Facts: Lam Hock, offended party, who according to the medical certificate issued on April 10, 1968 by Dr. Rogelio Zulueta was confined since April 8, 1968 to present due to head injury. Rodrigo Yorac, defendant-appellee, was charged with slight physical injuries before the City Court of Bacolod; pleaded guilty on April 16 resulting in his being penalized to suffer 10 days of arresto menor. He then started serving his sentence. On April 18, the provincial fiscal filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, charging the same defendant with frustrated murder arising from the same act against the aforesaid victim Lam Hock upon another medical certificate dated April 17 issued by the same doctor. On June 10, a motion to quash was filed by defendant on the ground that he has been previously convicted of slight physical injuries and having already served the penalty imposed on him for the very same offense, the prosecution for frustrated murder arising out of the same act committed against the same offended party, the crime of slight physical injuries necessarily being included in that of frustrated murder, he would be placed in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense. Judge Alampay, relying on the ruling of People v. Buling, granted the motion to quash and ordered the dismissal of the criminal case of frustrated murder against the accused. A motion for reconsideration being unavailing, an appeal was elevated to the SC.
Issue: WoN the decision of Judge Alampay to grant the motion to quash and to dismiss the criminal case of frustrated murder against accused is correct.
Held: The Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE. The X-ray examination discloses the existence of a fracture on January 17, 1957, that fracture must have existed when the first examination was made on December 10, 1956. There is therefore, no supervening fact that could be said to have developed or arisen since the filing of the original action, which would justify the application of the rule in the case of Melo vs. People and People vs. Manolong for which reason we are constrained to apply the general rule of double jeopardy. The Court attribute the new finding of fracture, which evidently lengthened the period of healing of the wound, to the very superficial and inconclusive examination made on December 10, 1956. Had an X-ray examination been taken at the time, the fracture would have certainly been disclosed. The wound causing the delay in healing was already in existence at the time of the first examination, but said delay was, caused by the very superficial examination then made.
ORIGIN AND PURPOSE According to Justice Laurel, the Constitution provision, "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, finds its origin from the days when sanguinary (brutal/gruesome) punishments were frequently resorted to by despots. A defendant in a criminal case should therefore, be adjudged either guilty or not guilty and thereafter left alone in peace. It is in that sense that the right against being twice put in jeopardy is considered as possessing many features in common with the rule of finality in civil cases. For the accused is given assurance that the matter is closed, enabling him to plan his, future accordingly, protecting him from continued distress, not to mention saving both him and the state from the expenses incident to redundant litigation. There is likewise the observation that this constitutional guarantee helps to equalize the adversary capabilities of two grossly mismatched litigants, a poor and impecunious defendant hardly in a position to keep on shouldering the costs of a suit.
THE SAME OFFENSE (People v. Tarok; Section 9, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court) The conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for any offense not only necessarily therein included but which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
REEXAMINED: THE SAME OFFENSE (Melo v. People) The rule of identity does not apply, however, when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. Stated differently, if after the first prosecution "a new fact supervenes on which defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the character of the crime and giving rise to a new and distinct offense, "the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense." In the Melo ruling, there was a reiteration of what was so emphatically asserted by Justice Laurel in the Tarok case in these words: "As the Government cannot begin with the highest, and then down step by step, bringing the man into jeopardy for every dereliction included therein, neither can it begin the lowest and ascend to the highest with precisely the same result."
INDISPENSIBLE REQUIREMENT: EXISTENCE OF A NEW FACT The indispensable requirement of the existence of "a new fact which supervenes for which the defendant is responsible" changing the character of the crime imputed to him and together with the facts existing previously constituting a new and distinct offense.