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United Kingdom

Paul Cornish
Strategic culture can be understood in at least three ways. At its simplest,
strategic culture might be descriptive of organisational behaviour; "the way
that a given strategic community thinks and behaves" (Norheim-Martinsen
2011: 519). Alternatively, strategic culture could be the context within which
strategy is made; "Each country's culture shapes its attitude towards warfare"
(Towle 2009: 12). Finally, and most ambitiously, strategic culture might be
understood to be instrumental, such that a given society's culture directs and
is manifested in its strategic behaviour; "an ideational milieu which limits
behavioural choices" and with which it should be possible "to derive specific
predictions about strategic choice" (Johnston 1995: 46).
This chapter will argue that the UK experience is broadly consistent with
the descriptive and the contextual understandings of strategic culture, but
much less so with the instrumental. In the four sections which follow it will
be shown that in the UK, paradoxically, the most decisive cultural influence
upon strategy is not to have a strategic culture, at least not in the sense of a
coherent and discrete framework of ideas which is authoritative and generally
applicable, which can endure as circumstances change, which is manifested
in the behaviour of strategic actors and which has some degree of predictive
power. A notable feature of UK strategic history has been the incumbent
government's wish to retain as much political authority and initiative for as
long as possible, and to resist being pressured into action until circumstances
are at their most propitious or until the pressure to act can no longer be
resisted. In other words, in the UK culture shapes but does not direct strategy
and ultimately, as this chapter will show, strategic culture gives way to stra-
tegic initiative as the defining characteristic of the UK national strategic
process.
Level of Ambition
The UK is best understood as a medium-ranking economic and military
power with a disproportionately high level of ambition in, and a sense of
responsibility for international security policy. At times this ambition can
appear to be something of an historic artefact, and at other times largely
rhetorical. But the UK's strategic history is more than a mere artefact (as
permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council indicates, for
example) and more than rhetorical. The UK has frequently demonstrated a
willingness to become directly involved and to act; diplomatically, economi-
H. Biehl et al. (eds.), Strategic Cultures in Europe, Schriftenreihe des
Zentrums fur Militargeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-658-01168-0_29, Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2013
372 Paul Cornish

cally and militarily. Nevertheless, the gap between rhetoric (i.e. declared
ambition) and reality (i.e. the political authority and material capacity to
influence international security) can at times appear rather wide. Critics
might then accuse the UK of having an unreasonable and irritating sense of
entitlement to membership of the club of most influential nations, even
though its qualifications for membership of that club have long since lapsed.
Others might form a different view, applauding the UK for the efficient use
of its capabilities and resources for national and even international benefit.
The UK government has on several occasions congratulated itself for "punch-
ing above our weight" in international affairs; a boxer who does the same
thing is either condemned for his foolhardiness and lack of judgement, or
praised for his courage and ambition.
The most accessible guide to the UK's level of ambition in the area of in-
ternational security is to be found in official government documents and
white papers, and particularly in the UK National Security Strategy (NSS).
The UK is a recent convert to the idea of publishing a formal national securi-
ty/strategy document but has produced three editions in the past four years.
The background to the current (October 2010) version of the NSS is signifi-
cant. Two weeks after the May 2010 general election the Conservative-
Liberal Democrat coalition government published its Programme for Gov-
ernment in which it promised that a newly established National Security
Council (NSC) would "develop and publish a new National Security Stra-
tegy". The task would be undertaken while a new Strategic Defence and
Security Review (SDSR) was underway, which would also be "commis-
sioned and overseen" by the NSC (Coalition 2010a: 24). Two months later
William Hague, the new Foreign Secretary, gave useful indications as to the
scope of the exercise. Hague spoke of extending the UK's "global reach and
influence" and explained that while the forthcoming security and defence
review would be "led by the requirements of foreign policy as well as inevi-
table financial constraints", it would also be an opportunity for a "fundamen-
tal reappraisal of Britain's place in the world and how we operate within it"
(Hague 2010).
