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C CO ON NS ST TI IT TU UT TI IO ON NA AL L L LA AW W 1 1 R RE EV VI IE EW WE ER R

ARTICLE VIII

SECTION 1
a) Lopez vs. Roxas
Judicial power is the authority of the courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights that are legally demandable
and enforceable before the courts of justice.

DOCTRINE: IF NO LAW IS APPLICABLE, THE COURTS
HAVE NO JURISDICTION.
b) Santiago vs. Bautista
Award of honors to a student by the board of teachers may
not be reversed by the Court where the awards are governed
by no applicable law.
c) Channie Tan vs. Republic
Court has no authority to entertain an action for judicial
declaration of citizenship where there is no law authorizing
such proceeding.
d) Felipe vs. Leuterio
Court may not reverse the award of the bard of judges in an
oratorical contest.
e) UST vs. Board of Tax Appeals
Implicit in the conferment of power on Congress to create
courts and to determine their jurisdiction is the denial of the
same to other departments.
f) Simon vs. CSC
Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as in equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.
g) Villarosa vs. HRET
The court may determine whether the HRET committed
grave abuse of discretion thus former may review the
decision of the latter.
h) Echagaray vs. Secretary of Justice
The power of control over the execution of its decision is
within the province of the Judiciarys power since the
constitution granted it with the entirety of judicial power. The
most important part if litigation whether civil or criminal, is the
process of evaluation of decisions were supervening events
may change the circumstances of the parties to compel the
court to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to
prevent unfairness.
Section 19 Article 7 should not be interpreted as denying the
courts of this power since even after the finality of the
decision, the court may still review their decision. The
suspension of the death sentence is within the exercise of
judicial power and it does not encroach upon the power of
the president to grant reprieve although the effect is the
same.
The same logic lies when the Congress, in exercising its
legislative power enacts a law amending the Death Penalty
Law. To contend that the executive has the power to protect
life would be a violation of the principle of the co-equal and
coordinate powers of the three branches of the government.
a) Santiago vs. Guingona
It is well within the powers of the court to determine whether
the Senate and its members gravely abused their discretion
in the exercise of its function and prerogatives. However, the
court may not delve into matters that are purely within the
internal affairs of the legislature.

SECTION 2
a) Lupangco vs. Court of Appeals
Where a statute designates the court having jurisdiction other
than courts of general jurisdiction, then courts of general
jurisdiction do not have authority. But where there is silence,
the general rule app lies.
b) Mantrust System Inc. vs. CA
The power to prescribe the jurisdiction of the court belongs to
the legislature, except for those powers, which the
constitution says may not be taken from the Supreme Court
(section 5). The president herself in her exercise of her
legislative powers issued the law in question. Thus, because
of the separation of power doctrine, there can be no
justification for judicial interference un the business of
administrative agencies except when there is a violation of
any of the constitutional rights or it commits grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.

DOCTRINE: THE COURT IS ONLY GIVEN JUDICIAL
POWER and NOTHING MORE THUS:
c) Manila Electric co. vs. Pasay Transportation inc
The courts may not be required to act as board of arbitrators
d) Noblejas vs. Tehankee
The court may not be charged of administrative functions
except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial
duties.
e) Director of Prisons vs. .Ang Cho Kio
It is not the function of the court to give advisory opinions

SECTION 4
a) Fortich vs. Corona
A decision of the court 2-2 is a decision in itself that the
motion for reconsideration shall not be granted.
Cases are decided, Matters are resolved.
b) Firestone Ceramics vs. CA
Decisions or resolutions of the Supreme Court en banc is the
decision of the Supreme Court itself. The supreme court is
not an appellate court vis--vis its divisions and exercise no
appellate jurisdiction over the latter. The only constraint is
that the any doctrine or principle of law rendered by the court
en banc or in division can only be reversed or modified by the
court sitting en banc.

SECTION 5
Requisites for the exercise of judicial review:
a) PACU vs. Secretary of Education
There must be before the court, actual case calling for the
exercise of judicial power and such question must be ripe for
adjudication meaning, the governmental action has an
adverse effect on the person challenging it.
b) People vs. Vera
The person challenging must have a legal standing that is,
he/she should have a direct and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustain or will sustain a direct injury as
a result of the enforcement.
c) People vs. Vera
Question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity, so that if it is not raised on the pleasing, it shall
not be raised in the trial, and if not raised on the trial, it may
not be raised on appeal.
d) Philconsa vs. Enriquez
The court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality
unless it is really unavoidable or the lis mota.
Standing:
a) Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorney of the
Philippines vs. COMELEC
The person has standing if it can be shown that:
1. he has personally suffered an injury as a
result of the alleged governmental action
2. Such injury can be directly traced to the
challenged action
3. The injury will likely be redressed by a
favorable action.
b) Kilosbayan vs. Guigona; Tatad vs. Department of
Energy
The SC may take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy
the requirements of legal standing; the Court has adopted a
liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the
petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental
significance to the people or paramount importance to the
public.


TAX PAYERS SUIT
a) Tan vs. Macapagal; Sanidad vs.COMELEC
Tax payers legal standing:
1. When it is established that public funds have
been disbursed in alleged contravention of the
law or the constitution, or in preventing the
illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation.
2. He will sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the questioned statute.

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE
a) de Agbayani vs. Philippine National Bank
The SC rejected the Orthodox view but instead, the court
adopted the view that before an act is declared
unconstitutional it is an operative fact, which can be a source
of rights and duties.
Modalities of constitutional interpretation:
a) historical approach approach through analyzing
the intention of the framers of the Constitution and
the circumstance of its ratification
b) structural approach drawing inference from the
architecture of the three-cornered power
relationships found in the constitutional
arrangement.
c) Doctrinal approach rely on established precedents
d) Ethical approach seeks to interpret the Filipino
moral commitments that are embedded in the
constitutional document
e) Textual approach reading the language of the
constitution as the man on the street would
understand it.
f) Prudential approach weighing and comparing the
costs and benefits that might be found in conflicting
rules.

Political Questions:
a) Baker vs. Carr
Various types of political questions:
textual type: where there is found a textually
demonstrable commitment of the issue to a political
department (Santiago vs. Guingona and Arroyo vs.
devencia)
functional type: lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving the issue or
there is impossibility of deciding without initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial
discretion (Avelino vs. Cuenco, Tanada vs.
Macapagal and Daza vs. Singson)
prudential type: there is impossibility of a courts
undertaking an independent resolution without
expressing lack of respect due to coordinate
branches of government; or adherence to a political
decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question (frequent
during the Marcos Era).

SECTION 6
Maceda vs. Vasquez: power to discipline judges of lower
courts.. (section 11), the ombudsman may not
investigate a judge independently of any administrative
action of the SC.

SECTION 8
Nitafan vc. Commission of Internal Revenue: salary of
judges and justices are subject to income tax; overruled
Endecia vs. David and Perfecto vs. Meer.
People vs. Gacott: decision en banc is needed only
when the penalty to be imposed is dismissal of a judge,
disbarment of a lawyer, suspension for more than one
year and a fine exceeding Php 10,000.00.
Zandueta vs de la Costa: Abolition of office is valid when
done in good faith and not for political or personal
reasons. Ins such a situation, there is no removal from
office because a removal implies that the office exists
after the ouster.
Vistan vs. Nicolas: A judge may not present himself as a
congressional candidate for that would constitute
misconduct.
In re: Judge Manzano: the judge may not accept the
position because of Section 12.
Consing vs CA: the absence of a certification will not
invalidate a decision.
Court Administator vs. Quinanola

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
Aruejo vs CA: Rules promulagater by the COMELEC will
govern only cases filed in the COMELEC. For cases
filed in regular court; rule of court shall prevail.
Orocio vs. COA; Bustamante vs. COA: decisions must
be made by the collegial body
Mison vs. COA: a decision that is void cannot be ratified;
a chairman us not the commission. Absent a decision of
the collegial body, there is no valid decision.
Paredes vs COMELEC: Supreme Court may review
finding of fact but only on cases when there is evidence
of arbitrariness.
Reyes vs RTC: decisions en banc may be brought to
the COURT but motion for reconsideration shall be
decisded by Commission en banc.
Cua vs COMELEC: 2-1 decision valid
Ambil vs. COMELEC: a ponente who retired cannot
promulgate his decision.
Dumayas vs COMELEC: Retirement of the judges
disqualifies them from promulgating the decision. The
justices left may form another majority.
Mateo vs. CA: RA 7902 provides that the judgment of
quasi-judicial agencies may be appealed to the CA
within 15 days from the receipt of notice. This is
pursuant to Section 7, which states: Unless otherwise
provided by this constitution or by law.
Garces vs CA: the case or matter that can be brought to
the SC on certiorari under Section 7 Art IX-C are those
that relate to the exercise of adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial powers. In the case of comelec, THIS involves
elective regional, provincial and city officials.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Aquino vs. CSC: CSC cannot disapprove an
appointment and require the appointment of another
person whom he believes is more qualified.
Binamira vs. Garrucho: Appointment is the selection by
authority vested with power of an individual who is to
exercise the functions of a given office. Designation
connotes merely an imposition by law of additional
duties of an incumbent official. The latter is a function of
the executive. Binamiras appointment was invalid
because he was not appointed by the President.
Borres vs. CA: primarily confidential: nature of the office
must be such as to require (see delos santos)
Briones vs. Osmena: While abolition of office does not
imply removal of the incumbent officer, this is true only
where the abolition of office is done in good faith and not
merely as a cover for a removal otherwise not allowed
by the constitution. The right to abolish cannot be used
to discharge employees in violation of civil service laws
(Gacho vs. Osmena).
Canonizado vs. Aguirre: There is no bona fide
reorganization thus, declaring the positions expired is
unconstitutional.
Delos Santos vs. Mallare: PROXIMITY RULE: every
appointment implies confidence but much more than
ordinary confidence is necessary to a holder of a
position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase
denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the
appointee but primarily close intimacy which ensure
freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or
freedom from misgivings or betrayals of personal trust
on confidential matters of the state.
Mayor vs Macaraig: The commissioners had a right to
remain in office until the expiration of the terms for which
they have been appointed unless removed for cause
provided by law. Security of tenure is protected right
under the constitution. Abolition is not the same as
removal from office.
FLORES vs. DRILON: When an elective official accepts
an appointment without first resigning his elective
position, the appointment is invalid.
Naseco vs. NLRC: civil service laws embrace all
government owned and controlled corporations with
original charterthat is, created by law (EIIB vs CA).
Naseco is not covered by CSC for it is merely a
subsidiary of the NDC.
PNOC vs NLRC: Corporations created by special
charters are subject to Civil Service, those
unincorporated under the Corporation code are not
SAMSON vs CA: The position of assistant secretary to
the mayor is not one of those considered as highly
confidential under Section 5F of RA 2260. What were
enumerated are secretaries but not assistant
secretaries. The compensation attached and
designation given suggest that the position is purely
clerical and the fact the they sometimes handle
confidential matter does not alter the nature of their work
(Ingles vs. Mutuc)
Santiago vs CSC: Power to appoint is a matter of
discretion, next in rank rule does not apply.
Larin vs Executive Secretary: the presidents power to
discipline include the power to remove. But it is limited.
The career service officers and employees who enjoy
security of tenure may be removed only for causes
provided by law in accordance with procedural due
process.
ACHACOSO vs. Macaraig: Permanent appointment can
only be extended to a person that has all the
qualifications. The mere fact that the position he
occupied belongs to a career service does not
automatically confer on him security of tenure.
GARCES vs. CA: Consent of the official concerned is
needed for a transfer to be valid.

COMELEC

SECTION 2
Antonio vs. COMELEC: COMELEC can promulgate its
own rules of procedure.
Tan vs. COMELEC: Commission may merely issue
recommendation of disciplinary action for deputized
officers.
Alunan vs. Mirasol: Election of Sk is beyond the scope
of supervision of the COMELEC
Kilosbayan Inc. vs COMELEC: COMELEC has power to
investigate and prosecute but the complainant must
show probable cause.
LORETO vs. BRION: second placer cannot take place of
the winner
Taule vs. Secretary Santos: The power of COMELEC is
over popular election.
Brillantes vs. Yorac: a designation as acting chairman is
temporary because it is revocable at will. It is not
allowed for it violates the safeguards of the
commissions independence.
Salazar vs. COMELEC: What the constitution says must
be heard en banc are motion for reconsideration of
decisions that is resolution of substantive issues.

SECTION 3
Soller vs. COMELEC: comelec division has jurisdiction
over cases in the first instance.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Supanagan Jr. vs. Santos: legislative bodies of local
governments shall have Sectoral representation as may
be prescribed by law. Under the Local Government
Code (BP 337), the power to appoint Sectoral is
conferred upon the President of the Philippines but the
secretary of Local Government may, by authority of the
president inform the Sectoral representatives of their
appointments. It is the president who appoints and the
secretary is merely the transmitter.
Tan vs. COMELEC: Areas affected refer to both places
that are covered by the new province and those other
areas of the Province of Negros Occidental since the
remaining areas are also affected. As provided in the
dissenting opinion of Justice Abad Santos in the case of
Paredes vs. Executing Secretary, when the constitution
speaks of the unit or units affected, t means all of the
people of the municipality if such is to be divided, or all
the people of two or more municipalities if there be a
merger.
Padilla vs. COMELEC: The deletion of the phrase unit
or in Section 10 Article 10 of the constitution does not
affect the ruling in Tan vs. COMELEC. The reason that
when the law states that the plebiscite shall be
conducted in the political units directly affected, it means
that residents of the political entity who would be
economically dislocated by the separation of a portion
thereof should have a right to vote in the said plebiscite
Abella vs. COMELEC: Component cities are those
whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for
provincial elective officials are treated like highly
urbanized cities which are outside the supervisory power
of the province to which they are geographically
attached. Such independence carries with it the
prohibition directed to registered voters not to vote and
be voted for the provincial elective offices.
Cordillera Broad Coalition vs. COA: CAR is merely an
administrative region created under the Reorganization
Plan. Considering the control and supervision exercised
by the President over CAR and the offices created under
EO 220, CAR may be considered at most as a regional
coordinating agency if the National Government which is
similar to the regional development councils which the
president may create under Section 14
Abbas vs. COMELEC: the creation of the autonomous
region is made effective upon the approval by a majority
votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite. Even
is we assume that it is in conflict with the Tripoli
agreement, the standard for the validity of said act is
provided by the constitution, thus RA 6734 will prevail.
Moreover, granting that the Tripoli agreement is part of
the law of the land, it will be of the same class as RA
6734, which is a statute. The rule is that the Later law
prevails thus RA 6734 will prevail over the older Tripoli
agreement.
Cordillera Regional Assembly vs. COMELEC: It is
expressly provided in the constitution that the
autonomous region shall be composed of provinces,
cities, municipalities, etc. In other words, the term
region used should mean two or more provinces.
Leonor vs. Cordillera Bodong Administration: Since
Cordillera Autonomous region did not come into
existence since only Ifugao ratified RA 6766, as a
consequent, the Cordillera Bodong Administration which
was created in pursuant to section 13 of EO 226, the
indigenous and special courts for the indigenous cultural
communities of the Cordillera region and the CPLA as
the regional police force do not legally exist.

ACCOUNTABILITY

! Hipolitas vs. Mergas: Even if the offense is not very
serious, the nature of the position amounts the acts as
malfeasance. Public Service requires utmost integrity
and strictest discipline. The yardstick of public service is
honesty and integrity, both imprinted in the 1973 and the
1987 constitution.
! ROMULO vs. YNIGUEZ: The Batasan by a majority, as
provided for the rules of court can dismiss the complaint
for impeachment because there would not be any use of
proceeding further if the required 2/3 would not be
obtained. Such act of the Batasan as a body is an
exercise of powers that have been vested upon it by the
Constitution beyond the power of the court to review.
! IN RE GONZALEZ: A public officer who under the
constitution is required to be a member if the Philippines
Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who
may be removed from office by impeachment, cannot be
charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such
public officer. Such public officer during his incumbency
cannot be charged before the Sandinganbayan or any
other court with the offence which carries with it penalty
of removal from office, or any penalty service of which
would amount to removal from office
! NUNEZ vs. SANDIGANBAYAN: The creation of the
Sandiganbayan was precisely aimed for curtailing and
minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and
maintaining a standard of honesty in public service.
! MAYOR LECAROZ vs. SAN: broad powers were given
to the sandiganbayan which includes all other civil and
criminal practices involving public officers of the court.
Section 4 Article XIII of the Constitution provides for the
creation of a special as the Sandiganbayan which has
jurisdiction cases involving such other offenses
committed by public officers and employees, including
those in government-owned and controlled corporations
in relation to their office as may be determined by law.
! ZALDIVAR vs. SAN: The Tanodbayan (Special
Prosecutor) and Ombudsman have different duties. The
former shall be known as the Office of the Special
Prosecutor and shall continue to function as may have
been provided for by law except those conferred on the
Office of the Ombudsman created under the
Constitution. The latter shall have the duty to investigate
on its own, any act or omissions of any public official
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient.
! DELOSO vs. DOMINGO: The clause any illegal act or
omission of any public official is broad enough to
embrace any crime committed by a public official.
Furthermore, the Ombudsman act makes perfectly clear
that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all
kinds of malfeasance that have been committed by any
officer or employee during his tenure of office. The
murder of 3 persons is no doubt an illegal act and since
this was committed by a governor, the crime lies within
the jurisdiction of the Ombudsmans investigative
authority.
! CRUZ vs. SANDIGANBAYAN: The authority of the
Ombudsman is not exclusive but is concurrent with other
similarly authorized agencies of the government like the
PCGG.
! BUENSADA vs. FLAVIER: The Ombudsman has the
power to suspend government officials and employees
pending investigation. The court held in Nera vs. Garcia
that suspension is just a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. The moment a criminal or
administrative complaint is filed with the ombudsman,
the respondent is deemed to be in his authority and he
can proceed to determine whether said respondent
should be placed under preventive suspensions.
! NATIVIDAD vs. FELIX: Deloso vs Domingo has already
been re-examined in the case of Aguinaldo vs. Domagas
and Sanchez vs. Demetriou which both provided that the
authority of the Ombudsman is not an exclusive authority
but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of
the offense charged. Accordingly, the Ombudsman may
take over the investigation of such case at any stage
from any investigative agency of the Government.
! CONCERNED OFFICIALS OF MWSS vs. VASQUEZ:
The discretion to accept or reject a bid and award
contract is vested on government agencies. Courts will
not interfere unless it is apparent that it is used as a
shield to a fraudulent award.
! LASTIMOSA vs. VASQUEZ: In the exercise of his
powers, the Ombudsman is authorized to call in
prosecutors for assistance as provided for in Seciton 31
of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (RA 6770). When a
prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the supervision
and control of the Ombudsman meaning, he is subject to
the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve
reverse and modify his decision. Petitioner cannot
legally act on her own and refuse to prepare and file the
information as directed by the Ombudsman.
The preventive suspension is also valid in pursuant to
Section 24 of the Ombudsman act which expressly
provided that the preventive suspension shall continue
until the case is terminated by the Office of the
Ombudsman, but not more than six months without pay.
ALMONTE vs. VASQUEZ: The privilege of confidentiality
is recognized only on matters relating to military,
diplomatic and other national security secrets. If the
claim of confidentiality does not rest on these matters,
the privilege cannot be invoked.

