SELF-DEFENSE

People vs Boholst-Caballero

Facts:
(According to Boholst)
The couple had a rough marriage.
Soon after, Caballero left, and
Boholst and her daughter was left to
the support of her parents.
One night, after carolling, Boholst
met Caballero who upon seeing her,
manhandled her. There were an
exchange of words and later on,
Caballero was already holding her
by the hair and slapping her face
until her nose bled.
Caballero pushed her to the
grounds, and to stop herself from
falling, she held on to his waist. As
she did so, she grasped the knife
tucked by the left side of his body.
She fell to the ground then
Caballero knelt over her and
chocked her saying that he will kill
her. Because she had no other
recourse, she pulled out the knife of
her husband and thrust it at him,
hitting the left side of his body near
the belt line.
When she was finally free, she ran
home and on the way, she threw
the knife.
In the morning, she surrendered to
the police and presented the torn
and blood-stained dress she wore
that night. The police officer
accompanied her to look for the
weapon but when it can no longer
be found, she was advised to just
give any knife and she did (now
marked Exhibit C).
(According to the Prosecutions witness,
Caballeros friend)
On the night of the incident, Boholst
was already waiting for Caballero,
and when he approached her, she
suddenly stabbed Francisco her with
the knife marked by the prosecution
as Exhibit C.
His friends brought him to the
hospital where he was later
interviewed by the police officer
confirming that his wife stabbed him.
But because he needs blood
transfusion, he needs to be
transferred to another hospital. He
died on the way.
Issue: Did Boholst act in legitimate defense
of her person?
Held: Yes.
Ratio decidendi:
The RTC held that Boholsts
evidence was not clear and
convincing:
Testimony improbable as
brought out by her
demonstration during the trial
No wound or injury on her
body treated by the physician
That the knife used was a
Moro knife and not exhibit C
is incredible
Contradictory statements
Has motive: husbands
abandonment
The court departs from the general
rule that appellate court will not
disturb the findings of the trial court
on facts testified by the witnesses
The trial court judge overlooked an
important piece of evidence that
could confirm the narration of the
appellant: location of the wound
inflicted on the victim.
As she was flat on her back and
and her husband choking her, she
had no other recourse but to pull
out the knife inserted at the left side
of her husbands belt and stabbed
him hitting the left back portion just
below the waist, as also described
by the attending physician as the
left lumbar region.
The fact that the blow landed in the
vicinity from where the knife was
drawn is a strong indication of the
truth of her testimony, for as she lay
on the ground with her husband
bent over her it was quite natural for
her right hand to get hold of the
knife tucked in the left side of the
mans belt and thrust it at that
section of the body nearest to her
hand at the moment.
This particular location of the wound
negates the credibility of the
prosecution witness that is if it was
true, then the wound should have
been directed towards the front of
the body of the victim rather than at
his back.
The Court finds the location of the
wound as a valuable circumstance
which confirms the plea of self-
defense.
Appellant also lacks motive. She
declared that she still loved her
husband and for several months
prior to the incident, she appeared
resigned to her fate.
She also surrendered herself
immediately the morning after.
The court also believed that the
knife must be a blade of six inches
as stated by Boholst for it to
penetrate through the left lumbar
region to the victims large intestine
and cause the discharge of fecal
matter. >.<
All the elements of self-defense are
present:
unlawful aggression as
pointed out above
reasonable necessity for
means employed: woman
strangled and chocked by a
furious aggressor, rendered
almost unconcious by the
strong pressure on her
throat. What is vital is the
imminent peril to Boholsts
life. The knife afforded
appellant the only reasonable
means with which she could
free and save herself.
Necessity knows no law.
Lack of sufficient provocation:
Boholst did not provoke
Caballero. She gave a valid
excuse that she went
carolling to earn money for
their child.

Boholst acted in the legitimate defense of
her person. Judgment of conviction set
aside. Acquitted.

People vs Alconga

Facts: On May 27, deceased Silverio
Barion, the banker of the card game, was
playing black jack against Maria De
Raposo. De Raposo and Alconga
were partners in the game, they had one
money. Alconga was seated behind Barion
and he gave signs to De Raposo. Barion,
who was suffering losses in the game,
found this out and he expressed his anger
at Alconga. The two almost fought outright
this was stopped.

The two met again on May 29. when
Alconga was doing his job as a home
guard. While the said accused was seated
on a bench in the guardhouse, Barion came
along and said Coroy, this is your
breakfast followed by a swing of his
pingahan, a bamboo stick. Alconga
avoided the blow by falling to the ground
under the bench with the intention to crawl
out of the guardhouse. A second blow was
given by Barion but failed to hit the
accused, hitting the bench instead. Alconga
managed to go out of the guardhouse by
crawling on his abdomen. While Barion was
about to deliver the 3rd blow, Alconga fired
at him with his revolver, causing him to
stagger and hit the ground. The deceased
stood up, drew forth his dagger and
directed a blow to the accused who was
able to parry the attack using his bolo. A
hand to handfight ensued. The deceased,
looking already beaten and having sustained
several wounds ran away. He was followed
by the accused and was overtaken after
200 meters.

A second fight took place and the deceased
received a mortal bolo blow, the one which
slasehde the cranium. The deceased fell
face downward besides many other blows
delivered. Alconga surrendered.

Issue: Whether or not self-defense can be
used as a defense by Alconga

Held: No. Self-defense cannot be sustained.
Alconga guilty of Homicide

The deceased ran and fled w/o having to
inflicted so much a scratch to Alconga, but
after, upon the other hand, having been
wounded with one revolver shot and several
bolo slashes the right of Alconga to inflict
injury upon him has ceased absolutely/
Alconga had no right to pursue, no right to
kill or injure. He could have only attacked if
there was reason to believe that he is still
not safe. In the case at bar, it is apparent
that it is Alconga who is the superior fighter
and his safety was already secured after
the first fight ended. There was no more
reason for him to further chase Barion. The
second fight will be treated differently and
independently. Under the first fight, self-
defense would have been valid, but that is
not the case in the second fight. In the
second fight, there was illegal aggression
on the part of Alconga and as a result, he
is found guilty of Homicide with no
mitigating circumstance (MC)
of Provocation

Note Provocation in order to be an MC
must be sufficient and immediately
preceding the act. It should be
proportionate to the act committed and
adequate to stir one to its commission



United States vs Mack

FACTS:
Setting: May 4, 1906, nighttime,
Tacloban, Leyte
Accused Mack (black soldier) was
sitting on a bench a few feet back
from the street, in an open space
(3-4 feet wide) between Olimpias
tienda (canteen) and another
building
Deceased Estanislao Indic
(policeman) and another policeman
approached, ordered Olimpia to
close the canteen, ordered Mack
and another soldier nearby to go to
their quarters. Mack did not obey.
Deceased began cursing and
abusing Mack for his failure to obey
orders. Companion policeman was
trying to restrain him but he broke
free and started toward the accused,
drawing his bolo (14.5-inch-long
blade) and brandishing it in a
threatening manner. Deceased is
believed to have been under the
influence of alcohol at this time.
Accused got up, drew his revolver,
fired 3 shots in rapid succession
(deceased was about 3-6 feet away
at this point) one hit the left
breast, just above the nipple, the
other hit the back of the head.
Mack asserted self-defense but trial
court found it to be an incomplete
defense (did not prove the
reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel the
aggression)
Trial court convicted Mack of
homicide (two degrees lower than
the crime he was charged with:
assassination)

ISSUES:
1. Did Mack shoot Estanislao Indic in
self-defense?
2. Can he be held criminally liable?