It appears that NSS 2010 was driven by a singular determination to re-
main involved in international affairs - "Britain's national interest requires us
to reject any notion of the shrinkage of our influence" - and to produce a
national strategy which "reflects the country that we want to be: a prosper-
ous, secure, modern and outward-looking nation, confident in its values and
ideas". The UK's "outlook", the document insisted, "will be characterised by
flexibility and resilience and underpinned by a firm commitment to human
rights, justice and the rule of law". NSS 2010 offered no shortage of strategic
vision and purpose: "We will use all the instruments of national power to
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prevent conflict and avert threats beyond our shores: our Embassies and High
Commissions worldwide, our international development programme, our
intelligence services, our defence diplomacy and our cultural assets." (NSS
2010b: 9f.) It is difficult to find much evidence here of limits (whether self-
imposed or circumstantial) to the UK's ambition in international security and
international affairs more broadly.
The Coalition Government presented security and defence as two sides
of the same coin; the intention was that there should be a clear and balanced
relationship between the NSS and the SDSR which was published the follow-
ing day. In a sense therefore, the UK government published its vision for
national and international security together with a mechanism for testing the
coherence and durability of that vision. That test should be how well the NSS
and SDSR fit together, and for how long. In other words, are the ends of
national strategy described in the NSS supported in an enduring fashion by
the ways and means set out in the SDSR? This is where the SDSR's Defence
Planning Assumptions (DP As) become critically important (SDSR 2010c:
18-34). The DPAs describe the type, intensity and number of military opera-
tions the government believes the Ministry of Defence (MoD) should be able
to mount. DPAs should therefore match in broad terms the strategic outlook
of the NSS. But the DPAs must also draw upon the projected size and shape
of the armed forces as laid out in the SDSR - the so-called 'Future Force'.
The DPAs are therefore the pivot point for the relationship between ambition
and strategy in the UK, and between rhetoric and reality: it is here that a
national strategic outlook and threat assessment must be met with the revised
force posture required by the SDSR. At the time of writing this chapter the
British Army's response to the SDSR - 'Army 2020' - was in the final stages
of preparation and there were indications that the Royal Navy and the Royal
Air Force would soon follow suit. Overall, it is likely that the UK's armed
forces will be smaller and less capable than envisaged in the SDSR. It is
doubtful, however, that any imbalance between the 'ways and means' of the
SDSR and the 'ends' of the NSS will result in the latter being modified. His-
torically in the UK, the national rhetoric or level of ambition has generally
been unaffected by economic and military reality.
Scope of Action for the Executive
In matters of security policy and strategy - including the commitment of
armed forces to combat operations - the scope of action for the executive
government in the UK is considerable. For centuries, the maintenance,
deployment and use of the armed forces were all included among the 'pre-
rogative powers' enjoyed by the monarch. Historically, the royal prerogative
374 Paul Cornish

amounted to an "undefined residue of power" which the sovereign "might
use for the public good" (Maer/Gay 2009: 3). Royal prerogative powers have
included such matters as the ratification of treaties, the dissolution of Parlia-
ment and the "control, organisation and disposition" of the armed forces of
the Crown, of which "the Sovereign is commander in chief' (ibid.: 4). The
royal prerogative was a remarkably open licence: not only could the monarch
choose when or indeed whether to use these powers, but it was also, implicit-
ly, for him or her to decide what was meant by "the public good".
Since the Bill of Rights in 1688 royal prerogative powers have devolved
progressively to the executive. In the political language of the early 21
st
cen-
tury it is for the Prime Minister and Cabinet of the elected government to
exercise the royal prerogative acting, as it were, on behalf of the monarch in
the pursuit of "the public good". The result is that where national strategy is
concerned the royal prerogative means that "the Government can declare war
and deploy armed forces to conflicts abroad without the backing or consent
of Parliament" (Lords 2006: 5). Peter Hennessy has hinted at the temptation
which successive governments might have experienced when they discovered
"just how convenient it was to be able to declare war under the royal prero-
gative without the formal sanction of the legislature" (Hennessy 2001: 141).
