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000383022

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

DORAL BANK,

Plaintiffs,

v.

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION, TRIBUNAL de PRIMERA
INSTANCIA, SALA de FAJ ARDO,
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY BOARD OF
THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO
and SOCIAL INTEREST GROWTH
ASSOCIATES CORPORATION,

Defendants.

CIVIL NO.:



RE: DECLARATORY J UDGMENT AND
INJ UNCTIVE RELIEF



EX PARTE MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
MOTION REQUESTING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF PURSUANT TO
FED.R.CIV.P. 65(a)

TO THE HONORABLE COURT:
COMES NOW Plaintiff, Doral Bank (Doral), through the undersigned counsels, and
respectfully states, alleges, and pray as follows against defendants, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC); Social Interest Growth Associates Corporation (SIGA); the Puerto Rico
Court of First Instance, Fajardo Courtroom (the Fajardo Court) and the Environmental Quality
Board of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (EQB) .
I. NATURE OF THE CLAIM AND RELIEF SOUGHT
This is an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief arising out of portions of a
J udgment and an Order entered by the Court of First Instance of Fajardo (Fajardo Court)
ordering Doral to take over possession and operate a wastewater treatment plant that is not its
property, solely because it is the priority lienholder on the real estate. This action also delves
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with Dorals inability to comply with the Fajardo Courts J udgment and Order given its
obligation to comply with a Consent Order entered by the Federal deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC). Unless restrained by this Court, Doral will be forced either to violate the Fajardo
Courts order and J udgment and face penalties and contempt proceeds or to comply with the
Fajardo Courts order and face the consequences of violating the FDICs Consent Order.
During 2004 and 2005 Defendant, Social Interest Growth Associates Corporation
(SIGA) executed two credit facilities with Doral, which were amended afterwards to grant
additional credit. To secure its obligations under the credit facilities, SIGA executed mortgages
as well as other collateral. SIGA defaulted on its obligations under the credit facilities and on
November 11, 2008, Doral filed suit (Civil Case No. GCD2008-0528) for collection of the
monies owed and to foreclose on the mortgages that served as collateral on one of the loans
(Loan No. 80-00000278). Eventually the parties entered into a stipulation and on J une 1, 2009
the Court entered judgment adopting the parties settlement agreement. Pursuant to the parties
settlement stipulation, which was incorporated into the Courts judgment, SIGA acknowledged
the debt claimed and consented to the entry of judgment against it in the amount of
$15,346,448.30.
Afterwards, on November 26, 2008, Doral filed a second judicial action against SIGA,
(Case No. NSCI2008-000976) this time seeking the collection of monies owed under the second
credit facility (Loan No. 80-00000430). Subsequently, the parties entered into a settlement
stipulation and on J anuary 28, 2009, the Court entered judgment adopting its terms and
conditions. In this second stipulation, Doral granted SIGA a period of one (1) year to sell a real
estate property known as Finca Santa Rita located in Fajardo, Puerto Rico and SIGA agreed
that it would use the product of that sale to pay off its debt with Doral under the second loan. In
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addition, SIGA agreed to sell another property, this one known as Finca Santo Toms located
in Naguabo, Puerto Rico, and to deposit 80% of the sales price in an escrow account with Doral.
On February 11, 2010 Doral requested the execution of the judgment in this second case
and the Court entered a Resolution determining that SIGA had breached the settlement
stipulation and ordered the execution of the judgment. Doral never foreclosed the mortgage that
constitutes a priority lien in the Finca Santa Rita property.
SIGA failed to continue to operate and maintain its wastewater treatment plant, causing
the spillage of untreated sewage water causing contamination of the properties located in a
residential development named Urbanizacin Santa Rita, located in Fajardo, Puerto Rico that
has 259 residential units. SIGAs failure to maintain and operate the wastewater treatment plant
created a risk to the health and well-being of the residents of that community. Moreover, SIGA
did not have the necessary permits and did not take the required precautions for the operation of
the wastewater treatment plant.
Given the aforestated, on February 22, 2011 and pursuant to Article 169 of the Puerto
Rico Mortgage Law, 30 L.P.R.A. 2565, Doral filed a third suit in the Fajardo Court against
SIGA seeking the entry of a preliminary and permanent injunction to avoid the deterioration of
the mortgaged property that served as collateral to the loan granted to SIGA (hereinafter the
Action). Pursuant to said statutory provision, Doral sought an order from the Court ordering
SIGA to maintain and operate its wastewater treatment plant and to take all necessary measures
to avoid or remedy the environmental harm it was causing or, alternatively, for the designation
by the Court of a Receiver to take possession and protect the mortgaged property. On April 19,
2012 the Fajardo Court entered J udgment in favor of Doral and ordered SIGA to correct all
deficiencies in the treatment plant within sixty (60) days, notify the EQB of the work performed
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in the plant and request inspections from the EQB, obtain the necessary permits to operate the
