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MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS GSIS, G.R. No.

122156
Digest:

G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE
ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL,
respondents.

This is a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus on the grounds of "The
Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution i.e., "in the
grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos."

Facts: The controversy arose when respondent Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986,
decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the
eventual "strategic partner," is to provide management expertise and/or
an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to
strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.

In a close bidding, Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm edged Manila Prince
Hotel, a Filipion firm by a margin of P2.42 per share for 15,300,000
shares. Prior to the declaration of the winning bidder, the petitioner
matched the offer of Renong Berhad and sent a manager's check as bid
security which the respondent GSIS refused to accept.

Petitioners herein invoked Sec 10, par 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution and argued that the respondent hotel is part of the
national patrimony as part of the tourism industry and is thus part of
the national economy.

Respondents on the otherhand argued that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII,
of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy
since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing
legislation(s) . . . Thus, for the said provision to Operate, there must
be existing laws "to lay down conditions under which business may be
done."

Among other things, that even if such is the case, Manila Hotel does not
fall under the term national patrimony. That, granting that the Manila
Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision
invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of
the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor
the land upon which the building stands. That, submission by petitioner
of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very well
be awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the
exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken
place. And finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse
of discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise its
discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse
its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as petitioner has
no clear legal right to what it demands and respondents do not have an
imperative duty to perform the act required of them by petitioner.

Issue:
1. Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution is a self-executing provision requiring implementing
legislations.
2. Whether or not the Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony.
3. Whether or not the matching bid is premature
4. Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondents in refusing the matching bid of the petitioner.

Held: In their resolution of the case, the Supreme Court held that,
"Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of
the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract."

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in
Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the
aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies
sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is
self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can
be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there
is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action.

Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to
enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all
provisions of the constitution are self-executing If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of
self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.

The SC further acknowledged that such provision is mandatory. And thus
the petition is granted.



Topic: VI. LAWS2. Parts of a law; (c) PreamblePeople v Echavez, 95 SCRA 663
(1980)Facts: Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed separate informations against sixteen
people for squatting which waspunishable under PD No. 772. FIve of the
informations were raffled to Judge Vicente Echavez, Jr. TheJudge dismissed the
five informations before the accused could be arraigned. One of the
Judge'sgrounds for the dismissal was that under the rule of ejusdem generis the
decree does not apply to thecultivation of a grazing land. The fiscal asked that the
dismissal order be reconsidered.

Issues: Whether PD No. 772 which penalizes squatting and similar acts, applies to
agricultural lands.

Ruling/Held: No. The court ruled that PD No. 772 does not apply to pasture lands
because its preambleshows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban
communities or more particularly to illegalconstructions in squatter areas made by
well-to-do individuals. The squatting complained of involvespasture lands in rural
areas

TANADA VS TUVERA
136 scra 27
Publication Presidential Proclamations
Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concerns as well as
the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable they must be published in the
Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, Taada et al seek a writ of
mandamus to compel Tuvera to publish and/or to cause the publication in the
Official Gazette of various Presidential Decrees (PDs), Letters of
Instructions(LOIs), Proclamations(PPs), Executive Orders(EOs), and
Administrative Orders(AOs).
ISSUE: Whether or not the various PDs et al must be published before they shall
take effect.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the fact that a PD or LOI states its date of
effectivity does not preclude their publication in the Official Gazette as they
constitute important legislative acts, particularly in the present case where the
president may on his own issue laws. The clear objective of this provision is to give
the public general adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their
actions and conduct. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis
for the application of the maxim ignorantia legis non excusat.Publication is
indispensable.


TANADA VS TUVERA


146 scra 446
Publication Presidential Proclamations etc What unless otherwise provided
means in Article 2 of the Civil Code
With the Supreme Courts decision that ordered Tuvera et al to publish in the
Official Gazette the unpublished presidential issuances which are of general
application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect,
Tuvera et al move for reconsideration and clarification.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication should be made in the Official Gazette or
elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed.
HELD: The Supreme Court cannot rule upon the wisdom of a law or repeal or
modify it if it finds the same as impractical. That is not its function for such is the
function of the legislature. The task of the Supreme Court is merely to interpret
and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the
government in accordance with prescribed procedure. Hence, the Court declared
that all laws shall immediately upon their approval or as soon thereafter as
possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only
after 15 days from their publication, or on another date specified by the
legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code. The clause unless
otherwise provided pertains to the date of publication and not the requirement of
publication.

