Civpro Rule 14 (Compiled)

[CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 14: SUMMONS JUDGE DELA ROSA ALSC2016]
1

UMANDAP V. SABIO
G.R. No. 140244 (August 29, 2000)

DOCTRINE:
Service of summons upon defendant is necessary in order that a court may acquire
jurisdiction over his person. Any judgment without such service in the absence of a
valid waiver is null and void.
General Rule: Summons must be served to the defendant personally.
Exception: Substituted service is allowed when the defendant cannot be served
personally within a reasonable time after efforts to locate him have failed
Requirements for substituted service:
o indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time,
o specify the efforts exerted to locate the petitioners and
o state that it was served on a person of sufficient age and discretion residing
therein.
The statutory requirements of substitued service must be followed strictly, faithfully
and any substituted service other than that authorized by the statute is considered
ineffective.
Sheriff's act enjoys the presumption of regularity.

EMERGENCY RECIT:
Domingo Estomo filed a case for damages based on breach of contract against Joel Umandap.
(no explanation as to what the contract is about) When summons were supposed to be issued
to Umandap, the process server could not locate him in the address indicated (one address for
both office and residence) hence the server opted to go for substituted service. Umandap,
however, still failed to file an answer prompting the court to declare him in default. The trial court
later ruled against him. A writ of execution was issued and Umandap's deposit and receivables
were garnished. Objecting to the order, he filed for certiorari under rule 65 alleging that the trial
court never acquired jurisdiction over his person because there has been no valid service of
summons; that the substituted service of summons was improper and invalid since the process
server's return failed to show on its face the impossibility of personal service. The CA, however,
found that he was not able to substantiate his claim, hence, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions prevails. Upon appeal to the SC, the court held based on the
proof of return, the substituted service was duly performed as efforts made to find the defendant
personally and the failure of such efforts were stated. The Court also found that indeed, he
received the orders of trial court and he is now guilty of laches for failure to seasonably act on
those lawful Orders.

FACTS:
Domingo Estomo filed against Joel Umandap an action for damages based on breach
of contract
Process Server Marmolejo effected substituted service of the summons and copy of
the Complaint upon Umandap, by leaving a copy thereof at his home and office
address to a certain Joseph David, his nephew, who refused to receive and
acknowledge the same
Umandap failed to file his answer, hence, he was declared in default and Estomo
was allowed to present his evidence ex parte
Trial court later ruled against Umandap for the following:304,393.25 representing
the unremitted collections from MORESCO/NEA received by Umandap, 200,000.00
as reimbursement of interest incurred and paid Estomo to finish the contracted
project, moral damages, attys fees and costs of suit (no explanation as regards the
amounts)
A writ of execution was issued and Umandap's deposit and receivables were
garnished
Umandap later filed a motion to Set Aside Judgment by Default and Quash Writ of
Execution but was denied; his MR was likewise denied
Hence, he filed for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA alleging that the trial court
never acquired jurisdiction over his person because there has been no valid
service of summons; that the substituted service of summons was improper
and invalid since the process server's return failed to show on its face the
impossibility of personal service, more particularly the following:
o it does not state the efforts exerted or the alleged occasions on which
attempts were made to personally serve the summons upon petitioner;
o it does not state that Joseph David, to whom the process server left or
tendered the summons and a copy of the complaint was a person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein or a competent person in
charge of petitioner's residence or office; and,
o it is not entitled to the presumption of regularity since there is no
compliance with the rules on substituted service.
CA ruled that the process server's Return is "valid and regular on its face, and readily
reveals that earnest efforts were exerted to find the defendant personally but such
efforts failed;" that Umandap was not able to overcome the presumption of regularity
by his unsubstantiated and self-serving assertion that the process server went to his
home and office address only once."

ISSUE:
1. WON substituted service of summons through Joseph David was valid and regular

HELD/RATIO:
General Rule: service of summons upon the defendant is necessary in order that a
court may acquire jurisdiction over his person. Any judgment without such service in
the absence of a valid waiver is null and void.
Section 6, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, the general rule in this jurisdiction is
that summons must be served personally on the defendant, it reads:
o "SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the
summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in
person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him."

However, when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time
after efforts to locate him have failed, substituted service may be made. Section 7,
Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:
o "SEC. 7. Substituted Service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant
cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding
section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at
the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion
then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or
regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof."

The impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to
find the defendant personally and the failure of such efforts. The statement should be
made in the proof of service. This is necessary because substituted service is in
derogation of the usual method of service. Substituted service is a method
extraordinary in character, and hence may be used only as prescribed in the
circumstances authorized by statute. Thus, the statutory requirements of substituted
service must be followed strictly, faithfully, and any substituted service other than that
authorized by the statute is considered ineffective."
Proof of service alluded to is the return required by Section 4 of Rule 14 which reads:
o "SEC. 4. Return. - When the service has been completed, the server shall,
within five (5) days therefrom, serve a copy of the return, personally or by
registered mail, to the plaintiff's counsel, and shall return the summons to
the clerk who issued it, accompanied by proof of service."

2


Now the officers return reads as follows:
"THIS IS TO CERTIFY, that on the 3rd day of February 1998, undersigned served
copy of the summon with the copy of the complaint and its annexes, upon the
defendant Joel R. Umandap Joel Construction, at No. 14-3rd St., New Manila,
Quezon City by leaving/tendering the copy to Joseph David receiving of said office,
but he refused to sign in receipt of the copy.

That despite efforts exerted to serve said process personally upon the
defendant on several occasions the same proved futile, for the reason that herein
defendant was not around, thus substituted service was made in accordance with the
provision of Section 8, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, and that this return is
now being submitted to the Court of origin with the information DULY SERVED.
xxx

CA correctly ruled that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions prevails. In the absence of contrary evidence, a presumption exists that a
sheriff has regularly performed his official duty. To overcome the presumption arising
from the sheriffs certificate, the evidence must be clear and convincing and mere
allegations of irregularity are insufficient.
The proof of return squarely complies with the requirements of substituted service as
enumerated in Laus vs CA:
o indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time,
o specify the efforts exerted to locate the petitioners and
o state that it was served on a person of sufficient age and discretion residing
therein.
Gleaning from the proof of return; it indicates the location or address of the defendant
where the summons was served, the efforts and/or prior attempts at personal service
made by the process server and that such attempts had proved futile, and lastly; it
indicates that summons was left or tendered to Joseph David "receiving of said
office."
More importantly, Umandap could hardly feign ignorance of the existence of this
instant case considering the fact that he received a copy of the default order as
evidenced by the Return and attached to the records of this case dated March 27,
1998. He also received a copy of the judgment of this Court as evidenced by
Registry Return Slip attached to the records of this case.
Considering that petitioner received both orders, he could have protected his rights by
availing himself of several avenues of redress, including, filing a motion to set aside
the order of default in accordance with Sec. 3 (b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court; or he
could have taken an ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals in accordance with Sec.
2 (a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court questioning the judgment of the trial court.
Sleeping on his rights, he is now barred by laches.

BIACO V. PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL BANK
G.R. No. 161417 (February 8, 2007)

EMERGENCY RECIT:
Petitioners husband applied for a loan with the bank secured by a real estate mortgage over a
parcel of land. When her husband failed to pay the REM was foreclosed and a complaint
initiated. The summons were served on the husband only and not personally to the petitioner.
She contends that the trial court has not acquired jurisdiction over her because the summons
were not given personally. The SC held that the summons that cannot be given personally
within a reasonable time may be given through substitute service following sec. 7 of rule 14.

FACTS:
Ernesto Biaco is the husband of petitioner Teresa Biaco. While employed in
Philippine Countryside Rural Bank (Bank) as branch manager, Ernesto obtained
several loans amounting to P820k from the bank evidenced by promissory notes.
o As security, Ernesto executed a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land,
the REM contained the signature of the spouses.
Ernesto failed to pay the loans, the bank through counsel sent him written demands
with the amount due P1,080,676.50 but he still failed to pay. Respondent bank filed a
complaint and foreclosure of the REM before the RTC of Misamis Oriental
o Summons was served to the spouses through Ernesto at his office
Export and Industry Bank at Jofelmor Bldg., Mortola st., CDO. Ernesto
received the summons but for unknown reasons failed to answer. Hence,
the spouses were declared in default upon motion of the bank. The bank
was allowed to present evidence ex parte.
Petitioner seeks to annul the RTC and CA decision contending that extrinsic fraud
prevented her from participating in the foreclosure proceedings. According to her, she
came to know about the judgment only after 6 months of finality. She asserts that
the court failed to acquire jurisdiction because summons were served on her
through her husband without any explanation as to why personal service
should not be made.
o She asserts that even if the action is quasi in rem personal service of
summons is essential in order to afford her due process

ISSUE:
1. WON the trial court acquired jurisdiction over her YES

HELD/RATIO:
1. YES.
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court
to validly try the case. In a proceeding rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired thru (1) seizure of the property
under legal process (2) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings.
The judicial foreclosure instituted by the bank undoubtedly vested trial court with the
jurisdiction over the res. A judicial foreclosure is a proceeding quasi in rem. As such,
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner is not required, it being sufficient that the
trial court is vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter.
A resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court (such as petitioner in this
case) must be personally served with summons under sec. 6 rule 14. If she cannot be
personally served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be
effected (1) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein (2) by leaving copies at
defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof in accordance with sec. 7 rule 14.


3

TOYOTA CUBAO INC. V. CA
G.R. NO. 126321 (October 23, 1997)

DOCTRINE: Rule 14 Section 7 Substituted Service of Summons
The RETURN on the SERVICE presents a disputable presumption on the facts and
particulars of the service of summons.
o For a SUBSTITUTED service of summons
the facts or needed particulars must be stated in the RETURN on
the Service to justify the substituted service.
FAILURE TO STATE IS NOT FATAL, sheriff or process server may have just failed
to disclose such facts, doesnt mean that the officer didnt have justifiable causes to
do substituted service.
o HOWEVER
evidence must be duly presented to prove proper compliance
with the rules on substituted service OR
proof that the defendant has actually been delivered copies of the
summons and complaint.

EMERGENCY RECIT
Guevarra had his car repaired in Toyota Cubao. He paid with a check which was
dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Toyota demanded payment, Guevarra still failed
to pay. Toyota thus filed a collection case.
The summons was done through substituted service of summons. The Return failed
to state the justifying/ requisites for a valid substituted service, it simply stated that it
was given to Guevarras sister-in-law (verbatim quoted below). By the motion of
Toyota, Guevarra was declared in default and obtained a favorable judgment after
presenting evidence ex-parte.
Guevarras car was levied and auctioned; he turned over his car willingly but showed
surprise as he did not know of a case against him.
He files a petition for certiorari with the CA arguing there was no jurisdiction over his
person. CA found merit, nullifies the judgment in default, the order of execution, and
the auction. Toyota files an appeal with the SC arguing failureto state in the Return of
the service the impossibility of service is not conclusive that the substituted service is
invalid.
SC affirms CA, Toyotas appeal no merit. There was no valid substituted service. SC
says that Toyota is correct in saying failure to state is not conclusive, however
evidence must be shown that the requisite have been complied with or proof that the
defendant has actually received the summons and complaint.

FACTS:
Toyota Cubao (Toyota) repaired Danilo Guevarras (Guevarra) car at the cost of 76
thousand. Guevarra paid with a check which was dishonored due to insufficient funds.
Toyota, demanded payment, Danilo failed to pay. Toyota files a CIVIL case for
collection.
Trial Court Issued the SUMMONS to Guevarra at his address in Calamba, Laguna.
o The PROCESS SERVER of the RTC of Calamba, submitted to the RTC the
RETURN ON THE SERVICE. The return stated VERBATIM:
Respectfully returned to the Branch Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 92, Quezon City, the herein attached original
summon in the above entitled case with the information that
it was duly served to the defendant DANILO A. GUEVARRA,
thru her sister-in-law, GLORIA CABALLES, by leaving a copy
of the summons and complaint but refused to sign.

Guevarra failed to answer, Toyota moved to declare him in default. A copy of the
motion was served through registered mail to Guevarra. Trial court granted the
motion and allowed Toyota to present evidence ex parte. The Trial Court the
rendered decision in-favor of Toyota.
A writ of execution was issued. The Deputy sheriff levied on the Guevarras Toyota
Corolla (plate # PRW-329).
o Notice of levy sent to Guevarra, he refused to sign, said not aware of any
case.
Sheriff then sent notice of an auction sale. At the auction, it was sold at 150 thousand
to Sillano.
Guevarra turned over the car on demand. However he filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA to NULLIFY the EX-PARTE judgment. Arguing the trial court did not
obtain jurisdiction over his person because of the defective summons.
o CA finding merit annulled the default judgment, writ of execution, and sale
at public auction. The substituted service of summons was NOT VALID
Toyota now assails the Decision of the CA
o Toyota argues that in Mapa vs. Court of Appeals,

the absence in the
sheriff's return of a statement about the impossibility of personal service
cannot be conclusive proof that the substituted service resorted to is
invalid.

ISSUE:
1. WON there is a valid substituted service of summons.

HELD/RATIO:
1. No valid substituted service of summons.
CA correct in annulling the default judgement, writ of execution, and sale at public
auction.
SC agrees with Toyota that in Mapa vs CA, the courts should not jump into
conclusion of an invalid substituted service of summons based on the absence of the
sheriffs return on the statement of the impossibility of service, HOWEVER, evidence
must be duly presented to prove proper compliance with the rules on substituted
service.
The SERVERS RETURN FAILED to state the facts or the needed particulars that
could justify the substituted service.
Although Moran, on the Rules of Court, has said that "Irregularities of this kind
(substituted service) (might) be cured by proof that the copies (have) actually been
delivered to the defendant," in the case at bar, however, Guevarra appears to have
been notified of the case for the first time only at the time the levy on execution of
judgment was effected by the sheriff.

4


PCIBANK V. ALEJANDRO
G.R. 175587 (Sept. 21, 2007)

DOCTRINE:
In case the defendant DOES NOT RESIDE and is NOT FOUND IN THE
PHILIPPINES (and hence personal service and substituted service cannot be
effected), the remedy of the plaintiff in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction to try
the case is to CONVERT THE ACTION INTO A PROCEEDING IN REM or QUASI IN
REM by attaching the property of the defendant.
Attach defendants property
The service of summons in this case (which may be by publication coupled with the
sending by registered mail of the copy of the summons and the court order to the last
known address of the defendant), is no longer for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction
but for compliance with the requirements of due process.
Substituted service of summons is the normal mode of service of summons that will
confer jurisdiction on the court over the person of residents temporarily out of the
Philippines.
Court may acquire jurisdiction over an action in personam by mere substituted service
without need of attaching the property of the defendant.

