East European Revolution of 1989: Lessons for Democratic Social Movements (And Socialists?

)
Author(s): Andre Gunder Frank
Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 25, No. 5 (Feb. 3, 1990), pp. 251-255+257-258
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
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doing work on issues specitic to India. The
money could also be used for introducing
safety features like the laminated windshield
in Maruti cars. Another possibility would
be to substitute the Nlaruti 1000 body in the
Maruti 800 and stop selliing the old tiny
model. The new Maruti 800 would be safer
(being bigger) and roomier.
The National Front government has to
show that it means business by taking tough
decisions on issues like the Maruti 1000.
These would be symbolic decisions and send
clear signals to the non-yuppies in India that
they can trust this government. If clear
signals are not given that society in India
cannot be fragmented any more, the upper
class will be emboldened into becoming even
more hedonistic and parasitic. It will make
even stronger demands tor resources being
diverted for production ot goods which only
a tiny minority can afford to use. Production
of such goods will then become politically
necessary even at thC expcnse of survival of
the poor.
It is assumed that the production and
possession of these goods wsill automnaticallN
make us rpeotahlcl. \\'W don't really worry
about comparing \% hat ought to be thile more
imllpor-tant aspccts o() life-hUiman rights,
civil rights, equalKit , h1Ope alld taith t'or our
people. 'T'his is 01 crse puIttiu a miore
generous interpretatiotn ou the i-notix es of' the
powcrful.
It is the nmore simitetr explanation which
is cause for worrv. 'h'l ric in this Countrv
have now little commnilitimieint to the countrv.
If the nation cannot give them what they
deserve as 'hard working' andi highly educated
individuals then they say that they really
have no choice but to emigrate. Af'ter all they
must "give the best opportunities to their
children"! An IIT graduate complains that
India does not of'fer the salaries, equipment
and jobs he deserves so hie can best serve
humanity by pursuing his interests in the US.
This model has been absorbed by the elite
in general. If you cannot go abroad then you
can at least create a little Ainerica here. But
the only way possible to do this is to hold
the society to ransom bn demanding tech-
nologv transit'ers.
East European Revolution of 1989
Lessons for Democratic Social Movements
(and Socialists?)
Andre Ctunder Franlk
The developmenits in Easterni Europe call for reappraisal of several
widely held theories and deeply felt ideologies of socialisfn, social
democracy and social movements and offer at least a dozen
imnportant lessons.
THE course and speed of events in Eastern
Europe, which have surprised everyone in-
cluding their protagonists, cry out for an
agonising reappraisal. We must reappraise
several widely held theories and deeply felt
ideologies of socialism, of course, but also
about democracy and/or social democracy
and the role of social movements in both.
Moreover, both the economic causes and
consequences of these socio-political pro-
cesses merit more attention than they usually
receive in the euphoric reception which the
revolution of 1989 has so far received. Their
analysis offers at least a dozen important
lessons, whose key words are emboldened
below. Hopefully, they can also embolden
us all to face and act in the future.
(1) The role of social movements in
initiating and carrying these events was
perhaps greater than ever before. The role
of participatory social movements in social
transformation requires reappraisal. Our
previous writings about social movements
referred to the ones in the East as pluri-class
based, but said little more than that they are
growing massively and rapidly. The pluri-
class participation in social movements
seems to have continued in the East, while
in the West participants are drawn predomi-
nantly from the middle class, especially the
intelligentsia, and in the South social move-
ments include these but are predominantly
popular/working class based (Fuentes and
Frank 1989, Frank and Fuentes 1990). In the
East, leadership in the social movements has
also been drawn from the intelligentsia, but
participation seems also to have included
people from other middle class backgrounds,
as well as masses of working class people.
As elsewhere also, women have participated
more massively and in more important posi-
tions in these n.w social movements. This
social composition of the movements may
also help account for their less hierarchical
and more anti-authoritarian character than
the more traditional institutions whose
power and legitimacy they challenged. This
class and gender composition of the social
movements and their participation beyond
all expectations in social transformation in
Eastern Europe and parts of the Soviet
Union now demands further analysis.
(2) The peaceful character of the momen-
tous social movements and political transfor-
mations in 1989 in Eastern Europe merits
special attention. That is, the movements
themselves were deliberately peaceful, and
little or no force of arms was used to repress
them except in Rumania. There armed
repression by the securitate was successfully
countered by the army, which took the peo-
ple's side in a (largely spontaneous?) uprising.
Not only the role of the army, but also the
spontaneity and suddenness of this popular
uprising in Rumania, should be distiiiguish-
ed from the social movements elsewhere in
Eastern Europe. These had much longer,
deeper, and more organisational roots in the
churches in East Germany, Carta 77 in
Czechoslovakia, a multitude of peace and
environmental movements (n Hungary, and
of course Solidarnosc and the Catholic
Church in Poland. Bulgaria, perhaps, was
between these and Rumania. In the Russian
parts of the Soviet Union, social movements
and a multiplicity of 'clubs' have also been
playing major roles in promoting perestroika
and glasnost. Indeed, to permit 'his' perest-
roika and glasnost to progress, Mikhail Gor-
bachev has had to appeal over the heads of
his own party to social movement mobilisa-
tion of people both outside and inside the
party. The efficacy of all these (different
kinds of) peaceful social movements in pro-
moting social transformation requires
reevaluation.
(3) The demand for democracy was and
is so far-reaching and deep-going as to ex-
pand the meaning of democracy itself. We
must advance beyond parliamentary political
and state economic democracy, also include
'civil democracy' in civil society. That is,
democratic participation and demands in-
clude, but also extend far beyond, the institu-
tional confines of parliamentary political
democracy and of economic democracy, e g,
through the rejection of the corruption and
privileges of the nomenclatura. Street level
and local democratic participation and par-
ticipatory democracy expresses itself through
a myriad of other (e g, church) institutional,
more and less organisational, and even spon-
taneous and rapidly changing forms. Our
understanding of democracy, therefore, also
requires revision and extension.
(4) The role of party politics is downgrad-
ed, at least relatively, by these peaceful social
movements and their demands for demo-
cracy. Many movements and their members
reject and/or redefine exclusive or principal
reliance on party politics. Not only do they
mobilise and organise people and their
demands also through other mobilisational
and institutional forms. The movements are
also consciously and explicitly 'anti-party'.
