact that when he disembarked in Dubai, he
was already discharged and without employment his contract having already run its full term and he had already been put on a plane
bound for the Philippines. This explains the lack or absence of direct evidence showing his mental state.
The circumstances prior to and surrounding his death, however, provide substantial evidence of the existence of such mental defect or disorder.
Such mental disorder became evident when he failed to join his connecting flight to Hongkong, having during said stopover wandered out of the
Bangkok airport's immigration area on his own. We can perceive no sane and sufficient reason for a Pinoy overseas contract worker or seaman
to want to while away his time in a foreign land, when he is presumably unfamiliar with its native tongue, with nothing to do and no source of
income, and after having been absent from kith and kin, heart and home for almost an entire year. Nor can we find any plausible reason for him
to be wielding a knife and scaring away passersby, and even taking a stab at an armed policeman, unless he is no longer in full possession of
his sanity. To our mind, these circumstances are sufficient in themselves to produce a firm conviction that the deceased seaman in this case was
no longer in full control of his senses when he left his work. To reiterate, in this case, no more than substantial evidence is required.
Second Issue: Employer Exempted from Liability?
It is petitioner's contention that "Pineda's death caused by his own willful act of attacking a Thai policeman and getting shot at in self-
defense is not compensable", inasmuch as Par. 6, Section C, Part II of the POEA's Standard Format Contract of Employment for
Seaman states that:
No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death resulting from a (deliberate or) willful
act on his own life by the seaman(,) provided, however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or
death is directly attributable to the seaman. (Emphasis supplied).
Moreover, petitioners contend that this Court already held in the case of Mabuhay Shipping Services, Inc.vs. NLRC and Cecilia
Sentina
14
that the employer is not liable for the willful act of an employee on his own life. Further, Article 172 of the Labor Code
provides for a limitation on the liability of the State Insurance Fund when the "disability or death was occasioned by the employee's
intoxication, willful intention to injure or kill himself or another, notorious negligence . . . . ".
Petitioners are in error. This Court agrees with the POEA Administrator that seaman Pineda was no longer acting sanely when he
attacked the Thai policeman. The report of the Philippine Embassy in Thailand dated October 9, 1990 depicting the deceased's strange
behavior shortly before he was shot dead, after having wandered around Bangkok for four days, clearly shows that the man was not in
full control of his own self:
15

(CAD) IN REPLY TO TELEX SENT TO EMBASSY BY ADM. SARMIENTO/DELA ROSA OF OWWA/DOLE RE CAUSE OF
DEATH OF DECEASED SEAMAN JEREMIAS PINEDA, KINDLY ADVICE HIS OFFICE THAT SUBJECT ARRIVED
BANGKOK 1515H ON BOARD XC903 ON A STOP OVER FLIGHT FROM DUBAI ON HIS WAY TO HONGKONG
PROCEEDING TO MANILA. UNFORTUNATELY PINEDA FAILED TO TAKE THE SAME FLIGHT OUT AT 1630H, CHECKED
OUT OF IMMIGRATION, WENT OUT OF AIRPORT AND WANDERED OUT AND FEW DAYS LATER MET HIS UNTIMELY
DEMISE. PLS. REFER TO OURAD DATED 5 OCT 89 QUOTING FULL TEXT OF POLICE REPORT ADDRESSED TO THIS
EMBASSY RECOUNTING INCIDENT LEADING TO FATAL SHOOTING OF PINEDA. KINDLY FURNISH OWWA/DOLE
FULL TEXT OF SAID REPORT FOR THEIR INFO.
PER REPORT RECEIVED FROM AIRPORT PERSONNEL PINEDA WAS ACTING STRANGELY, REFUSED TO BOARD
HIS SCHEDULED FLIGHT AND DISAPPEARED FROM AIRPORT . POLICE REPORT ALSO CONFIRMED HIS STRANGE
BEHAVIOR LEADING TO HIS ARREST, THEN RUNNING AMOK AND CAUSING TROUBLE TO PASSERS AND ATTEMPT
TO STAB THE DUTY POLICEMAN WHO TRIED TO PACIFY HIM .
PINEDA SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN SUFFERING FROM SOME MENTAL DISORDER AS CAN BE GLEANED FROM HIS
PERSONAL LETTERS DISCOVERED AMONG HIS PERSONAL EFFECTS. HE COMPLAINED OF SUFFERING FROM
SEVERE HEAD PAINS AND EVEN REPORTED TO CAPTAIN OF A SHIP ABOUT THREATS ON HIS LIFE BY FELLOW
SEAMAN WHICH INVARIABLY LEAD (sic) TO HIS BEING REPATRIATED HOME WHICH GREATLY AFFECTED HIS
DISPOSITION .
SUGGEST DOLE CONTACT CAPTAIN OF M/V AMAZSON (sic) AND ASCERTAIN AS TO WHY PINEDA HAVE (sic) TO
DISEMBARK AND SUBSEQUENTLY REPATRIATED. IF PINEDA WAS ALREADY SUFFERING FROM MENTAL
DISORDER AS FEARED, HE SHOULD HAVE NOT BEEN ALLOWED TO TRAVEL HOME ALONE AND SHOULD HAVE
BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY A PHYSICIAN. (emphasis supplied)
The POEA Administrator ruled, and this Court agrees, that since Pineda attacked the Thai policeman when he was no longer in
complete control of his mental faculties, the aforequoted provision of the Standard Format Contract of Employment exemption the
employer from liability should not apply in the instant case. Firstly, the fact that the deceased suffered from mental disorder at the time
of his repatriation means that he must have been deprived of the full use of his reason, and that thereby, his will must have been
impaired, at the very least. Thus, his attack on the policeman can in no wise be characterized as a deliberate, willful or voluntary act on
his part. Secondly, and apart from that, we also agree that in light of the deceased's mental condition, petitioners "should have
observed some precautionary measures and should not have allowed said seaman to travel home alone",
16
and their failure to do so
rendered them liable for the death of Pineda. Indeed, "the obligations and liabilities of the (herein petitioners) do not end upon the
expiration of the contracted period as (petitioners are) duty bound to repatriate the seaman to the point of hire to effectively terminate
the contract of employment."
17

The instant case should be distinguished from the case of Mabuhay, where the deceased, Romulo Sentina, had been in a state of
intoxication, then ran amuck and inflicted injury upon another person, so that the latter in his own defense fought back and in the
process killed Sentina. Previous to said incident, there was no proof of mental disorder on the part of Sentina. The cause of Sentina's
death is categorized as a deliberate and willful act on his own life directly attributable to him. But seaman Pineda was not similarly
situated.
Incidentally, petitioners conjecture that the deceased could have been on drugs when he assaulted the policeman. If this had been the
case, the Thai police and the Philippine Embassy in Bangkok would most certainly have made mention thereof in their respective
reports. But they did not do so.
Third Issue: Was Death Work-Related?
Petitioners further argue that the cause of Pineda's death "is not one of the occupational diseases listed by law", and that in the case
of De Jesus vs. Employee's Compensation Commission,
18
this Court held that ". . . for the sickness and the resulting disability or death
to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex 'A' of the Rules (the Amended Rules
on Employee's Compensation) with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the
disease is increased by the working conditions."
19

Petitioner's reliance on De Jesus is misplaced, as the death and burial benefits being claimed in this case are not payable by the
Employee's Compensation Commission and chargeable against the State Insurance Fund. These claims arose from the responsibility
of the foreign employer together with the local agency for the safety of the employee during his repatriation and until his arrival in this
country, i.e., the point of hire. Through the termination of the employment contract was duly effected in Dubai, still, the responsibility of
the foreign employer to see to it that Pineda was duly repatriated to the point of hiring subsisted. Section 4, Rule VIII of the Rules and
Regulations Governing Overseas Employment clearly provides for the duration of the mandatory personal accident and life insurance
covering accident death, dismemberment and disability of overseas workers:
Sec. 4. Duration of Insurance Coverage. The minimum coverage shall take effect upon payment of the premium and shall
be extended worldwide, on and off the job, for the duration of the worker's contract plus sixty (60) calendar days after
termination of the contract of employment; provided that in no case shall the duration of the insurance coverage be less than
one year. (Emphasis supplied)
The foreign employer may not have been obligated by its contract to provide a companion for a returning employee, but it cannot deny
that it was expressly tasked by its agreement to assure the safe return of said worker. The uncaring attitude displayed by petitioners
who, knowing fully well that its employee had been suffering from some mental disorder, nevertheless still allowed him to travel home
alone, is appalling to say the least. Such attitude harks back to another time when the landed gentry practically owned the serfs, and
disposed of them when the latter had grown old, sick or otherwise lost their usefulness.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Decision assailed in this petition is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
NFD INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS and BARBER INTERNATIONAL A/S, petitioners,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NELIA MISADA, for herself and in behalf of her minor children CAESAR and
ALPHA JOY, all surnamed MISADA and HIMAYA ENVIDIADO, for herself and in behalf of her minor children HENREA, HAZEL, and
HENDRICK, all surnamed ENVIDIADO, respondents.
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision dated April 25, 1994 of the National Labor Relations Commission
which ordered petitioners to pay a total of U.S. $26,641.42 as death benefits to private respondents.
Petitioner NFD International Manning Agents, Inc., a domestic manning corporation, engaged the services of Eduardo P. Misada and
Enrico A. Envidiado to work for petitioner Barber International A/S (Barber), a Norwegian shipping company. Misada and Envidi ado
were hired as second and third officers, respectively, on board the vessel M/V Pan Victoria. They were to travel from Sweden to South
Korea for a period of ten months from January 1991 to November 1991.
On July 5, 1991, private respondent Nelia Misada received notice that her husband, Eduardo Misada, died on June 28, 1991 whil e on
board the M/V Pan Victoria. On July 12 1991, private respondent Himaya Envidiado likewise received notice that her husband, Enrico
Envidiado, died on board the vessel.
As heirs of the deceased seamen, private respondents, in their behalf and in behalf of their minor children, filed for death compensation
benefits under the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) Standard Contract of Employment and the Norwegian National
Insurance Scheme (NIS) for Filipino Officers. Their claims were denied by petitioners.
Private respondents filed separate complaints before the POEA Adjudication Office. They prayed for U.S. $13,000.00 each as death
compensation under the POEA Standard Contract of Employment and U.S. $30,000.00 for each wife and U.S. $8,000.00 for each child
under eighteen years under the Norwegian NIS.
1

In their Answer, petitioners claimed that private respondents are not entitled to death benefits on the ground that the seamen's deaths
were due to their own willful act. They alleged that the deceased were among three (3) Filipino seamen who implanted fragments of
reindeer horn in their respective sexual organs on or about June 18, 1991; that due to the lack of sanitary conditions at the time and
place of implantation, all three seamen suffered "severe tetanus" and "massive viral infections;" that Misada and Envidiado died within
days of the other; that the third seaman, Arturo Fajardo, narrowly missed death only because the vessel was at port in Penang,
Malaysia at the time the tetanus became critical.
2

The complaints were consolidated and the parties filed their respective position papers and documentary evidence. On October 20,
1993, the POEA Administrator dismissed the case for lack of merit.
Private respondents appealed to respondent Commission. During the pendency of the appeal, private respondents submitted additional
documentary evidence in support of their Memorandum on Appeal.
On April 25, 1994, respondent Commission reversed the POEA Administrator and ordered petitioners to pay private respondents the
following:
(a) To complainant Nelia F. Misada and her two minor children, Julius Caesar and Alpha Joy, all surnamed Misada:
(1) Death compensation of U.S. $13,000.00 under the POEA Standard Format;
(b) To complainant Himaya G. Envidiado and her three (3) minor children, Henrea, Hazel and Hendrick, all surnamed
Envidiado;
(1) Death compensation of U.S. $13,000.00 under the provisions of the POEA Rules and Regulations; and
(2) Backwages as of July 1991 amounting to U.S. $641.42 or its peso equivalent.
SO ORDERED.
3

Hence this petition. Petitioners claim that:
I
FIRSTLY, THE NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN CONSIDERING DOCUMENTS WHICH DO NOT
FORM PART OF THE EVIDENCE IN THE INSTANT CASE, THEREBY DEPRIVING PETITIONERS OF DUE PROCESS;
II
SECONDLY, THE NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT OVERTURNED WHAT HAS BEEN
ESTABLISHED BY CIRCUMSTANTIAL AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ON THE BASIS OF DOCUMENTS WHICH AT
BEST ARE HEARSAY; and
III
THIRDLY, THE NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE POEA DECISION ON THE
BASIS OF DOCUMENTS WHICH AT BEST ARE NOT CONCLUSIVE AS TO THE CAUSE OF DEATH OF SUBJECT
SEAMEN.
4

Petitioners claim respondent Commission gravely abused its discretion in admitting private respondent's additional evidence on appeal.
Petitioners allege that the additional evidence were "surreptitiously" submitted in violation of petitioner's right to due process.
The submission of additional evidence before the respondent Commission is not prohibited by the New Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC. After all, rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling in labor cases.
5
The NLRC and labor arbiters
are directed to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to
technicalities of law and procedure all in the interest of substantial justice.
6
In keeping with this directive, it has been held that the
NLRC may consider evidence, such as documents and affidavits, submitted by the parties for the first time on appeal.
7
The submission
of additional evidence on appeal does not prejudice the other party for the latter could submit counter-evidence.
8

In the case at bar, the additional evidence was submitted by private respondents before the respondent Commission in their
Memorandum on Appeal dated November 8, 1993. The decision of respondent Commission was rendered on April 25, 1994, i.e., six (6)
months after the additional documents were submitted. Petitioners had ample opportunity to object and refute the documents. They had
the chance to submit counter-evidence during this period but they did not do so. It was only when they moved for reconsideration of the
decision of respondent Commission that they questioned the admission of these evidence.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain one's side.
9
It is also an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
10
It is not the
denial of the right to be heard but denial of the opportunity to be heard that constitutes violation of due process of law.
11

Procedural matters having been disposed of, the substantive issue in this case is whether respondent Commission gravely erred in
finding that the deaths of the two seamen, Eduardo Misada and Enrico Envidiado, did not come as a result of their willful and deliberate
act.
Part II, Section C, No. 1, Paragraph 1 of the POEA "Standard Employment Contract Governing the Employment of All Filipino Seamen
on Board Ocean-Going Vessels"
12
provides that:
1. In case of death of the seaman during the term of this contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine
Currency equivalent to the amount of U.S. $50,000.00 and an additional amount of U.S. $7,000.00 to each child under the age
of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four children at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.
xxx xxx xxx
13

Part II, Section C, No. 6 of the same Standards Employment Contract also provides:
6. No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death resulting from a willful act on his
own life by the seaman, provided, however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is
directly attributable to him.
14

The death of a seaman during the term of his employment makes the employer liable to the former's heirs for death compensation
benefits. The POEA Standard Employment Contract fixes the amount at U.S. $50,000.00 and an additional amount of U.S. $7,000.00
for each child, not exceeding four, under twenty-one years of age. The employer becomes liable once it is established that the seaman
died during the effectivity of his employment contract. This rule, however, is not absolute. The employer may be exempt from liability if
he can successfully prove that the seaman's death was caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act.
15

In the instant case, petitioners claim that the deaths of the two seamen came as a result of their self-inflicted injuries. As proof,
petitioners presented written from the master of the M/V Pan Victoria, the medical reports of Misada, Envidiado and Arturo Fajardo, the
seaman who survived the infection, and the written statements of three (3) officers of the vessel taken during a special inquiry
conducted after their deaths.
Petitioners contend that Misada and Envidiado and Arturo Fajardo implanted fragments of the horn of a reindeer or antelope in their
respective sexual organs while on a voyage on board the M/V Pan Victoria. The horn was left by a Greek officer from a previous
voyage. Misada found the horn and asked for it from the Chief Officer. Misada gave the horn to the Second Engineer to carve and
shape for implantation. Thereafter, shaped fragments of the horn were inserted by Misada and Envidiado subcutaneously into their
respective sex organs on June 19, 1991 while that of Fajardo was implanted two or three days later. The implantations were made
surgically in the absence of sanitary and sterile facilities.
Several days later, Misada complained of difficulty in swallowing and breathing. He had severe tonsillitis and was suffering from spasms
and convulsions.
16
The ship captain was compelled to alter course and drop anchor at Colombo, Sri Lanka for medical
treatment.
17
Misada, however, died on board the vessel on June 28, 1991. His dead body was examined at the Colombo General
Hospital, Colombo, Sri Lanka, where the cause of his death was placed as "acute laryngo-trachea bronchitis with pneumonia due to
viral infection."
18

It was after the vessel left Colombo on June 30, 1991 that Envidiado started exhibiting the same symptoms as Misada. The ship captain
had to drop anchor at the nearest port which was Galle, Sri Lanka.
19
Envidiado was brought ashore and admitted to hospital. He died a
few days later.
On July 3, 1991, Arturo Fajardo started exhibiting the same symptoms as the two other seamen. On inquiry, the master of the vessel
learned that Misada, Envidiado and Fajardo implanted pieces of reindeer horn in their sex organs. Fajardo's condition worsened and
the master was compelled to drop anchor at Penang, Malaysia where Fajardo was admitted to hospital on July 5, 1991. He was
diagnosed to be suffering from tetanus and given medication for said illness. Fajardo recovered two weeks later.
20

As a result of this chain of events, the master of the vessel conducted a formal inquiry to verify the cause of the seamen's deaths and
illness. Written testimonies as to the events leading to their deaths were taken from the master, the Chief Officer, Second Engineer and
Second Cook.
The testimonies of the officers are insufficient to prove the fact that Misada's and Envidiado's deaths were caused by self-inflicted
injuries. The testimonies were given by people who merely observed and narrated the circumstances surrounding the deaths of the two
seamen and the illness of Fajardo. Fajardo himself did not submit any testimony regarding the implantation. The testimonies of the
officers are, at best, hearsay. Moreover, the officers did not have the competence to make a medical finding as to the actual cause of
the deaths. No autopsy report was presented to corroborate their testimonies. On the contrary, Eduardo Misada was medically
diagnosed to have died of "acute laryngo-trachea bronchitis with pneumonia probably due to viral cause."
21
This was declared in his
"Cause of Death Form" after his dead body was examined on June 29, 1991 by Dr. Sydney Prematirat, a Judicial Medical Officer at
Colombo, Sri Lanka.
Enrico Envidiado was not issued a "Cause of Death Form." While still alive, he was examined in Galle, Sri Lanka by Consultant
Physician Chandima de Mel who found a wound in his penis and diagnosed his illness as "severe tetanus."
22
His "Certificate for
Removal of A Dead Body" dated July 8, 1991 issued by Dr. T.L. Seneviratne, Chief Medical Officer of Health, Municipal Council ,
Colombo, Sri Lanka,
23
and "Certificate of Embalming" dated July 8, 1991 issued by Keith Anthony Raymond
24
stated that Envidiado
died of "viral myocarditis natural causes."
The "Certificate for Removal of a Dead Body" and "Certificate of Embalming" are not proofs of the real cause of death. Their probative
value is confined only to the fact of death.
25
These documentary evidence, however, did not at all indicate that Envidiado died of
tetanus as previously diagnosed by Dr. de Mel. And despite Dr. de Mel's allegedly correct diagnosis, Envidiado died a few days later.
As correctly found by respondent Commission, petitioners' evidence insufficiently proves the fact that the deaths of the two seamen
were caused by their own willful and deliberate act. And even if the seamen implanted fragments of reindeer horn in their sex organs,
the evidence does not substantially prove that they contracted tetanus as a result of the unsanitary surgical procedures they performed
on their bodies. Neither does the evidence show that the tetanus was the direct cause of their deaths.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed and the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC CA No.
006490-94 is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND BRIGIDO SAMSON, represented by wife, NORMA S.
SAMSON, respondents.
Gamaliel G. Bongco for petitioner.
Doroteo A. Dadal for private respondent.

ALAMPAY, J .:
The case at bar stems from a claim for disability compensation benefits and hospitalization expenses under employment contract, filed by private
respondent herein, Brigido Samson, against the petitioner before the National Seaman's Board (NSB).
On April 2, 1981, a decision was rendered on by the Executive Director of the NSB, ordering petitioner herein to:
1. Pay complainant the sum of US $3,800.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency as disability compensation benefits; and
2. Pay complainant's counsel Atty. Doroteo A. Dudal, the sum of US $380.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency as
attorney's fees.
Payment of these amounts should be coursed thru the National Seamen Board.
Not satisfied with the foregoing judgment, petitioner appealed to the NLRC. During the pendency of said appeal, petitioner offered P18,000.00 to
private respondent. On May 7, 1981, private respondent received said amount and executed a "Release" document stating therein the following:
RELEASE
I, BRIGIDO SAMSON, do hereby certify to the following facts and circumstances:
1) That I had been employed by the PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CORPORATION (PISC) as 2nd Engineer on
its vessel the M/V "ASEAN KNOWLEDGE" from May 31, 1980 to February 12, 1981.
2) That my last day of service on board was on February 12, 1981.
3) That for a just, legal and valid cause, I had been repatriated due to illness after arrival in Manila onFebruary 12, 1981.
4) That I received all salaries, wages and other compensation due me during the period of my incapacity.
5) That I assumed responsibility of paying the services of the Lawyer who represents my case with the NSB against PISC in
claiming for my compensation benefits which amounted to P18,000.00.
6) That I hereby declare and affirm that I accept the validity and legality of my separation and express my desire and intention
to release the Philippine International Shipping Corporation (PISC) for any claim that may accrue to my favor whether
contractual, equitable or legal in character in the course of my employment with said company and whatever right I have
against the same in consequence of the termination of my employment.
SIGNED THIS 7th DAY OF May, 1981 in Quezon City.
(SGD.) BRIGIDO SAMSON
WITNESS:
______________ (SGD.)
(Annex B, Petition, Rollo 15).
When private respondent executed the aforestated Release document, he was then undergoing Medical treatment for the injury he sustained
while on board petitioner's vessel M/V Asean Knowledge as a Second Engineer therein.
On December 17, 1981, the appealed decision was affirmed by the NLRC. After the said decision reached finality, the corresponding writ of
execution was issued and served on petitioner. On April 28, 1982, the Sheriff who served the writ submitted a report to the Board, stating that
petitioner had paid P18,000.00 to private respondent herein which the latter accepted and evidenced by a voucher and a "Release" document
dated May 7, 1981; and that because of said payment, the Sheriff had in the meantime refrained from collecting the balance of the award until
the Board shall have passed upon this matter.
On May 19, 1982, the Board issued an Order calling the parties to a hearing, During the scheduled hearing on June 7, 1982, private respondent
maintained that the P18,000.00 was accepted by him only as partial payment of the award since he badly needed the money for his on-going
medical treatment. Petitioner herein, however, insisted that said amount constituted full payment of the award.
On June 17, 1982, an Order was issued by the Board:
Considering all the foregoing, the Board is of the opinion and so hold that the amount paid and the circumstances surrounding
the payment of P18,000.00 to complainant do not appear to be full compliance of the decision award rendered by this Board in
its decision dated April 2, 1981, as affirmed on appeal by the NLRC in its decision promulgated December 17, 1981. At most,
the sum of P18,000.00 paid to complainant would constitute only as partial compliance with the said decision but not a waiver
of the balance including the attorney's fees.
WHEREFORE, let an amended writ of execution issue as to the balance of the unpaid decision award and as to the attorney's
fees.
Pursuant to the said Order, an amended Writ of Execution was forthwith issued. Petitioner herein however, filed a motion to quash the amended
writ of execution. In a Resolution dated July 26, 1982, the Board denied the said motion. Petitioner appealed the denial of its motion to herein
respondent NLRC. On December 20, 1982, the NLRC rendered a resolution dismissing petitioner's appeal.
Hence, this instant petition for certiorari, with petitioner attributing to the NLRC the commission of the following alleged errors, namely.
1. The respondent NLRC erred in not quashing the amended writ of execution despite the release already executed by private
respondent.
2. The respondent NLRC erred in recognizing a clearly illegal decision, because said decision orders payment in the dollar
standard in violation of law.
We find no merit whatsoever in the petition.
The only issue in this case that may be said to approximate and raise a question of law is the submission of petitioner that the directive in the
decision, affirmed by the NLRC, ordering payment of the award using the dollar standard is in violation of law. We find however this petition
taken by petitioner to be untenable.
While it is true that Republic Act No. 529 makes it unlawful to require payment of domestic obligations in foreign currency, this particular statute
is not applicable to the case at bar. A careful reading of the decision rendered by the Executive Director of the NSB dated April 2, 1981 and
which led to the Writ of Execution protested to by petitioner, will readily disclose that the award to the private respondent does not compel
payment in dollar currency but in fact expressly allows payment of "its equivalent in Philippine currency." (Rollo, p. 14)
Moreover, as pointed out by public respondent, without any subsequent controversion interposed by petitioner, the fixing of the award in dollars
was based on the parties employment contract, stipulating wages and benefits in dollars since private respondent was engaged in an overseas
seaman on board petitioner's foreign vessel. (Comment of respondent NLRC to the Petition, pg. 10, Rollo, 49)
Accordingly, we fail to see any violation of R.A. No. 529.
As to petitioner's principal contention that its payment of P18,000.00 under the document of release executed by private respondent constitutes
full satisfaction of the award, We uphold the ruling of the public respondent NLRC on this matter and find no error, much less grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent NLRC in rejecting such assertion.
In the case of MRR Yard Crew Union versus Philippine National Railways, 72 SCRA 88 (1976), this Court held that the fact that the employee
"has signed a satisfaction receipt does not result in waiver; the law does not consider as valid any agreement to receive less compensation than
that the worker is entitled to recover."
Moreover, from the records it appears that there was a hearing on June 7, 1982 called by the National Seamen Board precisely to consider and
resolve whether the payment of P18,000.00 admittedly made by petitioner was in full or partial satisfaction of the award for disability
compensation benefits due to the private respondent. The said Board gave credit to the manifestations of private respondent that the latter was
constrained to accept the payment of P18,000.00 and execute the release of document as at that time he was still undergoing on-going medical
treatment for which apparently he needed funds for his expenses. (Order of June 17, 1982 of the National Seamen Board; Annex C of Petition,
Rollo, pp. 16-17). A decision on a question of fact by an administrative body is entitled to respect. Courts, as a rule, refuse to interfere with
proceedings undertaken by administrative bodies or officials in the exercise of administrative functions, absent any showing that such decision
was rendered in consequence of fraud, imposition or mistake. (Nera vs. Titong, Jr., 56 SCRA 40, 44, citing Manuel vs. Villena, 37 SCRA 745;
Venancio Lim, Sr., vs. Secretary of Agriculture, 34 SCRA 751). It was also stated in Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Camara Shoes vs. Camara
Shoes, 112 SCRA 689, that findings of fact of National Labor Relations Commission are generally entitled to respect except when there is grave
abuse of discretion, a circumstance which however we do not find attendant in the case at bar.
Aside from the reasons above-stated, we also note that the release document was executed by private respondent on May 7, 1981 during the
pendency of the appeal made to the NLRC by petitioner Philippine International Shipping Corporation from the decision of the National Seamen
Board, dated April 2, 1981. Despite the execution of said release document, the petitioner herein did not file any motion to dismiss its appeal or
to have said appealed case declared terminated due to the alleged satisfaction of the judgment. This omission negates an inference that the
parties had actually agreed that the payment of the P18,000.00 would be equivalent to a full satisfaction of the award and/or a waiver of the
balance on the award.
It is also worth noting that the questioned decision of the NLRC dated December 17, 1981, affirming the decision of the National Seamen Board,
does not appear to have been the subject of any challenge or appeal whatsoever. It was only after the National Seamen Board had issued its
order of June 17, 1982 directing petitioner to pay the balance still remaining on its previous decision award and directing the issuance of an
amended writ of execution that petitioner took exception to the decision of the NLRC which had long become final by alleging that the decision of
the National Seamen Board which the NLRC had affirmed, is in violation of law. Petitioner may not now evade the effects of a final NLRC
decision by assailing the writ of execution issued pursuant thereto.
WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.
PACIFIC ASIA OVERSEAS SHIPPING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and TEODORO RANCES, respondents.
The petitioner, Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corporation (Pascor, in short), seeks the annulment and setting aside of the Resolutions of the
public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated 14 August 1986 and 19 November 1986, denying Pascor's appeal for
having been filed out of time and denying its Motion for Reconsideration, respectively.
Sometime in March 1984, private respondent Teodoro Rances was engaged by petitioner Pascor as Radio Operator of a vessel belonging to
Pascor's foreign principal, the Gulf-East Ship Management Limited. Four (4) months later, and after having been transferred from one vessel to
another four times for misbehaviour and inability to get along with officers and crew members of each of the vessels, the foreign principal
terminated the services of private respondent Rances citing the latter's poor and incorrigible work attitude and incitement of others to
insubordination.
1

Petitioner Pascor filed a complaint against private respondent with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration tion (POEA) for acts
unbecoming a marine officer and for, character assassination," which case was docketed as POEA Case No: M-84-09-848. Private respondent
denied the charges set out in the complaint and by way of counterclaim demanded an amount of US$ 1,500.00 which a court in Dubai had, he
contended, awarded in his favor against petitioner's foreign principal. In due course, on 4 September 1985, the POEA found private respondent
liable for inciting another officer or seaman to insubordination and challenging a superior officer to a fist fight and imposed six (6) months
suspension for each offense or a total of twelve (12) months suspension, with a warning that commission of the same or similar offense in the
future would be met with a stiffer disciplinary sanction. The POEA decision passed over sub silentiothe counterclaim of private respondent.
2