The scope of action for the executive is being progressively challenged,
however, from three directions. The first of these is the sheer complexity of
government in the UK. Particularly where security policy is concerned,
membership of the executive is not limited to the Prime Minister, one or two
Secretaries of State and the professional leaders of the armed services. The
Treasury, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the MoD, the Department
for International Development, the Department for Business and Skills, the
Home Office, the Cabinet Office and the intelligence agencies all contribute
decisively to national security policy, in one way or another. Public organisa-
tions such as the National Audit Office have an oversight role, as does Par-
liament where debates are frequently held on matters of national strategy, and
formal questions are asked of government. Several House of Commons Se-
lect Committees take a close interest in aspects of national strategy, such as
the Public Accounts, Business Innovation and Skills, Armed Forces Bill,
Treasury, Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, and International Development
Committees. As its title suggests, the House of Commons Defence Select
Committee has a particularly relevant oversight function and the Public Ad-
ministration Select Committee has recently developed a close interest in
matters of national strategy.
The second challenge comes in the form of the beginnings, in 2010, of a
more formal and transparent national strategic process in the UK. The UK
National Security Council and its head, the National Security Adviser took a
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leading role in the preparation of both NSS and SDSR. Although several
government departments co-operated in the preparation of the two docu-
ments, the Cabinet Office emerged as more of a contributor to, than co-
ordinator of the UK strategy debate. Under the Cabinet Office's auspices,
national strategy will henceforth be reviewed on a regular basis: an annual
progress report will be presented to the Joint Parliamentary Committee on the
National Security Strategy; the National Security Risk Assessment will be
refreshed every two years; and a new NSS and SDSR should be produced
every five years.
The third challenge comes in the form of the long-running campaign to
bring the royal prerogative to an end by placing its powers on a statutory
footing, making way for closer Parliamentary scrutiny and control over gov-
ernment decisions. The high point in this campaign came in March 2003
when the government of Prime Minister Tony Blair agreed to a debate (and
vote) in the House of Commons before the military intervention in Iraq be-
gan. As Blair notes in his memoirs, "We won the vote handsomely in the end,
by 412 to 149", observing that this was "the only military action expressly
agreed in advance by the House of Commons" (Blair 2010: 428f.). As it
transpired, however, the 2003 vote was a passing gesture by government and
it remained a matter of debate whether the executive should always seek
Parliamentary approval before the deployment of armed forces on operations.
As the debate stalled, so the advocates of ever closer Parliamentary scrutiny
became ever more frustrated. In 2004 the House of Commons Public Admin-
istration Select Committee made a plea which was almost desperate in its
tone: "we believe that any decision to engage in armed conflict should be
approved by Parliament, if not before military action then as soon as possible
afterwards" (PASC 2004: 16, paragraph 57). In 2010 the new Coalition Gov-
ernment introduced a number of reforms to the British constitution, including
an end to the royal prerogative to dissolve Parliament, but the executive's
power to resort to armed force was not addressed (Coalition 2010a: 26-28).
In March 2011, in response to a query from the House of Commons Political
and Constitutional Reform Committee (a new Parliamentary committee), the
Cabinet Secretary described the Coalition Government's position in the fol-
lowing terms:
the government believes that it is apparent that since the events lead-
ing up to the deployment of troops in Iraq, a convention exists that
Parliament will be given the opportunity to debate the decision to
commit troops to armed conflict and, except in emergency situations,
that debate would take place before they are committed (PCRC 2011).
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Much of the content of this passage is open to discussion. What, precisely, is
the substance of the 'convention' and how binding is it on government deci-
sion-making? If Parliament is to be 'given the opportunity' by the executive,
does that imply that the legislature's position is subordinate and/or advisory?
Equally, if the decision to commit troops has already been made, will Parlia-
ment be in the position either of approving the executive's decision ex post
facto, or of being ignored? How, finally, should 'emergency situations' be
defined? Some of these concerns were borne out in the House of Commons
debate on the deployment of armed forces to Libya under UN Security Coun-
cil Resolution 1973. The debate took place on 21 March 2011 - after the
forces had been committed - although the Foreign Secretary William Hague
did reassure the House that "We [the government] will also enshrine in law
for the future the necessity of consulting Parliament on military action"
(Hague 2011). Apparently unimpressed by this outcome, the Political and
Constitutional Reform Committee noted "an urgent need for greater clarity
on Parliament's role in decisions to commit British forces to armed conflict
abroad", recommended that the government should prepare a detailed parlia-
mentary resolution as the basis for consultation with Parliament and accepted
that William Hague's commitment to "enshrine Parliament's role in law" was
"likely to be a longer-term project" (PCRC 2011).