EMERGENCY RECIT:
There was a suit for collection of money instituted by PCIB against Alejandro. In this case PCIB
lied in order for the court to attach Alejandros property. PCIB said that Alejandro does not
reside in the country. The rule is that if the defendant is not in the country (thus, service of
summons is impossible) then the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the defendants person.
What the court does is to transform the action from in personam to in rem. It is done by
attaching the property of the defendant. However, when this was done, it was found later to be
invalid because in reality, Alejandro resides in the Philippines. Personal service of summons
could have been served against him (or even substituted). Therefore, garnishment is not
warranted.

FACTS:
Alejandro was a lawyer of Romula Mabanta (yes, that one)
He was a client of PCIB and he wrote a promissory note obligating himself to pay the
amount of around 249+ million representing loans.
Because of fluctuations in the exchange rate, PCIB alleges that there was a
deficiency on the amount of money assigned by Alejandro to PCIB.
So PCIB asked to Alejandro to put additional bond to cover the loans.
Instead, Alejandro did not give additional bond and he alleged that PCIB mishandled
his money in that it failed to close the account when the Yen exchange rate was still
good.
So PCIB files a case for a collection of sum of money against Alejandro.
PCIB wanted to obtain a writ of attachment against certain properties of Alejandro.
PCIB alleged that Alejandro is not a resident of this country and has left to defraud his
creditors.
This, the trial court believed so it issued the writ/garnishment
However, Alejandro questioned this through an MR and voluntarily submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the court.
Alejandro alleges that he is a resident of his country; that PCIB knows his address
and it knows of his office address in Makati (Romulo Mabanta, remember)
The trial court ruled in favor of Alejandro. CA and SC affirms.
Now Alejandro files a case against PCIB for damages. Some of his checks allegedly
bounced because of the garnishment of the court

ISSUE:
1. WON PCIB is liable for damages as it falsely accused Alejandro of not being a resident of the
Philippines, allowing it to obtain a garnishment of Alejandros properties.

HELD/RATIO:
1. YES. It is liable
One of the ways to obtain a garnishment of the properties of a defendant is to allege that he
is not a resident of the country. PCIB falsely represented such information in order to obtain
garnishment.
Garnishment is the remedy for a non-resident because personal summons is not
feasible since again, the defendant is not a resident.
This converts the nature of the case from in personam to in rem because of the
involvement of the persons property.
This is done by the court to acquire jurisdiction over the case.
PCIB lied and said that Alejandro is not a resident of the Philippines in order to obtain
garnishment of the property. If PCIB had not lied, garnishment would not be awarded
by the court because jurisdiction can be acquired by it through personal/substituted
service of summons.
The wrongful attachment of his property caused damage to Alejandro, thus he is
entitled to damages.
PCIB cannot be said to be in good faith because it has always known of his home and
work address. Therefore, it was wrong in saying that Alejandro is not a resident of this
country.


5

VLASON ENTERPRISES V. CA
GR No. 121662-64 (July 6, 1999)

DOCTRINE:
A corporation may be served summons through its agents or officers who under the Rules
are designated to accept service of process.

The secretary of the president may receive summons for the corporation. This rule requires,
however, that the secretary should be an employee of the corporation sought to be
summoned (not just the secretary of an officer). Only in this manner can there be an
assurance that the secretary will bring home to the corporation the notice of the filing of the
action against it.
Used previous digest made by Harvey for the facts, and edited them and the rest to fit the
issue on summons. The case has too much facts, issues and parties impleaded!! Only
the relevant part on summons is included here.

FACTS:
Poro Point Shipping Services is the agent of Omega in the Philippines. Its ship, MV Star
Ace, had engine troubles so it asked the Philippine Ports Authority to unload its cargo
here in the country while waiting transshipment to Hong Kong.
They were granted permission. However, despite said permission, the Bureau of
Customs still seized the vessel and confiscated its cargo on the ground that it might be
the hijacked MV Silver Med.
The ship was placed in La Union. While it was there, La Union was rocked by three
typhoons, which destroyed the ship.
Poro Point entered into a salvage agreement to restore the ship with Duraproof.
Bureau of Customs initially released the ship, but subsequently changed its mind when
it changed directors. It moved for the sale of the cargo of the ship.
Duraproof files a case to enforce its salvors initially just against the officials of Bureau
of Customs
Duraproof amended its complaint, including a lot of other persons and entities.
Summonses for the amended Petition were served on Atty. Joseph Capuyan for Med
Line Philippines: Angliongto (through his secretary, Betty Bebero), Atty. Tamondong
and Commissioner Mison. Upon motion of the private respondent, the trial court allowed
summons by publication to be served upon the alien defendants who were not residents
and had no direct representatives in the country
Relevant part on service of summons on a corporation: The sheriffs return shows
that Angliongto who was president of petitioner corporation, through his secretary Betty
Bebero, was served summons on January 18, 1990. Petitioner claims that this service
was defective because Bebero was an employee of Vlasons Shipping, Inc., which was
an entity separate and distinct from Petitioner Vlason Enterprises Corporation (VEC)

ISSUE:
1. WON there was a proper service of summons to the corporation?

HELD/RATIO:
1. NO.
A corporation may be served summons through its agents or officers who under the
Rules are designated to accept service of process. A summons addressed to a
corporation and served on the secretary of its president binds that corporation. This is
based on the rationale that service must be made on a representative so integrated
with the corporation sued, that it is safe to assume that said representative had
sufficient responsibility and discretion to realize the importance of the legal papers
served and to relay the same to the president or other responsible officer of the
corporation being sued. The secretary of the president satisfies this
criterion. This rule requires, however, that the secretary should be an
employee of the corporation sought to be summoned. Only in this manner can
there be an assurance that the secretary will bring home to the corporation [the]
notice of the filing of the action against it.
In the present case, Bebero was the secretary of Angliongto, who was
president of both VSI and petitioner, but she was an employee of VSI, not of
petitioner. The piercing of the corporate veil cannot be resorted to when
serving summons.
Doctrinally, a corporation is a legal entity distinct and separate from the members and
stockholders who compose it. However, when the corporate fiction is used as a
means of perpetrating a fraud, evading an existing obligation, circumventing a statute,
achieving or perfecting a monopoly or, in generally perpetrating a crime, the veil will
be lifted to expose the individuals composing it. None of the foregoing exceptions
has been shown to exist in the present case.

6


PAGALARAN V. BAL-LATAN
G.R. No. L-4119 (March 11, 1909)

DOCTRINE:
An acknowledgment on the back of the summons by the defendant shall be
equivalent to service.
After judgment in default had been entered, the remedy open to the appellant was to
ask that the judgment be vacated and that she be heard but only if her
nonappearance in the action was due to fraud, accident, or mistake.

EMERGENCY RECIT
Petitioner Eusebia Pagalaran filed a complaint against Valentin Bal-laten and Maria Bidayanes
for the recovery of her two female carabaos (called a caraballa). It was alleged that the two
defendants unlawfully took the two carabaos from petitioner. Summonses were served against
defendants. Defendant Bidayanes acknowledged and even signed at the back of the summons.
However, defendant Bidayanes failed to appear on trial. Decision was rendered against
defendants. On a bill of exception to the SC, the SC ruled that summons was properly served
and that defendant Bidayanes failed to appear; and even if there wasnt proper summons, the
remedy is to appeal the decision of the trial court.

FACTS:
The Summons are worded as follows:
o Eugenia Pagalaran, plaintiff, vs. Valentin Bal-latan and Maria Bidayanes,
defendants. Demand for the return of one caraballa with calves. Civil
cause No. 69. To Maria Bidayanes, Aparri. You are hereby notified
that the Hon. Albert E. McCabe, judge of the First Instance of this judicial
district has been pleased to set Friday, the 21st day of September, 1906,
for the hearing of the above-entitled cause to the end that you may appear
before this court with your lawyer and such evidence as you may intend to
adduce in your favor. Given by the Hon. Albert E. Mc Cabe, judge of
First Instance, this 17th day of September, 1906, In Aparri, Province of
Cagayan.
At its back is the following:
o By virtue of the foregoing summons I, the sheriff for the Province of
Cagayan de Luzon, First Judicial District of the Philippine Islands, called at
the house of Maria Bidayanes in the barrio of Talungan, within the limits of
this town, and personally notified her of the contents of said order to appear
before the court; thereupon she acknowledged service, and I delivered to
her a duplicate hereof, the receipt for which she signed together with
myself. (Signed) Antonio Soriano, provincial sheriff. (Signed) Maria
Bidayanes.
Defendant Bidayanes was held to be in default. She did not appeal, but instead asked
the trial court to vacate its judgement since she was allegedly not formally
summoned. Trial court denied her motion, and so she elevated the matter to the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
1. WON there was a valid and formal summons.

HELD/RATIO:
1. YES. The Summons was validly served against defendant Bidayanes.
As appears from the order which defendant-appellant herself has presented,
defendant Bidayanes was formally summoned on the 17th of September, 1906,
to appear on the 21st of said month and year. Section 397 [of the old Code of
Procedure] provides that "an acknowledgment on the back of the summons by
the defendant shall be equivalent to service."
If the summons was not accompanied by a new complaint, section 112 of the
[old] Code of Procedure authorizes the plaintiff to simply refer to the complaint
that she had filed with justice of the peace.
Even if there had been no complaint or formal summons, no law or reason
whatever justifies the nonappearance of the defendant after having been
summoned. She ought to have appeared and not have abandoned the action,
either to challenge the jurisdiction of the court or the validity of the summons.
Lastly, after judgment in default had been entered, the remedy open to the
appellant was to ask that the judgment be vacated and that she be heard. She
should have appeared and stated that her nonappearance in the action was due
to fraud, accident, or mistake.


7

ONG PENG V. CUSTODIO
(March 25, 1961)

DOCTRINE:
The defendant had already appeared when the amended complaint was served-defendant had,
in fact, presented a motion to dismiss. We rule that after the defendant has appeared by virtue
of a summons, as in this case, and presented a motion to dismiss, he may be served with the
amended complaint, without need of another summons, and in the same form and manner
ordinary motions or papers are served

FACTS: (super short case)
Ong Peng (Plaintiff) sued Jose Custodio (Defendant) to recover the sum of
P2,527.30, representing the value of goods and materials obtained by defendant from
plaintiff.
The complaint was filed on April 15, 1958, and on April 30 ,Jose (defendant) moved
to dismiss the complaint on the ground that plaintiff's (Ong Peng) cause of action had
already prescribed
Plaintiff ( Ong Peng) answered defendant's (Jose Custodio) motion and attached to
his answer an amended complaint which set forth the promissory note supporting the
claim. (which was only a formal amendment)
No answer to the amended complaint was presented and no objection to its
admission was also interposed.
the court admitted the amended complaint on the ground that no objection thereto
had been filed, and on May 28, it denied the motion to dismiss.
The LC decided in favor of Ong, thus Jose was required to pay the amount of
2,527.30 pesos

ISSUE:
1. WON the defendant came under the jurisdiction of the court for the purposes of the amended
complaint because the same was not served upon him with summons and in accordance with
the ROC

HELD/RATIO:
"In the case at bar the defendant had already appeared when the amended complaint was
served-defendant had, in fact, presented a motion to dismiss. We rule that after the defendant
has appeared by virtue of a summons, as in this case, and presented a motion to dismiss, he
may be served with the amended complaint, without need of another summons, and in the
same form and manner ordinary motions or papers are served"
Unlike in the case of Atkins, Kroll and Co. vs. Domingo, where the defendant was served
properly the original summons, but before the trial started the amended complaint was handed
to his 16 years old son. The SC held that there was a improper summon.
"Also In the case at bar, the amended complaint contained no new matter; it only sets forth the
promissory note upon which the cause of action is based (only a formal amendment)"

Side CivPro Issue
WON the judge should have heard the case for dismissal of the complaint before allowing the
amendment.
The court held that it is upon the discretion of the judge to defer the hearing and determination
thereof until the trial if the ground alleged therein does not appear to be indubitable and that the
amendment was only a formal one.

ATKINS, KROLL, AND CO. V. DOMINGO
GR L-19565 (March 24, 1963)

DOCTRINE:
Where a judgment was rendered based on the amended complaint, the amended complaint and
summons should have been served upon defendant with same formalities as the original
complaint and summos.

EMERGENCY RECIT: case is short

FACTS
Atkins, Kroll & Co (Atkins) filed a complaint against Santiago Domingo (Domingo) for
partition of parcels of land in Zamboanga
Later in the case, Atkins filed a motion to amend the complaint
o That a certain lot (Lot No. 36) was not included in the original complaint
o And that since the filing of the original complaint, differences have arisen
regarding the accounting for the rental of the properties
Upon motion by Atkins, Santiago was declared in default.
Court rendered judgment on the basis of the amended complaint and divided the land
accordingly
Santiago then filed a motion to set aside the judgment and prays for new trial on the
ground that he had neither never received summons nor did he have knowledge of
the pending case
Court denied Santiagos motion

ISSUE:
1. WON summons was properly served

HELD/RATIO:
1. NO. Judgment is set aside
Upon review, the facts show that original complaint and summons (for the original
complaint) was made by the deputy of the sheriff to Maximo Domingo (Maximo), son
of Santiago Domingo, over the age of 16, in their residence
Facts also show that copy of the amended complaint which had been sent to
Santaigo by registered mail had been returned undelivered thus compelling Atkins
counsel to personally deliver the same to Maximo
If only Santiago appeared in the action, service of the amended complaint in such
manner would have been sufficient
However, since Santiago failed to appear in the action, the service of the amended
complaint upon the 16yo son could not be deemed sufficient
The amended complaint and summons should have been served upon Santiago with
the same formalities as the original complaint and summons

8


BELLO V. UBO
G.R. No. L-30353 (September 30, 1982)

DOCTRINE: Sec. 5, Rule 14
Summons may be served by the sheriff or other proper court officer of the province or, for
special reasons, by a person especially authorized to serve the summons by the judge of the
court which issued the same. This enumeration is exclusive.

EMERGENCY RECIT:
Bello filed a complaint for recovery of real property with damages against the defendants Ubo.
Summons were issued to the Defendants by Patrolman Yobia of the Police Dept. of Leyte. No
answer was filed by defendants so they were declared in default and Bello was declared owner.
Ubo hired a lawyer who found out that the copy of the complaint was still with Pat. Yobia.
Defendants filed motion for relief from judgment charging irregularity of the service of summons
and praying that they be said aside and that their motion be admitted. CFI denies motion and
MR because of Yobias counteraffidavit saying that he explained the nature of the summons
and the complaint to the defendants. Defendants file appeal, and eventually won because there
was no valid service of summons and consequently the CFI of Leyte did not acquire jurisdiction
over them.