wastewater treatment plant, operate the wastewater treatment and to file periodic reports to the
Court stating its compliance with the terms of the judgment. In its J udgment, the Fajardo Court
indicated that if SIGA failed to comply with the orders that were made part of the J udgment, the
court would place the wastewater treatment plant under receivership and also that the court
could order Doral to cover the costs and expenses necessary for the implementation of the
J udgment and then allow Doral to recover them from SIGA. After the Fajardo Courts judgment
became final and unappealable, SIGA notified the Fajardo Court that it lacked the financial
resources to comply with what was ordered. Then, on December 21, 2012, the Fajardo Court
placed the wastewater treatment plant under receivership and required Doral to employ a
receiver and to perform all necessary analysis, work, repairs, and studies to ensure the operation
of the wastewater treatment plant according to the requirements of the applicable law and
regulations. The Court reiterated that Doral would be required to disburse the monies necessary
to complete all repair and maintenance work at the wastewater treatment plant. Doral sought a
rehearing of the grounds for said order but was unsuccessful in its attempt to demonstrate to the
court that Doral, as a highly regulated financial institution, was prohibited from disbursing
additional monies related to a loan which was in default.
On March 21, 2014 the Puerto Rico Environmental Quality Board (EQB) filed a
motion to intervene in the Action. On May 15, 2014 the Fajardo Court ordered Doral to comply
with its Order or face a daily penalty of $1,000.00 since the day it was ordered to rehabilitate and
operate the wastewater treatment plant..
On J une 27, 2014 the EQB again sought the impositions of monetary sanctions against
Doral for not complying with the Fajardo Courts order. On J uly 7, 2014 the Fajardo Court
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ordered Doral to identify in five (5) days all necessary emergency measures it has taken to ensure
compliance with its order. The order was notified on J uly 11, 2014 and deposited in the mail on
J uly 14, 2014. Therefore, the deadline for Doral to comply with the Fajardo Courts order is
Tuesday, July 22, 2014.
This motion seeks the entry of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction,
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a), staying the Fajardo Courts Order commanding Doral to assume
the costs and expenses related to the maintenance and operation of a wastewater treatment plant
owned by its debtor, SIGA, or face steep economic sanctions for every day it fails to comply.
The subject Court Order forces Doral to make a substantial disbursement of funds for the
benefit of SIGA, to maintain and operate SIGAs wastewater treatment plant indefinitely, under
a credit facility granted by Doral to SIGA that is in default, as already determined by the Fajardo
Court.
All of this would merely be backdrop to a routine dispute between a borrower and a bank
for the foreclosure of collateral to a loan on a property in which the borrower operates a
wastewater treatment plant, where it not for the fact that Doral is subject to a consent order
(Consent Order) entered into with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the
office of the Commissioner of Financial Institutions of Puerto Rico ( the OCIF) on August 8,
2012 and a letter dated April 2, 2012 from the FDIC (the FDIC Letter) notifying Doral that it
deemed Doral to be in troubled condition. Pursuant to the Consent Order, Doral was
prohibited by the FDIC to extend, directly or indirectly, any additional credit to, or for the
benefit of, any borrower whose loan or other credit is more than 90 days delinquent or has been
classified as Substandard, Doubtful, or listed for Special Mention, precisely the existing
situation with the SIGA credit facilities.
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Therefore, Doral has been placed in a position where to comply with the Fajardo Courts
order it would have to violate the Consent Order and to comply with the Consent Order it would
have to violate the Fajardo Courts Order.
Given that the FDIC is the appropriate Federal banking agency for Doral, under section
3(q) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. 1813(q), and that the provisions of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDICA) provide that the United States district court has the
exclusive jurisdiction and power to order and require compliance with an order issued by the
FDIC under section 1818(b), such as the Consent Order, Doral requests in this case the entry of a
judgment declaring that the Fajardo Courts Order was issued without jurisdiction, as it modifies
the terms and conditions of the Consent Order, in violation of federal law. In this motion, Doral
seeks a temporary restraining order (TRO) immediately staying the Fajardo Courts Order and
a preliminary injunction staying the Fajardo Courts Order until the final resolution of the
declaratory action filed in this case.
II. DISCUSSION
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has developed a four (4) pronged test for
determining when a party is entitled to a preliminary injunction. The First Circuit has repeatedly
held that a preliminary injunction should be granted if the plaintiff demonstrates that (A) it has a
reasonable likelihood of eventual success on the merits; (B) it will suffer irreparable injury if the
injunction is not granted; (C) the balance of equities favors the plaintiff; and (D) the public
interest favors entry of a preliminary injunction. See, Ross-Simons of Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat,
Inc., 102 F. 3d 12, 15 (1
st
Cir. 1996); Narrangansett Indian Tribe v. Guilbert, 934 F. 2d 4, 5-6 (1
st

