1

G.R. No. L-23035 July 31, 1975 PHILIPPINE NUT INDUSTRY vs

STNDRD !RNDS
PHILIPPINE NUT INDUSTRY, IN"., petitioner,
vs.
STNDRD !RNDS IN"#RP#RTED $%& TI!UR"I# S. E'LLE $s
D()*+,o) o- P$,*%,s, respondents.
Perfecta E. De Vera for petitioner.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for private respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Actin Assistant Solicitor
General !sidro C. "orro#eo and Solicitor $rancisco %. "autista for respondent
Director.

.UN#/ PL., J.:
Challenged in this petition for review is the decision of respondent Director of
Patents which orders the cancellation of Certificate of Registration No. SR-416
issued in favor of herein petitioner Philippine Nut ndustr!, nc. "hereinafter
called Philippine Nut# for the trade$ar% &P'(PPN) P(*N+)RS C,RD*(
P)*N-+S,& upon co$plaint of Standard .rands nc. "hereinafter to /e called
Standard .rands#.
+he records of the case show the following incidents0
Philippine Nut, a do$estic corporation, o/tained fro$ the Patent ,ffice on
*ugust 11, 1261, Certificate of Registration No. SR-416 covering the trade$ar%
&P'(PPN) P(*N+)RS C,RD*( P)*N-+S,& the la/el used on its
product of salted peanuts.
,n 3a! 14, 1264, Standard .rands a foreign corporation,
1
filed with the
Director of Patents nter Partes Case No. 465 as%ing for the cancellation of
Philippine Nut6s certificate of registration on the ground that &the registrant was
not entitled to register the $ar% at the ti$e of its application for registration
thereof& for the reason that it "Standard .rands# is the owner of the trade$ar%
&P(*N+)RS C,C7+*( P)*N-+S& covered /! Certificate of Registration
No. SR-184, issued /! the Patent ,ffice on 9ul! 45, 12:5. Standard .rands
alleged in its petition that Philippine Nut6s trade$ar% &P'(PPN)
P(*N+)RS C,RD*( P)*N-+S& closel! rese$/les and is confusingl!
si$ilar to its trade$ar% &P(*N+)RS C,C7+*( P)*N-+S& used also on
salted peanuts, and that the registration of the for$er is li%el! to deceive the
/u!ing pu/lic and cause da$age to it.
,n 9une 1, 1264, Philippine Nut filed its answer invo%ing the special defense
that its registered la/el is not confusingl! si$ilar to that of Standard .rands as
the latter alleges.
*t the hearing of ,cto/er 4, 1264, the parties su/$itted a partial stipulation of
facts. ,n Dece$/er 14, 1264, an a$ended partial stipulation of facts was
su/$itted, the pertinent agree$ents contained in which are0 "1# that Standard
.rands is the present owner of the trade$ar% &P(*N+)RS C,C7+*(
P)*N-+S& covered /! Certificate of Registration No. SR-184 issued on 9ul!
45, 12:5; "4# that Standard .rands trade$ar% was first used in co$$erce in the
Philippines in Dece$/er, 12<5 and "<# that Philippine Nut6s trade$ar%
&P'(PPN) P(*N+)RS C,RD*( P)*N-+S& was first used in the
Philippines on Dece$/er 41, 12:5 and registered with the Patent ,ffice on
*ugust 11, 1261.