RULING: REVERSED
1. Yes self-defense
Elements of self-defense: (1)
unlawful aggression, (2) no
sufficient provocation on the part
of the accused, (3) reasonable
necessity for the employment of
the means taken to prevent/resist
such unlawful aggression
Weight of evidence clearly
maintains the accuseds
contention that he did and said
nothing to provoke or offend the
deceased, except in so far as
his failure to obey the order to
go back to his quarters may
have had that effect
Under the circumstances,
accused had no reasonable
grounds to believe that he could
safely escape the situation.
Mere physical superiority (Mack
was bigger and taller than the
victim) is no protection to an
unarmed man against an
assailant with a large bolo.
Furthermore, Indics intoxication
probably rendered him more
dangerous.
Accused could not reasonably be
expected to take the chance that
ordinary force would be used in
striking, or that the blow would
be given upon some protected
part of his body, or that the
cutting edge of the blade was
not keen enough to give him his
death blow.
The reasonable and natural thing
for him to do under the
circumstances was to fire at the
body of his opponent, and thus
make sure of his own life.
2. No criminal liability
The fact that this court has held
that the taking of a life was not
reasonably necessary in
defending oneself against assault
does not sustain a ruling that
taking the life of ones assailant
may not become reasonably
necessary in the defense of
ones person.
Case 4 of Article 8 of Penal
Code: an accused person is
entitled to exemption from
criminal liability based on self-
defense.

People vs Sumicad

FACTS:
Setting: Feb 23, 1931, 5:30pm,
Plaridel, Occidental Misamis
Accused Julian Sumicad was resting
from hauling logs for the
construction of a chapel. Segundo
Cubol passed by where he was
resting.
Sumicad had rendered five and a
half days of service to Cubol. He
asked Cubol for the money
(payment) that Cubol owed him.
Cubol answered with, What debt!,
insulted Sumicad and struck him
with his fist.
Sumicad got up and moved
backward, trying to escape, but
Cubol pursued him. Sumicad found
himself cornered by a pile of logs.
As Cubol pressed upon him,
Sumicad drew his bolo and delivered
a blow to the right shoulder. Cubol
lunged at Sumicad, trying to wrestle
the bolo from him. Sumicad struck
two other blows. One blow broke
through the cranium, the other made
a cut extending from the left
eyebrow to the nose and upper lip.
Cubol gave down and crawled away,
sat on a nearby log.
Witness Francisco Villegas asked
Cubol if he had struck Sumicad with
his fists, he said yes. Villegas told
Sumicad to surrender himself to the
authorities, which he did.
Cubol died in about an hour. A knife
was found in his pocket. Sumicad
testified that when he inflicted the
blow, Cubol was trying to draw the
knife from his pocket.

ISSUE:
1. Did Sumicad inflict blows in self-
defense?
2. Is Sumicad criminally liable?

RULING: REVERSED
1. Yes
Element #1: Deceased was
aggressor Cubol admitted that
he hit Sumicad with his fists
Element #2: There was lack of
sufficient provocation on the part
of the accused quarrel which
resulted to Cubols death was of
his own doing; accused was not
materially to blame in bringing
about trouble
When the aggression begun, the
accused retreated until he was
cornered in the angle of a pile
of logs.
Accused first delivered a cut on
the left shoulder (labo nito,
kanina sabi right tapos ngayon
left). Sanitary officer reported
that this could not have resulted
in death. Instead of desisting
assault, deceased pressed
forward and tried to get the bolo.
Given this, accused was justified
in using the bolo as a weapon,
for it would have been an act of
suicide to permit that weapon to
pass into the hands of his
assailant.
The reputation of the deceased
for violence is pertinent, for it
shows that when the fatal blows
were struck, the accused had
reasonable grounds for believing
that he was in grave peril to life
or limb. Deceased was known to
his neighbors to be a dangerous
man.
Under the circumstances,
Sumicad had the right to resist
the aggression with the bolo,
and if he unfortunately inflicted a
fatal blow, it must be considered
to have been given in justifiable
self-defense.
2. No
All elements necessary to constitute
justifiable self-defense are present in
the case.

DISSENTING OPINION: C.J. Avancea
Incomplete self-defense: defendants
use of bolo was not a reasonably
necessary means of defending
himself against the others attack,
which was but a matter of fisticuffs
having received the first blow on the
arm, the deceased was justified in
acting as he did, in the reasonable
belief that defendant would continue
the attack with that weapon.