TATAD VS SEC OF ENERGY
Equal Protection Oil Deregulation Law
Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the
government has always been finding ways to alleviate the oil industry. The
government created laws accommodate these innovations in the oil industry. One
such law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law
allows that any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil
and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and
operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or
use the same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by the
Department of Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims,
among others, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil
and imported refined petroleum products violates the equal protection clause.
Tatad contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three
existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective investors in the
downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to
source refined petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be taxed on unrefined
crude products and 7% on refined crude products.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it violated Sec
19 of Art 12 of the Constitution. It violated that provision because it only
strengthens oligopoly which is contrary to free competition. It cannot be denied
that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a
foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league
players in the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the
dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various
capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense
benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts
and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the
entry of new players. New players that intend to equalize the market power of
Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to spend
billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will
suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be
competing on an uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff differential is
desirable because it will induce prospective players to invest in refineries puts the
cart before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be
attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new players
belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream
oil industry is an idle dream.
RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against
the new players insofar as it placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis--vis
the established oil companies by requiring them to meet certain conditions already
being observed by the latter.
ROMULO, MABANTA, BUENAVENTURA, SAYOC & DE LOS ANGELES vs.
HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND
Posted on June 20, 2013 by winnieclaire
Standard
G.R. No. 131082 June 19, 2000
Facts: petitioner Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc and De Los Angeles
(hereafter PETITIONER), a law firm, was exempted for the period 1 January to 31
December 1995, from the Pag-IBIG Fund coverage by respondent HDMF because
of a superior retirement plan.
The HDMF Board of Trustees, pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7742,
issued Board Resolution No. 1011, Series of 1995, amending and modifying the Rules
and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742. As amended, Section 1 of Rule VII
provides that for a company to be entitled to a waiver or suspension of Fund
coverage, 3 it must have a plan providing for both provident/retirement and
housing benefits superior to those provided under the Pag-IBIG Fund.
PETITIONER submitted to the HDMF a letter explaining that the Amendments to
the Rules are invalid. In that the amendments are void insofar as they abolished
the exemption granted by Section 19 of P.D. 1752, as amended. The repeal of such
exemption involves the exercise of legislative power, which cannot be delegated to
HMDF.
HDMF disapproved PETITIONERs application on the ground that the requirement
that there should be both a provident retirement fund and a housing plan is clear in
the use of the phrase and/or, and that the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 7742 did
not amend nor repeal Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752 but merely implement the law.
The respondent Board was merely exercising its rule-making power under Section
13 of P.D. No. 1752. It had the option to use and only instead of or in the rules
on waiver in order to effectively implement the Pag-IBIG Fund Law. By choosing
and, the Board has clarified the confusion brought about by the use of and/or
in Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752, as amended.
PETITIONER filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals but was
dismissed.
Issue: Whether or not the board of HDMF exceeded its delegated power.
Held: YES. The controversy lies in the legal signification of the words and/or.
It seems to us clear from the language of the enabling law that Section 19 of P.D.
No. 1752 intended that an employer with a provident plan or an employee housing
plan superior to that of the fund may obtain exemption from coverage. If the law
had intended that the employee [sic] should have both a superior provident plan
and a housing plan in order to qualify for exemption, it would have used the words
and instead of and/or.
Notably, paragraph (a) of Section 19 requires for annual certification of waiver or
suspension, that the features of the plan or plans are superior to the fund or
continue to be so. The law obviously contemplates that the existence of either plan
is considered as sufficient basis for the grant of an exemption; needless to state,
the concurrence of both plans is more than sufficient. To require the existence of
both plans would radically impose a more stringent condition for waiver which was
not clearly envisioned by the basic law. By removing the disjunctive word or in the
implementing rules the respondent Board has exceeded its authority.
It is without doubt that the HDMF Board has rule-making power as provided in
Section 51 17 of R.A. No. 7742 and Section 13 18 of P.D. No. 1752. However, it is
well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power
to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be
within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the
administrative agency. 19 It is required that the regulation be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity
with, the standards prescribed by law.
In the present case, when the Board of Trustees of the HDMF required in Section
1, Rule VII of the 1995 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing
R.A. No. 7742 that employers should have both provident/retirement and housing
benefits for all its employees in order to qualify for exemption from the Fund, it
effectively amended Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. And when the Board subsequently
abolished that exemption through the 1996 Amendments, it repealed Section 19 of
P.D. No. 1752. Such amendment and subsequent repeal of Section 19 are both
invalid, as they are not within the delegated power of the Board. The HDMF
cannot, in the exercise of its rule-making power, issue a regulation not consistent
with the law it seeks to apply. Indeed, administrative issuances must not override,
supplant or modify the law, but must remain consistent with the law they intend to
carry out. Only Congress can repeal or amend the law
GREGO vs. COMELEC Case Digest
GREGO vs. COMELEC
274 SCRA 481, 1997