GENERAL PROVISIONS

! METRAN vs. PAREDES: It is also a well settled rule that
where a suit is brought against an officer or agency with
relation to some matter in which defendant represents
the state in action and liability, and the state, while not a
party to the record, is the real party against which relief
is sought so that a judgment for plaintiff, although
nominally against the named defendant as an individual
or entity distinct from the state, will operate to control the
action of the state or subject it to liability, the suit is in
effect one against the state and cannot be maintained
without its consent.
! NATIONAL AIRPORTS CORP vs. TEODORO: Not all
government entities, whether corporate or non-
corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suits is
determined by the character of the objects for which the
entity is organized.
! CAA vs. CA: It has already been settled in the Teodoro
case that CAA as an agency is not immune from suit. It
being engaged in functions pertaining to a private entity
for is essentially runs a business, even if revenues be
not its prime objective but the promotion of travel and the
convenience of the traveling public, an enterprise not
exclusive prerogative of the state
! REPUBLIC vs. FELICIANO: A suit for the recovery of
property is not an action in rem but an action in
personam. It is an action directed against a specific
party or parties and any judgment therein binds only
such party or parties. The complaint is clearly a suit
against the state which under settled jurisdiction is not
permitted, except upon a showing that the state has
consented to be sued, wither expressly or impliedly
! MOBIL PHILIPPINES vs. ARRASTRE: A non-corporate
government entity performs a function proprietary in
nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If
said non-governmental function is undertaken as an
incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver
of sovereign immunity from suit extended to such
government entity
! FESTEJO vs. FERNANDO: Rule of immunity may be
relaxed where its strict application will result in an
injustice.
! MINISTERIO vs. CFI: Municipal corporations exist in a
dual capacity and their functions are twofold. In one
they exercise the right springing form sovereignty the
other capacitates the municipalities to exercise a private,
proprietary right. In the second function, the officers and
agents act in their corporate or individual capacity.
! MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO vs. JUDGE
FIRME: The test of liability of the municipality depends
on whether or not the driver, acting on behalf of the
municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary
functions
! DA vs. NLRC: a state may be said to have descended to
the level of an individual and this can be deemed to have
actually given its consent to be sued only when it
appears into business contracts. It does not apply
where the contract relate to the exercise of sovereign
functions (US vs. Ruiz).
! PNR vs. IAC: Consent of state to be sued can be
manifested expressly through a general or special law or
indicated implicitly as when the state commences
litigation for the purposed of asserting an affirmative
relief or when it enters into a contract. When the state
enters into a covenant, it is deemed to have descended
to the level of the other party.
! REPUBLIC vs. SANDOVAL: The Mendiola Commission
only has recommendatory powers and he presidents
statement was merely an expression of solidarity with
the rallyists. Although consent to be sued may be given
impliedly, still it cannot be maintained that such consent
was given considering the circumstances obtaining in
the instant case
! US. vs. REYES: The doctrine of state immunity and its
exceptions are summarized in Shauf vs. CA where it
was held that the rule may not be sued without its
consent is one of the generally accepted principles of
international law that we have adopted as part of the law
of the land. While the doctrine appears to prohibit suits
against the state without its consent, it is also applicable
to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their
duties.
! WYKIE vs. RARANG: Crimes cannot be possible
covered by the immunity agreement. Our laws and even
the laws of US do no allow the commission of cries in
the name of official duty.
! REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA vs. VINZONS: The rule that
a state may not be sued without its consent is a
necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of states. All states are
sovereign equals and cannot assert justification over one
another. The establishment of a diplomatic mission is an
act jure imperii. Entering into a contract for maintenance
is therefore an act jure imperii and not a waiver of
immunity.

NATIONAL PATRIMONY

! SANTA ROSA MINING vs. LEIDO: whatever right that
was vested over the mining claims before PD 1214 were
merely possessory right which can be lost through
abandonment or forfeiture or may be revoked for valid
legal grounds.








N NO OT TE ES S A AN ND D D DI IG GE ES ST TS S


Article VIII
The Judicial Department

Section 1
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.


Since Congress has the power to create, they have the
power to dissolve courts.

Judicial Power
There are two requirements for the application of judicial
power:
There must be an actual controversy.
The controversy should be decideable by the
application of law.

Hypothetical questions are not for the Courts to decide. Nor
can they give advisory opinions because advisory opinions
are hypothetical in nature. The best way to decide
controversies is through a fair appreciation

Political question: when the Constitution has given the
resolution of the question to the political departments or to
the people in their sovereign capacity to decide.

Baker v. Carr

Considering Section 1 of Article VIII, whatis a political
question? (found in page 506 of the large book)

According to CJ Concepcion, it is the duty of the Court to
answer questions concerning grave abuse of discretion. Not
a new provision. Found in the Civil Code.

U.S. v. Nixon

Who decides executive privilege? US Supreme Court: we
do. Although there may be confidential documents. The
Supreme Court may see this behind closed doors.

Judicial power is the right to determine actual controversies
arising between adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of
proper jurisdiction (Muskrat v. United States, 219 US 346)

It is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes
involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before
the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violation of
such rights (Lopez v. Roxas 17 SCRA 756)

The exercise of judicial power goes beyond the promulgation
of final decisions. In the Echegaray case, the Supreme Court
issued a temporary restraining order delaying the execution
of the sentence. In that decision, the Court said that the
power to control the execution of its decision is an essential
aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial
subtraction because the Constitution vests the entirety of
judicial power in one Supreme Court and other such lower
courts as may be established by law.

As to the claim that such power was an intrusion into the
executive, the Court said that the presidential power of
pardon cannot be interpreted to mean that the courts are
powerless to enforce their decisions after their finality. An
accused convicted of final judgment still possesses collateral
rights and these rights can still be claimed in the appropriate
courtts. Thus, the courts still have power over the execution
of a sentence.

Since what is given to the judiciary is only judicial power, the
courts may not do anything that is beyond the scope of
judicial power (Meralco v. Pasay Transportation Co. 57 Phil.
600). Also found application in Noblejas v. Teehankee (23
SCRA 405) where as Commissioner on Land Registration he
claimed the same privileges and emoluments as a judge of a
Court of First Instance. The Supreme Court ruled that it had
no administrative power over officials of the Executive
Department.

When a law says that disputes between government
agencies shall be settled administratively and the
administrative decision shall have the effect of a final
decision of the courts of justice, it means that recourse to
courts is premature before the exhaustion of administrative
remedies (PHIVIDEC v. Velez, G. R. No. 84295)

When a law prohibits courts from issuing injunctions in cases
involving infrastructure projects of the government, such a
prohibition can only refer to administrative acts in
controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in
technical cases. Outside this, and on issues involving
questions of law, the courts cannot be prevented from
exercising power (Malaga v. Penachos, Jr. G. R. No. 86695)

Grave abuse of discretion
Sinon v. Civil Service Commission: is meant such carpricious
and whimsical exercise of judgement as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction.

Garcia v. Board of Investments

Synopsis BOI abused authority when nothing was
shown to justify the transfer of the petrochem plant to
Batangas except blanket discretion given to investors to
choose the site or transfer it from their first choice.

Advisory opinions
The recommendatory powers of the Courts are limited to
Article 5 of the RPC. (Director of Prisons v. Ang Cho Kio 92
Phil 906). An advisory opinionis a response to a legal issue
posed in the abstract. This is not a judicial act.

Declaratory Relief


Four requirements for Declaratory Relief:
there must be a justiciable controversy
the controversy must be between persons whose
interests are adverse
the party seeking relief must have an interest in the
controversy
the issue involved must be ripe for legal
determination

A declaratory judgment involves real parties with conflicting
legal interests. A declaratory judgment is final and binding on
the parties.

Section 2
The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not
deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5 hereof.

No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it
undermines the security of tenure of its Members.

The Supreme Court has constitutional powers and Statutory
powers (which is up to Congress to allow).

The courts cannot injoin discretionary acts of executive
bodies.

Congress has the power to create new courts and to
apportion jurisdiction among various courts. Congress may
not impair the independence of the judiciary. Section 5 deals
with powers that Congress may never take away.

In Mantrust Systems, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the restriction
of an injuction against APT in connection with the disposition,
sale, and acquisition of assets transferred to it or against any
purchaser of the assets sold by the Trust by means of a
Presidential Proclamation does not impair the judicial power
of courts because the power to prescribe the power of the
courts belong to the legislature, and Marcos was THE
legislature at that time.

Whether or not courts of general jurisdiction have authority
over administrative agencies depend on the statutes
governing the suibject. Where the statute designates the
court having jurisdiction other than courts of general
jurisdiction, then courts of general jurisdiction have no
authority. Otherwise, the general rule applies (Lupango v.
CA, 160 SCRA 848)

The proper exercise of judicial power requires prior legislative
action definining such enforceable and demandable rights
and prescribing remedies for violations of such rights and
determining the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide
controversies and disputes arising from legal rights.

Jurisdiction is the authority of a court to exercise judicial
power in a specific case and is a prerequisite of judicial
poower, which is the totality of powers a court exercises
when it assumes jurisdicition and hears and decides a case
(Corwin, the Constitution of the USA).

The authority of Congress to create courts of varying
jurisdictions is subject only to the limitations that it may not
reduce the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and that it
cannot create a second Supreme Court and confer additonal
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court (without its approval).

The power to create courts takes with it the power to abolish
courts, but Congress cannot abolish courts to remove
unwanted judges. Congress can reorganize the judiciary but
not the SC.

Section 3
The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for
the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the
amount appropriated for the previous year and, after
approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.

The grant of fiscal autonomy to the judiciary assures its
independence. Appropriations may not be reduced beyond
that given the year prior and should be regularly and
automatically released.

The Department of Budget and Management cannot tell the
Supreme Court what kind of equipment it may purchase. The
provision is not new.

Section 3. Fiscal Autonomy

Radiowealth v. Agregalado

Facts This case is about the purchase and installation of
P585 worth of Webster Teletalk machines, model 206MA,
and Webster telephone speakers. The Clerk of Court certified
the purchase and installation of these machines on the 2nd
and 3rd floor of Malacaang Annex, which used to house the
Supreme Court, were of urgent character and necessary to
public service.

C. L. Dacanay, chairman of the Property Requisition
Committee appointed by the President disapproved the
purchase and installation as contrary to EO 302 and the
policy adopted by the cabinet discontinuing open market
purchases, as well as being violative of EO 298.

The Auditor-General also refused to sign the treasury warrant
to be able to pay Radiowealth.

Held In the requisition of fixtures, equipment, and
supplies, both the executive and judicial departments are on
the same footing. The several EOs that the Auditor-General
gives as basis for refusing to sign the warrant are not based
on express legislation.

Bengson v. Drilon

Facts The issue is on the constitutionality of the veto by
the President of certain provisions in the 1992 GPA relating
to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired justices of
the Supreme Court.

Held The attempt to use veto power to set aside a
resolution of the Supreme Court to deprive retirees of
benefits given them by RA 1797 trenches upon the fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary granted by the Constitution.

Fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the judiciary, CSC, COA,
COMELEC, Office of the Ombudsman, and other
constitutional commissions contemplates a guarantee of full
flexibility to allocate and utilize resources with the wisdom
and dispatch that their needs require.



The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner
the independent constitutional offices allocates and utilizes
funds for their operatons is anathema to fiscal autonomy.

Notes Fiscal autonomy is the power and authority to levy,
assess, and collect fees, fix rates of compensation. This case
was brought about by a misunderstanding of the concept of
veto power.


Section 4
(1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice
and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its
discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.

(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,
international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be
heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases
which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en
banc, including those involving the constitutionality,
application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other
regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or
resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in
the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the
concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the
required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided
en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid
down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in
division may be modified or reversed except by the court
sitting en banc.


Composed of one Chief Justice and fourteen Associate
Justices. A vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled
within 90 days.

Composition may not be changed by ordinary legislation.

Divisions of up to three, five, and seven members each, three
justices required to make a decision, otherwise it must be
decided en banc. The divisions are as provided for in the
Rules of Court.

Today, there are three divisions of five each.

The following must be heard en banc
Constitutionality of a treaty, international or
executive agreement, or law
Constitutionality of presidential decreees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other
regulations,
Where a majority in a division is not obtained
Reversing or modifying a principle of law previously
laid down in banc or in division
Administrative cases where the vote is for a
dsimissal of a judge of a lower court or the discipline of one
Election contests of either the President or the Vice
President

Court en banc is not an appellate court. Doctrinal decisions
may only be overturned by court sitting en banc. When sitting
en banc, the case is decided by a majority of the number of
justices who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues and voted thereon.

Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or
resolved with a concurrence of a majority of the Members
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in
the case and voted thereon means that the word decided
must be applied to cases and the word resolved must be
applied to matters, applying the rule of reddendo singula
singulis. The three vote rule does not apply when the
required three votes is not obtained in seeking a motion for
reconsideration. The failure of the division to resolve the
motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case
undecided (Fortich v. Corona, G. R. No. 131457)

Section 5
The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question.

(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost,
assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation
thereto.

(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in
issue.

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua or higher.

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is
involved.

(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations
as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment
shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge
concerned.

(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a
miscarriage of justice.

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,
the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-
privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.



(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in
accordance with the Civil Service Law.

Fortich v. Corona

Facts Carlos Fortich was governor of Bukidnon and
Renato Corona (now SC Justice) was the Deputy Executive
Secretary during the time of this case. The case deals with a
piece of land which was conveted from being a non-
agricultural land to agricultural land under the Agrarian
Reform Program.

Some farmers were contesting an earlier decision of the
court through a motion of reconsideration. The 2
nd
resolution
ended with a vote of 2-2.

The farmers interpreted this pursuant to the Constitutional
provision that says cases or matters by a division shall be
decided by a majority of the members who actually took part
in the deliberations on the issues in the canse and voted
thereon, and in no case without a concurrence of at least
three such members. When the required number is not
obtained, the case shall be decided en banc, provided that
no doctrine or principle or law laid down by the Court in a
decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or
reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.

Held The framers distinguished between cases and
matters. Cases are decided and matters are resolved using
reddendo singula singulis. It is clear that only cases are
referred to the Court en banc for decision whenever the
required number of votes is not obtaned.

In the case, there is a 2-2 vote on the motion for
reconsideration. This means that the motion is lost and the
assailed decision is not reconsidered and therefore deemed
affirmed.

Marbury v. Madison

Held Whether an act repugnant to the Constitution can
become the law of the land. The Constitution is the
paramount law of the land, an act of legislature, repugnant to
the Constitution is void. It is the duty of the Court to decide
cases where laws are in conflict with each other. If a law is
void because of its repugnance to the Constitution, does it,
notwithstanding its validity, bind courts and oblige them to
give effect? It is the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.

Notes In cases where a law passed by the legislature is
contrary to the Constitution, the Constitution takes
precedence.


Angara v. Electoral Commission

Facts Angara was elected to the National Assembly on
December 3, 1935. On December 9, 1935, the Electoral
Commission by resolution fixed that as the date of the last
day of filing prostests against elections, returns, and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly.

Held The National Assembly has in effect cut off the
power of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests
because the Electoral Commission has the sole power of
regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National
Assembly

The judicial department has the obligation of interpreting the
Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries.

The Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and
the subject matter of the case at bar for the purpose of
determining the character, scope, and extent of the
Constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as the sole
judge of contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.

Tan v. Macapagal

Facts Eugene Tan, Silvestre Ocampo, and Rogelio
Fernandez of Roxas City filed for declaratory relief as
taxpayers assailing the validity of the Laurel-Leido resolution
dealing with the range of authority of the 1971 Constitutional
Commission

Issues Whether or not the petitioners have the standing to
sue.
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction to say/interfere with
the Concom

Held The person who impugns the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of its enforcement

The case must be ripe for adjudication, which in this case it is
not. The judiciary must leave the ConCom to fulfill its
responsibility. As long as the proposed amendments are still
unacted, there is no room for the interposition of a judicial
oversight. Only after the amendment is ratified can the
appropriate case be instilled.