,n Dece$/er 11, 126<, after the presentation of oral and docu$entar! evidence
and the filing /! the parties of their $e$oranda, respondent Director of Patents
rendered Decision No. 451 giving due course to Standard .rand6s petition and
ordering the cancellation of Philippine Nut6s Certificate of Registration No. SR-
416. +he Director of Patents found and held that in the la/els using the two
trade$ar%s in =uestion, the do#inant part is the &ord 'Planters', displa!ed &in
a ver! si$ilar $anner& so $uch so that &as to appearance and general
i$pression& there is &a ver! confusing si$ilarit!,& and he concluded that
Philippine Nut &was not entitled to register the $ar% at the ti$e of its filing the
application for registration& as Standard .rands will /e da$aged /! the
registration of the sa$e. ts $otion for reconsideration having /een denied,
Philippine Nut ca$e up to this Court for a review of said decision.
n see%ing a reversal of the decision of respondent Director of Patents, petitioner
/rings forth eleven assigned errors all of which revolve around one $ain issue0
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is the trade$ar% &P'(PPN) P(*N+)RS C,RD*( P)*N-+S& used /!
Philippine Nut on its la/el for salted peanuts confusinl( si#ilar to the
trade$ar% &P(*N+)RS C,C7+*( P)*N-+S& used /! Standard .rands on
its product so as to constitute an infringe$ent of the latter6s trade$ar% rights and
>ustif! its cancellation?
2

+he applica/le law to the case is found in Repu/lic *ct 166 otherwise %nown as
the +rade-3ar% (aw fro$ which @e =uote the following pertinent provisions0
Chapter -*. A
Sec. 4. Registration of trade-$ar%s, trade-na$es and service-
$ar%s on the principal register. A +here is here/! esta/lished a
register of trade-$ar%s, trade-na$es and service-$ar%s which
shall /e %nown as the principal register. +he owner of a trade-
$ar%, trade-na$e or service-$ar% used to distinguish his goods,
/usiness or services fro$ the goods, /usiness or services of
others shall have the right to register the sa$e on the principal
register, unless it0
"d# Consists of or co$prises a $ar% or trade-na$e &hich so
rese#bles a #ar) or trade*na#e registered in the Philippines or
a #ar) or trade-na$e previousl! used in the Philippines b(
another and not a/andoned, as to /e li%el!, when applied to or
used in connection with the goods, /usiness or services of the
applicant, to cause confusion or $ista%e or to deceive
purchasers; ... "e$phasis ,urs#
Sec. 18. Brounds for cancellation A *n! person, who /elieves
that he is or will /e da$aged /! the registration of a $ar% or
trade-na$e, $a!, upon the pa!$ent of the prescri/ed fee, appl!
to cancel said registration upon an! of the following grounds0
"c# +hat the registration was o/tained fraudulentl! or contrar!
to the provisions of section four, Chapter hereof; ....
Sec. 44. !nfrine#ent, &hat constitutes. A *n! person who
shall use, without the consent of the registrant, an!
reproduction, counterfeit, cop! or colora/le i$itation of an!
registered $ar% or trade-na$e in connection with the sale,
offering for sale, or advertising of an! goods, /usiness or
services on or in connection with which such use is li)el( to
cause confusion or #ista)e or to deceive purchasers or others as
to the source or oriin of such oods or services, or identit! of
such /usiness; or reproduce, counterfeit, cop! or colora/l!
i$itate an! such $ar% or trade-na$e and appl! such
reproduction, counterfeit, cop!, or colora/le i$itation to la/els,
signs, prints, pac%ages, wrappers, receptacles or advertise$ents
intended to /e used upon or in connection with such goods,
/usiness or services, shall /e lia/le to a civil action /! the
registrant for an! or all of the re$edies herein provided.
"e$phasis supplied#.
n the cases involving infringe$ent of trade$ar% /rought /efore the Court it has
/een consistentl! held that there is infringe$ent of trade$ar% when the use of
the $ar% involved would /e li%el! to cause confusion or $ista%e in the $ind of
the pu/lic or to deceive purchasers as to the origin or source of the co$$odit!;
that whether or not a trade$ar% causes confusion and is li%el! to deceive the
pu/lic is a =uestion of fact which is to /e resolved /! appl!ing the &test of
do$inanc!&, $eaning, if the co$peting trade$ar% contains the $ain or essential
or do$inant features of another /! reason of which confusion and deception are
li%el! to result, then infringe$ent ta%es pace; that duplication or i$itation is not
necessar!, a si$ilarit! in the do$inant features of the trade$ar%s would /e
sufficient.