Of course, they are especially against the
Communist Party; but they also reject
(becoming) any other party. Several social
movements reject(ed) transforming them-
selves into political parties after achieving
their immediate goals of liberation. At a na-
tional activist meeting of Neues Forutn in
East Germany, 80 per cent of those present
were against transforming the movement in-
to a party for the coming national electionis.
Czechoslovakia's Civic Forum has a 'loose
organisation' with "no master plan, no by-
laws, and its strategy is not drafted by paid(
consultants" (New York Tinmes, Iiwrntwa-
tional Herald 7ribune, December 7, 1989).
A founder of the Left Alternative in Hunzgary
declares that it iS "a theoretical tenldency, not
Economic and Political Weekly February 3, 1990
251
a party. On the contrary it is an anti-party
organisation from the base of the society"
(International Viewpoint, December 11,
1989, p 13).
However, the movement membership in-
cludes people who were or still are in (even
Communist) parties; and the movements ex-
pect some of their members to become ac-
tive in new parties-but as individuals. The
organisational independence of the move-
ments, qua movements, was fought for too
hard and is too precious to be easily sacrific-
ed to party political demands and exigen-
cies. On the contrary, the movements are
very conscious of the contribution they
must, and can only, make to democracy as
social movements, and not as, or at least in
addition to, political parties.
(5) Nationalism and ethnicity were also
factors in all social movements in Eastern
Europe. Nationalism (if only against "the
Russians") and ethnic issues helped mobilise
people into and in all of these social move-
ments and then to define some of their
demands. In the Baltic republics of the
Soviet Union, nationalism is perhaps the
major force in and of the social movements
and their demands. Other ethnic, national
and religious differences and demands are
mobilising people against Soviet power and
against each other in ethnic/nationalist
(social?) movements in the Transcaucasian
and Central Asian regions of the Soviet
Union. Of course, each of these movements
is as different from the other as each ethnici-
ty and nation, and their circumstances are
unique. Moreover, the ethnic and nationalist
demands of the moment are very much in-
fluenced by each group's more and less
privileged or underprivileged class and
geo/political/economic position of domi-
nance or subordination, and by recent
changes in these, of which more below.
Many of the more nationalist and ethnic
based movements include, or even prioritise,
demands for 'national' state power. These
demands also distinguish them from other
social movements, which do not aspire to
state power, of which also more below.
(6) The problem of state power poses a
difficult and partly novel challenge to the
social movements and their relation with
political parties and the state. The revolu-
tions of 1989 in Eastern Europe were made
by largely peaceful social mover. ents that
sought and achieved the downfall of govern-
ments and crumbling of state power, which
they mostly did not want to replace them-
selves. In the face of political state power
vacuums, East European social movements
have found themselves 'obliged' to (re)orga-
nise to exercise state power. Lech Walesa
declared that the greatest error Solidarnosc
ever made was to take over the government
in Poland; but "it had no choice"' he said.
Neues Forum in East Germany and Civic
Forum in Czechoslovakia resist becoming
parties, but they have to intervene in
rebuilding and running the state anyway.
Some of the social movements' membership
must adopt a sort of 'double militancy' one
in the movement and another in a political
party. The leading Czech (movement) dissi-
dent, Vaclav Havel, became state president.
Indeed, the most urgent political problem
after 'liberation' is widely presented as what
to do about the state. Worries abound at
home and abroad that the state is crumbling
in East Germany, has already done so in
Rumania, and God forbid, threatens to do
so in the Soviet Union armed to the teeth
with nuclear weapons. Who will be 'respon-
sible' for managing the nuclear button in the
no longer responsible superpower, or who
even will keep 'public order' on the streets
of East Berlin and Bucharest? The fear for
stability is expressed abroad. (For East
Berlin, Four Power control has been propos-
ed as a 'solution' abroad while for Moscow
the only one offered is a prayer for Gor-
bachev.) At home, however, the dilemma
presents itself in more practical terms. If 'we'
do not act to assume positions of power or
at least to support our allies who have or
want some, then others will so act and/or
support our enemies. Thus, liberation or
not, the 'liberating' social movements are
obliged in one way or another more to con-
form to existing (state) institutions than to
reform them. The hope for more civil demo-
cracy lies in new social movements to replace
old ones that succumb to existing institutions
and their own institutionalisation by them.
The institutionalisation of movements in-
to parties and state power is nothing new
elsewhere, of course. Many political parties
started as social movements, and some end-
ed up managing, or even becoming indistin-
guishable from, state power. The now
60-year long all (state) powerful Mexican
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)
even incorporates this transition into its
name. Indeed, some Communist parties in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and
elsewhere could be said also to have begun
life as a social movement, albeit more of the
'old' petit bourgeois led 'working class' kind.
Even so, they or their 'leader' ended up as
'I'etat, c'est mnois'
The conflict between 'fundi' (fundamen-
talist movement goals and procedures) and
'realo' (realist party organisation and state
power compromises), which is splitting the
Green Movement/party in West Germany,
is also built into the external (and perhaps
internal) circumstances of the social
movements in Eastern Europe. Thus, econo-
mic, political and other exigencies may pusb
or pull the social movements in Eastern
Europe in the directions of state power-
and the compromises of principle as well as
the political cost of failure against impossi-
ble economic and other odds. In Poland,
Solidarnosc now has to push the bitter IMF
medicine and shock treatment down its
members' throats. Nationalist and some
ethnic movements, however, often aspire to
'independent' national/ethnic state power of
their own and/or seek to share it in their
ethnic neighbour state, with which they want
amalgamation. Hardly any of them seem to
consider their own weakness in the face of
and to resolve the same economic crisis,
which gave rise to and still propels their
movements in the first place.