PACU v. Sec. of Education

Facts PACU requests that Act No. 2706 as amended by
Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional because
A. It deprives owners of schools and colleges as well
as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due
process of law
B. It deprives parents of their natural right and duty to
rear their children for civic efficiency
C. Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of
Education unlimited power to prescribe rules and standards
is an unlawful delegation of legislative power.
Issue Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction

Held When a law has been treated as constitutional, the
Court may refuse to consider an attack on its validity.

The petitioners here have suffered no wrong from the
enforcement of the criticized statutes.

Judicial power is limited to actual cases and controversies.
The Court does not sit to adjudicate mere academic
questions to satisfy scholarly interest.



Gonzales v. Marcos



Facts Gonzales raised a constitutional question regarding
an impermissible encroachment of President Marcos on the
legislative prerogative. The issue is centered on the validity
of the creation of EO 30, a trust for the benefit of the Filipino
people under the name and style of the CCP, entrusted with
the task of constructing a national theater and music hall, an
arts building and facilities to awaken the peoples
consciousness in our cultural heritage and to encourage
assistance in its preservation.

The respondents contend that the petitioner has no
personality to contest the case since the funds to construct
the CCP came from donations and gifts and not from
taxation.

Issue Meanwhile, President Marcos issued PD 15 and
179 creating the CCP, defined its functions, and since the
PDs were issued during Martial Law, the constitutionality of
EO 30 is rendered moot and academic.

LOCUS STANDI

Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance

Facts VAT is issued on the sale, barter, or exchange of
goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of
services. It is equivalent to the 10 percent of the gross selling
prices of gross value in money of goods or properties sold,
bartered, or exchanged or from the gross receipts from the
sale or exchange of services.

RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT
system and enhance its administration by amending the
NIRC role.

The substantive issues raised in some of the cases are
presented in abstract and hypothetical form because of lack
of concrete record.

Held The Court has no power to render advisory opinions
or even jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory judgment. In
the case at bar, the Court is being asked to sit as a 3
rd

legislative chamber to view the law.

Solicitor General v. MMA

Facts In MTC v. Gonong the Court held that the
confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles for traffic
violations was not among the sanctions that could be
imposed by the Metro Manila Commission, unless the
vehicles were stalled and obstructing the public streets. Even
the confiscation of licences is not allowed.

On May 1990, the MMA issued an ordinance authorizing
itself to detach the license plates, tow and impound attended,
unattended, abandoned motor vehicles that are illegally
parked.

The Solicitor General notes that the conflict between the
Gonong decisions and the MMA ordinance has created
confusion among motiorists. He also said that the sanctions
arer illegal, violative of law, and should be stopped.
The MMA argued that there was no conflict between the
Gonong decision and the MMA ordinance because the
ordinance was supposed to supplement, not supplant the
Gonong decision. The decision itself said that the
conficscation of licenses was invalid in the absence of a valid
law or ordinance which was why Ordinance II was enacted.
The MMA pointed out that the ordinance could not be
attacked collaterally but only in a direct action concerning its
validity.

Held The court decided to address the problem because
of lack of clarity in the law. The court relaxed procedural rules
in exercise of its inherent power because of the importance
to the public.

Joya v. PCGG

Facts 35 Petitioners in the special civil action for
prohibition and mandamus and preliminary injunction to stop
the PCGG from proceeding with the auction sale scheduled
on January 11, 1991 by Christies of New York of the Old
Masters Painting and 18
th
and 19
th
century silverware seized
from the Marcoses.

Issue Whether or not the Court had the power to review
the case

Held In this case, the Court Held

1. The paintings and the silverware are not public
property. The paintings were donated to the Metropolitan
Museum. The silverware was seized from the Marcoses.
2. The writ of mandamus cannot prosper because the
petitioners are not after the fulfillment of a positive duty in
light of an enforceable right.
3. It cannot prosper also as a taxpayer suit because
the artwork and the silverware were not purchased with
public funds.
4. There is no actual case, because the auction
happened already. The case is moot.

Macasiano v. NHA

Facts Macasiano sought to have Sec. 28 and 44 of RA
7279 (Urban Devt and Housing Act of 1992) declared
unconstitutional. His locus standi was based on his being a
consultant of the DPWH and his being a taxpayer. The
provisions in question provide for rules regarding eviction and
demolition. It discourages eviction and demolition and
provides for a moratorium of 3 years. Macasiano says that
the provisions are unconstitutional because they deprive the
government and private property owners of their property
without due process.

Issue Whether the court can review the case

Held There is no actual controversy. The petitioner did
not claim that the provsions actually prevented him from
performing his duties as a consultant and exercising his
rights as a property owner. He has no locus standi.

Requisities for declaratory relief are:
1. justiciable controversy
2. adverse litigants
3. the party seeking relief must have legal interest

Petition dismissed.

Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC



Facts Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Sec. 51,
Art. X of RA 7854. The present elective officials of the
Municipality of Makati will continue as officials of the City of
Makati and exercise their powers and functions until a new
election is held and the new officials have qualified or
assumed their office.
The petitioners contend that this is against Section 8, Art. X
and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution which provides
that the term of office of elective local officials as three years
(except barangay officials whose terms are defined by law),
none having more than three consecutive terms.

The petitioners said that the section of RA 7854 restarts the
term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati and
disregards the term previously served by them, particularly
favoring Mayor Binay who already has three consecutive
terms.

Held The Court cannot entertain the case. They are
presenting a hypothetical issue that Mayor Binay will run
again, Also, petitioners are residents of Taguig and are not
the proper parties to raise the abstract issue.

Oposa v. Factoran

Facts The plaintiffs are all minors duly represented and
joined by their parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is
the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. The original defendant
was the then Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., now replaced by Angel
Alcala.

The plaintiffs want the DENR to cancell all existing timber
license agreements and to cease and decist in receiving all
timber licenses and approving new timber licenses.

The defendants said the plaintiffs have no cause of action
and the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question.

Issue Whether the petitioners have a cause of action to
prevent misappropriation or impairment of Philippine
rainforests

Held Petitioners instituted a class suit. The subject matter
of the complaint is the general interest of all citizens of the
Philippines. The petitioner minors assert that they represent
their generation and the generations yet unknown. Their
personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is
based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility.
Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve
the rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced
ecology.


Kilosbayan v. Guingona, Jr.

Facts This case seeks to prohibit and restrain the
implementation of a Contract of Lease executed by the
PCSO and PGMC in connection with the online lottery
system, also known as the lotto.

Kilosbayan, a nonstock demestic corporation composed of
civic-spirited citizens, nuns, priests, pastors, and lay leaders
are suing in their capacity as taxpayers and concerned
citizens. Senators Freddie Webb and Wigberto Taada and
Representative Joker Arroyo are suing as members of
Congress and as taxpayers.

Public respondents allege that the petitioners have no
standing to maintain the instant suit.

Held A partys standing before the Court is a procedural
technicality which it may in the exercise of its discretion set
aside in view of the importance of the issues raised.
Jurisprudence likewise shows that the SC entertains cases of
paramount importance to public interest even if it appears
that petitioners have no locus standi.

The instant petition in the case at bar is of paramount public
interest and the ramifications of such issues immeasurably
affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the
people even in the remotest barangays and the counter
productive and retrogressive effects staggering as it is
expected to raise billions of pesos.

Board of Optometry v. Colet

Facts The petitioners seek to set aside and restrain the
enforcement of RA 8050, an act regulating the practice of
optometry (Revised Optometry Law of 1995)

The petitioners argue that RA 8050 derogates and violates
the fundamental right of every Filipino to reasonable
safeguards against deprivation of life, liberty, and property
without due process of law.

Issue Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the
Constitutional case

Held There is the unbending rule in Constitutional Law
that courts will not assume jurisdiction over a Constitutional
question unless the following requisites are satisfied:

1. There must be an actual case or controversy
invoving a conflict of rights suceptible to judicial
determination.
2. The constitutional question must be raised by
the proper party
3. The constitutional question must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity
4. The resolution of the constitutional question must be
necessary to the solution of the case.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case that is
appropriate or ripe for adjudication. There is no actual case
involving any or all of the private respondents, hence this
case is just for declaratory relief.

The perties have no locus standi in this case since they are
not licensed optometrists and not even juridical persons.

Tatad v. Garcia

Facts The petition is to prohibit respondents from
implementing and enforcing the Revised and Restated
Agreement to build and lease and transfer a LRT System for
EDSA.

The petitioners Francisco Tatad, Serge Osmea III, and
Rodolfo Biazon are suing as members of the Senate and as
taxpayers. The respondent Jesus Garcia is the incumbent


Secretary of Transportation while private respondent EDSA
LRT Corp. is a Hong Kong based company.

The Agreement provided for the captialization and
construction of the EDSA LRT III. The private respondent
shall construct the LRT III and then the DOTC will run it. The
DOTC will give monthly rentals to the private respondent to
recover its capital, taken from the earnings of the rail line.
After 25 years, the DOTC shall have completed the payment
and the ownership of the project shall be transferred to the
latter.

Issue Whether or not the respondents have the standing
to file the case

Held The prevailing doctrrines in taxpayer suits are to
allow taxpayers to question contracts entered into by the
national government and in government owned and
controlled corporations allegedly in contravention of the law
and to disallow the same when only municipal contracts are
involved. However, following the Kilosbayan ruling, the
Supreme Court has no choice but to give locus standi to the
petitioners.

Separate Opinion (Mendoza)

As members of Congress, because they allege no
infringement of prerogative as legislators. 1 As taxpayers
because petitioners allege neither an unconstitutional
exercise of the taxing or spending powers of Congress nor
an illegal disbursement of public money.
As taxpayers, the suit must specifically prove that he has
sufficient interest in that he will sustain a direct injury as a
result of the illegal expenditure of public money raised by
taxation. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general
interest common to all members of the public. In that case, a
local government BOT contract for a public market did not
involve a disbursement of public funds so there was no locus
standi.

In order that citizens' actions may be allowed a party must
show that
he personally has suffered some actual or
threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of
the government;
the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action;
and
the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
action.

Today's holding that a citizen, qua citizen, has standing to
question a government contract unduly expands the scope of
public actions and sweeps away the case and controversy
requirement so carefully embodied in Art. VIII, 5 in defining
the jurisdiction of this Court. The result is to convert the Court
into an office of ombudsman for the ventilation of generalized
grievances.

Kilosbayan v. Morato

Facts As a result of the decision in Kilosbayan v.
Guingona, the PCSO and PGMC entered into a new
agreement that would be consistent with the PCSO charter
and conformable with the Courts decision.

On January 25, 1995, the parties signed an Equipment
Lease Agreement (ELA) whereby the PGMC leased online
lottery equipment and accessories to the PCSO in
consideration of a rental agreement equivalent to 4.3% of
ticket sales. The term of the lease is 8 years starting from the
start of the commercial operation of the lottery equipment.

On February 1995, a suit was filed seeking to declare the
ELA invalid because it was substantially the same as the old
lease contract. If ever it was different, it should be considered
void because it violated the PCSO charter and the decision
of this Court.

The PCSO maintains that the ELA is a different lease
contract and that it did not have the funds to purchase its
own lottery equipment. Respondents question the right of the
petitioners to bring the suit on the ground that not being
parties to the contract of lease, they have no personal and
substatntial interest likely to be injured by the enforcement of
the contract.

Held The petition was dismissed, 7-6, but was later
overturned when some of the judges who voted in favor of
the PCSO retired. The petition was then sustained, 8-5


Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization

Facts Bagatsing is assailing the validity of the contract
entered into by the government selling 48% shares in Petron
for violating the rights of members of Congress or
impermissibly intruding into the domain of the Legislature.

Petitioners also claim that the business of oil refining is a
public utility and should not be sold to foreigners, in this case
a Dutch company.

Issue Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to
sue as members of Congress and as taxpayers

Held They have no legal standing as members of
Congress because they failed to show that the contract
impaired them as members of Congress.

However, they can still sue as taxpayers because of the
ruiling in Kilosbayan v. Guingona that taxpayers may sue if
there is a misappropriation of public funds contrary to law.

In this case, the SC still ruled in favor of PNOC since they
found that PETRON is not involved in the buisiness of oil
refining and therefore is not a public utility.

TELEBAP, GMA7 v. COMELEC

Facts Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the
Philippines with GMA 7 challenged the validity of RA 6646
which provided for the sale of print, radio, and TV ads to the
COMELEC during elections for free.

TELEBAP is suing as taxpayers and citizens and GMA is
suing as a franchise holder.

Issue Whether or not the petitioner have locus standi to
file the case



Held The TELEBAP, although a group of lawyers in the
media industry does not have standing to sue since they did
not show that they had a personal and substantial interest in
the case and that they were unjustly afffected by the act.
GMA, however, has the capacity to sue since they showed
that in granting the ads for free, they stand to lose profits.

In this case, however, the SC ruled in favor of the COMELEC
since COMELEC Time will inform the public and the right of
the people to information is paramount to the autonomy of
the broacdcast media and to affirm the validity of RA 6646
bears a social function that is for the common good.

Gonzales v. Narvasa

Facts Ramon Gonzales in his capacity as a citizen and
taxpayer assails the constituionality of the creation of the
PCCR and of the positions of presidential consultants and
advisers by executive order. The PCCR is tasked to review
proposed amendments to the 1987 Constitution.

Issue Whether or not Gonzalez has the locus standi to
sue

Held A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish
that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government. In
this case, petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or
is in danger of sustaining personal injury attributed to the
creation of the PCCR.

If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner that can claim any
injury in this case.

A tax payer has standing to raise a constitutional issue when
it is established that public funds have been disbursed in
alleged contravention of the law.

Sandoval v. PAGCOR

Facts PAGCOR, a GOCC organized and requested for
legal advice from the Secretary of Justice whether or not it is
authorized by its charter to operate and manage Jai Ailai
frontons in the country. The Secretary of Justice said that
PAGCOR was allowed to operate frontons under its charter.

Petitioner Del Mar filed a petition to prevent PAGCOR from
managing and operating the jai-alai games on the grounds
that it violated the PAGCOR charter and the Constitution.

PAGCOR entered into an agreement with Belle Corporation
where Belle will make available to PAGCOR the required
infrastructure facilities without any financial outlay from
PAGCOR while PAGCOR handles the actual management
and operation of jai alai.

Sandoval also sought to prevent PAGCOR from managintg
the jai alai games by itself or in joint venture for being
patently illegal and having no basis in the law. Del Mar and
Sandoval are suing as taxpayers and in their capacity as
members of the House of Representatives.

Issue Whether or not Sandoval and Del Mar had real party
interest to bring the case for review

Held The petitioners have no legal standing to sue as
taxpayers since no public funds were used byt the court
adopted a liberal policy on locus standi when a case involves
an issue of transcendental significance to society, so the
Court decided to declare the Representatives as having legal
standing to file the petition.


IBP v. Zamora

Facts President Estrada deployed Marines to help the
PNP in patrolling malls after the Rizal pay LRT bombings.
The IBP challenged the validity of the Executive Order as
unconstitutional.

The Executire Secretary contends that the respondents have
no standing because they have no ''real party" interest in the
case.

Issue Whether or not the IBP has locus standi in the case.

Held IBP has no locus standi but the Court brushed aside
the rule following Kilosbayan v. Guingona; where it was held
that locus standi is merely procedural & the courts may take
a liberal approach and brush aside the rule if the case is
paramount to public interest.


BAYAN v. Executive Secretary

Facts BAYAN is a political party in the party-list seat in the
House of Representatives. Together with Reps. Aquino,
Taada, and Arroyo challenged the validity of the Visiting
Forces Agreement as taxpayers and as members of
Congress.

The respondents contend that the petitioners have no
standing but they still heard the case because itis of
transcendental importance to the public interest.

Issue Whether BAYAN and the other Representatives
have standing to contest the validity of the VFA.

Held The Court found that the petitioners had no standing
to have the case heard because as members of the Lower
House, they were not party to the ratification of the treaty.
They also failed to show any direct injury if the treaty was to
be implemented. However, the Court took cognizance of the
case because of its transcendental significance to the
people.


Liang v. People

Facts Jeffrey Liang is a Chinese national employed as an
economist with the Asian Development Bank. He is charged
with allegedly uttering defamatory words to Joyce Cabal, a
member of the clerical staff of the ADB. On April 13, 1994,
the MTC of Mandaluyong acting pursuant to the DFA that
Liang enjoyed immunity from legal processes, dismissed an
earlier criminal case against him. The RTC of Pasig,
however, set aside the order of the MTC, hence the appeal.

Issue The issue is whether or not Jeffrey Liang has a
political personality and therefore the court cannot resolve
the issue because it is a political question



Held The SC also said that the case did not involve a
political question becauese the Court can find legal
standards for resolving the issue. This is the inverse of the
functional type of political question as defined in Baker v.
Carr. The Court ruled that the immunity granted to officers
and staff of the ADB is not absolute, and is limited to acts
performed in an official capacity. Slander or oral defamation
cannot be considered as an official act.


Marcos v. Manglapus

Facts The case is about whether or not President Aquino
can prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines in
the exercise of her powers granted by the Constitution.

The President is constrained to uphold and defend the
Constitution and she has the obligation to protect the people,
promote their welfare, and advance the national interest.

The Presidential powers are not limited merely to exercising
the Commander-in-Chief powers in terms of emergency or to
leading the State against external and internal threats to its
existence.

The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers
in times of emergency but is tasked with attending to the day-
to-day problems of maintaining peace and order.

Held The framers of the Constitution believed that the
free use of the political question doctrine allowed the Court
during the Marcos years to fall back on prudence, institutional
difficulties, complexity of issues, momentousness of
consequences, or a fear that it was extravagantly extending
judicial power in the cases where it refused to examine and
strike down an exercise of authoritarian power.