FACTS:
Plaintiff Bello filed with the Court of First instance of Leyte a complaint for recovery of
real property with damages against the defendants
o Prays that he be declared the true and lawful owner of the parcel of land
which had been forcibly occupied by the defendants since 1962 under
claim of ownership
o Sums of coconuts harvested + moral damages + expenses of relocation
survey + attorneys fees and costs
Summons were issued, required defendants Ubo to file their answer to the complaint
within 15 days from service thereof. A certain Patrolman Castulo Yobia of the Police
Department of Jaro, Leyte served the summons on the defendants.
No answer was filed by defendants. Plaintiffs counsel filed a motion to declare
defendants in default. CFI of Leyte declared so and directed plaintiff to present ex-
parte evidence. Judgment in default declared Bello as the owner of the western
portion of the land, and ordered defendants to vacate that portion, and pay attorneys
fees + costs.
Upon receipt of the order of default, the defendants contracted the services of Atty.
Generoso Casimpan who immediately inquired from Pat. Castulo Yobia about the
service of the summons. Pat. Yobia then showed him a copy of the complaint which
he failed to deliver to the defendants.
Defendants counsel filed a motion for relief from judgment charging irregularity in the
service of the summons and praying that the order of default and the judgment by
default be set aside and that defendants' answer, which was attached to said motion,
be admitted.
o Defendants alleged in said motion that the subject land was inherited by
them, and that they have been paying taxes so that they have a good and
valid right thereto.
o Plaintiffs complaint was filed merely to compel them to settle a criminal
case for frustrated homicide which they had filed against the plaintiff's son.
CFI denies motion for relief from judgment on the ground that the same was not
accompanied by an affidavit of merit.
Defendants filed MR - since the motion for relief from judgment was predicated on
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendants, the same need not be
accompanied by an affidavit of merit. But they amended the complaint before the
court could decide on it.
Plaintiff Bello filed opposition to the amended MR with counteraffidavit by Pat. Yobia
saying that:
o He went to where Ubo and her son was residing. Ubo and Regis initially
refused to accept the summons. But Yobia explained the nature of the
Summons; that there is a civil case filed against them; that they need to find
a lawyer to assist them. Ubo and Regis then reluctantly signed the
summons. Thereafter, he detached the copy of the complaint and handed it
to Ubo and Regis. He however took back the same afterwards; he also held
on to the copy of the summons and afterwards returned to his police
station.
CFI denies defendant Ubos MR: Yobias explanation of the nature of the summons
and the complaint should have warned the defendants of the existence of a case
against them; and the irregularity consisting in the failure of the serving officer to
deliver to each one of them a copy of the complaint is, therefore, neutralized. It was
incumbent upon the defendants to have checked up their case.
Defendants file notice and motion to appeal as pauper. The plaintiff, on the other
hand, filed a motion for execution pending appeal. CFI later grants defendants
appeal.

ISSUE:
1. WON there is a proper service of summons in the case at bar, and consequently, did the CFI
of Leyte acquire jurisdiction over their person

HELD/RATIO:
1. No. There was no valid service of summons on the defendants and, consequently, the Court
of First Instance of Leyte did not acquire jurisdiction over their person.
Sec. 5, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that summons may be
served by the sheriff or other proper court officer of the province or, for special
reasons, by a person especially authorized to serve the summons by the judge of the
court which issued the same. This enumeration is exclusive.
We considered as irregular the service of summons by a police sergeant who was not
a sheriff or a court officer and who was not authorized by the court to deliver the
summons. Despite the counteraffidavit, the records of the case are replete with
indications that the serving policeman was grossly ignorant of the rules concerning
summons. The return of service was not made under oath in violation of Sec. 20, Rule
14 of the Rules of Court - which requires that "the proof of service of a summons ...
shall be sworn to when made by a person other than the sheriff or his deputy."
Furthermore, even assuming that Yobia could be considered as a proper person to
serve the summons, still there was no valid and effective service since he brought
back the summons with him together with the copy of the complaint.
Since a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant only by means of
a valid service of summons, trial and judgment without such valid service are,
therefore, null and void.


9

FILMERCO COMMERCIAL CO. INC. V. IAC
GR no. 70661 (April 9 1987)

DOCTRINE:
The terms "dwelling house" or "residence" are generally held to refer to the time of
service, hence it is not sufficient "to leave the copy at defendant's former
dwelling house, residence, or place of abode, as the case may be, after his
removal therefrom."
The doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction refers to determination of liability
and not to determination of jurisdiction. This is so because said doctrine comes to
play only during the trial of the case after the court has already acquired jurisdiction
over the corporation. Hence, before this doctrine can be applied, based on the
evidence to be presented, it is imperative that the court must first have jurisdiction
over the corporation.

EMERGENCY RECIT:
Filmerco obtained loans from BPI where Spouses Miguel signed a deed of continuing
surety agreement to secure the said loans. When Filmerco defaulted BPI filed an
action to recover the sum of money from both Filmerco and Spouses Miguel. Also,
the defendants failed to answer within the reglementary period so they were judicially
declared in default. Several motions, on the ground that there was no valid summons
served, were filed by the defendants but these were all denied by the lower courts.
The SC held, citing various jurisprudence, that there was no valid service of summons
as it was served at the past residence of Filmerco. Likewise there was no valid
service of summons as to the spouses as summons were served to one Angle Moger
who was the owner of the house (which was subsequently leased to the spouses)
and who refused to receive the said summons.

FACTS:
Filmerco Commercial Co., Inc., (Filmerco) obtained two separate loans BPI on
November 26, 1982 and December 26, 1982 respectively. As security for the
payment of the obligation, spouses Jaime and Ana Maria Miguel executed a deed of
continuing suretyship wherein the Miguels bound themselves jointly and solidarily with
Filmerco for the payment of the latter's obligation under the loan-accounts.The loans
remained outstanding so on May 5,1983, BPI filed a complaint for recovery of a sum
of money against Filmerco and spouses Jaime and Ana Maria Miguel before the
Makati RTC.
The defendants were declared in default for failure to file an answer within the
reglementary period. The plaintiff then presented evidence ex-parte after which the
lower court on June 11, 1984 rendered a decision awarding the ff.: a) the sum of
P308,525.17 plus 10% interest per annum and 12% penalty fee per annum from May
21, 1984 until the amount is fully paid;
b) the sum equivalent to 20% of the total amount due as and for attorney's fees; c) to
pay the costs of suit. (p.52, Rollo)
Various appeals and MRs were filed by the defendants on the ground that there was
no valid service of summons therefore the courts decision is a nullity as the court
never acquired jurisdiction over them.
According to the sheriff's return dated September 7, 1983, summons and copy of the
complaint were not served on the petitioners at 31 Sta. Escolastica Street, Pasay
City, their given principal place of business and had to be returned to the court
unserved for the reason that the "defendants have already vacated the premises
and/or addresses more than a year ago and no definite information could be had
regarding their present whereabouts." Three separate summons for each of the
defendants were addressed to 31 Sta. Scholastics Street, Pasay City, Metro Manila.
Upon motion of the private respondent (plaintiff in the case) the lower court issued
alias summons.
According to the sheriff's return, summons were duly served upon "defendant-
spouses Jaime and Ana Maria Miguel at No. 18, Yuchengco Drive, Pacific Malayan
Village, Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, thru Mrs. Angle Morger, a person
residing therein of suitable age and discretion to receive service of that nature and
who received the said court processes for and in behalf of the defendants but refused
to sign." It was noted therein that the defendant spouses are "duly served" but that
the other defendant Filmerco was "not and could not be served" and the summons
pertaining to it was " returned unserved."
Petitioner spouses, Jaime and Ana Maria Miguel contend that the substituted service
of summons upon their persons thru Mrs. Angle Morger at No. 18 Yuchengco Drive,
Pacific Malayan Village, Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila was invalid for the
following reasons: (1) at the time of the service they were not residents of the said
address, and (2) Mrs. Angle Morger was not authorized to receive papers or
documents for them. They submitted affidavits of Angle Morger to prove their point.

ISSUE:
1. WON there was a valid service of summons

HELD/RATIO:
1. NO. This is so because the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction comes to play only
during the trial of the case after the court has already acquired jurisdiction over the corporation.
Hence, before this doctrine can be applied, based on the evidence to be presented, it is
imperative that the court must first have jurisdiction over the corporation. For the court to
acquire jurisdiction over a domestic corporation such as the petitionercorporation, summons
must be served upon it through the officers of the corporation enumerated in Section 13, Rule
14 of the Revised Rules of Court. There is not even a semblance of any effort to serve
summons upon an officer as such Since, the summons intended for the petitioner-corporation
was "not and could not be served" as certified in the sheriff's return, the lower court never
acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner-corporation. It follows that the judgment against the
petitioner-corporation is null and void
The allegations that the petitioners deliberately concealed their whereabouts to escape the
payment of just and valid obligations appear to have some basis. However, allegations such as
these do not justify the appellate court's upholding a judgment wherein the trial court has not
acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants.

10


LAUS V. CA
G.R. No. 101256 (March 8, 1993)

DOCTRINE:
The general rule in this jurisdiction is that summons must be personally served;
pursuant to Section 7, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, such personal service
is to be accomplished by "handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he
refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him." However, if this mode of service cannot
be effected within a reasonable time, substituted service may be resorted to under
Section 8 of the same Rule.
The substituted service should be availed only when the defendant cannot be served
promptly in person. Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the
efforts made to find the defendant personally and the failure of such efforts. The
statement should be made in the proof of service. This is necessary because
substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service.

EMERGENCY RECIT:
Laus executed a promissory note in favour of Torres. He failed to pay the same so Torres filed
for a complaint for the collection of sum of money. Sheriff Cruz went to the address of to serve
summoins. Laus was not at home. Sheriff within 10 minutes resorted to substituted service to
Areola who was at Laus residence. Investigations later show that Areola was merely a friend of
their maid who stayed there for 1 week and was only 10-11 years old. Issue: Whether or not the
trial court acquired jurisdiction over Laus by virtue of the substituted service of summons
effected by Deputy Sheriff Cruz. Held: NO. Substitued service of summons was not validly
effected. TC did not acquire jurisdiction over Laus. Sheriff in his return/ proof of service failed
to indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time, specify the efforts
exerted to locate Laus, and state that it was served on a person of sufficient age and discretion
residing therein.

FACTS:
Loreto Alfaro-Laus (LAUS) executed a promissory note (P66K) in favor of Consuelo
P. Torres (TORRES). Upon maturity of the PN, only P11K was paid. Laus made no
further payments.
Torres filed against and Laus and John Doe a complaint for the collection of a
sum of money.
Deputy Sheriff Cruz proceeded to the Laus to serve the summons and a copy of the
complaint.
o Failing to serve the summons personally upon Laus after waiting for 10
minutes, he resorted to a substituted service through one Josephine
Areola, who purportedly represented herself to be the maid of Laus. Sheriff
Cruz executed and filed a return stating said substituted service.
Sheriff in his RETURN/proof of service indicated the substituted service of summons.
Laus did not file any answer. Trial Court declared Laus in default. Trial Court
rendered a judgment by default ordering Laus to pay Torres.
Laus filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction over their persons.
They allege that the service of summons was ineffective because it was not
indicated in the return that the sheriff had first exerted efforts to serve the same
personally before resorting to substituted service.
Trial Court denied MTD on the ground that it had already rendered a judgment by
default.
Laus filed a motion to reconsider. He reiterated the contention that the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over their persons because of the defective service of
summons, and that they do not even know Areola, who received the summons. It
turned out from their investigation that said Areola was just a guest of one of their
maid who stayed for 1 week. Also, Areola was just a child of about 10-11 years old
and would not be expected to know what to do with the documents handed to her. It
would not be fair for Laus if the summons would be served upon through a person
who is not of sufficient age and discretion and a transcient at that.
Trial court denied the motion for reconsideration and held that there was a proper
service of summons.
Court of Appeals denied Laus petition for certiorari for lack of merit (improper
remedy, remedy should be appeal).
ISSUE:
1. WON the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Laus by virtue of the substituted service of
summons effected by Deputy Sheriff Cruz (focal issue)

HELD/RATIO:
Since Laus did not voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the trial court, proper
service of summons became imperative.
The substituted service of summons in this case was not validly effected. The trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the Laus. The order of default, the judgment by
default, the writ of execution issued by it, the auction sale of the petitioners' properties
levied on execution are, therefore, all null and void.
A perusal of the sheriff's return in the case at bar readily reveals that it does not
o (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable
time
o (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the petitioners
o and (c) state that it was served on a person of sufficient age and discretion
residing therein.
o The fact of the matter is that as disclosed in his testimony taken in
connection with the motion for reconsideration, and the affidavit he
prepared in conjunction with such hearing.
o Deputy Sheriff Cruz resorted to a substituted service on his first and only
attempt to effect a personal service. Upon being informed that the
petitioners were not around at that time, he immediately resorted to a
substituted service through Areola, a person whose age he did not even
know or attempt to discover. He did not even inquire about the
whereabouts of the petitioners, the time they were expected to return
home, the hours of the day they could be contacted at their house or the
location of their offices, if any, in order that he could faithfully comply with
the requirement of personal service.
The general rule in this jurisdiction is that summons must be personally served;
pursuant to Section 7, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, such personal
service is to be accomplished by "handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person,
or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him." However, if this mode of service
cannot be effected within a reasonable time, substituted service may be resorted to
under Section 8 of the same Rule.
"SECTION 8. Substituted Service. If the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by
leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's dwelling house or residence with
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the
copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person
in charge thereof."
o "Within a reasonable time" contemplates a period of time longer than that
demarcated by the word "prompt," and presupposes that a prior attempt at
personal service, within a justifiable time frame as would be necessary to
bring the defendant within the jurisdiction of the court, had failed. Since
substituted service is in derogation of the common law and is extraordinary
in character, it must be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances
authorized by statute. Statutes prescribing modes other than personal
service of summons must be strictly complied with to give the court
jurisdiction, and such compliance must appear affirmatively in the return.

11

In Keister vs. Navarro, this Court described how the impossibility of personal service
should be shown: "Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the
efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed. This
statement should be made in the proof of service. This is necessary because
substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It has been held
that this method of service is 'in derogation of the common law; it is a method
extraordinary in character, and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the
circumstances authorized by statute.'
Emphasizing the need for strict compliance with the requirements of substituted
service, this Court issued Administrative Circular No. 59, which read: The manner
of effecting substituted service as prescribed in Venturanza v. Court of Appeals, must
be strictly complied with, thus:
o 'The substituted service should be availed only when the defendant cannot
be served promptly in person. Impossibility of prompt service should be
shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the
failure of such efforts. The statement should be made in the proof of
service. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of
the usual method of service.
o Substituted service is a method extraordinary in character, and hence may
be used only as prescribed in the circumstances authorized by statute.
Thus, the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed
strictly, faithfully.