If the debate concerning Parliamentary involvement in strategic decision-
making is currently paused, it seems likely to proceed only in one direction:
towards closer Parliamentary oversight. Yet it seems just as unlikely that the
executive will give way on this matter. For the present, therefore, in matters
of national security policy and strategy the scope of action for the executive
remains extensive.
Foreign Policy Orientation
As the first part of this chapter suggests, the UK's foreign policy orientation
is largely unencumbered by political or geographical constraints, self-
imposed or otherwise. The UK's history is that of a global maritime trading
nation and it now considers itself, almost by right, to be a prominent and
respected stakeholder in the international system. The UK is the world's fifth
largest trading nation. Even though the UK balance of trade has long been in
deficit, the word 'trade' appears no fewer than 12 times in the 2010 National
Security Strategy and is described in that document as "the lifeblood of our
economy" (NSS 2010b: 4). Politically and diplomatically, the UK considers
itself to be a prominent and constructive contributor to those leading interna-
tional organisations of which it is a member, including the UN, the OECD,
the G20 and the EU. The UK's imperial and colonial past is now represented
United Kingdom 377

in its participation in the 54-member Commonwealth. Queen Elizabeth II is
head of the Commonwealth as well as the monarch and head of state in 16 of
those independent countries (known as 'Commonwealth Realms'). The UK
also has self-governing possessions known as 'Crown Dependencies' (the
Channel Islands and the Isle of Man) as well as 14 British Overseas Territo-
ries which are not independent and which come under UK jurisdiction. These
include Bermuda and the British Virgin Islands as well as territories which
have more obvious strategic significance such as the Falkland Islands, Gi-
braltar and two Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus.
Where national and international security policy are concerned the UK's
orientation is rather less complicated. The UK's alliance with the United
States is an enduring feature both of the national policy discourse (in the
form of a seemingly interminable discussion as to whether or not the UK has
a 'special relationship' with the US) and in more practical terms: US and UK
conventional armed forces have deployed together on operations and train
together, often using similar equipment; their respective special or elite forc-
es co-operate closely; and British armed forces do not contemplate undertak-
ing large military operations other than in association with their US allies.
Furthermore, the depth of the intelligence relationship between the two coun-
tries is unrivalled elsewhere, and the UK's submarine-based nuclear deterrent
force is the product of co-operative arrangements with the US which have
lasted for more than 50 years.
The US-UK strategic relationship colours the UK's attitude towards both
NATO and the EU's efforts in the security and defence dimension. NATO is
paramount in UK strategic thinking: SDSR 2010 notes that the UK requires
"collective security through NATO as the basis for territorial defence of the
UK, and stability of our European neighbourhood" (SDSR 2010c: 12). The
UK's expectations of the EU - as a security provider - are different. Here,
the UK requires "an outward-facing EU that promotes security and pros-
perity" (rather than defence, per se). UK attitudes towards the development
of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) have varied according
to the political complexion of the government but in general the UK's ap-
proach has been to encourage the European effort in order to strengthen the
Atlantic alliance rather than to compete with it. The UK has been consistent
in its demand that any EU strategic effort should be inter-governmental and
should add value to the Euro-Atlantic strategic relationship rather than dupli-
cate it. In short, if the CSDP can encourage European members of NATO to
spend more on defence or to collaborate more effectively, then it will have
the support of the UK.
In the UK outlook, the relationship between NATO and the EU has been
uneasy, at best. In November 2010, however, an initiative was taken which
378 Paul Cornish

offers the possibility of a more efficient, and less fractious combination of
Atlanticism and Europeanism in the field of security and defence. Signed at
Lancaster House in London, the Anglo-French bilateral treaties on co-
operation in security and defence, which will run for 50 years, are evidence
of vastly improving relations between France and the UK. This bilateral rap-
prochement reflects similarities in the strategic posture adopted by both coun-
tries as well as deepening mutual respect among security and defence offi-
cials and military commanders. The UK was a valued adviser, for example,
in the preparation of the 2008 French White Paper on Defence; a gesture
which would have been unthinkable until very recently.