The 1987 Constitution precludes the Supreme Court by its
mandate from refusing to invalidate a political use of power
through a convenient recourse to the political question
doctrine. We are compelled to decide what would have been
non-justiciable under our decisions interpreting earlier
fundamental charters.

Daza v. Singson

Facts The House of Representatives proportionally
apportioned its 12 seats in the Commission on appointments
among the several political parties. The petitioner Raul Daza
was chosen to represent the LDP. Later, the LDP was
reorganized. 24 members from the LP resigned from the
party and joined the LDP, swelling its number and reducing
the LP to only 17. The House revised the representation in
the Commission of Appointments, withdrawing the
petitioners seat.

Daza challenged the validity of his removal. He said his seat
was permanent and the LDP was not a duly registered
political party and has not yet attained stability.
Representative Singson who took Dazas seat claimed that
the SC has no jurisdiction as this is a political question.

Held The House has the authority to change its
representation in the COA to reflect any changes that may
transpire in political alignments. It is understood that such
changes must be permanenet and do not include temporary
alliances not involving severance of political loyalties or
formal disapplication.

The Court said that the question was in the legality and not
the wisdom of the act of the chamber, therefore it is not a
political question.


RULE MAKING POWER

Bustos v. Lucero

Facts Bustos is charged with a criminal offense and he
wanted to confront his accusers during the preliminary
investigation. The prosecutor objected invoking Ruloe 108,
Section II of the Rules of Court which provide the rights of a
defendant after arrest.

It is contended that Section 11 of Rule 108 infringes section
13, Article VIII of the Constitution which says that the
Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules
concering pleading practice and procedure in all courts, and
the admission to the practice of law. These rules shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.

It is said that the rule in question impairs substantive rights of
the accused.

Held Rule 108, Section II is an adjective law and not a
substantive law or substantive right. Applied to criminal law,
substantive law declares what acts are crimes and
procedural law provides and procedural law provides or
regulates the steps by which the the guilty party is punished.

Preliminary Investigations are eminently and essentially
remedial, as it is the first step in a criminal prosecution.

While Section 11, Rule 108 denies to a defendant his right to
cross-examine during a preliminary investigation, his right to
present witnesses remains unaffected and his constitutional
rights to be informed of the charges against him both at such
investigation and at the trial are unchanged.

It is difficult to draw a line in any particular case beyond
which legislative power over remedy and procedure can pass
without touching upon the substantive rights of parties
affected, as it is impossible to fix that boundary by general
condition.

It is inevitable that the Supreme Court, in making rules
should step on substantive rights and the Constitution must
be presumed to tolerate it if not to expect such incursion as
does not affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner
or deprive him of a defense, but operates only ina limited and
unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage.

The motion is denied.

Fabian v. Desierto

Facts Teresita Fabian was engaged by Nelson Agustin,
then the District Engineer of the First Metro Manila
Engineering District, in an amorous relationship. During the
course of this relationship he showered Fabians company


with public works contracts and interceded it in his office.
Later, when their relationship soured Agustin resisted
Fabians attempts to leave. Fed up, Fabian filed an
administrative case with the Office of the Ombudsman. The
Deputy Ombudsman eventually acquitted Agustin of all
charges.

Fabian claims that according to Section 27 of RA 6770,
appeals to decisions of the Ombudsman go directly to the
Supreme Court. Agustin says that the bar on administrative
case appeal based on the Ombudsmans rules on procedure
must be binding. Even though no party raised the issue, the
SC ordered the parties to look into the constitutionality of
Section 27 of RA 6770.

Obiter Issue If Section 27 of RA 6770 is declared
unconstitutional, what are Fabians remedies?

Held Section 27 of RA 6770 is indeed unconstitutional,
but since that Section 27 hints at appellate jurisdiction which,
being substantive in nature, cannot be disregarded by the
Court under its rule-making power.
The test for whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court,
for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges,
enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, is whether the
rule regulates procedure the judicial process for enforcing
rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress for a disregard or
infraction of them.
If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If
the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified as a substantive matter. If it operates as a means
of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely
with procedure.
A transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-
making power, of pending cases involving a review of
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals relates to
procedure only. The instant petition is hereby referred and
transferred to the Court of Appeals for final disposition.

In Re: Cunanan (Bar Flunkers)

Facts This case talks about the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953.
Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, in
order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed his
examination successfully, he must have obtained a general
average of 75% in all subjects without failing below 50% in
any subject.

Feeling themselves fully qualified to practice law, some
unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages a few
percentages lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated for
and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which
reduced the passing general average in bar exams to 70%
effective since 1946.

The President requested the views of this court and the court
submitted written comments and shortly thereafter, the
President vetoed the bill, and Congress did not override the
veto. The President allowed the bill to become law without
his signature.

Held Under the Constitution, the SC has the power to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts and the admission to the practice of
law. The Congress is also given the power to repeal, alter, or
supplement the rules promulgated by this Tribunal
concerning admission to the practice of law.

The Constitution does not say or mean that Congress may
admit, suspend, disbar, or reinstate directly attorneys-at-law-
or a determinate group of individuals to the practice of law.
Its power is limited to repeal, modify, or supplement existing
rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the need for
a better service or legal profession requires it.

RA 972 is unconstitutional and therefore void without any
force or effect.

Javellana v. Department of Interior

Facts Atty. Erwin Javellana was an elected city
councilman of Bago City, Negros Occidental. On October 5,
1989 the City Engineer, Ernesto Divinagracia filed
Administrative Case No. C-1090 against Javellana for
violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees and for oppression,
misconduct, and grave abuse of authority.

Divinagracia alleged that Javellana, while being an
incumbent member of the City Council has continuously
engaged in the practice of law without authority from the
Regional Director. Javellana appeared as counsel in a case
against the City Engineer, Divinagracia for Illegal Dismissal
and Reinstatement with Damages.

Javellana filed a petition for certiorari praying that the new
Local Government Code be declared unconstitutional
because it infringes on the right of the SC to prescribe rules
on the practice of law.

Held The case was dismissed for lack of merit.
Javellanas contention that Section 90 of the Local
Government Code entrenched in the power of the Supreme
Court to prescribe rules on the practice of law is off tangent.
The LGC simply prescribes rules of conduct for public
officials to avoid conflict of interest between the discharge of
their duties and private practice of their profession.

Maniago v. CA

Facts The offended party in a criminal case did not file to
reserve the right to bring a separate civil action based on the
same accident against the driver or the drivers employer
Ruben Maniago.

Maniago argues that the civil action against him impliedly
instituted in the criminal action previously filed against his
employer because the private repsondent did not reserve his
right to file an independent action.

While the case was pending the Criminal action was
dismissed for failure of the prosecution to file a formal offer of
evidence.

Issue Whether despite the absence of a reservation,
respondent may nevertheless bring a separate action for
damages against Maniago as specified in the Civil Code.



Whether the dismissal of the criminal case brings with it the
dismissal of the attendant civil action.

Held The question on whether the criminal action and the
action for recovery of a civil liability must be tried on a single
proceeding has always been regarded as a matter of
procedure, and since the rulemaking power has been
conferred by the Constitution on this Court, it is in the
keeping of the Court.

The requirement of reservation does not impair, diminish, or
defeat substantive rights but only regulates the exercise in
the general interest of orderly procedure.

Maceda v. Vasquez

Facts Maceda was the presiding judge of the RTC
(Antique) when he was charged by Napoleon Abiera of the
PAO for allegedly falsifying his Certificates of Service dated
February 6, 1989 by certifying that all civil and criminal cases
that have been submitted for decision or determination for a
period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or
before January 31, 1989 in truth there are cases waiting for a
decision. Abiera further alleges that Maceda similarly falsified
Certificates of Service for a total of 17 months.

The repsondent sought the help of the Office of the
Ombudsman and the Ombudsman ordered that Maceda file
his counteraffidavit and other controverting evidence. The
Ombudsman also denied the ex-parte motion to refer to the
SC filed by petitioner

Petitioner contends that Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over
the case since the offense charged rose from a judges
performance of his officail duties, which is under the control
and supervision of the Supreme Court and that the
Ombudsmans investigation constitutes an encroachment
into the SCs constitutional duty of supervision over all
inferior courts.

Issue Whether the Office of the Ombudsman could
entertain a criminal complaint for alleged falsification of a
judges certification submitted to the SC, and assuming it
can, whether a referral should first be made to the SC.

Held The investigation of the Ombudsman encroaches on
the Courts power of administrative supervision over all
courts and its personnel in violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers.

Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court
employees arises from their administrative duties, the
Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer
the same to the Supreme Court for determination on whether
a judge or court employee acted within the scope of his
administrative duties.

People v. Gacott, Jr.

Facts Judge Eustaquio Gacott filed a motion for
reconsideration when he was rebuffed by the Supreme Court
through the annulment of his order dismissing a criminal
case, complemented with a reprimand and a fine of
P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law.

Gacott relies on the second sentence of Article VIII, Section
11 which says that the Supreme Court en banc shall have
the power to discipline judges of lower court or order
dismissal by a vote of majority of the members who actually
took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon. He argues that the adverbial phrase en banc
refers to a full court and not a division thereof.

In 1993, a Court en banc resolution was adopted which
clarified the SC Rules and Regulations, noting that en banc
cases are contemplated when the penalty imposed is
dismissal or if the suspension is more than one year with a
fine exceeding P10,000.00

Issue Whether or not Gacott could be administratively
disciplined by a mere division of the SC and not the Court en
banc

Held To require the entire Court to deliberate upon and
participate in all administrative matters regardless of the
sanction, improbable, or imposed, would result in congested
dockets and undue delay in adjudication of cases in Court. In
cognizance of the need of a thorough and judicious
evaluation of serious charges against members of the
judiciary only when the penalty imposed does not exceed
suspension or does not need a fine of P10,000 or both, the
administrative matter may be decided in division. This is a
way to expedite the decision and resolution of cases of
matters pending before the SC.


Garcia v. People

Facts The Petitioners are sentenced to reclusion perpetua
for murdering Jose Estrella. They filed a petiiton for
mandamus compelling the RTC in Iloilo to forward the
records of the criminal case to the SC for automatic review.

Issue Whether the SC must automatically review a trial
courts decision convicting the accused of a capital offense
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.

Held The Court only admits cases where the actual
penalty imposed is death. As the petitioners did not file a
notice of appeal or otherwise indicate their desire to appeal
from the decision convicting them of murder, the decision
became final and unappealable.

Judge Fuentes vs. Ombudsman

Facts Pursuant to an act constructing the first flyover in
Davao, the DPWH expropriated land under the right of
eminent domain. However, as of May 1994, the government
still had an outstanding debt to the landowners affected by
the construction. the DPWH decided to auction off all scrap
and iron junk found in the DPWH depot in Panacan. Davao
City. Alex Bacquial won the bidding and attempted to
withdraw the auctioned pooperties but was prevented by the
City Engineer because he sand there were still serviceable
properties there due for rehabilitation.

Bacquial filed an ex parte motion for the issuance of a break
through order to effect the withdrawal of the auctioned
properties. The motion was granted by Judge Fuentes.



The City Engineer filed a criminal case against Judge
Fuentes for grave abuse of discretion with the office of the
Ombudsman. Judge Fuentes filed this present petition to
enjoin the Ombudsman from proceeding with the case and to
order the same to remand the case to the Supreme Court.
Held The Supreme Court, as granted in the Constitution,
has the sole power to administratively supervise all courts
and court personnel and take the proper administrative action
against them.

Judge Caoibes vs. Ombudsman

Facts Judge Alumbres filed a criminal complaint with the
Office of the Ombudsman against Judge Caoibes for physical
injuries, malicious mischief, and assault upon a person in
authority. Judge Alumbres also filed an administrative case
with the Supreme Court praying for the dismissal off the
petitioner for grave misconduct unbecoming of a judicial
officer.

Judge Caoives contended that the Supreme Court, not the
Office of the Ombudsman, has the authority to make
preliminary determination of the respective culpability of the
petitioner and respondent-judge who both being members of
the bench are under its exclusive supervision and control.

Issue Whether or not the Ombudsman should defer action
on the Criminal Case pending resolution of the Administrative
case.

Held The Ombudsman should dismiss the criminal case.
Only the SC can oversee the judges and court personnels
compliance wioth all laws and to take the proper
administrative action against them. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power.

Court Administrator v. Quianola

Facts The Office of the Court Administrator conducted a
physical and judicial inventory of cases pending before the
MTC of San Pedro, Laguna. They found a lot of cases
pending beyond the reglamentary period in the sala of Judge
Quianola

Judge Quianola countered that due to a stroke he suffered,
he could not do his duties as efficiently as he suffered from a
cerebral hematoma.

The OCA said that the Judge falsified his Certificates of
Service and that if he indeed was of poor health he should
have asked for assistance, which in fact, he did not.

Held The Judge was remiss in his duties and his faliure to
expeditiously decide cases within the constitutionally allotted
90 day period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants
administrative sanctions. Fined PhP 40,000.00


Section 6
The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision
over all courts and the personnel thereof.

Specific Powers
Judicial Powers of the Supreme Court (1-2) - these are the
only provisions that speak of jurisdiction. These include
original jurisdiction for cases affecting diplomatic
representatives and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, as well as
appellate jurisdiction over enumerated cases.

Auxiliary Administrative Powers of the Supreme Court (3-6)
they include the powers to issue temporary assignments of
judges, to order a change of venue, to promulgate rules of
procedure and enforcement of constitutional rights,
integration of the bar, leagal assistance and admission to the
practice of law, to appoint its employees, and to have
administrative supervision over all courts.

Congress may merely diminish the statutory jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court but not the jurisdiction granted by the
Constitution itself.

Judicial Review
Judicial review necessitates the search for an applicable law.
The lower court must decide on the constitutionality of a
statute (from Art. 5 of the Civil Code). But it is binding only on
the parties involved. It only becomes binding when the
Supreme Court says so.

Esssential Requisities
The power of judicial review is merely an aspect of judicial
power. The first requisite for the exercise of judicial review
before the court is an actual case calling for the exercise of
judicial power. The question before it must be ripe for
adjudication - the governmental act being challenged must
have an adverse effect on the person challenging it (PACU v.
Secretary of Education, 97 Phil 806), and the person
challenging the act must have locus standi to challenge - he
must have a personal or substantaial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a
result of its enforcement (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 58)

Auxiliary Requisities
As a general rule the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the
pleadings, it may not be raised at the trial, and so on. There
are exceptions, though. (Id. 88) The court will not touch
constitutionality unless it is unavoidable or the lis mota (Sotto
v. COMELEC, Board of Optometry v. Colet)

In Mariano v. COMELEC, the SC shut down the petition as
premature because the elections for the mayor of the City of
Makati are three years away. The elections would have
extended his term of office beyond the constitutional limit of
three consecutive terms.

The rule that the Court can only decide on a question of law
when there is an actual case or controversy is not a hard and
fast rule. The exceptions occur when for instance, lack of
clarity may be creating a great confusion detrimental to public
order, like the MMDA confiscating license plates and drivers
licenses for traffic violations.

The requirement of locus standi may be waived when the
petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental
importance to the people (IBP v. Zamora)

Taxpayer Suits
In cases involving the expenditure of public funds, it
must be shown that:
It must be established that there is an exercise of
Congress by its taxing or spending power.


The taxpayer has a sufficient interest in preventing
the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation
there will be a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the statute

Political Questions
Political questions are those questions which under the
Constitution are decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislature or executive branch of the
government.

Guidelines in distinguishing whether an issue is a political
question or not (Baker v. Carr):
textual question: there is a textually demonstrable
commitment of the issue to a political department :
functional type: there is a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. :
Santiago v. Guingona (election of minority floor leader)
prudential: where there is the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of
govbernment or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made (repeated by
Section 1), or the potentiality of embarassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on a
question. : whether or not we recognize China.

Effect of declaration of unconstitutionality
The Supreme Court has rejected the view that an
unconstitutional act confers no rights, imposes no duties, and
affords no protection whatsoever.

The Court has adopted the view that before an act is
declared unconstitutional, it is an operative fact which can be
the source of rights and duties.

It was applied in the case of De Agbayani v. PNB, where the
period before a moratorium law was declared
unconstitutional wa- is not allowed to toll prescriptive period
of the right to foreclose a mortgage.

Since the power of judicial review flows from judicial power,
and since inferior courts are possessed of judicial power, it
may be inferred that power of judicial review is not exclusive
to the Supreme Court. This conclusion may be inferred from
Article VIII, Section 5(2) which confers to the Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction (appellate review) overjudgments and
decrees of inferior courts in all cases in which
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international
agreement, law, presidential decree, or regulation is in
question.

Standing is a substantive requirement: Justice Mendoza.

It is discretionary on a Court to recognize the standing of a
taepayer. Same thing with matters of transcendental
importance. Lawmakers have standing if it affects the
integrity of the legislative act. Gonzales vs. Narvasa
disallowed taxpayer suit because there was no new money
given out.

Kilosbayan, IBP, and Lacson cases show cases of
transcendental importance. State of rebellion simply means
that a rebellion is going on. It's just a declaration of fact.

There is no need for the concurrence of Congress to declare
Martial law.

Section 6
The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision
over all courts and the personnel thereof.

Section 7.
(1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme
Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme
Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have
been for fifteen years or more, a judge of a lower court or
engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.

(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges
of lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge
thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a
member of the Philippine Bar.

(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven
competence, integrity, probity, and independence.

Section 8.
(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief
Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and
a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a
retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative
of the private sector.

(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by
the President for a term of four years with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first
appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall
serve for four years, the professor of law for three years, the
retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the
private sector for one year.

(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex
officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its
proceedings.

(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such
emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the
appropriations for the Council.

(5) The Council shall have the principal function of
recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise
such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may
assign to it.