DE LEON V. HONTANOSAS
G.R. No. L-40377 (October 29, 1975)

DOCTRINE:
If a party, after receiving summons fails to answer the same, such party shall be declared in
default. Regarding summons served on one spouse, such is binding on the other spouse if the
spouse receiving the summons informs the other spouse of such fact.

FACTS:
Juan de Leon filed a complaint against spouses de Leon for the collection of a sum of
money. Juan caused the attachment of the spouses conjugal home in Dumaguete.
The summons for the spouses were served on the husband in Cebu who wired his
wife in Dumaguete informing her about the case.
The wife filed a motion to dissolve the writ of attachment claiming that the real owner
of the conjugal home was her father and alleged that it has her husband who
contracted the loan and the same did not redound to the benefit of the family. The TC
did not resolve the matter immediately.
TC granted Juans motion to declare the spouses in default for not filing an answer
after summons were served upon the husband. Judgment was rendered ordering the
spouses de Leon to pay Juan the claimed amount. However, the execution of
judgment was stayed.
TC proceeded to hear the motion to dissolve despite its promulgation of judgment. TC
decided against the spouses because the wife failed to ask the TC to set aside the
order of default. The execution proceeded and the property was sold to Juan.
The wife filed an MR reasoning that the subject property was sold by the wifes father
to her. TC granted the MR and set aside the order of default and set the case for pre-
trial. This caused the filing of the present case for certiorari against the TC judge.

ISSUE:
1. WON TC committed GAD in setting aside the order of default (and not its judgment of default)
and for setting the case for pre-trial.

HELD/RATIO:
1. Yes. TC committed GAD.

Although the wife was not personally served with summons, she was properly declared in
default because the service of summons upon her husband was binding on her. On receiving
the summons and copies of the complaint, the husband lost no time in apprising her of that fact
by means of a telegram.

Thus, she was made aware of the complaint but instead of answering it, she resisted the writ of
attachment. Thus, the order and judgment of default were proper and the TC committed GAD
by setting aside as it did.

CASE RESULT: TC order setting aside the order of default was reversed. Since the property
was already sold to Juan, its period of redemptions begins after the promulgation of the decision
of the Court in this case.

12


CARRIAGA V. MALAYA
G.R. No. L-48375 (August 13, 1986)

DOCTRINE: (Sec 7)
The service of summons may, with leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines through any
other manner which the court may deem sufficient. This also contemplates service through
registered mail

FACTS:
Herein respondent Ana Almonte Cariaga Soon, filed in her behalf and in behalf of her
minor daughter an action for (1) Annulment of a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of
Real Property, (2) Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT), (3) Recovery of
Real Property with damages
All herein petitioners filed an answer with counterclaim except Jose C. Cariaga Jr.
and Marieta Cariaga-Celis who were both residing abroad and were not served
summons
Upon motion Almonte, the lower court granted them leave to effect extra-territorial
service of summons
o These summons were served through registered mail abroad
Herein petitioners, who are resident of the Philippines filed a motion to set aside the
summons as null and void, it being irregular and unauthorized
Lower Court: Motion to set aside summonses was denied since there was
substantial compliance with Sec 17 in relation to Sec 7 Rule 14 of the ROC.

ISSUE:
1. WON the service of summons by registered mail upon defendants in the case at bar
is one which is contemplated within the principles laid down in the provisions of Secs.
17, 7 and 22, Rule 14 of the New Rules of Court

HELD/RATIO:
1. YES. The service of summons is proper.
Extraterritorial service of summons is proper:
o when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff;
o when the action relates to, or the subject of which is, property within
the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest,
actual or contingent;
o when the relief demanded in such an action consists, wholly or in part,
in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the
Philippines; and
o when defendant non-resident's property has been attached within the
Philippines
In any of such four cases, the service of summons may, with leave of court, be
effected out of the Philippines in three ways:
o by personal service;
o by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places
and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the
summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to
the last known address of the defendant; and
o in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient.
In this case, the third mode of extraterritorial service of summons was
substantially complied with
The requirement of due process has been met as shown by the fact that
defendants actually received the summonses and copies of the complaint

ABLAZA V. CIR
G.R. No. L-33906 (December 21, 1983)

DOCTRINE:
Persons associated in business are sued under a common name, service may be effected upon
all by serving upon any one of them or upon the person in charge of the office or place of
business maintained in the common name.
Emergency Recit:
ADLO filed a complaint before the CIR against CBT for salary differentials. CBT was served
summons, a copy of the complaint, and a required notice of hearing. CBT failed to file its
answer or any responsive pleading in time. CBT was declared in default and ADLO, et al., were
allowed to present their evidence ex-parte. An amount of the salary differentials demanded was
computed. A writ of execution was issued by the CIR againt CBT and Ablaza, the operator.
Abalaza's personal properties were levied upon. Ablaza sought relief but CIR denied. Hence
this petition for certiorari which the SC dismissed for lack of merit. The contention that Ablaza
was not impleaded, thus, not making her a party, is incorrect. Persons associated in business
are sued under a common name, service may be effected upon all by serving upon any one of
them or upon the person in charge of the office or place of business maintained in the common
name. there were irregularities in the summons of Ablaza is incorrect. Similarly, Ablza actively
avoided the service of summons and even said outright that she does not care abut the
summons. Similarly, there was no new cause of action included because the petition for salary
differentials necessarily include "payment for services rendered on Sundays or on legal
holidays."

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari to declare null and void the decision of the respondent
Court of Industrial Relations
The Association of Democratic Labor Organizations (ADLO) et al. filed a complaint
before the CIR against Cerisco Blackcat Trading (CBT) for salary differentials
(minimum wage, overtime pay, and reinstatement with backwages.
CBT was served summons with a copy of the complaint attached thereto. CIR also
had the required notice of hearing served to CBT.
CBT failed to file its answer or any responsive pleading within the reglementary
period provided by law. Hence, CIR declared CBT in default and private respondents
ADLO, et al., were allowed to present their evidence ex-parte.
After trial, CIR rendered its decision ordering the Chief of the Examining Division of
the Court to make a computation of the amount of salary differentials and to submit a
report to the Court immediately for further disposition.
The Chief of the Examining Division reported that there is a P223,098.04 salary
difference.
CIR issued an order which approves the Report of Examiner there being no objection
filed thereto by respondents.
ADLO moved for the issuance of a writ of execution which the CIR granted against a
corporation CBT owned but Ablaza (petitioner in the case at hand) operated.
After an authorized deputy sheriff of the CIR levied upon Ablaza's personal
properties, the latter filed an urgent petition for relief. CIR denied both the petition for
relief and the subsequent motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
1. WON there was fraud or fatal irregulatiries in service of summons, court processes and
orders which deprive a party of due notice and right to be heard constitute a violation of due
process.
2. WON the complaint was amended to include new causes of action without any formal
amended complaint being filed and new summons being issued on the amended complaint.


13

HELD/RATIO:
1. NO, there was none. The complaint filed with the CIR was against Cerisco Blackcat Trading
as sole respondent and the body of the complaint makes no mention whatsoever of Ablaza, to
whom no summons was not duly served. While it is absolutely indispensable for the
maintenance of a contentious action in the courts of justice to have as defendant some natural
or juridical person, this is not the case today.
Ablaza argues that the name "CERISCO TRADING" is a mere business name while
"BLACKCAT" is a mere trademark, the combination CERISCO BLACKCAT TRADING
is neither a natural or a juridical person, and as such, can neither sue nor be sued.
She is incorrect.
Section 9, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that when persons
associated in business are sued under a common name, service may be effected
upon all by serving upon any one of them or upon the person in charge of the office or
place of business maintained in the common name. Ablaza was doing business under
the common name Cerisco Blackcat Trading and always transacted business under
that name, the service of summons made upon the person in charge of the office or
place of business maintained in the common name was adequate.
This is specially true in this case where the plaintiffs are poor laborers. When the
rules are applied to labor cases, the interpretation must proceed in accordance with
the liberal spirit of the labor laws. nroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The records indicate beyond doubt that the respondent in the case before the CIR
was adequately given the necessary notice and that the owners of Cerisco Blackcat
Trading deliberately avoided acknowledgment of the service of summons. No less
than seven returns of the Sheriff clearly show that there was service of the necessary
processes. At no time did petitioner Ablaza, owner of Cerisco, condescend to honor
or respect the summons. At one instance, she verbally told the bailiff that "they don't
care about this," after throwing the court process outside the gate 'of the compound.
Since personal service of summons was made impossible, substituted service was
availed of by the bailiff by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of
business with some competent person in charge thereof.

2. The other issue with regard the alleged inclusion of new causes of action, this argument has
no merit.
The prayer asked for wage differentials pursuant to the statutory minimum wage law,
overtime pay, reinstatement, and backwages. The payment for services rendered on
Sundays or on legal holidays is necessarily included in the prayer for overtime pay
beyond the eight hours. Likewise, payment for maternity leave may be deemed
included in the abovecited prayer. In fact, there was no amendment to speak of in the
case at bar. All that private respondents did was to introduce evidence tending to
prove claims which were necessarily included in their prayer.c
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law librarySO ORDERED.

Separate Opinion:
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J ., concurring:chanrobles virtual law library
The summons directed to CBT was defective in that it did not include Ablaza. The defect,
however, could have been cured by "Victoria Ablaza, doing business under the name and
trademark Cerisco Blackcat Trading," since the intention was to sue the owner of the business
enterprise. Amendment is allowed in cases where it appears that the plaintiff intended, in fact, to
act against the individual doing business rather than against the business entity which the
individual was operating
Nonetheless, under Section 9, Rule 14, service of summons upon the person in charge of the
place of business in the common name, as was done in this case, was adequate.

14


DELTA MOTOR SALES CORP. V. MANGOSING
(G.R. No. L-41667, April 30, 1976)

DOCTRINE:
A strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over
a corporation. The officer upon whom service is made be one who is named in the statute;
otherwise the service is insufficient.

EMERGENCY RECIT:
Pamintuan filed a cased against Delta Motor for breach of warranty and recovery of damages.
The summons for Delta Motor was served on Miranda, a mere employee. Delta Motor was
declared in default for not answering the complaint and was found by the court to be liable for
breach and damages. Delta Motor filed a petition contending that Miranda was not a corporate
secretary and the service on Miranda was a mistake. The lower court denied the motion. Hence,
the petition. The issue is whether the service of summons was proper. The court held that the
service of summons was NOT proper because Miranda, a mere employee, is not one of those
mentioned in Rule 14, Sec 13 to whom service upon private domestic corporation or partnership
should be served. The court did not acquire jurisdiction over Delta Motor.

FACTS:
Pamintuan (Respondent) sued Delta Motor (petitioner) for the recovery of the sum of
P58,000 as damages and attorney's fees for allegedly selling a defective Toyota car to
Pamintuan and for failing to fulfill its warranty obligation by not properly repairing the car
(leaks emanating from its windshield, doors and windows).
The summons for Delta Motor was served on its employee, Miranda, who acknowledged
its receipt by signing on the lower portion of the original summons.
Delta Motor did not answer the complaint within the reglementary period and
consequently, Pamintuan filed a motion to declare Delta Motor in default.
The lower court in its decision granted the motion and found Delta liable for breach of
warranty and damages.
That decision was served on Delta Motor which prompted Deltas lawyers to file a petition
to lift the order of default, to set aside the judgment and for new trial.
Delta Motor alleged that Miranda was not the corporate secretary but the secretary of a
certain Ramos of the personnel department and that service upon her was a mistake.
The lower court denied Delta Motors motion. Delta Motor appealed. Pamintuan countered
the appeal with a motion for execution. The lower court granted Pamintuans motion for
execution and refused Delta Motors appeal.
Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:
1. WON Delta Motor was properly served with summons
2. WON the court had jurisdiction to render the judgment by default against it and to execute
that judgment.

HELD/RATIO:
1. NO.
Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 13. Service upoin private domestic corporation or partnership. If defendant is
a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly
registered, service may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier,
agent, or any of its directors.

For the purpose of receiving service of summons and being bound by it, a corporation is
Identified with its agent or officer who under the rule is designated to accept service of
process. Service of summons must be made to the person named in the Rules. The
secretary to whom the summons was served was not one of those mentioned in the Rules,
thus, the service was insufficient.

2. NO.
Courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of a party defendant and of the subject-matter
of the action by virtue of the service of summons in the manner required by law. Where
there is no service of summons or a voluntary general appearance by the defendant, the
court acquires no jurisdiction to pronounce a judgment in the case.

In the instant case the Manila court did not acquire jurisdiction over Delta Motor because it
was not properly served with summons. The service of summons on Miranda, who is not
among the persons mentioned in section 13 of Rule 14, was insufficient. It did not bind
Delta Motor. Consequently, the order of default, the judgment by default and the execution
are void and should be set aside.


15

MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION V. MIGUEL GARCIA
G.R. No. L-55935 (July 30, 1986)

DOCTRINE:
The can properly dismiss a complaint on a motion to dismiss due to lack of cause of action even
without a hearing. The trial court can consider all the pleadings filed, including answers, motions
and evidence then on record for purposes of resolving a motion to dismiss based on lack of
cause of action.