People vs Genosa

Facts:
According to Marivic Genosa, on the
evening of November 15 1995, after
going home after work, she, together
with her cousin Ecel Arano, looked
for her husband because she was
worried that he was gambling again.
When she returned after looking for
him, Ben was already home drunk.
Ben nagged her for following him,
and challenged her to fight. When
she ignored him, he got angrier and
did a number of things, including
cutting the television antenna to
keep her from watching TV, whirling
Marivic, holding her by the neck,
causing her to fall on the side of
the bed, etc. Marivic thereafter
packed Bens clothes because she
wanted him to leave but when he
saw this, he flew into a rage, held
her by the neck, and told her, You
might as well be killed so nobody
would nag me. He dragged her by
the neck towards a drawer where a
gun was but he couldnt open the
said drawer so he just got a three-
inch blade from his wallet. At this
point, Marivic smashed his arm
and smashed Bens nape with a
pipe when the blade and the wallet
fell and Ben was about to pick them
up. Marivic claims to have run to
the bedroom then. She shot her
husband with the aforementioned
gun afterwards, but at the time she
shot him, he already went to bed.
Marivic was charged and convicted
of parricide; sentenced to death
(because of the generic aggravating
circumstance of treachery)
Marivic admitted in court to killing
her husband and anchored her
prayer for acquittal on the battered
woman syndrome (BWS), a form of
self-defense (or at least, incomplete
self-defense) that has been
appreciated, at the time of the case,
only in other jurisdictions, particularly
the US and UK
o The BWS was first raised in
the SC
Three phases of the cycle of
violence of the BWS: 1) the
tension-building phase, 2) the acute
battering incident, and 3) the
tranquil, loving (or, at least,
nonviolent) phase
o Characterized by learned
helplessness, inability to
leave the husband, belief that
the beaten wife is somehow
responsible for the behavior
of her husband, feeling of
being unsafe, pervasive
anxiety, etc.
Issue:
Whether or not self-defense can be
appreciated as a justifying
circumstance based on the novel
theory of BWS
Held:
No. RTC judgment was affirmed, but
because of two mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating
circumstance, and she already
served her minimum sentence, she
was qualified to apply for parole.
But Marivic is entitled to the
following mitigating circumstances:
o Diminution of her freedom of
action, intelligence or intent:
because the severity of the
violence against her, as
proven by various
Psychological experts in
court, is analogous to an
illness that diminished the
exercise of her will power,
but without depriving her of
consciousness of her acts
o Having acted upon an
impulse so powerful as to
have naturally produced
passion and obfuscation:
even though she was able to
retreat to a separate room,
her emotional and mental
state continued after Bens
aggression
The aggravating circumstance of
treachery was not appreciated in the
SC, unlike in the RTC: when the
killing is preceded by an argument
or quarrel, treachery cannot be
appreciated
Ratio:
The court failed to find ample
evidence that would confirm the
presence of the essential
characteristics of BWS
Only the second phase (i.e. the
acute battering incident) of the BWS
cycle was sufficiently proven by the
defense
In any event, the existence of BWS
does not in itself establish the legal
right of the woman to kill her
abusive partner. Evidence must still
be considered in the context of self-
defense.
Crucial is the state of mind of the
woman at the time of the offense;
although actual physical assault is
not required for BWS cases,
impending danger must still be
shown (i.e. threatening behavior or
communication on the part of the
victim)
In the case, Ben apparently ceased
his attack and went to bed at the
time Marivic shot him
Aggression, if not continuous, does
not warrant self-defense
Additional notes:
The court went on to make a point
about the requirements of BWS in
order to be appreciated as self-
defense:
1) Each of the phases of the
cycle of violence must be
proven to have characterized
at least two battering
episodes between the
appellant and her intimate
partner
2) The final acute battering
episode preceding the killing
of the batterer must have
produced in the battered
persons mind an actual fear
of an imminent harm from
her batterer and an honest
belief that she needed to use
force in order to save her
life.
3) At the time of the killing, the
batterer must have posed
probable -- not necessarily
immediate and actual --
grave harm to the accused,
based on the history of
violence perpetrated by the
former against the latter.
Taken altogether, these
circumstances could satisfy
the requisites of self-defense.
Under the existing facts of the
present case, however, not all of
these elements were duly
established.

RA 9262

Section 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in
this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their
children" refers to any act or a series of
acts committed by any person against a
woman who is his wife, former wife, or
against a woman with whom the person
has or had a sexual or dating relationship,
or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family
abode, which result in or is likely to result
in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including
threats of such acts, battery, assault,
coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation
of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to,
the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that
include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which
is sexual in nature, committed against a
woman or her child. It includes, but is not
limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of
lasciviousness, treating a woman or her
child as a sex object, making demeaning
and sexually suggestive remarks, physically
attacking the sexual parts of the victim's
body, forcing her/him to watch obscene
publications and indecent shows or forcing
the woman or her child to do indecent acts
and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife
and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal
home or sleep together in the same room
with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the
victim to engage in any sexual activity by
force, threat of force, physical or other harm
or threat of physical or other harm or
coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or
omissions causing or likely to cause mental
or emotional suffering of the victim such as
but not limited to intimidation, harassment,
stalking, damage to property, public ridicule
or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and
mental infidelity. It includes causing or
allowing the victim to witness the physical,
sexual or psychological abuse of a member
of the family to which the victim belongs, or
to witness pornography in any form or to
witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful
or unwanted deprivation of the right to
custody and/or visitation of common
children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that
make or attempt to make a woman
financially dependent which includes, but is
not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or
preventing the victim from engaging in any
legitimate profession, occupation, business
or activity, except in cases wherein the
other spouse/partner objects on valid,
serious and moral grounds as defined in
Article 73 of the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of
financial resources and the right to the use
and enjoyment of the conjugal, community
or property owned in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money or
properties or solely controlling the conjugal
money or properties.
(b) "Battery" refers to an act of inflicting
physical harm upon the woman or her child
resulting to the physical and psychological
or emotional distress.
(c) "Battered Woman Syndrome" refers to a
scientifically defined pattern of psychological
and behavioral symptoms found in women
living in battering relationships as a result
of cumulative abuse.
(d) "Stalking" refers to an intentional act
committed by a person who, knowingly and
without lawful justification follows the woman
or her child or places the woman or her
child under surveillance directly or indirectly
or a combination thereof.
(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation
wherein the parties live as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage or are
romantically involved over time and on a
continuing basis during the course of the
relationship. A casual acquaintance or
ordinary socialization between two
individuals in a business or social context is
not a dating relationship.
(f) "Sexual relations" refers to a single
sexual act which may or may not result in
the bearing of a common child.
(g) "Safe place or shelter" refers to any
home or institution maintained or managed
by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) or by any other
agency or voluntary organization accredited
by the DSWD for the purposes of this Act
or any other suitable place the resident of
which is willing temporarily to receive the
victim.
(h) "Children" refers to those below eighteen
(18) years of age or older but are incapable
of taking care of themselves as defined
under Republic Act No. 7610. As used in
this Act, it includes the biological children of
the victim and other children under her
care.

Section 26. Battered Woman Syndrome as
a Defense. Victim-survivors who are found
by the courts to be suffering from battered
woman syndrome do not incur any criminal
and civil liability notwithstanding the
absence of any of the elements for
justifying circumstances of self-defense
under the Revised Penal Code.
In the determination of the state of mind of
the woman who was suffering from battered
woman syndrome at the time of the
commission of the crime, the courts shall
be assisted by expert psychiatrists/
psychologists.