On 10 October 1985, private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner, docketed as POEA Case No: M-85-10-0814 and entitled "Teodoro
Rances v. Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corporation." In this complaint, he sought to carry out and enforce the same award obtained by him in
Dubai allegedly against Pascor's foreign principal which he had pleaded as a counterclaim in POEA Case No: M-84-09-848. Private respondent
claimed that be had filed an action in the Dubai court for US$ 9,364.89, which claim was compromised by the parties for US$ 5,500.00 plus "a
return ticket to (private respondent's) country," with the proviso that "the opponent" would pay "to the claimant" US$ 1,500.00 'in case the wife of
the claimant Rantes doesn't agree with the amount sent to [her] Private respondent further claimed that since his wife did not "agree with" the
amount given to her as 'an allotment for the 3-month period (of April, May and June 1984), he was entitled to recover the additional US$
1,500.00 "as mandated under the Compromise Agreement which was the basis of the decision of the Dubai Civil Court.
3
As evidence of this
foreign award, private respondent submitted what purports to be an "original copy (sic) of the decision" of the Dubai court written in Arabic script
and language, With a copy of an English translation by an unidentified translator and a copy of a transmittal letter dated 23 September 1984
signed by one Mohd Bin Saleh "Honorary Consul for Philippines." The full texts of the purported English translation of the Dubai award and of
the transmittal letter are set out in the margin.
4

In its answer filed on 11 December 1985, petitioner Pascor made four principal arguments: that the copy of the Dubai decision relied upon by
private respondent could not be considered as evidence, not having been properly authenticated; that Pascor was not a party to the Dubai court
proceedings; that the POEA had no jurisdiction over cases for the enforcement of foreign judgments; and that the claim had al ready been
resolved in POEA Case No: M-84-09-848, having been there dismissed as a counterclaim.
In a decision dated 14 April 1986, the POEA held petitioner Pascor liable to pay private respondent Rances the amount of US$ 1,500.00 "at the
prevailing rate of exchange at the time of payment." This decision was served on petitioner's counsel on 18 April 1986, which counsel filed a
'Memorandum on Appeal and/or Motion for Reconsideration" on 29 April 1986.
Private respondent moved the next day for dismissal of the appeal and for issuance of a writ of execution, upon the ground that petitioner's
appeal had been filed one (1) day beyond the reglementary period and that, consequently, the POEA decision had become final and executory.
Petitioner opposed dismissal of its appeal and issuance of a writ of execution, arguing that the one (1) day delay in filing its Memorandum on
Appeal had been occasioned by an excusable mistake.
On 20 May 1986, the POEA issued an order denying petitioner's appeal for having been filed out of time. Petitioner moved for reconsideration,
paid the docket fee and posted the required supercedes bond in connection with its appeal.
On 29 May 1986, the POEA denied private respondent's Motion for a Writ of Execution and elevated the case to the NLRC.
On 14 August 1986, public respondent NLRC denied petitioner's appeal as flied out of time. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was similarly
denied.
In the present Petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraint ' 9 Order, Pascor urges that
public respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of its jurisdiction in denying its appeal and motion for reconsideration.
We think petitioner's contention has merit. The record shows, not an intent to delay the proceedings but rather a genuine and substantial effort
on the part of petitioner Pascor to file, in a timely manner, its Memorandum on Appeal which, in the circumstances of this case, should not have
been disregarded by respondent NLRC. The circumstances surrounding the one (1) day delay in the filing of petitioner's Memorandum on
Appeal are summed up by petitioner in the following terms:
30.1. Mr. Ruben de la Cruz, who was newly hired as messenger in the law firm representing the petitioner was tasked with the
delivery of the memorandum on appeal in the afternoon of April 28, 1986 (the last day for filing the same).
30.2. When Mr. de la Cruz read the caption of the memorandum, he noted that the same is addressed to the respondent
NLRC and he erroneously concluded that it should be filed with the offices of the NLRC in Intramuros, Manila.
30.3. Wen Mr. de la Cruz presented petitioner's Appeal at the docket section of respondent NLRC, he was advised that the
same should be filed with the offices of the POEA in Ortigas, San Juan, Metro Manila.
30.4. Mr. de la Cruz upon being apprised of his error immediately proceeded to the offices of the POEA in order to have
petitioner's (PASCOR's) appeal received but unfortunately, by the time he arrived thereat, the POEA office had already closed
for the day. Thus, the appeal was filed the following day.
To Support the above explanation, in addition to an affidavit executed by Mr. Ruben de la Cruz, petitioner submitted a certification dated 2 May
1986 executed by Evelyn G. Sauza, receive . receiving clerk of respondent NLRC stating that she had read to receive the Memorandum on
Appeal on or about 4:15 P.M., 28 April 1986, because the Memorandum was supposed to be filed with the POEA office in Ortigas and not with
the NLRC in Intramuros.
The brevity of the delay in filing an appeal is not, of course, by itself a sufficient basis for giving due course to the appeal. In the present case,
however, the factual circumstances combine with the legal merits of the case urged by the petitioner to move us to the conviction that
respondent NLRC should have recognized and heeded the requirements of orderly procedure and substantial justice which are at stake in the
present case by allowing the appeal. In Siguenza v. Court of appeals,
5
the Court stressed that the right to appeal should not be lightly
disregarded by a stringent application of rules of procedure especially where the appeal is on its face meritorious and the interests of substantial
justice would be served by permitting the appeal:
In the case of Castro v. Court of Appeals (132 SCRA 782), we stressed the importance and real purpose of the remedy of
appeal and ruled:
An appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. We have advised the courts to proceed with caution so
as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal (National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority v. Municipality
of Libmanan, 97 SCRA 138) and instructed that every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities (A.
One Feeds, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 590).<re||an1w>
The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The rules of procedure are
used only to help secure not override substantial justice. (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals [72 SCRA 1201).
Therefore, we ruled in Republic v. Court of Appeals (83 SCRA 453) that a six-day delay in the perfection of
the appeal does not warrant its dismissal. And again inRamos v. Bagasao, 96 SCRA 396, this Court held
that the delay in four (4) days in filing a notice of appeal and a notion for extension of time to file a record on
appeal can be excused on the basis of equity.
We should emphasize, however, that we have allowed the of an appeal in some cases where a sent application of the rules
would have denied it only when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of our equity
junction.
In the case at bar, the petitioner's delay in their record on appeal should not be strictly construed as to deprive them of the
right to appeal especially since on its face the appeal appears to be impressed appeal especially with merit.
6

We turn to the merits of the Petition. An examination of the complaint and of the Manifestation and Motion filed by respondent Rances in POEA
Case No: M-85-08-14, shows that the cause of action pleaded by respondent Rances was enforcement of the decision rendered by c. Dubai
Court which purported to award him, among other things, an additional amount of US$ 1,500.00 under certain circumstances. In the complaint
dated 23 October 1985, respondent Rances stated:
Details of cause of action (Why are you complaining?) (To include place and date of occurrence of case of action and amount
of claim, if any) P 2,295 US$ salary for three (3) months stated in the compromise of 1,500 TJS$ total of 2,795.50 US$ [as] per
decision from Civil Court of Dubai U.A.E.
7

The Motion/Manifestation dated 3 December 1985 filed by respondent Rances may be quoted in extension
1. Originally, complainant's claim was US$ 9,364.89 which he filed with the Dubai Court for adjudication.
xxx xxx xxx
2. The US$ 9,364.89 claim was compromised by the court in a decision dated September 12, 1984. Xerox copy of the decision
is hereto attached as Annex "B" and the authentication as Annex "B-l' and made an integral part thereof.
3. Pertinent portion of the decision referred to above reads as follows:
Both parties came to a decision that the opponent would pay to the claimant the amount of Five Thousand &
Five Hundred dollars for the withdrawal of the claimant and providing him return ticket to his country. The
opponent declared that he would pay One Thousand & Five Hundred Dollars to the opponent in case the
wife of the claimant doesn't agree with the amount sent to.
4. During the hearing leading to the Compromise, I emphasized that the allotment I was giving my wife was US$ 765.00 per
month and at the time the case was filed the allotment was already 3 months in arrears which already amounted to US$
2,295.00.
5. The amount sent my wife which is only P 13,393.45 through PASCOR and confirmed by a Certification of the Philippine
National Bank, Dagupan City Branch, hereto attached as Annex 'C' is definitely very meager compared to the exchange value
of US$ 2,295.00;
6. My wife certainly did not agree and cannot agree or admit that only P 13,393.45 will be given her as an allotment for the 3-
month period; hence, urder the Compromise Agreement, we are entitled to recover the additional US$ 1,500.00;
7. The agreement insofar as the additional remittance to my wife of US$1,500.00 is reasonable in that adding the same to the
P13,393.45 my wife received would sum up to US$2,295.00 corresponding to the accumulated 3 month allotment due my wife.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Office to
Cause or require respondent to remit and/or pay the undersigned or his wife of the amount of US$ 1,500.00as mandated
under the Compromise Agreement which was the basis of the decision of the Dubai Civil Court.
8

It should be noted that respondent Rances submitted to the POEA only the Dubai Court decision; he did not submit any copy of the
'Compromise Agreement' (assuming that to have been reduced to writing) which he presumably believed to have been absorbed and
superseded by the Dubai decision.
That the cause of action set out in respondent Rances' complaint was enforcement of the Dubai decision is further, indicated in the decision
dated 14 April 1986 rendered by the POEA. This decision provided in part as follows:
Complainant alleged that his original claim of US$ 9,364.89 for unpaid salaries, termination pay and travel expenses was filed
in Dubai. In a decision rendered by the Dubai Court, his claim was compromised in the amount of US$ 5,500.00 plus return
plane ticket. The amount of US$ 1,500.00 will be paid to his wife if she does not agree with the amount sent to her. The three
(3) months unremitted allotments refers to the months of April, May and June 1984. As evidenced by the Allotment Shp,
respondent approved the authority given by complainant stating that the amount of US$ 765.00 be remitted to his wife belong
with the month of April 1984. The amount remitted to his wife for allotment cover the three (3) month period was only P
13,393.45.The basis of complainant's claim is the reservation in the decision of the Dubai Court which states that in case the
wife of the claimant does not agree with the amount sent to her, the opponent shall pay US$ l,500.00.
9

Clearly, therefore, respondent Rances' action was for enforcement of the Dubai decision to the extent that such decision provided for payment of
an additional amount of US$1,500.00 and that respondent relied upon such decision.
Petitioner argues vigorously that the POEA had no authority and jurisdiction to enforce the judgment of a foreign court. Under Section 1, Rule 1,
Book VI of the POEA Rules and Regulations, it will be seen that the POEA has jurisdiction to decide all cases 'involving employer employee
relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including seamen." Respondent
Rances, however, relied not upon the employer - employee relationship between himself and petitioner corporation and the latter's foreign
principal, but rather upon the judgment obtained by him from the Dubai Court which had apparently already been partially satisfied by payment
to respondent Rances of US$ 5,500.00. The POEA has no jurisdiction to hear and decide a claim for enforcement of a foreign judgment. Such a
claim must be brought before the regular courts. The POEA is not a court; it is an administrative agency exercising, inter alia, adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial functions. Neither the rules of procedure nor the rules of evidence which are mandatorily applicable in proceedings before courts,
are observed in proceedings before the POEA.
10

Even assuming (arguendo, merely) that the POEA has jurisdiction to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment, still respondent Rances cannot
rely upon the Dubai decision. The Dubai decision was not properly proved before the POEA. The Dubai decision purports to be the written act or
record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country, and therefore a public writing under Section 20 (a) of Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Sections 25 and 26 of Rules 132 prescribe the manner of proving a public of official record of a foreign country in the following
terms:
Sec. 25. Proof of public or official record. An official record or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied. if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the
office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate maybe be made by a secretary of embassy or litigation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Sec. 26. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a writing is attend for the purpose of evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may
be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having
a seal, under the seal of such court. (Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, respondent Rances failed to submit any attestation issued by the proper Dubai official having legal custody of the original of
the decision of the Dubai Court that the copy presented by said respondent is a faithful copy of the original decision, which attestation must
furthermore be authenticated by a Philippine Consular Officer having jurisdiction in Dubai. The transmittal letter, dated 23 September 1984,
signed by Mohd Bin Saleh, Honorary Consul for Philippines' does not comply with the requirements of either the attestation under Section 26 nor
the authentication envisaged by Section 25.
11

There is another problem in respect of the admissibility in evidence of the Dubai decision. The Dubai decision is accompanied by a document
which purports to be an English translation of that decision., but that translation is legally defective. Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules
of Court requires that documents written in a non-official language hke Arabic) shall not be admitted as evidence unless accompanied by a
translation into English or Spanish or Filipino.
12
In Ahag v. Cabiling,
13
Mr. Justice Moreland elaborated on the need for a translation of a
document written in a language other than an official language:
... Moreover, when there is presented in evidence an exhibit written in any language other than Spanish, if there is an
appeal, that exhibit should be translated into Spanish by the official interpreter of the court, or a translation should be agreed
upon by the parties, and both original and translation sent to this court. In the case before us, there is an untranslated exhibit
written in the Visayan language.
14

In Teng Giok Yan v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.,
15
the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, had occasion to stress the importance
of having a translation made by the court interpreter who must, of course, be of recognized competence both in the language in which the
document involved is written and in English. The Court said:
[t]he trial court was certainly not bound by the translation given by the Chinese Embassy, specially in the absence of a delete
assurance that said translation was correct and that it was made by the Embassy Adviser himself. On the other hand, the
translation made by the court interpreter is official and reliable not only because of the recognized ability of said interpreter to
translate Chinese characters into English, but also because said interpreter was under the direct supervision and control of the
court. ....
16

In the instant case, there is no showing of who effected the English translation of the Dubai decision which respondent Rances submitted to the
POEA. The English translation does not purport to have been made by an official court interpreter of the Philippine Government nor of the Dubai
Government. Neither the Identity of the translator nor his competence in both the Arabic and English languages has been shown. The English
translation submitted by the respondent is not sworn to as an accurate translation of the original decision in Arabic. Neither has that translation
been agreed upon by the parties as a true and faithful one.
The foregoing does not exhaust the difficulties presented by reliance upon the Dubai decision. The Dubai Court decision, even on the basis of
the English translation submitted by respondent Rances, does not purport on its face to have been rendered against petitioner Pascor nor
against the foreign principal of petitioner. Respondent Rances simply assumed that the decision was rendered against petitioner's foreign
principal. The Dubai decision does not Identify the parties to the litigation that was resolved by said decision. Accordingly, the Dubai decision can
scarcely be enforced against petitioner Pascor. Further, even if the Dubai decision had on its face purported to be rendered against petitioner
Pascor, we must note that petitioner Pascor has expressly denied that jurisdiction had ever been acquired by the Dubai court over the person of
Pascor in accordance with the Rules of Procedure applicable before the Dubai Court.
17
Respondent Rances has not proved the contents of the
Dubai Rules of Procedure governing acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident defendant.
Finally, if it be assumed (arguendo, once more) that the Dubai Court had indeed acquired jurisdiction over the person of Pascor's foreign
principal Gulf East Ship Management Ltd. it still would not follow that Pascor would automatically be bound by the Dubai decision. The
statutory agency (or suretyship) of Pascor is limited in its reach to the contracts of employment Pascor entered into on behalf of its principal with
persons like respondent Rances.
18
Such statutory inability does not extend to liability for judgments secured against Gulf East Ship
Management Ltd., in suits brought against Gulf East outside Philippine territorial jurisdiction, even though such a suit may involve a contract of
employment with a Filipino seaman.
We conclude that the POEA acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering its Decision dated 14 April 1986 and its Order dated 20 May
1986, and that public respondent NLRC similarly acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering its Orders dated 14 August 1986 and 19
November 1986 denying petitioner's appeal and Motion for Reconsideration. This, however, is without prejudice to the right of respondent
Rances to initiate another proceeding before the POEA against petitioner Pascor, this time on the basis alone of the contract of employment
which existed between said respondent and petitioner or petitioner's foreign principal; there, respondent Rances may seek to show that he is still
entitled to the allotments which he claims were not remitted by his employer to his wife.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the Resolutions of public respondent NLRC dated 14 August 1986 and 19
November 1986 are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 8 December 1986 is hereby
made PERCENT. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.
FACILITIES MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, J. S. DREYER, and J. V. CATUIRA, petitioners,
vs.
LEONARDO DE LA ROSA AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations, dated February 14, 1972, ordering petitioners herein to pay
private respondent Leonardo de la Osa his overtime compensation, as wen as his swing shift and graveyard shift premiums at the rate of fifty
(50%) per cent of his basic sa (Annex E, p. 31, rollo).
The aforesaid decision was based on a report submitted by the Hearing Examiner, CIR (Dagupan City Branch), the pertinent portions of which
are quoted hereinbelow:::
In a petition filed on July 1, 1967, Leonardo dela Osa sought his reinstatement. with full backwages, as well as the recovery of
his overtime compensation, swing shift and graveyard shift differentials. Petitioner alleged that he was employed by
respondents as follows: (1) painter with an hourly rate of $1.25 from March, 1964 to November, 1964, inclusive; (2) houseboy
with an hourly rate of $1.26 from December, 1964 to November, 1965, inclusive; (3) houseboy with an hourly rate of $1.33
from December, 1965 to August, 1966, inclusive; and (4) cashier with an hourly rate of $1.40 from August, 1966 to March 27,
1967, inclusive. He further averred that from December, 1965 to August, 1966, inclusive, he rendered overtime services daily
and that this entire period was divided into swing and graveyard shifts to which he was assigned, but he was not paid both
overtime and night shift premiums despite his repeated demands from respondents.
Respondents filed on August 7, 1967 their letter- answer without substantially denying the material allegations of the basic
petition but interposed the following special defenses, namely: That respondents Facilities Management Corporation and J. S.
Dreyer are domiciled in Wake Island which is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippine Government; that respondent
J. V. Catuira, though an employee of respondent corporation presently stationed in Manila, is without power and authority of
legal representation; and that the employment contract between petitioner and respondent corporation carries -the approval of
the Department of Labor of the Philippines.
Subsequently on May 3, 1968. respondents filed a motion to dismiss the subject petition on the ground that this Court has no
Jurisdiction over the instant case, and on May 24, 1968, petitioner interposed an opposition thereto. Said motion was denied
by this Court in its Order issued on July 12, 1968 sustaining jurisdiction in accordance with the prevailing doctrine of the
Supreme Court in similar cases.
xxx xxx xxx
But before we consider and discuss the foregoing issues, let us first ascertain if this Court could acquire jurisdiction over the
case at bar, it having been contended by respondents that they are domiciled in Wake Island which is beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippine Government. To this incidental question, it may be stated that while it is true the site of work is
Identified as Wake Island, it is equally true the place of hire is established in Manila (See Section B, Filipino Employment
Contract, Exhibit '1'). Moreover, what is important is the fact that the contract of employment between the parties litigant was
shown to have been originally executed and subsequently renewed in Manila, as asserted by petitioner and not denied by
respondents. Hence, any dispute arising therefrom should necessarily be determined in the place or venue where it was
contracted.
xxx xxx xxx
From the evidence on hand, it has been proven beyond doubt that petitioner canvas assigned to and performed work in
respondent company at slight time which consisted of two different schedules, namely, swing shift and graveyard shifts,
particularly during his tenure as houseboy for the second period and as cashier. Petitioner's testimony to this effect was not
contradicted, much less rebutted, by respondents, as revealed by the records. Since petitioner actually rendered night time
services as required by respondents, and considering the physical, moral and sociological effects arising from the performance
of such nocturnal duties, we think and honestly believe that petitioner should be compensated at least fifty percent (50%) more
than his basic wage rate. This night shift premium pay would indeed be at par with the overtime compensation stipulated at
one and one-half (1 ) times of the straight time rate.
xxx xxx xxx (pp. 31-36, rollo).
Apropos before this Court were filed three (3) other cases involving the same petitioner, all of which had been finally dispoded of, as follows:
G.R. No Date of Filing Disposition
1. L-37117 July 30, 1973 Petition denied for
lack of merit on Sept.
13, 1973. Motion for
Reconsideration
denied lack of
merit, Nov. 20,1973.
2. L-38781 June 17,1974 Petition denied for
lack of merit on June
21,1974.
3. L-39111-12 Sept. 2,1974 Case dismissed on Feb.
6, 1976, pursuant to
voluntary manifesta
tion of private respon
dent Inocente R. Riel
that his claims had all
been settled to his entire
satisfaction.
Incidentally, in connection with G.R. No. L-39111-12 (No. 3 above), WE found strong evidence that petitioner therein, which is also the petitioner
in the case at bar, "twisted the arm" of private respondent, when the latter in his Manifestation dated July 3, 1975, stated:
3. ... Furthermore, since petitioner FMC is a foreign corporation domiciled in California, U.S.A. and has never been engaged in
business in the Philippines, nor does it have an agent or an office in this country, there exists no valid reason for me to
participate in the continuation and/or prosecution of this case (p. 194, rollo).
as if jurisdiction depends on the will of the parties to a case. At any rate, considering that petitioner paid the claims of private respondent, the
case had become moot and academic. Besides, the fact of such payment amounts to an acknowledgment on the part of petitioner of the
jurisdiction of the court over it.
WE have also noted that the principal question involved in each of the above-numbered three (3) cases is more or less Identical, to wit: Is the
mere act by a non-resident foreign corporation of recruiting Filipino workers for its own use abroad, in law doing business in the Philippines?
In the case at bar, which was filed with this Court on June 3, 1974, petitioners presented, inter alia, the following issue: ... can the CIR validly
affirm a judgment against persons domiciled outside and not doing business in the Philippines, and over whom it did not acquire jurisdiction')
While it is true that the issues presented in the decided cases are worded differently from the principal issue raised in the case at bar, the fact
remains that they all boil down to one and the same issue, which was aptly formulated and ably resolved by Mr. Justice Ramon C. Fernandez,
then with the Court of Appeals and now a member of this Court, in CA-G.R. No. SP-01485-R, later elevated to this Court on appeal by certiorari
in Case G.R. No. L-37117 this case, the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals, which was penned by Justice Fernandez and which WE
hereby adopt, runs as follows:
The principal issue presented in this special civil action is whether petitioner has been 'doing business in the Philippines' so
that the service of summons upon its agent in the Philippines vested the Court of First Instance of Manila with jurisdiction.
From the facts of record, the petitioner may be considered as doing busuness un the Philippines within the the scope of
Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of the Court which provide:
SEC 14. Service upon private foreign corporations. If the defendant is a foreign corporation or a non-
resident joint stock company or association: doing business in the Philippines, service may be made on its
resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose or, if there be no such agent, on the
government official designated by law to that effect, or on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.
Indeed, the petitioner, in compliance with Act 2486 as implemented by Department of Labor Order No. IV dated May 20, 1968
had to appoint Jaime V. Catuira, 1322 A. Mabini, Ermita, Manila as agent for FMC with authority to execute Employment
Contracts and receive, in behalf of that corporation, legal services from and be bound by processes of the Philippine Courts of
Justice, for as long as he remains an employee of FMC (Annex 'I', rollo, p. 56). It is a fact that when the summons for the
petitioner was served on Jaime V. Catuira he was still in the employ of the FMC.
In his motion to dismiss Annex B', p. 19, Rollo), petitioner admits that Mr. Catuira represented it in this country 'for the purpose
of making arrangements for the approval by the Department of Labor of the employment of Filipinos who are recruited by the
Company as its own employees for assignment abroad.' In effect, Mr. Catuira was a on officer representing petitioner in the
Philippines.
Under the rules and regulations promulgated by the Board of Investments which took effect Feb. 3, 1969, implementing Rep.
Act No. 5455, which took effect Sept. 30, 1968, the phrase 'doing business' has been exemption with illustrations, among them
being as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(f) the performance within the Philippines of any act or combination of acts enumerated in section l(l) of the
Act shall constitute 'doing business' therein. in particular, 'doing business includes:
(1) Soliciting orders, purchases (sales) or service contracts. Concrete and specific solicitations by a foreign
firm, not acting independently of the foreign firm amounting to negotiation or fixing of the terms and
conditions of sales or service contracts, regardless of whether the contracts are actually reduced to writing,
shall constitute doing business even if the enterprise has no office or fixed place of business in the
Philippines. xxx
(2) Appointing a representative or distributor who is dociled in the Philippines, unless said representative or
distributor has an independent status, i.e., it transacts business in its name and for its own account, and not
in the name or for the account of the principal.
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Opening offices, whether called 'liaison'offices, agencies or branches, unless proved otherwise.
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements, and contemplate
to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to,
or in the progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and objective of the business
organization (54 O.G. 53).
Recently decided by this Court again thru Mr. Justice Ramon C. Fernandez which is similar to the case at bar, is G.R. No. L-26809,
entitled Aetna Casualty & Curety Company, plaintiff- appellant versus Pacific Star Line, the Bradman Co., Inc., Manila Port Service and/or Manila
Railroad Company, Inc., defendants-appellees." The case is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVI, in
its Civil Case No. 53074, entitled Aetna Casualty & Surety Company vs. Pacific Star Lines, The Bradman Co., Inc., Manila Port Service and/or
Manila Railroad Company, Inc." dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff has no legal capacity to bring the suit.
It appears that on February 11, 1963, Smith Bell & Co. (Philippines), Inc. and Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., Inc., as subrogee instituted Civil
Case No. 53074 in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Pacific Star Line, The Bradman Co., Inc., Manila Port Service and/or Manila
Railroad Company, Inc. to recover the amount of US$2,300.00 representing the value of stolen and damaged cargo plus litigation expenses and
exemplary damages in the amounts of P1,000.00 and P2,000.00, respectively, with legal interest thereon from the filing of the suit and costs.
After all the defendants had filed their answer, the defendants Manila Port Service and Manila Railroad Company, Inc. amended their answer to
allege that the plaintiff, Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, is a foreign corporation not duly licensed to do business in the Philippines and,
therefore, without capacity to sue and be sued.
After the parties submitted a partial stipulation of facts and additional documentary evidence, the case was submitted for decision of the trial
court, which dismissed the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff insurance company is subject to the requirements of Sections 68 and 69 of
Act 1459, as amended, and for its failure to comply therewith, it has no legal capacity to bring suit in this jurisdiction. Plaintiff appealed to this
Court.
The main issue involved in the appeal is whether or not the plaintiff appellant has been doing business in the Philippines, considering the fact
that it has no license to transact business in the Philippines as a foreign corporation. WE ruled:
The object of Sections 68 and 69 of the Corporation Law was not to prevent the foreign corporation from performing single
acts, but to prevent it from acquiring a domicile for the purpose of business without taking the steps necessary to render it
amenable to suit in the local courts. It was never the purpose of the Legislature to exclude a foreign corporation which
happens to obtain an isolated order for business from the Philippines, from securing redress in the Philippine courts (Marshall
Co. vs. Elser & Co., 46 Phil 70,75).
In Mentholatum Co., Inc., et al vs- M Court rules that-
No general rule or governing principle can be laid down as to what constitutes 'doing' or 'engaging in' or
'transacting' business. Indeed, each case must be judged in the light of its peculiar environmental
circumstances. The true test, however, seems to be whether the foreign corporation is continuing the body
or substance of the business or enterprise for which it was organized or whether it has substantially retired
from it and turned it over to another. (Traction Cos. v. Collectors of Int Revenue [C.C.A Ohio], 223 F. 984,
987). The term implies a continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements, and contemplates, to that
extent, the performance of acts or works or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in
progressive prosecution of, the purpose and object of its organization (Griffin v. Implement Dealers' Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 241 N.W. 75, 77; Pauline Oil & Gas Co. v. Mutual Tank Line Co., 246 P. 851, 852, 118 Okl. III;
Automotive Material Co. vs. American Standard Metal Products Corp., 158 N.E. 698, 703, 327 III. 367)'. 72
Phil. 524, 528-529.
And in Eastboard Navigation, Ltd., et al. vs. Juan Ysmael & Co., Inc., this Court held:
(d) While plaintiff is a foreign corporation without license to transact business in the Philippines, it does not
follow that it has no capacity to bring the present action. Such license is not necessary because it is not
engaged in business in the Philippines. In fact, the transaction herein involved is the first business
undertaken by plaintiff in the Philippines, although on a previous occasion plaintiff's vessel was chartered by
the National Rice and Corn Corporation to carry rice cargo from abroad to the Philippines. These two
isolated transactions do not constitute engaging in business in the Philippines within the purview of Sections
68 and 69 of the Corporation Law so as to bar plaintiff from seeking redress in our courts. (Marshall Wens
Co. vs. Henry W. Elser & Co. 49 Phil., 70; Pacific Vegetable Oil Corporation vs. Angel O. Singson, G.R. No.
L-7917, April 29, 1955)'. 102 Phil., pp. 1, 18.
Based on the rulings laid down in the foregoing cases, it cannot be said that the Aetna Casualty & Surety Company is
transacting business of insurance in the Philippines for which it must have a license. The Contract of insurance was entered
into in New York, U.S.A., and payment was made to the consignee in its New York branch. It appears from the list of cases
issued by the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Manila that all the actions, except two (2) cases filed by Smith,
Beer & Co., Inc. against the Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, are claims against the shipper and the arrastre operators just
like the case at bar.
Consequently, since the appellant Aetna Casualty & Surety Company is not engaged in the business of insurance in the
Philippines but is merely collecting a claim assigned to it by the consignee, it is not barred from filing the instant case although
it has not secured a license to transact insurance business in the Philippines.
Indeed, if a foreign corporation, not engaged in business in the Philippines, is not banned from seeking redress from courts in the
Philippines, a fortiori, that same corporation cannot claim exemption from being sued in Philippine courts for acts done against a person or
persons in the Philippines.WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY DENIED WITH COSTS AGAINST THE PETITIONERS.SO ORDERED.
WALLEM PHILIPPINES SHIPPING, INC., petitioner, vs.
THE HON. MINISTER OF LABOR, in his capacity as Chairman of the National Seamen Board Proper, JAIME CAUNCA, ANTONIO
CABRERA, EFREN GARCIA, JOSE OJEDA and RODOLFO PAGWAGAN,respondents.
Petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction with prayer that the Orders dated December 19, 1977 and April 3, 1979 of the National Seamen
Board (NSB) be declared null and void. Private respondents were hired by petitioner sometime in May 1975 to work as seamen for a period of
ten months on board the M/V Woermann Sanaga, a Dutch vessel owned and operated by petitioner's European principals. While their
employment contracts were still in force, private respondents were dismissed by their employer, petitioner herein, and were discharged from the
ship on charges that they instigated the International Transport Federation (ITF) to demand the application of worldwide ITF seamen's rates to
their crew.
Private respondents were repatriated to the Philippines on October 27, 1975 and upon their arrival in Manila, they instituted a complaint against
petitioner for illegal dismissal and recovery of wages and other benefits corresponding to the five months' unexpired period of their shipboard
employment contract.
In support of their complaint, private respondents submitted a Joint Affidavit
1
stating the circumstances surrounding their employment and
subsequent repatriation to the Philippines, material averments of which are herein below reproduced:
J O I N T A F F I D A V I T
xxx xxx xxx
5. That aside from our basic monthly salary we are entitled to two (2) months vacation leave, daily subsistence allowance of
US$8.14 each, daily food allowance of US$2.50. as well as overtime pay which we failed to receive because our Shipboard
Employment Contract was illegally terminated;
6. That while we were in Rotterdam, on or about July 9, 1975, representative of the ITF boarded our vessel and talked with the
Ship's Captain;
7. That the following day, the representatives of the ITF returned and was followed by Mr. M.S.K. Ogle who is the Company's
Administrative Manager, again went to see the Captain;
8. That at around 7:00 in the evening all the crew members were called in the Mess Hall where the ITF representatives
informed us that they have just entered into a "Special Agreement" with the Wallem Shipping Management, Ltd., represented
by Mr. M.S.K. Ogle, Administrative Manager, wherein new salary rates was agreed upon and that we were going to be paid
our salary differentials in view of the new rates;
9. That in the same meeting, Mr. M.S.K. Ogle also spoke where he told that a Special Agreement has been signed and that we
will be receiving new pay rate and enjoined us to work hard and be good boys;
10. That the same evening we received our salary differentials based on the new rates negotiated for us by the ITF.
11. That while we were in the Port Dubai, Saudi Arabia, we were not receiving our pay, since the Ship's Captain refused to
implement the world-wide rates and insisted on paying us the Far East Rate;
12. That the Port Dubai is one that is within the Worldwide rates sphere.
13. That on October 22, 1975, Mr. Greg Nacional Operation Manager of respondent corporation, arrived in Dubai Saudi Arabia
and boarded our ship;
14. That on October 23, 1975, Mr. Nacional called all the crew members, including us to a meeting at the Mess Hall and there
he explained that the Company cannot accept the worldwide rate. The Special Agreement signed by Mr. Ogle in behalf of the
Company is nothing but a scrap of paper. Mr. Jaime Caunca then asked Mr. Nacional, in view of what he was saying, whether
the Company will honor the Special Agreement and Mr. Nacional answered "Yes". That we must accept the Far East Rates
which was put to a vote. Only two voted for accepting the Far East Rates;
15. That immediately thereafter Mr. Nacional left us;
16. That same evening, Mr. Nacional returned and threatened that he has received a cable from the Home Office that if we do
not accept the Far East Rate, our services will be terminated and there will be a change in crew;
17. That when Mr. Nacional left, we talked amongst ourselves and decided to accept the Far East Rates;
18. That in the meeting that evening because of the threat we informed Mr. Nacional we were accepting the Far East Rate and
he made us sign a document to that effect;
19. That we the complainants with the exception of Leopoldo Mamaril and Efren Garcia, were not able to sign as we were at
the time on work schedules, and Mr. Nacional did not bother anymore if we signed or not;
20. That after the meeting Mr. Nacional cabled the Home Office, informing them that we the complainants with the exception of
Messrs. Mamaril and Garcia were not accepting the Far East Rates;
21. That in the meeting of October 25, 1975, Mr. Nacional signed a document whereby he promised to give no priority of first
preference in "boarding a vessel and that we are not blacklisted";
22. That in spite of our having accepted the Far East Rate, our services were terminated and advised us that there was a
change in crew;
23. That on October 27, 1975, which was our scheduled flight home, nobody attended us, not even our clearance for our
group travel and consequently we were not able to board the plane, forcing us to sleep on the floor at the airport in the evening
of October 27, 1975;
24. That the following day we went back to the hotel in Dubai which was a two hours ride from the airport, where we were to
await another flight for home via Air France;
25. That we were finally able to leave for home on November 2, 1975 arriving here on the 3rd of November;
26. That we paid for all excess baggages;
27. That Mr. Nacional left us stranded, since he went ahead on October 27, 1975;
28. That immediately upon arriving in Manila, we went to respondent Company and saw Mr. Nacional, who informed us that
we were not blacklisted, however, Mr. Mckenzie, Administrative Manager did inform us that we were all blacklisted;
29. That we were asking from the respondent Company our leave pay, which they refused to give, if we did not agree to a
US$100.00 deduction;
30. That with the exception of Messrs. Jaime Caunca Amado Manansala and Antonio Cabrera, we received our leave pay with
the US$100.00 deduction;
31. That in view of the written promise of Mr. Nacional in Dubai last October 23, 1975 to give us priority and preference in
boarding a vessel and that we were not blacklisted we have on several occasions approached him regarding his promise,
which up to the present he has refused to honor.
xxx xxx xxx
Answering the complaint, petitioner countered that when the vessel was in London, private respondents together with the other crew insisted on
worldwide ITF rate as per special agreement; that said employees threatened the ship authorities that unless they agreed to the increased
wages the vessel would not be able to leave port or would have been picketed and/or boycotted and declared a hot ship by the ITF; that the
Master of the ship was left with no alternative but to agree; that upon the vessel's arrival at the Asian port of Dubai on October 22, 1975, a
representative of petitioner went on board the ship and requested the crew together with private respondents to desist from i nsisting worldwide
ITF rate and instead accept the Far East rate; that said respondents refused to accept Far East ITF rates while the rest of the Filipino crew
members accepted the Far East rates; that private respondents were replaced at the expense of petitioner and it was prayed that respondents
be required to comply with their obligations under the contract by requiring them to pay their repatriation expenses and all other incidental
expenses incurred by the master and crew of the vessel.
After the hearing on the merits, the hearing Officer of the Secretariat rendered a decision
2
on March 14, 1977 finding private respondents to
have violated their contract of employment when they accepted salary rates different from their contract verified and approved by the National
Seamen Board. As to the issue raised by private respondents that the original contract has been novated, it was held that:
xxx xxx xxx
For novation to be a valid defense, it is a legal requirement that all parties to the contract should give their consent. In the
instant case only the complainants and respondents gave their consent. The National Seamen Board had no participation in
the alleged novation of the previously approved employment contract. It would have been different if the consent of the
National Seamen Board was first secured before the alleged novation of the approved contract was undertaken, hence, the
defense of novation is not in order.
xxx xxx xxx
The Hearing Officer likewise rules that petitioner violated the contract when its representative signed the Special Agreement and he signed the
same at his own risk and must bear the consequence of such act, and since both parties are in paridelicto, complaint and counterclaim were
dismissed for lack of merit but petitioner was ordered to pay respondents Caunca and Cabrera their respective leave pay for the period that they
have served M/V Woermann Sanaga plus attorney's fees.
Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration with the Board which modified the decision of the Secretariat in an Order
3
of December
19, 1977 and ruled that petitioner is liable for breach of contract when it ordered the dismissal of private respondents and their subsequent
repatriation before the expiration of their respective employment contracts. The Chairman of the Board stressed that "where the contract is for a
definite period, the captain and the crew members may not be discharged until after the contract shall have been performed" citing the case
of Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Ogilvie, et al. (104 Phil. 748). He directed petitioner to pay private respondents the unexpired portion of their
contracts and their leave pay, less the amount they received as differentials by virtue of the special agreements entered in Rotterdam, and ten
percent of the total amounts recovered as attorney's fees.
Petitioner sought clarification and reconsideration of the said order and asked for a confrontation with private respondents to determine the
specific adjudications to be made. A series of conferences were conducted by the Board. It was claimed by petitioner that it did not have in its
possession the records necessary to determine the exact amount of the judgment since the records were in the sole custody of the captain of
the ship and demanded that private respondents produce the needed records. On this score, counsel for respondents manifested that to require
the master of the ship to produce the records would result to undue delay in the disposition of the case to the detriment of his clients, some of
whom are still unemployed.
Under the circumstances, the Board was left with no alternative but to issue an Order dated April 3, 1979
4
fixing the amount due private
respondents at their three (3) months' salary equivalent without qualifications or deduction. Hence,the instant petition before Us alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent official as Chairman of the Board, in issuing said order which allegedly nullified the findings of
the Secretariat and premised adjudication on imaginary conditions which were never taken up with full evidence in the course of hearing on the
merits.
The whole controversy is centered around the liability of petitioner when it ordered the dismissal of herein private respondents before the
expiration of their respective employment contracts.
In its Order of December 19, 1977
5
the Board, thru its Chairman, Minister Blas F. Ople, held that there is no showing that the seamen conspired
with the ITF in coercing the ship authorities to grant salary increases, and the Special Agreement was signed only by petitioner and the ITF
without any participation from the respondents who, accordingly, may not be charged as they were, by the Secretariat, with violation of their
employment contract. The Board likewise stressed that the crew members may not be discharged until after the expiration of the contract which
is for a definite period, and where the crew members are discharged without just cause before the contract shall have been performed, they shall
be entitled to collect from the owner or agent of the vessel their unpaid salaries for the period they were engaged to render the services, applying
the case of Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Jesus Ogilivie et al.
6