EMERGENCY RECIT:
Petitioner Marcopper filed a complaint for quieting of title/reconveyance against Respondent
Garcia to declare the latters free patent over the subject land void. Respondent Garcia filed his
answer with counterclaim alleging that he is the sole and exclusive owner of the land. Petitioner
then filed its answer to the respondent's counterclaim and filed a request for admission
admitting that admitted that it was not able to file any opposition against the issuance of a Free
Patent to the respondent because it had no knowledge of such issuance. Respondent then filed
a motion to dismiss. The lower court dismissed the petitioner's complaint for having no cause of
action and for being moot and academic. Hence, the petition. Petitioner raised the issue that the
motion to dismiss was not proper because no hearing on the merits of the case was conducted.
The SC held that the lower court had the opportunity to examine the merits of the pleadings
submitted by the parties. The order of dismissal was in the nature of a summary judgment. The
trial court can properly dismiss a complaint on a motion to dismiss due to lack of cause of action
even without a hearing

FACTS:
Petitioner Marcopper Mining Corporation filed a complaint for quieting of
title/reconveyance and damages against private respondent Miguel Garcia praying
that Garcia's Free Patent No. 542586 and OCT No. P-2186 of the Register of Deeds
of Marinduque be declared void and asked that a transfer certificate of title be issued
in its favor for having acquired it in good faith and for value from Buenaventura Paez
who had been in open, continuous, exclusive, adverse and notorious possession,
occupation, cultivation and enjoyment thereof since about 1921.
The respondent alleged in his answer with counterclaim that he is the sole owner of
the land in question as the holder of a free patent and for which, a corresponding
certificate of title was issued by the Registrar of Deeds; that Paez was just residing in
a small portion of the land by mere tolerance of the respondent. Respondent further
alleged that Paez had executed an affidavit of quitclaim over the land.
Petitioner then filed its answer to the respondent's counterclaim and filed a request
for admission. The petitioner admitted that it was not able to file any opposition
against the issuance of a Free Patent to the respondent because it had no knowledge
of such issuance but it did file an action for the cancellation of such certificate of title
upon its discovery.
The respondent filed a motion to dismiss arguing that that the OCT of the respondent
had already become indefeasible; that petitioner's action for reconveyance has
prescribed; that even if the action had not yet prescribed, the petitioner could not avail
of the same since the land before the issuance of the OCT is public and therefore,
cannot be the subject of reconveyance; and that the petitioner is guilty of laches and
inexcusable negligence in not protecting and asserting its rights, if any, over the
disputed land.
The lower court dismissed the petitioner's complaint for having no cause of action and
for being moot and academic
Hence, the petition. The petitioner contends that it is a well-settled rule that when the
motion to dismiss is based on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action,
no evidence may be allowed and the issue should only be determined in the light of
the allegations of the complaint and the judge may not inquire into the truth of the
allegations, and find them to be false without a hearing
ISSUE:
1. WON the Motion to dismiss was proper

HELD:
1. YES.
The rule on a motion to dismiss cited by the petitioner, while correct as a general rule
is not without exceptions. In the present case, before the trial court issued the
questioned order dismissing petitioner's complaint, it had the opportunity to examine
the merits of the complaint, the answer with counterclaim, the petitioner's answer to
the counterclaim and its answer to the request for admission. It was but logical for
said court to consider all of these pleadings in determining whether or not there was a
sufficient cause of action in the petitioner's complaint. The order of dismissal was in
the nature of a summary judgment. The trial court can properly dismiss a complaint
on a motion to dismiss due to lack of cause of action even without a hearing, by
taking into consideration the discussion in said motion and the opposition thereto.
Furthermore, even if the complaint stated a valid cause of action, a motion to dismiss
for insufficiency of cause of action will be granted if documentary evidence admitted
facts sufficient to defeat the claim. Moreover, petitioner-appellant cannot invoke the
rule that, when the ground for asking dismissal is that the complaint states no cause
of action, its sufficiency must be determined only from the allegations in the
complaint. The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical
sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial justice. If a
technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be defeated.
Where the rules merely secondary in importance are made to override the ends of
justice and had been misapplied to the prejudice of the substantial right of a party,
said rigid application cannot be countenanced.

16


EB VILLAROSA V. BENITO
G.R. No. 136426. (August 6, 1999)

DOCTRINE:
Summons; Jurisdiction; The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to
accept summons for a domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and more
clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now
states general manager instead of only manager; corporate secretary instead of
secretary; and treasurer instead of cashier. The phrase agent, or any of its directors is
conspicuously deleted in the new rule.
The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. Section 20, Rule 14 now
provides that the inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. The
emplacement of this rule clearly underscores the purpose to enforce strict enforcement
of the rules on summons.

FACTS:
Petitioner E. B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. is a limited partnership with principal
office address at 102 Juan Luna St., Davao City and with branch offices at 2492 Bay
View Drive, Tambo, Paraaque, Metro Manila and Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de
Oro City. Petitioner and private respondent executed a Deed of Sale with
Development Agreement wherein the former agreed to develop certain parcels of
land located at Barrio Carmen, Cagayan de Oro belonging to the latter into a housing
subdivision for the construction of low cost housing units. They further agreed that in
case of litigation regarding any dispute arising therefrom, the venue shall be in the
proper courts of Makati.
On April 3, 1998, private respondent, as plaintiff, filed a Complaint for Breach of
Contract and Damages against petitioner, as defendant, before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati allegedly for failure of the latter to comply with its contractual
obligation in that, other than a few unfinished low cost houses, there were no
substantial developments therein.
Summons, together with the complaint, were served upon the defendant, through its
Branch Manager Engr. Wendell Sabulbero at the stated address at Kolambog,
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City but the Sheriffs Return of Service stated that the
summons was duly served upon defendant E. B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. thru its
Branch Manager Engr. WENDELL SALBULBERO on May 5, 1998 at their new office
Villa Gonzalo, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City, and evidenced by the signature on the
face of the original copy of the summons.
On June 9, 1998, defendant filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss
alleging that on May 6, 1998, summons intended for defendant was served upon
Engr. Wendell Sabulbero, an employee of defendant at its branch office at Cagayan
de Oro City. Defendant prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of
improper service of summons and for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. Defendant contends that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over its
person since the summons was improperly served upon its employee in its branch
office at Cagayan de Oro City who is not one of those persons named in Section 11,
Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure upon whom service of summons may be
made.
Private Respondent cites earlier cases where the SC upheld service of summons
upon a construction project manager; a corporations assistant manager; ordinary
clerk of a corporation; private secretary of corporate executives; retained counsel;
officials who had charge or control of the operations of the corporation, like the
assistant general manager; or the corporations Chief Finance and Administrative
Officer. In these cases, these persons were considered as agent within the
contemplation of the old rule.

ISSUE:
1. WON an agent of a domestic private corporation can receive summons in behalf of
their corporation?
2. WON the filing of a motion to dismiss can be deemed voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court.

HELD:
1. NO. The service of summons upon the branch manager of petitioner at its branch
office at Cagayan de Oro, instead of upon the general manager at its principal office
at Davao City is improper. There being no proper service of summons, the trial
court cannot take cognizance of a case for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. Any proceeding undertaken by the trial court will consequently be null
and void.
o Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides the enumeration of
persons to whom summons may be served. The list is restricted, limited and exclusive
following the rule on statutory construction expressio unios est exclusio alterius.
o Delta Motor Sales Corporation vs. Mangosing: A strict compliance with the mode of
service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. The officer upon
whom service is made must be one who is named in the statute; otherwise the service is
insufficient. x x x. The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will
receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be
served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know
what to do with the legal papers served on him. In other words, to bring home to the
corporation notice of the filing of the action. x x x. The liberal construction rule cannot be
invoked and utilized as a substitute for the plain legal requirements as to the manner in
which summons should be served on a domestic corporation. x x x. (italics supplied).
o The particular revision under Section 11 of Rule 14 was explained by retired Supreme
Court Justice Florenz Regalado, thus: x x x the then Sec. 13 of this Rule allowed service
upon a defendant corporation to be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier,
agent or any of its directors. The aforesaid terms were obviously ambiguous and
susceptible of broad and sometimes illogical interpretations, especially the word agent of
the corporation. The Filoil case, involving the litigation lawyer of the corporation who
precisely appeared to challenge the validity of service of summons but whose very
appearance for that purpose was seized upon to validate the defective service, is an
illustration of the need for this revised section with limited scope and specific terminology.
Thus the absurd result in the Filoil case necessitated the amendment permitting service
only on the in-house counsel of the corporation who is in effect an employee of the
corporation, as distinguished from an independent practitioner. (italics supplied)

2. NO. The filing of a motion to dismiss, whether or not belatedly filed by the
defendant, his authorized agent or attorney, precisely objecting to the jurisdiction of
the court over the person of the defendant can by no means be deemed a
submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
Before, the rule was that a party may challenge the jurisdiction of the court over his person
by making a special appearance through a motion to dismiss and if in the same motion,
the movant raised other grounds or invoked affirmative relief which necessarily involves
the exercise of the jurisdiction of the court, the party is deemed to have submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the court. This doctrine has been abandoned in the case of La Naval
Drug Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., which became the basis of the adoption
of a new provision in the former Section 23, which is now Section 20 of Rule 14 of the
1997 Rules.


17

PARAMOUNT INSURANCE CORP. V. AC ORDONEZ CORP
G.R. No. 175109 (August 6, 2008)

DOCTRINE:
SEC. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. When the defendant is
a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the
Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the president,
managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house
counsel.

ER:

FACTS:
Petitioner Paramount Insurance Corp. is the subrogee of Maximo Mata, the registered
owner of a Honda City sedan involved in a vehicular accident with a truck mixer
owned by respondent corporation and driven by respondent Franklin A. Suspine on
September 10, 1997, at Brgy. Panungyanan, Gen. Trias, Cavite.
February 22, 2000: petitioner filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, a
complaint for damages against respondents.
Based on the Sheriffs Return of Service, summons remained unserved on
respondent Suspine, while it was served on respondent corporation and received by
Samuel D. Marcoleta of its Receiving Section on April 3, 2000.
May 19, 2000: petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default
June 28, 2000: respondent corporation filed an Omnibus Motion (And Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion to Declare Defendant in Default) alleging that summons was
improperly served upon it because it was made to a secretarial staff who was
unfamiliar with court processes; and that the summons was received by Mr. Armando
C. Ordoez, President and General Manager of respondent corporation only on June
24, 2000. Respondent corporation asked for an extension of 15 days within which to
file an Answer.
June 30, 2000: Pending resolution of its first motion to declare respondents in default,
petitioner filed a Second Motion to Declare Defendants in Default.
July 26, 2000: respondent corporation filed a Motion to Admit Answer alleging honest
mistake and business reverses that prevented them from hiring a lawyer until July 10,
2000, as well as justice and equity. The Answer with Counterclaim specifically denied
liability, averred competency on the part of respondent Suspine, and due selection
and supervision of employees on the part of respondent corporation, and argued that
it was Maximo Mata who was at fault.
August 25, 2000: the MTC of Makati City issued an Order admitting the answer and
setting the case for pre-trial on Oct. 17, 2000
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, it filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order before the RTC of Makati City.
October 16, 2000: the RTC of Makati City issued a temporary restraining order
May 22, 2001: RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction.
September 21, 2005: the RTC granted the petition, set aside MTC decision dated
August 25, 2000, making permanent the May 22 decision.
July 17, 2006: CA reverses Sept. 21 decision and reinstates Aug. 25 decision

ISSUE:
1. WON THERE WAS VALID SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON DEFENDANT AC
ORDONEZ CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION.

HELD:
1. NO
Section 11, Rule 14 sets out an exclusive enumeration of the officers who can receive
summons on behalf of a corporation. Service of summons to someone other than the
corporations president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, and in-house counsel, is not valid.
The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to receive summons for a
domestic corporation or partnership is limited and more clearly specified in the new
rule. The phrase agent, or any of its directors has been conspicuously
deleted. Moreover, the argument of substantial compliance is no longer
compelling. We have ruled that the new rule, as opposed to Section 13, Rule 14 of
the 1964 Rules of Court, is restricted, limited and exclusive, following the rule in
statutory construction that expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Thus, the service of
summons to respondent corporations Receiving Section through Samuel D.
Marcoleta is defective and not binding to said corporation.
On its face, the return shows that the summons was received by an employee who is
not among the responsible officers enumerated by law. Such being invalid, petitioner
should have sought the issuance and proper service of new summons instead of
moving for a declaration of default.
Consequently, the motions for declaration of default filed on May 19, 2000 and June
30, 2000 were both premature. Thus, there was no grave abuse of discretion when
the Metropolitan Trial Court admitted respondent corporations Answer. Although it
was filed beyond the extension period requested by respondent corporation, however,
Sec. 11, Rule 11 grants discretion to the trial court to allow an answer or other
pleading to be filed after the reglementary period, upon motion and on such terms as
may be just. An answer should be admitted where it had been filed before the
defendant was declared in default and no prejudice is caused to plaintiff. The
hornbook rule is that default judgments are generally disfavored.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated July 17, 2006 reinstating the August 25, 2000 and September 26,
2000 Orders of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 66 which admitted
respondent corporations Answer and set the case for pre-trial, as well as the
Resolution dated October 12, 2006 denying the motion for reconsideration, are
AFFIRMED.

18


LITTON MILLS, INC. V. CA
G.R. No. 94980 (May 15, 1996)

DOCTRINE: (Topic- Rule 14, Sec 14)
A court need not go beyond the allegations in the complaint to determine whether or not a
defendant foreign corporation is doing business for the purpose of Rule 14, Sec 14 (service
upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown)
Service upon foreign corporations could be made in 3 ways: (1) by serving upon the agent
designated in accordance with law to accept service of summons; (2) if there is no resident
agent, by service on the government official designated by law to that effect; and (3) by serving
on any officer or agent of said corporation within the Philippines

EMERGENCY RECIT:
Litton supplied Empire (the local agent of Gelhaar) soccer jerseys. To be able to collect from the
bank, a certificate of inspection from Empire is required, but the latter refused to issue such.
Litton filed a complaint for specific performance with RTC Pasig. The law firm of Sycip, Salazar,
Feliciano and Hernandez objected to the jurisdiction of the court over Gelhaar contending: (1)
the latter is a foreign corporation and beyond the reach of the local courts, and (2) Litton failed
to prove that Gelhaar was doing business in the Philiipines which is required before summons
could be served. HELD: Petition dismissed. The fact of doing business must be established by
appropriate allegations in the complaint. A court need not go beyond the allegations in the
complaint to determine whether or not a defendant foreign corporation is doing business. The
allegation that Empire, for and in behalf of Gelhaar, ordered dozens of soccer jerseys from
Litton and for this purpose Gelhaar caused the opening of an irrevocable letter of credit in favor
of Litton is a sufficient allegation that Gelhaar was doing business in the Philippines.

FACTS:
Petitioner Litton Mills, Inc. (Litton) agreed to supply Empire Sales Philippines
Corporation (Empire), the local agent of private respondent Gelhaar Uniform
Company (Gelhaar), a US corporation, 7,770 dozens of soccer jerseys
Litton sent four shipments totalling 4,770 dozens of the soccer jerseys between
December 2 and December 30, 1983. A fifth shipment, consisting of 2,110 dozens of
the jerseys, was inspected by Empire from January 9 to January 19, 1984, but Empire
refused to issue the required certificate of inspection which is required for Littons
collection from the bank
Litton filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig for specific performance
and sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to compel
Empire to issue the inspection certificate covering the 2,110 dozen jerseys and the
recovery damages
The trial court issued the writ on January 25, 1984. The next day, Empire issued the
inspection certificate, so that the cargo was shipped on time.
On February 8, 1984, Atty. Remie Noval filed in behalf of the defendants a Motion
For Extension of Time To File An Answer/Responsive Pleading. He filed ten other
motions for extension, which were all granted except for the last. On his motion, the
court later reconsidered its order of denial and admitted the answer of the defendants.
The law firm of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano and Hernandez entered a special
appearance for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over Gelhaar
based on the ff grounds:
o as a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines, it is beyond
the reach of the local courts
o Litton failed to allege and prove that Gelhaar was doing business in the
Philippines, which is required, before summons could be served under Rule
14, 14.
It also denied the authority of Atty. Noval to appear for Gelhaar

ISSUE:
1. WON jurisdiction over Gelhaar was acquired
2. WON the contract with Litton constitutes doing business.
3. WON the appearance of Atty. Noval in behalf of Gelhaar was binding on the latter

HELD/RATIO:
1. YES
The petitioner opines that the phrase, (the) fact (of doing business in the Philippines)
must first be established in order that summons be made and jurisdiction acquired,
indicates that a mere allegation to that effect in the complaint is not enough there
must instead be proof of doing business
Jurisdiction and venue of actions are initially determined by the allegations of the
complaint. Jurisdiction cannot be made to depend on independent pleas set up in a
mere motion to dismiss, otherwise jurisdiction would become dependent almost
entirely upon the defendant.
The fact of doing business must be established by appropriate allegations in the
complaint. A court need not go beyond the allegations in the complaint to determine
whether or not a defendant foreign corporation is doing business for the purpose of
Rule 14, 14
In the case at bar, the allegation that Empire, for and in behalf of Gelhaar,
ordered 7,770 dozens of soccer jerseys from Litton and for this purpose
Gelhaar caused the opening of an irrevocable letter of credit in favor of Litton is
a sufficient allegation that Gelhaar was doing business in the Philippines.