Section 9
The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower
courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at
least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no
confirmation.



For the lower courts, the President shall issue the
appointments within ninety days from the submission of the
list.

Section 10.
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts, shall be
fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary
shall not be decreased.

Section 11.
The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower
courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach
the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en
banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower
courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted thereon.

Section 12.
The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

Section 13.
The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted
to it for decision en banc or in division shall be reached in
consultation before the case is assigned to a Member for the
writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect
signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy
thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon
the parties. Any Members who took no part, or dissented, or
abstained from a decision or resolution, must state the
reason therefor. The same requirements shall be observed
by all lower collegiate courts.

Section 14.
No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based.

No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a
decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied
without stating the legal basis therefor.


People v. Lizada

Facts The case is an automatic review of the decision of
the RTC-Manila finding Lizada guilty of four counts of rape,
meting him the death penalty for each count. Lizada is the
live-in partner of Rose Orillosa, mother of Analia, the victim.

Lizada denied ever having raped Analia. He claimed that he
loved the children of Rose as if they were his own children.
Lizada contends that Analia was coached by her mother
because Rose wanted control of the business they set up.

Held The SC did not appreciate the contention of Lizada
that he should be acquitted. They found him guilty of two
counts of simple rape and acts of lasciviousness. They
reduced his sentence to reclusion perpetua.


Re: Problem of delays in cases before the
Sandiganbayan

Facts There was a complaint regarding some delays in the
resolution of cases before the Sandiganbayan. Because of
the inherent Consitutional right to a speedy trial, the Board of
Governors of the IBP decided that SC Administrative Circular
1094 be made applicable to the Sandiganbayan in regard to
the pending cases under its jurisdiction. The IBP Governors
also recommend to the SC an inquiry into the causes of
delay in the resolution of cases before the Sandiganbayan.

After an inquiry made, the Court found that there are are a
totla of 415 cases left undecided beyond the reglementary
period. There are two views regarding the reglementary
period of deciding cases before the Sandiganbayan. One
view maintains that the cases should be decided according to
Article VIII, Section 15 (1) and (2) which says that all cases
or matter filed to the lower collegiate courts shall be decided
within 12 months from the date of submission. The second
view, howver, contends that since the Sandiganbayan is a
trial court, they are required to decide cases within 3 months
from the date of submission.

Issues What is the reglementary period within which the
Sandiganbayan must decide/resolve cases within its
jurisdiction?

Is the Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 1094,
which directs all trial judges to make a physical inventory of
the cases in their dockets, applicable to the Sandiganbayan?
If it is, should Judge Garchitorena be liable for the delays
because of a lack of an efficient filing system to monitor the
flow of cases?

Held The provision in Article VIII, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution which says that cases or matters filed must be
decided by lower collegiate courts within 12 months, does
not apply to the Sandiganbayan. The provision refers to
regular courts of lower collegiate level, which is the Court of
Appeals.

The Sandiganbayan is a special court on the same level as
the Court of Appeals, possessing all inherent powers of a
court of justice with the same functions of a trial court. The
Sandiganbayan, being a special court, shall have the power
to promulgate its own rules. In fact, it promulgated its own
rules regarding the reglementary period of undecided cases
under its jurisdiction. In its own rules it says that judgments
on pending cases shall be rendered within 3 months. Also,
the law creating the Sandiganbayan is also clear with the 3
month reglementary period.

The Sandiganbayan, in a sense, acts like a trial court,
therefore a 3 month and not a 12 month reglementary period
shall apply.

The Administrative Circular shall apply to the Sandiganbayan
and its chairman is liable. Judge Francis Garchitorena is
fined P20,000 for inefficiency and gross neglect of duty. He is
also relieved of duty as Chairmain of the Sandiganbayan and
as a presiding judge to devote himself exclusively to decision
writing in all the pending cases in his sala and those pending
without a ponente, which he shall write, are decided and
resolved.




ARTICLE 10
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

SECTION 9: Legislative bodies of local governments shall
have Sectoral representation as may be prescribed by law

Supangan Jr. vs. Santos
G.R. 84663 24 August 1990

Facts: The petitioners are attacking the authority of the
Secretary of Local Government to designate/appoint
members/Sectoral representatives to the local legislative
bodies on the ground that it violates Section 9 of the Art. X of
the Constitution. Moreover, the petitioners contend that the
power to appoint belongs to the President and cannot be
delegated to the Secretary of the Department of local
Government.

Issues:
a) W/N the Secretary of local Government can appoint
or designate Sectoral representatives to the local
legislative bodies.
b) W/N the President or the Secretary can make
designation/appointment without any enabling law
pursuant to Section 9.
c) W/N the designations made by the Secretary are
null and void.

Decision: Section 9 of Art X provides that legislative bodies
of local governments shall have Sectoral representation as
may be prescribed by law. Under the Local Government
Code (BP 337), the power to appoint Sectoral is conferred
upon the President of the Philippines but the secretary of
Local Government may, by authority of the president inform
the Sectoral representatives of their appointments. It is the
president who appoints and the secretary is merely the
transmitter.

With regards the second issue, the court held that the phrase
as may be prescribed by law is not prospective in character.
Section 9 commands that there shall be appointed legislative
bodies of local government whether or not a law exists or has
still to be passed. In this case, there is a law (BP 337), which
is still operative and not inconsistent with the Constitution.

BP 337 requires that before the president may appoint
members of the local legislative bodies, there must be a
determination made by the Sanggunian itself that said
sectors are made of sufficient number in the city or
municipality to warrant representation after consultation with
associations and person belonging to the sector concerned.
In cases wherein the Sanggunian has not yet determined
whether there is a need of representation of a particular
sector in their city, then there is no basis for the designations/
appointments.

With regards qualifications, the court held that the minimum
requirement is that the representatives must at least belong
to the sector they are representing.


SECTION 10:

Tan vs. COMELEC
142 SCRA 727 (11 July 1986)


Facts: Petitioners are residents of the province of Negros
Occidental. On December 1985, they filed a case for
prohibition for the purpose of stopping responded COMELEC
from conducting plebiscite. The petitioners were assailing
the constitutionality of BP 885 which is an Act Creating a
New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the
Province of Negros del Norte, on the ground that it is a
violation of the constitution. Respondents on the other hand
insist on the validity of the law and argues that the remaining
cities and municipalities of the Province of Negros Occidental
not included in the area of the new province of Negros del
Norte do not fall within the meaning of the scope of the term
unit or units affected thus, the plebiscite should only cover
the units affected or those places that will be covered by the
new of Negros del Norte.

Issue: W/N the term areas affected refer only to places
covered by the new province where the plebiscite should be
limited.

Decision: A reading of the constitution would give us an
idea that the provisions made it imperative that there be first
obtained the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite
in the unit or units affected whenever a province is created,
divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of
boundaries such as in the present case. Areas affected refer
to both places that are covered by the new province and
those other areas of the Province of Negros Occidental since
the remaining areas are also affected. As provided in the
dissenting opinion of Justice Abad Santos in the case of
Paredes vs. Executing Secretary, when the constitution
speaks of the unit or units affected, t means all of the people
of the municipality if such is to be divided, or all the people of
two or more municipalities if there be a merger. Such ruling
is applicable in the case at bar.


Padilla Jr. vs. COMELEC
GR. No. 103328, 19 October 1992


Facts: A plebiscite was held throughout the Municipality of
Labo for the creation of the Municipality of Tulay Na Lupa (in
Camarines Norte) in pursuant to RA NO 7155. After the
plebiscite, the board of canvassers declared the rejection ad
disapproval o an independent Municipality of Tulay na Lupa.
The Governor of Camarines Norte (the petitioner) seeks to
set aside the plebiscite conducted and prays that a new one
be undertaken. He contends that there is a failure because
the results that were obtained were invalid and illegal since
the plebiscite should have been conducted only in the units
affected (the 12 baranggays) comprising the new Municipality
of Tulay na Lupa. It is the contention of the petitioner that the
ruling on Tan vs COMELEC was already pass with the new
constitution which deleted the words unit or thus, the ruling
in Paredes vs. Executive Secretary should be reinstate.

Issue: W/N the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in conducting the plebiscite in the remaining areas
of the mother Municipality of Labo instead of only the 12
baranggays affected.

Decision: The deletion of the phrase unit or in Section 10
Article 10 of the constitution does not affect the ruling in Tan
vs. COMELEC. The reason that when the law states that the
plebiscite shall be conducted in the political units directly


affected, it means that residents of the political entity who
would be economically dislocated by the separation of a
portion thereof should have a right to vote in the said
plebiscite. Those who are affected include not only the 12
baranggays but also those living in the parent Municipality of
Labo. The petition was dismissed.


SECTION 12:


Abella vs. COMELEC
GR. No. 100710 03 September 1991


Facts: Adelina Larrazabal is a registered voter of Ormoc City
and she wishes to run for governor of the province of Leyte.
Ormoc City is not yet a highly urbanized component city yet it
is considered as an independent of the province of Leyte to
which it is geographically attached and its charter prohibits its
voters from voting for the provincial elective officials. It is the
contention of the petitioner that while a Component Citys
charter prohibits its voters from participating in the elections
for provincial office, there is nowhere in the charter that
prohibits said voters from running for the provincial office.

Issue: W/N a voter of Ormoc, who is prohibited from electing
provincial officials can likewise run for provincial office.

Decision: Component cities like Ormoc city whose charters
prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials
are treated like highly urbanized cities which are outside the
supervisory power of the province to which they are
geographically attached. Such independence carries with it
the prohibition directed to registered voters not to vote and
be voted for the provincial elective offices. The phrase shall
not be qualified and entitled to vote in the members of the
provincial board of the Province of Leyte connotes two
prohibitions: one is from running and second is from voting
for any provincial elective officials.

SECTION 14 and SECTION 18:

Cordillera Broad Coalition vs. COA
GR NO. 82217 29 January 1990


Facts: The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of
EO 220 which created the Cordillera Administrative Region
on the ground that it pre-empts the enactment of an organic
act by the Congress and the creation of the autonomous
region in the Cordilleras through a plebiscite.
EO 220 was brought about by negotiations between the
CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army) headed by Fr.
Balwed and the Aquino government. It created the Cordillera
Administrative Region (CAR), which covers provinces from
Abra to City of Baguio. It was hoped that Car would
accelerate the economic and social growth in the region and
prepare it for the establishment of the autonomous region of
Cordilleras to be supervised by the field offices of the
departments of the National Government.

Issue:
1) W/N EO 220 is unconstitutional
2) W/N CAR is a territorial and political subdivision

Decision
1) EO 220 envisions the consolidation and
coordination of the delivery of services in the area
covered by the administrative region as a step
preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the
Cordilleras. It does not create an autonomous
region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely
provides for transitory measures in anticipation of
the enactment of an organic act that would create
the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The transitory
nature of CAR does not necessarily mean that it is
and interim autonomous region in the Cordilleras for
an autonomous region is composed of an elective
executive and legislature and special courts with
personal, family and property law jurisdiction, which
is not established by EO 220 (Section 18).
Moreover, the cordillera executive board, which is
composed of the mayor of Baguio and provincial
governors, merely serve as an implementing body.
2) With regards the 2
nd
issue, again, CAR is not an
autonomous nor even an interim autonomous
region. It did not create new territorial and political
subdivisions or merge existing ones into a larger
division. It is not even a political subdivision that
has a separate juridical personality. CAR is merely
an administrative region created under the
Reorganization Plan. Considering the control and
supervision exercised by the President over CAR
and the offices created under EO 220, CAR may be
considered at most as a regional coordinating
agency if the National Government which is similar
to the regional development councils which the
president may create under Section 14.

The petitions were dismissed.

SECTION 18:

Abbas vs. COMELEC
179 SCRA 287 (1989)


Facts: The petitioners are assailing the validity of RA 6734,
an act providing for an organic act for the creation of the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. They are praying
that the court would enjoin COMELEC from conducting the
plebiscite and the Secretary of Budget and Management
from releasing funds to the COMELEC for said purpose.
They contend that RA 6734 unconditionally creates an
autonomous region in Mindanao which is contrary to the
provision of the Constitution on the autonomous region which
make the creation of such region dependent upon the
outcome of the plebiscite. Furthermore, petitioners assail RA
6734 for according to them, this is in conflict with the Tripoli
agreement.


Issue: W/N RA 6734 is unconstitutional and W/N it conflicts
with the Tripoli Agreement.

Decision: RA 6734 in constitutional. Even is we assume that
it is in conflict with the Tripoli agreement, the standard for the
validity of said act is provided by the constitution, thus RA
6734 will prevail. Moreover, granting that the Tripoli
agreement is part of the law of the land, it will be of the same
class as RA 6734, which is a statute. The rule is that the


Later law prevails thus RA 6734 will prevail over the older
Tripoli agreement.

As provided in the constitution, the creation of the
autonomous region is made effective upon the approval by a
majority votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite.
By majority, the constitution means that it should be
dependent not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite but
on the will of the majority in each constituent units.

With regards the issue on the constituent units, the
petitioners contention that by including areas which do not
strictly share the same characteristics as the other, the
Congress unlawfully expanded the scope of the region. Such
a contention was not given any merit by the court for the
congress may determine what areas should comprise the
autonomous region.

With regards the question on the power of the president to
merge existing regions, the court held that the president has
the power to do so because what is being merged are
administrative regions which are mere groupings of
contiguous provinces for administrative purposes.
Administrative regions are not territorial and political
subdivisions and the power to merge them is traditionally
lodged on the president to facilitate the exercise of general
supervision over local governments.

The petition was dismissed.


Cordillera Regional Assembly vs. COMELEC
GR NO. 93054 04 December 1990


Facts: A plebiscite was held on January 30, 1990 in
pursuant to RA 6766 for the creation of the Cordillera
Autonomous Region. According to the results, only the
province of Ifugao ratified the Organic Act. The petitioners
were claiming that the Memorandum of the Secretary of
Justice to the president saying that CAR can legally and
validly constitute CAR is unconstitutional.

Issue: W/N the province of Ifugao, being the only province
which voted favorable for the creation of the CAR ca alone,
validly and legally constitute such region.

Decision: No. It is expressly provided in the constitution that
the autonomous region shall be composed of provinces,
cities, municipalities, etc. In other words, the term region
used should mean two or more provinces. Moreover, RA
6766 never intended that a single province may constitute
the autonomous region other wise, there would be absurd
situations like there would always be two sets of officials, the
provincial officials and the regional officials. This is too much
considering the size of the area. Moreover, a huge amount
of 10M would be allocated to the region which is again too
much considering that it is composed of Ifugao alone.

The ruling in Abbas vs. COMELEC is not applicable in this
case because the ruling in said case clearly state that the
word majority means majority of the votes by constituent
units. There is nothing in the Abbas case which deaks wutg
te issue of whether an autonomous region could exist despite
the fact that only one province constitute it.

The petition was granted.

Leonor vs. Cordillera Bodong Administration
GR 92649 14 February 1991


Facts: Due to the fact that the Cordillera Autonomous region
did not come into existence since only Ifugao ratified RA
6766, as a consequent, the Cordillera Bodong Administration
which was created in pursuant to section 13 of EO 226, the
indigenous and special courts for the indigenous cultural
communities of the Cordillera region and the CPLA as the
regional police force do not legally exist.
The Maeng Tribal Court was not constituted as an
indigenous or special court hence, it only exists under
the customs and traditions of an indigenous cultural
community.
Such courts are not part of the judicial system and do
not possess judicial power.
The decisions of conciliation panels as advisory and
conciliatory bodies has the force and judgment of the
courts by it can be enforced only through the local city or
municipality.
The decisions of tribal courts on compromise or
arbitration may be enforced or set aside by regular
courts only.


ARTICLE XI
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS


SECTION 1

HIPOLITA VS. MERGAS
A.M. No. P-90-412 11 March 1991



Decision:

A deputy sheriff, as officer of the court , whose duties
firm an integrated part of the administration of justice,
may be properly punished, even punishment short of
dismissal or suspension from office for violation of Rules
of Court which impedes the fair and just administration of
justice.
Even if the offense is not very serious, the nature of the
position amounts the acts as malfeasance.
He is bound, virtute officii, to bring to the discharge of his
duties.
Public Service requires utmost integrity and strictest
discipline.
The yardstick of public service is honesty and integrity,
both imprinted in the 1973 and the 1987 constitution.


SECTION 2

ROMULO VS. YNIGUEZ
141 SCRA 263 (1986)



Facts:
The petitioners, representing more than 1/5 of all the
members of the Batasan called for the impeachment of


President Marcos together with a verified complaint for
impeachment Said resolution was referred to the Speaker to
the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government unfortunately, said committee found the
complaint insufficient of substance to warrant its further
consideration and dismissed the charges. The petitioners
filed the present case praying that section 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the
Batasan Rules on Impeachment be declared unconstitutional
for it amends section 3 of the 1973 Constitution by vesting in
a smaller body to supplant and overrule the impeachment
complaint endorsed by 1/5 of all the members. Such power
was vested only in the Batasang Pambansa, as a collegiate
body, which has the power to initiate, try and decide all cases
of impeachment. Section 8 of the rules of court was also
said to be unconstitutional because by requiring a majority
vote of all the members of the BP for approval of the
resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment, the rules
imposes an unconstitutional and illegal condition precedent in
order that complaint for impeachment can proceed to trial

Issue:
W/N the rules of court were unconstitutional in so far as it
vest a majority of all the members to overrule an
impeachment complaint endorsed by 1/5 of the Batasan.