The findings and conclusion of the Board should be sustained. As already intimated above, there is no logic in the statement made by the
Secretariat's Hearing Officer that the private respondents are liable for breach of their employment contracts for accepting salaries higher than
their contracted rates. Said respondents are not signatories to the Special Agreement, nor was there any showing that they instigated the
execution thereof. Respondents should not be blamed for accepting higher salaries since it is but human for them to grab every opportunity
which would improve their working conditions and earning capacity. It is a basic right of all workingmen to seek greater benefits not only for
themselves but for their families as well, and this can be achieved through collective bargaining or with the assistance of trade unions. The
Constitution itself guarantees the promotion of social welfare and protection to labor. It is therefore the Hearing Officer that gravely erred in
disallowing the payment of the unexpired portion of the seamen's respective contracts of employment.
Petitioner claims that the dismissal of private respondents was justified because the latter threatened the ship authorities in acceeding to their
demands, and this constitutes serious misconduct as contemplated by the Labor Code. This contention is not well-taken. The records fail to
establish clearly the commission of any threat. But even if there had been such a threat, respondents' behavior should not be censured because
it is but natural for them to employ some means of pressing their demands for petitioner, who refused to abide with the terms of the Special
Agreement, to honor and respect the same. They were only acting in the exercise of their rights, and to deprive them of their freedom of
expression is contrary to law and public policy. There is no serious misconduct to speak of in the case at bar which would justify respondents'
dismissal just because of their firmness in their demand for the fulfillment by petitioner of its obligation it entered into without any coercion,
specially on the part of private respondents.
On the other hand, it is petitioner who is guilty of breach of contract when they dismissed the respondents without just cause and prior to the
expiration of the employment contracts. As the records clearly show, petitioner voluntarily entered into the Special Agreement with ITF and by
virtue thereof the crew men were actually given their salary differentials in view of the new rates. It cannot be said that it was because of
respondents' fault that petitioner made a sudden turn-about and refused to honor the special agreement.
In brief, We declare petitioner guilty of breach of contract and should therefore be made to comply with the directives contained in the disputed
Orders of December 19, 1977 and April 3, 1979.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated March 14, 1977 of the Hearing Officer is SET ASIDE and the Orders dated December
19, 1977 and April 3, 1979 of the National Seamen Board are AFFIRMED in toto. This decision is immediately executory. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
ESALYN CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. EDNA BONTO-PEREZ, HON. ROGELIO T. RAYALA, HON. DOMINGO H. ZAPANTA, HON. JOSE N. SARMIENTO, CENTRUM
PROMOTIONS PLACEMENT CORPORATION, JOSE A. AZUCENA, JR., and TIMES SURETY & INSURANCE COMPANY,
INC. respondents.
One of the anguished cries in our society today is that while our laws appear to protect the poor, their interpretation is sometimes anti-poor. In
the case at bench, petitioner, a poor, uncounselled entertainment dancer signed a contract with her Japanese employer calling for a monthly
salary of One Thousand Five Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$1,500) but later had to sign an immoral side agreement reducing her salary below the
minimum standard set by the POEA. Petitioner invoked the law to collect her salary differentials, but incredibly found public respondent straining
the seams of our law to disfavor her. There is no greater disappointment to the poor like petitioner than to discover the ugly reality behind the
beautiful rhetoric of laws. We will not allow this travesty.
This is a petition for certiorari to review the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
1
dated December 29, 1992, which
affirmed the Decision of public respondent Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) Administrator Jose N. Sarmiento, dated February
17, 1992, dismissing petitioner's complaint for unpaid salaries amounting to Six Thousand Dollars (US$6,000.00).
The facts are undisputed.
On December 1, 1988, petitioner, an entertainment dancer, entered into a standard employment contract for overseas Filipino artists and
entertainers with Planning Japan Co., Ltd.,
2
through its Philippine representative, private respondent Centrum Placement & Promotions
Corporation. The contract had a duration of two (2) to six (6) months, and petitioner was to be paid a monthly compensation of One Thousand
Five Hundred Dollars (US$1,5000.00). On December 5, 1888, the POEA approved the contract. Subsequently, petitioner executed the following
side agreement with her Japanese employer through her local manager, Jaz Talents Promotion:
Date: Dec. 10, 1988
SUBJECT: Salary Deduction
MANAGERIAL COMMISSION
DATE OF DEPARTURE: _________________
ATTENTION: MR. IWATA
I, ESALYN CHAVEZ, DANCER, do hereby with my own free will and voluntarily have the honor to authorize your good office
to please deduct the amount of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY DOLLARS ($250) from my contracted monthly salary of SEVEN
HUNDRED FIFTY DOLLARS ($750) as monthly commission for my Manager, Mr. Jose A. Azucena, Jr.
That, my monthly salary (net) is FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($500).
(sgd. by petitioner)
3

On December 16, 1988, petitioner left for Osaka, Japan, where she worked for six (6) months, until June 10, 1989. She came back to the
Philippines on June 14, 1989.
Petitioner instituted the case at bench for underpayment of wages with the POEA on February 21, 1991. She prayed for the payment of Six
Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$6,000.00), representing the unpaid portion of her basic salary for six months. Charged in the case were private
respondent Centrum Promotions and Placement Corporation, the Philippine representative of Planning Japan, Co., Inc., its i nsurer, Times Surety
and Insurance Co., Inc., and Jaz Talents Promotion.
The complaint was dismissed by public respondent POEA Administrator on February 17, 1992. He ratiocinated,inter alia:
. . . Apparently and from all indications, complainant (referring to petitioner herein) was satisfied and did not have any
complaint (about) anything regarding her employment in Japan until after almost two (2) years (when) she filed the instant
complaint on February 21, 1991. The records show that after signing the Standard Employment Contract on December 1,
1988, she entered into a side agreement with the Japanese employer thru her local manager, Jaz Talents Promotion
consenting to a monthly salary of US$750.00 which she affirmed during the conference of May 21, 1991. Respondent agency
had no knowledge nor participation in the said agreement such that it could not be faulted for violation of the Standard
Employment Contract regarding the stipulated salary. We cannot take cognizance of such violation when one of the principal
party (sic) thereto opted to receive a salary different from what has been stipulated in their contract, especially so if the
contracting party did not consent/participate in such arrangement. Complainant (petitioner) cannot now demand from
respondent agency to pay her the salary based (on) the processed Employment Contract for she is now considered in bad
faith and hence, estopped from claiming thereto thru her own act of consenting and agreeing to receive a salary not in
accordance with her contract of employment. Moreover, her self-imposed silence for a long period of time worked to her own
disadvantage as she allowed laches to prevail which barred respondent from doing something at the outset. Normally, if a
person's right (is) violated, she/he would immediately react to protect her/his rights which is not true in the case at bar.
The term laches has been defined as one's negligence or failure to assert his right in due time or within reasonable time from
the accrual of his cause of action, thus, leading another party to believe that there is nothing wrong with his own claim. This
resulted in placing the negligent party in estoppel to assert or enforce his right. . . . Likewise, the Supreme Court in one case
held that not only is inaction within reasonable time to enforce a right the basic premise that underlies a valid defense of
laches but such inaction evinces implied consent or acquiescence to the violation of the right . . .
Under the prevailing circumstances of this case, it is outside the regulatory powers of the Administration to rule on the liability
of respondent Jaz Talents Promotions, if any, (it) not being a licensed private agency but a promotion which trains entertainers
for abroad.
xxx xxx xxx
(Citations omitted.)
On appeal, the NLRC upheld the Decision, thus:
We fail to see any conspiracy that the complainant (petitioner herein) imputes to the respondents. She has, to put it bluntly, not
established and/or laid the basis for Us to arrive at a conclusion that the respondents have been and should be held liable for
her claims.
The way We see it, the records do not at all indicate any connection between respondents Centrum Promotion & Placement
Corporation and Jaz Talents Promotion.
There is, therefore, no merit in the appeal. Hence, We affirmed.
4

Dissatisfied with the NLRC's Decision, petitioner instituted the present petition, alleging that public respondents committed grave abuse of
discretion in finding: that she is guilty of laches; that she entered into a side contract on December 10, 1988 for the reduction of her basic salary
to Seven Hundred Fifty U.S. Dollars (US$750.00) which superseded, nullified and invalidated the standard employment contract she entered into
on December 1, 1988; and that Planning Japan Co., Ltd. and private respondents are not solidarily liable to her for Six Thousand US Dollars
(US$6,000.00) in unpaid wages.
5

The petition is meritorious.
Firstly, we hold that the managerial commission agreement executed by petitioner to authorize her Japanese Employer to deduct Two Hundred
Fifty U.S. Dollars (US$250.00) from her monthly basic salary is void because it is against our existing laws, morals and public policy. It cannot
supersede the standard employment contract of December 1, 1988 approved by the POEA with the following stipulation appended thereto:
It is understood that the terms and conditions stated in this Employment Contract are in conformance with the Standard
Employment Contract for Entertainers prescribed by the POEA under Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1986. Any
alterations or changes made in any part of this contract without prior approval by the POEA shall be null and void;
6
(Emphasis
supplied.)
The stipulation is in line with the provisions of Rule II, Book V and Section 2(f), Rule I, Book VI of the 1991 Rules and Regulations Governing
Overseas Employment, thus:
Book V, Rule II
Sec. 1. Employment Standards. The Administration shall determine, formulate and review employment standards in
accordance with the market development and welfare objectives of the overseas employment program and the prevailing
market conditions.
Sec. 2. Minimum Provisions for Contract. The following shall be considered the minimum requirements for contracts of
employment:
a. Guaranteed wages for regular working hours and overtime pay for services rendered beyond regular
working hours in accordance with the standards established by the Administration;
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Standard Employment Contract. The administration shall undertake development and/or periodic review of region,
country and skills specific employment contracts for landbased workers and conduct regular review of standard employment
contracts (SEC) for seafarers. These contracts shall provide for minimum employment standards herein enumerated under
Section 2, of this Rule and shall recognize the prevailing labor and social legislations at the site of employment and
international conventions. The SEC shall set the minimum terms and conditions of employment. All employers and principals
shall adopt the SEC in connection with the hiring of workers without prejudice to their adoption of other terms and conditions of
employment over and above the minimum standards of the Administration. (Emphasis supplied.)
and
BOOK VI, RULE I
Sec. 2. Grounds for suspension/cancellation of license.
xxx xxx xxx
f. Substituting or altering employment contracts and other documents approved and verified by the Administration from the
time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of expiration of the same without the
Administration's approval.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the basic salary of One Thousand Five Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$1,500.00) guaranteed to petitioner under the parties' standard
employment contract is in accordance with the minimum employment standards with respect to wages set by the POEA, Thus, the side
agreement which reduced petitioner's basic wage to Seven Hundred Fifty U.S. Dollars (US$750.00) is null and void for violating the POEA's
minimum employment standards, and for not having been approved by the POEA. Indeed, this side agreement is a scheme all too frequently
resorted to by unscrupulous employers against our helpless overseas workers who are compelled to agree to satisfy their basic economic
needs.
Secondly. The doctrine of laches or "stale demands"' cannot be applied to petitioner. Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect for
an unreasonable and unexplained length time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier,
7
thus giving
rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.
8
It is not concerned with mere lapse of time;
the fact of delay, standing alone, is insufficient to constitute laches.
9

The doctrine of laches is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims, and is
principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
10
There is no absolute rule as to what
constitutes laches; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court, and since it is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat
justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice.
11

In the case at bench, petitioner filed her claim well within the three-year prescriptive period for the filing of money claims set forth in Article 291 of
the Labor Code.
12
For this reason, we hold the doctrine of laches inapplicable to petitioner. As we ruled in Imperial Victory Shipping Agency
v. NLRC, 200 SCRA 178 (1991):
. . . Laches is a doctrine in equity while prescription is based on law. Our courts are basically courts of law not courts of equity.
Thus, laches cannot be invoked to resist the enforcement of an existing legal right. We have ruled in Arsenal v. Intermediate
Appellate Court . . . that it is a long standing principle that equity follows the law. Courts exercising equity jurisdiction are
bound by rules of law and have no arbitrary discretion to disregard them. In Zabat, Jr. v. Court of Appeals . . ., this Court was
more emphatic upholding the rules of procedure. We said therein:
As for equity, which has been aptly described as a "justice outside legality," this applied only in the absence
of, and never against, statutory law or, as in this case, judicial rules of procedure. Aequetas nunguam
contravenit legis. The pertinent positive rules being present here, they should pre-empt and prevail over all
abstract arguments based only on equity.
Thus, where the claim was filed within the three-year statutory period, recovery therefore cannot be barred by laches. Courts
should never apply the doctrine of laches earlier than the expiration of time limited for the commencement of actions at law.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied. Citations omitted.)
Thirdly, private respondents Centrum and Times as well as Planning Japan Co., Ltd. the agency's foreign principal are solidarily liable to
petitioner for her unpaid wages. This is in accordance with stipulation 13.7 of the parties' standard employment contract whi ch provides:
13.7. The Employer (in this case, Planning Japan Co., Ltd. ) and its locally (sic) agent/promoter/representative (private
respondent Centrum Promotions & Placement Corporation) shall be jointly and severally responsible for the proper
implementation of the terms and conditions in this Contract.
13
This solidary liability also arises from the provisions of Section 10(a)(2), Rule V, Book I of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code, as amended, thus:
Sec. 10. Requirement before recruitment. Before recruiting any worker, the private employment agency shall submit to the
Bureau the following documents:
a) A formal appointment or agency contract executed by a foreign-based employer in favor of the license holder to recruit and
hire personnel for the former . . . . Such formal appointment or recruitment agreement shall contain the following provisions,
among others:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Power of the agency to sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with the principal or foreign based employer for any of the
violations of the recruitment agreement and the contracts of employment.
xxx xxx xxx
Our overseas workers constitute an exploited class. Most of them come from the poorest sector of our society. They are thoroughly
disadvantaged. Their profile shows they live in suffocating slums, trapped in an environment of crime. Hardly literate and in ill health, their only
hope lies in jobs they can hardly find in our country. Their unfortunate circumstance makes them easy prey to avaricious empl oyers. They will
climb mountains, cross the seas, endure slave treatment in foreign lands just to survive. Out of despondence, they will work under sub-human
conditions and accept salaries below the minimum. The least we can do is to protect them with our laws in our land. Regretfully, respondent
public officials who should sympathize with the working class appear to have a different orientation.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decisions of respondent POEA Administrator and NLRC Commissioners in POEA Case
No. Adj. 91-02-199 (ER), respectively dated February 17 and December 29, 1992, and the Resolution of the NLRC, dated March 23, 1993, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private respondents are held jointly and severally liable to petitioner for the payment of SIX THOUSAND US
DOLLARS (US$6,000.00) in unpaid wages. Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
FINMAN GENERAL ASSURANCE CORP., petitioner, vs.
WILLIAM INOCENCIO, ET AL. AND EDWIN CARDONES, THE ADMINISTRATOR, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS AND EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION, THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, respondents.
Pan Pacific Overseas Recruiting Services, Inc. ("Pan Pacific") is a private, fee-charging, recruitment and employment agency. T in accordance
with the requirements of Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA),
Pan Pacific posted a surety bond issued by petitioner Finman General Assurance Corporation ("Finman") and was granted a license to operate
by the POEA.
Private respondents William Inocencio, Perfecto Palero, Jr., Edwin Cardones and one Edwin Hernandez filed with the POEA separate
complaints against Pan Pacific for violation of Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended and for refund of placement fees paid to
Pan Pacific. The complainants alleged that Pan Pacific charged and collected such fees from them but did not secure employment for them.
Acting on the complaints, the POEA Administrator motu proprio impleaded petitioner Finman as party respondent in its capacity as surety for
Pan Pacific. Separate summonses were served upon Finman and Pan Pacific. The return of the summons served on Pan Pacific at i ts official
address registered in the POEA records, showed that Pan Pacific had moved out therefrom; no prior notice of transfer or change of address was
furnished by Pan Pacific to the POEA as required under POEA rules. The POEA considered that constructive service of the complaints had been
effected upon Pan Pacific and proceeded accordingly.
For its part, petitioner Finman filed an answer denying liability and pleading, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that: (1) the POEA had
no "jurisdiction over surety bonds," that jurisdiction being vested in the Insurance Commission or the regular courts; (2) it (Finman) had not
violated Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the Labor Code and complainants' claims had accrued during the suspension of the principal obligor, Pan
Pacific; (3) complainants had no cause of action against Finman, since it was not privy to the transactions between them and Pan Pacific and
had not received any moneys from them; and (4) the amounts claimed by complainants had been paid by them as deposits and not as
placement fees.
A hearing was held by the POEA on 14 April 1988, at which time complainants presented their evidence. Petitioner Finman, though notified of
this hearing, did not appear.
On 30 May 1989, the POEA Administrator issued an Order which, in its dispositive portion, said:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally complainants' claims as
follows:
1. William Inocencio P6,000 .00
2. Perfecto Palero, Sr. P5,500 .00
3. Edwin Cardones P2,000 .00
Respondent agency is ordered to release Cardones' passport, the expenses or obtaining the same of which (sic) shall be
deducted from the amount of P2,000.00 as it appears that it was respondent agency who applied for the processing thereof.
The claim of Edwin Hernandez is dismissed without prejudice.
For the established violations respondent agency is hereby imposed a penalty fine in the amount of P60,000.00. Further, the
ban earlier imposed upon it is herein reiterated.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner Finman went on appeal to the Secretary of Labor insisting that: (1) the POEA had no authority to implead petitioner as party
respondent in the proceedings before the POEA; and that (2) the POEA had no authority to enforce directly the surety bond against petitioner. In
an Order dated 3 August 1989, the Secretary of Labor upheld the POEA Order appealed from and denied the appeal for lack of merit.
Petitioner Finman now comes before this Court on a Petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order,
raising much the same issues it had already ventilated before the POEA and the Secretary of Labor. It is contended once again by petitioner
Finman that the POEA had no authority to implead petitioner in the proceedings commenced by private respondents: and that the POEA was not
authorized to require, in those same proceedings, petitioner to pay private respondents' claims for refund against Pan Pacific on the basis of the
surety bond issued by petitioner.
Petitioner's contentions are interrelated and will be dealt with together. They are, however, quite bereft of merit and must be rejected.
Petitioner cannot seriously dispute the direct and solidary nature of its obligations under its own surety bond. Under Section 176 of the Insurance
Code, as amended, the liability of a surety in a surety bond is joint and several with the principal obligor. Petitioner's bond was posted by Pan
Pacific in compliance with the requirements of Article 31 of the Labor Code, which states that
Art. 31. Bonds. All applicants for license or authority shall post such cash and surety bonds as determined by the Secretary
of Labor to guarantee compliance with prescribed recruitment procedures, rules and regulations, and terms and, conditions of
employment as appropriate.
The Secretary of Labor shall have the exclusive power to determine, decide, order or direct payment from, or application of,
the cash and surety bond for any claim or injury covered and guaranteed by the bonds. (Emphasis supplied).
The tenor and scope of petitioner Finman's obligations under the bond it issued are set out in broad ranging terms by Section 4, Rule II, Book I
of the POEA Rules and Regulations:
Section 4. Payment of Fees and Posting of Bonds. Upon approval of the application by the Minister, the applicant shall pay
an annual license fee of P6,000.00. It shall also post a cash bond of P100,000.00 and a surety bond of P150,000.00 from a
bonding company acceptable to the Administration duly accredited by the Office of the Insurance Commission. The bonds
shall answer forall valid and legal claims arising from violations of the conditions for the grant and use of the license or
authority and contracts of employment. The bonds shall likewise guarantee compliance with the provisions of the Labor Code
and its implementing rules and regulations relating to recruitment and placement, the rules of the Administration and relevant
issuances of the Ministry and all liabilities which the Administration may impose. The surety bonds shall include the condition
that notice of garnishment to the principal is notice to the surety.
1
(Emphasis supplied).
While petitioner Finman has refrained from attaching a copy of the bond it had issued to its Petition for Certiorari, there can be no question that
the conditions of the Finman surety bond Pan Pacific had posted with the POEA include the italicized portions of Section 4, Rule 11, Book I
quoted above. It is settled doctrine that the conditions of a bond specified and required in the provisions of the statute or regulation providing for
the submission of the bond, are incorporated or built into all bonds tendered under that statute or regulation, even though not there set out in
printer's ink.
2