2. YES
Gelhaar contends that the contract with Litton was a single, isolated transaction and
that it did not constitute doing business.
It is not really the fact that there is only a single act done that is material. The other
circumstances of the case must be considered. In the case at bar, the trial court was
certainly correct in holding that Gelhaars act in purchasing soccer jerseys to be within
the ordinary course of business of the company considering that it was engaged in
the manufacture of uniforms. The acts noted above are of such a character as to
indicate a purpose to do business.
In accordance with Rule 14, 14, service upon Gelhaar could be made in three
ways: (1) by serving upon the agent designated in accordance with law to
accept service of summons; (2) if there is no resident agent, by service on the
government official designated by law to that effect; and (3) by serving on any
officer or agent of said corporation within the Philippines. Here, service was
made through Gelhaars agent, the Empire Sales Philippines Corp. There was,
therefore, a valid service of summons on Gelhaar, sufficient to confer on the
trial court jurisdiction over the person of Gelhaar.

3. NO
Atty. Noval admits that he was not appointed by Gelhaar as its counsel. What he
claims is simply that Gelhaar knew of the filing of the case in the trial court and of his
representation
No voluntary appearance by Gelhaar can, therefore, be inferred from the acts of Atty.
Noval.


19

WANG LABORATORIES V. MENDOZA

SAHAGUN V. CA
G.R. No. 78328 (June 3, 1991)

DOCTRINE:
Service of summons on a nonresident defendant who is not found in the country is required, not
for purposes of physically acquiring jurisdiction over his person but simply in pursuance of the
requirements of fair play (due process), so that he may be informed of the pendency of the
action against him and the possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to him or in
which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of a resident, and that he may
thereby be accorded an opportunity to defend in the action, if he be so minded. For this
purpose, publication in a local newspaper of general circulation (or in any other locality the
judge may order, as provided in Sec 15, Rule 14) suffices.

EMERGENCY RECIT:
Abel Sahagun was sued by Filinvest for the payment of a promissory note. Because Abel was in
the US at the time, ordinary service of summons could not be done; so, the court ordered notice
to be published in a newspaper, Manila Evening Post. However, there was a variance in the
address of Abel as provided in the order of the court, versus that in the published notice. The
SC ruled that notice of summons by publication was proper, even if not published in the US,
because the notice still complied with the Rules. The Rules: (a) allow the court discretion to
determine where and when the publication will be made; (b)in addition, require a copy of the
summons be served at the defendant's last known address. However, since (b) was never
proven, there was no proper service of summons to Abel in this case.

FACTS:
(1)
Abel Sahagun, the husband of herein petitioner Carmelita Sahagun, was the manager of
Rallye Motor Co., Inc.
Allegedly, Abel made it appear that Rallye Motor had sold a vehicle to Ernesto Salazar,
who issued a promissory note in payment, secured by a chattel mortgage on the vehicle
itself.
Rallye, through Abel, assigned the note to Filinvest.
Upon maturity, Salazar failed to pay the amount of the note to Filinvest. Initially, Filinvest
sued Salazar, but it discovered later on that the mortgaged car had never been
delivered to Abel.
Therefore, Filinvest sued Abel. A write of attachment was issued on the house and lot of
Abel where he and his family live; his wife also claims to own the house exclusively,
having paid for it with her own earnings.
Since at the time of the suit, Abel was in the US and his whereabouts were unknown,
Filinvest moved to declare Abel in default. But the trial court instead directed Filinvest to
effect service of summons on Abel. When Filinvest failed to do so, the trial court
dismissed the complaint.
Carmelita, wife of Abel, moved to intervene in the case and was granted by the court
some time to file her complaint in intervention. However, for her failure to show up at the
pre-trial, she and Abel were declared in default.
Subsequently, the court decided against the Sahagun spouses, ordering them to pay
Filinvest.
CA: set aside trial court's ruling, saying that Carmelita was deprived of the opportunity to
present evidence
(2)
Later on, Filinvest filed ANOTHER complaint, and asked for leave of court to serve
summons by publication ("in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, to
which this matter may be assigned after due raffle in accordance with existing law, for
three successive days") on Abel in the US. After at least 60 days after notice, Abel was
supposed to file his answer in Court
In this case, Carmelita and Rallye Motors were properly impleaded as
defendants
The court ordered that the address of Abel to be included in the published notice was
"1228-A Antipolo Street, Makati, Metro Manila." However, the entry in the Manila
Evening Post itself was his last known address was "No. 16 Mangga Chupoy, Pilar
Village Subdivision, Las Pias, Metro Manila," directly contradicting the order of the
court.
Abel was declared in default. This was assailed by Carmelita on certiorari to the CA.
The CA ruled against Carmelita. Hence, she brought this petition.

ISSUE: Did the trial court acquire jurisdiction over Abel by the publication of summons in the
Manila Evening Post, thereby giving the court power to declare him in default? (Was the
summons by publication proper?)

HELD/RATIO: YES
Section 17, Rule 14 (note: this is now Sec 15) applies here because: (1) the defendant
is outside of the country; (2) the case concerns real property
The trial court correctly ordered service of summons on Abel, adopting for such service
one of the modes authorized by the above provision of the Rules, that is, "by publication
in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may
order."
On the issue of whether or not the publications should have been made in the US:
It is evident that the law itself does not consider actual notice to the defendant in
cases of this kind as absolutely necessary. (El Banco Espaol-Filipino vs.
Palanca, etc.)
"This Court clarified that in a quasi in rem action jurisdiction over the person of a
nonresident defendant is not essential. The service of summons by publication is
required "merely to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process". --> in
the nature of a judgment in rem (De Midgely vs. Ferandos, etc., et al.)
Also, it is not even known in what state Abel is; hence, publication in the US is
not feasible.
However, just because it is difficult to serve summons to a nonresident in this
way, this is no reason to set aside the rule of publication by summons wherever
the court may order.
Service of summons on a nonresident defendant who is not found in the country
is required, not for purposes of physically acquiring jurisdiction over his person,
but simply for fair play, so that he may be informed of the pendency of the action
against him and the possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to him
or in which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of a
resident, and that he may thereby be accorded an opportunity to defend in the
action.
HOWEVER: despite our holding that publication in the Philippines is sufficient, the
service of summons in this case is still defective, because there was no showing that
copies of the summons and the amended complaint were duly served at the defendant's
last known correct (remember the confusion in the address published and address
ordered by the court to be written) address by registered mail.
The failure to strictly comply correctly with the requirements of the rules regarding the
mailing of copies its publication is a fatal defect in the service of summons.

20


VELAYO-FONG V. SPOUSES VELAYO
GR No. 155488 (December 6, 2006)

DOCTRINE: Rule 14
EXTRAJUDICIAL SERVICE applies only when the action is in rem or quasi rem. In such
actions, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction
on the court provided, the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.
Process servers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties. To
overcome this, the evidence must be clear and convincing.

EMERGENCY RECIT
Spouses Raymond and Maria sued Erlinda and her father Rodolfo for damages for maliciously
instituting a criminal complaint (estafa and kidnapping) against Raymond. Erlinda is a non-
resident of the Philippines but the Process Server certified she was served the copy of
summons and complaint when found in the lobby of Intercon Hotel, Makati but refused to sign
receipt thereof. RTC declared Erlinda and Rodolfo in default. Erlinda argued she was not validly
served summons relying on the rule of extraterritorial service. SC held extraterritorial service is
only proper when the action is in rem or in quasi rem. The action in this case is in personam.
The Process Servers certification that summons was served to Erlinda to acquire jurisdiction
over her person enjoys the presumption of regularity since Erlinda was not able to show clear
and convincing proof to the contrary. Petition denied.

FACTS (quite long, very technical)
Spouses Raymond and Maria Velayo filed a complaint for sum of money and
damages against Erlinda Velayo-Fong et al. Raymond and Erlinda are half-brothers.
Spouses alleged that Erlinda and their father Rodolfo:
- filed a complaint against Raymond for estafa and kidnapping a minor
- caused Spouses to be included in the Hold Departure List of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID), preventing them from leaving the country to
their damage and prejudice.
- filed a complaint before the SEC which caused Spouses funds to be frozen and
paralyzed their business transactions and operations
Erlinda Velayo-Fong is a resident of U.S.A and not found in the Philippines
- Spouses prayed for a writ of preliminary attachment against her properties in the
Philippines
- Spouses filed an Urgent Motion praying that the summons upon Velayo-Fong be
served to her Condos in Pasay and Makati. Granted. The Process Server
submitted the Officers Return certifying that a copy of the summons and
complaint was personally served upon Erlinda at the lobby of the Intercon Hotel,
Makati in the presence of lobby personnel Ms. Zulueta but Erlinda refused to
sign receipt thereof.
- Process Server also certified that a copy of the same was served personally
upon Rodolfo in Las Pinas but also refused to sign receipt.
Upon ex-parte motions of Spouses, RTC declared Erlinda and Rodolfo in default for
failure to file an answer and ordered ex-parte presentation of evidence.
Erlinda filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default claiming fraud, accident or
mistake prevented her from filing a responsive pleading, that no copy of the summons
was served upon her, and that she has valid and meritorious defenses to refute
Spouses material allegations. Spouses opposed.
RTC denied Erlindas Motion: the presumption of regularity in the Process Servers
discharge of function was not sufficiently overcome and no evident reason for the
Process Server to make a false narration regarding service of summons.
Spouses filed a Motion for Execution. Erlinda filed an Opposition contending she has
not yet received the Decision and it is not yet final and executory as against her.
RTC denied the Motion for Execution finding the Decision and Order not furnished
upon Erlinda
Erlinda, through her counsel, finally received the Decision and Order.
Erlinda appealed to the CA questioning the propriety and validity of the service of
summons made upon her. Spouses opposed arguing that the appeal should be
dismissed for Erlindas reliance on the rule of extraterritorial service is misplaced.
CA affirmed RTC: Erlinda was not furnished a copy of the decision but she was
validly served with summons since the complaint for damages is an action in
personam and only personal service of summons, not extraterritorial service, is
essential to acquire jurisdiction over her person. Erlindas Motion for Reconsideration
was denied.

ISSUE:
1. How may service of summons be effected on a non-resident?
2. Was there a valid service of summons made upon Erlinda? YES

HELD: Petition DENIED. CA decision affirmed.

RATIO
Sec. 17, Rule 14 on Extraterritorial Service provides that when the defendant is a
non-resident and he is not found in the country, summons may be served
extraterritorially. There are only four instances when extraterritorial service of
summons is proper:
(a) when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiffs;
(b) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property, within the
Philippines, in which the defendant claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent;
(c) when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in
excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the
Philippines; and
(d) when the defendant's property has been attached within the Philippines.
In these instances, service of summons may be effected by
(a) personal service out of the country, with leave of court;
(b) publication, also with leave of court; or
(c) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
Thus, extrajudicial service of summons apply only where the action is in rem, that
is, an action against the thing itself instead of against the person, or in an action quasi
in rem, where an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding
is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. The
rationale for this is that in in rem and quasi in rem actions, jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that
the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.
Where the action is in personam, that is, one brought against a person on the basis of
her personal liability, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the
court to validly try and decide the case.
When the defendant is a non-resident, personal service of summons within the state
is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person.

Summons on the
defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if
he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. This cannot be done, however, if the
defendant is not physically present in the country, and thus, the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case
against him.
In this case, Spouses cause of action is Erlinda et al maliciously instituted a criminal
complaint before the NBI and a petition before the SEC which prevented the
respondents from leaving the country. The action instituted by the Spouses affect the
parties alone, not the whole world. Any judgment therein is binding only upon the
parties properly impleaded. Thus, it is an action in personam. As such, personal
service of summons upon the defendants is essential in order for the court to acquire
jurisdiction over their persons, which was effected upon Erlinda.

21

A process server's certificate of service is prima facie evidence of the facts as set out
in the certificate.

Between the claim of non-receipt of summons by a party against the
assertion of an official whose duty is to send notices, the latter assertion is fortified by
the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. To overcome the
presumption of regularity of performance of official functions in favor of such Officer's
Return, the evidence against it must be clear and convincing. Erlinda was unable to
come forward with the requisite quantum of proof to the contrary, the presumption of
regularity of performance on the part of the process server stands.

22


JOSE V. BOYON
GR. NO. 147369 (October 23, 2003)

DOCTRINE:
1. Substituted service can be availed of only after a clear showing that personal service
of summons was not legally possible.
2. Service by publication is applicable in actions in rem and quasi in rem, but NOT in
personal suits such as actions for specific performance.

EMERGENCY RECIT:
Petitioners Jose filed a complaint for specific performance against Respondents Boyon to
compel them to facilitate the transfer of ownership of a parcel of land subject of a controverted
sale. The summons was issued by the judge but the process server resorted to substituted
service because allegedly, his efforts to serve it personally to the Respondents failed. The
Petitioners then filed a motion to effect summons by publication which was granted and the
Respondents were declared in default for failure to file their answers. The judge then rendered a
decision in favor of the Petitioners and when the Respondents found out about this, they
assailed the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that the service of summons was not validly
effected. The SC agreed with Respondents. The service of summons was not valid because the
process server did not comply with the rules of substituted service of summons as he did not
exert any genuine effort to locate the Respondents and he merely indicated in the Return of
Summons their alleged whereabouts. The summons not having been validly effected, the court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the Respondents and the decision of the lower court is null and
void.