Decision: The rules are constitutional. When the Batasan
denied the motion of Ramon Mitra to recall from the archives
of resolution and the complaint for impeachment, it in effect
confirmed the action of the committee on justice, human
rights and good government in dismissing said resolutions
and complaint on impeachment. The Batasan by a majority,
as provided for the rules of court can dismiss the complaint
for impeachment because there would not be any use of
proceeding further if the required 2/3 would not be obtained.
Such act of the Batasan as a body is an exercise of powers
that have been vested upon it by the Constitution beyond the
power of the court to review. Moreover, the rules are always
within the power of the Batasan to modify, change or replace
any time. These rules are merely procedural and not
substantive. The petition was dismissed.

IN RE GONZALES
160 SCRA 771 (1988)


Decision:

A public officer who under the constitution is required to be a
member if the Philippines Bar as a qualification for the office
held by him and who may be removed from office by
impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the
incumbency of such public officer. Such public officer during
his incumbency cannot be charged before the
Sandinganbayan or any other court with the offence which
carries with it penalty of removal from office, or any penalty
service of which would amount to removal from office.

The reason why the complaint for disbarment here must be
dismissed is that members of the Supreme Court, as
members of the Philippine Bar may be removed from office
only by impeachment because to grant a complaint for
disbarment of a member of the court during the members
incumbency would in effect be to circumvent and hence to
run afoul to the constitutional mandate that members of the
Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for
and conviction of certain offenses listed in the constitution.

In Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan, it was held that the court has
jurisdiction over public officers and employees including
government owned and controlled corporation, except
constitutional officers that can be removed only by
impeachment which includes the president, the members of
the SC and the members of the constitutional commissions.
The party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject
to prosecution trial and punishment in accordance with law
after being impeached. It is important to make clear that the
court is not here saying that its members or the other
constitutional officers are entitled to immunity from liability for
possible criminal acts or for misbehavior. Fundamental
procedural requirement must first be observed before such
liability may be determined or enforced.
SECTION 4
NUNEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
111 SCRA 422 (1982)



Decision:

The provision on the Sandiganbayan was a constitutional
recognition of the continuing need to combat graft and
corruption already recognized in earlier anti-graft laws. The
creation of the Sandiganbayan was precisely aimed for
curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official
corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in public
service.



MAYOR LECAROZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
128 SCRA 324 (1984)



Facts:
The petitioner who was the mayor of Sta. Cruz Marinduque
was charged with the crime of grave coercion for willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously taken over the operation and
control of the gasoline station owned by a certain Par. The
petitioner was said to have used police forces in order to
control the gasoline station therefore depriving Pedro Par of
the possession and exercise of a lawful trade and
occupation. The petitioned contends that the Sandiganbayan
has no jurisdiction over the case and that his case should
have been filed with the ordinary courts where the alleged
crime was committed.

Issue: W/N the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is limited to
criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices
of public officers.

Decision: broad powers were given to the sandiganbayan
which includes all other civil and criminal practices involving
public officers of the court. Section 4 Article XIII of the
Constitution provides for the creation of a special as the
Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction cases involving such
other offenses committed by public officers and employees,
including those in government-owned and controlled
corporations in relation to their office as may be determined
by law. It is clear in the petition that the petitioner has used
his position in order to gain advantage of Par. Thus, the


sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over his case. The petition
was dismissed.


SECTION 5-7

ZALDIVAR VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
160 SCRA 843 (1988)


Facts: Enrique Zaldivar, governor of the province of antique
sought to restrain the Sandiganbayan and Tanod Bayan Raul
Gonzalez from proceeding with the prosecution and hearing
of cases filed against him since the new constitution
expressly provided that it is only the Ombudsman who has
the authority to file cases with the Sandiganbayan.

Issue: W/N the Tanodbayan under the 1973 Constitution and
continued as such even after the ratification of the new
constitution. May he conduct preliminary investigation and
file cases against government officials.

Decision: Yes. The Tanodbayan (Special Prosecutor) and
Ombudsman have different duties. The former shall be
known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor and shall
continue to function as may have been provided for by law
except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman
created under the Constitution. The latter shall have the duty
to investigate on its own, any act or omissions of any public
official when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient.

Under the present constitution, Raul Gonzalez is mere
subordinate of the Ombudsman and can investigate cases
only upon the latters authority. The incumbent Tanodbayan
(Special Prosecutor) is clearly without authority to conduct
preliminary investigations and to direct the filling of criminal
cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the
Ombudsman. Petition was granted.



Francisco et. al. v. House of Representatives (Davide
Impeachment)
G.R. No. 160261


Keyword: Separation of powers between the executive,
legislative and judiciary branch of government.
Facts: 1) On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives
adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix
William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on
Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on
the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF).
2) On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E.
Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and
seven Associate Justices of this Court for culpable violation
of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high
crimes.

The complaint was endorsed by Representatives
Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang
Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee on
Justice on August 5, 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of
Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for
impeachment may be filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to
the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by
a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from
such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session
days from receipt thereof.
3) The House Committee on Justice

ruled on
October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
sufficient in form, but voted to dismiss the same on October
22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
4) Four months and three weeks since the filing
on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23,
2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to
dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with
the Secretary General of the House by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.
5) (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B.
Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results
of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third
(1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives

6) Thus arose the instant petitions against the
House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions
contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint
is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of
Article XI of the Constitution that [n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year

7) Respondent House of Representatives
through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-
respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a
Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to
hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of
Representatives,which is an independent and co-equal
branch of government under the Constitution, from the
performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate
impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene
(Ex Abudante Cautela) and Comment, praying that the
consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of
the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment
proceedings and that the sole power, authority and
jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and
decide impeachment cases, including the one where the
Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld
pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution.
Briefly stated, the position of respondents Speaker De
Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a political action which
cannot assume a judicial character.



Issues:
Sub issue: 1) Whether or not the power of judicial review
extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings.
Main issues: 1) Whether or not the filing of the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the
one year bar provided in the Constitution; and
2) Whether or not the resolution thereof is a
political question has resulted in a political crisis.

Ruling:
Sub issue
Yes, judicial review extends to those arising from
impeachment proceedings.
Petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of
judicial review to determine the validity of the second
impeachment complaint.
This Courts power of judicial review is conferred on the
judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of
our present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on
exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel
in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral
Commission, to wit: x x x the Constitution is a definition
of the powers of government. Who is to determine the
nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way.
And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but
only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument
secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all
that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy"
which properly is the power of judicial review under
the Constitution.
x.x.x And the judiciary in turn, with the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively
checks the other departments in the exercise of its
power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.
There exists no constitutional basis for the
contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of
checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole and one section is not to be
allowed to defeat another. Both are integral
components of the calibrated system of independence
and interdependence that insures that no branch of
government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the
Constitution.
Main issues:
Issue # 1
Yes, the filing of the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
with the House of Representatives falls within the one
year bar provided in the Constitution.
Having concluded that the initiation takes
place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint
and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the
initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5)
of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner,
another may not be filed against the same official within
a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of
the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment
complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with
seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003
and referred to the House Committee on Justice on
August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint
filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and
Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on
October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same impeachable officer within a one-year
period.
Issue # 2
No, the resolution thereof is not a political
question it has not resulted in a political crisis.
The possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional
crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding
the Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot
abandon their constitutional duties just because their action
may start, if not precipitate, a crisis. What lies in here is an
issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this
Court can properly and competently address and adjudicate
in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under
our system of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter
or problem that squarely falls under the Courts jurisdiction,
no other course of action can be had but for it to pass upon
that problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling
itself with the process of impeachment has effectively set up
a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in
fact and in law.






SECTION 7

BIR VS. OMBUDSMAN
GR. 115103 11 April 2002



Facts:
The office of the ombudsman received an information from
an informer-for-reward regarding alleged anomalous grant
of tax refunds to La Tondena Distilleries and Distillera
Limtauco and Co. upon receipt of information Ombusdman
issued a subpoena duces tecum addressed to the Legal
Department of the BIR and later on to Commissioner Chato
ordering them to appear before the Ombudman and to bring
the complete original case dockets of the refunds granted to
limtauco and la tondena. It is the contention of BIR that the
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case since to review
the same was lodged with the court of Appeals and not the
Ombudsman. Moreover, it was the contention of BIR that
before a subpoena duces tecum is issued, there must first be
a pending action. Petitioner further opines that the fact-
finding investigation by the Ombudsman is not the proper
case for it is only step preliminary to the filing of recovery
actions on the tax refunds granted to Limtauco and La
Tondena.

Issue: W/N the actions of the Ombudsman is correct.

SECTION 11 and 12

DELOSO vs. DOMINGO
GE No. 90591 21 November 1990


Facts: Governor Deloso of Zambales seeks to stop
responded Manuel Domingo Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
from conducting a preliminary investigation of the charge of
multiple murder against him. He contends that the
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case because it
only has the power to investigate acts and omissions that are
connected to his duties as governor and that the Tanodbayan
has no jurisdiction to prosecute the murder case against the
petitioner.

Issue: W/N the ombudsman has jurisdiction to investigate
the charge of multiple murder allegedly committed by the
petitioner as provincial governor.

Decision: Yes. The constitution empowers the ombudsman to
investigate any act or omission of any public official without
any qualification that said act or omission must have been
committed or incurred in relation to his office. The
Ombudsman and his deputies are tasked to protect the
people through acting promptly on complaints filed in any
form or manner against public officials or employees of the
government as well as investigate on its own any complaint
by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employees, office or agency, when such at or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. (Section
12 and 13 of Art XI). The clause any illegal act or omission
of any public official is broad enough to embrace any crime
committed by a public official. Furthermore, the Ombudsman
act makes perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance that
have been committed by any officer or employee during his
tenure of office. The murder of 3 persons is no doubt an
illegal act and since this was committed by a governor, the
crime lies within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsmans
investigative authority.

The Ombudsman Act of 1989 vests in the Ombudsman
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. A murder charged against the petitioner
carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death hence, it is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
and the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate it.
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.





SECTION 13

CRUZ vs. Sandiganbayan
GR. No. 94595 26 February 1991


Issue: W/N the respondent PCGG (Presidential Commission
on Good Government) has the authority to conduct
preliminary investigation and file the information with the
Sandiganbayn for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
practices act.

Decision: Yes. The exclusive jurisdiction of the Tanod
Bayan to conduct preliminary investigation was modified by
EO 1, which constituted and created the PCGG. Section 3 of
EO No 1 provides that the commission shall have the power
to conduct investigations as may be necessary. Under EO
14, it is further provided that the PCGG shall be empowered
to file in the Sandiganbayan and prosecute all cases
investigated by it under EO no. 1. With the ratification of the
constitution, the office of the Ombudsman was created under
Article XI, the authority of PCGG was maintained. The
authority of the Ombudsman is not exclusive but is
concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the
government like the PCGG.


BUENSADA VS. FLAVIER
GR No. 106719 21 September 1993


Facts:

The petitioners were preventively suspended by the
Ombudsman pending investigations filed against them. It is
the contention of the petitioners that the action of the
Ombudsman is an abuse of discretion for according to
Section 13 (3) of the 1987 consitution, the Ombudsman can
only recommend to the heads of the departments and other
agencies the preventive suspension of officials and
employees facing administrative investigation conducted by
his office thus, he cannot order the suspension himself. The
ombudsman invokes Section 24 of RA No. 6770 which
provided that the ombudsman or his deputy may preventively
suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending
an investigation. Respondents also argue that the power to
suspend is contemplated by section 13 (8) of the constitution
which provides that the Ombudsman shall exercise such
other functions or perform such functions or duties as may be
provided by law.



Issue: W/N the Ombudsman has the power to suspend
government officials and employees working in offices other
than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending investigation of
the administrative complaint filed against said officials and
employees.

Decision. The Ombudsman has the power to suspend
government officials and employees pending investigation.
The court held in Nera vs. Garcia that suspension is just a
preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The
purpose of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) is to give the
Ombudsman such powers as he may need to perform
efficiently the task committed to him by the Constitution. Any
interpretation that will hamper the work of the Ombudsman
should be avoided. Moreover, it can be concluded that the
Congress, by deleting the words subordinate and in his
bureau leaving the phrase to read suspend any officer or
employee under his authority pending investigation, intended
to empower the Ombudsman to preventively suspend all
officials and employees under investigation by his office. The
moment a criminal or administrative complaint is filed with the
ombudsman, the respondent is deemed to be in his authority
and he can proceed to determine whether said respondent
should be placed under preventive suspensions.


NATIVIDAD vs. FELIX
GR No. 111616 04 February 1994



Facts: The petitioner is the Municipal Mayor of Ramos,
Tarlac and he was charged for the killing of Severino Aquino,
a robbery and NPA suspect, while the latter was in
investigation at the police station. The PNP requested the
Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor to investigate the petitioner for
the death of the victim. Petitioner wrote to the secretary of
justice requesting the preliminary investigation be done in
Manila, but this was denied. The petitioner then moved to
remand his case for preliminary investigation contending that
respondent judge has no jurisdiction over the case because it
was the Ombudsman and not the provincial prosecutor who
has jurisdiction to conduct the investigation. respondent
judge denied the petition.

Issue: W/N the provincial prosecutor of Tarlac has authority
to conduct a preliminary investigation of the offense allegedly
committed by the petitioner. Case,

Decision: In Deloso vs. Domingo, it was said that the
Ombudsman has the power to conduct preliminary
investigation on any illegal act or omission of any public
official which is broad enough to encompass any crime
committed by a public official. However, looking at the latest
law on the Sandiganbayan, Section 4 of said law provided
that the Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive jurisdication
in all cases involving: a) offenses or felonies bu public
officers and employees in relation to their office and b)
penalty prescribed be higher than prison correctional or
imprisonment for 6 years or fine of Php 6,000.00. In the case
at bar, the second requirement was met but the first is
wanting.

Moreover, Deloso vs Domingo has already been re-
examined in the case of Aguinaldo vs. Domagas and
Sanchez vs. Demetriou which both provided that the
authority of the Ombudsman is not an exclusive authority but
rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the
offense charged. Accordingly, the Ombudsman may take
over the investigation of such case at any stage from any
investigative agency of the Government. Also, a careful
reading of Section 15 of the Ombudsman act would give us
an idea an idea that the Ombudsmans investigatory powers
are but directory in nature. The petition was dismissed for
lack of merit.


CONCERNED OFFICILS OF MWSS vs. VASQUEZ
G.R. No. 109113 25 January 1995



Facts: The Ombudsman, in its October 1992 order, directed
the Board of Trustees of MWSS to (a) set aside the
recommendation of the Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards
Committee that a MWSS contract be given to a contractor
offering fiberglass pipes and b) to instead award the contract
to a complying and responsive bidder. The petitioners sought
to annul these orders contending that:
a) the respondent acted without jurisdiction in issuing
these said orders
b) respondent committed grave abuse of discretion by
capriciously interpreting the decision of MWSS
which is a specialized agency of government.
The respondent on the other hand contents that the authority
of the Ombudsman is sufficiently broad enough to cloth it
with sufficient power to look into the alleged irregularities in
the bidding that was conducted in the MWSS. The
ombudsman can call for investigation of any act or omission
of any public official, employee, office or agency when such
act appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.
Respondent further argues that the Ombudsman has
investigatory powers, prosecutory powers, public assistance
functions, authority to inquire and obtain information and
function to adopt, institute and implement preventive
measures, thus the act of the Ombusdman is well within its
powers.

Issue: W/N the Ombudsman has the power to issue said
orders.

Decision: No. The Ombudsman seen to have pre-empted
the exercise of discretion by the Board of Trustees of the
MWSS since the recommendation to award the contract
appears to be yet pending consideration and action of the
MWSS Board. The MWSS is government owned and
controlled corporation, which has discretion on matters that
can be best discharged by it. It was said in Razon vs. PPA
that neither the court nor congress and perhaps the
Ombudsman could be expected to have the technical
expertise to look into matters of this nature. The discretion to
accept or reject a bid and award contract is vested on
government agencies. Courts will not interfere unless it is
apparent that it is used as a shield to a fraudulent award.


LASTIMOSA VS. VASQUEZ
GR. 116801 06 April 06 1995




Facts: Petitioner is the Assistant Provincial prosecutor of
Cebu. She and the Provincial Prosecutor refused to file a
criminal charge of attmpeted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo.
Thus, the Ombudsman filed an administrative complaint
against them for grave misconduct, insubordination, gross
neglect of duty refraining from prosecuting. The two were
placed under preventive suspension. It was the contention of
the petitioner that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over
the case of the mayor thus, they cannot be forced to file the
case against Ilustrisimo.

Issue: W/N the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to
call on the provincial prosecutor to assist it in the prosecution
of the case for attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo.

Decision: Yes. In the exercise of his powers, the
Ombudsman is authorized to call in prosecutors for
assistance as provided for in Seciton 31 of the Ombudsman
Act of 1989 (RA 6770). When a prosecutor is deputized, he
comes under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman
meaning, he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to
direct, review, approve reverse and modify his decision.
Petitioner cannot legally act on her own and refuse to
prepare and file the information as directed by the
Ombudsman.

The preventive suspension is also valid in pursuant to
Section 24 of the Ombudsman act which expressly provided
that the preventive suspension shall continue until the case is
terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman, but not more
than six months without pay.

Petition was dismissed:

Note: Preventive Suspension:

Civil Service (90 days) grounds: simple showing that the
charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct,
neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to
believe that the respondent is guilty of charges.

Ombudsman (6 months) ground: same as the grounds
under the civil service decree plus an additional requirement
that the evidence of guilt is strong and that the respondents
continued stay in the office may prejudice the case filed
against him.

Local Government Code (60 days) preventive suspension
can be ordered only after the issues are joined, meaning, all
the preliminary requirements and exchanges had been
completed, respondent has already filed his counter affidavit
and the case is ready for resolution.