(7) The economic crisis has been expanding
and deepening in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union. The economic crisis and re-
lated economic factors contributed material-
ly to the desire and ability of these social
(and also ethnic/nationalist) movements to
mobilise so many people at this time for such
far-reaching political ends. The decade of the
1980s, indeed beginning in the mid-1970s, is
now called 'the period of stagnation' in the
Soviet Union and generated accelerating
economic crisis and absolute deterioration
of living standards in most of Eastern
Europe (as also in Latin America, Africa
and some other parts of the world, vide
Frank 1988). Significantly especially in
Eastern Europe, this period also spelled an
important deterioration and retrocession in
its relative competitive standing and stan-
dards of living compared to Western Europe
and, even to the newly industrialising coun-
tries (NICs) in East Asia. Moreover, the
course and (mis)management of the econo-
mic crisis generated shifts in positions of
dominance or privilege and dependency or
exploitation among countries, sectors, and
different social, including gender, and ethnic
groups within the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe. All of these economic changes and
pressures generated or fuelled social discon-
tent, demands, and mobilisation, which ex-
presses themselves through enlivened social
(and ethnic/nationalist) movements-with a
variety of similarities and differences among
them. It is well known that economically
based resentment is fed by the loss of 'ac-
customed' absolute standards of living as a
whole or in particular items and by related
relative shifts in economic welfare among
population groups. Most economic crises are
polarising, further enriching, relatively if not
also absolutely, the better off; and further
impoverishing both relatively and absolutely
those who were already worse off, including
especially women.
This change may also generate resent-
ments and mobilisation in both groups. The
less privileged mobilise to defend their
livelihood and its ravage by 'the system' and
by those who benefit from it through cor-
ruption or otherwise. Among identifiable
ethnic groups, these include Turks in
Bulgaria, Hungarians in Rumania, Gypsies
and others in Hungary, Albanians in Serbia,
Serbians in Yugoslavia, Bohemians in
Czechoslovakia, Azerbaijanis and a host of
others in the Soviet Union, who among
other problems have recently been plauged
by massive unemployment. However, the
more privileged also develop resentments
against the 'system', which obliges the richer
to 'carry' or 'subsidise' at their own 'exDense'
their 'good for nothing' 'lazy' poorer
neighbours. Morever, .these more privileged
groups see even greener pastures for them-
selves on the other side of some socialist/
capitalist or other border. Among these are
many Russians, Armenians and others in the
Soviet Union and especially the Estonians,
Latvians and Lithuanians. They also include
the Slovenians and to a lesser extent the
252 Economic and Political Weekly February 3, 1990
Croatians in Yugoslavia, and of course many
Germans in the GDR, whose eyes and even
feet are turned toward the economic magnet
in the West. (Under) privileged or not where
they now are, thousands of 'ethnic Germans'
in the Soviet Union, Poland and Rumania
suddenly discover their age-old deep-down
feeling of Germanity and their desire to par-
take of the German miracle in the Federal
Republic. The population at large, beyond
its particular(ist) ethnic, national, and other
groups, also mobilises, or at least is more
readily mobilisable, in support of demands,
which groups out of increasing economically
based resentments. However, these demands
easily become politicised to extend to and
be expressed by the participatory exercise of
economic, political and civil democracy, not
to mention (again) the ethnic and nationalist
demands into which they can also be easily
reformulated. These recently augmented
economic(ally based) resentments through-
out Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are
an indisputably major factor in generating
(and accounting for) the widespread popular
mobilisation through social (and ethnic/na-
tionalist) movements here and now.
.(8) However, strategic and political
changes prepared new world and regional
political circumstances, which also helped
the social movements initiate, proceed with
and succeed so far with their social mobilisa-
tion and political demands. Particularly im-
portant in Eastern Europe was the abroga-
tion of the Brezhnev doctrine. Indeed,
perhaps Gorbachev turned the Brezhnev
doctrine on its head to exert pressure for
political and economic change in Eastern
Europe. For instance, the Hungarian Foreign
Minister consulted the Soviet ambassador
and received his nod of approval before
opening the border with Austria, which
unlocked the floodgates from East Germany.
During his visit to East Germany, Gorbachev
literally implanted the kiss of death on the
cheek of Erich Honecker and then signalled
that an armed repression of the October 9
rally in Leipzig would be unacceptable (some
reports have it that he even threatened to
place locally stationed Soviet troops between
the demonstrators and any threatened East
German state attack on them).
* In the Soviet Union itself, of course,
perestroika and and glasnost have paved the
way for the mobilisation of the social (and
ethnic/nationalist) movements; and these in
turn are both a necessary mobilising factor
to promote perestroika and glasnost, and a
threat to the same if they 'get out of hand'.
Poland and China. already demonstrated
that perestroika is subject to severely limited
and possibly counterproductive without
glasnost political reform; while the Hungarian
example demonstrated that they can and
must go hand in hand, at least so far. In-
deed perhaps also considering this experi-
ence abroad, Gorbachev himself has
clarified how glasnost is a sine qua non of
successful perestroika in the Soviet Union.
And successful perestroika is a sine qua non
for the Soviet Union to maintain any kind
of power, let alone 'superpower' status in the
competitive world political economy. Perhaps
paradoxically therefore, political abrogation
of the Brezhnev doctrine and some 'libera-
tion' of the Soviet Union from its economic
burdens in Eastern Europe are also political
economic imperatives for the maintenance
of strategic security and the promotion of
economic development in the Soviet Union
today.
In short, these political and strategic
.hanges are an important countributory con-
ditioning and permissive factor for all these
social movements' mobilisation and success
so far. Moreover, the world economic crisis
and its particular manifestations in the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are con-
tributing factors directly through their
generation of economically based resent-
ments, and also indirectly through the
economic imperatives they pose for the
political changes, which make these social
movements and their relative success possi-
ble so far. Of course, the importance of these
economic, political and strategic circum-
stances invites further elucidation.
(9) Early euphoria masks some bitter
realities. The euphoria of democratic suc-
cess and the honeymoon of liberation has
relegated all these economic processes and
polarising problems to the last baggage car
of the popular express train. Its locomotive
seems to run on political steam alone, and
it is fuelled or even pushed along by the
social movements in or from the overflowing
passenger cars. The press in particular, and
all the more so in the West, depicts almost
the whole process as a jubilant joy ride to
freedom and democracy. And so it is no
doubt, but not that alone. The dc&nomic
structure, process and problems is not
transformed by political euphoria alone.