In the case at bar, the POEA held, and the Secretary of Labor affirmed, that Pan Pacific had violated Article 32 of the Labor Code, as amended
Article 32. Fees to be paid by workers. Any person applying with a private fee charging employment agency for employment
assistance shall not be charged any fee until he has obtained employment through its efforts or has actually commenced
employment. Such fee shall be always covered with the approved receipt clearly showing the amount paid. The Secretary of
Labor shall promulgate a schedule of allowable fees. (Emphasis supplied).
as well as Article 34 (a) of the same Code:
Article 34. Prohibited practices. It shall be unlawful for any individual, entity, licensee, or holder of authority:
(a) To charge or accept, directly or indirectly, any amount than that specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by
the Secretary of Labor, or to make a worker pay any amount greater than actually received by him as a loan or advance.
(Emphasis supplied)
There is, hence, no question that, both under the Labor Code
3
and the POEA Rules and Regulations,
4
Pan Pacific had violated at least one of
the conditions for the grant and continued use of the recruitment license granted to it. There can, similarly, be no question that the POEA
Administrator and the Secretary of Labor are authorized to require Pan Pacific to refund the placement fees it had charged private respondents
without securing employment for them and to impose the fine of P60,000.00 upon Pan Pacific. Article 36 of the Labor Code authorizes the
Secretary of Labor "to restrict and regulate" the recruitment and placement activities of agencies like Pan Pacific and "to i ssue orders and
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of [Title I on "Recruitment and Placement of
Workers]," including of course, Article 32 on "Fees to be paid by workers," quoted earlier. Upon the other hand, Section 13 of Rule VI, Book I of
the POEA Rules and Regulations expressly authorize the POEA Administrator or the Secretary of Labor to impose fines "in addition to or in lieu
of the penalties of suspension or cancellation" of the violator recruitment agency's license.
If Pan Pacific is liable to private respondents for the refunds claimed by them and to the POEA for the fine of P60,000.00, and if petitioner
Finman is solidarily liable with Pan Pacific under the operative terms of the bond, it must follow that Finman is liable both to the private
respondents and to the POEA. Petitioner Finman asserts, however, that the POEA had no authority to implead it in the proceedings against Pan
Pacific.
We are not persuaded by this assertion. Clearly, petitioner Finman is a party-in-interest in, certainly a proper party to, the proceedings private
respondents had initiated against Pan Pacific the principal obligor. Since Pan Pacific had thoughtfully refrained from notifying the POEA of its
new address and from responding to the complaints, petitioner Finman may well I be regarded as an indispensable party to the proceedings
before the POEA. Whether Finman was an indepensable or merely a proper party to the proceedings, we believe and so hold that the POEA
could properly implead it as party respondent either upon the request of the private respondents or, as it happened, motu propio. Such is the
situation under the Revised Rules of Court
5
and the application thereof, directly or by analogy, by the POEA can certainly not be regarded as
arbitrary, oppressive or capricious.
The fundamental argument of Finman is that its liability under its own bond must be determined and enforced, not by the POEA or the Secretary
of Labor, but rather by the Insurance Commission or by the regular courts. Once more, we are not moved by petitioner's argument.
There appears nothing so special or unique about the determination of a surety's liability under its bond as to restrict that determination to the
Office of the Insurance Commissioner and to the regular courts of justice exclusively. The exact opposite is strongly stressed by the second
paragraph of Article 31 of the Labor Code:
Art. 31. Bonds. ... ...
The secretary of Labor shall have the exclusive power to determine, decide, order or direct payment from, or application of, the
cash or surety bond for any claim or injury covered and guaranteed by the bonds. (Emphasis supplied)
We believe and so hold that to compel the POEA and private respondents the beneficiaries of Finman's bond-to go to the Insurance
Commissioner or to a regular court of law to enforce that bond, would be to collide with the public policy which requires prompt resolution of
claims against private recruitment and placement agencies. The Court will take judicial notice of the appealing frequency with which some,
perhaps many, of such agencies have cheated workers avid for overseas employment by, e.g., collecting placement fees without securing
employment for them at all, extracting exorbitant fees or "kickbacks" from those for whom employment is actually obtained, abandoning hapless
and unlettered workers to exploitative foreign principals, and so on. Cash and surety bonds are required by the POEA and its predecessor
agencies from recruitment and employment companies precisely as a means of ensuring prompt and effective recourse against such companies
when held liable for applicants or workers' claims. Clearly that public policy will be effectively negated if POEA and the Department of Labor and
Employment were held powerless to compel a surety company to make good on its solidary undertaking in the same quasi-judicial proceeding
where the liability of the principal obligor, the recruitment or employment agency, is determined and fixed and where the surety is given
reasonable opportunity to present any defenses it or the principal obligor may be entitled to set up. Petitioner surety whose liabili ty to private
respondents and the POEA is neither more nor less than that of Pan Pacific, is not entitled to another or different procedure for determination or
fixing of that liability than that which Pan Pacific is entitled and subject to.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Costs against petitioner. This Resolution is immediately executory.
EASTERN ASSURANCE & SURETY CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF LABOR, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, ELVIRA VENTURA, ESTER TRANGUILLAN, et
al., respondents.
In connection with the application with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) of J & B Manpower Specialist, Inc. for a
license to engage in business as a recruitment agency, a surety bond was filed on January 2, 1985 by the applicant and the Eastern Assurance
and Surety Corporation, herein petitioner, in virtue of which they both held themselves
. . . firmly bound unto (said) Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, Ministry of Labor in the penal sum of PESOS
ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND ONLY . . . (Pl50,000.00) for the payment of which will and truly to be made, . . . (they
bound themselves, their) heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns, jointly and severally . .
The bond stipulated that:
a) it was "conditioned upon the true and faithful performance and observance of the . . . principal (J & B Manpower Specialist, Inc.) of its duties
and obligations in accordance with all the rules and regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Labor Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration and with the terms and conditions stipulated in the License;
b) the liability of the . . . Surety (petitioner) shall in no case exceed the sum of PESOS ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00)
ONLY, PHILIPPINE CURRENCY;
1

c) notice to the Principal is also a notice to the Surety; and
d) LIABILITY of the surety . . . shall expire on JANUARY 02, 1986 and this bond shall be automatically cancelled ten (10) days after its expiration
and the surety shall not be liable for any claim not discovered and presented to it in writing within said period of . . . from expiration and the
obligee hereby expressly waives the rights to file any court action against the Surety after termination of said period of . . . . above cited.
2

As narrated by respondent Secretary of Labor, the facts are as follows:
3

From June 1983 to December 1985 . . . thirty three (33) . . . (persons) applied for overseas employment with . . . (J & B). In
consideration of promised deployment, complainants paid respondent various amounts for various fees. Most of' the receipts
issued were sighed by Mrs. Baby Bundalian, Executive Vice-President of . . . (J & B).
Because of non-deployment . . . (the applicants) filed separate complaints with the Licensing and Regulation Office of POEA
against . . . (J & B) for violation of Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the Labor Code between the months of April to October 1985.
Despite summons/notices of hearing,, . . . (J & B) failed to file Answer nor appear in the hearings conducted.
In its separate Answer, . . . EASCO essentially disclaimed liability on the ground that the claims were not expressly covered by
the bond, that POEA had no jurisdiction to order forfeiture of the bond, that some of the claims were paid beyond or prior to the
period of effectivity of the bond.
On September 8, 1986, the POEA Administrator issued the Order in favor of complainants ruling thus:
After careful evaluation, we find that the receipts and testimonies of complainants, in the absence of
controverting evidence substantially establish that respondent charged and collected fees from them in
amounts exceeding what is prescribed by this Administration. Complainants' non-deployment strongly
indicates that there was no employment obtained for them. Hence, violation of Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the
Labor Code, as amended, is established against respondent. The claims of complainants having arose
(arisen) out of acts of the principal covered under the surety (bond), the respondent surety is equally liable
therefor.
Except for complainants Ramos, Samson, de Leon and Rizada, whose claims were transacted prior to the effectivity of the
bond, . . . EASCO was declared jointly and severally liable with . . . (J & B) to twenty-nine (29) complainants.
(The dispositive portion of the POEA Administrator's Order also contained the following statement and direction, viz.:
Respondent was suspended on May 23, 1985, June 26, 1985 and January 17, 1986 all for illegal exaction.
Considering its track record of illegal exaction activities and considering further the gross violation of
recruitment rules and regulations established against it in the instant cases, and the expiration of its license
on February 15, 1985, it is hereby forever banned from participation in the overseas employment program. It
is ordered to cease and desist from further engaging in recruitment activities otherwise it shall be prosecuted
for illegal recruitment.')
(J & B filed a motion for reconsideration). On December 19, 1986, the then deputy Minister of Labor and Employment denied
the . . . Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit and affirmed the findings in the Order of the POEA Administrator finding no
reversible error therein.
On appeal by EASCO J & B having as aforestated taken no part in the proceeding despite due service of summons the judgment was
modified by the Secretary of Labor, by Order dated July 1, 1987, disposing as follows:
4

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Resolution of the then Deputy Minister of Labor dated December 19, 1986
affirming the Order of the POEA Administrator dated September 8, 1986 is hereby MODIFIED. Respondent J & B Manpower
Specialist is directed to refund all thirty-three (33) complainants as listed in the Order of September 8, 1986 in the amounts
listed thereto with the modification that complainants Lucena Cabasal and Felix Rivero are both entitled only to P15,980 and
not P15,980 each. Respondent Eastern Assurance and Surety Corporation is hereby found jointly and severally liable with
respondent J & B Manpower Specialist to refund nineteen (19) complainants in the modified amounts . . . (particularly
specified).
The other findings in the Order of the POEA Administrator dated September 8, 1986 affirmed in the Resolution of the then
Deputy Minister . . . are also hereby AFFIRMED. This Order is FINAL. No further Motion for Reconsideration hereof shall be
entertained.
It is noteworthy that EASCO's liability for the refund, jointly and severally with its principal, was limited to 19 named complainants (in contrast to
verdicts of the POEA and the Deputy Minister which both ordered payment to no less than 33 complainants) and was correspondingly reduced
from P308,751.75 and US $ 400.00
5
to the aggregate amount of P 140,817.75.
6

The special civil action of certiorari at bar was thereafter instituted by EASCO
7
praying for the nullification of the POEA Administrator's Order of
September 8, 1986, the Resolution of the Deputy Minister of Labor of' December 19, 1986, and the Order of the Secretary of Labor of July 1,
1987, It theorizes that:
1) the POEA had no jurisdiction over the claims for refund filed by non-employees;
2) neither did the Secretary of Labor have jurisdiction of the claims;
3) assuming they had jurisdiction, both the POEA and Secretary of Labor also committed legal errors and acted with grave
abuse of discretion when they ruled that petitioner is liable on the claims.
EASCO contends that the POEA had no "adjudicatory jurisdiction" over the monetary claims in question because the same "did not arise from
employer-employee relations." Invoked in support of the argument is Section 4 (a) of EO 797 providing in part
8
that the POEA has
. . . original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employer-employee relations arising out
of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment including seamen . . .
The complaints are however for violation of Articles 32 and 34 a) of the Labor Code. Article 32 and paragraph (a) of Article 34 read as
follows:
Art. 32. Fees to be paid by workers.Any person applying with a private fee-charging employment agency for employment
assistance shall not be charged any fee until he has obtained employment through its efforts or has actually commenced
employment. Such fee shall be always covered with the approved receipt clearly showing the amount paid. The Secretary of
Labor shall promulgate a schedule of allowable fees.
Art. 34. Prohibited practices.It shall be unlawful for any individual, entity, licensee, or holder of authority:
a) To charge or accept, directly or indirectly, any amount greater than that specified in the schedule of allowable fees
prescribed by the Secretary of Labor, or to make a worker pay any amount greater than actually received by him as a loan or
advance; . . .
The penalties of suspension and cancellation of license or authority are prescribed for violations of the above quoted provisions, among others.
And the Secretary of Labor has the power under Section 35 of the law to apply these sanctions, as well as the authority, conferred by Section
36, not only, to "restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies," but also to "promulgate rules and regulations to
carry out the objectives and implement the provisions" governing said activities. Pursuant to this rule-making power thus granted, the Secretary
of Labor gave the POEA
9
"on its own initiative or upon filing of a complaint or report or upon request for investigation by any aggrieved person, .
. . (authority to) conduct the necessary proceedings for the suspension or cancellation of the license or authority of any agency or entity" for
certain enumerated offenses including
1) the imposition or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of any amount of money, goods or services, or any fee or bond in excess of what is
prescribed by the Administration, and
2) any other violation of pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and other relevant laws, rules and regulations.
10

The Administrator was also given the power to "order the dismissal of the case or the suspension of the license or authority of the
respondent agency or contractor or recommend to the Minister the cancellation thereof."
11

Implicit in these powers is the award of appropriate relief to the victims of the offenses committed by the respondent agency or contractor,
specially the refund or reimbursement of such fees as may have been fraudulently or otherwise illegally collected, or such money, goods or
services imposed and accepted in excess of what is licitly prescribed. It would be illogical and absurd to limit the sanction on an offending
recruitment agency or contractor to suspension or cancellation of its license, without the concomitant obligation to repair the injury caused to its
victims. It would result either in rewarding unlawful acts, as it would leave the victims without recourse, or in compelling the latter to litigate in
another forum, giving rise to that multiplicity of actions or proceedings which the law abhors.
Even more untenable is EASCO's next argument that the recruiter and its victims are in pari delicto the former for having required payment,
and the latter for having voluntarily paid, "prohibited recruitment fees" and therefore, said victims are barred from obtaining relief. The
sophistical, if not callous, character of the argument is evident upon the most cursory reading thereof; it merits no consideration whatever.
The Court is intrigued by EASCO's reiteration of its argument that it should not be held liable for claims which accrued prior to or after the
effectivity of its bond, considering that the respondent Secretary had conceded the validity of part of said argument, at least. The Secretary ruled
that EASCO's "contention that it should not be held liable for claims/payments made to respondent agency before the effectivity of the surety
bond on January 2, 1985 is well taken." According to the Secretary:
12

. . . A close examination of the records reveal(s) that respondent EASCO is not jointly and severally liable with respondent
agency to refund complainants Lucena Cabasal, Felix Rivero, Romulo del Rosario, Rogelio Banzuela, Josefina Ogatis,
Francisco Sorato, Sonny Quiazon, Josefina Dictado, Mario del Guzman and Rogelio Mercado (10 in all). These complainants
paid respondent agency in 1984, or before the effectivity of the bond on January 2, 1985 as evidence by the reciept and their
testimonies.
The related argument, that it is also not liable for claims filed after the expiry (on January 2, 1986) of the period stipulated in the surety bond for
the filing of claims against the bond, must however be rejected, as the Secretary did. The Court discerns no grave abuse of discretion in the
Secretary's statement of his reasons for doing so, to wit:
. . . While it may be true that respondent EASCO received notice of their claims after the ten (10) day expiration period from
cancellation or after January 12, 1986 as provided in the surety bond, records show that . . . EASCO's principal, respondent
agency, was notified/ summoned prior to the expiration period or before January 12, 1986. Respondent agency received
summons on July 24, 1985 with respect to claims of complainants Penarroyo, dela Cruz and Canti. It also received summons
on November 26, 1985 with respect to Giovanni Garbillons' claim. Respondent agency was likewise considered constructively
notified of the claims of complainants Calayag, Danuco Domingo and Campena on October 6, 1985. In this connection, it may
be stressed that the surety bond provides that notice to the principal is notice to the surety. Besides, it has been held that the
contract of a compensated surety like respondent EASCO is to be interpreted liberally in the interest of the promises and
beneficiaries rather than strictly in favor of the surety (Acoustics Inc. v. American Surety, 74 Nev-6, 320 P2d. 626, 74 Am. Jur.
2d).
So, too, EASCO's claim that it had not been properly served with summons as regards a few of the complaints must be rejected, the issue being
factual, and the Court having been cited to no grave error invalidating the respondent Secretary's conclusion that summons had indeed been
duly served.
Finally, EASCO's half-hearted argument that its liability should be limited to the maximum amount set in its surety bond, i.e., P150,000.00, is
palpably without merit, since the aggregate liability imposed on it, P140,817.75, supra, does not in fact exceed that limit.WHEREFORE, the
petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, and this decision is declared to be immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.
CLARITA V. CRUZ, petitioner, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), EMS
MANPOWER & PLACEMENT SERVICE (PHIL.), ABDUL KARIM AL YAHYA, and TRAVELLERS INSURANCE, respondents.
Clarita V. Cruz** went abroad pursuant to an employment contract that she hoped would improve her future. Although a high school graduate,
she agreed to work as a domestic helper in Kuwait in consideration of an attractive salary and vacation leave benefits she could not expect to
earn in this country. But her foreign adventure proved to be a bitter disappointment. On March 18,1988, after completing her two-year
engagement, she was back home in the Philippines with her dead dreams and an angry grievance.
On March 23,1988, she filed a complaint against EMS Manpower and Placement Services (Phil.) and its foreign principal, Abdul Karim Al Yahya,
for underpayment of her salary and non-payment of her vacation leave. She also claimed that she was charged a placement fee of P7,000.00
instead of the legal maximum of only P5,000.00. She alleged that her foreign employer treated her as a slave and required her to work 18 hours
a day. She was beaten up and suffered facial deformity, head trauma and decreased sensation in the right portion of her body. On top of all this,
she was paid only $120 per month and her total salaries were given to her only three hours before her flight back to Manila. This was after the
plane she was supposed to take had left and she had to stay in the airport for 24 hours before her employer finally heard her pleas and delivered
her passport and ticket to her.
In its answer and position paper, the private respondent raised the principal defense of settlement as evidenced by the Affidavit of Desistance
executed by the complainant on June 21, 1988. In this document, she declared inter alia that
xxx xxx xxx
2. Thereafter going thoroughly over the facts of the case by reconciling our records, we came to discover that it was only a
plain case of misunderstanding on our part, and that we have already settled our differences;
3. That I am no longer interested in further continuance of the above case against EMS Manpower & Placement Services
either criminal, civil or administrative or whatever nature as I hereby desist now and hereafter;
4. That I am executing this affidavit of desistance to attest to the truth of the foregoing facts and circumstances and for the
purpose of asking the dismissal of my said complaint against EMS Manpower & Placement Services.
On the basis of this affidavit, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) dismissed her complaint in a decision dated May 16,
1989. This was affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in its resolution dated December 28, 1990, reconsideration of
which was denied on February 21, 1991.
The petition now before us faults the POEA and the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for having upheld the Affidavit of Desistance. Cruz
rejects the settlement as having been obtained from her under duress and false pretenses and insists on her original claim for the balance of her
salaries and vacation- leave pay at the agreed rate of P250.00 per month.
Her contention is that she was inveigled into signing the Affidavit of Desistance without the assistance of counsel. The "Attorney" Alvarado who
assisted her was not really a lawyer but only a helper in the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration. Atty. Biolena, on the other hand, merely
acknowledged the document. Moreover, when she signed the affidavit, she was under the impression when she was agreeing to settle only her
claim for one month unpaid vacation leave, as the wording of the receipt she issued on the same date showed, to wit:
June 21, 1988
Receipt
This is to certify that I received the amount of P2,400.00 from EMS Manpower & Placement Services in settlement of 1 month
unpaid vacation leave.
(Sgd.) CLARITA V. CRUZ
IN THE PRESENCE OF:
(Sgd.) O.G. ALVARADO
OWWA Legal Dept.
For its part, the private respondent argues that the petitioner is bound by her Affidavit of Desistance, which she freely and knowingly executed.
After all, she was not an ignorant and illiterate person but a high school graduate who understood what she was signing. The due execution of
the instrument must also be sustained on the basis of the presumptions of regularity of official functions and of good faith.
Significantly, neither the private respondent nor the Solicitor General refuted the petitioner's submission that the person who allegedly assisted
her in the execution of the Affidavit of Desistance and explained to her its content and meaning was not a lawyer but a mere employee in the
OWWA. His status was merely assumed but not established by the respondents although it was directly questioned. The comments of the public
and private respondents did not meet this challenge squarely.
It is no less noteworthy that the receipt the petitioner issued on the same day was only for "P2,400.00 . . . in settlement of 1 month unpaid
vacation." This clearly shows that she was not waiving the rest of her demands in exchange for that measly amount (which did not even really
represent the commutable value of the 1 month vacation leave at the rate of $250.00). In fact, the total claim of the petitioner is for P88,840.00,
itemized as follows:
a) P84,240.00, representing the salary differentials of $130 for 24 months (US $3,120.00 x P27.00).
b) P2,600.00, representing the balance of her vacation leave pay.
c) P2,000.00, representing her excess placement fee.
In Principe v. Philippine-Singapore Transport Service, Inc., 1 this Court held:
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the quitclaim had foreclosed petitioner's right over the death benefits of her
husband, the fact that the consideration given in exchange thereof was very much less than the amount petitioner is claiming
renders the quitclaim null and void for being contrary to public policy. The State must be firm in affording protection to labor.
The quitclaim wherein the consideration is scandalously low and inequitable cannot be an obstacle to petitioner's pursuing her
legitimate claim. Equity dictates that the compromise agreement should be voided in this instance. (Emphasis supplied.)
The following guidelines were likewise set in Periquet v. NLRC: 2
Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents
a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is
only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement
are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court is convinced that the petitioner was not fully aware of the import and consequences of the Affidavit of Desistance when she executed
it, allegedly with the assistance of counsel. Except for the disputable presumptions invoked by the private respondent, such assistance has not
been established against the petitioner's allegation that the "Attorney" Alvarado who supposedly counseled her was not even a lawyer. Indeed,
even assuming that such assistance had been duly given, there is still the question of the intrinsic validity of the quitclaim in view of the gross
disparity between the amount of the settlement and the petitioner's original claim. It is difficult to believe that the petitioner would agree to waive
her total claim of P88,840.00 for the unseemly settlement of only P2,400.00. And even if she did, the waiver would still be null and void as
violative of public policy.
It remains to state that, contrary to the contention of the private respondent in the proceedings below that it has no privity of contract with the
petitioner, we have held in a long line of cases that the local recruiter is solidarily liable with the foreign principal for all damages sustained by the
overseas worker in connection with his contract of employment. Such liability is provided for in Section 1, Rule II, Book II, of the POEA Rules and
Regulations, which we have consistently sustained.
This decision demonstrates once again the tenderness of the Court toward the worker subjected to the lawless exploitation and impositions of
his employer. The protection of our overseas workers is especially necessary because of the inconveniences and even risks they have to
undergo in their quest for a better life in a foreign land away from their loved ones and their own government.
The domestic helper is particularly susceptible to abuse because she usually works only by herself in a private household unlike other workers
employed in an open business concern who are able to share and discuss their problems and bear or solve them together. The domestic helper
is denied that comfort. She has no companions in her misery. She usually broods alone. There is no one to turn to for help. That is why we must
carefully listen to her when she is finally able to complain against those who would rob her of her just rewards and even of her dignity as a
human being.
WHEREFORE, the resolutions of the NLRC dated December 28, 1990, and February 21, 1991, are SET ASIDE, and the Affidavit of Desistance
is DECLARED null and void. POEA Case No. 88-03-255 is REMANDED to the POEA for further proceedings and expeditious resolution.
SO ORDERED.
TRANS ACTION OVERSEAS CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR, ROSELLE CASTIGADOR, JOSEFINA MAMON, JENELYN CASA, PEACHY LANIOG,
VERDELINA BELGIRA, ELMA FLORES, RAMONA LITURCO, GRACE SABANDO, GLORIA PALMA, AVELYN ALVAREZ, CANDELARIA
NONO, NITA BUSTAMANTE, CYNTHIA ARANDILLO, SANDIE AGUILAR, DIGNA PANAGUITON, VERONICA BAYOGOS, JULIANITA
ARANADOR, LEONORA CABALLERO, NANCY BOLIVAR, NIMFA BUCOL, ZITA GALINDO, ESTELITA BIOCOS, MARJORIE MACATE,
RUBY SEPULVIDA, ROSALIE SONDIA, NORA MAQUILING, PAULINA CORDERO, LENIROSE ABANGAN, SELFA PALMA, ANTONIA
NAVARRO, ELSIE PENARUBIA, IRMA SOBREQUIL, SONY JAMUAT, CLETA MAYO,respondents.

ROMERO, J .:
The issue presented in the case at bar is whether or not the Secretary of Labor and Employment has jurisdiction to cancel or revoke the license
of a private fee-charging employment agency.
From July 24 to September 9, 1987, petitioner Trans Action Overseas Corporation, a private fee-charging employment agency, scoured Iloilo
City for possible recruits for alleged job vacancies in Hongkong. Private respondents sought employment as domestic helpers through
petitioner's employees, Luzviminda Aragon, Ben Hur Domincil and his wife Cecille. The applicants paid placement fees ranging from P1,000.00
to P14,000.00, but petitioner failed to deploy them. Their demands for refund proved unavailing; thus, they were constrained to institute
complaints against petitioner for violation of Articles 32 and 34(a)
1
of the Labor Code, as amended.
Petitioner denied having received the amounts allegedly collected from respondents, and averred that Aragon, whose only duty was to pre-
screen and interview applicants, and the spouses Domincil were not authorized to collect fees from the applicants. Accordingl y, it cannot be held
liable for the money claimed by respondents. Petitioner maintains that it even warned respondents not to give any money to unauthorized
individuals.
POEA Regional Extension Unit Coordinator Edgar Somes testified that although he was aware that petitioner collected fees from respondents,
the latter insisted that they be allowed to make the payments on the assumption that it could hasten their deployment abroad. He added that
Mrs. Honorata Manliclic, a representative of petitioner tasked to oversee the conduct of the interviews, told him that she was leaving behind
presigned receipts to Aragon as she cannot stay in Iloilo City for the screening of the applicants. Manliclic, however, denied this version and
argued that it was Somes who instructed her to leave the receipts behind as it was perfectly alright to collect fees.
On April 5, 1991, then Labor Undersecretary Nieves R. Confesor rendered the assailed order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, respondents are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the following claims:
1. Rosele Castigador P14,000.00
2. Josefina Mamon 3,000.00
3. Jenelyn Casa 3,000.00
4. Peachy Laniog 13,500.00
5. Verdelina Belgira 2,000.00
6. Elma Flores 2,500.00
7. Ramona Liturco 2,500.00
8. Grace Sabando 3,500.00
9. Gloria Palma 1,500.00
10. Avelyn Alvarez 1,500.00
11. Candelaria Nono 1,000.00
12. Nita Bustamante 5,000.00
13. Cynthia Arandillo 1,000.00
14. Sandie Aguilar 3,000.00
15. Digna Panaguiton 2,500.00
16. Veronica Bayogos 2,000.00
17. Sony Jamuat 4,500.00
18. Irma Sobrequil 2,000.00
19. Elsie Penarubia 2,000.00
20. Antonia Navarro 2,000.00
21. Selfa Palma 3,000.00
22. Lenirose Abangan 13,300.00
23. Paulina Cordero 1,400.00
24. Nora Maquiling 2,000.00
25. Rosalie Sondia 2,000.00
26. Ruby Sepulvida 3,500.00
27. Marjorie Macate 1,500.00
28. Estelita Biocos 3,000.00
29. Zita Galindo 3,500.00
30. Nimfa Bucol 1,000.00
31. Nancy Bolivar 2,000.00
32. Leonora Caballero 13,900.00
33. Julianita Aranador 14,000.00
The complaints of Ma. Luz Alingasa, Nimfa Perez, and Cleta Mayo are
hereby dismissed in view of their desistance.
The following complaints are hereby dismissed for failure to
appear/prosecute:
1. Jiyasmin Bantillo 6. Edna Salvante
2. Rosa de Luna Senail 7. Thelma Beltiar
3. Elnor Bandojo 8. Cynthia Cepe
4. Teresa Caldeo 9. Rosie Pavillon
5. Virginia Castroverde
The complaints filed by the following are hereby dismissed for lack of
evidence:
1. Aleth Palomaria 5. Mary Ann Beboso
2. Emely Padrones 6. Josefina Tejero
3. Marybeth Aparri 7. Bernadita Aprong
4. Lenia Biona 8. Joji Lull
Respondent agency is liable for twenty eight (28) counts of violation of Article 32 and five (5) counts of Article 34 (a) with a
corresponding suspension in the aggregate period of sixty six (66) months. Considering however, that under the schedule of
penalties, any suspension amounting to a period of 12 months merits the imposition of the penalty of cancellation, the license
of respondent TRANS ACTION OVERSEAS CORPORATION to participate in the overseas placement and recruitment of
workers is hereby ordered CANCELLED, effective immediately.
SO ORDERED.
2
(Emphasis supplied)
On April 29, 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Temporary Lifting of Order of Cancellation alleging, among other things, that to deny it the
authority to engage in placement and recruitment activities would jeopardize not only its contractual relations with its foreign principals, but also
the welfare, interests, and livelihood of recruited workers scheduled to leave for their respective assignments. Finally, it manifested its
willingness to post a bond to insure payment of the claims to be awarded, should its appeal or motion be denied.
Finding the motion to be well taken, Undersecretary Confesor provisionally lifted the cancellation of petitioner's license pending resolution of its
Motion for Reconsideration filed on May 6, 1991. On January 30, 1992, however, petitioner's motion for reconsideration was eventually denied
for lack of merit, and the April 5, 1991, order revoking its license was reinstated.
Petitioner contends that Secretary; Confesor acted with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed orders on alternative grounds, viz.:
(1) it is the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) which has the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide illegal
recruitment cases, including the authority to cancel recruitment licenses, or (2) the cancellation order based on the 1987 POEA Schedule of
Penalties is not valid for non-compliance with the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 regarding its registration with the U.P. Law Center.
Under Executive Order No. 797
3
(E.O. No. 797) and Executive Order No. 247 (E.O. No. 247),
4
the POEA was established and mandated to
assume the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board (OEDB), the National Seamen Board (NSB), and the overseas
employment function of the Bureau of Employment Services (BES). Petitioner theorizes that when POEA absorbed the powers of these
agencies, Article 35 of the Labor Code, as amended, was rendered ineffective.
The power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit employees for overseas employment is vested upon the Secretary of Labor
and Employment. Article 35 of the Labor Code, as amended, which provides:
Art. 5. Suspension and/or Cancellation of License or Authority The Minister of Labor shall have the power to suspend or
cancel any license or authority to recruit employees for overseas employment for violation of rules and regulations issued by
the Ministry of Labor, the Overseas Employment Development Board, and the National Seamen Board, or for violation of the
provisions of this and other applicable laws, General Orders and Letters of Instructions.
In the case of Eastern Assurance and Surety Corp. v. Secretary of
Labor,
5
we held that:
The penalties of suspension and cancellation of license or authority are prescribed for violations of the above quoted
provisions, among others. And the Secretary of Labor has the power under Section 35 of the law to apply these sanctions, as
well as the authority, conferred by Section 36, not only to "restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all
agencies," but also to "promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions" governing
said activities. Pursuant to this rule-making power thus granted, the Secretary of Labor gave the POEA,
6
"on its own initiative
or upon filing of a complaint or report or upon request for investigation by any aggrieved person, . . (authority to) conduct the
necessary proceedings for the suspension or cancellation of the license or authority of any agency or entity" for certain
enumerated offenses including
1) the imposition or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of any amount of money, goods or services, or any fee or bond in excess
of what is prescribed by the Administration, and
2) any other violation of pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and other relevant laws, rules and regulations.
7