ALMONTE vs. VASQUEZ
G.R. 95367 23 May 1995


Facts: The Ombudsman received anonymous letters
alleging that funds representing saving from unfilled positions
in the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau has
been illegally disbursed thus, it launched an investigation and
issued subpoena duces tecum requiring the petitioners to
produce all documents relating to the Personal Service
Funds in the year of 1988. Petitioners refused to comply with
the orders saying that the DBM only released funds for the
947 plantilla positions which were filled. Moreover, the
petitioners were alleging that the documents being asked by
the Ombudsman are confidential in nature thus, they cannot
be forced to present them.

Issue: W/N the Ombudsman can investigate a case brought
about by an undersigned and unverified letter and W/N EIIB
can invoke confidentiality against the Ombudsman.

Decision:

The privilege of confidentiality is recognized only on matters
relating to military, diplomatic and other national security
secrets. If the claim of confidentiality does not rest on these
matters, the privilege cannot be invoked. What is being
asked by the Ombudsman do not pertain to diplomatic nor
military secrets. The fact that the said documents were
already examined by COA gives the Ombudsman more right
to examine them because there is no reason why said
documents may be allowed to be examined by one agency of
government and be considered as confidential by another. If
the documents are really confidential, then they can always
be examined in strict confidence of the Ombudsman himself.

The contention of the petitioners that the Ombudsman can
only act in appropriate cases and subject to such limitation as
may be provided by law does not mean that the Ombudsman
cannot investigate a case brought by unverified source. As a
matter of fact, the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides that the
Ombudsman shall receive complaints from any source in
whatever form concerning official act and omission. The
general investigation in the Ombudsmans office is precisely
for the purpose of protecting those against whom a complaint
is filed against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution
as much as securing the state from useless and expensive
trials.

Petition was dismissed.


SECTION 18

CAASI VS. COURT OF APPEALS
GR 88831 08 November 1990


Facts: Merito Miguel is the municipal mayor of Bolinao
Pangasinan. His rival Mateo Caasi, was contending that
Miguel should have been disqualified to run for the position of
mayor on the account of his being a green card holder filed
the present petition. Moreover, the petitioner contends that
section 18 of Article XI which states that Public officers and
employees who seek to change their citizenship or acquire
the statues of an immigrant of another country during his
tenure shall be dealt with by law, applies to this case.
According to Miguel, he merely obtained the green card in
order that he may freely enter the United States for his
periodic check-up and to visit his children. Miguel further
argues that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao
Pangasinan and that he voted during the previous elections.
COMELEC ruled that the possession of a green card does
not sufficiently establish that Miguel abandoned his residence
in the Philippines.



Issues:
a) W/N section 18 applies to this case
b) W/N a green card holder is proof that the holder is a
permanent resident of the US.

Decision: In the application for Immigrant Visa and Alien
registration, Miguel said that he inteded to stay permanently
in the US. Thus, his immigration to the US in 1984 constitute
an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the
Philippines because he entered the US with the intention to
live there permanently as evidenced by his application for an
immigrants visa. To assume otherwise would mean that he
applied for immigration to the US under false pretenses.
However, Section 18 does not apply to this case because
Miguel acquired the status of an immigrant before he was
elected to public office and not during his tenure as mayor.
Nonetheless, Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
applies to him. Said law states that any person who is
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country
shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this
code unless he has waived his status. Miguels filing of his
candidacy does not constitute a waiver of his status, thus, he
remains to be an immigrant. Consequently, he is disqualified
from running in public office. The decision of COMELEC and
Court of Appeals were set aside.


SECTION 13

HONASAN VS. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
GR No. 159747


Facts: Gregorio Honasan and several others were charged
with violation of Article 134-A of the RPC for the offense of
coup detat. The panel of investigating prosecutors of the
department of justice sent a subpoena to the petitioner for
preliminary investigation. The petitioner questions the
jurisdiction of DOJ over the case asserting that the imputed
acts were committed in relation to his public office thus it
must be the Ombudsman not the DOJ that has the
jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation. He
further contends that he should be charged in the
Sandiganbayan and not in the regular courts since he is a
public official and that the OMB-DOJ joint circular is
unconstitutional. Respondent on the other hand contends
that the Department of Justice Panel of investigators has
jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation over the
charge in pursuant to the Revised Administrative Code of
1987. Moreover, the Ombudsman has the power to deputize
DOJ prosecutors as provided in the constitution.

Issue: W/N the DOJ has jurisdiction over the case.

Decision: The authority of the respondent DOJ is not based
on the OMB-DOJ Circular but rather on the provisions of the
1987 Administrative Code which provides that the DOJ shall
have the power to investigate the commission of crimes,
prosecute offenders and administer the probation and
correction system. The office of the Ombudsman is
conferred with the power to investigate on its own or on
complaint by any person any act or omission of any public
official, employee or agency when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. Such
power does not exclude other government agencies tasked
by law to investigate and prosecute cases involving public
officials. Accordingly, the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides
that the Sandiganbayan, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction, may take over at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of
such cases.

Ombudsman cases involving criminal offenses may be
subdivided into two classes: 1) those cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan (under the direct control of the Ombudsman)
and 2) those falling under the jurisdiction of regular courts
(the control and supervision by the ombudsman is only in
Ombudsman cases complaints filed in or taken cognizance
of by the Office of the Ombudsman charging any public
officer or employee). The power to investigate or conduct
preliminary investigation on any Ombudsman case may be
exercised by an investigator or prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman or by any Provincial or City Prosecutor in their
regular capacity or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.
Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act state that the
Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute any
illegal act or omission of any public official however, as held
in the case of Aguinaldo vs. Domagas, this authority is not
exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent
authority in respect of offense charged. This means that the
Ombudsman has no exclusive jurisdiction to investigate
offenses committed by public officers or employees for such
power is concurrent with other investigating agencies such as
provincial and state prosecutors. But in its exercise of its
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman may take over, at any
stage, the investigating of such cases. In other words, DOJ
is not precluded from conducting any investigation of cases
involving public officers involving violations of penal laws but
if the case falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, then respondent Ombudsman may, in the
exercise of its primary jurisdiction take over at any stage.
The petition was dismissed.

SECTION 7

LAUREL VS. DISIERTO
G.R. 145368 12 April 2002


Facts: The National Centennial Commission was constituted
for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebration in
1998 with former vice-president Salvador Laurel as
Chairperson. Sometime on August 1998, Senator Coseteng
delivered a speech in the Senate denouncing alleged
anomalies in the construction and operation of the centennial
exposition project. Upon motion of Senator Drilon, the
speech was referred to the Committee on Accountability of
Public Officer. In 1999, president Estrada formed an ad hoc
independent citizens committee to investigate al the facts
and circumstances surrounding the Philippine Centennial
projects including its component activities to be headed by
former Senator Rene saguisag. The Saguisag Committee
recommended the further investigation by the Ombudsman
and indictment in proper cases of NCC chair Salvador laurel.
Petitioner in this present case assails the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman on the ground that he is not a public officer
because the NCC was not a public office. He contends that
he is not a public officer as defined under the anti-graft and
corrupt practices act.

Issue: W/N the petitioner is a public official and W/N the
Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case.



Decision: The power to investigate and prosecute by the
Ombudsman pertains to any act or omission of any public
officer or employee when such an act or omission appears to
be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not
make any distinction between cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts.
Thus, the clause any illegal act or omission of any public
official is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by
a public officer or employee.
Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over this
case would depend on whether or not NCC is a public office
and consequently, its chairman, a public official. It was held
by the court that NCC performs executive functions and was
precisely created to execute the law moreover, it has a role in
the countrys economic development, especially the in the
central Luzon. Thus, NCC performs sovereign functions
which is one of the characteristics of a public office. Having
performed sovereign functions, it is therefore a public office
and the petitioner, a public officer. The fact that petitioner did
not receive any compensation is of little consequence, the
office of the petitioner may be characterized then as an
honorary office, as opposed to lucrative one or an office of
profit, but it is public office nonetheless. The office of the
ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case. Petition was
dismissed
SECTION 4

AZARCON VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
GR No. 116033 26 February 1997


Facts: Petitioner Azarcon, in his capacity as administrator of
properties deposited by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, was
accused of malversation of public funds for allowing Jaime
Acla, his subcontractor to take possession of the properties
owned by the latter which was seized due to his tax liabilities.
Petitioner alleges that he was not a public officer hence, he
should not have been charged with malversation of public
funds. He also contends that the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over the crimes committed solely by private
individuals. Azarcon points out that he cannot be considered
as a public because there is no provision in the National
Internal revenue Code which authorizes the Bureau of
Internal revenue to appoint him as one.

Issue: W/N the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a
private individual who is charged with malversation of public
funds as a principal after the said individual had been
designated by the BIR as a custodian of the distrained
property.

Decision: The court held that in accordance with Section 4 of
PD No.1606, the Sandiganbayan can only exercise
jurisdiction over a private individual when the complaint
charges the private individual either as a co-principal,
accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee who
has been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction.
Azarcon also cannot be considered a public officer for Article
203 of the RPC defines public officers as: 1) one who is
taking part in the performance of public functions in the
government and 2) that his authority to take part in the
performance of public functions or to perform public duties
must be by direct provision of the law, by popular election or
by appointment by competent authority. The petitioners
designation by the BIR as a custodian of the properties does
not make him a public officer. Consequently, the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the controversy and
therefore, its decisions are null and void.



CAMANAG VS. GUERRERO
GRN 121017 February 17, 1997


Facts: Sometime in 1993, the Professional Regulations
Commission (PRC) issued the Table of Results of those who
failed the May, 1993 Certified Public Accountant (CPA)
Licensure Examinations where petitioner Olivia B. Camanag
was listed as having failed with a general average of 50.00%.
The following year, an anonymous letter was sent to PRC
Chairman Hermogenes P. Pobre 'claiming that certain BIR
employees allegedly passed the CPA Licensure Exams
under anomalous circumstances and Chairman Pobre
immediately referred the situation to the Ombudsman.
Ombudsman Investigator set the fact-finding investigation of
the matter and issued a Subpoena Duces Tecum to the Chief
of the BIR Personnel Division. Petitioner seeks the
declaration of nullity of Sections 15 and 17 of the
Ombudsman Act (R.A. No. 6770), insofar as it empowers the
Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigations and to
directly undertake criminal prosecutions.

Issue: W/N the power of the Ombudsman to conduct
preliminary investigations is a violation of the constitution.

Decision: No. The the Ombudsman. under the 1987
Constitution, particularly under paragraph 8. Section 13,
Article XI.9 may be validly empowered with prosecutorial
functions by the legislature, and this the latter did when it
passed R.A. No. 6670, which gave the Ombudsman, among
9 others, the power to investigate and prosecute individuals
on matters and/or complaints referred or filed before it.
Moreover, the Office of the Ombudsman is a distinct
constitutional body whose duties and functions are provided
for by the Constitution itself. Considering that the power of
the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute criminal cases
emanates as it does from the Constitution itself, particularly,
under paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI, which empowers
the Ombudsman to "exercise such other powers or perform
such other functions or duties" as Congress may prescribe
through legislation, it cannot be argued that such power or
the exercise thereof is unconstitutional or violative of the
principle of separation of powers enshrined in the
Constitution. The case was dismissed.


Article XII: National Economy and Patrimony


Section 2

Alienation of natural resources

SANTA ROSA MINING CO. VS. LEIDO, JR.
156 SCRA 1 1987


Facts: The petitioner, Santa Rosa Mining Company Inc., is
assailing the constitutionality of Presidential decree No 1214


and seeks to enjoin the respondent public officials from
enforcing. Petitioner contends that it is a holder of fifty mining
claims situate in Camarines Norte acquired under the
provisions of Act if the US Congress of 1902 or the Philippine
Bill. The contested law provided that all mining claims
located under the provisions of the Philippine bill should file a
mining lease application within 1 year from the approval of
the decree, which the petitioners complied with under protest.
It was the contention of the respondents that the petition
should fail since petitioners failed to exhaust administrative
remedies before filing the petition in court citing the pending
appeal filed with the Office of the President.

Issue: W/N the petitioners are legitimate owners of the
mining claims and W/N the PD 1214 is valid.

Decision: The court held that whatever right that was vested
over the mining claims before PD 1214 were merely
possessory right which can be lost through abandonment or
forfeiture or may be revoked for valid legal grounds.
Moreover, the petitioner was wrong in citing Gold Greek
Mining Corp vs. Rodriguez because the issue in this case
was the right to a patent over a mining claim after compliance
with all the legal requirements for a patent. Such in not the
issue in the present case. Thus, the petitioners cannot claim
ownership over the mining claims.
PD 1214 is constitutional because it is a valid exercise of the
sovereign power of the state, as owner over lands of the
public domain, of which the petitioners mining claim are still
form a part, and over the patrimony of the nation, of which
mineral deposits are a valuable asset.
Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over the
affected land or the mining claim. It merely segregates the
located land or area from the public domain by barring other
would-be locators from locating themselves in the area. The
petition was dismissed.


SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS
185 SCRA 722 (1990)


Facts: San Miguel Corporation seeks the reversal of the
Court of Appeals decision denying its application for
registration of a parcel of land since it was not able to show
entitlement to the said land which was purchased by the
company from a certain Severino Perez. Solicitor General
opposed the application contending that SMCs claim of
ownership in fee simple cannot be granted. Severino Perez
contest ownership of the land on the basis of tax declarations
and Spanish title which he could not avail of because the 6-
month period from February 1976 that was prescribed by PD
892 has already elapsed. Moreover, the land is part of public
domain thus SMC, as a private corporation is disqualified
from owning it as provide by the constitution.

Issue: W/N Severino Perez owns the land and thereby has
the right to sell it to SMC

Decision: The court held that open, exclusive and
undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period
prescribed by the law, which in this case is 30 years, creates
a legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the
requirement, ipso jure, ceases to be public land. The tax
declarations were insufficient to prove ownership or right of
possession of the land. It only comes as strong evidence if
there is actual possession which was not been proven by the
predecessor-in-trust. The decisions of the CA were affirmed.

Utilization of natural resources

MINERS ASSOCIATION vs. FACTORAN Jr.
G.R. No. 98332 16 January 1995


Facts: The petitioners are assailing the validity of
Administrative Order Nos 57 and 82 which were issued by
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in
order to implement the legislative acts of the president which
regards the exploration, development and utilization of
minerals. Administrative Order No. 57 provides that all
existing mining leases which were granted after the effectivity
of the 1987 constitution except small scale mining leases
shall be converted into production-sharing agreements within
one year from the effectivity of the Mining Guidelines. AO
No. 82 on the other hand provides that entities listed there
(mining companies) must within two years from the effectivity
of the DENR AOs submit a letter of intent and mineral
Production Sharing Agreement. Petitioners contend that
these AOs impair the contracts previously entered into for it
pre-terminates existing mining leases.

Issue: W/N the said orders are valid.

Decision: AO 57 and 82 are valid. Upon the effectivity of
the 1987 constitution, the state assumed a more dynamic
role in the utilization, exploration and development of the
natural resources. The constitution expressly provided that
utiliation may be undertaken by means of direct act of the
state or it may opt to enter into co-production, joint venture,
or production sharing agreements. The AO did not pre-
terminate existing mining leases in general. For one, it does
not apply retroactively before the effectivity of the 1987
constitution but rather, only to all existing mining leases or
agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the
1987 constitution. It is a well settled doctrine that mining
leases and agreements granted by the state are subject to
alteration through reasonable exercise of power of the state.
The orders intended to secure the paramount interest of the
public, their growth and welfare. The petition was dismissed.


SECTION 3

Classification of lands

DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. JUDGE AQUINO
G.R. 31688 17 DECEMBER 1990


Facts: Petitioner contends that the limestone rich land of
Bucay Abra which, was purchased by Abra Industrial
Corporation, is within the Central Cordiallera Forest reserve.
The director of lands further points out that the land being
denuded does not affect its classification. Moreover, while
the land could be classifies as mineral land under the Bureau
of mines, the process of exclusion from the Cordillera forest
reserve had not yet been undertaken thus, the said land was
still part of the forest zone which was inalienable under the
constitution.




Issue: W/N the lower court was wrong in granting the
application fore registration of the parcels of land not
withstanding its finding that they were within the forest zone.

Decision: Yes. The lower court erred. The district foresters
failure to object the exclusion of the area sought to be
registered from the forest reserve is not a justification for
registration, Moreover, the power to exclude the area from
the forest zone belongs to the President of the Philippines,
upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural resource and not the district Forester or even the
Director of Forestry. The rule in Director of Forestry vs
Munoz which provide that the forest lands or forest reserves
are incapable of private appropriation and possession. This
ruling is premised on the regalian doctrine. Pursuant to the
constitution, a kind must first be released from its
classification as forest land in accordance with the
certification of the Director of Forestry. Classification of lands
is an exclusive prerogative of the executive department.
Moreover, a positive act of the government is needed to
declassify a forest land into alienate or disposable. The fact
that the land is denuded does not affect its classification. The
decision was reversed and set aside.


REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS
160 SCRA 228 (1988)


Facts: Jose de la Rosa and his children applied for
registration of a parcel of land in the Benguet province. The
application was opposed by the Benguet Consolidated Inc,
(as to Lots 1-5) Atok Corporation (as to Lots 6-9) and the
Republic of the Philippines as to lots 1-9. In support of the
applications, the original owners who sold the lots to De la
rosa testified that they acquired the lots by virtue of
prescription. Benguet and Atok on the other hand contends
that Lots 1-5 and 6-9 respectively were sold to them by their
successors in interest sometime in 1934 and 1909. The
Bureau of Forestry interposed its objection on the ground that
Lots 1-9 was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest
Reserve under PD No. 217. According to Benguet and Atok
the claims were perfected prior to the 1935 constitution thus
the properties were already considered private and thus the
successors in interest can transfer the same to the
companies. The court of appeals ruled in favor of de la Rosa
saying that there is no conflict of interest between the owners
of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights.
Under such ruling, the surface was classified as agricultural
while the land beneath as mineral.