The bitter reality of worsening economic
privation daily impresses itself on the
population very much so in Poland and
much of Yugoslavia; less so but also in
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and East
Germany; and every day much more so in
the Soviet Union. Rumania enjoys only a
temporary respite from the ravages of food
exports but the other problems will soon
follow. Few people in their populations may
know, or care to calculate, the importance
of the economic reality, which underlies and
guides the directions of this political train
like the railroad tracks and switches, as well
as the roadbed underlying them, direct or
at least limit the movement of the train.
Many people, nonetheless, are acutely
aware of the economic processes and con-
sequences, which accompany the political
changes brought on by these social move-
ments. In Poland already and threateningly
elsewhere, it is as if the bulky economic bag-
gage is relentlessly moving forward through
the train, displacing more and more of the
social movement passengers along the way.
As a result, the anger of the passengers
is
increasingly displaced from political oppres-
sion to economic privation. The passengers'
anger is also diverted against each other,
against the more privileged passengers and
cars farther in front (and by them against
those in back who are only 'useless weight'
to pull along), and by almost all the
passengers and crew against the locomotive,
the station masters, and perhaps against the
whole railroad system. Of course and rightly
so, every passen-ger wsill insist oni using the
newly won democracy and the associated
social movements to have his/her say on
these matters of vital concern. Many
passengers may soon wish to lend new
(social movement) support to some populist
novice train driver who promises them final
deliverance, especially from unwanted other
passengers. The Serbian leader Milosevic
and his support offers an already sufficiently
terrifying example. Ethnic and national(ist)
cars may well soon be detached from the
train in Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and
perhaps elsewhere. The forward cars in the
Baltics, Slovenia and East Germany may
find looser or firmer attachment to other
more Westerly directed locomotives. What
alternative political economic tracks, if any,
or more likely sidings, may be available to
the more rearward cars is harder to say.
Thus the very social movements, which
first served as vehicles of liberation, could
then threaten the same political democratic
processes they themselves launched. Indeed,
in the throes of economic and political crisis,
derivative or other social movements could
become vehicles of ethnic, nationalist, and
class strife and rivalries-with unforeseeable
consequences, which could include dicta-
torial populist backlashes against the newly
won democracy.
(10) A historical comparison of the revolu-
tions and their social (but not nationalist)
movements of 1789, 1848, 1917, 1968 and
1989 (and some comparative reflections on
the place and role of Russia) may be in order.
This can put the revolution of 1989 into
some kind of historical context, in lieu of
a conclusion to this review of a still ongoing
process in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union. The 1789 revolution was initially
peaceful, but it turned violent and to
counter-revolution after taking state power.
It was a 'bourgeois' revolution to pave the
way for more capitalism, but it was not
against 'feudalism'. (In the aftermath, on the
winning side of the Napoleonic Wars and
at Vienna, Russia became a European
power.) The revolutions of 1848 were both
peaceful and violent assaults on state power,
but all of them were violently repressed and
condemned to failure. Thus, these revolu-
tions failed to impose liberal bourgeois prin-
ciples over conservative ones then and there,
although many of their same policies were
adopted by and by anyway, little thanks to
social movements led by the working class,
however. (Russia again lost influence in Cen-
tral Europe in the face of German unifica-
tion and economic development.
After
losing the Crimean War, Czar Alexander II
freed the serfs and introduced his own
perestroika and glasnost, with some but
insufficient results.)
In 1917, the revolution started mostly
peacefully in February and resorted to more
force to pass state power from the Czars
Economic and Political Weekly February 3,
1990 253
to the Kerenwki government. In October/
November 1917, the initial aim was to exer-
cise a peaceful threat to influence the existing
government; but the revolutionary process
acceierated into an armed assault on state
power. It proved successful but led to civil
war and subsequently the power of the
Soyiet Communist'Party. The working class.
(social) movements failed everywhere in
post-war Europe, and even in Russia the
workers were a tiny percentage of the revolu-
tionary forces, which was further reduced by
their decimation in the Civil War. (Still dur-
ing World War I, Lenin had made a separate
peace at Brest-Litovsk and forfeited (now
Soviet) Russia's share of the winners' spoils.
However, as conqueror on the winning side
of World War II and at Yalta and Potsdam,
Soviet Russia assumed and was awarded a
dominant role in Central-now 'Eastern'
Europe and soon superpower status in the
world.)
The 1968 'revolutions' were largely peace-
ful social movements, which were often
repressed by force of arms even though none
aspired to or seriously threatened state
power. A particular distinguishing feature of
the 'new' social movements was that they
were not working class led or based. On the
contrary, 1968 represents the acknowledge-
ment that social movements must reach and
appeal far beyond the 'traditional' (indust-
rial) working classes and their Communist
Party and/or unionised leadership. The
Prague Spring, if it be included among 1968
'movements', contemplated a peaceful trans-
fer of power within the existing state ap-
paratus; but it was reversed through military
invasion by the Soviet Army. The 1968 Tet
offensive in Vietnam was, of course, another
matter. (Soviet power was challenged here
and there, but survived.)
The revolutions of 1989 started peacefully
as widespread and deepgoing social move-
ments. They succeeded quicker and more
than even their protagonists expected in put-
ting civil democracy in civil society to work
to achieve political liberation. Finally, the
domino theory, which on previous occasions
already was feared but remained inoperative,
worked this time, albeit rather unexpectedly.
It did so in part because the social move-
ments did not suffer armed repression,
domestic or foreign (except in the more 'in-
dependent' Rumania, where however the
Army turned to support and save the
popular uprising). This generally mild
resistance by the top, of course, was condi-
tioned by changes in circumstance and policy
in the Soviet Union. The collapse at Lhe top
in some cases in the face of these movements
then nearly undid the state power and in-
stitutions that 'guarantee public order', so
much so that even commentators in the West
took alarm. Perhaps this alarm reflects the
failure, or let's hope it is only a delay, to ap-
preciate th) momentous de facto reformula-
tion and exter&w-s.i of the democratic process
when, to paraphrase. Abraham Lincoltn, it
is extended 'by, of and tor the people'
beyond parliamentary political democracy
to civil democracy in civil society. At the
N O T I C E
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is
hnereby notified for tne n
-form-a::lon
of the
cblic
that THE RAVALGAON SUGAR FARM
LIMITED proposes to mdak appilcatice1 to ttne Central Government in the Department of
Company Affairs, New Delh under sub sect,ori (2 of Section 22 of the Monopolies and
Restrict:ve Trade Pract ces Act 1960) +or . 'prrxlto the establishment of a new under-
takings "un-lit div sion. Br:ef p orfcuc3rs of *:e proposal are as under
1. Name and Address of tne Applicant THE RAVALGAON SUGAR FARM LIMITED
Construction House,
Walchcind Hirachand Marg,
Bo mbaiy 400 038.