The Administrator was also given the power to "order the dismissal of the case of the suspension of the license or authority of
the respondent agency or contractor or recommend to the Minister the cancellation thereof."
8
(Emphasis supplied)
This power conferred upon the Secretary of Labor and Employment was echoed in People v. Diaz,
9
viz.:
A non-licensee or non-holder of authority means any person, corporation or entity which has not been issued a valid license or
authority to engage in recruitment and placement by the Secretary of Labor, or whose license or authority has been
suspended, revoked or cancelled by the POEA or the Secretary. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the Court's disposition on the matter, we rule that the power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit employees for
overseas employment is concurrently vested with the POEA and the Secretary of Labor.
As regards petitioner's alternative argument that the non-filing of the 1987 POEA Schedule of Penalties with the UP Law Center rendered it
ineffective and, hence, cannot be utilized as basis for penalizing them, we agree with Secretary Confesor's explanation, to wit:
On the other hand, the POEA Revised Rules on the Schedule of Penalties was issued pursuant to Article 34 of the Labor
Code, as amended. The same merely amplified and particularized the various violations of the rules and regulations of the
POEA and clarified and specified the penalties therefore (sic). Indeed, the questioned schedule of penalties contains only a
listing of offenses. It does not prescribe additional rules and regulations governing overseas employment but only detailed the
administrative sanctions imposable by this Office for some enumerated prohibited acts.
Under the circumstances, the license of the respondent agency was cancelled on the authority of Article 35 of the Labor Code,
as amended, and not pursuant to the 1987 POEA Revised Rules on Schedule of Penalties.
10

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the decision of the Secretary of Labor dated
April 5, 1991, is AFFIRMED. No costs.SO ORDERED.
HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner, vs.
HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, and FERDIE
MARQUEZ, respondents.
This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code,
prohibiting illegal recruitment.
The facts are as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
1. On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza, Pasay City, in a sworn statement filed with the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA for brevity) charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar, viz:
04. T: Ano ba ang dahilan at ikaw ngayon ay narito at
nagbibigay ng salaysay.
S: Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang aking PECC Card ay
ayaw ibigay sa akin ng dati kong manager. Horty
Salazar 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Mla.
05. T: Kailan at saan naganap and ginawang panloloko sa
iyo ng tao/mga taong inireklamo mo?
S. Sa bahay ni Horty Salazar.
06. T: Paano naman naganap ang pangyayari?
S. Pagkagaling ko sa Japan ipinatawag niya ako. Kinuha
ang PECC Card ko at sinabing hahanapan ako ng
booking sa Japan. Mag 9 month's na ako sa Phils. ay
hindi pa niya ako napa-alis. So lumipat ako ng ibang
company pero ayaw niyang ibigay and PECC Card
ko.
2. On November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to whom said complaint was assigned, sent to the
petitioner the following telegram:
YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR BEFORE FERDIE MARQUEZ POEA ANTI ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT UNIT 6TH FLR. POEA BLDG. EDSA COR. ORTIGAS AVE. MANDALUYONG MM ON
NOVEMBER 6, 1987 AT 10 AM RE CASE FILED AGAINST YOU. FAIL NOT UNDER PENALTY OF LAW.
4. On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent
Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205 which reads:
HORTY SALAZAR
No. 615 R.O. Santos St.
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila
Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the
CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the
seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment,
it having verified that you have
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy
workers for overseas employment;
(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38
of the same code.
This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws.
Done in the City of Manila, this 3th day of November, 1987.
5. On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty. Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office order
designating respondents Atty. Marquez, Atty. Jovencio Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a team tasked to
implement Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205. Doing so, the group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen Lito
Castillo of the People's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News Today proceeded to the residence of the petitioner at 615 R.O.
Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before
entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed
them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman
Development (Phil.). However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team
chanced upon twelve talent performers practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team
confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora
Salazar.
6. On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA the following letter:
Gentlemen:
On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar of 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, we respectfully request that the personal
properties seized at her residence last January 26, 1988 be immediately returned on the ground that said seizure was contrary
to law and against the will of the owner thereof. Among our reasons are the following:
1. Our client has not been given any prior notice or hearing, hence the Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205
dated November 3, 1987 violates "due process of law" guaranteed under Sec. 1, Art. III, of the Philippine
Constitution.
2. Your acts also violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine Constitution which guarantees right of the people "to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose."
3. The premises invaded by your Mr. Ferdi Marquez and five (5) others (including 2 policemen) are
the private residence of the Salazar family, and the entry, search as well as the seizure of the personal
properties belonging to our client were without her consent and were done with unreasonable force and
intimidation, together with grave abuse of the color of authority, and constitute robbery and violation of
domicile under Arts. 293 and 128 of the Revised Penal Code.
Unless said personal properties worth around TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) in all (and which were
already due for shipment to Japan) are returned within twenty-four (24) hours from your receipt hereof, we
shall feel free to take all legal action, civil and criminal, to protect our client's interests.
We trust that you will give due attention to these important matters.
7. On February 2, 1988, before POEA could answer the letter, petitioner filed the instant petition; on even date, POEA filed a
criminal complaint against her with the Pasig Provincial Fiscal, docketed as IS-88-836.
1

On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought to be barred are alreadyfait accompli, thereby making
prohibition too late, we consider the petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved.
The Court finds that a lone issue confronts it: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue
warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code? It is also an issue squarely raised by the petitioner for the Court's
resolution.
Under the new Constitution, which states:
. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
2

it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest.
3
In one case, it was declared that mayors may not exercise this power:
xxx xxx xxx
But it must be emphasized here and now that what has just been described is the state of the law as it was in September,
1985. The law has since been altered. No longer does the mayor have at this time the power to conduct preliminary
investigations, much less issue orders of arrest. Section 143 of the Local Government Code, conferring this power on the
mayor has been abrogated, rendered functus officio by the 1987 Constitution which took effect on February 2, 1987, the date
of its ratification by the Filipino people. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertinently provides that "no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person or things to be seized." The constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested that
thenceforth, the function of determining probable cause and issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of arrest or search
warrants, may be validly exercised only by judges, this being evidenced by the elimination in the present Constitution of the
phrase, "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" found in the counterpart provision of said 1973
Constitution, who, aside from judges, might conduct preliminary investigations and issue warrants of arrest or search
warrants.
4

Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body:
We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and
on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the existence of probable cause for
purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case. Although his
office "is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused," he stands, invariably,
as the accused's adversary and his accuser. To permit him to issue search warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make
him both judge and jury in his own right, when he is neither. That makes, to our mind and to that extent, Presidential Decree
No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional.
5

Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an amendment by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the
late President Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential Decree No. 1693, in the exercise of his legislative powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973
Constitution. Under the latter, the then Minister of Labor merely exercised recommendatory powers:
(c) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall have the power to recommend the arrest and detention of
any person engaged in illegal recruitment.
6

On May 1, 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1920, with the avowed purpose of giving more teeth to the campaign against
illegal recruitment. The Decree gave the Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers:
(b) The Minister of Labor and Employment shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-
holder of authority if after proper investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and
public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the closure of companies, establishment
and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed or
authorized to do so.
7

On January 26, 1986, he, Mr. Marcos, promulgated Presidential Decree No. 2018, giving the Labor Minister search and seizure powers as well:
(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to cause the arrest and
detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a
danger to national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the
search of the office or premises and seizure of documents, paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in illegal
recruitment activities and the closure of companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of
workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do so.
8

The above has now been etched as Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code.
The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its twilight moments.
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go
through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.
The Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Morano v. Vivo
9
is not well-taken. Vivo involved a deportation case, governed by Section 69 of
the defunct Revised Administrative Code and by Section 37 of the Immigration Law. We have ruled that in deportation cases, an arrest (of an
undesirable alien) ordered by the President or his duly authorized representatives, in order to carry out a final decision of deportation is valid.
10
It
is valid, however, because of the recognized supremacy of the Executive in matters involving foreign affairs. We have held:
11

xxx xxx xxx
The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil.
1122, 1125). That power may be exercised by the Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the peace and
domestic tranquility of the nation." Justice Johnson's opinion is that when the Chief Executive finds that there are aliens whose
continued presence in the country is injurious to the public interest, "he may, even in the absence of express law, deport
them". (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil. 534, 568, 569; In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41).
The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is detrimental to public welfare is absolute
and unqualified (Tiu Chun Hai and Go Tam vs. Commissioner of Immigration and the Director of NBI, 104 Phil. 949, 956).
12

The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) can not be made
to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.
Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general
warrant:
Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the
CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the
seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment,
it having verified that you have
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy
workers for overseas employment;
(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38
of the same code.
This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws.
13

We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and void, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the
nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
1) All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables,
communications/ recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the
printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents/communications, letters and facsimile
of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.
2) Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to promote the objectives and
purposes of the subversive organizations known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement
and April 6 Movement; and
3) Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other subversive materials and
propaganda, more particularly,
1) Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2) DATSUN, pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969;
3) A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542;
4) TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and
5) TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 472 with marking "Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas, the search warrant which authorized the search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts,
lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Parties of Texas, and the
operations of the Community Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like
manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connection with the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too
general, and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to
violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes (the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy)" was held to be a
general warrant, and therefore invalid. The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in
question cannot be characterized differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme court calls to mind a notable chapter in English history; the era of disaccord between
the Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where
they pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan." Reference herein to such
historical episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that
speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security.
14

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and
search:
2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of
Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The
respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.
No costs.SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA, accused-appellant.

KAPUNAN, J .:
Accused-appellant Carol M. dela Piedra questions her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale and assails, as well, the constitutionality of
the law defining and penalizing said crime.
The Court affirms the constitutionality of the law and the conviction of the accused, but reduces the penalty imposed upon her.
The accused was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City in an information alleging:
That on or about January 30, 1994, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without having previously obtained from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, a license or authority to engage in
recruitment and overseas placement of workers, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, offer and promise for a fee employment
abroad particularly in Singapore thus causing Maria Lourdes Modesto [y] Gadrino, Nancy Araneta y Aliwanag and Jennelyn Baez y Timbol, all
qualified to apply, in fact said Maria Lourdes Modesto had already advanced the amount of P2,000.00 to the accused for and in consideration of
the promised employment which did not materialized [sic] thus causing damage and prejudice to the latter in the said sum; furthermore, the acts
complained of herein tantamount [sic] to economic sabotage in that the same were committed in large scale.
1

Arraigned on June 20, 1994, the accused pleaded not guilty
2
to these charges.
At the trial, the prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely, Erlie Ramos, SPO2 Erwin Manalopilar, Eileen Fermindoza, Nancy Araneta and
Lourdes Modesto. The succeeding narration is gathered from their testimonies:
On January 30, 1994, at exactly 10:00 in the morning, Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA),
received a telephone call from an unidentified woman inquiring about the legitimacy of the recruitment conducted by a certain Mrs. Carol
Figueroa. Ramos, whose duties include the surveillance of suspected illegal recruiters, immediately contacted a friend, a certain Mayeth
Bellotindos, so they could both go to No. 26-D, Tetuan Highway, Sta. Cruz, Zamboanga City, where the recruitment was reportedly being
undertaken. Upon arriving at the reported area at around 4:00 p.m., Bellotindos entered the house and pretended to be an applicant. Ramos
remained outside and stood on the pavement, from where he was able to see around six (6) persons in the house's sala. Ramos even heard a
woman, identified as Carol Fegueroa, talk about the possible employment she has to provide in Singapore and the documents that the
applicants have to comply with. Fifteen (15) minutes later, Bellotindos came out with a bio-data form in hand.
On February 1, 1994, Ramos conferred with a certain Capt. Mendoza of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) to organize the arrest of the
alleged illegal recruiter. Also present were other members of the CIS, including Col. Rodolfo Almonte, Regional Director of the PNP-CIS for
Region IX, Eileen Fermindoza, and a certain SPO3 Santos. The group planned to entrap the illegal recruiter the next day by having Fermindoza
pose as an applicant.
3

On February 2, 1994, at around 8:00 p.m., Col. Almonte directed the case to SPO2 Erwin Manalopilar, a member of the Philippine National
Police who was assigned as an investigator of the CIS, to conduct a surveillance of the area to confirm the report of illegal recruitment.
Accordingly, he, along with Eileen Fermindoza, immediately proceeded to Tetuan Highway. The two did not enter the house where the
recruitment was supposedly being conducted, but Fermindoza interviewed two people who informed them that some people do go inside the
house. Upon returning to their office at around 8:30 a.m., the two reported to Capt. Mendoza who organized a team to conduct the raid.
The raiding team, which included Capt. Mendoza, SPO2 Manalopilar, Fermindoza and a certain Oscar Bucol, quickly set off and arrived at the
reported scene at 9:30 that morning. There they met up with Erlie Ramos of the POEA. Fermindoza then proceeded to enter the house while the
rest of the team posted themselves outside to secure the area. Fermindoza was instructed to come out after she was given a bio-data form,
which will serve as the team's cue to enter the house.
4

Fermindoza introduced herself as a job applicant to a man and a woman, apparently the owners of the house, and went inside. There, she saw
another woman, later identified as Jasmine, coming out of the bathroom. The man to whom Fermindoza earlier introduced herself told Jasmine
that Fermindoza was applying for a position. Jasmine, who was then only wearing a towel, told her that she would just get dressed. Jasmine
then came back and asked Fermindoza what position she was applying for. Fermindoza replied that she was applying to be a babysitter or any
other work so long as she could go abroad. Jasmine then gave her an application form.
A few minutes later, a certain Carol arrived. Jasmine informed Carol that Fermindoza was an applicant. Fermindoza asked Carol what the
requirements were and whether she (Fermindoza) was qualified. Carol told Fermindoza that if she had a passport, she could fill up the
application papers. Fermindoza replied that she had no passport yet. Carol said she need not worry since Jasmine will prepare the passport for
her. While filling up the application form, three women who appeared to be friends of Jasmine arrived to follow up the result of their applications
and to give their advance payment. Jasmine got their papers and put them on top of a small table. Fermindoza then proceeded to the door and
signaled to the raiding party by raising her hand.
Capt. Mendoza asked the owners of the house, a married couple, for permission to enter the same. The owners granted permission after the
raiding party introduced themselves as members of the CIS. Inside the house, the raiding party saw some supposed applicants. Application
forms, already filled up, were in the hands of one Mrs. Carol Figueroa. The CIS asked Figueroa if she had a permit to recruit. Figueroa retorted
that she was not engaged in recruitment. Capt. Mendoza nevertheless proceeded to arrest Figueroa. He took the application forms she was
holding as the raiding party seized the other papers
5
on the table.
6

The CIS team then brought Figueroa, a certain Jasmine Alejandro, and the three women suspected to be applicants, to the office for
investigation.7
In the course of their investigation, the CIS discovered that Carol Figueroa had many aliases, among them, Carol Llena and Carol dela Piedra.
The accused was not able to present any authority to recruit when asked by the investigators.
8
A check by Ramos with the POEA revealed that
the acused was not licensed or authorized to conduct recruitment.
9
A certification
10
dated February 2, 1994 stating thus was executed by
Renegold M. Macarulay, Officer-in-Charge of the POEA.
The CIS likewise interviewed the supposed applicants, Lourdes Modesto, Nancy Araneta and Jennelyn Baez, all registered nurses working at
the Cabato Medical Hospital, who executed their respective written statements.
11

At the trial, Nancy Araneta, 23, recounted that she was at Jasmine Alejandro's house in the afternoon of January 30, 1994. Araneta had learned
from Sandra Aquino, also a nurse at the Cabato Medical Hospital, that a woman was there to recruit job applicants for Singapore.
Araneta and her friends, Jennelyn Baez and Sandra Aquino, arrived at Jasmine's house at around 4:30 p.m. Jasmine welcomed them and told
them to sit down. They listened to the "recruiter" who was then talking to a number of people. The recruiter said that she was "recruiting" nurses
for Singapore. Araneta and her friends then filled up bio-data forms and were required to submit pictures and a transcript of records. They were
also told to pay P2,000, and "the rest will be salary deduction." Araneta submitted her bio-data form to Carol that same afternoon, but did not
give any money because she was "not yet sure."
On the day of the raid on February 2, 1994, Araneta was again at the Alejandro residence to submit her transcript of records and her picture.
She arrived at the house 30 minutes before the raid but did not witness the arrest since she was at the porch when it happened.
12

Maria Lourdes Modesto, 26, was also in Jasmine Alejandro's house on January 30, 1994. A friend of Jasmine had informed her that there was
someone recruiting in Jasmine's house. Upon arriving at the Alejandro residence, Lourdes was welcomed by Jasmine.1wphi1.nt
Lourdes recalled that Carol Figueroa was already briefing some people when she arrived. Carol Figueroa asked if they would like a "good
opportunity" since a hospital was hiring nurses. She gave a breakdown of the fees involved: P30,000 for the visa and the round trip ticket, and
P5,000 as placement fee and for the processing of the papers. The initial payment was P2,000, while P30,000 will be by salary deduction.
Lourdes filled up the application form and submitted it to Jasmine. After the interview, she gave the initial payment of P2,000 to Jasmine, who
assured Lourdes that she was authorized to receive the money. On February 2, 1994, however, Lourdes went back to the house to get back the
money. Jasmine gave back the money to Lourdes after the raid.
13

Denial comprised the accused's defense.
Carol dela Piedra, 37, is a housewife and a resident of Cebu City. Her husband is a businessman from Cebu, the manager of the Region 7
Branch of the Grollier International Encyclopedia. They own an apartment in Cebu City, providing lodging to students.
The accused claimed that she goes to Singapore to visit her relatives. She first traveled to Singapore on August 21, 1993 as a tourist, and came
back to the Philippines on October 20 of the same year. Thereafter, she returned to Singapore on December 10, 1993.
On December 21, 1993, while in Singapore, the accused was invited to a Christmas party sponsored by the Zamboanga City Club Association.
On that occasion, she met a certain Laleen Malicay, who sought her help. A midwife, Malicay had been working in Singapore for six (6) years.
Her employer is a certain Mr. Tan, a close friend of Carol.
According to the accused, Malicay sent P15,000 home for her father who was then seriously ill. Malicay was not sure, however, whether her
father received the money so she requested the accused to verify from her relatives receipt thereof. She informed the accused that she had a
cousin by the name of Jasmine Alejandro. Malicay gave the accused Jasmine's telephone number, address and a sketch of how to get there.
The accused returned to the country on January 21, 1994. From Cebu City, the accused flew to Zamboanga City on January 23, 1994 to give
some presents to her friends.
On January 30, 1994, the accused called up Jasmine Alejandro, Laleen Malicay's cousin, to inform her that she would be going to her house. At
around noon that day, the accused, accompanied by her friend Hilda Falcasantos, arrived at the house where she found Jasmine entertaining
some friends. Jasmine came down with two of her friends whom she introduced as her classmates. Jasmine told them that the accused was a
friend of Laleen Malicay.
The accused relayed to Jasmine Malicay's message regarding the money the latter had sent. Jasmine assured her that they received the
money, and asked Carol to tell Malicay to send more money for medicine for Malicay's mother. Jasmine also told her that she would send
something for Malicay when the accused goes back to Singapore. The accused replied that she just needed to confirm her flight back to Cebu
City, and will return to Jasmine's house. After the meeting with Jasmine, the accused went shopping with Hilda Falcasantos. The accused was in
the house for only fifteen (15) minutes.
On February 2, 1994, the accused went to the Philippine Airlines office at 7:30 in the morning to confirm her 5:30 p.m. flight to Cebu Ci ty. She
then proceeded to Jasmine's residence, arriving there at past 8 a.m.
Inside the house, she met a woman who asked her, "Are you Carol from Singapore?" The accused, in turn, asked the woman if she could do
anything for her. The woman inquired from Carol if she was recruiting. Carol replied in the negative, explaining that she was there just to say
goodbye to Jasmine. The woman further asked Carol what the requirements were if she (the woman) were to go to Singapore. Carol replied that
she would need a passport.
Two (2) minutes later, three (3) girls entered the house looking for Jasmine. The woman Carol was talking with then stood up and went out. A
minute after, three (3) members of the CIS and a POEA official arrived. A big man identified himself as a member of the CIS and informed her
that they received a call that she was recruiting. They told her she had just interviewed a woman from the CIS. She denied this, and said that
she came only to say goodbye to the occupants of the house, and to get whatever Jasmine would be sending for Laleen Malicay. She even
showed them her ticket for Cebu City.
Erlie Ramos then went up to Jasmine's room and returned with some papers. The accused said that those were the papers that Laleen Malicay
requested Jasmine to give to her (the accused). The accused surmised that because Laleen Malicay wanted to go home but could not find a
replacement, one of the applicants in the forms was to be her (Malicay's) substitute. Ramos told the accused to explain in their office.
The accused denied in court that she went to Jasmine's residence to engage in recruitment. She claimed she came to Zamboanga City to visit
her friends, to whom she could confide since she and her husband were having some problems. She denied she knew Nancy Araneta or that
she brought information sheets for job placement. She also denied instructing Jasmine to collect P2,000 from alleged applicants as processing
fee.
14

The accused presented two witnesses to corroborate her defense.
The first, Jasmine Alejandro, 23, testified that she met the accused for the first time only on January 30, 1994 when the latter visited them to
deliver Laleen Malicay's message regarding the money she sent. Carol, who was accompanied by a certain Hilda Falcasantos, stayed in their
house for 10 to 15 minutes only. Carol came back to the house a few days later on February 2 at around 8:00 in the morning to "get the
envelope for the candidacy of her daughter." Jasmine did not elaborate.
Jasmine denied that she knew Nancy Araneta or Lourdes Modesto. She denied that the accused conducted recruitment. She claimed she did
not see Carol distribute bio-data or application forms to job applicants. She disclaimed any knowledge regarding the P2,000 application fee.
15

The other defense witness, Ernesto Morales, a policeman, merely testified that the accused stayed in their house in No. 270 Tugbungan,
Zamboanga City, for four (4) days before her arrest, although she would sometimes go downtown alone. He said he did not notice that she
conducted any recruitment.
16

On May 5, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision convicting the accused, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing consideration[s][,] this Court finds the accused Carol dela Piedra alias Carol Llena and Carol
Figueroa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment committed in a large scale and hereby sentences her to suffer the
penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of P100,000.00, and also to pay the costs.
Being a detention prisoner, the said accused is entitled to the full time of the period of her detention during the pendency of this case
under the condition set forth in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.
17

The accused, in this appeal, ascribes to the trial court the following errors:
I
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING SEC. 13 (B) OF P.D. 442[,] AS AMENDED[,] OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS [THE] ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
II
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE APPREHENDING TEAM COMPOSED OF POEA
AND CIS REPRESENTATIVES ENTERED INTO [sic] THE RESIDENCE OF JASMIN[E] ALEJANDRO WITHOUT ANY SEARCH
WARRANT IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, AND ANY EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN
VIOLATION THEREOF, SHALL BE INADMISSIBLE FOR ANY PURPOSE IN ANY PROCEEDING AS PROVIDED UNDER ARTICLE
III, SECTION 3, (2) OF THE SAME CONSTITUTION;
III
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THAT WHEN SPO2 [sic] EILE[E]N FERMINDOZA ENTERED
THE RESIDENCE OF JASMIN[E] ALEJANDRO, THERE WAS NO CRIME COMMITTED WHATSOEVER, HENCE THE ARREST OF
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS ILLEGAL;
[IV]
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISCOVERING THAT SPO2 [sic] EILE[E]N FERMINDOZA WAS NOT
ILLEGALLY RECRUITED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, HENCE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT SHOULD BE ACQUITTED;
V
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DETECTING THAT NANCY ARANETA WAS NOT ILLEGALLY
RECRUITED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, HENCE, ACCUSED SHOULD BE EXONERATED;
VI
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT REALIZING THAT MARIA LOURDES MODESTO WAS NOT
ILLEGALLY RECRUITED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, HENCE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT SHOULD BE EXCULPATED;
VII
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS CHARGED WITH
LARGE SCALE ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT ON JANUARY 30, 1994, THE DATE STATED IN THE INFORMATION AS THE DATE OF
THE CRIME, BUT ACCUSED WAS ARRESTED ON FEB. 2, 1994 AND ALL THE EVIDENCES [sic] INDICATED [sic] THAT THE
ALLEGED CRIME WERE [sic] COMMITTED ON FEB. 2, 1994, HENCE, THE INFORMATION IS FATALLY DEFECTIVE;
VIII
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED CRIME OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT
WAS COMMITTED NOT ON [sic] LARGE SCALE, HENCE, THE PENALTY SHOULD NOT BE LIFE IMPRISONMENT;
IX
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THOSE EVIDENCES [sic] SEIZED AT THE HOUSE
OF JASMIN[E] ALEJANDRO AND PRESENTED TO THE COURT WERE PLANTED BY A BOGUS ATTORNEY[,] ERLIE S. RAMOS
OF THE POEA;
X
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISCOVERING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT DID NOT RECEIVE
ANY PAYMENT EVEN A SINGLE CENTAVO FROM THE ALLEGED VICTIMS WHO DID NOT SUFFER DAMAGE IN ANY MANNER,
YET SHE WAS CONVICTED TO SERVE HER ENTIRE LIFE BEHIND PRISON BARS. SUCH PUNISHMENT WAS CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL, HENCE, A WANTON VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION.
18

In the first assigned error, appellant maintains that the law defining "recruitment and placement" violates due process. Appellant also avers, as
part of her sixth assigned error, that she was denied the equal protection of the laws.
We shall address the issues jointly.
Appellant submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining "recruitment and placement" is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due
process clause.
19

Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part
will render them liable to its penalties.
20
A criminal statute that "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated
conduct is forbidden by the statute," or is so indefinite that "it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions," is void for
vagueness.
21
The constitutional vice in a vague or indefinite statute is the injustice to the accused in placing him on trial for an offense, the
nature of which he is given no fair warning.
22