Facts: On October 31, 1981, before the effectivity of the Local Government Code
of 1991, private respondent Humberto Basco was removed from his position as
Deputy Sheriff by no less than the Supreme Court upon a finding of serious
misconduct in an administrative complaint.

Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for councilor in the Second District of the
City of Manila in the January 18, 1988 local elections. He won and assumed office.
He was successfully re-elected in 1992 and 1995.

It was his latest re-election which is the subject of the present petition on the
ground that he is disqualified under Section 40(b) of the LGC of 1991. Under said
section, those removed from office as a result of an administrative case are
disqualified to run for any elective local position.

Issue: Does Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 apply
retroactively to those removed from office before it took effect on January 1,
1992?

Held: The Supreme Court held that its refusal to give retroactive application to
the provision of Section 40(b) is already a settled issue and there exist no
compelling reason for the Court to depart therefrom. That the provision of the
Code in question does not qualify the date of a candidates removal from office and
that it is couched in the past tense should not deter the Court from applying the
law prospectively. A statute, despite the generality in its language, must not be so
construed as to overreach acts, events or matters which transpired before its
passage.




T O P I C : C H A P T E R V
S U B J E C T S O F C O N S T R U C T I O
N C. OTHER ISSUANCES WHICH HAVE THE
BINDING FORCE ANDEFFECT
OFLAWS T I T L E : A V E L I N A B . C O N T E a n d
L E T I C I A B O I S E R -
P A L M A , p e t i t i o n e r s , vs. COMMISSION ON
AUDIT (COA), respondent.(264 SCRA 19, L - 116422 04 NOVEMBER
1996)F A C T S : A v e l i n a C o n t e a n d L e t i c i a B o i s e r w e r e
b o t h f o r m e r e m p l o y e e s o f SSS who availed of compulsory
retirement benefits provided forunder RA No. 660.
Both al s o cl ai med wi th the SSS fi nanci al assistance benefits as
provided for under SSS Resolution No. 56,Series of 1971. The subject SSS
resolution was disallowed by COA in its
rulingi s s u e d o n J u l y 1 0 , 1 9 8 9 s t a t i n g t h a t t h e s c h e me o f f
i n a n c i a l assistance authorized by SSS is similar to separate
retirementp l a n o r i n c e n t i v e s / s e p a r a t i o n p a y p l a n s a d o p
t e d b y o t h e r gov er nment agenci es whi ch i n t ur n r esul ts i n t he
i ncr ease of benefits beyond what is allowed under existing retirement
laws. The SSS ther eaft er sought pr es i dent i al author i t y to conti
nuei mp l e me n t i n g R e s . 5 6 t o w h i c h t h e Of f i c e o f t h e E x e c
u t i v e Secretary replied that the Office of the President is not
inclinedto favorably act on the request or let alone overrule COAs
earlierruling.Peti t i oner s Cont e and Boi ser sought r econs i der ati on o
f COA sruling disallowing their claim and also sought payment from
SSSo f b e n e f i t s a s p r e s c r i b e d u n d e r R e s . 5 6 , b o t h o f w h i c
h w e r e denied by COA and SSS.I S S U E : W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e
b e n e f i t s p r o v i d e d f o r u n d e r S S S R e s o l u t i o n No.
56 be considered simply as financial assistance for retiringemployees,
or does such a scheme constitute a supplementaryretirement plan
prescribed by RA 4968.H E L D : T h e S u p r e m e C o u r t
r u l e d t h a t S S S R e s o l u t i o n N o . 5 6 c o n s t i t u t e
a supplementary retirement plan, thus, within the ambit of Sec. 28(b) of CA 186 as
amended by RA 4968 which bars the creation of a n y i n s u r a n c e o r
r e t i r e me n t p l a n o t h e r t h a n t h e G SI S
f o r gover nment offi cer s and empl o yees, i n or der to pr event the
undue and iniquitous proliferation of such plans. Resolution No.56 is
therefore invalid, void and of no
effect.P e t i t i o n w a s d i s m i s s e d f o r l a c k o f m e r i t , t h e a
s s a i l e d C O A decision is upheld, and SSS Resolution No. 56 is declared
illegal,void and of no effect.
T I T L E : J U A N A U G U S T O B .
P R I M I C I A S v s . T H E
M U N I C I P A L I T Y O F URDANETA,PANGASINAN, ET
AL.(93 SCRA 462, G.R. No. L-26702 18 OCTOBER
1979)F A C T S : A c r i m i n a l c o m p l a i n t w a s f i l e d
a g a i n s t p l a i n t i f f P r i m i s c i a s f o r violation of Municipal
Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964 after beingapprehended by a member of the
Municipal Police for
overtakinga t r u c k . P r i mi s c i a s t h e r e a f t e r f i l e d f o r t h e a n n u l
me n t o f t h e s u b j e c t o r d i n a n c e w i t h p r a y e r f o r i s s u a n
c e o f p r e l i m i n a r y i n j u n c t i o n t o r e s t r a i n d e f e n d a n t s f r o
m e n f o r c i n g t h e s a i d ordinance. The Court of First Instance rendered
Ordinance No. 3,S-1964 as null and void, and repealed by RA 4136 also known asthe
Land Transportation and Traffic Code. Appellant appealed
thedecision.I S S U E : W h e t h e r o r n o t O r d i n a n c e N o . 3 ,
S e r i e s o f 1 9 6 4 e n a c t e d b y t h e Municipal Council of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan is null and void.H E L D : Y e s , t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t
r u l e d t h a t s u b j e c t o r d i n a n c e h a s b e e n repealed
by the enactment of RA 4316 and has therefor, becomenull and void stating that a
later law prevails over an earlier law. The Supreme Court further averred that
local ordinances, in
thisc a s e , a m u n i c i p a l o r d i n a n c e , a r e i n f e r i o r
i n s t a t u s a n d s u b o r d i n a t e t o t h e l a w s o f t h e s t a t e a n
d w h e n e v e r t h e r e i s conflict between an ordinance and a statute, the
ordinance must give way.