FACTS:
Petitioners Patrick and Rafaela JOSE (P) lodged a complaint for specific performance
against Respondents Helen and Romeo BOYON (R) to compel them to facilitate the transfer
of ownership of a parcel of land subject of a controverted sale
The judge issued summons to the (R)
As per return of the summons, substituted service was resorted to by the process
server allegedly because efforts to serve it personally to the (R) failed
(P) filed an Ex-parte Motion for Leave of Court to Effect Summons by Publication
The judge granted such and issued an Order declaring the (R) in default for failure
to file their respective answers
(P) were allowed to submit their evidence ex-parte
The judge issued a Resolution ordering (R) to execute the necessary document
with the effect of withdrawing the Affidavit of Loss they filed and annotated with the
Register of Deeds of Makati
Helen Boyon, who was then residing in the US, was surprised to learn from her sister of the
Resolution
(R) then filed an Ad Cautelam motion questioning the validity of the service of
summons effected by the court a quo--DENIED
(R) raised the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court via a motion for
reconsideration--DENIED
(P) moved for the execution of the controverted judgment--GRANTED
(R) now filed a petition for certiorari questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court

ISSUE:
1. WON the service of summons was valid
2. WON summons by publication was proper

HELD/RATIO:
1. NO
In general, trial courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the
service of summons
Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, such
service may be done by personal or substituted service, following the procedures
laid out in SEC 6 and 7 of RULE 14
Personal service of summons is preferred to substituted service; only if the former
cannot be promptly made can the process server resort to the latter
Proof of service of summons must:
a. Indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time
b. Specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant
c. State that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and
discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office
or regular place of business of the defendant

DEFECTIVE PERSONAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS
In the instant case, the process server hastily and capriciously resorted to
substituted service without actually exerting any genuine effort to locate
respondents
o He only went to their home in Alabang
o The Return of Summons states that efforts to do so were ineffectual and
unavailing because Helen Boyon was in the US and Romeo Boyon was
in Bicol, BUT it did not mention exactly what efforts, if any, were
undertaken to find them
o At best, the Return merely states the alleged whereabouts of (R)
o Without specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or of the
efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general statement that such
efforts were made will not suffice for purposes of complying with the
rules of substituted service of summons
Hamilton v. Levy: The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of
summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officers Return; otherwise, any
substituted service made in lieu of personal service cannot be upheld. This is
necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of
service. It is a method extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as
prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute.
Madrigal v. CA: Service of summons, especially for actions in personam, is
essential for acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the resort
to a substituted service must be duly justified. Failure to do so would invalidate all
subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.

2. NO
Extraterritorial service of summons or summons by publication applies only when
the action is in rem or quasi in rem
In the instant case, the action filed was an action for specific performance. While
the suit incidentally involved a piece of land, the ownership or possession thereof
was NOT put in issue since they did not assert any right or interest over it
Having failed to serve the summons on (R) properly, the RTC did not validly
acquire jurisdiction over their persons. All proceedings conducted subsequent
thereto should be deemed null and void.


23

LA NAVAL DRUG CORP. V. CA
GR 103200, (August 31, 1994)
This case is weirdly categorized under Summons when it is mainly about special
jurisdiction and filing of a motion to dismiss. Anyway, sunod na lang ako sa syllabus
but I still placed the ratio on filing a motion to dismiss just in case.

DOCTRINE:
For Jurisdiction
1. As a general rule: Jurisdiction over the person must be immediately raised. For example, it
must be pleaded in a motion to dismiss or by way of an affirmative defense in an answer.
Voluntary appearance before the ccourt shall be deemed a waiver of this defense. The
assertion, however, of affirmative defenses shall not be constructed as an estoppel or as a
waiver of such defense.
2. By way of exception to the above doctrine: Where the court itself clearly has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the action, the invocation of this defense
may be done at any time. It is the law and note the courts nor the parties which confer
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action.

For Motion to Dismiss:
Any ground for dismissal in a motion to dismiss, except improper venue, may be pleaded as an
affirmative defense and a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had
been filed

EMERGENCY RECIT:
Yao filed a complaint against La Naval because it allegedly violated the terms of its arbitration
agreement. Yao accuses La Naval of delaying the appointment of their 3
rd
arbitrator. Soon after
Yao filed an amended complaints which was a summary case for the enforcement of the
arbitration agreement with damages. La Naval countered by arguing that Yao failed to notify first
their two arbitrators which was the reason which delayed the appointment of the third. He also
filed a motion to dismiss the summary case. The trial court denied La Navals petition. The CA
confirmed arguing that La Naval was estopped. The SC set aside the trila court order and CA
decision arguing that the court should not go beyond its jurisdiction over the nature of the case
which was summary in nature. La Naval was also not estopped because filing a motion to
dismiss the complaint is not barred if the court has indeed no jurisdiction over the nature of the
case

FACTS:
Wilson Yao filed is the owner of a commercial building which it leased to La Naval.
After the expiration of their initial contract, La Naval exercised his option to lease the
building again but it and Yao failed to agree on the rental rates.
The original lease contract contained a provision that they can settle disputes via
arbitration in accordance with RA 876.
o They both agreed, in writing, to resolve the matter through arbitration.
o Their contract provides that in case of failure to agree on rental rates, the
issue will be submitted to a group of Arbitrators composed of 3 members.
One to be appoint by the lessor. The second to be appointed by the lessee
and the third to be appointed by the appointees of the lessor and lessee.
Both parties were able to appoint their respective arbitrators. However, the
appointment of the third arbitrator was postponed because La Naval wanted it Board
of Directors to approved the approval of the third arbitrator. Yao suspected that this
was a delaying tactic of La Naval and a violation of their agreement and the
Arbitration Law
Yao sought court remedy by invoking Sec 6 of the Arbitration Law which provides that
an aggrieved party may petition the court for an order directing that such arbitration
proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement. Yao filed the petition and
prayed that the court summarily direct the already appointed arbitrators to appoint
and confirm the third arbitrator and resolve the issue on rental rates
La Naval denied all the allegations of Yao arguing he has no cause of action because
the petition was premature because Yao has not yet notified the two arbitrators to
appoint and confirm and that lack of notice by Yao is the reason for the delay
Yao filed an amended petition for the enforcement of the arbitration agreement with
damages. The trial court admitted the amended petition despite opposition from La
Naval
La Naval answered the amended petition arguing that it should be dismissed
because: Yao did not pay filing fees and it is in the nature of an ordinary civil action
therefore it is necessary to have a full blown and regular trial. La Naval also filed a
motion to set a preliminary hearing
The RTC of Angeles City order the for the parties to submit their position papers on
the issue as to whether or not respondent Yao's claim for damages may be litigated
upon in the summary proceeding for enforcement of arbitration agreement. It likewise
informed the parties that petitioner's Motion to Set Case for Preliminary Hearing" of
Special and Affirmative Defenses would be resolved together with the question of
damages.
La Naval argued that in Special Case No. 6024, the CA sits as a special court
exercising limited jurisdiction and is not competent to act on respondent Yao's claim
for damages, which poses an issue litigable in an ordinary civil action. But the CA was
not persuaded by La Naval's submission so it denied the motion for reconsideration
The Court of Appeals also denied the motion because La Naval was estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the court

ISSUE:
1. WON the court has jurisdiction? No
2. WON La Naval was estopped? - NO

HELD/RATIO:
On the jurisdiction of the court:
It is clear from the arbitration law the it explicitly confines the court's authority only to
pass upon the issue of whether there is or there is no agreement in writing providing
for arbitration.
o If the court finds there is an agreement, it will direct the parties to proceed
based on their agreement
o If the court finds there is NO agreement it will immediately dismiss the case
because the proceedings is summary in nature
The court cannot stray to matters outside the area of its declared authority or beyond
what has been expressly invested by law, particularly, such as in this instance, where
the proceedings are summary in nature.
On estoppels:
The Court sees it propitious to re-examine specifically the question of whether or not
the submission of other issues in a motion to dismiss, or of an affirmative defense (as
distinguished from an affirmative relief) in an answer, would necessarily foreclose,
and have the effect of a waiver of, the right of a defendant to set up the court's lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
o Not inevitably.
Section 1, Rule 16, of the Rules of Court, provides that a motion to dismiss may be
made on the following grounds:
o (a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or
over the subject of the action or suit;
o (b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit;
o (c) The venue is improperly laid;
o (d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;

24


o (e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause;
o (f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of
limitations;
o (g) That the complaint states no cause of action;
o (h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff's pleading has been
paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished;
o ( i ) That the claim on which the action or suit is founded is unenforceable
under the provisions of the statute of frauds;
o ( j ) That the suit is between members of the same family and no earnest
efforts towards a compromise have been made.
Any ground for dismissal in a motion to dismiss, except improper venue, may be
pleaded as an affirmative defense and a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if
a motion to dismiss had been filed. An answer itself contains the negative, as well as
affirmative, defenses upon which the defendant may rely.
A negative defense denies the material facts averred in the complaint essential to
establish the plaintiff's cause of action, while an affirmative defense in an allegation of
a new matter which, while admitting the material allegations of the complaint, would,
nevertheless, prevent or bar recovery by the plaintiff. Inclusive of these defenses are
those mentioned in Rule 16 of the Rules of Court which would permit the filing of a
motion to dismiss.
In the same manner that the plaintiff may assert two or more causes of action in a
court suit, a defendant is likewise expressly allowed, under Section 2, Rule 8, of the
Rules of Court, to put up his own defenses alternatively or even hypothetically.
Indeed, under Section 2, Rule 9, of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in an answer, except for the failure to state a
cause of action, are deemed waived. We take this to mean that a defendant may, in
fact, feel enjoined to set up, along with his objection to the court's jurisdiction over his
person, all other possible defenses. It thus appears that it is not the invocation of any
of such defenses, but the failure to so raise them, that can result in waiver or
estoppel. By defenses, of course, we refer to the groun ds provided for in Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court that must be asserted in a motion to dismiss or by way of
affirmative defenses in an answer
Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
action shall be dismissed. This defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal
or even after final judgment
Jurisdiction over the nature of the action, in concept, differs from jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Illustrated, lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action is the
situation that arises when a court, which ordinarily would have the authority and
competence to take a case, is rendered without it either because a special law has
limited the exercise of its normal jurisdiction on a particular matter or because the
type of action has been reposed by law in certain other courts or quasi-judicial
agencies for determination. Rules on lack of jurisdiction over subject matter applies
with lack of jurisdiction over nature of the case.
In summary, it is our considered view, as we now so hereby express,
that
o (1) Jurisdiction over the person must be seasonably raised, i.e., that it is
pleaded in a motion to dismiss or by way of an affirmative defense in an
answer. Voluntary appearance shall be deemed a waiver of this defense.
The assertion, however, of affirmative defenses shall not be constructed as
an estoppel or as a waiver of such defense.
o (2) Where the court itself clearly has no jurisdiction over the subject matter
or the nature of the action, the invocation of this defense may be done at
any time. It is neither for the courts nor the parties to violate or disregard
that rule, let alone to confer that jurisdiction, this matter being legislative in
character. Barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances, such
as hereinbefore exemplified, neither estoppel nor waiver shall apply.
All considered, the court a quo must then refrain from taking up the claims of the
contending parties for damages, which, upon the other hand, may be ventilated in
separate regular proceedings at an opportune time and venue. The circumstances
obtaining in this case are far, we hold, from justifying the application of estoppel
against either party.


25

BOTICANO V. CHU
G.R. No. L-58036 (March 16, 1987)

DOCTRINE:
1. Defect of summons is cured by the voluntary appearance of the defendant.
2. Distinction must be made as to the effects of the appeal:
If appeal is made without first asking the RTC to set aside the declaration of default,
the appellate court set aside and all he can get is a review of the RTCs default
judgment without the opportunity of having the higher court consider defense
evidence
If defendant first asks the RTC to set aside the declaration of default and he is able to
prevail, the declaration will be set aside and he will not have the opportunity to
present his evidence in the RTC. Even if he lost in the RTC, his defense can be
considered when appeal is made to the appellate tribunal

PARTIES:
Petitioners Eliseo Boticano (owner of the car who was hit by another truck)
Respondent Manuel Chu (owner of the car who bumped the car of petitioner)

EMERGENCY RECIT:
The driver of Manuel Chu hit and bumped the truck owned by Eliseo Boticano while it was
parked at the national highway. Manuel acknowledge his liability and made an agreement to
pay Eliseo for the damages. This agreement didnt materialized hence, eliseo sued manuel in
court. Service of summons were given to manuel and to the drive of manuel. The summon for
manuel was received by his wife while the summon given to the driver remain unserved. Manuel
was declared to be in default. TC ruled in favor of Eliseo. Manuel then filed a notice of appeal to
the judgment of the TC and he also submitted different kinds of motion and pleadings. He even
appeared in court. ISSUE: WON the court acquired jurisdiction over Manuel Chu. HELD: YES.
Defect in summons can be cured thru voluntary appearance in court. Through filing the different
motions and pleadings in court, the court already acquired jurisdiction over Manuel.