2. Capital Structure of the applicant Preference Capital Equity Capital
organisation
Authorised Rs
50,00(,000
Rs 54,00,000
Subscribed & Paid-up Rs 20,00,000 Rs 34,00,000
3. Management structure of the app'icant organisa! on :ndicalting the names of the
Directors, including the
Managing/Whole
time Directors and Manager, if any
The Company is manaqed by Managing Director uinder the superintendence and
control of Boord of Directors consisting of:
Shrir Arvind R.Doshi Chairmain
Shri D.R Joshi
Shr! GanSadhar G
Gaidgil
Shri Ajit Gulabchand
Shri Chakor L.Doshi
Sri N.G.Joshi
Shr! Harshavardhan B Dosh Managing Director
Shri Arvind G.Daftary
Shri Ra+as R.Doshi
4. Indicate whether the proposal relates Trte proposal relates to mdnufacture of
to the establishment of a new under- nevw article viz. Industrial Alconol and
taking or a new unit/division,. hence a rew unit,/division.
S. Location of the new undertaking/ . Ravalgaon, 1al. Malegaon,
unit/division Dist. Nasik, Maharashtra
6. Capital structure of the proposed
.
Not applcabie
undertaking
7. In case the proposal reJates to
production, storage, supply, distri-
bution, marketing or control of
goods, indicate.
i) Name of goods/articles Industrl- Alcohol
ii) Proposed Licensed capacity/ 30.000 i'res per day
turnover before expansion.
iii) Estimated annual turn-over Rs.151.26 lacs ioprox. on the basis of
seasonal working of 160 days in a
year.
B. In case the proposal relates to Not Appilicable
provision of any service state the
volume of activity in terms of usual
measure such as value
turnover,
income, etc.
9. Cost of
ProJect
s .230.00 !acs
10. Scherne of finance indicating the Internal Generation Rs. 60.00 lacs
amour-its to be raised from each source Loans from financial
institutions Rs. 170.00 lacs
Any person interested in the matter may make a representation in quadruplicate to the
Secretary, Department of Company Affairs, Government of India, Shastri Bhavan, New Delhi,
within 14 days froM the date of the publication of this notice, intimating his views on
the proposal and indicating the nature of his interest therein.
Place: BOMBAY FOR THE RAVALGAON SUGAR FARM LTD.
Date 31/1/1990 A.V. Gaikwad
Registered Office
GM (Finance) and Company Secretary
Constructior House,
Walchand Hirachand Marc,
Bombay 400 038 BAP'D 64^.
254
Economic and Political Weekly February 3, 1990
same time, the economic structures and pro-
cesses underlying these socio political
transformations also have not received the
attention, which their importance merits.
However, the hard knocks of economic life
still threaten to divert, albeit hopefully not
to revert, these social movements and poli-
tical processes in dangerous directions. If like
1789, 1989 will go down in history as a year
of revolution, what portends for 1990 and
its decade-also analogies to the 1790s?
Whether some, and if so what kinds of,
counter-revolutionary Thermidors may still
be in the offing, and when, we would not
like now to foresee. (Beginning with military
failure in Afghanistan [another Crimean
War?], the 'imperial' reach of the Soviet
Union is under effective political challenge
due principally to economic failure, and the
'Union' may effectively break up. Russia;
whether still 'soviet' or not, may thereby be
relatively weakened but perhaps absolutely
revitalised and strengthened.) [On the variety
of social movements and their nineteenth
and twentieth century history, see Samir
Amin, Giovanni Arrighi, Andre Gunder
Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein 1990. On
East-West European reunification, see Frank
1983/1984.]
(11) Really existing socialism has been im-
portantly transformed by these events and
also requires reconsideration. In accounting
for these events and transformations. the
most determinant failure of really existing
(non)socialism in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union has been its failure to compete
well economically with the West. It is well
known that the centralised plan economies
achieved relative success through their forced
absolute growth (mobilising more inputs to
get more output of sausage machines if not
of sausages). Heavy industry, and in some
countries large scale industrial agriculture,
boomed. Social services were provided and
assured, but not so individual services. It has
become equally apparent that these inflexi-
ble economies were unable to promote inten-
sive growth (making the sausage machine
more productive and producing more and
more varied outputs with less inputs). It was
precisely during the recent technological
revolution and particularly computerisation
in the West, and indeed also in the East
Asian NICs, that the centralised economies
of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
were unable to keep pace. On the contrary,
as already observed above, they lost ground
both absolutely and relatively. This was the
most determinant starting point of these
social movements and revolutions. As an
economic failure moreover, 'socialism' has
proven to be no match for nationalism. First
Yugoslav and Hungarian and above all
Polish nationalism, and now nationalism
and ethnicity in the Baltics, Transcaucasus,
Central Asia, the Ukraine, and elsewhere in
Eastern Europe challenge the political
economic order and demand democratic self
determination. For with economic success,
neither these social and nationalist move-
ments nor this (kind of) demand for
democracy would have developed, and much
less this move to marketisation of the
economies.
These observations about Eastern Europe,
however, require a brief parenthetical com-
parative glance at other parts of the wsorld.
It is noteworthy that economies throughout
Africa, most of Latin America, and parts
of Asia have recently suffered the sane com-
petitive failure as manifested in disastrouts-
ly declining absolute standards of living and
relative marginalisation from the world
economy. Many of them more so even than
most economies in Easterni Europe. 1'lcrlhaps
Poland, Rumania, BoliNvia, Argcnltilnai,
maybe Burma, and much of Africa top the
sad list of greatest decline. Social imloNements
have also developed in many oft the othel
counitries outside Easterni Eiurope, y et in
none of them with similar results or even
such far-reaching goals. In Africa, there has
been considerable about face in political
economic orienltation awa! f'ronm socialisa-
tion and the East and in Support of ethnic
and national independenice at homiie, but no
dramlatic changes. ln Latin America, there
has been a return to political demnocracy; but
it was only marginally carried by the mainy
social movements, somc ot their claimils to
the contrary notwithstanding. The most
dralmatic process of demociatisatioln, ill
Argentina, was tar less the resLult of thle
humanl right movement of the Niadres de la
Plaza de Mavo and others thain it was of thc
defeat of the Argentine military forces by
those of Britain (with the miilitarv ziid of the
United States and thle political suppiort o0t
all the \West). In Burma, the social mocnment
was repressed by the torce ot ai ms. 'O onc
degree or another, so it was in manv other
countries, from Chile, to Mexico, to Jamaica,
to Gabon, to Sri l,anka. Social movements
in any of these countries with the torce and
threat of those in Eastern Europe would ha\v
been drenched in blood.