DEFENSE OF HONOR

People vs Luague

Facts:
Wenceslao Alcansare and Natividad
Luague were charged with homicide.
Feb 18, 1935:
o Wency was out to grind corn
in another house several
kilometers away. Natividad
was alone in her house with
only her three young children
accompanying her.
o Paulino Disuasido came and
began to make love to
Natividad. She protested, but
he threatened her with a
knife and began to embrace
her and touch her breasts.
o In preparing to lie with her,
he left the knife on the floor.
Natividad, seeing the
opportunity, grabbed the knife
and stabbed him in the
abdomen.
o Paulino, seeing that he had
been wounded, jumped out
the window and fell on some
stones.
o Natividad immediately went to
the poblacion to surrender
herself to the authorities and
report the incident.
Issue:
Does Natividads act constitute a self-
defense, exempting her from criminal
liability?
Ruling:
Yes. Natividads act constitutes self-defense.
Wenceslao is acquitted because he had no
participation in the act.
The attempt to rape a woman constitutes
an aggression sufficient to put her in a
state of legitimate self-defense
A womans honor cannot but be
esteemed as a right as precious, if
not more than her very existence
It is evident that a woman, who,
thus imperiledkills the offender,
should be afforded exemption from
criminal liability provided by this
article and subsection since such
killing cannot be considered a crime
from the moment it became the only
means left for her to protect her
honor from so great an outrage
Prosecutions version of the story is
improbable
Their version: Wency wanted to kill
Paulino because he made unchaste
advances on Nati. One day when
Paulino was walking with Olimpio
Libosada (a friend), they invited
them in. This was witnessed by
Pablo Alvarez (but he left shortly
after so he wasnt able to witness
what happened next). Natividad
borrowed Paulinos knife to cut her
nails. She asked him where he
came from and then used the knife
to stab Paulino in the abdomen.
Wenceslao picked up a stone and
struck Paulino in the forehead.
Paulino fled

The story is unreliable because its
improbable and contradictory:
o Why did Olimpio not do
anything to defend his
friend?
o Why would the wife take it
upon herself to execute the
plan by stabbing Paulino,
and not the husband? Wont
it be more natural for the
husband to punish the
offender?
o Why would Alvarez, who
testified that he had
knowledge that Wenceslao
would get even with Paulino
at the first opportunity, not
do anything to stop the same
from happening?
o Why would the spouses who
allegedly conspired to kill
Paulino not have any
weapon in hand to carry out
their plans (the knife was
gotten from Paulino and the
rock was randomly picked
from the ground)?


People vs De La Cruz

Facts: Accused was found guilty of
homicide for stabbing and killing Rivera.
Prosecution claimed that Dela Cruz and
Rivera had a relationship and that the
accused was madly in love with the
deceased and was extremely jealous of
another woman with whom Rivera also had
a relationship. Dela Cruz claimed, on the
other hand, that on her way home one
evening, Rivera followed her, embraced and
kissed her and touched her private parts.
She didnt know that it was Rivera and that
she was unable to resist the strength of
Rivera so she got a knife from her pocket
and stabbed him in defense of her honor.
Held: She is justified in using the
pocketknife in repelling what she believed to
be an attack upon her honor. It was a dark
night and she could not have identified
Rivera. There being no other means of self-
defense.

People vs Jaurigue

FACTS:
Avelina Jaurigue and Nicolas
Jaurigue, her father, were
prosecuted for the crime of murder
for which Nicolas was acquitted
while Avelina was found guilty of
homicide. She appealed to the Court
of Appeals for Southern Luzon on
June 10, 1944 to completely absolve
her of all criminal responsibility for
having acted in defense of her
honor, to find in her favour
additional mitigating circumstances
and omit aggravating circumstance.
At about 8:00 PM of September 20,
1942, Amado Capina, deceased
victim, went to the chapel of
Seventh Day Adventists to attend
religious services and sat at the
front bench facing the altar. Avelina
Jaurigue entered the chapel shortly
after the arrival of her father for the
same purpose and sat on the bench
next to the last one nearest the
door. Upon seeing Avelina, Amado
went and sat by Avelinas right side
from his seat on the other side of
the chapel, and without saying a
word, placed his hand on the upper
part of her right thigh.
Avelina Jaurigue, therafter, pulled
out with her right hand the fan knife
which she had in a pocket of her
dress with the intention of punishing
Amados offending hand. Amado
seized her right hand but she
quickly grabbed the knife on her left
hand and stabbed Amado once at
the base of the left side of the neck
inflicting upon him a wound about 4
inches deep, which is mortal.
Nicolas saw Capina bleeding and
staggering towards the altar, and
upon seeing his daughter
approached her and asked her the
reason for her action to which
Avelina replied, Father, I could not
endure anymore.
Amado Capina died a few minutes
after. Barrio lieutenant, Casimiro
Lozada was there and Avelina
surrendered herself. Lozada advised
the Jaurigues to go home
immediately for fear of retaliation of
Capinas relatives.

EVENTS PRIOR:
One month before that fatal night,
Amado Capina snatched Avelinas
handkerchief bearing her nickname
while it was washed by her cousin,
Josefa Tapay.
7 days prior to incident (September
13, 1942), Amado approached her
and professed his love for her which
was refused, and thereupon
suddenly embraced and kissed her
and touched her breasts. She then
slapped him, gave him fist blows
and kicked him. She informed her
matter about it and since then, she
armed herself with a long fan knife
whenever she went out.
2 days after (September 15, 1942),
Amado climbed up the house of
Avelina and entered the room where
she was sleeping. She felt her
forehead and she immediately
screamed for help which awakened
her parents and brought them to her
side. Amado came out from where
he had hidden and kissed the hand
of Avelinas father, Nicolas.
Avelina received information in the
morning and again at 5:00 PM on
the day of the incident (September
20, 1942) that Amado had been
falsely boasting in the
neighbourhood of having taken
liberties with her person. In the
evening, Amado had been courting
the latter in vain.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the defendant should
be completely absolved of all
criminal responsibility because she is
justified in having acted in the
legitimate defense of her honor.
Whether or not the Court should find
the additional mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender,
presence of provocation and
absence of intent in her favour
Whether or not committing said
offense in a sacred place is an
aggravating circumstance in this
case

HELD:
Conviction of defendant is sustained
and cannot be declared completely
exempt from criminal liability. To be
entitled to a complete self-defense of
chastity, there must be an attempt
to rape. To provide for a justifying
circumstance of self-defense, there
must be a) Unlawful aggression, b)
Reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it, c)
Lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself.
Attempt to rape is an unlawful
aggression. However, under the
circumstances of the offense, there
was no possibility of the defendant
to be raped as they were inside the
chapel lighted with electric lights and
contained several people. Thrusting
at the base of Capinos neck as her
means to repel aggression is not
reasonable but is instead, excessive.
Mitigating circumstances are
considered in her favour.
Circumstances include her voluntary
and unconditional surrender to the
barrio lieutenant, provocation from
the deceased which produced
temporary loss of reason and self-
control of the defendant and lack of
intent to kill the deceased evidenced
by infliction of only one single
wound.
Aggravating circumstance of having
committed offense in a sacred place
is not sustained as there is no
evidence that the defendant had
intended to murder the deceased
when she entered the chapel that
night. She killed under great
provocation.
Penalty: For homicide, penalty is
reclusion temporal. However, with 3
mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstance, it is
reduced by two degrees, in this
case, prision correccional.
Indeterminate Sentence Law
provides the penalty ranging from
arresto mayor in its medium degree
to prision correccional in its medium
degree.
Avelina is sentenced to 2mos and 1
day of arresto mayor as minimum to
2 years, 4 months, and 1 day of
prision correccional as maximum; to
indemnify heirs of Capina in the
sum of 2,000; with corresponding
subsidiary imprisonment not to
exceed 1/3 of principal penalty and
to pay costs. She is given the
benefit of of her preventive
imprisonment
SEPARATE OPINION: Hilado
questions the validity or nullity of
judicial proceedings in the Japanese-
sponsored courts.