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1. +he first argu$ent advanced /! petitioner which @e /elieve goes to the core
of the $atter in litigation is that the Director of Patents erred in holding that the
do$inant portion of the la/el of Standard .rands in its cans of salted peanuts
consists of the word P(*N+)RS which has /een used in the la/el of Philippine
Nut for its own product. *ccording to petitioner, P(*N+)RS cannot /e
considered as the do$inant feature of the trade$ar%s in =uestion /ecause it is a
$ere descriptive ter$, an ordinar! word which is defined in @e/ster
nternational Dictionar! as &one who or that which plants or sows, a far$er or
an agriculturist.& "pp. 11-11, petitioner6s /rief#
@e find the argu$ent without $erit. @hile it is true that P(*N+)RS is an
ordinar! word, nevertheless it is used in the la/els not to descri/e the nature of
the product, /ut to pro>ect the source or origin of the salted peanuts contained in
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the cans. +he word P(*N+)RS printed across the upper portion of the la/el in
/old letters easil! attracts and catches the e!e of the ordinar! consu$er and it is
that word and none other that stic%s in his $ind when he thin%s of salted
peanuts.
n cases of this nature there can /e no /etter evidence as to what is the do$inant
feature of a la/el and as to whether there is a confusing si$ilarit! in the
contesting trade$ar%s than the la/els the$selves. * visual and graphic
presentation of the la/els will constitute the /est argu$ent for one or the other,
hence, we are reproducing hereunder a picture of the cans of salted peanuts of
the parties to the case.
+he picture /elow is part of the docu$entar! evidence appearing in the original
records, and it clearl! de$onstrates the correctness of the finding of respondent
Director that the word P(*N+)RS is the do$inant, stri%ing $ar% of the la/els
in =uestion.
t is true that there are other words used such as &Cordial& in petitioner6s can and
&Coc%tail& in Standard .rands6, which are also pro$inentl! displa!ed, /ut these
words are $ere ad>ectives descri/ing the t!pe of peanuts in the la/eled
containers and are not sufficient to warn the unwar! custo$er that the two
products co$e for$ distinct sources. *s a whole it is the word P(*N+)RS
which draws the attention of the /u!er and leads hi$ to conclude that the salted
peanuts contained in the two cans originate fro$ one and the sa$e
$anufacturer. n fact, when a housewife sends her house$aid to the $ar%et to
/u! canned salted peanuts, she will descri/e the /rand she wants /! using the
word P(*N+)RS and not &Cordial& nor &Coc%tail&.
4. +he neCt argu$ent of petitioner is that respondent Director should not have
/ased his decision si$pl! on the use of the ter$ P(*N+)RS, and that what he
should have resolved is whether there is a confusing si$ilarit! in the trade$ar%s
of the parties.
t is =uite o/vious fro$ the record, that respondent Director6s decision is /ased
not onl! on the fact that petitioner herein adopted the sa$e do$inant $ar% of
Standard .rands, that is, the word P(*N+)RS, /ut that it also used in its la/el
the sa$e coloring sche$e of gold, /lue, and white, and /asicall! the sa$e la!-
out of words such as &salted peanuts& and &vacuu$ pac%ed& with si$ilar t!pe
and siDe of lettering as appearing in Standard .rands6 own trade$ar%, all of
which result in a confusing si$ilarit! /etween the two la/els.
0
+hus, the
decision states0 &Eurther$ore, as to appearance and general i$pression of the
two trade$ar%s, find a ver! confusin si#ilarit(.& ")$phasis supplied#
5

Referring again to the picture @e have reproduced, the stri%ing si$ilarit!