Cir. 1991); Geoffrey, Inc. v. Toys R Us, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 661, 664-665 (D.P.R. 1991). The
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most critical part of the test is whether the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits. See,
Weaver v. Henderson, 984 F. 2d 11, 12 (1
st
Cir. 1993).
(a) Plaintiffs Have a Great Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The statutory scheme set out by federal law grants federal agencies such as the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, the FDIC, and the Federal Reserve Board wide-ranging
supervisory and enforcement authority over our nation's banking system. See 12 U.S.C.
1813(q). These agencies are charged with the task of overseeing that banking system for the
protection of the public and the national economy as a whole, and not for the benefit or
protection of individual banking institutions. In re Franklin National Bank Securities Litigation,
478 F.Supp. 210, 215 (E.D.N.Y.1979).
The most significant of their supervisory powers is the capacity to issue and enforce
cease and desist orders. 12 U.S.C. 1818. The agencies may draw upon this power to prevent a
bank from violating any agreements with the regulatory agency; to remedy violations of any
law, rule, or regulation, or any condition imposed in writing by the agency in connection with
the granting of any application or other request by the bank, 12 U.S.C. 1818(b)(1); or to
prohibit any banking practice or procedure that the Comptroller deems to be unsafe or
unsound. Id.
In short, cease and desist orders can be utilized to regulate virtually every aspect of a
bank's business. See, e.g., Groos National Bank v. Comptroller of the Currency, 573 F.2d 889
(5th Cir. 1978). Given the magnitude of the public and private interests that are impacted by such
extensive agency regulation of financial institutions, it is not surprising that Congress has seen fit
to prescribe a specific statutory mechanism for obtaining judicial review of agency enforcement
actions in this area. The procedure outlined in 12 U.S.C. 1818(h)(2) places judicial review of
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agency cease and desist orders firmly in the hands of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal.
At the same time, however, Congress has provided the federal district courts with limited
jurisdiction over three types of controversies stemming from the issuance of cease and desist
orders. First, under 12 U.S.C. 1818(c)(2), the district courts are granted jurisdiction to issue
injunctive relief setting aside, limiting, or suspending the enforcement, operation, or
effectiveness of temporary cease and desist orders issued by a supervisory agency. Second, the
district courts may, upon application of the appropriate agency, issue an injunction designed to
enforce the terms of such temporary cease and desist orders. See 12 U.S.C. 1818(d). Third, the
district courts may exercise jurisdiction to order the enforcement of any outstanding notice or
order issued by an agency under section 1818. See 12 U.S.C. 1818(i).
Aside from these carefully delineated circumstances where federal district courts are
granted jurisdiction over cease and desist controversies, Congress has categorically determined
that no court shall have jurisdiction to affect by injunction or otherwise the issuance or
enforcement of any notice or order under this section, or to review, modify, suspend, terminate,
or set aside any such notice or order. Id. Accordingly, the Fajardo Court lacked jurisdiction to
enter an order interpreting, and with the effect of modifying, the Consent Order. See Ridder v.
Office of Thrift Supervision, 146 F.3d 1035, 1042 (D.C.Cir.1998) (section 1818(i)(1) precludes
judicial review of the Temporary Order); Baytree Leasing Co. v. Alliance Investors LLC, 2012
WL 1016016 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 21, 2012) (By seeking a determination of the validity and scope of
the Consent Order, Plaintiffs inherently seek a review of the Consent Order, which goes beyond
the jurisdiction of a district court.).
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Pursuant to a Stipulation and Consent to the Issuance of a Consent Order, without
admitting or denying the charges made by the FDIC, Doral agreed to the issuance of the Consent
Order. Thereafter, the FDIC issued a Consent Order which is still in effect.
One of the provisions of the Consent Order provides as follows:
(e) The Bank shall not extend, directly or indirectly, any additional credit to, or for the
benefit of, any borrower whose loan or other credit is more than 90 days delinquent or
has been classified as Substandard, Doubtful, or listed for Special Mention in the
current Report of Examination or any future report of examination, and is uncollected,
unless the Board, or designated committee thereof, provides, in writing, a detailed
explanation of why the extension is in the best interest of the Bank. Prior to extending
additional credit pursuant to this subparagraph, whether in the form of a renewal,
extension, or further advance of funds, such additional credit shall be approved by the
Board, who shall determine that:

(i) the failure of the Bank to extend such credit would be detrimental to the best
interests of the Bank, with a written explanation of why the failure to extend such credit
would be detrimental;

(ii) the extension of such credit would improve the Banks position, with a written
explanatory statement of how and why the Banks position would improve; and

(iii) an appropriate workout plan has been developed and will be implemented in
conjunction with the additional credit to be extended.

Doral is not the owner of Finca Santa Rita, the real estate where SIGAs wastewater
treatment plant is located and Dorals only relation with that property is that of being the creditor
of a loan granted to SIGA that is guaranteed by a mortgage affecting the property. SIGA
defaulted on the loan. Doral filed a collections and foreclosure action against SIGA in 2008 and
obtained a judgment against SIGA which has not been executed. Thus, Doral, at this time, is the
judgment creditor of SIGA. Doral neither foreclosed on the mortgage nor became involved,
directly or indirectly, in the operation of the wastewater treatment plant. Given SIGAs failure to
protect Dorals collateral, by failing to maintain and operate the wastewater treatment plant
located therein and causing the spillage of untreated sewage water to the property, Doral
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exercised its right as a creditor under Puerto Ricos Mortgage Law and filed an injunction action
seeking an order for SIGA to take the necessary actions and precautions to protect the collateral
from deterioration. The Fajardo Court granted the relief sought by Doral and, in April 2012,
ordered SIGA to repair and maintain the wastewater treatment plant. However, SIGA failed to
comply with its obligations under the Courts judgment.
Faced with SIGAs failure to protect the collateral, by failing to properly maintain and
operate the wastewater treatment plant, the Fajardo Court then turned to Doral to do so, at its
expense. The Fajardo Court has ordered Doral to employ a receiver to seek all necessary permits
and to incur all necessary expenses to ensure the proper and legal operation of the wastewater
treatment plant. In the meantime, Doral has been further ordered to pay all costs associated with
collecting the wastewater from a neighboring project, and to transport it to a designated place or
facility for disposal.
There is no legal basis in support of the Fajardo Courts order imposing on Doral the
obligation to take over the operation of a wastewater treatment plant that it does not own. Then,
when Doral advised the Fajardo Court that it could not comply with its order, as it would
constitute a breach of its obligations under the Consent Order, the Fajardo Court not only
disregarded the terms and conditions of the Consent Order but opted to interpret it and reject
Dorals argument. In addition, the Fajardo Court ordered Doral to comply with its order in five
(5) days, which expire Tuesday July 22, 2014, or face a daily fine of $1,000.00 for every day it
has failed to comply with the Courts order starting from the day the order was issued, which
could be interpreted as more than two years ago.
It is unquestionable that the Fajardo Court lacked jurisdiction to issue an order that has
the effect of modifying the Consent Order. 12 U.S.C.A. 1818(b)(i). Under the provisions of the
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FDICA no court shall have jurisdiction to affect by injunction or otherwise the issuance or
enforcement of any notice, or order under any such section [including 1818(e)], or to review,
modify, suspend, terminate or set aside any such notice or order. 12 U.S.C.A. 1818(b)(i). The
Fajardo Courts order has the effect of forcing Doral to make disbursements under a loan granted
to SIGA that has been delinquent for more than ninety (90) days, which is a transaction
prohibited by the Consent Order.
There is no legal basis to support the Fajardo Courts order for Doral assume
responsibility for the wastewater treatment plant and ensure its proper and legal operation on a
property that it does not own. No theory of lender liability exists to support the Fajardo Courts
order. Further, the entry of such order is in direct conflict with Dorals obligations under the
Consent Order. For the foregoing reasons, Doral contends that there exists a high probability that
it will prevail in its request for a declaration that the Fajardo Courts order is null and void as it
was entered without jurisdiction and that it conflicts with the FDICs preemptive Consent Order.