DEFENSE OF PROPERTY

People vs Apolinar

Facts:
Midnight of December 22, 1936, the
defendant and appellant Anastacio Apolinar
alias Atong was at that time the occupant
of a parcel of land owned by Joaquin
Gonzales in Papallasen, La Paz, Umingan,
Pangasinan. Armed with a shotgun, Atong
was looking over said land when he
observed that there was a man carrying a
bundle on his shoulder. Believing that he
was a thief (of palay), the defendant called
his attention but he ignored him. The
defendant fired in the air and then at the
person. The man, identified as Domingo
Petras, was able to get back to his house
and consequently narrated to Angel
Natividad, the barrio chief, that he had been
wounded in the back by a shotgun. He
then showed the two wounds - one in each
side of the spinal column - which wounds
were circular in form and a little bigger than
a quarter of an inch, according tot he
medical report of Dr. Mananquil. Petras died
of the wounds he sustained. The defendant
surrendered to the authorities immediately
after the incident and gave a sworn
statement (Exhibit F) before the Justice of
Peace of Umingan on December 23, 1936.
Issue
: WON the killing of Petras was justified by
defense of property
Held:
No; the right to property is not of such
importance as right to life, and defense of
property can be invoked as a justifying
circumstance only when it is coupled with
an attack on the person of one entrusted -
with said property.

US vs Bumanglag

Facts:

On the night of January 2, 1909,
Rafael Bumanglag noticed that 40 bundles
of palay which were kept in his granary
were missing. He searched for the missing
palay the following morning and found them
in an enclosed field which was planted with
sugar cane, at a distance of about 100
meters from his granary.
For the purpose of ascertaining who
had done it, he left the palay there, and
that night, accompanied by Gregorio
Bundoc, Antonio Ribao, and Saturnino
Tumamao, he waited near the said field for
the person who might return to get the
palay.
Guillermo Ribis appeared and
attempted to carry the palay away with him,
but at that instant Bumanglag, Bundoc, and
Ribao assaulted the presumed thief with
sticks and cutting and stabbing weapons; as
a result of the struggle which ensued, Ribis
fell down and died instantly.
All the defendants declared that they
only beat the deceased with sticks because
he had unsheathed the bolo he carried

Issue: Is appellant guilty of the crime of
homicide as co-principal by direct
participation?

Ruling: Judgement reversed with respect to
Bundoc only

Reasoning:

While the defendants declared that
they only beat the deceased with sticks, it
appeared that several serious wounds had
been inflicted with cutting and stabbing
weapons as per the declaration of the
health officer Felipe Barba.
The bolo worn by the deceased was
in its sheath and hanging from his waist. It
can not be concluded that the deceased
even intended to assault his murderers with
his bolo either before he was attacked by
them or during the fight. Had Ribis made
use of the bolo, it would have been found
unsheathed at the place where the fight
occurred.
Without unlawful aggression and the
other requisites which would exempt the
accused from criminal responsibility, the
appellant and his two companions assaulted
Ribis with sticks and cutting and stabbing
arms, inflicting upon him serious and mortal
wounds, and therefore, the said accused is
guilty of the crime of homicide as co-
principal by direct participation, fully
convicted, together with his codefendants
who are already serving their sentence.
The court took into account the
mitigating circumstance of No. 7, Art. 9 of
the Penal Code (which was in effect at that
time), because the defendant acted with
loss of reason and self-control on seeing
that the deceased was taking possession of
the palay which was clearly his.
The special circumstance established
by Art. 11 of the same code should also be
considered in favor of the accused in view
of the erroneous belief that it is legal to
punish, even to excess the thief who, while
refusing to work, devotes himself to
depriving his neighbors of the fruits of their
arduous labor.

Dissent by Moreland:
The only proofs relative to the
manner in which Rivis met his death were
presented by defendants. Their statements
are largely similar: when Bumanglag
surprised the thief, the latter attacked him
with a bolo which prompted the former to
call upon his companions who assisted
Bumanglag to protect him which resulted in
the death of Rivis. However, the court
refused to believe these statements
because 1) the bolo was unsheathed; 2)
the sanitary inspector Barbas testimony
states that some of the wounds were made
with sharp instruments.
However, no one watched the body
of the deceased during the interval between
the time when the death occurred and
when the body was first examined.
(Therefore, the evidence is not conclusive
as to whether the deceased actually used
his bolo to attack the defendants.)
Barba was no qualified expert to
determine that certain wounds are caused
by sharp objects. He merely stated his
conclusions about the wounds without
presenting facts from which these would
naturally spring.
It nowhere appears, except from the
fact of death itself that the defendants
sought or intended to kill the decedent.
Their sole purpose appears from the
evidence to have been to protect their
companion from the murderous assault of
the decedent.

On defense of property:
The defendant, Bumanglag was upon
his own land and was, therefore, defending
his habitation or property, as well as in
defense of his person, against one who
manifestly intends by violence or surprise to
commit a known felony upon either and, if
need be, may kill his adversary.
While the premises upon which the
assault occurred where not the habitation of
the defendant, still, as a matter of law, no
substantial distinction is made between
habitation and premises; for the purposes of
self-defense, there is no difference between
ones habitation and his premises.
There was not only an unlawful
aggression against the defendant but also
that there was a wrongful invasion of his
habitation and an attempt to commit a
felony against his property.
It would seem, under all
circumstances that it can not fairly be
charged that the defendants, particularly the
appellant, acted otherwise than as
reasonable men would have acted in the
same situation.

People vs Narvaez

This case is an appeal from the decision of
the CFI which convicted the accused of
murder qualified by treachery with the
aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation offset by the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.