/etween the two la/els is =uite evident not onl! in the co$$on use of
P(*N+)RS /ut also in the other words e$plo!ed. *s a $atter of fact, the
capital letter &C& of petitioner6s &Cordial& is ali%e to the capital &C& of Standard6s
&Coc%tail&, with /oth words ending with an &1&.
*d$ittedl!, no producer or $anufacturer $a! have a $onopol! of an! color
sche$e or for$ of words in a la/el. .ut when a co$petitor adopts a distinctive
or do$inant $ar% or feature of another6s trade$ar% and with it $a%es use of the
sa$e color ense$/le, e$plo!s si$ilar words written in a st!le, t!pe and siDe of
lettering al$ost identical with those found in the other trade$ar%, the intent to
pass to the pu/lic his product as that of the other is =uite o/vious. 'ence, there
is good reason for Standard .rands6 to as% wh! did petitioner herein use the
word P(*N+)RS, the sa$e coloring sche$e, even al$ost identical siDe and
contour of the cans, the sa$e la!-out of words on its la/el when there is a
$!riad of other words, colors, phrases, s!$/ols, and arrange$ents to choose
fro$ to distinguish its product fro$ Standard .rands, if petitioner was not
$otivated to si$ulate the la/el of the latter for its own can of salted peanuts,
and there/! deceive the pu/lic?
* si$ilar =uestion was as%ed /! this Court in Clar)e vs. +anila Cand( Co., <6
Phil. 111, when it resolved in favor of plaintiff a case of unfair co$petition
/ased on an i$itation of Clar%e6s pac%ages and wrappers of its candies the $ain
feature of which was one rooster. +he Court =ueried thus0 &... wh!, with all the
/irds in the air, and all the fishes in the sea, and all the ani$als on the face of the
earth to choose fro$, the defendant co$pan! "3anila Cand! Co.# selected two
roosters as its trade$ar%, although its directors and $anagers $ust have /een
well aware of the long-continued use of a rooster /! the plaintiff with the sale
and advertise$ent of its goods? ... * cat, a dog, a cara/ao, a shar% or an eagle
sta$ped upon the container in which candies are sold would serve as well as a
rooster for purposes of identification as the product of defendant6s factor!. @h!
did defendant select two roosters as its trade$ar% ?& "p.112, supra#
Petitioner contends, however, that there are differences /etween the two
trade$ar%s, such as, the presence of the word &Philippine& a/ove P(*N+)RS
4
on its la/el, and other phrases, to wit0 &Eor Fualit! and Price, ts Gour
,utstanding .u!&, the address of the $anufacturer in FueDon Cit!, etc., plus a
pictorial representation of peanuts overflowing fro$ a tin can, while in the la/el
of Standard .rands it is stated that the product is $anufactured in San
Erancisco, California, and on top of the tin can is printed &3r. Peanut& and the
representation of a &hu$aniDed peanut&. "pp. <1-<<, petitioner6s /rief#
@e have ta%en note of those alleged differences /ut @e find the$ insignificant
in the sense that the! are not sufficient to call the attention of the ordinar! /u!er
that the la/eled cans co$e fro$ distinct and separate sources. +he word
&Philippine& printed in s$all t!pe in petitioner6s la/el $a! si$pl! give to the
purchaser the i$pression that that particular can of P(*N+)RS salted peanuts
is locall! produced or canned /ut that what he is /u!ing is still P(*N+)RS
canned salted peanuts and nothing else. *s regards &3r. Peanut& on Standard
.rands6 la/el, the sa$e appears on the top cover and is not visi/le when the cans
are displa!ed on the shelves, aside fro$ the fact that the figure of &3r. Peanut&
is printed on the tin cover which is thrown awa! after opening the can, leaving
no lasting i$pression on the consu$er. t is also for this reason that @e do not
agree with petitioner that it is &3r. Peanut and the 'u$aniDed Peanut& which is
the trade$ar% of Standard .rands salted peanuts, it /eing a $ere descriptive
pictorial representation of a peanut not pro$inentl! displa!ed on the ver! /od!
