BASCOS vs.COURT OF APPEALS and RODOLFO A.

CIPRIANO
G.R. No. 101089 April 7, 1993
FACTS: Rodolfo A. Cipriano representing Cipriano Trading Enterprise (CIPTRADE
for short) entered into a hauling contract with Jibfair Shipping Agency Corp
whereby the former bound itself to haul the latters 2,000 m/tons of soya bean
meal to the warehouse in Calamba, Laguna. To carry out its obligation,
CIPTRADE, through Cipriano, subcontracted with Bascos to transport and to
deliver 400 sacks of soya bean meal from the Manila Port Area to Calamba,
Laguna. Petitioner failed to deliver the said cargo. As a consequence of that
failure, Cipriano paid Jibfair Shipping Agency the amount of the lost goods in
accordance with their contract.
Cipriano demanded reimbursement from petitioner but the latter refused to pay.
Eventually, Cipriano filed a complaint for a sum of money and damages with writ
of preliminary attachment for breach of a contract of carriage. The trial court
granted the writ of preliminary attachment. In her answer, petitioner interposed
the defense that there was no contract of carriage since CIPTRADE leased her
cargo truck to load the cargo from Manila Port Area to Laguna and that the truck
carrying the cargo was hijacked and being a force majeure, exculpated petitioner
from any liability.
After trial, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of Cipriano and against
Bascos ordering the latter to pay the former for actual damages for attorneys
fees and cost of suit. The Urgent Motion To Dissolve/Lift preliminary
Attachment Bascos is DENIED for being moot and academic. Petitioner appealed
to the Court of Appeals but respondent Court affirmed the trial courts judgment.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari
ISSUE:
(1) WON petitioner a common carrier
(2) WON the hijacking referred to a force majeure
HELD:
1. YES. We agree with the respondent Court in its finding that petitioner is a
common carrier. Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a common carrier as "(a)
person, corporation or firm, or association engaged in the business of carrying or
transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water or air, for
compensation, offering their services to the public." The test to determine a
common carrier is "whether the given undertaking is a part of the business
engaged in by the carrier which he has held out to the general public as his
occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the business transacted." In this
case, petitioner herself has made the admission that she was in the trucking
business, offering her trucks to those with cargo to move. Judicial admissions are
conclusive and no evidence is required to prove the same.
(2) Common carriers are obliged to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods transported by them. Accordingly, they are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently if the goods are lost, destroyed or
deteriorated. There are very few instances when the presumption of negligence
does not attach and these instances are enumerated in Article 1734. In those

cases where the presumption is applied, the common carrier must prove that it
exercised extraordinary diligence in order to overcome the presumption. The
presumption of negligence was raised against petitioner. It was petitioner's
burden to overcome it. Thus, contrary to her assertion, private respondent need
not introduce any evidence to prove her negligence. Her own failure to adduce
sufficient proof of extraordinary diligence made the presumption conclusive
against her.
JOSE PILAPIL vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALATCO TRANSPORTATION COMPANY,
INC.
(G.R. No. 52159, December 22, 1989)
FACTS:
Petitioner Pilapil, on board respondents bus was hit above his eye by a stone
hurled by an unidentified bystander. Respondents personnel lost no time in
bringing him to a hospital, but eventually petitioner partially lost his left eyes
vision and sustained a permanent scar.
Thus, Petitioner lodged an action for recovery of damages before the Court of
First Instance of Camarines Sur which the latter granted. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals
reversed
said
decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not common carriers assume risks to passengers such as the stoning
in this case?
HELD:
In consideration of the right granted to it by the public to engage in the business
of transporting passengers and goods, a common carrier does not give its
consent to become an insurer of any and all risks to passengers and goods. It
merely undertakes to perform certain duties to the public as the law imposes,
and holds itself liable for any breach thereof.
While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in
the safe transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence
against them, it does not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute
safety of its passengers.
Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger
on account of the wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if
the common carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good
father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
Clearly under the above provision, a tort committed by a stranger which causes
injury to a passenger does not accord the latter a cause of action against the
carrier. The negligence for which a common carrier is held responsible is the
negligent omission by the carrier's employees to prevent the tort from being
committed when the same could have been foreseen and prevented by them.
Further, under the same provision, it is to be noted that when the violation of the

contract is due to the willful acts of strangers, as in the instant case, the degree
of care essential to be exercised by the common carrier for the protection of its
passenger is only that of a good father of a family.