Issue: W/N the companies have exclusive rights to the
property in question. W/N the CA was correct in their
contention.

Decision: The court held that the CA was incorrect by stating
that the surface can be agricultural land while the subsurface,
mineral because classification must be categorical. The land
must either be agricultural or mineral. In the instant case, it
can be observed that the land which was originally classified
as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral once the
mining claims were perfected. Once minerals are discovered
in the land, whatever its use to which it is being devoted such
use may be discontinued by the state to enable it to extract
the mineral therein. The owners however will be
compensated pursuant to the Mining Laws. Benguet and
Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by
virtue of their respective mining claims. The land could not
have been transferred to the private respondents by virtue of
prescription nor could it be used simultaneously by them and
the mining companies. The decision of the trial court was
reinstated.


Right of corporation to own lands

DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. INTERMEDIATE COURT OF
APPEALS
146 SCRA 509 (1986)



Facts: The Director of Lands filed a petition questioning the
judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court which ordered
the registration in favor of Acme Plywood and Veneer Co. of
the five parcels of land acquired by it from Mariano and Acer
Infiel. The petitioner contends that the registration
proceeding should be governed by the 1973 constitution
which provides that the private corporation may not lease
more than 1000 hectares of land. This provision is not found
in the 1935 constitution which was in force in 1962 when
Acme purchased the land from the Infiels.

Issue: W.N the corporation may acquire the whole parcel of
land considering that it is beyond the 1000 limit provided by
the new constitution. W/N the Acme validly acquired the
land.

Decision: The court held that the company may acquire the
whole parcel of land (481,390 sq meters) because the validity
of the acquisition is determined as of the time the land was
acquired. The limit provided in the 1973 constitution is found
in the 1935 constitution and since it is the constitution in force
at the time of acquisition that which will be followed, the
acquisition is valid. The Infiels are not disqualified from
acquiring and owning the said land because pursuant to the
Public Land Act, national cultural minorities who possessed
and occupied the same for more than 30 years are given the
right to exercise ownership over said lands. Thus, they can
sell it to a corporation like Acme. The rule is that alienable
public land held by a possessor personally through his
predecessors in interest openly, continuously and exclusively
for the prescribed period of time (30 years) is converted to
private property by mere lapse or completion of said period.
The acquisition of Acme then was valid. The court ruled in
favor of the respondents.

SECTION 7

HALILI VS. CA
G.R.113539 12 March 1998


Facts: The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality and
validity of the two conveyances between Helen de Guzman
and David Rey Guzman (Helens son) and between David
and Emiliano Cataniag. Helen is an American citizen who
inherited real properties from her deceased husband, Simeon
de Guzman, also an American citizen. Sometime on 1989,
Helen, executed a quitclaim transferring all her properties,


two of which she inherited from Simeon, to her son. David
later on sold the properties in Bulacan to a certain Emilio
Cataniag. It is the contention of the petitioners that the
conveyance from Helen to David, both American citizens was
illegal because it was a violation of Section 7 article 12 of the
constitution, thus the same should be declared null and void.
(note: the petitioners are claiming that they have right of
redemption over the land sold by David that is why they are
contending the validity of he conveyance. Art 1621 of the civil
code provides that owners of adjoining land shall have right
of redemption when a piece of rural land is alienated. In
order for the petitioners to be able to exercise right of
redemption, the contested land must be rural land. The trial
court and CA declared the land as urban, thus the petitioners
cannot invoke right of redemption. These issues however
are not important in our discussion)

Issue:
W/N the conveyance is illegal thus should be declared null
and void.

Decision: The court held that the sale of the subject land to
Emiliano Cataniag, a Filipino citizen, renders moot any
question on the constitutionality of the prior transfer made by
Helen to David. It is true that Helens deed of quitclaim
(which transferred the property to David) collided with the
constitution specifically Section 7 of Art XII. The court cited
the case of Krivenko vs. Register of deeds, which discussed
the issue as to who are qualified to own public and private
lands in the Philippines. It was held in that case that
alienation of agricultural lands is limited to Filipino citizens.
Section 5 (now section 7) of Article XII closes the only
remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may
leak into alien hands because it would be futile to prohibit the
alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if after all, they
may be freely alienated upon becoming private agricultural
lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. The capacity to
acquire public lands is made dependent upon the capacity to
acquire or hold lands of public domain. Private land may be
transferred only to individuals qualified to acquire lands of the
public domain (Filipino individuals and corporations with at
least 60% of the capital owned by Filipino citizens).
Consequently, the only way aliens can acquire private lands
or a land of the public domain is through legal succession.
Although the transfer from Helen to David is illegal,
transferring the land to a citizen of the Philippines cured the
flaw of the original transaction. In such cases, title of the
transferee will be rendered valid. Through this action, the
object of the constitution which is to keep our land in
Filipino hands will be served. The petition was denied.

FRENZEL VS. CATITO
G.R. No. 143958 11 July 2003


Facts: Frenzel, an Australian citizen of German descent,
filed a complaint against the responded Ederlina Catito, a
filipina. Frenzel was married to another Filipina but since
1981, they were already legally separated. Sometime in
1983, Frenzel met Ederlina in Australia. The latter was also
married to a German national but she concealed this fact
from Frenzel. The two had an amorous relationship and the
Frenzel persuaded Ederlina to go back to the Philippines
where they can engage in a business. Upon going back to
the Philippines, Frenzel bought a property under the name of
Ederlina. He also helped the girl set up a parlor business.
Sometime in 1984, Frenzel discovered Ederlinas marriage
but the latter assured the former that she will be getting a
divorce soon. During this time, Frenzel continued buying
properties under Ederlinas name thinking that said
properties would be conjugal anyway when they get married.
Unfortunately, Ederlinas divorce was opposed by her
husband twice. By 1985, Frenzel and Ederlinas relationship
started deteriorating until they separated that same year.
Frenzel demanded the return of all the amounts and
properties Ederlina acquired from him. Shortly thereafter,
Frenzel filed a complaint in the RTC contending that during
the period of their common-law relationship, he acquired
solely through his own efforts the personal properties.

Issue: W/N the properties should be returned to Frenzel.

Decision: The court ruled that Ederlina is the purchaser of
the contested properties and even if Frenzel was the buyer,
he has no cause of action against the former because he
was an alien, thus, disqualified from acquiring lands in the
Philippines. Moreover, applying pari delicto, the petitioner
was precluded from recovering the properties from the
respondent since he himself is still married to his former
Filipina wife.

Section 14 (now Section 7) of Article XIV (now XII) of the
1973 constitution provides that lands of public domain which
include private lands may be transferred or conveyed only to
individuals or entities qualified to acquire or hold private
lands or lands of public domain. Aliens, whether individual or
corporations are disqualified from acquiring lands. Even if
the petitioner is the real vendee, the transactions are a
violation of the Constitution, hence null and void and produce
no legal effect. One who loses his money or property by
knowingly engaging in a contract or transaction, which
involves his own moral turpitude, may not maintain an action
for his losses. This rule is expressed in the maxims EX
DOLO ORITUR ACTION and IN PARI DELICTO POTIOR
EST CONDITIO DEFENDIS. The sale is illegal per se and to
allow the petitioner to recover the properties would be
subversive of public policy. The petition was dismissed.


SECTION 10

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS
G.R. No. 122156 03 February 1997


Facts: Petitioner invokes the Filipino First Policy enshrined in
the 1987 constitution in its bid to acquire 51% of the share of
the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) formerly owned by the
GSIS. The said policy provides that the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony (Section 10 of Article XII). The issue arose
when GSIS decided to sell its MHC shares through public
bidding. In a close bidding, Renong Berhad, a Malaysian
firm placed a bid higher than the petitioner. Pending the
declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder, the
petitioner matched the bid price at PHp 44.00 per share,
which was tendered by the Malaysian company. Manila
Prince then petitioned to the court to enjoin the respondents
from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian
firm contending that Manila hotel is part of national
patrimony, thus, Filipinos should be given preference during


the bid. Respondents on the other maintain that Section 10
is not applicable based on the following grounds:
1. Section 10 of Art XII of the constitution is not a self-
executing provision and requires an implementing
legislation
2. granting that the provision is self-executing, manila
hotel does not fall under the term national
patrimony which only refers to lands of public
domain and natural resources
3. granting manila hotel is part of the national
patrimony, the provision invoked is still inapplicable
since what is being sold is only the shares, not the
hotel building or the land where it stands.
4. GSIS rules provide that qualified bidders can only
match the highest bid if the former cannot be
awarded the block of shares

Issue: W/N the Manila Prince Hotel should be given
preference in acquiring the 51% share of MHC.

Decision: The court held that the argument of the
respondent that Section 10 is not self-executing is flawed.
Section 10 is a mandatory and positive command, which is
complete in itself and needs no further guidelines or
implementing rules for its enforcement. When the
constitution mandates that in granting of rights and privileges
and concessions covering national economy and patrimony,
the state shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means
that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.

Patrimony pertains to heritage and refers not only to natural
resources of the Philippines. Manila hotel is a living
testimonial of Philippine heritage for more than 8 decades, it
has bore witness to the triumphs and failures of the Filipinos.
Consequently, respondents claim cannot be sustained.

The Filipino First policy must mean that the state shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos but this provision does not
mandate the pampering and preferential treatment of
incompetent Filipino citizens or corporations. Nonetheless,
while the Filipino first policy bestows preference on qualified
Filipinos, the mere tending of highest bid is not an assurance
that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder.
Since the petitioner already matched the bid price tendered
by the Malaysian firm, there is no reason why it should not be
declared the winning bidder. The respondent was ordered to
accept the matching bid of the petitioner.


Dissenting Opinion: Puno, J.

Section 10 is pro-Filipino but it is not anti alien for it does not
absolutely bar aliens in the grant of rights, privileges and
concession covering national patrimony. In the absence of
qualified Filipinos, the state is not prohibited from granting
these rights to aliens if the act will promote the welfare of the
nation. The right of preference of the petitioner only arises if
it tied the bid of Renong Berhad during the bid. The
petitioner has no right to match the bid after the bidding
closed because doing so would be unfair

TANADA VS. ANGARA
G.R. No. 118295 02 May 1997


Facts: Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then secretary of DTI,
representing the government of RP signed the final act
embodying results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations. By signing the said act, the Philippines
agreed to submit to the WTO agreement. The petitioners
assail the WTO agreement for violating the mandate of the
1987 Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos and to
give preference to qualified Filipinos to promote the
preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and
locally produced goods. They also pray for the nullification of
said agreement because 1) the WTO requires the Philippines
to place nationals and products of member-countries on the
same footing as Filipinos and local products (the national
treatment and parity provisions in the WTO Agreement)
and 2) that the WTO intrudes, limits and impairs the
constitutional powers of both congress and the supreme
court.

Issues:
1. W/N the provision of the Agreement Establishing the
WTO contravene the provisions of the Constitution
particularly Section 10 and 12 Article XII of the 1987
constitution. (There are 7 issues in this case, only
the 3
rd
issue is useful in our discussion)
2. W/N the senate may ratify the Philippine
concurrence in the WTO

Decision: Section 10 and 12 of Article XII should be read
and understood in relation to the other sections of the said
article specifically Sections 1 and 13. Section 13 provides
that the state shall pursue a trade policy that serves the
general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of
exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity. Through
this section, the Constitution takes into account the realities
of the outside world. The constitution indeed mandates a
bias in favor of Filipinos (Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS) but it
also recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest
of the world on the cases of equality and reciprocity. In other
words, the constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist
policy for it does not shut out foreign investments, goods and
services in the development of the Philippine economy.
What the constitution frowns upon are unfair competition and
trade practices.

The constitutional policy of a self reliant and independent
national economy does not rule out the entry of foreign
investments, goods and services. Moreover, the constitution
encourages industries that are competitive in both domestic
and foreign markets. Given a free trade environment
espoused by the WTO, Filipino entrepreneurs will be able to
demonstrate capacity to grow.

Looking at the constitution, it can be surmised that there are
enough balancing provisions in the fundamental law that
would allow the senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in
the WTO agreement (Section 1 and 13). The ratification then
was constitutional. Petitions were dismissed.


ILOILO ICE AND COLD STORAGE COMPANY VS.
PUBLIC UTILITY BOARD
G.R. No. 19857 02 March 1923


Facts: The petitioner is a corporation organized under the
Philippine law. Sometime in 1921, the secretary of Public


utility investigated the operation of the ice plants in Iloilo and
he reported that the petitioner should be considered a public
utility. Thereafter, the Public Utility Board issued a decision
holding the petitioner a public utility and as such, subject to
the control and jurisdiction of the Public Utility Commissioner.
Petitioner rejected said decision.

Issue: W/N the petitioner is a public utility.

Decision: A Public utility is a utility corporation, which
renders service to the general pubic. Its essential feature is
that its service is not confined to privileged individuals but is
open to an indefinite public. The public or private character
of a utility does not depend on the number of persons who
avail of its services but on whether or not it is open to serve
all members of the public who may require it. Evidence
shows that the petitioner is operating a small ice plant and
that there was no attempt made to supply the needs of all
who may apply to expand the plant. Moreover, sales have
been made to selected customers only. The fact that the
petitioner has no competitor in the field does not make it a
public utility. Iloilo ice is not a public utility and should not
submit to the jurisdiction of the board

ARTICLE 17

PLANAS vs. COMELEC
49 SCRA 105 (1973)


Facts: Petitioner prays for the annulment of PD 73 in so far
as it calls for a plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the
proposed constitution and Presidential Decree No. 86 which
organized the Citizens Assemblies to be consulted on
certain public questions on the ground that these decrees
are either void or no in effect. It is the contention of the
petitioner that PD 73 has no effect because the power to call
a plebiscite is lodged exclusively in congress while calling for
Citizens Assemblies is illegal since it contravenes with
Article XV of the 1935 constitution on the following grounds:
a) it is contemplated in the constitution that in the
elections wherein the draft constitution is submitted
for ratification, only qualified citizens are permitted
to vote whereas in Citizens Assemblies, even 15
year olds can vote.
b) Elections, plebiscites contemplated in the
constitution have provisions for secrecy, citizens
assemblies have none.

Issues: W/N PD 73 and 86 and consequently, the
ratification of the constitution is valid.

Decision: Before the court decided on this case, PD 1102
was issued by President Marcos announcing that the Filipino
people has ratified the constitution proposed by the 1971
constitutional convention.


MITRA JR. VS. COMELEC
104 SCRA 59 (April 4, 1981)



Facts: The petitioners assail the ratification of the 1973
constitution contending that it is not in force an effect
believing that in the event the said constitution is rejected,
the 1935 constitution, which according to petitioners was
merely suspended by the establishment of Martial Law, could
be once more operative.

Issue: W/N the ratification of the 1973 constitution is
unconstitutional (based on the 1935 constitution)

Decision: The court dismissed the case basing its decision in
the ruling in Javellana vs. Executive Secretary. In said case,
the new constitution was held to be in force and effect by six
justices while four dissented from the majority view. Since the
case was dismissed, the validity of the ratification of the
constitution was upheld, one of the basic postulates being
the presumption of validity. Moreover, the opinion of then
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, while in dissent,
acknowledged that even without a valid ratification, a new
constitution could come into effect by the acquiesce of the
people, to whom sovereignty resides. Besides the
referendum in 1973, there were other instances when the
people went to polls to show their acquiesce in the
constitution, namely, during the 1976 amendments, and two
elections held under the present constitution. There is no
question that the 1973 constitution is in force and effect thus
the present case was dismissed.

SUMMARY OF THE JUSTICES OPINION ON THE
JAVELLANA vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CASE (WHICH
RESOLVED THE RATIFICATION ISSUE)

Originally, there where a total of seven Justices who
opined that the requirements of the 1935 constitution for
a valid ratification namely:
a) Ratification of amendments must be held in an
election conducted under the election law
b) Supervised by the COMLEC
c) Where only franchised voters take part
have not been followed.
A. Chief Justice Conception
- the amendatory process provided in
the 1973 constitution was not
followed because it was precisely
provided that only qualified coed
under Article V of the 1935
constitution are allowed to
participate in the plebiscite
B. Makalintal and Castro
- the citizens assemblies were not
limited to qualified, let alone
registered voters but included all
citizens from the age of 15
- No official ballets were used in the
voting for it was done only by
acclamation or show of hands
- There was no secrecy as one of the
essential features of election
process
- No set of rules were observed
- COMELEC did no part in the
elections
- thus, the 1935 constitutional
requirements were not followed.
C. Zaldivar (same as above)
D. Fernando (same as above)
E. Teehankee
- two if the essential requisites for
ratification through election namely
the participation of enfranchised


person only and administration of
the COMELEC are missing thus,
there is an irregularity in the
ratification.
F. Barredo
- The referendum falls short of the requirements provided by
the 1935 constitution but the result of the referendum (votes
of the people) is sufficient basis for declaring that the New
Constitution has been ratified.
Those who originally dissented (Esguerra, Makaisar and
Antonio) believed that people alone should determine
whether the constitution was ratified or not. Since the
majority of the people ratified the constitution, it is should
be considered in force. Moreover, since there is no
provision on revision in the 1935 constitution, the 1971
constitutional convention was called by the direct
authority of the people and not by the authority of the
constitution.
However, 3 justices voted to dismiss the case
(Makalintal, Castro, Barredo) including the dissenters.
They all believed that whether or not the requirements in
the 1935 constitution were complied with is irrelevant in
the face of the acceptance of the constitution by the
people.

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