The first of the two treaties, a 'Declaration on Defence and Security Co-
operation', provides a broad framework for military and security co-operation
between the two countries. Naval co-operation will be enhanced and a Com-
bined Joint Expeditionary Force will be established, involving about 5,000
troops from each country, trained to operate together under either a British or
a French commander. The CJEF could undertake bilateral Franco-British
missions or could be deployed on behalf of either NATO or the EU. The
second treaty concerned Anglo-French nuclear co-operation, involving the
sharing of knowledge on nuclear weapon design and joint simulated testing
of nuclear warheads at the UK Atomic Weapons Research Establishment at
Aldermaston and the French Commissariat a l'energie atomique et aux ener-
gies alternatives at Valduc in Burgundy. The two governments also agreed to
launch a study into the joint development of some aspects of nuclear subma-
rine technology. For the present however, the treaty stopped short of a com-
mitment to merge the two countries' submarine-based independent nuclear
deterrent forces.
The Anglo-French treaties of 2010 have to be seen in the context both of
the uneasy relationship between NATO and the EU and, more significantly,
of the increasing frustration on the part of the United States at the apparent
inability of its European allies to contribute much to the Alliance in the way
of military and expeditionary capability. The Anglo-French agreements could
inject life back into the transatlantic security partnership. But they could also,
conversely, reduce the flow of oxygen to the CSDP. The Anglo-French trea-
ties are emphatically bilateral and intergovernmental, and they also promise
to deliver hard results in a relatively short period; almost the polar opposite
(in the UK view) of the CSDP programme.
United Kingdom 379

Willingness to Use Military Force
Since 1945 Britain's armed forces have been deployed in significant numbers
to as many as two dozen medium- to large-scale operations, nationally and
internationally, as well as special forces operations and countless less com-
plex military tasks. These deployments have covered a very wide variety of
military undertakings: peacekeeping, non-combatant evacuation, counter-
terrorism, counter-insurgency, policing, counter-piracy, air exclusion, search
and rescue, the delivery of humanitarian aid, disaster relief, special forces
commitments and full-scale armed conflict at sea, on land and in the air. With
so much military activity it is perhaps not surprising that since 1945 there has
only been one year - 1968 - when a British serviceman or woman has not
been killed on operations.
With so much recent military experience, and of such diversity, the UK
can scarcely be said to have been reluctant as far as the willingness to use
armed force is concerned. But neither can there be said to be an unconstrai-
ned acceptance in the UK that military force can be an instrument of security
policy. There are three principal reasons for this, the first of which concerns
the level of defence spending.
UK defence spending in 2012 amounts to some 39 billion, placing the
UK third in the world behind the United States and China. This figure is
being reduced, however, as the result of the 2010 spending review in which it
was decided that the defence budget would be cut by 8 percent over a four
year period ending in 2015. Defence spending is also facing other pressures.
In 2006 the government's estimate of the cost of the replacement of the Tri-
dent submarine fleet was 20 billion. Following the government's decision
in 2010 to cover that cost from the main defence budget, a proportion of that
sum will be payable from the defence account by 2015. The UK defence
equipment programme is also assessed to be over-committed by some
38 billion over the ten year period from 2010, making it unlikely that an
8 percent reduction will be sufficient. Finally, those government departments
which experienced deep cuts in 2010 are likely to argue that defence spend-
ing, which escaped relatively lightly in their view, should be cut still more
deeply in the next Comprehensive Spending Review. The financial climate
makes it unlikely, therefore, that the term 'unconstrained' will appear in UK
security and defence policy and planning for the foreseeable future.
The UK's propensity to commit armed force is also influenced by the
development of a more integrated approach to international security. The
integrated (or, formerly, the 'comprehensive') approach is concerned in par-
ticular with the prevention, management and resolution of tensions and com-
plex crises. Military effort alone is unlikely to offer a durable solution to
380 Paul Cornish

complex security challenges and the pace and style of any response will be
determined by the interplay of a number of perspectives; diplomatic, eco-
nomic, developmental, military and even cultural. The UK position was em-
phasised in the 2010 SDSR, in the foreword to which Prime Minister David
Cameron indicated that the task of the 'integrated approach' would be "to
identify risks early and treat the causes, rather than having to deal with the
consequences". Cameron went on to argue that "our approach recognises that
when we fail to prevent conflict and are obliged to intervene militarily, it
costs far more". Subsequently, in the main body of the SDSR the government
set out a view which, rather in the manner of the just war tradition, comes
close to a policy of 'last resort' where the use of armed force is concerned:
We will be more selective in our use of the Armed Forces, deploying
them decisively at the right time but only where key UK national in-
terests are at stake; where we have a clear strategic aim; where the
likely political, economic and human costs are in proportion to the
likely benefits; where we have a viable exit strategy; and where justi-
fiable under international law. (SDSR 2010c: 3, 17)
The SDSR also acknowledged the role of the NSC in bringing together the
various strands of the UK's integrated approach to international security. A
significant part of the NSC's work would be the management of a risk-based
approach to international security policy, as set out in the 2010 NSS. The
NSS reproduced some of the findings of the new National Security Risk
Assessment, in the form of a set of 'priority risks' presented in three 'tiers'.