Of similar significance is the tact that in
none of these other countries has there been
any serious attempt, let alone any success,
to replace the obviouily failing economic
systenm or organisation by anothcr radically
different one, let alotnc to replace the tfailuire
of capitalismii there bv socialismli. Onl the con-
trary, in tcrmns of econonic organisation
there has been a right turn to marketisation
('privatisation') everywNhere. Mloreover, the
failure of 'socialism' in Eastern Europe can
only accelerate the same and marketisation
elsewhere, no matter how socially costly run
away capitalism has already been there.
None of the new democratic regimes in Latin
America propose to reform, let alone to turn
back, 'export led growth' (be it absolute
growth as in Chile or absolute decline as in
Argentina). On the corntrarv again, the
democratic opening itself is under threat
from the repressive economic measures the
democratic governments are obliged (not the
least through the intervention of the IMF)
to impose on their populations.
Indeed, the only notable exception to all
these experiences has been that in Iran:
There the armed to the teeth regime of the
Shah disintegrated as its Winter Palace was
stormed aind taken by ani unarmlied peacet'ul
crowd as the spearheald ot'f deepgoinlg social
movement. How'ever, ttlhe movement was led
by thec exiled t'utnldamiienltalist religioLs leader
Ayatollah Khomileinii, w, ho returnled inI
trhiiilpll and channrlielled thlis religion led
social tiovemient into thie constr-uction ot a
Shiite Islamlic t heocratic state. It renounilced
aniid denlouiniced etually bothl Soviet comI-
miunist aniid US imperialist satains anld ait
elnormioutis sacri ticcs to its population fought
a ten-year war agai nst its Sunnilli IslinicII
ieliglbotius In Iraq (hilch both finanilcedi b\
their sales ot oil on the world imarkct).
T1hu1S, 1Ct'h liiIlure Ot sOCialist, but ilso oft
miany capitalist and mli\d, econoIlmiies is
mlarkeld abo\v all b\ thleir- inability and
frtil,,l.> ILaete(lllt\I to competc onl thle wNorld
mlarlkle't. Of oltr" sc, tt is has alss\avs been the
ease; for it Is in tmti nzit tir-e' oft' any coin -
'ctitisl\'c race thit o11v onle
or a t'e\s ctan wiln
aniid miany muLst lost. 'I'llis process of selec-
tiotll operaites lar'ey irrespective of tie
'system' wsithI s\ litli thty comlipete, wiuch is
at best a conutbiUtos ' mt.to(l ill tlc inmevitable
select iol ot s ilill t s nid losers. 1Tiereftore.
thet CCOnomiC tfliluric anilcd loss otf 'sociallils'
per *c is relati\e to botti the SuIccess anld also
thte i'ailture of' 'capiialisnll' to c-limpete ill tile
seft' samiiie ('capitalist') world ima.lrket. The
replacereilnt otf one 'systemil' by the' other is
110 guiarateetce thatt atav ccononm will thlle
coimpcte more successtfully; tor milost will
have to ConitIIueL losing the race.
The mnove mass al-v fro 'so.iallim' adld to
greater niarketisation of the East E-uropean
econiomilies arnd their turther integra.tion in
world markct comilpetitionl now come on the
heels ot their recenit tailur.e and at a time ot
their own recently increased anid still grow-
ing ecotnomic weakness. Therefore, they pose
great econlomic arid political danigers, niot
the least of turther economic tailure atid
of popular political disillusionment arld
backlash.
The economilic crisis ini Eastcrn Europe
and thc Soviet Unioti is alriiost certaini fur-
ther to decepen in thc short run. Both the
deepening crisis and the marketisation
respotlse will resuilt in even greater shortages,
new unemploymcilt, ramipant inflation arid
the disruption ot the \wclfare state. All of
these, and particularly the latter, will be at
the special cost of swomen arid their childrern,
whose already disproportionate burden will
thereby incrcase still further. In the Soviet
Union, Gorbachev was ill advised (by Abel
Abegayan) to push for perestroika and ac-
celeration ot groswth in the economy at the
same time. The result has been an economic
(and political) disaster; because restructur-
ing temporarily reduces grosvth instead of
increasing it, and the simultaneouis attempt
to accelerate threw an additional monkey
wrench into the wsorks.
In Eastern Europe a!s) economic restruc-
turing is bound to invol%e transitional
economic dislocation in different degrees
and forms. It \. ill he absolutely the most
severe in Poland, as well as in the South and
East in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union,
which have the weaikest anld reccertfv most
Economic and Political Weekly February 3, 1990 255
weakened econromies. Rumania was also
weakened, especially by Ceausescu's policy
of exporting all to pay off the debt. Ceasing
to export so much food can offer temporary
relief, some resurrection of agriculture but
not of industry. East Germany faces the pro-
spects of immediate 'Ausverkauf' sell out to
West Germans who come to buy already
subsidised consumer goods at 10 or 20 to
1 exchange rates between the West and East
marks. However, East Germany, which has
long been a de facto silent member of the
EC through its privileged access to the West
German market, also has the earlies; pro-
spects of full integration in the EC. The
weakening of the state in East Germany and
its dependent confederation with or even in-
tegration into the West German state, how-
ever will also leave the East Germans with
scarce political economic bargaining power
in Germany, the EC and Europe. Czech and
Hungarian state power may offer more com-
petitive bargaining.power and benefits to
(parts of) their populations. Everywhere, the
first steps toward productive integration,
however, are likely to be the sale of East
Euxopean productive assets to West Euro-
pean firms and others, for who in Eastern
Europe itself has the means successfully to
bid for 'privatised' assets. Only some small
ones could be run as 'co-operatives' which
are in reality firms that must compete in the
market as well.