We reiterated these principles in People vs. Nazario:
23

As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common intelligence must necessari ly
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to
accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and become an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
We added, however, that:
x x x the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction. Thus,
in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that had made it illegal for "three or more persons to
assemble on any sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by." Clearly, the ordinance imposed
no standard at all "because one may never know in advance what 'annoys some people but does not annoy others.'"
Coates highlights what has been referred to as a "perfectly vague" act whose obscurity is evident on its face. It is to be distinguished,
however, from legislation couched in imprecise languagebut which nonetheless specifies a standard though defectively phrasedin
which case, it may be "saved" by proper construction.
Here, the provision in question reads:
ART. 13. Definitions.(a) x x x.
(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not:
Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
x x x.
When undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority, recruitment activities are punishable as follows:
ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. (a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this
Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this
Code. The Ministry of Labor and Employment or any law enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this Article.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage and
shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or
confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first
paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or
as a group.
x x x.
Art. 39. Penalties. (a) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) shall be imposed if
illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein:
(b) Any licensee or holder of authority found violating or causing another to violate any provision of this Title or its implementing rules
and regulations, shall upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than five years or a fine of not less than
P10,000 nor more than P50,000 or both such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court;
(c) Any person who is neither a licensee nor a holder of authority under this Title found violating any provision thereof or its
implementing rules and regulations shall, upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four years nor
more than eight years or a fine of not less than P20,000 nor more than P100,000 or both such imprisonment and fine, at the di scretion
of the court;
x x x.
In support of her submission that Article 13 (b) is void for vagueness, appellant invokes People vs. Panis,
24
where this Court, to use appellant's
term, "criticized" the definition of "recruitment and placement" as follows:
It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the meaning of the questioned provision for lack of records of debates and deliberations that
would otherwise have been available if the Labor Code had been enacted as a statute rather than a presidential decree is that they could be,
and sometimes were, issued without previous public discussion or consultation, the promulgator heeding only his own counsel or those of his
close advisers in their lofty pinnacle of power. The not infrequent results are rejection, intentional or not, of the interest of the greater number
and, as in the instant case, certain esoteric provisions that one cannot read against the background facts usually reported in the legislative
journals.
If the Court in Panis "had to speculate on the meaning of the questioned provision," appellant asks, what more "the ordinary citizen" who does
not possess the "necessary [legal] knowledge?"
Appellant further argues that the acts that constitute "recruitment and placement" suffer from overbreadth since by merely "referring" a person for
employment, a person may be convicted of illegal recruitment.
These contentions cannot be sustained.
Appellant's reliance on People vs. Panis is misplaced. The issue in Panis was whether, under the proviso of Article 13 (b), the crime of illegal
recruitment could be committed only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee." The
Court held in the negative, explaining:
As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto but merely to create a
presumption. The presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or
more persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is made in the course of the "canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers."
The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of recruitment and placement of workers. Any of the acts mentioned in
the basic rule in Article 13(b) will constitute recruitment and placement even if only one prospective worker is involved. The proviso merely lays
down a rule of evidence that where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective workers,
the individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement. The words "shall be deemed"
create that presumption.
This is not unlike the presumption in article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, for example, regarding the failure of a public officer to produce upon
lawful demand funds or property entrusted to his custody. Such failure shall beprima facie evidence that he has put them to personal use; in
other words, he shall be deemed to have malversed such funds or property. In the instant case, the word "shall be deemed" should by the same
token be given the force of a disputable presumption or of prima facie evidence of engaging in recruitment and placement.
It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the meaning of the questioned provision for lack of records of debates and deliberations that
would otherwise have been available if the Labor Code had been enacted as a statute rather than a presidential decree is that they could be,
and sometimes were, issued without previous public discussion or consultation, the promulgator heeding only his own counsel or those of his
close advisers in their lofty pinnacle of power. The not infrequent results are rejection, intentional or not, of the interest of the greater number
and, as in the instant case, certain esoteric provisions that one cannot read against the background facts usually reported in the legislative
journals.
At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign against illegal recruitment and placement, which has
victimized many Filipino workers seeking a better life in a foreign land, and investing hard-earned savings or even borrowed funds in pursuit of
their dream, only to be awakened to the reality of a cynical deception at the hands of their own countrymen.
Evidently, therefore, appellant has taken the penultimate paragraph in the excerpt quoted above out of context. The Court, in Panis, merely
bemoaned the lack of records that would help shed light on the meaning of the proviso. The absence of such records notwithstanding, the Court
was able to arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the proviso by applying principles in criminal law and drawing from the language and intent of
the law itself. Section 13 (b), therefore, is not a "perfectly vague act" whose obscurity is evident on its face. If at all, the proviso therein is merely
couched in imprecise language that was salvaged by proper construction. It is not void for vagueness.
An act will be declared void and inoperative on the ground of vagueness and uncertainty, only upon a showing that the defect is such that the
courts are unable to determine, with any reasonable degree of certainty, what the legislature intended. x x x. In this connection we cannot
pretermit reference to the rule that "legislation should not be held invalid on the ground of uncertainty if susceptible of any reasonable
construction that will support and give it effect. An Act will not be declared inoperative and ineffectual on the ground that it furnishes no adequate
means to secure the purpose for which it is passed, if men of common sense and reason can devise and provide the means, and all the
instrumentalities necessary for its execution are within the reach of those intrusted therewith."
25

That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently considers as customary and harmless acts such as " labor or employment referral"
("referring" an applicant, according to appellant, for employment to a prospective employer) does not render the law overbroad. Evidently,
appellant misapprehends concept of overbreadth.
A statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively guaranteed by the
Constitution, such as the freedom of speech or religion. A generally worded statute, when construed to punish conduct which cannot be
constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it fails to give adequate warning of the boundary between the
constitutionally permissible and the constitutionally impermissible applications of the statute.
26

In Blo Umpar Adiong vs. Commission on Elections,
27
for instance, we struck down as void for overbreadth provisions prohibiting the posting of
election propaganda in any place including private vehicles other than in the common poster areas sanctioned by the COMELEC. We held
that the challenged provisions not only deprived the owner of the vehicle the use of his property but also deprived the citizen of his right to free
speech and information. The prohibition in Adiong, therefore, was so broad that it covered even constitutionally guaranteed rights and, hence,
void for overbreadth. In the present case, however, appellant did not even specify what constitutionally protected freedoms are embraced by the
definition of "recruitment and placement" that would render the same constitutionally overbroad.
Appellant also invokes the equal protection clause
28
in her defense. She points out that although the evidence purportedly shows that Jasmine
Alejandro handed out application forms and even received Lourdes Modesto's payment, appellant was the only one criminally charged.
Alejandro, on the other hand, remained scot-free. From this, appellant concludes that the prosecution discriminated against her on grounds of
regional origins. Appellant is a Cebuana while Alejandro is a Zamboanguea, and the alleged crime took place in Zamboanga City.
The argument has no merit.
At the outset, it may be stressed that courts are not confined to the language of the statute under challenge in determining whether that statute
has any discriminatory effect. A statute nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation.
29
Though the law itself be fair
on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as
practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice
is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.
30

The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, however, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of
the laws.
31
Where the official action purports to be in conformity to the statutory classification, an erroneous or mistaken performance of the
statutory duty, although a violation of the statute, is not without more a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
32
The unlawful administration
by officers of a statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal
protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. This may appear on the face of the
action taken with respect to a particular class or person, or it may only be shown by extrinsic evidence showing a discriminatory design over
another not to be inferred from the action itself.But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing of "clear and
intentional discrimination."
33
Appellant has failed to show that, in charging appellant in court, that there was a "clear and intentional
discrimination" on the part of the prosecuting officials.
The discretion of who to prosecute depends on the prosecution's sound assessment whether the evidence before it can justify a reasonable
belief that a person has committed an offense.34 The presumption is that the prosecuting officers regularly performed their duties,
35
and this
presumption can be overcome only by proof to the contrary, not by mere speculation. Indeed, appellant has not presented any evidence to
overcome this presumption. The mere allegation that appellant, a Cebuana, was charged with the commission of a crime, while a
Zamboanguea, the guilty party in appellant's eyes, was not, is insufficient to support a conclusion that the prosecution officers denied appellant
equal protection of the laws.
There is also common sense practicality in sustaining appellant's prosecution.
While all persons accused of crime are to be treated on a basis of equality before the law, it does not follow that they are to be protected in the
commission of crime. It would be unconscionable, for instance, to excuse a defendant guilty of murder because others have murdered with
impunity. The remedy for unequal enforcement of the law in such instances does not lie in the exoneration of the guilty at the expense of society
x x x. Protection of the law will be extended to all persons equally in the pursuit of their lawful occupations, but no person has the right to
demand protection of the law in the commission of a crime.
36

Likewise,
[i]f the failure of prosecutors to enforce the criminal laws as to some persons should be converted into a defense for others charged with crime,
the result would be that the trial of the district attorney for nonfeasance would become an issue in the trial of many persons charged with heinous
crimes and the enforcement of law would suffer a complete breakdown.
37

We now come to the third, fourth and fifth assigned errors, all of which involve the finding of guilt by the trial court.
Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur. First, the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to
lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers. Second, he or she undertakes either any activity within the meaning of "recruitment
and placement" defined under Article 13 (b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code.
38
In case of illegal
recruitment in large scale, a third element is added: that the accused commits said acts against three or more persons, individually or as a
group.
39

In this case, the first element is present. The certification of POEA Officer-in-Charge Macarulay states that appellant is not licensed or authorized
to engage in recruitment and placement.
The second element is also present. Appellant is presumed engaged in recruitment and placement under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code. Both
Nancy Araneta and Lourdes Modesto testified that appellant promised them employment for a fee. Their testimonies corroborate each other on
material points: the briefing conducted by appellant, the time and place thereof, the fees involved. Appellant has not shown that these witnesses
were incited by any motive to testify falsely against her. The absence of evidence as to an improper motive actuating the pri ncipal witnesses of
the prosecution strongly tends to sustain that no improper motive existed and that their testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.
40

Appellant's denials cannot prevail over the positive declaration of the prosecution witnesses. Affirmative testimony of persons who are
eyewitnesses of the fact asserted easily overrides negative testimony.
41

That appellant did not receive any payment for the promised or offered employment is of no moment. From the language of the statute, the act of
recruitment may be "for profit or not;" it suffices that the accused "promises or offers for a fee employment" to warrant conviction for illegal
recruitment.
The testimonies of Araneta and Modesto, coming as they do from credible witnesses, meet the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant committed recruitment and placement. We therefore do not deem it necessary to delve into the second and third assigned errors
assailing the legality of appellant's arrest and the seizure of the application forms. A warrantless arrest, when unlawful, has the effect of
invalidating the search incidental thereto and the articles so seized are rendered inadmissible in evidence.
42
Here, even if the documents seized
were deemed inadmissible, her conviction would stand in view of Araneta and Modesto's testimonies.
Appellant attempts to cast doubt on the prosecution's case by claiming in her ninth assigned error that Erlie Ramos of the POEA supposedly
"planted" the application forms. She also assails his character, alleging that he passed himself off as a lawyer, although this was denied by
Ramos.
The claim of "frame-up," like alibi, is a defense that has been invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted but
difficult to prove.
43
Apart from her self-serving testimony, appellant has not offered any evidence that she was indeed framed by Ramos. She has
not even hinted at any motive for Ramos to frame her. Law enforcers are presumed to have performed their duties regularly in the absence of
evidence to the contrary.
44

Considering that the two elements of lack of license or authority and the undertaking of an activity constituting recruitment and placement are
present, appellant, at the very least, is liable for "simple" illegal recruitment. But is she guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale? We find that she
is not.
A conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons whether
individually or as a group.
45
In this case, only two persons, Araneta and Modesto, were proven to have been recruited by appellant. The third
person named in the complaint as having been promised employment for a fee, Jennelyn Baez, was not presented in court to testify.
It is true that law does not require that at least three victims testify at the trial; nevertheless, it is necessary that there is sufficient evidence
proving that the offense was committed against three or more persons.
46
In this case, evidence that appellant likewise promised her employment
for a fee is sketchy. The only evidence that tends to prove this fact is the testimony of Nancy Araneta, who said that she and her friends, Baez
and Sandra Aquino, came to the briefing and that they (she and her "friends") filled up application forms.
The affidavit
47
Baez executed jointly with Araneta cannot support Araneta's testimony. The affidavit was neither identified, nor its contents
affirmed, by Baez. Insofar as it purports to prove that appellant recruited Baez, therefore, the affidavit is hearsay and inadmissible.
48
In any case,
hearsay evidence, such as the said affidavit, has little probative value.
49

Neither can appellant be convicted for recruiting CIS agent Eileen Fermindoza or even the other persons present in the briefi ng of January 30,
1994. Appellant is accused of recruiting only the three persons named in the information Araneta, Modesto and Baez. The information does
not include Fermindoza or the other persons present in the briefing as among those promised or offered employment for a fee. To convict
appellant for the recruitment and placement of persons other than those alleged to have been offered or promised employment for a fee would
violate her right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her.
50

In any event, the purpose of the offer of the testimonies of Araneta, Morales and Fermindoza, respectively, was limited as follows:
FISCAL BELDUA:
Your Honor please, we are offering the oral testimony of the witness, as one of those recruited by the accused, and also to
identify some exhibits for the prosecution and as well as to identify the accused.
51

x x x
FISCAL BELDUA:
We are offering the oral testimony of the witness, Your Honor, to testify on the fact about her recruitment by the accused and
immediately before the recruitment, as well as to identify some exhibits for the prosecution, and also the accused in this case,
Your Honor.
52

x x x
FISCAL BELDUA:
This witness is going to testify that at around that date Your Honor, she was connected with the CIS, that she was instructed
together with a companion to conduct a surveillance on the place where the illegal recruitment was supposed to be going on,
that she acted as an applicant, Your Honor, to ascertain the truthfulness of the illegal recruitment going on, to identify the
accused, as well as to identify some exhibits for the prosecution.
53

x x x
Courts may consider a piece of evidence only for the purpose for which it was offered,
54
and the purpose of the offer of their testimonies did not
include the proving of the purported recruitment of other supposed applicants by appellant.
Appellant claims in her seventh assigned error that the information is fatally defective since it charges her with committing illegal recruitment in
large scale on January 30, 1994 while the prosecution evidence supposedly indicates that she committed the crime on February 2, 1994.
We find that the evidence for the prosecution regarding the date of the commission of the crime does not vary from that charged in the
information. Both Nancy Araneta and Lourdes Modesto testified that on January 30, 1994, while in the Alejandro residence, appellant offered
them employment for a fee. Thus, while the arrest was effected only on February 2, 1994, the crime had already been committed three (3) days
earlier on January 30, 1994.
The eighth and tenth assigned errors, respectively, pertain to the penalty of life imprisonment imposed by the trial court as well as the
constitutionality of the law prescribing the same, appellant arguing that it is unconstitutional for being unduly harsh.
55
Section 19 (1), Article III of
the Constitution states: "Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted."
The penalty of life imprisonment imposed upon appellant must be reduced. Because the prosecution was able to prove that appel lant committed
recruitment and placement against two persons only, she cannot be convicted of illegal recruitment in large scale, which requires that
recruitment be committed against three or more persons. Appellant can only be convicted of two counts of "simple" illegal recruitment, one for
that committed against Nancy Araneta, and another count for that committed against Lourdes Modesto. Appellant is sentenced, for each count,
to suffer the penalty of four (4) to six (6) years of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P30,000.00. This renders immaterial the tenth assigned error,
which assumes that the proper imposable penalty upon appellant is life imprisonment.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the regional trial court is MODIFIED. Appellant is hereby declared guilty of illegal recruitment on two (2) counts
and is sentenced, for each count, to suffer the penalty of four (4) to six (6) years of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. NIDA ADESER y RICO, Appellant.

QUISUMBING, J .:
On appeal is the Decision
1
dated June 28, 2007, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01902, affirming the Decision
2
dated May 2,
2005, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 118 in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-2700 and 03-2701. The RTC convicted appellant
of the crimes of syndicated illegal recruitment constituting economic sabotage and estafa.
On November 12, 2003, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay filed before the RTC two Informations
3
against appellant Nida Adeser y Rico,
Lourdes Chang, and the spouses Roberto and Mel Tiongson. The Informations read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 03-2700
That on or about and sometime in the month of May, 2003, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, by means of false representation
and fraudulent allegation to the effect that they could secure employment abroad for complainant JOSEPHINE R. PALO, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit for a fee aforesaid person without the corresponding license from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, a syndicated illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage.
Contrary to law.
4

Criminal Case No. 03-2701
That on or about and sometime in the month of May, 2003, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, defrauded private complainant
JOSEPHINE R. PALO, in the following manner to wit: that said accused, by means of false representations and fraudulent allegations that they
could facilitate private complainants working and travel papers, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously ask, demand and receive
from the said complainant the amount of P80,000.00 as placement fee for the latters supposed deployment to Australia as "Apple Picker/Office
Worker"; and said private complainant carried away by said misrepresentations, in fact gave and delivered to said accused the amount
of P80,000.00, which amount accused in turn misapplied, misappropriated and converted to their own personal use and benefit, failing, however,
to deploy private complainant to Australia, and despite repeated demands accused failed and refused to do so, or account for the said amount,
to the damage and prejudice of the said private complainant in the aforesaid amount of P80,000.00.
Contrary to law.
5

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty
6
to both charges while her co-accused remained at large. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
Private complainant Josephine R. Palo and her sister Teresa Caraig testified that sometime in November 2002, the spouses Roberto and Mel
Tiongson, agents of Naples Travel and Tours, introduced Palo to appellant, owner and general manager of Naples, to discuss employment
opportunities in Australia. During their meeting held at the Naples office in Villaruel Tower, Villaruel Street, Pasay City, appellant and the
spouses Tiongson informed Palo that for a placement fee of P80,000, she can work as an apple picker in Australia with a monthly salary of
$1,400.
Thus, on November 8, 2002, Palo and Caraig went to the Naples office and gave Roberto Tiongson and Lourdes Chang, operations manager of
Naples, P15,000 as first installment for the placement fee. Palo was issued a voucher
7
signed by Roberto and Chang stating therein that
the P15,000 was for Palos visa application.
On November 11, 2002, Palo and Caraig returned to the Naples office and paid P58,500. She was again issued a voucher
8
signed by Roberto
and Chang stating therein that the amount paid was for Palos visa application. Palo insisted that the voucher should indicate that her payments
were for "placement fees" but they were able to convince her that it is not necessary because they know her.
After making her payments, she was required to submit her resume and pictures and was promised that she would be employed within three
months.
More than three months passed, however, but Palo was not deployed to Australia. Neither did she get her Australian visa.
In May 2003, she learned from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that Naples had closed down. NBI likewise informed her that Naples
had no license to operate and deploy workers abroad. Upon advice of the NBI, Palo filed a complaint
9
against appellant, the spouses Tiongson
and Chang.
Appellant on the other hand denied the charges against her. She admitted that she was the owner and general manager of Naples which was a
travel agency that offered visa assistance, ticketing, documentation, airport transfer and courier services, but denied having engaged in
recruitment. She claimed that she cannot remember meeting Palo in her office and asserted that she met her for the first time only at the fiscals
office when Palo was already claiming for a refund. She testified that Roberto, to whom Palo claims to have given her payment, was neither her
employee nor her agent but was only her drivers brother. Based on her records, Roberto endorsed to her office P30,000 from Palo for tourist
visa assistance. Appellant also admitted that she and Roberto offered to settle the P30,000 but not the amount claimed by Palo per vouchers
issued to her.
On May 2, 2005, the trial court rendered a Decision finding appellant guilty of both charges. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered NIDA ADESER is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Syndicated Illegal
Recruitment constituting Economic Sabotage in Criminal Case No. 03-2700 andEstafa in Criminal Case No. 03-2701. Accordingly, she is hereby
sentenced to suffer the following penalties:
1. In Criminal Case No. 3-2700 LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a FINE of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), and
2. In Criminal Case No. 03-2701 Indeterminate imprisonment of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to 13 years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify Josephine R. Palo the sum of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00) with legal
interest from the time of the filing of the information.
Cost against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
10

Appellant appealed her conviction but the same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated June 28, 2007. The appellate court
did not give credence to appellants denials and found that the prosecution evidence fully supports the finding that appellant and her co-accused
engaged in recruitment and placement as defined under the Labor Code despite having no authority to do so. It likewise held that the same
evidence proving the commission of the crime of illegal recruitment also established that appellant and her co-accused acted in unity in
defrauding Palo and in misrepresenting to her that upon payment of the placement fee, they could obtain employment abroad for her. The
appellants act of deception and the resultant damage suffered by Palo render appellant guilty of estafa.
In this appeal, appellant raises the following lone assignment of error:
THE [APPELLATE] COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HER GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
11

Essentially, the issue is whether appellants guilt for the crimes of syndicated illegal recruitment and estafa was proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
Appellant argues that she was able to prove that she was not part of the group that defrauded Palo. She points out that as can be gleaned from
the facts established and even from Palos testimony, she was not involved in the evil scheme orchestrated by Roberto and Chang as her
signature did not even appear on the vouchers issued to Palo.
Appellant likewise contends that the elements of the crime of illegal recruitment were not established with moral certainty. Naples was never into
recruitment as it was only engaged in the business of assisting clients procure passports and visas. She argues that it shoul d be Roberto and
Chang who should be convicted as she had no hand in recruiting Palo.
Appellants arguments are bereft of merit.
Illegal recruitment is committed when these two elements concur: (1) the offenders have no valid license or authority required by law to enable
them to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers, and (2) the offenders undertake any activity within the meaning of
recruitment and placement defined in Article 13(b) or any prohibited practices enumerated in Article 34 of the Labor Code. Under Article 13(b),
recruitment and placement refers to "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not." In the simplest terms, illegal
recruitment is committed by persons who, without authority from the government, give the impression that they have the power to send workers
abroad for employment purposes.
12
The law imposes a higher penalty when the crime is committed by a syndicate as it is considered as an
offense involving economic sabotage. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more
persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under
the first paragraph of Article 38 of the Labor Code.
13

Undoubtedly, what transpired in the instant case is illegal recruitment by a syndicate. As categorically testified by Palo and Caraig, appellant,
together with her co-accused, made representations to Palo that they could send her to Australia to work as an apple picker. There is no denying
that they gave Palo the distinct impression that they had the power or ability to send her abroad for work such that the latter was convinced to
part with a huge amount of money as placement fee in order to be employed. And this act was committed by appellant and her co-accused even
if they did not have the required license to do so. Appellant herself admitted that Naples, the travel agency which she owned and managed, only
offered visa assistance, ticketing, documentation, airport transfer and courier services. Clearly, neither she nor her agents had a license to
recruit Palo to work abroad. It is the lack of the necessary license or authority that renders the recruitment unlawful or criminal.
14

Thus, as against the positive and categorical testimonies of Palo and Caraig, appellants denials cannot prevail.
15
Moreover, there is no reason to
overturn the trial and appellate courts findings on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses as there is no showing that any of them had ill
motives against appellant or her co-accused and especially since it appears they were motivated solely by the desire to bring appellant and her
co-accused to justice for the crimes they have committed.
16

Neither can this Court sustain appellants contention that her participation in the recruitment is negated by the fact that her signature does not
even appear on the vouchers issued to Palo. Even if Palo did not present receipts signed by appellant, this would not rule out the fact that
appellant did receive the money. This Court has consistently ruled that absence of receipts as to the amounts delivered to a recruiter does not
mean that the recruiter did not accept or receive such payments. Neither in the Statute of Frauds nor in the rules of evidence is the presentation
of receipts required in order to prove the existence of a recruitment agreement and the procurement of fees in illegal recruitment cases. Such
proof may come from the credible testimonies of witnesses
17
as in the case at bar.
We likewise uphold appellants conviction for estafa. A person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may also be convicted of estafa under
Article 315(2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code provided the elements of estafa are present. Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code is committed by any person who defrauds another by using a fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. The offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means
of the accused and as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
18

Such is the case before us. Palo parted with her money upon the prodding and enticement of appellant and her co-accused on the false
pretense that they had the capacity to deploy her for employment in Australia. Unfortunately, however, Palo was not able to work abroad nor get
her Australian visa. Worse, she did not get her money back.
As to the penalties, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8042
19
or the Migrant Workers Act of 1995 provides the penalties for illegal recruitment:
SEC. 7. Penalties.
(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day
but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine not less than Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) nor more than Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than One million
pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein. (Emphasis supplied.)
x x x x
As appellant was found guilty of syndicated illegal recruitment constituting economic sabotage, she was aptly meted out the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.
With respect to the estafa case, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000
pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in
its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be;
x x x x
Considering that the total amount paid by Palo is P73,500 or P51,500 in excess of the P22,000 limit, an additional sentence of five years should
be imposed based on the above-quoted provision. Thus, appellant was correctly meted the maximum penalty of 13 years of reclusion
temporal.1avvphi1
As to the amount to be indemnified to Palo, contrary to the findings of the trial and appellate courts, Palos testimony and the vouchers she
presented establish that the total amount she paid is only P73,500
20
and not theP80,000 quoted as placement fee. Thus, she should only be
indemnified the said amount, plus legal interest of 12% per annum from the time of filing of the information.
21

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated June 28, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01902 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The amount to be indemnified to private complainant Josephine R. Palo is reduced to Seventy-Three
Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P73,500) with legal interest of 12% per annum from the time of filing of the information until fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. VICENTA MEDINA LAPIS, ANGEL MATEO, AIDA DE LEON (at large) and JEAN AM-AMLAW
(at large),appellants.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Illegal recruiters prey on our gullible and impoverished people by inveigling them with false or fraudulent promises of attractive employment in
foreign shores. Such vultures deserve the full sanction of the law.
The Case
Vicenta Medina Lapis and Angel Mateo appeal the March 6, 2000 Joint Decision
1
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City (Branch 138),
finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment and estafa. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court rules
"1. In Criminal Case No. 99-1112[,] accused Vicenta Medina Lapis and Angel Mateo are pronounced guilty of violating Section 6, of
Republic Act No. 8042, the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 and they are both sentenced to suffer life
imprisonment. Pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 7, Republic Act No. 8042, considering that both accused are non-licensers or
non-holders of authority, they are both sentenced to pay fines of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) each. Both accused are ordered to
indemnify both complainants jointly and severally of the amount of P118,000.00, the net amount after deducting the recovery
of P40,000.00. They are likewise ordered to pay both complainants jointly and severally the amounts of P24,000.00 as reimbursement
for traveling expenses; P4,000.00 as rental for boarding house, and P100,000.00 as unrealized income;
"2. In Criminal Case No. 99-1113[,] accused Vicenta Medina Lapis and Angel Mateo are guilty of violating Article 315 (2) (a) of the
Revised Penal Code and they are both sentenced to suffer imprisonment of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal.
"No civil liability need be imposed considering that in Criminal Case No. 99-1112 the same was already provided.
"Let the case as against Jane Am-amlao and Aida de Leon be sent to the archives to be revived upon arrest, surrender or acquisition of
jurisdiction over their person.
"SO ORDERED."
2

Two separate Informations,
3
both dated April 20, 1999, charged appellants with syndicated illegal recruitment under Republic Act (RA)
8042
4
and estafa under paragraph 2 (a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
5

In Criminal Case No. 99-1112, they were charged as follows:
"That on or about March, 1998 and thereafter in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit the herein
complainants, MELCHOR F. DEGSI and PERPETUA L. DEGSI for employment as an office worker and as a cook or mechanic in Japan, for and
in consideration thereof, they were required to pay the amount of P158,600.00 as alleged placement and processing fees, which the
complainants delivered and paid the amount of P158,600.00 Philippine Currency, without the accused having deployed the complainants despite
the lapse of several months, to their damage and prejudice."
6

In Criminal Case No. 99-1113, the Information reads:
"That on or about March, 1998 and thereafter in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with each other, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit and promise
employment to spouses MELCHOR and PERPETUA DEGSI in Japan for a total consideration of one hundred fifty eight thousand and six
hundred pesos (P158,600.00) as placement and processing fees, knowing that they have no capacity whatsoever and with no intention to fulfill
their promise, but merely as a pretext, scheme or excuse to get or exact money from said complainant as they in fact collected and received the
amount of P158,600.00 from said MELCHOR and PERPETUA DEGSI to their damage, loss and prejudice for the aforesaid amount."
7

With the assistance of their counsel de oficio,
8
appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges during their arraignment on July 27, 1999.
9