Bagatsing vs. Ramirez
BAGATSING vs. RAMIREZ
74 SCRA 306
GR No. L-41631, December 17, 1976
"The entrusting of the tax collection to private entities does not destroy the
public purpose of a tax ordinance."

FACTS: Aside from the issue on publication, private respondent bewails that the
market stall fees imposed in the disputed City Ordinance No. 7522, which
regulates public markets and prescribes fees for rentals of stalls, are diverted to
the exclusive private use of the Asiatic Integrated Corporation since the collection
of said fees had been let by the City of Manila to the said corporation in a
"Management and Operating Contract."

ISSUE: Does the delegation of the collection of taxes to a private entity
invalidates a tax ordinance and defeats its public purpose?

HELD: No. The assumption is of course saddled on erroneous premise. The fees
collected do not go direct to the private coffers of the corporation. Ordinance No.
7522 was not made for the corporation but for the purpose of raising revenues for
the city. That is the object it serves. The entrusting of the collection of the fees
does not destroy the public purpose of the ordinance. So long as the purpose is
public, it does not matter whether the agency through which the money is
dispensed is public or private. The right to tax depends upon the ultimate use,
purpose and object for which the fund is raised. It is not dependent on the nature
or character of the person or corporation whose intermediate agency is to be used
in applying it. The people may be taxed for a public purpose, although it be under
the direction of an individual or private corporation.
Posted 8th July 2012 by cLutz
Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa v. Manila Railroad Company
GR L-25316, 28 February 1979 (88 SCRA 616)
Second Division, Fernando (p): 5 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: There are no antecedent facts available for this case.
The union seeks reversal of decision of the lower court dismissing its petition for
mandamus. The court determined Republic Act 2023 was enacted only to compel
the employer to make the deduction of the employees debt from the latters
salary and turn this over to the employees credit union; but which does not convert
the credit unions credit into a first priority credit.
Issue: Whether, indeed, the law does not give first priority in the matter of
payments to the obligations of employees in favor of their credit unions.
Held: Where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for the
courts to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its
operation, must be obeyed. The express provisions of the New Civil Code, Articles
2241, 2242 and 2244 show the legislative intent on preference of credits. In the
present case, the applicable provision of Republic Act 2023 speaks for itself;
there being no ambiguity, it is to be applied. If the legislative intent in enacting
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section 62 of RA 2023 were to give first priority in the
matter of payments to the obligations of employees in favor of their credit unions,
then, the law would have so expressly declared. There is nothing in the provision of
Republic Act 2023 which provides that obligation of laborers and employees
payable to credit unions shall enjoy first priority in the deduction from the
employees wages and salaries.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision, without pronouncement as to
costs.