Facts:

In the afternoon of August 22, 1968,
GRACIANO JUAN, JESUS VERANO,
CESAR VERANO, CESAR IBANEZ,
GEORGE FLEISCHER and FLAVIANO
RUBIA were fencing the land of George
Fleischer, situated in MAITUM, SOUTH
COTABATO. At the place of fencing is the
house and rice drier of appellant
MAMERTO NARVAEZ.
At that time appellant was sleeping
and was awakened by the sound of the
chiseling of the walls of his house. He then
arose and saw the fencing. If the fencing
continued appellant would be prevented
from entering his house and rice mill
bodega. So he addressed the group,
through Rubia to stop and talk things over
(Pare, if possible you stop destroying my
house and if possible we will talk it over -
what is good). To which Fleischer
answered no (No, gademit, proceed, go
ahead) and continued the fencing.
At this instance, appellant lost his
equilibrium and got his gun and shot
Fleischer, hitting him. Rubia ran towards the
jeep, and knowing that there is a gun on
the jeep, appellant fired at Rubia likewise
hitting him. Both Fleischer and Rubia died

The case is intertwined with the long
drawn out legal battle between the Fleischer
and Co., Inc and the land settlers of
Cotabato, among whom was appellant. In
brief, the land where the settlers were
staying was declared public land which
Fleischer won in the bidding.
On Nov. 14, 1966, appellant was
among the settlers who filed in the CFI of
Cotabato the civil case to obtain an
injunction or annulment of the order of
award of land to the company. During the
pendancy of the case, appellant agreed to
lease a portion of the land (where his
properties were situated) although the
ownership of the land was still uncertain.
However, appellant failed to pay the agreed
rate which prompted Fleisher, et. al. to go
through the aforementioned fencing of
appellants property - which gave rise to the
deaths of Fleischer and Rubia.

Issues:

Did the victims have a right to fence
off the contested property, to destroy
appellants house and to shut off his way in
and out of his residence and the highway?
Was the aggression of Fleischer
unlawful?

Ruling: Appellant found guilty of two
homicides with mitigating circumstances
(incomplete self-defense, voluntary surrender
and obfuscation).

Reasoning:

When the incident occurred, the case
was still pending in the CFI. The parties
could not have known ahead of time who
would prevail in the proceedings.
The court cited Articles 536 and 539
of the Civil Code which stated that in no
case may possession be acquired through
force or intimidation as long as there is a
possessor who objects thereto and that
every possessor has a right to be respected
in his possession.
In view of the foregoing provisions,
the deceased had no right to destroy or
cause damage to the appellants house.
Their actions therefore would amount to
unlawful aggression.
The angry order of Fleischer to
continue the fencing would have resulted in
the further chiselling of the wall of
appellants house as well as the closure of
the access to and from his house and rice
mill is an aggression against appellants
property rights.
However, when the appellant fired
his shotgun from his window, killing his two
victims, his resistance was disproportionate
to the attack.
The third element is also present.
There was no provocation on the part of
the appellant, since he was asleep at first
and was only awakened by the noise
produced by the victims and laborers. His
plea for the deceased and their men to
stop and talk things over with him was no
provocation at all.
Appellants act in killing the deceased
was not justifiable, since not all the
elements for justification are present.

Evident premeditation is not present
because there is no direct evidence of the
planning or preparation to kill the victim.
Passion and obfuscation attended the
crime. The circumstances that appellant
discovered upon waking up must have so
aggravated his obfuscation that he lost
momentarily all reason causing him to reach
for his shotgun and fire at his victims in
defense of his rights.

The crime committed is HOMICIDE
on two counts mitigated by the privileged
extenuating circumstance of incomplete self
defense as well as by two generic
mitigating circumstances of voluntary
surrender and obfuscation. He was
sentenced to 4 months of imprisonment and
considering that appellant has been under
detention for 14 years since his voluntary
surrender, his immediate release was
ordered.


Separate Opinion of Gutierrez Jr.:

Defense of property is not of such
importance as to the right to life and
defense of property can only be invoked
when it is coupled with some form of attack
on the person of one entrusted with tsaid
property.
There is absolutely no evidence that
an attack was attempted, much less made
upon the person of appellant. The mere
utterance No, gademit, proceed, go ahead
is not the unlawful aggression which entitles
appellant to the plea of self-defense.

Ratio v. 2.0

o Defense of ones person is
treated as justifying circumstance
under Art 11 par 1 of RPC.
a. 1
st
requisite: aggression was
on the part of the victims
b. 2
nd
requisite: by killing the
two victims, appelantss
resistance was
disproportionate to the attack.
c. 3rd requisite: ONLY
REQUISITE PRESENT. As a
matter of fact, there was no
provocation on the part of
the appellant since his plea
for the deceased to stop and
talk things over was no
provocation at all.
o Appellants act of killing was not
justifiable since not all elements
are present but could be credited
with the special mitigating
circumstance of incomplete
defense pursuant to Art 13 par 6
of RPC.
Entitled to a penalty
lower by one or 2
degrees = prision
correcional
o The aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation was not
sufficiently established.
o There was also the presence of
2 mitigating circumstances:
voluntary surrender and passion
and obfuscation. (act of chiseling
and fencing off)
May further be
reduced by 1 degree
= arresto mayor
o Civil liability also modified =
reduced because the victims
contributed to the gravity of
appellants reaction.
o Article 39 of RPC was applied
but enactment of RA 5465 on
April 21, 1969 made the
provisions of Art 39 applicable
to fines only and not to
reparation of the damages
caused. Considering that RA is
favorable to the accused who is
not a habitual delinquent, it
must be given retroactive effect
(basically abolished subsidiary
imprisonment for non-paymen of
civil indemnity)
Decision: 4 months of arresto mayor and
civil liability of 4000 pesos for the heirs of
each of the deceased without subsidiary
imprisonment.

DEFENSE OF RELATIVE

United States vs Esmedia

FACTS:

At about 2pm, 24 June 1909,
Ciriaco Abando instructed his son,
Santiago, to go to a certain place in
his rice field to let out the water in
order that they could plant rice in
the said field. Santiago went to the
place designated, and while at work,
Gregorio Esmedia appeared on the
scene and started a quarrel with
Santiago.
Then, Gregorio drew a dagger and
stabbed Santiago in the back.
Santiago fell to the ground, but
arose immediately and attacked
Gregorio with his bolo, inflicting
several wounds which made
Gregorio fall to the ground.
Before this trouble finally terminated,
Ponciano and Mena Esmedai(the
two accused) and Ciriaco Abando
appeared in the vicinity.
Two accused contend that they were
working in the rice field nearby, and
in seeing Ciriaco and Santiago
attacking their father, thay started to
the place to render assistance,
Ponciano starting first. IN SELF-
DEFENSE, knocked them both down
using a club(not a bolo according to
him). After they had fallen to the
ground, Mena arrived.
Prosecution: When the accused saw
the fight between their father and
Santiago, they rushed to the place
and proceeded to kill Santiago and
Ciriaco outright.
RESULT:
1. Ciriaco was left dead on the
scene.
-wounds on top of his head caused by a
cutting instrument 3cm & 8cm length
-sustained fracture in the skull by means of
a blow
-wound on the head 3cm depth, neck 31cm
depth 3cm length
-left eye was bruised
-wound on the palm of his hand 3cm l,
2mm depth

2. Gregorio received fatal
wounds from which he died
within about 4 hours.
3. Santiago received fatal
wounds from which he died
5 days later.
(See pages 262, 263 for details of injuries)

*The theory of the defense that Ponciano
was attacked by Ciracio and Santiago is
untenable, as the nature of the wounds of
the bodies of these two persons show
clearly that at least some of them were
inflicted by BOLOS, and Ponciano must
have used a bolo in the fight, tough he
contends he only used a club.
*The bolo wounds on the heads of
Gregorio and Santiago were such a serious
nature that it would have been impossible
for them to have gone any distance after
having been wounded. They could not have
attacked Ponciano after.
*Santiago was stabbed at the back by
Gregorio but this would was not fatal.