The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) relates how appellants, despite their lack of authority or license, represented themselves as persons
who had the capacity to send the victims abroad for employment. We quote its version of the facts as follows:
"The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, Melchor Degsi and Perpetua Degsi (Complainants for brevity) and Priscil la Marreo (or
Priscilla Marelo).
"The prosecution and appellants stipulated that appellants are not licensed or authorized to recruit workers for employment abroad, in lieu of the
testimony of Senior Labor Researcher Johnson Bolivar of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
"Complainants are husband and wife, residents of Baguio City. They made a living earning an average ofP20,000.00 a month by selling fish and
vegetables in a rented stall in said City, at least until March 24, 1998 when they closed shop for reasons of attending to the demands of the
promised jobs for them in Japan. Both categorically identified Jane Am-amlao (or Jean Am-amlaw), their co-vendor in Baguio City Market, as the
person who approached them and assured them that she knew a legal recruiter, an ex-POEA employee, who had the capacity to send them
both abroad. Jane Am-amlaw (or Am-amlaw for brevity) recruited complainants and personally accompanied them on March 24, 1998 to meet
the person she earlier referred to, or Aida de Leon (or Alma de Leon), in the latters apartment at No. 7280 J. Victor St., Pio del Pilar, Makati.
"Complainants likewise categorically identified Aida de Leon (de leon for brevity) as the person who arranged a meeting in her apartment on
March 24, 1998 between complainants and appellant Angel Mateo (Mateo for brevity) whom de Leon introduced as their contact person for
Japan-bound workers. In said meeting, Mateo represented himself as having the capacity to send people abroad and showed complainants
various documents to convince them of his legitimate recruitment operations. Convinced that Mateo had indeed the capacity to facilitate their
employment as an office worker and as a cook or mechanic in Japan, complainants, on that same day, handed Mateo P15,000.00 which Mateo
required them to pay for their processing fees. This was to be the first of a series of sums of money to be extracted from complainants.
"Complainants were able to positively identify Mateo in court as the contact person of de Leon and who collected from them, from March 24,
1998 to June 23, 1998, sums of money for the alleged necessary expenses relative to the promised jobs awaiting them in Japan in the total
amount of P158,600.00. Complainants likewise categorically identified Mateo as the same person whose authorization was needed for the
recovery of P40,000.00 of theP45,000.00 they gave Mateo who in turn deposited it to Sampaguita Travel Agency under his own name.
"Complainants likewise positively identified appellant Vicenta Vicky Lapis (Lapis for brevity) in Court as the person introduced to them by
Mateo as his wife on April 29, 1998 at Maxs Restaurant in Makati when Lapis required complainants to pay P49,240.00 for their plane tickets
and travel taxes. Lapis is, in fact, only the live-in partner of Mateo. Lapis told complainants that she was helping to speed up the process[ing] of
their papers relative to the promised jobs awaiting them in Japan. Complainants met again Lapis, who was with Mateo on May 2, 1998 at the
Makati Restaurant, annex of Maxs Restaurant, when Lapis assured them that Mateo could really send them abroad and even wrote in a piece of
paper appellants address at Phase I, Lot 14, Blk 13 Mary Cris Subd., Imus, Cavite. On May 17, 1998, complainants once more met Lapis who
was with Mateo, de Leon and de Leons husband in Baguio City at the house of Priscilla Marreos daughter. Both appellants updated
complainant as to the status of their paper and reiterated their promise that complainants would soon be leaving for Japan, then collected from
complainants unreceipted amount of P20,000.00. Complainants met again with Lapis, who was again with Mateo, on May 19, 1998 at the
Sampaguita Travel Agency. Mateo extracted P45,000.00 from complainants and deposited it under his name. On that occasion, Perpetua
wanted to ask from the Sampaguita Travel Agencys employees where to pay the P45,000.00 but failed to do so because Lapis took her
attention away from asking while Mateo asked Melchor to hand over to him said sum.
"Priscilla Marreo (Priscilla for brevity) is the sister of Melchor who loaned complainants part of the P158,000.00 which appellants extracted from
complainant[s]. Thus, she made herself present in most of the meetings between complainants and appellants together with the two other
accused where she witnessed the assurances and promises made by appellants relative to complainants immediate departure for Japan and
their corresponding demands of sums of money. The testimony of Priscilla underscored the testimony of complainants showing that Am-amlaw,
de Leon, Lapis and Mateo indeed corroborated and confederated in the commission of illegal recruitment.
"The prosecution presented documentary evidence, such as varied unofficial receipts all bearing the signature of Mateo; Sinumpaang Salaysay
of Perpetua L. Degsi executed on July 21, 1998; Affidavit executed by complainants on July 21, 1998; Requirement for Guarantee Letter of Visa
bearing the names of both private complainants; Request for Certification of POEA-CIDG, Team to Mr. Hermogenes Mateo, Director II,
Licensing Branch of POEA as represented by Johnson Bolivar, Senior Labor Researcher of POEA, and the various documents that
complainants alleged to have been shown to them by Mateo to prove the legality of his recruitment operations."
10
(Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
For their part, appellants deny that they were engaged in recruitment activities, and that they promised foreign employment to the victims. Below
is the version of the facts presented by the defense:
"VICENTA MEDINA LAPIS testified that she is the live-in partner of her co-accused Mateo. They have been living together for almost three (3)
years. According to her, she first met both complainants at Maxs Restaurant in Makati when they talked to accused Mateo. She was there only
to accompany her live-in partner. The subject of the conversation between the complainants and accused Mateo was a contract in Baguio City.
She did not see complainant deliver money to accused Mateo while they were in that meeting. She also has no knowledge about the transaction
between complainant and accused Mateo. She admitted that she went to Baguio City together with accused Mateo to talk to the City Mayor. She
likewise admitted that the handwriting appearing in Exhibit F is hers but the reason why she gave it was only to comply to the request of the
complainant Perpetua Degsi regarding a matter to be followed up at the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The result of her follow-up
rendered was that complainant Perpetua Degsi has a pending case of estafa.
"ANGEL MATEO averred that he is engaged in the importation of heavy equipment and containers but he has never been engaged in
recruitment. To prove that he was really engaged in the delivery of heavy equipment, he presented a document of Import Service signed by a
certain Alexander Arcilla addressed to Honorable Timoteo Encar Jr., City Mayor, Cavite City dated March 14, 1997 and were marked as Exhibit
1 and 1-a. He also presented another document of Import Services issued by the Department of Trade and Industry addressed to Honorable
Mayor Maliksi as Municipal Mayor of Imus, Cavite; a photocopy of a Bill of Lading from Trade Bulk cargoes by Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.; and
Invoice of used vehicles, airconditioners and washing machines and the packing list which were all marked as Exhibits 3 to 5. Sometime in
March 24, 1998, he met the complainants at Pio del Pilar, in Makati City at the apartment of accused Aida de Leon. He went there to follow-up
their transaction about heavy equipment with Mayor Binay because, it was accused de Leon who entered the transaction with Mayor Binay.
While he was there, the complainants were introduced to him by accused de Leon. He admitted meeting the complainants on April 29, 1998 at
Maxs Restaurant but the reason was for him to meet Mrs. Marero in person and also because complainant Perpetua Degsi has a pending case
for large scale estafa and she needed a clearance. He denied having signed Exhibit B. He further claimed that the topic of their meeting was to
supply heavy equipment in Baguio City. He denied having asked for P50,000.00 on May 6, 1999. He likewise denied signing the receipt showing
the total amount of P158,600.00."
11

The Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court held that the evidence for the prosecution sufficiently established the criminal liability of appellants for the crimes charged. It ruled
in this manner:
"Evidence for the prosecution clearly established that both complainants were enticed by accused Mateo and were led to believe that the latter
has the capacity to send them for employment to Japan. Complainant Melchor Degsi and his wife Perpetua Degsi both testified to this fact.
Acting on their belief that indeed accused Mateo can deploy them to Japan, amounts were disbursed by both complainants to accused Mateo to
cover the processing and placement fees. x x x The Court finds the evidence presented by the prosecution sufficient to establ ish that accused
Mateo violated Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 when he demanded amounts for placement and processing fees but he failed to deploy both
complainants. The Court has a similar conclusion insofar as the accusation for estafa is concerned as the evidence shows accused Mateo knew
beforehand that he has no capacity to deploy both complainants abroad and that the enticement to work abroad was merely a scheme or plan to
exact money from both complainants. Deception was proven.
"Insofar as the accused Lapis is concerned it is to be noted that the theory of the prosecution is that she acted in conspiracy with her co-accused
Mateo who is her live-in partner. Evidence for the prosecution shows that at least on three (3) occasions accused Lapis was present when
accused Mateo asked and received money from complainants in connection with their intended employment in Japan. x x x The Court
conclude[d] that accused Lapis has knowledge of the intention of her co-accused Mateo in asking for money from both complainants. There was
active participation on her part in the recruitment of both complainants and in deceiving them about the capacity to secure employment. The
Court believes that conspiracy was established beyond reasonable doubt. Her defense of ignorance of the transaction cannot be considered
given the positive evidence presented by the prosecution which should prevail over her plain denial."
12

Hence, this appeal.
13

The Issues
In their Brief, appellants interpose the following assignment of errors:
"I
The court a quo gravely erred in finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violations of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995) committed by a syndicate and Article 315 paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
"II
The court a quo gravely erred in finding accused-appellant Vicenta Medina Lapis guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment and
estafa.
"III
The court a quo gravely erred in finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate.
"IV
The court a quo gravely erred in finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa defined and penalized under
Article 315 par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code as amended."
14

The Courts Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
First Issue:
Syndicated Illegal Recruitment
Appellants aver that the finding of syndicated illegal recruitment by the lower court was erroneous; its conclusion that the offense was committed
by three (3) or more persons had no factual or legal basis. Allegedly, without sufficient evidence, the trial court wrongfully presumed that all of
them had acted in conspiracy. According to them, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that they had conspi red and
confederated in illegally recruiting complainants. Appellants conclude that, if at all, they could only be held liable for illegal recruitment in its
simple form. We disagree.
Illegal recruitment is committed when these two elements concur: (1) the offenders have no valid license or authority required by law to enable
them to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers, and (2) the offenders undertake any activity within the meaning of
recruitment and placement
15
defined in Article 13(b) or any prohibited practices enumerated in Article 34 of the Labor Code.
16

Under Article 13(b), recruitment and placement refers to "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers[;] and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not." In the
simplest terms, illegal recruitment is committed by persons who, without authority from the government, give the impression that they have the
power to send workers abroad for employment purposes.
17

We believe that the prosecution was able to establish the elements of the offense sufficiently. The case records reveal that appellants did in fact
engage in recruitment and placement activities by promising complainants employment in Japan. Undisputed is the fact that the former did not
have any valid authority or license to engage in recruitment and placement activities. Moreover, the pieces of testimonial and documentary
evidence presented by the prosecution clearly show that, in consideration of their promise of foreign employment, they indeed received various
amounts of money from complainants totalling P158,600.
Where appellants made misrepresentations concerning their purported power and authority to recruit for overseas employment, and in the
process, collected from complainants various amounts in the guise of placement fees, the former clearly committed acts constitutive of illegal
recruitment.
18
In fact, this Court held that illegal recruiters need not even expressly represent themselves to the victims as persons who have the
ability to send workers abroad. It is enough that these recruiters give the impression that they have the ability to enlist workers for job placement
abroad in order to induce the latter to tender payment of fees.
19

It is also important to determine whether illegal recruitment committed by appellants can be qualified as a syndicated illegal recruitment or an
offense involving economic sabotage.
Section 6 of RA 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, provides that illegal recruitment shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage when it is committed by a syndicate or carried out by a group of three or more persons
conspiring and confederating with one another.
In several cases, illegal recruitment has been deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three or more persons conspiring
and/or confederating with each other in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under Article 38(b) of the
Labor Code.
20

In this case, it cannot be denied that all four (4) accused -- Jane Am-amlaw, Aida de Leon, Angel Mateo and Vicenta Medina Lapis participated
in a network of deception. Verily, the active involvement of each in the various phases of the recruitment scam formed part of a series of
machinations. Their scheme was to lure complainants to Manila and to divest them of their hard-earned money on the pretext of guaranteed
employment abroad. The prosecution evidence shows that complainants were convinced by Jane Am-amlaw to go to Manila to meet someone
who could find employment for them abroad. Upon reaching the city, they were introduced to Aida de Leon and Angel Mateo; Mateo claimed to
have the contacts, the resources and the capacity to employ them overseas. After that initial meeting, complainants made several payments to
him, supposedly for the processing requirements of their deployment to Japan. Later on, they met Vicenta Medina Lapis who vol unteered her
assistance in the processing of their employment papers and assured them that Mateo could easily send them abroad. Complainant Perpetua
Degsi testified on the devious trail of transactions with all of the accused as follows:
"Q How did you come to know the accused in this case?
A They were introduced to me by one Aida de Leon and Jane Am-Amlao.
Q Who is this Jane Am-Amlao you are referring to?
A She is our co-member in Baguio.
Q What is she in relation to your recruitment by Angel Mateo and Vicenta Lapis?
A She was the first one who mentioned to us that she knows somebody who has the capacity to send us abroad.
Q When was this?
A March, 1998.
Q When Jane Am-Amlao told you that she knows somebody who has the capacity to send you abroad what happened next?
A On March 24, 1998 Jane accompanied us here in Manila.
Q Where in Manila particularly?
A At No. 72 J. Victor Street, Pio del Pilar, Makati in the apartment of Aida de Leon.
Q So what happened at the apartment of Aida de Leon?
A Jane told us that Aida de Leon was an ex-employee of POEA and she was able to send many workers abroad.
Q Were you able to meet Aida de Leon?
A Yes, maam.
Q What happened when you met her?
A Aida called us by phone and according to her she has the contact person who can explain [to] us the details on how to be able to
work abroad.
Q After Aida called you up on the phone what happened next?
A We waited because according to her, that person is coming over to the house.
Q A[fter] waiting what happened after that?
A ANGEL MATEO arrived and he was introduced to me as the contact person and we could ask him how we could work abroad.
Q Who is this siya, you are referring to?
A ANGEL MATEO.
Q Who introduced you to ANGEL MATEO?
A AIDA DE LEON.
Q After introducing you to ANGEL MATEO what happened?
A ANGEL MATEO showed us some documents AND HE WAS ABLE TO convince us that he has the capacity to send us abroad.
Q What documents were shown to you?
A Incorporation documents of two companies one, Philippine company and one is Japan company and some other documents they
made in order to send workers abroad.
Q After convincing you that he can send you abroad what happened after that?
A He asked for a processing fee and I asked him how much.
Q What did he tell you?
A He told me that he does not know because AIDA DE LEON will be the one to give us the price.
Q After that what happened?
A I asked AIDA how much and she answered, twenty thousand pesos.
Q After telling you that the amount is P20,000.00 what happened next?
A We went to the bank to withdraw P20,000.00 but we were only able to withdraw P15,000.00 and then we handed the P15,000.00 to
ANGEL MATEO, in front of Jane Am-Amlaw.
Q After receiving said amount from you by ANGEL MATEO what happened next?
A We parted ways.
Q Was there anything else that happened after that?
A Before we parted ways, [he] asked from us other documents like ID, birth certificate, marriage contract in order for him to begin
processing our papers.
Q After that what happened next?
A On March 31, we went back to [him] and we gave [him] the other documents needed and we also gave [him] the balance for the
processing fee.
Q Who is this niya or he you are referring to?
A Angel Mateo.
Q Where did you meet?
A [He] called me and we met in the apartment of AIDA.
Q Were you able to meet ANGEL MATEO in the apartment of AIDA DE LEON?
A Yes.
Q What happened there?
A We gave [him] the documents and we started processing the documents
Q What are those documents that you gave to ANGEL MATEO?
A Birth certificate authenticated, marriage contract and passport IDs and then we went to Pasay City to start the processing of the
passport.
Q You told us that ANGEL MATEO asked for the balance of P5,000.00, were you able to pay the said amount to ANGEL MATEO?
A Yes, maam.
x x x x x x x x x
Q After receiving said amount of P5,000.00 what happened?
A After that meeting at Pasay City we parted ways but [he] did not issue us any receipt so on April 15, [he] again called us up and told
me that he needs NBI clearance so we processed our NBI clearance.
Q You told us that ANGEL MATEO called you, where were you at that time?
A Baguio City.
Q Were you able to come here in Manila?
A Yes maam, we met in Quiapo.
Q Were you able to meet ANGEL MATEO in QUIAPO?
A [He] did not arrive in Quiapo.
Q So what did you do?
A We proceeded [to] the NBI and we called up AIDA and asked her why ANGEL MATEO did not arrive and whom did AIDA talk to.
Q What was the reply of AIDA DE LEON?
A She told me that whatever ANGEL MATEO would tell us, thats what we should follow.
Q After that what happened?
A The processing of our NBI clearance did not finish so on April 15 ANGEL MATEO asked for P2,000.00 in order to help us process the
NBI.
Q After calling you on April 15, what happened next?
A On April 29, 1998 me, my sister, Melchor, and Melchors sister together with ANGEL MATEO met at Maxs Restaurant in Makati.
x x x x x x x x x
Q Were you able to meet ANGEL MATEO?
A Yes maam, they arrived together with somebody whom [she] introduced to us as [his] wife.
Q Who is this wife you are referring to?
A She is Vicky Lapis, and later on we found out that she is Vicenta Medina Lapis.
Q What was this meeting all about?
A We were updated on what was happening on our papers and then ANGEL MATEO AND VICENTA LAPIS asked for a plane ticket.
Q What was the update for the processing of your papers?
x x x x x x x x x
A Vicenta Lapis told us that she is just helping to speed up the processing of papers so that we could be sent abroad immediately and
she even showed us some documents and I even told her that I could help them in typing those documents."
21

The foregoing testimony very clearly demonstrates that the individual actuations of all four (4) accused were directed at a singular
criminal purpose -- to delude complainants into believing that they would be employed abroad. The nature and the extent of the
formers interactions among themselves as well as with the latter clearly show unity of action towards a common undertaking. Certainly,
complainants would not have gone to Manila to meet Aida de Leon and Angel Mateo without the prodding of Am-amlaw. They would
not have made various payments for their travel and employment papers without the fraudulent representations of Mateo De Leon.
Moreover, they would not have complied with further instructions and demands of Mateo without the repeated assurances made by
Lapis.
Even assuming that the individual acts of the accused were not necessarily indispensable to the commission of the offense, conspiracy
would have still been present. Their actions, when viewed in relation to one another, showed a unity of purpose towards a common
criminal enterprise and a concurrence in their resolve to commit it.
In People v. Gamboa,
22
the Court had occasion to discuss the nature of conspiracy in the context of illegal recruitment as follows:
"Conspiracy to defraud aspiring overseas contract workers was evident from the acts of the malefactors whose conduct before, during
and after the commission of the crime clearly indicated that they were one in purpose and united in execution. Direct proof of previous
agreement to commit a crime is not necessary as it may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated
or inferred from the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. As such, all
the accused, including accused-appellant, are equally guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment since in a conspiracy the act of one is the
act of all."
23
(Emphasis supplied)
To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be actual proof that all the conspirators took a direct part in every act. It is sufficient
that they acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.
24

Conspiracy is present when one concurs with the criminal design of another, indicated by the performance of an overt act leading to the
crime committed.
25

The OSG avers, as an incident to this issue, and in line with People v. Yabut,
26
that complainants are entitled to recover interest on the
amount of P118,000, which the trial court awarded from the time of the filing of the Information until fully paid. We agree with the OSGs
observation and hereby grant the legal interest on the amount prayed for.
In a number of cases,
27
this Court has affirmed the trial courts finding that victims of illegal recruitment are entitled to legal interest on
the amount to be recovered as indemnity, from the time of the filing of the information until fully paid.
Second Issue:
Appellants Liability for Estafa
Appellants argue that in a prosecution for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, it is indispensable that the
element of deceit, consisting of fraudulent representations or false statements of the accused, be made prior to or simultaneous with the delivery
of the thing; and that such misrepresentations or false statements induce the complainants to part with the object of the cri me. The former allege
that the prosecution failed to point out with certainty whether their misrepresentations or false statements were made prior to or at least
simultaneous with the latters delivery of the money.
Under the cited provision of the Revised Penal Code, estafa is committed by any person who defrauds another by using a fictitious name; or by
falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business; by imaginary transactions or similar forms of
deceit executed prior to or simultaneous with the fraud.
28
Moreover, these false pretenses should have been the very reason that motivated
complainants to deliver property or pay money to the perpetrators of the fraud. While appellants insist that these constitutive elements of the
crime were not sufficiently shown by the prosecution, the records of the case prove otherwise.
During almost all of their meetings, complainants paid various amounts of money to appellants only after hearing the feigned assurances
proffered by the latter regarding the formers employment prospects in Japan. Even as early as their first meeting in the house of Aida de Leon,
the payment by complainants of the initial amount ofP15,000 was immediately preceded by an onslaught of promises. These enticing, albeit
empty, promises were made by Angel Mateo, who even showed them documents purportedly evincing his connections with various foreign
companies. Equally important, they relied on such misrepresentations, which convinced them to pay the initial amount as "processing fees."
Complainant Melchor Degsi testified on the matter in this wise:
"Prosecutor Ong:
So when Angel Mateo arrived at the apartment of Aida de Leon, what did he do, if any?
Witness:
He introduced himself to us and told us that he can easily send us to Japan because he knows many Japanese employers and he also
showed us some documents, maam. (Nagpakilala siya at ang sabi niya ay kayang-kaya niya kaming padalhin sa Japan dahil marami
siyang kilalang Japanese employer at may ipinakita siyang mga dokumento, maam).
Q What are these documents, if you remember, that were shown to you?
A Papers of Japanese companies, Clean Supplies Co. Ltd., Arabian Boy Express Corporation and that is the reason why we were
convinced, maam.
Q So, after being convinced that Angel Mateo can send you abroad, what did you do after that?
A Nakumbinsi nga po kami at pagkatapos noon ay nag-usap-usap silang tatlo nina Jean Am-amlaw at humihingi na sila ng processing
fee na P20,000, maam.
Q So what did you do when they were already asking for the amount of P20,000 from you as processing fee?
A We told them that we do not have any money that time and we have to withdraw from the bank and then we went to Pasay and we
withdrew the amount of P15,000.00 so that was the only amount we were able to give them that time, maam.
Q Who were with you when you withdrew the said amount from the bank in Pasay?
A Jean Am-amlaw and Angel Mateo, maam.
Q Who received the amount of P15,000?
A Angel Mateo in front of Jean Am-amlaw, maam."
29
(Emphasis supplied)
p align="justify">From the foregoing, it is evident that the false statements that convinced complainants of the authenticity of the transaction were
made prior to their payment of the various fees. Indubitably, the requirement that the fraudulent statements should have been made prior to or
simultaneous with the actual payment was satisfied.
Verily, by their acts of falsely representing themselves as persons who had the power and the capacity to recruit workers for abroad, appellants
induced complainants to pay the required fees.
30
There is estafa if, through insidious words and machinations, appellants deluded complainants
into believing that, for a fee, the latter would be provided overseas jobs.
31

Although we agree with the ruling of the RTC convicting appellants of estafa, we note that it failed to apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law in
imposing the penalty. Under Section 1 of that law, the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence shall be the penalty properly imposed,
considering the attending circumstances; while the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the
Code.
32
Hence, pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the trial court should have fixed the minimum and the maximum penalties.
33

The Revised Penal Code provides the penalties for estafa as follows:
"Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). -- Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000.00
but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years.
In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code,
the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be." (Italics supplied)
Considering that complainants were defrauded in excess of the P22,000 limit fixed by law, the maximum penalty of prision mayor should be
imposed in its minimum period, or six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years, plus one (1) year for each additional P10,000 in excess of
the P22,000 limit. The total amount defrauded from the complainants was P158,600 -- or P136,600 in excess of P22,000, which translates to an
additional prison sentence of thirteen (13) years based on the aforementioned computation. Accordingly, the maximum penalty to be imposed
should be nineteen (19) years and one (1) day to twenty-one (21) years, thus raising the penalty to reclusion temporal. However, the penal
provisions for the crime of estafa provide that the total penalty to be imposed should not in any case exceed twenty (20) years imprisonment.
In Criminal Case No. 99-1113 for estafa, consonant with the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellants should thus be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor which is the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Code for the offense to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal. Indeed, the expression "the penalty next lower to that prescribed by said Code for the offense," used in
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, means the penalty next lower than that determined by the court in the case before it as the
maximum.
34

Third Issue:
Liability as Co-conspirator
Finally, appellants contend that the trial court should not have convicted Vicenta Medina Lapis because the prosecution evidence did not
sufficiently prove her participation in the conspiracy to defraud the victims. They maintain that she merely accompanied Angel Mateo during his
meetings with complainants and that she had no knowledge of the intentions of her co-accused. They add that mere knowledge, acquiescence
or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one as a co-conspirator.
We are not persuaded. As discussed earlier, Lapis not only knew of the conspiracy, but she also offered her assistance in the processing of the
employment requirements of complainants. Contrary to her claim that she was merely an unknowing spectator in the underhanded transactions,
she deliberately inveigled them into pursuing the promise of foreign employment. The records clearly bely her claim of innocence and indicate
that her participation in the criminal scheme transcends mere knowledge or acquiescence. Complainant Melchor Degsi describes one of the
many instances of how deeply involved Lapis was in the whole recruitment charade:
"Prosecutor Ong:
Mr. Witness, you testified a while ago that you were at Max Restaurant together with Vicenta Lapis and Angel Mateo?
Witness:
Yes, maam.
Q: Could you remember what Vicenta Medina [Lapis] said to you?
A: She promised that we will be sent to Japan sooner as OCW, maam.
Q: Could you recall how she said it?
A: She said Sigurado kay, makakapunta kayo ng Japan, maam.
Q: During that time that she was telling you sigurado kay makakapunta kayo ng Japan, did she show you anything?
A: Tinanong namin ang address nila at kusang loob na ibinigay ni Vicenta Medina [Lapis] sa amin ang address at direksyon para
makapunta kami sa Imus, Cavite, maam.
Q: What was the reason why Vicenta Medina Lapis gave you the address?
A: Para sigurado raw kami na hindi sila illegal kaya ibinigay niya ang address nila, maam."
35
(Emphasis supplied)
Once conspiracy is established, the act of one becomes the act of all regardless of the degree of individual participation.
36
Moreover, the precise
modality or extent of participation of each individual conspirator becomes merely a secondary consideration.
37
Notwithstanding nonparticipation
in every detail of the execution of the crime, the culpability of the accused still exists.
38

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. In Criminal Case No. 99-1112, appellants are ordered to pay legal interest on the amount of P118,000 from the time of the filing of
the Information until fully paid.
2. In Criminal Case No. 99-1113, appellants are sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as
minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.LUZ GONZALES-FLORES, accused-appellant.

This is an appeal from the decision
1
of the Regional Trial Court, branch 77, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Luz Gonzales-Flores guilty of
illegal recruitment in large scale and of three counts of estafa against Felizberto Leongson, Jr., Ronald Frederizo,
2
and Larry Tibor and
sentencing her to suffer four prison terms and to pay indemnity and damages to complainants.
In Criminal Case No. Q-94-59470, the information for estafa against accused-appellant alleged:
That on or about the month of August, 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring together, confederating with
several persons whose true names and true identities have not as yet been ascertained, and helping one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud FELIXBERTO LEONGSON, JR. y CASTAEDA in the following manner, to wit: the said
accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representation which she made to said complainant to the effect that they
had the power and capacity to recruitment employ complainant abroad as [a] seaman and could facilitate the processing of the
requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said complainant to give and deliver,
as in fact he gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P45,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and representations,
said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were made solely to obtain, as in fact they did obtain the
amount of 1245,000.00, which amount once in possession, with intent to defraud FELIXBER TO LEONGSON, JR. wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said
complainant in the aforesaid amount of P45,000.00, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
3

In Criminal Case No. Q-94-59471, also for estafa, the information charged:
That on or about the month of August, 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused conspiring. together , confederating with
several persons whose true names and true identities have not as yet been ascertained and helping one another did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud RONALD F[R]EDERI[Z]O Y HUSENIA in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by
means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which they made to said complainant to the effect that they had the power
and capacity to recruit and employ complainant abroad as [a] seaman and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given
the :.. " necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing
said RONALD F[R]EDERI[Z]O Y HUSENIA to give and deliver, as in fact gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P45,000.00
on the strength of said manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and
were made solely to obtain, as in fact they did obtain the amount of P45,000.00 which amount once in possession, with intent to
defraud complainant wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to their own pers9nal use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said RONALD F[RE]DERI[Z]O Y HUSENIA in the aforesaid amount of P45,000.00, Philippine
Currency.
CONTRARY TO LA W.
4

In Criminal Case No. Q-94-59472, another case for estafa, the information averred:
several persons whose true names and whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained and helping one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud LARRY TIBOR Y MABILANGAN in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means
of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which they made to said complainant to the effect that they had the power and
capacity to recruit and employ complainant abroad as [a] seaman and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the
necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said
complainant to give and deliver, as in fact gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P38,000.00 on the strength of said
manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were made solely to
obtain, as in fact they did obtain the amount of P38,000.00 which amount once in possession, with intent to defraud LARRY TIBOR Y
MABILANGAN wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously mis-appropriated misapplied and converted to their own personal use and benefit) to
the damage and prejudice of said complainant in the amount of P38,000.00, Phi1ippine Currency.
CONTRAR Y TO LAW.
5

On the other hand, in Criminal Case No. Q-94-59473, the information for illegal recruitment in large scale charged:
several persons whose true names and whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained and helping one another, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously canvass, enlist, contract and promise employment to the following persons, to wit:
1. RONALD F[R]EDERI[Z]O Y HlJSENIA
2. LARRY TIBOR Y MABILANGAN
3. FELIXBERTO LEONGSON, JR. y CASTANEDA
after requiring them to submit certain documentary requirements and exacting from them the total amount of P128,000,00 Philippine Currency as
recruitment fees such recruitment activities being done without the required license or authority from the Department of Labor.
That the crime described above is committed in large scale as the same was perpetrated against three (3) or more persons indi vidually or as
group as penalized under Articles 38 and 39) as amended by P.D. 2018, of the Labor Code.
6

When arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the criminal charges, whereupon the cases were jointly tried.
The evidence for the prosecution is as follows:
On August 6, 1994, at around 1:00 p.m., complainant Felixberto Leongson, Jr. chanced upon his neighbors, Cloyd Malgapo, Jojo Bumatay, and
accused-appellant, who were talking in front of his house at 68-C East Riverside, Bgy. Paltok, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.
Complainant was asked by accused-appellant if he was interested to work as a seaman in Miami, Florida, United States of America. He replied
that he was interested to work abroad but he had doubts regarding his qualification for the job. Accused-appellant assured him that this was not
a problem because she could fix his application. All he had to do was pay P45,000.00 as processing fee. Accused-appellant told him that Jojo
and Cloyd were departing soon. Complainant told accused-appellant that he would consider the offer.
That night, accused-appellant came to see Felixberto and reiterated her proposal. Felixberto said he wanted the job but he only had P10,000.00.
Accused-appellant told him the amount would be sufficient as an initial payment.
Accused-appellant came back with Joseph Mendoza, whose brother-in-Iaw, Engr. Leonardo Domingo, according to accused- appellant, was
recruiting seamen. Thereafter, accused-appellant and Mendoza took complainant, Cloyd, and Jojo's wife, Clarita, to a house on Second Street,
near Camp Crame in Quezon City, where the latter were introduced to Andy Baloran.
7
Complainant and his companions were told that Baloran
was an employee of the National Bureau of Investigation and he would take care of processing the applications for employment. Baloran told
complainant and the other job applicants that those who would be employed would be paid a monthly salary of US$ l,000.00, plus tips, and given
vacation leaves of 45 days with pay. Baloran asked complainant to submit his picture, bio-data, and birth certificate, which complainant later did.
Accused-appellant then asked complainant to give her the P10,000.00 as initial payment. Complainant handed her the money and asked for a
receipt, but accused-appellant told him not to worry and assured him that she would be responsible if anything untoward happened.
Complainant, therefore, did not insist on asking accused-appellant for a receipt. Accused-appellant said she gave the money to Baloran.
Two days later, Baloran and Domingo went to the compound where Felixberto and accused-appellant were residing and called Felixberto, Cloyd,
and Jojo to a meeting. Domingo told the applicants that he was the chief engineer of the luxury ocean liner where they would embark and
repeated to them the salaries and other benefits which they would receive. He told them not to get impatient.
Accused-appellant later saw complainant to collect the balance of P35,000.00. Complainant was told to give the money to accused-appellant at
Wendy's in Cubao, Quezon.City on August 12, 1994.
At the appointed date and place, complainant and his wife delivered the amount to accused-appellant who, in turn, handed it to Baloran. No
receipt was, however, issued to Felixberto.
Another meeting was held on August 16, 1994 at the Mandarin Hotel in Makati City by accused-appellant, Domingo, Baloran, Mendoza, the
Leongson spouses, the Malgapo spouses, and Jojo Bumatay. The applicants were told by Domingo that they would be employed as waiters and
attendants in the luxury liner and asked them again to wait a while.
On August 18, 1994, accused-appellant saw complainant again to collect the P 25,000.00 balance. Felixberto paid the amount to accused-
appellant four days later. As in the case of the first two payments, no receipt was given for the P25,000.00. Accused-appellant told him that she
would turn over the amount to Baloran. Although complainant regularly followed up his application with accused-appellant, he was told each time
to have patience and to just wait for the call from Domingo or from Baloran. But Felixberto never heard from either one of these two.
8

Felixberto's testimony was corroborated by his wife, Maria Luz, who said that accused-appellant claimed she could help her husband get a job
as a seamen despite the latter's lack of formal training. She knew of the three payments made to accused-appellant, totalling P 45,000.00, and
witnessed the last two payments of P10,000.00 at Wendy's, Cubao, and P25,000.00 at accused-appellant's residence. Maria Luz said she met
Baloran, Mendoza, and Domingo and discussed with them the job offered to her husband and the salaries and benefits appurtenant thereto.
9

Complainant Ronald Frederizo, a resident of 68-A East Riverside, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, also testified. According to him, in the
morning of August 10, 1994, he received a call from his sister, Elsa Cas, at Far East Bank, Binondo Branch, Manila, asking him to go home
because accused-appellant, their neighbor, was in his house recruiting seaman for employment abroad. Ronald said that when he arrived home,
he was told by accused-appellant that he had to pay P10,000.00 as initial payment for the processing of his application. Ronald withdrew the
amount from Elsa's account. Then, Ronald went with accused-appellant to a house on Second Street near Camp Crame in Quezon City. On the
way to that place, accused-appellant assured him that he would receive a salary of US$1,000.00. At an apartment on Second Street, Ronald
saw his neighbors, complainant Felixberto, Jojo, and Cloyd. Baloran and Mendoza were also there. Accused-appellant introduced Baloran to
Ronald, Cloyd, and Jojo. She told them that Baloran was going to take care of their applications and that he could pull strings at the NBI. Ronald
paid accused-appellant P10,000.00 for which no receipt was issued. He was assured by accused-appellant that he would be able to leave for his
job abroad in one or two weeks. He was told to be ready with the balance of P35,000.00 for the plane ticket on August 12, 1994.
Hence, on August 15, 1994, Ronald mortgaged his land in Batangas just so he could pay the P35,000.00 remaining balance. Accused-appellant
went to Ronald's house to meet him. Thereafter, Ronald, Elsa, and accused-appellant took a cab to Mandarin Hotel in Makati City. Accused-
appellant told Ronald to have no fear because the persons whom he was dealing with were her relatives. Elsa gave the P35,000.00 to accused-
appellant. Ronald no longer asked for a receipt because he trusted accused-appellant. At the hotel were Felixberto and his wife, Baloran, and
Domingo. Domingo showed Ronald and Felixberto his identification card and said that he was the captain of a ship. He told them that they would
receive a salary of US$1,000.00 plus other benefits. He also assured them that he would inform them of developments in their applications
through accused-appellant. After the meeting, Ronald went to his office and tendered his resignation. Ronald followed up his application almost
every week but every time he was told by accused-appellant to be patient
10
because Domingo had not yet called.
Complainant Larry Tibor said that on August 10, 1994, he went to the house of his cousin, Elsa Cas, at 68-A East Riverside, Bgy. Paltok, San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, because accused-appellant was there recruiting seamen to work abroad. Larry was then looking for a job.
Accused-appellant introduced herself and told him that she could get him a job abroad if he had the necessary documents and P 45,000.00.
Larry said he had only P3,000.00. He was told by accused-appellant to bring the amount the next day for his fare and certification. As instructed,
Larry paid the amount in the presence of his sister, Junet. He asked for a receipt, but accused-appellant told him to trust her. Accused-appellant
instructed Larry to prepare extra money as his initial payment was insufficient. Larry left for the province to get a loan. He went to accused-
appellant's house on August 15, 1994 and paid her an additional amount of P35,000.00. Again, no receipt was issued to him. Thereafter,
accused-appellant took him to Mandarin Hotel where he was introduced to Baloran and Domingo. Larry kept waiting for a call, but none came.
He was later told by accused-appellant that he could not leave yet because Baloran was sick and he had to postpone his trip.
11

Junet T. Lim, Larry's sister, testified that she was present her when brother paid P3,000.00 to accused-appellant, although no receipt was
issued. She stated that she asked accused-appellant questions to make sure she could help Larry get a job abroad as a seaman. Janet said
accused-appellant was able to convince her that she could do so. Junet also testified that she accompanied her brother in following up his job
application for about three months until November 1994, when they realized they had been defrauded by accused-appellant, Domingo, and
Baloran
12

Realizing that they had been deceived, complainants went to the Baler Police Station 2 in Quezon City on November 11, 1994 to file their
complaints for illegal recruitment and estafa against accused-appellant, Baloran, Domingo, and Mendoza. Felixberto executed his sworn
statement
13
on the same day, while Ronald and Larry gave their respective statements
14
on November 12, 1994.
On November 14, 1994, complainants went to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and discovered that accused-
appellant and her companions did not have any license or authority to engage in any recruitment activity.
Felixberto and Ronald asked the court to order accused-appellant to pay them back the placement fees of P45,000.00 which each of them had
paid and moral damages of P200,000.00 for each of them for the shame, anxiety, and loss of jobs they suffered. They also sought the
reimbursement for litigation expenses they each incurred, amounting to P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and P500.00 per court appearance. Larry,
on the other hand, sought the recovery of the total amount of P150,000.00 for placement fee, travelling expenses from the province to Manila to
follow up his application, and the anguish and .shame he suffered.
15

In her defense, accused-appellant Luz Gonzales-Flores, a resident of 68-B East Riverside, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, testified that
she knew Felixberto Leongson, Jr., who was her neighbor and a nephew of the owner of the house in which they were staying. She came to
know Ronald Frederizo and Larry Tibor through Elsa Cas. Accused-appellant denied having promised complainants overseas employment and
having collected money from them. According to her, she came to know Andy Baloran and Engr. Leonardo Domingo through Joseph Mendoza,
who referred her and her son, Noli, to them in connection with their own applications for overseas employment. She came to know Joseph
Mendoza through Elsa Cas and Felixberto Leongson, Jr.
Accused-appellant claimed that she and Noli agreed to pay Baloran, Domingo, and Mendoza the total sum of P90,000.00 for their application
fees. Since she did not have enough money to cover the amount, she asked her neighbors and friends to help her get a loan. Felixberto and his
wife offered help and introduced her to Jenny Tolentino, from whom she got a loan of P15,000.00 guaranteed by Felixberto's wife. Accused-
appellant said she used the amount to pay for her and her son's recruitment fees. Accused-appellant claimed that she paid the total amount of
P46,500.00 for her recruitment fee in three instalments, i.e., P10,000.00 to Mendoza at her house, P10,000.00, and Pl6,500.00 to Baloran at the
Mandarin Hotel. She alleged that she also gave them several pieces of jewelry worth P10,000.00. According to her, no receipts were issued for
the money and jewelry she gave. 1wphi1.nt
Accused-appellant said that because Domingo, Baloran, and Mendoza did not make good their promises, accused-appellant filed a complaint for
illegal recruitment and estafa against them on November 7, 1994 in the NBI, including as her co-complainants Felixberto Leongson, Jr., Ronald
Frederizo, Larry Tibor, Eduardo Sibbalucas, Har Taccad, Romeo Gallardo, Joseph Mendoza, and her son, Noli Flores.
16

Accused-appellant was investigated by the Baler Police Station 2 on November 11, 1994 as a result of the complaints filed against her by
Felixberto, Ronald, and Larry. Thereafter, she was detained.
17

On November 24, 1994, she appeared before the NBI accompanied by a policewoman to comply with the subpoena
18
issued regarding her
complaint. According to NBI Agent Jesus Manapat, accused-appellant's complaint was dismissed for lack of merit.
19

Based on the evidence presented, the trial court rendered its assailed decision on November 23, 1998, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused for illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa in three (3) counts having been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, she is hereby convicted of said crimes and is sentenced:
(1) To suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and pay a fine of P100,000 in Criminal Case No. Q-94-59473;
(2) To suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS AND THREE (3) MONTHS ofprision correccional, as
minimum, and up to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the costs in Criminal Case No. Q-94-59470;
(3) To suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS AND THREE (3) MONTHS ofprision correccional, as
minimum, and up to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the costs in Criminal Case No. Q-94-59471; and
(4) To suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging FOUR (4) YEARS AND THREE (3) MONTHS of prision correccional, as minimum,
and up to NINE (9) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the costs in Criminal Case No. Q-94-59472.
The accused is also directed to pay: (a) Ronald Federi[z]o, the amount of P45,000.00 as and by way of actual damages; (b) Felixberto
Leongson, Jr. P45,000.00 as and by way of actual damages; and (c) Larry Tibor, P38,000.00 as and by way of actual damages.
The accused is further directed to pay to the said private complainants moral damages in the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P20,000.00) each.
SO ORDERED.
20

Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that -
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RELYING UPON THE JURISPRUDENCE AND AUTHORITIES CITED, I.E., PEOPLE VS. COMIA,
PEOPLE VS. MANOZCA, PEOPLE VS. HONRADA, PEOPLE VS. TAN TIONG MENG, PEOPLE VS. VILLAS AND PEOPLE VS.
SENDON BECAUSE, WITH DUE RESPECT, THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES AVAILING IN SAID CASES ARE DIFFERENT AS
IN THE PRESENT CASE; AND
II. [THE LOWER COURT] ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACCUSED GUlLTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT ON THE BASIS OF THE
EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION TAKEN IN THE LIGHT OF THE UNREBUTTED EVIDENCE OF THE ACCUSED ON
VERY MATERIAL POINTS,
21

The contentions are without merit.
In Criminal Case No. Q-94-59473, accused-appellant was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale, the essential elements of which are: (1)
that the accused engages in acts of recruitment and placement of workers defined under Art. 13 (b) or in any of the prohibited activities under
Art. 34 of the Labor Code; (2) that the accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment,
particularly with respect to the securing of a license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers, either locally or overseas; and (3) that the
accused commits the unlawful acts against three or more persons, individually or as a group.
22

In these cases, according to the certification of the POEA, accused-appellant had no license or authority to engage in any recruitment
activities.
23
In fact, this was stipulated at the trial.
24
Accused-appellant claims, however, that she herself was a victim of illegal recruitment and
that she simply told complainants about job opportunities abroad.
The allegation is untenable. Art. 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines "recruitment and placement" as referring to any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment,
locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. The same article further states that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a
fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
25

The evidence for the prosecution shows that accused-appellant sought out complainants and promised them overseas employment. Despite
their initial reluctance because they lacked the technical skills required of seamen, complainants were led to believe by accused-appellant that
she could do something so that their applications would be approved. Thus, because of accused-appellant's misrepresentations, complainants
gave her their moneys. Accused-appellant's companions, Domingo, Baloran, and Mendoza, made her ploy even more plausible.
Accused-appellant contends that all she did was to refer complainants to Domingo, Baloran, and Mendoza. However, under Article 13 (b) of the
Labor Code, recruitment includes "referral," which is defined as the act of passing along or forwarding an applicant for empl oyment after initial
interview of a selected applicant for employment to a selected employer, placement officer, or bureau.
26
In these cases, accused-appellant did
more than just make referrals. She actively and directly enlisted complainants for supposed employment abroad, even promising them jobs as
seamen, and collected moneys from them.
The failure of complainants to present receipts to evidence payments made to accused-appellant is not fatal to the prosecution case. The
presentation of the receipts of payments is not necessary for the conviction of accused-appellant. As long as the prosecution is able to establish
through credible testimonies and affidavits that the accused-appellant was involved in the prohibited recruitment, a conviction for the offense can
very well be justified.
27
In these cases, complainants could not present receipts for their payment because accused-appellant assured them she
would take care of their money.
It must be remembered that the trial court's appreciation of complainants' testimonies deserves the highest respect since it was in a better
position to assess their credibility.
28
In these cases, complainants' testimonies, to the effect that they paid money to accused-appellant and her
companions, Domingo and Baloran, because the latter promised them overseas employment, were positive, straightforward, and categorical.
They maintained their testimonies despite the lengthy and gruelling cross-examination by the defense counsel. They have not been shown to
have any ill motive to falsely testify against accused-appellant. Naive, simple-minded, and even gullible as they may have been, it is precisely for
people like complainants that the law was made. Accordingly, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.
29

In contrast, accused-appellant's defense is merely denial. Time and again, this Court has ruled that denial, being negative evidence which is
self-serving in nature, cannot prevail over the positive identification of prosecution witnesses.
30
Here, complainants positively identified accused-
appellant as one of those who represented that they could be deployed for overseas work upon payment of the fees.
Accused-appellant claims that she herself had to borrow P15,00.00 from Jenny Tolentino, guaranteed by Maria Luz Leongson, to defray her own
and her son's application expenses. The claim has no merit. Maria Luz Leongson, who is Felixberto's wife, testified that accused-appellant
sought her help to guarantee a loan to pay the tuition fees of her daughter and the rent of the apartment in which she and her family were
staying,
31
and not to finance her and her son's overseas job applications.
Accused-appellant likewise testified that she paid in cash a total of P36,500.00 in three installments, i.e.,P10,000.00 to Mendoza at her house,
and P10,000.00 and P16,500.00 to Baloran, at the Mandarin Hotel. This testimony cannot be deemed worthy of belief. When cross-examined,
accused-appellant could not remember the dates when she allegedly made these payments. For someone who was jobless
32
and looking for
employment, it is very doubtful that she would pay considerable sums of money to strangers without even remembering at least the month or the
year when the same were supposed to have been paid.
Accused-appellant further contends that if she was indeed a conspirator in the illegal recruitment transactions with complainants, she would not
have filed a complaint
33
in the NBI against Domingo and Baloran. The complaint was, as already stated, dismissed and it is apparent that
accused-appellant filed the complaint only to make it appear that she herself had been the victim of swindling and illegal recruitment. First, the
complaint shows that it was filed on November 7, 1994, even before she was detained at the Baler Police Station 2 upon the sworn statements
of complainants. Complainants were included as complainants in a complaint filed by accused-appellant. Yet, the complainants were never told,
nor did they ever knew, of the complaint until the trial of these cases. Second, accused-appellant could have easily told them at least of the
complaint because Felixberto Leongson, Jr., Ronald Frederizo and Elsa Cas, a relative of complainant Larry Tibor, were her immediate
neighbors. Third, it is also noteworthy that despite her claim that she paid P10,000.00 to Mendoza, accused-appellant made the latter a co-
complainant in the complaint she filed with the NBI.
More importantly, accused-appellant's defense is uncorroborated. Not one of the persons she included in her complaint to the NBI was ever
presented in her defense in these cases. Nor did she present Domingo, Baloran, or Mendoza to corroborate her statements. It is probable that
had she presented any of these persons, their testimonies would have been adverse to accused-appellant.
34

Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary as it may be deduced from the mode in which the offense was
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused which point to a joint purpose and design.
35
In these cases, the fact is that there was
conspiracy among accused-appellant, Domingo, and Baloran in recruiting complainants for employment overseas. The evidence shows that
each had a role in that conspiracy. Domingo posed as a representative of the luxury liner in recruiting crew for the vessel. Baloran represented
himself as the person who would actually process complainants' travel documents, while accused-appellant acted as a scout for job applicants
and a collector of their payments. It was only Mendoza who did not misrepresent himself as someone capable of helping complainants go
abroad nor collect money from them.
36

In sum, we are of the opinion that the trial court correctly found accused-appellant guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale: The imposition on
accused-appellant of the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.00 is thus justified.
Accused-appellant was likewise found guilty of estafa under Art. 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code committed
By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
Both elements of the crime were established in these cases, namely, (a) accused-appellant defrauded complainant by abuse of confidence or by
means of deceit and (b) complainant suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation as a result.
37
Complainants parted with their
money upon the prodding and enticement of accused-appellant on the false pretense that she had the capacity to deploy them for employment
abroad. In the end, complainants were neither able to leave for work overseas nor did they get their money back, thus causing them damage
and prejudice.
38

The issues that misappropriation on the part of accused-appellant of the money paid by complainants and their demand for the same were not
sufficiently established are immaterial and irrelevant, conversion and demand not being elements of estafa under Art. 315 (2) (a) of the Revised
Penal Code.
In Criminal Case Nos. Q-94-59470 and Q-94-59471, the amounts involved are both P45,000.00, as testified to by complainants Felixberto
Leongson, Jr. and Ronald Frederizo. Pursuant to Art. 315, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and the ruling
in People v. Gabres,
39
the trial court correctly meted accused-appellant the maximum penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor in each case.
This is so considering that the maximum penalty prescribed by law for the felony is six (6) years, eight (8) months, and 21 days to eight (8) years
of prision mayor. The amounts involved in these cases exceed 1222,000.00 by at least 1220,000.00, necessitating an increase of one (1) year
for every 1210,000.00. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the sentence is thus from six (6) months and one (1) day to
four (4) years and two (2) months ofprision correccional. The trial court can exercise its discretion only within this period. Thus; the minimum
penalty imposed by the trial court should be reduced to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional.
In Criminal Case No. Q-94-59472, where the amount involved is 1238,000.00, the indeterminate sentence which should be imposed on
accused-appellant should range from four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years of prision
mayor, as maximum.
In accordance with the ruling in People v. Mercado,
40
the fact that no receipts were presented to prove the amounts paid by complainants to
accused-appellant does not prevent an award of actual damages in view of the fact that complainants were able to prove by their respective
testimonies and affidavits that accused-appellant was involved in the recruitment process and succeeded in inveigling them to give their money
to her. The award of moral damages should likewise be upheld as it was shown to have factual basis.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant guilty of illegal recruitment in large
scale and estafa against complainants Felixberto Leongson, Jr., Ronald Frederizo, and Larry Tibor is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICA TIONS
that, in the cases for estafa, accused-appellant is sentenced:
(1) In Criminal Case No. Q-94-S9470, to suffer a prison term ranging from four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum;
(2) In Criminal Case No. Q-94-S9471, to suffer a prison term ranging from four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum; and
(3) In Criminal Case No. Q-94-S9472, to suffer a prison term ranging from four (4) years and two (2) monthsofprision correccional, as
minimum, to nine (9) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

ROSITA SY, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision
1
dated July 22, 2008 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30628.
Rosita Sy (Sy) was charged with one count of illegal recruitment in Criminal Case No. 02-0537 and one count of estafa in Criminal Case No. 02-
0536. In a joint decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Sy was exonerated of the illegal recruitment charge. However, she was convicted of
the crime of estafa. Thus, the instant appeal involves only Criminal Case No. 02-0536 for the crime of estafa.
The Information
2
for estafa reads:
That sometime in the month of March 1997, in the City of Las Pias, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorabl e Court, the above-
named accused, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Felicidad Mendoza-Navarro y Landicho in the following manner,
to wit: the said accused by means of false pretenses and fraudulent representation which she made to the said complainant that she can deploy
her for employment in Taiwan, and complainant convinced by said representations, gave the amount of P120,000.00 to the said accused for
processing of her papers, the latter well knowing that all her representations and manifestations were false and were only made for the purpose
of obtaining the said amount, but once in her possession[,] she misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to her own personal use
and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of Felicidad Mendoza-Navarro y Landicho in the aforementioned amount ofP120,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
3

On May 27, 2007, Sy was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. Joint trial ensued thereafter.
As summarized by the CA, the facts of the case are as follows:
Version of the Prosecution
Sometime in March 1997, appellant, accompanied by Corazon Miranda (or "Corazon"), went to the house of Corazons sister, Felicidad Navarro
(or "Felicidad"), in Talisay, Batangas to convince her (Felicidad) to work abroad. Appellant assured Felicidad of a good salary and entitlement to
a yearly vacation if she decides to take a job in Taiwan. On top of these perks, she shall receive compensation in the amount of Php120,000.00.
Appellant promised Felicidad that she will take care of the processing of the necessary documents, including her passport and visa. Felicidad
told appellant that she will think about the job offer.
Two days later, Felicidad succumbed to appellants overseas job solicitation. With Corazon in tow, the sisters proceeded to appellants residence
in Better Homes, Moonwalk, Las Pias City. Thereat, Felicidad handed to appellant the amount of Php60,000.00. In the third week of March
1997, Felicidad returned to appellants abode and paid to the latter another Php60,000.00. The latter told her to come back the following day. In
both instances, no receipt was issued by appellant to acknowledge receipt of the total amount of Php120,000.00 paid by Felicidad.
On Felicidads third trip to appellants house, the latter brought her to Uniwide in Sta. Cruz, Manila, where a male person showed to them the
birth certificate that Felicidad would use in applying for a Taiwanese passport. The birth certificate was that of a certain Armida Lim, born to
Margarita Galvez and Lim Leng on 02 June 1952. Felicidad was instructed on how to write Armida Lims Chinese name.
Subsequently, appellant contacted Felicidad and thereafter met her at the Bureau of Immigration office. Thereat, Felicidad, posing and affixing
her signature as Armida G. Lim, filled out the application forms for the issuance of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant
Certificate of Registration (ICR). She attached to the application forms her own photo. Felicidad agreed to use the name of Armida Lim as her
own because she already paid to appellant the amount of Php120,000.00.
In December 1999, appellant sent to Felicidad the birth certificate of Armida Lim, the Marriage Contract of Armida Lims parents, ACR No.
E128390, and ICR No. 317614. These documents were submitted to and eventually rejected by the Taiwanese authorities, triggeri ng the filing of
illegal recruitment and estafa cases against appellant.
Version of the Defense
Appellant denied offering a job to Felicidad or receiving any money from her. She asserted that when she first spoke to Felicidad at the latters
house, she mentioned that her husband and children freely entered Taiwan because she was a holder of a Chinese passport. Felicidad
commented that many Filipino workers in Taiwan were holding Chinese passports.
Three weeks later, Felicidad and Corazon came to her house in Las Pias and asked her if she knew somebody who could help Felicidad get a
Chinese ACR and ICR for a fee.
Appellant introduced a certain Amelia Lim, who, in consideration of the amount of Php120,000.00, offered to Felicidad the use of the name of her
mentally deficient sister, Armida Lim. Felicidad agreed. On their second meeting at appellants house, Felicidad paid Php60,000.00 to Amelia
Lim and they agreed to see each other at Uniwide the following day. That was the last time appellant saw Felicidad and Amelia Lim.
4

On January 8, 2007, the RTC rendered a decision,
5
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the court finds the accused Rosita Sy NOT GUILTY of the crime of Illegal Recruitment and she is hereby
ACQUITTED of the said offense. As regards the charge of Estafa, the court finds the accused GUILTY thereof and hereby sentences her to an
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years of prision correctional as minimum to 11 years of prision mayor, as maximum. The accused is ordered to
reimburse the amount of sixty-thousand (Php60,000.00) to the private complainant.
SO ORDERED.
6

Aggrieved, Sy filed an appeal for her conviction of estafa. On July 22, 2008, the CA rendered a Decision,
7
affirming with modification the
conviction of Sy, viz.:
WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATION sentencing accused-appellant to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in all
other respects.
SO ORDERED.
8

Hence, this petition.
The sole issue for resolution is whether Sy should be held liable for estafa, penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).
9

Swindling or estafa is punishable under Article 315 of the RPC. There are three ways of committing estafa, viz.: (1) with unfaithfulness or abuse
of confidence; (2) by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts; or (3) through fraudulent means. The three ways of committing estafa may be
reduced to two, i.e., (1) by means of abuse of confidence; or (2) by means of deceit.
The elements of estafa in general are the following: (a) that an accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence, or by means of deceit; and
(b) that damage and prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused the offended party or third person.
The act complained of in the instant case is penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC, wherein estafa is committed by any person
who shall defraud another by false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. It is
committed by using fictitious name, or by pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
The elements of estafa by means of deceit are the following, viz.: (a) that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent
representation was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false
pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended
party suffered damage.
10

In the instant case, all the foregoing elements are present. It was proven beyond reasonable doubt, as found by the RTC and affirmed by the
CA, that Sy misrepresented and falsely pretended that she had the capacity to deploy Felicidad Navarro (Felicidad) for employment in Taiwan.
The misrepresentation was made prior to Felicidads payment to Sy of One Hundred Twenty Thousand Pesos (P120,000.00). It was Sys
misrepresentation and false pretenses that induced Felicidad to part with her money. As a result of Sys false pretenses and misrepresentations,
Felicidad suffered damages as the promised employment abroad never materialized and the money she paid was never recovered.
The fact that Felicidad actively participated in the processing of the illegal travel documents will not exculpate Sy from liability. Felicidad was a
hapless victim of circumstances and of fraud committed by Sy. She was forced to take part in the processing of the falsified travel documents
because she had already paid P120,000.00. Sy committed deceit by representing that she could secure Felicidad with employment in Taiwan,
the primary consideration that induced the latter to part with her money. Felicidad was led to believe by Sy that she possessed the power and
qualifications to provide Felicidad with employment abroad, when, in fact, she was not licensed or authorized to do so. Deceived, Felicidad
parted with her money and delivered the same to petitioner. Plainly, Sy is guilty of estafa.
Illegal recruitment and estafa cases may be filed simultaneously or separately. The filing of charges for illegal recruitment does not bar the filing
of estafa, and vice versa. Sys acquittal in the illegal recruitment case does not prove that she is not guilty of estafa. Il legal recruitment and
estafa are entirely different offenses and neither one necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other. A person who is convicted of
illegal recruitment may, in addition, be convicted of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC.
11
In the same manner, a person
acquitted of illegal recruitment may be held liable for estafa. Double jeopardy will not set in because illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, in
which there is no necessity to prove criminal intent, whereas estafa is malum in se, in the prosecution of which, proof of criminal intent is
necessary.
12

The penalty prescribed for estafa under Article 315 of the RPC is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount defrauded is over Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) but does not exceed Twenty-two Thousand Pesos (P22,000.00),
and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00); but the total penalty that may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with
the accessory penalties that may be imposed under the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal,
as the case may be.
The addition of one year imprisonment for each additional P10,000.00, in excess of P22,000.00, is the incremental penalty. The incremental
penalty rule is a mathematical formula for computing the penalty to be actually imposed using the prescribed penalty as the starting point. This
special rule is applicable in estafa and in theft.
13
1avvphi1
In estafa, the incremental penalty is added to the maximum period of the penalty prescribed, at the discretion of the court, in order to arrive at the
penalty to be actually imposed, which is the maximum term within the context of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL).
14
Under the ISL,
attending circumstances in a case are applied in conjunction with certain rules of the Code in order to determine the penalty to be actually
imposed based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense. The circumstance is that the amount defrauded exceedsP22,000.00, and
the incremental penalty rule is utilized to fix the penalty actually imposed.
15

To compute the incremental penalty, the amount defrauded shall be subtracted by P22,000.00, and the difference shall be divided
by P10,000.00, and any fraction of P10,000.00 shall be discarded.
16

In the instant case, prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period is the imposable penalty. The duration of
prision correccional in its maximum period is from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years; while prision mayor in its
minimum period is from six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years. The incremental penalty for the amount defrauded would be an
additional nine years imprisonment, to be added to the maximum imposable penalty of eight years. Thus, the CA committed no reversible error
in sentencing Sy to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.
As to the amount that should be returned or restituted by Sy, the sum that Felicidad gave to Sy, i.e., P120,000.00, should be returned in full. The
fact that Felicidad was not able to produce receipts is not fatal to the case of the prosecution since she was able to prove by her positive
testimony that Sy was the one who received the money ostensibly in consideration of an overseas employment in Taiwan.
17

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 30628, sentencing
petitioner Rosita Sy to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, is hereby AFFIRMED. We, however, MODIFY the CA Decision as to the amount of civil indemnity, in
that Sy is ordered to reimburse the amount of One Hundred Twenty Thousand Pesos (P120,000.00) to private complainant Felicidad Navarro.
SO ORDERED.

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PART 3 PRE-EMPLOYMENT

ROSA C. RODOLFO, Petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

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