Salvatierra v. CA
GR 107797, 26 August 1996 (261 SCRA 45)
First Division, Hermosisima (p): 3 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: In 1930, Enrique Salvatierra died intestate and without any issue. He was
survived by his legitimate brothers: Tomas, Bartolome, Venancio and Macario, and
sister Marcela, all surnamed Salvatierra. His estate consisted of three parcels of
land (Cadastral Lot 25, covered by Tax Declaration 11950, Cadastral Lot 26,
covered by Tax Declaration 11951, and Cadastral Lot 27, covered by Tax
Declaration 11949). On 4 May 1966, Macario Salvatierra sold Lot 26 to his son,
Anselmo Salvatierra by means of a deed of sale, and in consideration of P1,000.00.
Meanwhile, Marcela sold her share to Venancio. Bartolomes share was sold by his
heirs to Tomas. On 24 September 1968, an Extrajudicial Partition with
Confirmation of Sale was executed by and among the surviving legal heirs and
descendants of Enrique Salvatierra. After the partition, Venancio owned 1041
square meters consisting of Lot 27 and portion of Lot 26 (which is approximately
749 square meters), Anselmo owned 405 square meters of Lot 26, while the heirs
of Tomas owned 1,116 square meters, the whole of Lot 25. Thereafter on 15 June
1970, Venancio sold the whole of Lot 27 and a 149 square meter portion of Lot 26
to spouses Lino Longalong and Paciencia Mariano. It was discovered in 1982 through
a relocation survey that the 149 square meter portion of Lot 26 was outside
Longalongs fence as Anselmo Salvatierra was able to obtain a title in his name
(Original Certificate of Title 0-4221) covering the whole of Lot 26). Efforts to
settle the matter at the barangay level proved futile because Purita Salvatierra
(widow of Anselmo) refused to yield to the demand of Lino Longalong to return to
the latter the 149 square meter portion of Lot 26.
Longalong filed a case with the Regional Trial Court for the reconveyance of the
said portion of Lot 26. The court a quo dismissed the case on the grounds that
Longalong failed to establish ownership of the portion of the land in question, and
that the prescriptive period of four years from discovery of the alleged fraud
committed by defendants predecessor Anselmo Salvatierra within which plaintiffs
should have filed their action had already elapsed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision, ruling that a vendor can sell only what he owns or what he is
authorized to sell; and as to the co-owner of a piece of land, he can of course sell
his pro indiviso share therein to, but he cannot sell more than his share therein.
Hence, the appeal.
Issue: Whether Longalong is entitled to reconveyance of the 149 square meters in
Lot 26
Held: When the terms of the agreement are clear and unequivocal, the literal and
plain meaning thereof should be observed, pursuant to Article 1370 of the Civil
Code (If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention
of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall control.)
Contracts which are the private laws of the contracting parties, should be fulfilled
according to the literal sense of their stipulations, if their terms are clear and
leave no room for doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, for
contracts are obligatory, no matter what their forms maybe, whenever the
essential requisites for their validity are present. In the present case, there is no
ambiguity in the terms and stipulations of the extrajudicial partition (Extrajudicial
Partition with Confirmation of Sale). Since Macarios share (later Anselmos) is only
405 of the 749 square meters comprising Lot 26, Venancio was entitled to the
remaining 344 square meters of Lot 26, 149 square meters of which was sold to
Longalong. Supplemented by the holding that the prescriptive period on
reconveyance is ten years and not four years, as held in Caro v. CA, Longalong is
entitled to reconveyance as his complaint was filed five years after the
constitution of Anselmos fraudulent Original Certificate of title.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for want of merit, with costs against
petitioners.

Abellana V. Marave independent civil actionsCase:


Petition for certiorari from the decision of the Judge of RTC of Ozamiz City was
issuedwith grave abuse of discretion, to dismiss the Independent civil action filed
bydefendants for failure to reserve their right to institute it separately, when
thecriminal case for physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was commenced.
Facts:

Abellana while driving his cargo truck hitting a motorized pedicab resulting
in injuriesto its passengers, private respondents, Lamason, Gurrea, Flores, Nemeno
resulting inthe crime of physical injuries thru reckless imprudence.