of the la/el covering the can, unli%e the ter$ P(*N+)RS which do$inates the
la/el.
t is correctl! o/served /! respondent Director that the $erchandiDe or goods
/eing sold /! the parties herein are ver! ordinar! co$$odities purchased /! the
average person and $an! ti$es /! the ignorant and unlettered 6 and these are
the persons who will not as a rule eCa$ine the printed s$all letterings on the
container /ut will si$pl! /e guided /! the presence of the stri%ing $ar%
P(*N+)RS on the la/el. Differences there will alwa!s /e, /ut whatever
differences eCist, these pale into insignificance in the face of an evident
si$ilarit! in the do$inant feature and overall appearance of the la/els of the
parties.
t is not necessar!, to constitute trade$ar% &infringe$ent&, that
ever! word of a trade-$ar% should /e appropriated, /ut it is
sufficient that enough /e ta%en to deceive the pu/lic in the
purchase of a protected article. ".unte .ros. v. Standard
Chocolates, D.C. 3ass., 4: E. Supp. 485, 451#
* trade-na$e in order to /e an Hinfringe$ent6 upon another
need not /e eCactl! li%e it in for$ and sound, /ut it is enough if
the one so rese$/les another as to deceive or $islead persons
of ordinar! caution into the /elief that the! are dealing with the
one concern when in fact the! are dealing with the other. "Eoss
v. Cul/ertson, 1<6 P. 4d 811, 815, 18 @ash. 4d 611#
@here a trade-$ar% contains a do$inating or distinguishing
word, and purchasing pu/lic has co$e to %now and designate
the article /! such do$inating word, the use of such word /!
another in $ar%ing si$ilar goods $a! constitute nfringe$ent
though the $ar%s aside fro$ such do$inating word $a! /e
dissi$ilar. "Fueen 3fg. Co. v. lsaac Bins/erg I .ros., C.C.*.
3on., 4: E. 4d 454, 458#
"d# &nfringe$ent& of trade-$ar% does not depend on the use of
identical words, nor on the =uestion whether the! are so si$ilar
that a person loo%ing at one would /e deceived into the /elief
that it was the other; it /eing sufficient if one $ar% is so li%e
another in for$, spelling, or sound that one with not a ver!
definite or clear recollection as to the real $ar% is li%el! to /e
confused or $isled. "Northa$ @arren Corporation v. -niversal
Cos$etic Co., C. C. *; ., 15 E. 4d 884, 88:#
<. @hat is neCt su/$itted /! petitioner is that it was error for respondent
Director to have en>oined it fro$ using P(*N+)RS in the a/sence of evidence
showing that the ter$ has ac=uired secondar! $eaning. Petitioner, invo%ing
*$erican >urisprudence, asserts that the first user of a tradena$e co$posed of
co$$on words is given no special preference unless it is shown that such words
have ac=uired secondar! $eaning, and this, respondent Standard .rands failed
to do when no evidence was presented to esta/lish that fact. "pp. 14-16,
petitioner6s /rief#
+he doctrine of secondar! $eaning is found in Sec. 4 "f#, Chapter -* of the
+rade-3ar% (aw, viz0
)Ccept as eCpressl! eCcluded in paragraphs "a#, "/#, "c# and "d#
of this section, nothing herein shall prevent the registration of a
$ar% or trade-na$e used /! the applicant which has /eco$e
5
distinctive of the applicant6s goods, /usiness or services. +he
Director $a! accept as pri#a facie evidence that the $ar% or
trade-na$e has /eco$e distinctive, as applied to or used in
connection with the applicant6s goods, /usiness or services,
proof of su/stantiall! eCclusive and continuous use thereof as a
$ar% or trade-na$e /! the applicant in connection with the sale
of goods, /usiness or services for the five !ears neCt preceding
the date of the filing of the application for its registration. "*s
a$ended /! Sec. <, Rep. *ct No. 6<5.#
+his Court held that the doctrine is to the effect that a word or phrase originall!
incapa/le of eCclusive appropriation with reference to an article on the $ar%et,
/ecause geographicall! or otherwise descriptive, $ight nevertheless have /een
used so long and so eCclusivel! /! one producer with reference to his article
that, in that trade and to that /ranch of the purchasing pu/lic, the word or phrase
has co$e to $ean that the article was his product.