Conventional military threats and responses do not have the highest priority
in this new methodology, suggesting another constraint on the recourse to
armed force. Tier One risks to the UK include international terrorism, cyber
attacks, major accidents and natural hazards and, finally, "an international
military crisis between states, drawing in the UK". It is only the last of these
which could be an exclusively military task, although this scenario does not
appear to envisage a direct attack on the UK. It is only in Tier Three - the
lowest priority risks - that the more traditional military tasks are to be found,
including a conventional attack on the UK by another state, a conventional
attack on another NATO or EU member "to which the UK would have to
respond", and "an attack on a UK overseas territory" (NSS 2010b: 27).
The final set of constraints on military activity by - or, rather, in -
the UK concern the relationship between the armed forces, government and
society. By one view: "In the United Kingdom, political control over the
armed forces was established as a principle some centuries ago and, unusual-
ly even for Western Europe, has never been seriously challenged." (Broad-
bent 1998: 4) Others have settled on military professionalism as the decisive
United Kingdom 381

restraint on the behaviour of Britain's armed forces. Harries-Jenkins, for
example, describes the professional military officer as being "above all, obe-
dient and loyal to the authority of the state, competent in military expertise,
dedicated to using his skill to provide for the security of the state, and politi-
cally and morally neutral" (Harries-Jenkins 1990: 121). Similarly, Keegan
writes of the "political docility" of the British army which he sees as
"famously unpolitical", citing the strength of small-unit (i.e. regimental)
cohesion as a factor limiting the development of esprit d'armee and conse-
quently of unconstitutional raison d'armee (Keegan 1987: 2-9; Hackett
1983: 9ff.). A third explanation for the supposedly apolitical tradition among
Britain's armed forces is that the British Army - the service considered most
likely to intervene in domestic politics - was for much of recent history simp-
ly preoccupied elsewhere (Howard 1957: 14; Bond 1963).
Since 1945 Britain's armed forces have not intervened in the most direct
and overt manner imaginable in the government of the United Kingdom
- there have been no coups d'etat. Nevertheless, not all critics would accept
this as evidence of the 'politically neutral', 'apolitical', or 'famously unpoli-
tical' character of Britain's armed forces. Military leaders have often occu-
pied prominent and highly influential positions in society, both while serving
in the armed forces and after retirement. In some cases, the most distin-
guished officers have been awarded life (and even hereditary) peerages, giv-
ing them a role in the country's legislature, while others have taken executive
or advisory roles in commercial enterprises.
Another explanation for the relatively ordered relationship between
armed forces, government and society in the UK is to be found in the deve-
lopment of the 'Military Covenant'. During the 1990s British armed forces
were involved in a series of conflicts and operations, of varying intensity. At
that time it appeared that the relationship between society and its armed forc-
es was becoming less certain and more complex. It was perhaps not surpris-
ing, therefore, that the British Army chose to mark the beginning of the new
century with the publication in 2000 of a doctrinal statement which has be-
come known as the Military Covenant. The Military Covenant is brief and
straightforward and is reproduced here in full:
The Military Covenant is the mutual obligation between the Nation,
the Army and each individual soldier; an unbreakable common bond
of identity, loyalty and responsibility which has sustained the Army
throughout its history.
Soldiers will be called upon to make personal sacrifices - including
the ultimate sacrifice - in the service of the Nation. In putting the
needs of the Nation and the Army before their own, they forego some
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of the rights enjoyed by those outside the Armed Forces. In return.