(b) Doral Will Suffer Irreparable Harm
If injunctive relief is not granted, Doral is bound to suffer irreparable injury. First, if
Doral fails to comply with the Fajardo Court order it faces stiff monetary sanctions and the
possibility of being found in contempt of the Court. On the other hand, if Doral complies with
the Fajardo Courts order, then it faces civil money penalty for it would constitute a breach of the
Consent Order. The FDICA provides tiered penalties that range from $5,000 up to $1,000,000.00
per day for each day the bank violates a provision of the Consent Order, and even the possibility
of losing its status as an insured depository institution, which would be fatal to Dorals operation
as a financial institution. The FDIC's authority to impose civil monetary penalties on institution-
affiliated parties of up to $1,000,000 per day rises from three statutory provisions. The
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provisions differentiate the FDIC's ability to impose sanctions based on the level of culpability
properly attributed to the offending party. Unquestionably, under 12 U.S.C. 1818(i), the FDIC
is empowered to impose monetary penalties generally.
As in this case, irreparable harm most often exists where a party has no adequate remedy
at law. Charlesbank Equity Fund II v. Blinds to Go, Inc., 370 F. 3d 151, 162 (1
st
Cir. 2004).
Where a plaintiff stands to suffer a substantial injury that cannot adequately be compensated by
an end-of-case award of money damages, irreparable harm exists. See, Rosario-Urdaz v.
Rivera-Hernndez, 350 F. 3d 219, 222 (1
st
Cir. 2003). If the Court does not grant Dorals request
for injunctive relief, and Doral eventually prevails in this case, it will never be able to recover its
losses or undue the damage which Doral would suffer should the FDIC regulators sanction Doral
for violating the Consent Order.
(c) The Balance of Equities favors Doral
The requirement to balance the equities forces the Court to look at the balance of
relevant impositions, that is, whether the hardship to the defendants if they are wrongly
enjoined will outweigh the harm plaintiffs stand to suffer if they are denied injunctive relief. See,
Ross-Simons Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc., 102 F. 3d 12, 15 (1
st
Cir. 1996). In this case, the
balance of equities clearly favors the plaintiffs.
As already stated, no matter which course of action Doral decides to take it will either
face severe penalties and possible contempt of Court or severe penalties and the devastating loss
of its status as an insured depository institution. Doral has been placed between a rock and a
hard place as no matter which order it decides to comply with, it will necessarily breach the
other and face serious consequences. On the other hand, there would be no harm done if this
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Court stays the Fajardo Courts order as the status quo that has been in effect for at least two
years would remain.
(d) The Public Interest
Doral does not question that there exists a strong public policy to avoid environmental
hazards and contamination in Puerto Rico. Doral does not question the Fajardo Courts
legitimate interest in solving an emergency situation that is creating an environmental hazard to
the residents and properties of Hacienda Santa Rita. Yet, Doral questions the Fajardo Courts
basis for identifying Doral as a purported deep pocket and ordering it to take measures and spend
substantial resources in the operation of someone elses wastewater treatment plant simply
because it lent funds to SIGA that are guaranteed by a mortgage on the property where the
wastewater treatment plant is located. Doral never performed work of any kind on the property
nor did it exercise any degree of care, custody or control over the property.
Nonetheless, there exists a strong public interest in allowing financial institutions to
comply with regulatory requirements and FDIC orders entered to ensure that they meet sound
banking practices, avoid violations of the law, and maintain adequate asset quality, capital,
earnings and liquidity. Congress has legislated in the field of banking from the days of
M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 32526, 42627, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819), creating
an extensive federal statutory and regulatory scheme. The history of national banking legislation
has been one of interpreting grants of both enumerated and incidental powers' to national banks
as grants of authority not normally limited by, but rather ordinarily pre-empting, contrary state
law. Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 32, 116 S.Ct. 1103, 134 L.Ed.2d 237 (1996)
(citations omitted). Indeed, since the passage of the National Bank Act in 1864, the federal
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presence in banking has been significant. See id. at 3233, 116 S.Ct. 1103. Moreover, because
there has been a history of significant federal presence in national banking, the presumption
against preemption of state law is inapplicable. United States v. Locke, 120 S.Ct. 1135 (1999);
see Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 116 S.Ct. 1103 (1996); Franklin Nat. Bank
v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 37576, 74 S.Ct. 550, 98 L.Ed. 767 (1954).
Under 12 U.S.C. 1818 (2000), if, in the FDIC's opinion, an insured depository
institution or any of its directors has engaged in unsafe or unsound business practices or has
violated ... a law, rule, or regulation, or any condition imposed ... by the [FDIC] ..., the [FDIC]
may ... issue and serve upon ... such party a notice of charges ... constituting the alleged
violation. 12 U.S.C. 1818(b)(1). The party is entitled to a hearing. Id. The FDIC is also
authorized to issue a temporary cease and desist (asset freeze) order pending completion of the
hearing if the alleged violation is likely to cause insolvency or significant dissipation of assets
... or to weaken the condition of the ... institution or otherwise prejudice the interests of its
depositors .... 12 U.S.C. 1818(c)(1).
1