RTC of Ozamis found Abellan guilty of the said crime in the criminal case,
damageswas in favor awarded to the offended parties. Abellana appealed this
decision.Likewise, the offended parties filed a separate and independent civil
action fordamages allegedly suffered by them for reckless driving of Abellana.
CrispinAbellana, as employer of Francisco was included as defendants in the
complaint.

Both Crispin and Francisco sought the dismissal of such action principally on
theground that there was no reservation for the filing thereof in the City Court
of Ozamis. They argued it was not allowable at the stage where the criminal case wasalready on
appeal.
Issue:

W/N respondent judges decision was of grave abuse of discretion?
Ruling:

Petition for Certiorari is Dismissed.

Their motion to dismiss and MR was rejected by the court, stating that,
petitionersstand was anchored on the thought that, the civil action for recovery
of civil liabilityfrom the offense charge is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, unless theoffended party reserves his right to institute it separately. The
legal proposition that a separate civil action can be legally filed and allowed by the
court only at theinstitution, or the right to file such separate civil action reserved
of waived, at suchinstitution of the criminal action, and never on appeal to the next
higher court. Thiswas the stand of the petitioners.

Such interpretation, as noted, ignores the
de novo
aspect of appealed cases from citycourts. On appeal to this court, the judgment
of the city court was vacated and a trial
de novo
will have to be conducted.

Section 7 of Rule 123 of RC, an appealed case shall be tried in all respects anew
inthe CFI as if it had been originally instituted in that court. Respondent judge
wasduly mindful of such norm



Art 33 of the Civil code states that, in cases of physical injuries, a civil action
fordamages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, maybe brought
bythe injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of
the criminalprosecution and shall require only preponderance of evidence


Paras v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)


FACTS: A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong
Barangay. The recall election was deferred due to Petitioners opposition that
under Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take place within one year from the
date of the officials assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a
regular local election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the
first Monday of May 2006, no recall may be instituted.


ISSUE: W/N the SK election is a local election.


HELD: No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its
context, and it must be considered together and kept subservient to its general
intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall
once during his term, as provided in par. (a) and par. (b). The spirit, rather than the
letter of a law, determines its construction. Thus, interpreting the phrase regular
local election to include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there
will never be a recall election rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a
statute, the Court assumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective law.
An interpretation should be avoided under which a statute or provision being
construed is defeated, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.

National Federation of Labor vs. NLRC 327 SCRA 158 (2000)Facts:
Private respondents Charlie Reith and Susie Galle Reith, general manager andowner, Patalon
Coconut Estate, was forced to sell their estate, when congresspassed, Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the ComprehensiveAgrarian Reform Law
(CARL), Operation was ceased and employees were laid off without separation pay.
Issue
: The issue is whether or not an employer that was compelled to cease itsoperation
because of the compulsory acquisition by the government of its land forpurposes of
agrarian reform, is liable to pay separation pay to its affected employees.
Held:
The closure contemplated under Article 283 of the Labor Code is a unilateraland
voluntary act on the part of the employer to close the business establishment
asmay be gleaned from the wording of the said legal provision that "The employer
may
also terminate the employment of any employee due to.The use of the word
"may,"in a statute, denotes that it is directory in nature and generally permissive
only. 10 The "plain meaning rule" or
verba legis
in statutory construction is thus applicable inthis case. Where the words of a
statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, itmust be given its literal meaning
and applied without attempted interpretation.Note
Bene: Employees were claiming separation pay on the basis of Art. 283 Labor
Codewhich states that employer MAY also terminate the employment of an
employee forreasons therein by serving notice thereof and paying separation pay
to affectedemployees There was compulsory acquisition by the government of
the employers land(Patalon Coconut Estate) for purposes of agrarian reform which
forced the employerto cease his operation Issue: whether or not employer is
liable for separation pay? Held: NO, employer is not liable for separation pay!o It
is a unilateral and voluntary act by the employer if he wants to
give separationpayo This is gleaned from the wording MAY in the
statuteo MAY denotes that it is directory in nature and
generally permissive onlyo Plain-meaning rule is applicableo To depart from
the meaning expressed by the words is to alter the statute, tolegislate and not
interpreto
Maledicta est exposition quae corrumpit textum
dangerous constructionwhich is against the text

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