7

.! wa! of illustration, is the word &Selecta& which according to this Court is a
co$$on ordinar! ter$ in the sense that it $a! /e used or e$plo!ed /! an! one
in pro$oting his /usiness or enterprise, /ut which once adopted or coined in
connection with one6s /usiness as an e$/le$, sign or device to characteriDe its
products, or as a /adge of authenticit!, $a! ac=uire a secondar( #eanin as to
/e eCclusivel! associated with its products and /usiness, so that its use /!
another $a! lead to confusion in trade and cause da$age to its /usiness.
1

+he applica/ilit! of the doctrine of secondar! $eaning to the situation now
/efore -s is appropriate /ecause there is oral and docu$entar! evidence
showing that the word P(*N+)RS has /een used /! and closel! associated
with Standard .rands for its canned salted peanuts since 12<5 in this countr!.
Not onl! is that fact ad$itted /! petitioner in the a$ended stipulation of facts
"see p. 4 of this Decision#, /ut the $atter has /een esta/lished /! testi$onial
"tsn ,cto/er 4, 1264, pp. 4-5# and docu$entar! evidence consisting of invoices
covering the sale of &P(*N+)RS coc%tail peanuts&. ")Chi/its C to C-4; D to D-
11; ) to )-11; E to E-4# n other words, there is evidence to show that the ter$
P(*N+)RS has /eco$e a distinctive $ar% or s!$/ol insofar as salted peanuts
are concerned, and /! priorit! of use dating as far /ac% as 12<5, respondent
Standard .rands has ac=uired a preferential right to its adoption as its trade$ar%
warranting protection against its usurpation /! another. ,bi -us ibi re#ediu#.
@here there is a right there is a re$ed!. Standard .rands has shown the
eCistence of a propert! right"*rce Sons I Co. vs. Selecta .iscuit Co., nc.,
supra, pp. 464-46<# and respondent Director, has afforded the re$ed!.
Still on this point, petitioner contends that Standard .rands6 use of the
trade$ar% P(*N+)RS was interrupted during the 9apanese occupation and in
fact was discontinued when the i$portation of peanuts was prohi/ited /!
Central .an% regulations effective 9ul! 1, 12:<, hence it cannot /e presu$ed
that it has ac=uired a secondar! $eaning. @e hold otherwise. Respondent
Director correctl! applied the rule that non-use of a trade$ar% on an article of
$erchandiDe due to legal restrictions or circu$stances /e!ond one6s control is
not to /e considered as an a/andon$ent.
n the case of Andres .o#ero vs. +aiden $or# "rassiere Co., !nc., (-15452,
3arch <1, 1264, 11 SCR* ::6, the sa$e =uestion was raised /! petitioner
Ro$ero when he filed with the .ureau of Patents a petition to cancel the
registration of the trade$ar% &*dagio& for /rassieres $anufactured /! 3aiden
Eor$ .rassiere Co., nc. 'is petition having /een dis$issed /! the Director of
Patents, Ro$ero appealed to this Court and one of the issues posed /! hi$ was
that when the Bovern$ent i$posed restrictions on i$portations of /rassieres
/earing that particular trade$ar%, there was a/andon$ent of the sa$e /!