Doral contends that the public interest clearly favors compliance with the Consent Order.
More so when the EQB has the resources and ability to take over the wastewater treatment plant
and ensure its proper and legal operation. After all, it was the EQB which granted the original
permit for the operation by SIGA of the wastewater treatment plant and allowed that it be
operated outside of the applicable legal and regulatory requirements. Moreover, the EQB has a
statutory obligation to execute the Puerto Rico environmental public policy and, as such, is the

1
After being served with a temporary cease-and-desist order, the ... party may apply to ... the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, for an injunction setting aside, limiting, or suspending ... such order pending the
completion of the administrative proceedings .... 12 U.S.C. 1818(c)(2). Likewise, the FDIC may move to enforce
a challenged asset freeze order. 12 U.S.C. 1818(d).

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government entity responsible to oversee compliance with the islands environmental laws and
regulations. 12 L.P.R.A. 1120.
(e) The Basis for a Temporary Restraining Order
The Fajardo Court order provides that Doral must take over and comply with the proper
and adequate operation of the wastewater treatment plant by no later than J uly 22, 2014.
Moreover, Doral will face monetary sanctions if it fails to comply with the Fajardo Courts order
or even if it chooses to comply with it. Thus, if this Court does not enter a temporary restraining
order preventing the implementation of the Fajardo Court Order, Doral will inevitably suffer
irreparable harm.
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a) the factual statements contained in this request have been
verified by Doral under penalty of perjury. See Exhibit A. Moreover, the undersigned
attorneys certify that on this same date notice of this filing has been given to all defendants.
Evidence of such notice will be filed on this same day.
WHEREFORE, Doral, respectfully requests, that this Court enter a temporary restraining
order staying the Fajardo Court order and, thereafter, schedule a hearing and enter a preliminary
injunction order.






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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
In San J uan, Puerto Rico this day of J uly, 2014.
GURLEY VITALE, PSC
P.O. Box 8387, San J uan, PR 00910-0387
Phone (941) 365-4501/(787) 522-0525
Fax (941) 365-2916/(787) 522-0524

/s/ Alfredo Fernndez-Martnez
Alfredo Fernndez-Martnez, Of Counsel
USDC Bar. No. 210511
Primary: afernandez@GurleyVitale.com

/s/ David E. Gurley
David E. Gurley
USDC Bar No. 221202
Primary: dgurley@GurleyVitale.com
Secondary: eservice@GurleyVitale.com
Attorneys for Doral Bank













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