The accused Ponciano received one
wound on the head, but it was not
of serious nature; Mena on the other
hand escaped uninjured.

ISSUE:
WON the accused can be exempt
from criminal liability in causing the death of
Santiago and Ciracio Abando.



HELD:
The two accused are exempt from
criminal liability for having caused the death
of Santiago Abando, inasmuch as it has
been shown that they inflicted these wounds
upon him in defense of their father who
was fatally wounded at that time.






AVOIDANCE OF A GREATER EVIL

People vs Norma Hernandez

Facts of the Case:
Vivencio Lascano courted Maria
Norma Hernandez in August 1954
Jan. 6, 1955- Norma accepted
Vivencio and told him to brings his
parents to their home so they could
talk about their marriage
Feb. 6, 1955- Vivencio brought 12
aunts, 30 chickens, and 3 goats to
ask for Normas hand in marriage.
Parents of both parties agreed to
the marriage. Wedding was sent to
Mar. 19, 1955 at the Roman
Catholic Church in Batangas. They
also agreed that Vivencios parents
would buy a wedding dress, two
vestidos, a pair of shoes for the
bride, to advance P20 for fetching of
sponsors in the wedding, and to
repair the roof of Normas uncle.
Mar. 11, 1955- without telling
anyone else, not even her parents,
Norma decide to leave for Mindoro
because she never loved Vivencio in
the first place and she believed that
if the marriage failed, it would be
blamed on her for being a girl and
not Vivencio.
Mar. 16, 1955- wedding gown was
brought to appellants house, but
since no one was there, the gown
was just left in the balcony.
Mar. 19, 1955- they served around
70 guests in the morning because
Vivencios parents invited Normas
guests and relatives. Norma was
nowhere to be found. She wasnt
able to show up, thereby causing
great shame and humiliation to
Vivencio and his parents.

Issue:
Does Normas act of going to Mindoro for
the deliberate purpose of preventing the
celebration of marriage with complainant
because she does not love the latter
constitute slander by deed?

Held: NO. Judgement of slander by deed
against Norma reversed and appellant is
acquitted.
Malice, one of the essential
requisites of slander has not been
proven.
There is no malice because it
cannot be sustained that appellant
was motivated by spite or ill-will in
deliberately frustrating the marriage.
There were no strained relations
existing between the complainant
and the appellant and her parents
before the incident. On the contrary,
there always existed good relations
between them being neighbors.
In the act done by Norma, there
was no malice because in changing
her mind, assuming that she was in
love with complainant previous to
the incident, she was merely
exercising her right not to give
consent to the marriage after
mature consideration, such consent
being her prerogative as one of the
contracting parties.
She can freely refuse such consent
during the actual marriage even if
there was previous valid agreement
to marry.
If a party to an agreement to marry
who backs out should be held liable
for the crime of slander by deed,
then that would be an inherent way
of compelling the party to go into
marriage without his or her free
consent

Ty vs People

FACTS:
Vicky Ty's mother was confined in
the Manila Doctors' Hospital from 30
Oct 1990 until 4 June 1992. She
signed the "Acknowledgment of
Responsibility for Payment".
Ty's sister was also confined in the
same hospital from 13 May 1991 to
2 May 1992.
The total hospital bill amounted to
P1,075,592.95.
Ty signed promissory note that she
would pay in installments.
She drew 7 postdated checks, all
worth 30k, against Metrobank. All
were dishonored by the bank due to
insufficiency of funds.
Despite demand letters from hospital
to Ty, she did not pay the debt.
Ty alleges that she only issued the
chcecks because of "an
uncontrollable fear of a greater
injury," as the hospital was
maltreating the patient.

ISSUE:
Is the defense of uncontrollable fear tenable
to warrant exemption from criminal liability?

RULING: DENIED
3 requisites for the exempting
circumstance: (1) existence of an
uncontrollable fear; (2) fear must be
real and imminent; (3) fear of an
injury is greater than or at least
equal to that committed
Mere threat of injury is not enough.
It should not be fanciful, speculative,
remote.
No evidence that mother's illness
was so life-threatening.
Ty did not take advantage of the
many opportunities available to her
to avoid committing a crime.
No evidence to corroborate her
claim that she was
compelled/coerced to cooperate with
hospital's demands.
Does not fall under justifying
circumstance under Art 11 of RPC
either.
1. Evil sought to be avoided
actually exists - evil is merely
speculative
2. Injury feared must be greater
than the one done to avoid it
3. There must be no other practical
means and less harmful means
of preventing it - she could have
given jewelry or other forms of
security






FULFILLMENT OF DUTY

FACTS:
Delima was a police officer who was
looking for escaped convict Lorenzo
Napilon.
Delima found Napilon in the house
of Jorge Alegria armed with a
pointed piece of bamboo in the
shape of a lance.
Delima demanded Napilon's
surrender but Napilon attacked
instead. Delima was able to dodge.
Delima fired his revolver but did not
hit Napilon.
Napilon ran away with the weapon.
Delima pursued him and fired again,
this time hitting and killing him.

ISSUE:
Is Delima criminally liable?

RULING: JUDGMENT REVERSED
no
Delima was performing his duty as a
police officer to bring an escaped
convict back into custody. Napilon
was under obligation to surrender.
Napilon's use of the bamboo as a
weapon compelled Delima to resort
to extreme means which, although
fatal, was justified by the
circumstances.