respondent co$pan! which entitled petitioner to adopt it for his own use and
which in fact he had /een using for a nu$/er of !ears. +hat argu$ent was $et
/! the Court in the words of 9ustice 9esus .arrera thus0
... +he evidence on record shows, on the other hand, that the
trade$ar% &*dagio& was first used eClusivel! in the Philippines
/! appellee in the !ear 12<4. +here /eing no evidence of use of
the $ar% /! others /efore 12<4, or that appellee a/andoned use
thereof, the registration of the $ar% was $ade in accordance
with the +rade$ar% (aw. Branting that appellant used the $ar%
when appellee stopped using it during the period of ti$e that
the Bovern$ent i$posed restrictions on i$portation of
respondent6s /rassiere /eing the trade$ar%, such te#porar(
non*use did not affect the rihts of appellee because it &as
occasioned b( overn#ent restrictions and &as not per#anent,
intentional, and voluntar(.
+o wor% an a/andon$ent, the disuse $ust /e
per$anent and not ephe$eral; it $ust, /e
6
intentional and voluntar!, and not involuntar!
or even co$pulsor!. +here $ust /e a
thoroughgoing discontinuance of an! trade-
$ar% use of the $ar% in =uestion "Call$an,
-nfair Co$petition and +rade$ar%, 4nd )d., p.
1<41#./0&ph1/.23t
+he use of the trade$ar% /! other $anufacturers did not
indicate an intention on the part of appellee to a/andon it.
+he instances of the use /! others of the ter$ .udweiser, cited
/! the defendant, fail, even when li/erall! construed, to indicate
an intention upon the part of the co$plainant to a/andon its
rights to that na$e. &+o esta/lish the defense of a/andon$ent, it
is necessar! to show not onl! acts indicating a practical
a/andon$ent, /ut an actual intention to a/andon.& Sanlehner v.
)isener I 3endelson Co., 182 -.S. 12, 41 S. Ct. 8 "4: (. )d.
6.1#."*nheuser-.usch, nc, v. .udweiser 3alt Products Corp.,
458 E. 44:.#
CCC CCC CCC
Non-use /ecause of legal restrictions is not evidence of an
intent to a/andon. Non-use of their ancient trade-$ar% and the
adoption of new $ar%s /! the Carthusian 3on%s after the! had
/een co$pelled to leave Erance was consistent with an intention
to retain their right to use their old $ar%. */andon$ent will not
/e inferred fro$ a disuse over a period of !ears occasioned /!
statutor! restrictions on the na$e of li=uor. "Ni$s, -nfair
Co$petition and +rade-3ar%, p. 1462.# "pp. :64-:64, supra#
"e$phasis ,urs#
*ppl!ing the words of 9ustice Ro$an ,Daeta in the &*ng +i/a!& case "*ng vs.
+ori/io +eodoro, p. :6, supra# to the case now /efore -s, petitioner herein $ust
not /e allowed to get a free ride on the reputation and selling power of Standard
.rands P(*N+)RS salted peanuts, for a self-respecting person, or a reputa/le
/usiness concern as is the case here, does not re$ain in the shelter of another6s
popularit! and goodwill /ut /uilds one of his own.
4. Eindings of fact /! the Director of Patents are conclusive and /inding on this
Court provided the! are supported /! su/stantial evidence. 2 +he testi$onial
and docu$entar! evidence in addition to the stipulation of facts su/$itted /!
the parties full! support the findings of respondent Director that"1# there is a
confusing si$ilarit! /etween the la/els or trade$ar%s of Philippine Nut and
Standard .rands used in their respective canned salted peanuts; "4# respondent
Standard .rands has priorit! of adoption and use of the la/el with P(*N+)RS
as the do$inant feature and the sa$e has ac=uired secondar! $eaning in
relation to salted peanuts; and "<# there has /een no a/andon$ent or non-use of
said trade$ar% /! Standard .rands which would >ustif! its adoption /!
petitioner or an! other co$petitor for the sale of salted peanuts in the $ar%et.
PR)3S)S C,NSD)R)D, @e *EER3 the decision of respondent Director
of Patents with costs against petitioner.