The political economic move to marketi-
sation and privatisation, whether 'capitalist'
or 'socialist', which is engendered by the
social movements in Eastern Europe can at
best replace one economic and social polari-
satiion by another. The corruption and
privileges, which was based on Communist
Party rule, can be largely but not entirely
eliminated. But marketisation and privati-
sation engenders another more automatic
economic and social polarisation of income
and position, also between the genders, and
among class and ethnic groups and regions.
A minority will float to the surface of a
perhaps first ebbing and then rising tide; and
the majority will be sunk even further below
the surface. This polarisation is likely to pro-
gress both ethnically and nationally, and in-
ternationally. Therefore, it will further
exacerbate ethnic and national tensions, con-
flicts, and movements within and among
states. The now already more competitively
privileged regions and peoples are likely to
improve their positions further, perhaps even
by closer economic and political relations or
even integration with neighbours to the West
and North. Underprivileged minorities in
these, and underprivileged majorities else-
where are likely to become increasingly
marginalised. The dream of joining Western
Europe may thus be realised for the few. At
best, some parts of the East may become
another Southern Europe, albeit at the cost
to both of competing with each other, which
has already raised fears in the South of
Europe. However, the many in Eastern
Europe and perhaps in the south-eastern
parts of the Soviet Union, however, face the
real threat instead of Latinamericanisation,
which has already befallen Poland. East
Europeari countries face domestic inflation
and foreign devaluation, and then currency
reform perhaps by shock treatment. The
social costs are certain, but the economic
successes thereQf are not, as repeated failures
in Argentina and Brazil have recently
demonstrated. In some cases, particularly in
the Soviet Union, even economic Africanisa-
tion or at least Mideasternisation and
political Lebanisation is a serious threat. In
the short run, any break up of the 'second'
world will permit some of its members to
join the (capitalist) 'first' world, but most
will be relegated to the (also capitalist) 'third'
world.
(12) So, is there another Socialism for the
future? How and what would it come to be?
An oft posed issue, at least by some who
consider themselves socialists, is whether the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, or indeed
any other place, has really been 'socialist'
at all. Since their answer is a resounding NO,
they also argue that the long standing
failures and critiques of really existing
socialism, which finally gave rise to the
revolutions of 1989, were not really of
'socialism', but only of 'Stalinism' or some
other aberration of or impostor for 'true
socialism'. The ideological implication of
this argument is, of course, that these
failures also do not comp omise the true
socialist cause
anld
do not oblige real
socialists to undertake any agonising reap-
praisal. Real socialists then nted only insist
more than ever on their own critiques of real-
ly existing (non)socialism to differentiate 'us'
goodies from 'them' baddies. The 'practical'
implication of this 'theory' is that, all ex-
perience notwithstanding, true socialism is
still around the corner or at least down the
road.
However, the real practicality and even
theoretical coherence of this perhaps well
meaning argument clashes with all world
socio-political-economic reality. To begin
with, if there ever was an argument that only
preaches to the already (auto)converted, this
is it. It could not possibly convert those who
have already experienced really existing
socialism, even if it was really non-socialism:
Those among them who now reject most of
the previously really existing (non)socialism
are likely also to continue rejecting any
potential 'real' socialism. Indeed, many of
them are likely to put their faith instead in
the magic of the market and some, alas,
perhaps in far right politics. On the other
hand, those who now lose the benefits of
their previous experience will only yearn foi
the 'good old days' of order and stability of
the old (non)socialist ancient regime. Among
these, those who had little and now lose even
that will recall their modest benefits and ask
for renewed order, if not of the old 'com-
munist' variety, then perhaps of a new
'fascist' one. Only those who received much
from the old party may now, under a new
democratic socialist guise, try to hang on to
as much of it as possible. The social demo-
cratic argument will also lack appeal to those
elsewhere who never wanted themselves or
any one else to experience 'socialism' or
'communism' of whatever kind. Therefore,
it is wholly unrealistic to think that the
damage of the whole experience to the idea
of socialism, demo6ratic or of whatever
kind, can simply be wished away by latter
day professions of ones own purity against
others' former sins.
Secondly, however anti-Stalinist the sub-
jective intent .of this argumiient, its objective
consequence is to stick to the guns of the
Stalinist theory of 'socialism in one country'
or in some even smaller community. Beyond
disregarding the first problem ard that of
transition to this socialism in theory and
praxis, this argument clashes with
the
same
practical reality of having to compete in
practice the whole world over. Yet the inabili-
ty to do so was the fundamental failure and
undoing of Stalinist 'socialism' or whlatcvcr
it was. Whatever kinid of socialism,i. or
capitalism, or nlixed econiomy, o- Islamic
political economy, or whatever any pcople
may 'choose', they cannot escape this \%ot idt-
Wide coniipctition, which is a fact of' ljiC.
Co-operationi as an 'alternat ive' is all et \!
well-as long as it is tmore &ompetivi\e.
Thirdly, thli (only'?) aliiet tat yve interpret.a-
tion of 'teall socialisnm is '\,orld' socialism.
Beyond its unireality tor any foreseeable
future, it is difficult to imagine what this
'socialism' might ever mean. What would
distinguish this 'world socialism' from
'world capitalism' as long as competition
reins as (or the?) fact of life in the world in
the future as it has for millennia in the past?
How about social democracy if not demo-
cratic socialism? One time 'socialists' in the
West and East, even including Mikhail Gor-
bachev himself, have found new apprecia-
tion for and interest in social democracy as
the desideratum, which best comrbines both
'socialism' and 'democracy'. They, again in-
cluding Gorbachev, look to Sweden, and
sometimes Austria, as the model for Fastern
Europe and even for the Sosviet Union. In
the architectural design for the new (ioiin-
mon European Home', many socialists anid
social democrats would further provide for
social democratic, if not democratic socia-
list, influences emanating from the East also
into the West. Thus, the whole of Europe
would become another Sweden writ large.
As Gandhi answered when he was asked
what he thought of European civilisation:
"It would be a good idea" Unfortunately,
these good ideas take little account of some
hard realities.