British soldiers must always be able to expect fair treatment, to be
valued and respected as individuals, and that they (and their families)
will be sustained and rewarded by commensurate terms and conditions
of service.
In the same way the unique nature of military land operations means
that the Army differs from all other institutions, and must be sustained
and provided for accordingly by the Nation. This mutual obligation
forms the Military Covenant between the Nation, the Army and each
individual soldier; an unbreakable common bond of identity, loyalty
and responsibility which has sustained the Army throughout its
history.
It has perhaps its greatest manifestation in the annual commemoration
of Armistice Day, when the Nation keeps covenant with those who
have made the ultimate sacrifice, giving their lives in action. (British
Army 2010)
The Military Covenant clearly makes demands on society on behalf of the
armed forces. What is most significant is the level at which the document
articulates the relationship between society and its armed forces. In this short
document it is telling that 'soldier' or 'soldiers' are used four times, 'indivi-
dual' or 'individuals' three times, and 'personal' once. What the Military
Covenant describes, therefore, is a relationship between society and indivi-
duals - with members of the armed forces regarded and valued as people, to
whom a duty of care is owed. The document thus has the sense of a social
contract between parties by which, among other things, the recourse to armed
force should be subject to rigorous assessment to ensure that badly planned,
under-equipped or unnecessarily risky military operations will be avoided.
Conclusion
Paradoxically, the prevailing cultural norm in the UK national strategic de-
bate is that policy and decisions should not be governed or directed by a
strategic culture - at least not in the most ambitious sense discussed in the
opening paragraph of this chapter. There is, instead, an historical predispo-
sition in the UK to pragmatism and initiative in matters of national strategy
and, particularly in times of deepening fiscal constraints, to an approach
which can best be described as "muddling through" (Cornish 2010: 25-27).
As each of the four sections of this chapter has shown, national strategy in
United Kingdom 383

the UK is also cautious and conservative, and an often impenetrably elite
occupation.
For a middle-ranking power, the UK's level of ambition in international
security policy could scarcely be higher. But this ambition is attributable
more to history and tradition - and to an acquired, often unquestioned and
occasionally even romantic self-image - than to the conscious thought and
rational behaviour of the national strategic elite. The cultural dimension to
this outlook is more contextual than constructed, in other words. Further-
more, the cultural context against which UK strategy is formed is powerfully
enduring and is resistant to political, economic and military change. This
resistance can be explained in part by the considerable scope of action en-
joyed by the executive in matters of national strategy. This will change - as
the machinery of government becomes ever more complex and as the royal
prerogative comes under increasing pressure - but change will occur slowly
and incrementally.
In terms of security policy and strategy the UK's foreign policy orienta-
tion is to remain very closely allied to the United States. At the level of the
two key European security institutions - NATO and the EU - the UK's in-
stinctive preference is for the former, in which the US is the leading member.
The UK's relationship with the US and its support for NATO are under-
pinned by a long-standing insistence that security and defence policy are
matters for governments to decide, individually and then jointly, rather than
institutions. The UK's security and defence policy orientation, in all its fac-
ets, is seen most eloquently in the 2010 Lancaster House treaties between
France and the UK. Finally, while the UK has clearly been willing to resort to
armed force in a wide variety of ways and in many different circumstances,
that willingness has not been unconstrained. What is most significant howev-
er, at least for the purposes of this chapter, is that constraints on the recourse
to armed force are explained more by budgetary restrictions, and by the de-
velopment of the comprehensive/integrated approach (itself, in part, a conse-
quence of financial stringency), than by the direction of a national cultural
mood. Where culture does have a direct effect on military matters in the UK
is in the form of the Military Covenant - described here as a social contract
between armed forces, government and society. What is telling here is that
the effect is felt at the personal (or tactical) level of the individual member of
the armed forces, rather than at the level of national strategy.
All strategic decisions, actions and behaviours are inextricably embedded
in the national culture from which they spring. But in the case of the United
Kingdom, while culture certainly provides the context for national strategy,
the relationship between cultural context and national strategy is kept in an
immature, underdeveloped and largely non-instrumental state. With the
384 Paul Cornish

Military Covenant in mind, where the preparation, deployment and use of
armed force are concerned the United Kingdom might at best be said to have
a tactical rather than a strategic culture.
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