People vs Belbes

Facts:
- Domingo Belbes and Jose Pabon
were assigned by their station
commander to maintain peace and
order at the JS prom of Pili
barangay HS.
- 9:00pm, the teacher in charge were
approached by 2 students informing
her that there was someone making
trouble. The 2 patrolmen responded
to the said incident.
- Fernando Bataller a senior at the
HS, drunk and with the company of
his 2 friends was vomiting and
holding on to the bamboo fence of
the schools temp bldg. the bamboo
splits broke and at this instance
pabon and Belbes appeared and
without warning fired his gun.
Bataller fell to the ground, the 2
patrolmen fled and Bataller was
pronounced DOA. Autopsy report
states that bataller suffered the ff
wounds:
o Head, located at the right
lower face, skin, muscles,
blood vessels, nerves, bone
torn away
o Chest(front located at left,
antero lateral approx.. 5 cm
below but lateral to the left
nipple, another gunshot
wound at left lateral waistline
o Chest(back) located at the
middle back at the level of
the lowest rib, skin and
superficial muscles torn
away, another gunshot
wound located at the left
back lateral level of the
lowest rib
- Defendants version: Bataller was
destroying the bamboo splits, drunk
but being prevailed upon by his
friends. He was not vomiting but he
smelled of wine. Upon introducing
themselves as patrolmen, Fernando
did not mind them but instead, tried
to stab Pabon but was able to step
back and after 2 knife thrusts,
Pabon retreated (the account said
deceased stabbed Pabon and then
said he was not hit, labo). Belbes
was stabbed by Bataller and was hit
on the lower left shoulder. Belbes
held his hand but he was able to
free himself and tried to stab Belbes
again, he made a warning shot.
Bataller grabbed the firearm and his
2 friends started to get aggressive.
During the process of grappling for
the firearm, it went off and Fernando
fell to the ground. He took the knife
from Batallers hand and asked the
people to bring Bataller to the
hospital. They proceeded to the
police station and turned over the
knife to the desk officer which is
now with the provincial command.
- Pabon corroborated the testimony
except that there was no warning
shot and failed to mention the
aggression of the friends.
- The trial court found the defense
weak and held that the evidence of
the prosecution sufficient. The court
convicted Belbes of murder and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Issue: Was the Trial court correct in holding
accused appellant guilty of murder?
Held: No. Belbes is not guilty of murder but
of homicide, with mitigating circumstance of
incomplete justifying circumstance of
fulfillment of duty.
- Defendant claims that he was only
performing his official functions when
he responded to the incident, there
were 2 students that reported an
incident, they went to check the
veracity of the statements. He had
no intent and voluntariness; he
cannot be faulted for the death of
the deceased.
- He also questions the credibility of
the cousin who was one of the 2
who were with Bataller that night,
saying that since he is a relative he
has every intention falsely testify
against him. But the positive and
clear testimony of a witness is
sufficient to sustain a judgment of
conviction also the trial court finding
should be respected here since they
were able to observe the demeanor
of the witness (tc admitted the
testimony and was used to convict
him).
- Burden of evidence to prove that the
killing was done in self-defense
should be on the accused, he
cannot rely on the weakness of the
prosecution but on the strength of
his own evidence. Even if the
evidence of the prosecution were it
could not be disbelieved after the
accused himself had admitted the
killing (when he claimed that he did
it on self-defense).
- The inconsistency between the
testimony of Belbes and the facts
are as follows: he claims that he
was stabbed but was only medically
examined after 21 hours of the
alleged stabbing (possibly self-
inflicted). Also, he said that he and
the deceased were grappling for the
firearm yet the wounds suggest that
he was hit sideways (wounds at the
front and back of the body). Also, it
only took about 6 seconds after the
teacher asked them to respond to
the incident until they heard
gunshots.
- Art. 11 (5) states that a person
incurs no criminal liability if the
crime was done in the fulfillment of
a duty or in the lawful exercise of a
right or office. This has 2 requisites:
(1) lawful exercise of a duty and (2)
the injury or offense committed the
necessary consequence of the due
performance of his duty. In this case
the 2
nd
requisite is lacking.
- There was no treachery since the 2
requirements for this circumstance
are: (1) done to ensure safety on
the part of the accused and gave no
chance to the offended person to
defend himself and (2) the means,
method or manner of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted
by the offender.
- Not reckless imprudence since the
gunshots were directly aimed at the
deceased
- Decision: decision modified, appellant
found guilty of homicide and
sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of 9 yrs of prision mayor to
14 yrs reclusion temporal. Also
ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim the amount of 50,000 as civil
indemnity and 20,000 as moral
damages.

LAWFUL ORDER OF A SUPERIOR

People vs Beronilla

Facts:
Appeal by accused from CFI conviction of
murder for execution of Arsenio Borjal in
the evening of April 18, 1945 in La Paz,
Abra. Borjal was elected mayor of La Paz,
at the outbreak of war, continued to serve
during the Japanese occupation, until March
10, 1943, when he moved because of an
attempt on his life. On December 18, 1944,
accused was appointed Military Mayor of La
Paz. He received a memo authorizing him
to appoint a jury of 1 bolomen to try those
accused of crimes against the State, and a
list of all puppet government officials
(including Borjal) instructing him to
investigate said persons. In March 1945,
Borjal returned to La Paz to escape
bombing of Bangued, and so he was
placed under custody. Borjal was found
guilty. Headquarters said whatever
disposition you make is hereby approved.
That night, accused ordered the execution
of Borjal. 2 years later, accused were
indicted in the CFI of Abra for murder.
Thereafter, PRoxas issued a Proclamation
granting amnesty to all persons who
committed acts penalized under RPC in
furtherance of resistance to the enemy
against persons aiding war efforts of enemy.
CFI convicted Beronilla as conspirator and
co-principal for murder (crime fell with
Proclamation, but no benefit because Borjal
was executed after liberation).

Issue:
Whether or not accused was guilty of
murder.

Held:
No. Arrest, prosecution, and trial of Borjal
pursuant to express orders of headquarters,
or higher command. But a radiogram from
the area commander calling attention to the
illegality of Borjals conviction and sentence,
which prosecution claimed was known to
accused, was found. The message said that
the jury was illegal and could not try or
punish Beronilla. Obviously, if the
Volckmann message was known to
Beronilla, his ordering the execution of
Borjal on the night of April 18, 1945 can
not be justified. Evidence finds no
satisfactory proof that Beronilla actually
received the radiogram or any copy thereof,
for only Beronillas bodyguard, relative of
Borjal, claimed to have seen him read the
letter over his shoulder. Such witness
failed to mention it in his affidavit. The
affidavit only stated that the bodyguard was
not with Beronilla when the message
arrived. Also, had Beronilla executed Borjal
in violation of superior orders, he would not
have reported it, as he did after. The
message was not transmitted. It appearing
that the charge is the heinous crime of
murder, and that the accused-appellants
acted upon orders, of a superior officers
that they, as military subordinates, could not
question, and obeyed in good faith, without
being aware of their illegality, without any
fault or negligence on their part, we can not
say that criminal intent has been
established.