Thus, even disregarding the Soviet Union,
which is hardlv realistic, the prospects for
early Swedishisation in Eastern Europe are
not very bright. On the contrary, it will take
much doing by all, including Western
Europe and even the, United States and
Japan, only to lav some-indeed even to
protect already existing-economic (social
democratic) foundations for political social
democracy in Eastern Europe. It is at best
Economic and Political Weekly February 3, 1990
uincertain whether and how, much a Wxves
(ierman/European 'Marshall' Plan would
promote social democracy in Eastern
Europe. Nor is it certain that such an enter-
prise woutd further more progressive social
democracy (with small or large s/S d/Ds)
and less conservative politics and parties in
the West. Investment in good btusiness (but
not in unprofitable social investinents) in the
East could as easily spell morc polztrisation
in the \A'cst as well. RcaiTv new social
movements, East and \VCst, could develop
both to retlect and to propel si ch lacceleratcd
polarisation.
ThLus, 'socialists' are indeed onli<ced by the
1Lard tacts of life to rethink 'socialism', if they
sis t on stic kin i to their 'socialist ideology-
ot al. %Ve w-outild not pretenid to do this
rethin'inng here andl now, let alone by oLur-
sclves. o be realistic however, any such
socialism swould have not only to take ac-
couint of competitioon, buLt to rewrite the ruiles
of the (competitive) gamne tinder which it
tacles place. Gender, class, national, ethnic,
rcliaious, comllmunity, and economic, p(obL-
l social, cuilttural, ideologicida and aill
otller initererst group atnd n family or indivIdual
interrelationIS \ ould hiave to hli%c in\;\ pttl Li-
cipatory' social (movenment) e\xprc\srons andcl
institutional protection ot and guILaralnteCS
tor thie mIuttual respect of their dermocratic
cxpression anid fo- the peaceful resolutioni
ot their coinlicts of interest beyold anythinle
known in thi wso rid herctofore. Realist icallv
speakinvg, tlie prospects for any such 'demlo-
cratic socialism' or otherwise inl tile worid
at largc are still diiii. Indced, all the esidence
i
that thinus
w
ill,
and xN ill 1-have to, get still
w-korse bclfore they get hetter. However. things>
na.y indeeld nc so muilch Aiosc and so rapid-
. that nmankirld ridan t'ice a-l (ontinonl cC )ono-
m'i ccoloeieia and.3or tnilil.trv political and
thereCore sOCi culitural crisis of suLch alar-
ruing proport ions and aibsoluite threat (
pity'sical '\tilntion or siLHvi\al, that w\e wvI1
tiiallylibe moved
to get ourselves
togethecr.
[I-[he aulthor is gratefufl fo!r erl u1sefLul Coni:iieCnt<;
o n the first dr-aft to Nlichacl I Ilnian. especially
on eco nomics and history; and to Marta
Fuentes oni economnics anid social nuos emieTits. I
References
Ainin, SaLmir, (iovanni Arri-i, Andre Guinder
Frarnk and I mmanuel sWallerteirn (1990):
Transformilng Itl 't ORvlrtion: SoLia31
;lovemrent' in the 9' or/cl-Svstenm. Nc%\
York, Monthly Review P rcs (otrlhcomtin).
Franik, Andre Gtiinder (1983 //1984); ihe LFnro-
pean ChIiallenee: f-rout At! rntiL XA da1nc,7e
Pan-European Eiiente for Pea-cc andbl Job.,
Nottingham, U9K, Spokesman Boorks, '1983
Aestport, Conn, USA, Lawrence Htill, 1984-
Frank, Andre Gunder and Marta Fueni-,
(1990): 'Social NMlovements in Recem \l o
History' in Samir Amimi et al, op eit
Fuentes, Marta and Andre Gunder 19
(1989): 'Ten 1Theses on Social Mloxwme,
Wi rld !)evelo-pnenit, XV11, 2, ehri
Also -cc their 'Ninte Iethcss onl So];Al Mo \l -
men<'tLts, Ji. onornic ;rlP wi IX Oeklv',
Aii-ust '9, 1987.
N O T I C E
PHILLIPS CARBON BLACK LIMITED
FORM 1A
It is hereby notified for the information of the public that PHILLIPS CARBON BLACK
LIMITED proposes to give to the Central Government in the Department of
Company Affairs,
New
Delhi,
a notice under sub-Section
(1)
of Section 21 of the
Monopohles and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, for substantial expansion
of their undertaking. Brief particulars of the proposal are as under:
1. Name eu cress of the owner of the : PHILLIPS CARBON BLACK LIMITED
underta-: -.. 31, NETAJI SUBHAS ROAD,
CALCUTTA - 700 001.
2. Caieta! st-ucture of the ovner Authorised
organisationr
Rs. 7,50,00,000 divided into
75,00,000 Equity Shares of Rs 10/-
each.
Issued, subscribed and paid up-
Rs. 5,25,52,500 dcivded into
52,55,250 Equity Shares of Rs. 10/-
each.
3 Locatio, of the unit or division tC be Durgapur, Dist. Burdwan,
expanded West Bengal.
4. Irn case the expd)ser c ests to
production, storaSe,
C .u, ci sticu,,on,
marketing or control of uc us! nicate:
i Name of goods
CARBON BLACK
i,)
Licensed capacitsY/t!rnover
before 50,000 MT/Year
expansion.
ki) Expansion procosec C 1,00,000 MT/Year
5. In case the expan,sion, relates to a, Does not apply
service, state the extent of expa s -tn *!
terms of usual measures such cus v/u1e,
turnover, income etc.
6. Cost of the project Rs. 114.00 Crores
7 Scheme of inance indicating the Internal resources, loans,
amrounts to be raised from each source. debentures etc.
Ary person
interested
in
the
melter
may make a representation In quadruplicate
to the Secretarv Department of Company Affairs, Governmc'nt of India, Shastri
Bhavan, New Delhi, within 14 days from the date of puciu ration of this
notice, int.matinQ his views on tne proposal and indicating the nature of his
In,<rest therein.
C.S. LAHIRI
Secretary
Dated this 3rd day of January, 1990
-
____________________ - _______________________ Pressman|
:-5 8
Economic
and Political
Weekly February 3,
1990