FACTS:
Eliseo Boticano is the registered of owner of a Bedford truck which he was using in
hauling logs for a certain fee
While the truck owned by Eliseo Boticano is parked at the National Highway in Nueva
Ecija, it was hit and bumped at the rear portion by another Bedford truck owned by
Manuel Chu Jr. driven by Jaime Sigua
Manuel Chua acknowledge his ownership over the truck and agreed with Eliseo to
shoulder the expenses of the repair of the damaged truck
Manuel Chua failed to comply with the aforesaid agreement as well as to pay
damages for lost income despite demands by eliseo
Summons were issued to:
o Jaime Sigue returned unserved since he was no longer connected with
the partnership of Manuel Chu (San Pedro Saw Mill)
o Manuel Chu returned duly served on him thru his wife Veronica Chu at
his dwelling house
Eliseo moved to dismiss the case against Jaime Sigua and declare Manuel in default
for failure to file the answer motion grated by the lower court
TC ruled in favor of Eliseo Boticano based on the evidence he adduced on during the
trial
Manuel Chua filed for a notice of appeal granted by the TC
Eliseo filed with the TC a motion to dimiss the appel denined by the TC
Case was brought to the CA judgment by TC is set aside since manuel chu was
not properly served with summons and a copy of the complaint

ISSUE:
1. WON the voluntary appearance by manuel chu is equivalent to service YES
2. If the defendant in the RTC has been declared in default, may he appeal the default
judgement that may subsequently rendered even if he has not asked the RTC to set aside the
declaration of default YES
3. WON the jurisdiction over mauel was acquired - YES

HELD/RATIO:
1. YES
Manuel chu voluntary appeared thru counsel in the trial court thru filing a notice of
appeal filed a Notice of Appeal, Appeal Bond, Motion for Extension of Time to File
Record on Appeal, Record on Appeal, Motion for Withdrawal of Appearance, Notice
of Appearance and Opposition to Plaintiff s Motion to Dismiss Appeal and for
Issuance of a Writ of Execution
Not only did he submit pleadings and motions, he likewise appeared in person thru
counsel in the hearing on May 14, 1979 and orally argued in open court on the
pending incident
Under Sec 23 of Rule 14, the defendants voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service. Hence, this principle has been consistently held by the SC that
the defect of summons is cured by the voluntary appearance of the defendant
2. YES
Distinction must be made as to the effects of the appeal:
o If appeal is made without first asking the RTC to set aside the declaration
of default, the appellate court set aside and all he can get is a review of the
RTCs default judgment without the opportunity of having the higher court
consider defense evidence
o If defendant first asks the RTC to set aside the declaration of default and he
is able to prevail, the declaration will be set aside and he will not have the
opportunity to present his evidence in the RTC. Even if he lost in the RTC,
his defense can be considered when appeal is made to the appellate
tribunal
3. YES.
Contention of Manuel that there is no service of summons because Manuels wife is
not part of the partnership (San Pedro Sawmill) as according to Sec 13 Rule 14
Settled rule that the action must be brought by the real party in interest. The title of
the case in the TC, CA and in the SC shows that the partnership is not the party
contrary to the contention of manuel. Moreover, he acknowledge the responsibility
and liability he has against Eliseo
Jurisdiction was properly acquired by the trial court over Manuel thru both service of
summons and voluntary appearance in court
RESOLUTION OF THE CA IS REVERSED AND SET ASIDE

26


CEZAR V. RICAFORT-BAUTISTA
GR No. 136415 (October 31, 2006)

DOCTRINE: (R14, Sec. 7 on substituted service of summons)
Courts acquire jurisdiction over the defendant either through 1) the service of
summons upon them or 2) their voluntary appearance in court
The service of summons is intended to give official notice to the defendant that an
action had been commenced against it
Without service of summons, or when summons are improperly made, both the trial
and the judgment, being in violation of due process, are null and void, unless the
defendant waives the service of summons by voluntarily appearing and answering the
suit
ROC: Whenever practicable, summons must be served personally. In case the
defendant refuses to receive and sign for it, summons should be tendered to him. In
the even that summons cannot be served within a reasonable time, substituted
service may be resorted to:
Sec. 7. Substituted service. - (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

EMERGENCY RECIT:
Cezar failed to pay SMC for construction materials he bought from SMC
SMC filed a suit for collection and summons was issued to Cezar
Sheriff served the summons through substituted service of summons to one alleged
employee of Cezar
Cezar failed to answer and was declared in default
SMC obtained favorable judgment, Judge Ricafort-Bautista ordered Cezar to pay
SMC
SMC asked for motion for execution and this was set for a hearing
Cezar filed an urgent ex-parte motion to re-set hearing and filed a petition with the SC
praying for the nullity of the RTCs decision, contending that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over his person for defective substituted service of summons
SC held that the substituted service of summons was indeed defective, because the
sheriffs return did not contain any statement on the impossibility of personal service
However, this defect was cured by Cezars voluntary appearance in court, in the form
of the urgent ex-parte motion to re-set hearing that he filed
SC held that the RTC validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of Cezar

FACTS:
Specified Materials Co. (SMC) filed a complaint for collection of sum of money
against Virgilio Cezar (Cezar) due to his failure to pay the construction materials he
bought under a credit line extended by SMC, allegedly standing at P1.86M
SMC sent 2 letters to Cezar and his brother, Perfecto, to remind them of their
obligation
In reply, Cezar sent 3 letters: manifesting his willingness to settle his account with
SMC, asking for an inventory of the actual items delivered and used, as well as a
suspension of any judicial action on SMCs part while theyre still settling his account
SMCs representatives met with Cezar to reconcile their conflicting records. Cezar
admitted that he failed to record some deliveries made amounting to around P648k
Cezar requested that they meet again after 2 days so he could verify his documents
but he failed to show up for the subsequent mettings
SMC sent a final demand letter to Cezar
SMC filed the aforementioned complaint and summons was issued to Cezar,
served by Sheriff Juan C. Marquez on January 9, 1997, evidenced by the Sheriffs
Return
o Served through Mr. Arsenio Robles, employee of Cezar who is
authorized to transact business
Cezar failed to file his answer to the complaint and SMC moved that he be declared
in default Cezar was declared in default and SMC was able to present its evidence
SMC filed a motion to admit amended complaint, because of its erroneous
computation in the obligation (P1.86M when it should be P2M)
A copy of the motion and the amended complaint were personally received by Cezar
Amended complaint was ordered admitted
Judge Ricafort-Bautista issued the assailed decision in favor of SMC, ordering Cezar
to pay P2M amounting to his obligation, penalty and attorneys fees
Cezar, by way of special appearance, fled a motion to set aside decision, arguing that
the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over his person denied
Cezar filed a petition for annulment of judgment, preliminary injunction with prayer for
TRO with the CA dismissed. MR denied
Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC of the resolutions of the
CA denied for failure to comply with procedural requirements (this resolution
became final and executory already)
SMC filed a motion for execution with the RTC hearing was set for this motion
Cezar then filed an urgent ex-parte motion to re-set hearing hearing did not
push through
Hearing was rescheduled a couple of times until finally Judge Ricafort-Bautista
granted the motion for execution

ISSUE:
1. WON the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of Cezar by virtue of the substituted
service of summons effected by the Sheriff

HELD/RATIO:
Petition is unmeritorious. RTC decision affirmed. (Talo si Cezar)
Cezars defense: Arsenio Robles (Robles), his employee who received the
summons, was not his really his employee; Robles was from Batangas and was
merely peddling mango seedlings within the vicinity of his office when the summons
was served
SC: Sheriff here employed DEFECTIVE substituted service of summons (defective
because the Sheriffs Return did not contain any statement on the impossibility of
personal service, which is required if the Sheriff resorts to substituted service)
Jurisdiction was still validly acquired by the RTC. The defect in the service was
CURED by his voluntary appearance
o Cezars urgent ex-parte motion to re-set hearing constitutes a voluntary
appearance = submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of
the defendant
Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiff once the complaint is filed
Courts acquire jurisdiction over the defendant either through 1) the service of
summons upon them or 2) their voluntary appearance in court
The service of summons is intended to give official notice to the defendant that an
action had been commenced against it.
Without service of summons, or when summons are improperly made, both the
trial and the judgment, being in violation of due process, are null and void,
unless the defendant waives the service of summons by voluntarily appearing
ROC: Whenever practicable, summons must be served by handing a copy thereof to
the defendant in person. In case the defendant refuses to receive and sign for it, by
tendering the summons to him or her. In the even that summons cannot be served

27

within a reasonable time, the Rules permit that substituted service may be resorted
to:
Sec. 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant
cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding
section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at
the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion
then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or
regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

UCPB V. ONGPIN
GR 146593 (October 26, 2001)

DOCTRINE:
If a defendant is a non-resident and his property in the Philippines had been attached,
service may, by leave of court, be effected outside the Philippines or by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation.
If the whereabouts of the defendant is unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent
inquiry, service may, by leave of court, likewise be effected by publication in a newspaper
of general circulation. In this case, the plaintiff must show that the address of defendant is
unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.

EMERGENCY RECIT:
PAI entered into a loan agreement with UCPB. Ongpin, then controlling stockholder of PAI,
signed as surety. PAI was unable to pay its obligation, which prompted UCPB file a complaint.
UCPB also sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment on the ground that in fraud of
creditors, Ongpin has left for Hong Kong and is now residing therein. RTC issued a writ and
garnishment. Ongpin, through his counsel moved to dismiss the complaint and to quash the writ
of attachment and garnishment, on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over his person,
the summons being without any effect. RTC denied his motion. UCPB filed a petition with the
RTC a motion to serve summons through publication, but this method failed. A similar motion
was filed and the RTC granted. The Sheriff and lawyer of UCPB, sought to serve summons on
the person of Ongpin, but the latter could not be found. They then resorted to serving the
summons on the executive secretary of the President of PILTEL. After summons was served,
the Sheriff implemented the writ of attachment and garnishment. Ongpin filed a motion to
dismiss and prohibition on the implementation of the writ. RTC denied. On appeal to the CA, it
reversed the decision of the RTC and held that no proper summons was made on Ongpin.

FACTS:
Philippine Apparel Inc. (PAI) entered into a credit arrangement with United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB), for a case-to-case credit line.
o Roberto Ongpin (Ongpin), then controlling stockholder of PAI, signed as surety.
As PAI failed to pay its obligations, UCPB, filed a complaint against Ongpin, to enforce his
obligation as surety of PAI.
UCPB sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, one of the grounds being,
Ongpin has changed residence (Hong Kong), in fraud of creditors.
RTC issued an order granting UCPBs prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary
attachment.
A writ of attachment and a notice of garnishment were issued by the RTC.
Ongpin, making a special appearance through counsel, moved to dismiss the complaint
and to quash the writ of attachment and garnishment on the ground that: the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the person of Ongpin, the summons prepared on Oct. 1995, having been
unserved as of Nov. 1995.
o RTC denied the urgent motion as well as Ongpins motion for reconsideration.
Ongpin filed a petition for certiorari in the CA assailing the orders of the RTC.
During the pendency of the petition, UCPB filed with the RTC a motion for leave to serve
summons through publication.
o RTC granted the motion.
o But the publication was held in abeyance on Oct. 1996.
o UCPB entered into an agreement with TODAY for the publication of the summons on
Oct. 4, 11, and 18, 1996.
o UCPB received the RTCs order at the close of office hours on Oct 3, 1996.
Attempts to prevent the publication were made but the by requesting the same proved
futile.
As a result, TODAY published the summons on Oct. 4, 1996.

28


It was only on Oct. 8, 1996, that UCPB was able to inform the newspaper to hold in
abeyance further publication of the summons.
Later, CA promulgated a decision stating that
o The issuance of the writ of attachment together with the notice of garnishment is
valiated;
UCPB filed with the RTC, another motion to serve summons through publication with leave
of court.
Deputy Sheriff Glenn Para (Para), together with Atty. Rodulfo Baculi, Jr. (Baculi),
representative of UCPB, went to the PILTEL office, to serve summons on Ongpin; then the
chariman of the board of PILTEL and was expected to attend a board meeting on that day.
o There they found out that Ongpin was not going to attend the board meeting.
o They proceeded to BA Lepanto Building where Ongpin holds office, but they were
later informed that Ongpin was not known at that place.
o They returned to PILTEL where they met Anne Morallo (Morollo). She told them that
she was authorized to receive the court processes for and on behalf of Ongpin even
though the latter was not holding office in building.
o Summons was then served on Morallo, who received it accordingly.
o However, when Morallo tried to forward the summons to Ongpin, the latters lawyer
(Atty. Narvasa), refused to receive it.
After serving summons, Sheriff Para then implemented the writ of attachment by serving
notices of garnishment on certain properties of Ongpin.
Ongpin filed with the RTC an Urgent Omnibus motion to dismiss, prohibition of the
implementation of the writ of attachment, quashal of the notice of garnishment, and for
release of the properties. RTC denied.
On appeal to the CA, it reversed and set aside the order of the RTC, on the ground that
PILTEL was not the regular place of business of Ongpin, and even if it was, Morallo could
not be considered a competent person in charge of Ongpins office, as she was the
executive secretary of the PILTEL President, not Ongpins.

ISSUE:
1. WON the substituted service of summons of Morallo was valid?

HELD/DOCTRINE:
1. No.
Rule 14, Sec. 7 (Rules of Civil Procedure) provides that: if, for justifiable causes, personal
service cannot be effected on defendant, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of
the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
o The word office or the phrase regular place of business refers to the office or place
of business of the defendant at the time of service. The rule specifically designates
the persons to whom copies of the process should be left.
o It does not necessarily follow that the regular place of business of a chairman of the
board of directors is the same as the address of the corporation as it is possible for
him to hold office elsewhere.
o In the case at bar, PILTEL, where substituted summons was served and of which
respondent was the chairman of the board, was not even a party to the present suit.
Respondent was sued in his personal capacity as surety for PAI.
o As the PILTEL office is not respondents regular place of business, it cannot therefore
be said that Anne V. Morallo, the person who received the service of summons in
behalf of respondent, was authorized to receive service of process on behalf of
respondent.
Under the Rules:
o If a defendant is a non-resident and his property in the Philippines had been
attached, service may, by leave of court, be effected outside the Philippines or by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
o If the whereabouts of the defendant is unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent
inquiry, service may, by leave of court, likewise be effected by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation. In this case, the plaintiff must show that the address
of defendant is unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.
o It is clear that UCPB is not without remedy under the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure to enforce the writ of attachment through a valid service of summons.
o If, indeed, Ongpin is no longer a resident of the Philippines, UCPB still can, by leave
of court, serve summons by publication, as it in fact tried to do. The records show that
UCPB attempted to serve summons by publication, but later abandoned its effort and
for some reason attempted personal service instead.
o If, on the other hand, Ongpin is a resident and UCPB cannot determine the correct
address of Ongpin, UCPB only needs to show that Ongpins address is unknown and
cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry. Upon compliance with this requirement, it
can validly serve summons by publication in a newspaper of general circulation


29

HSBC V. CATALAN
G.R. No. 159591. (October 18, 2004)

DOCTRINE
The Court has held that the filing of motions seeking AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF such as,
to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default
judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, are considered
VOLUNTARY SUBMISSION TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT.
A party who makes a SPECIAL APPEARANCE in court challenging the jurisdiction of
said court, cannot be considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.

EMERGENCY RECIT
Catalan filed before RTC for recovery of sum of money and damages against HSBC for the
banks failure to pay the value of 5 checks amounting to 3.2 HK dollars. Summons were issued
in the office of HSBC in Paseo De Roxas Makati. However, the court did not validly acquire
jurisdiction over the case since the bank HSBC Trust ies a foreign juridical entity. The bank was
also consistent in assailing the RTCs jurisdiction as it filed a special appearance. The special
appearance is not to be considered a voluntary submission to the court. Therefore, there was
no proper service of summons and RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.

FACTS
Respondent Catalan filed before the RTC a complaint for a sum of money with
damages against petitioner HSBANK due to HSBANKs alleged wanton refusal to pay
her the value of five HSBANK checks issued by Thomson amounting to
HK$3,200,000.00.
Thomson wrote a letter to a certain Ricky Sousa of HSBANK confirming the checks
he issued to Catalan and requesting that all his checks be cleared. However, even
with repeated demands, the bank was not able to give the money.
Thomson died and Catalan forwarded her demand to HSBC TRUSTEE. Catalan sent
photocopies of the returned checks to HSBC TRUSTEE. Not satisfied, HSBC
TRUSTEE through deceit and trickery, required Catalan, as a condition for the
acceptance of the checks, to submit the original copies of the returned checks,
purportedly, to hasten payment of her claim.
Summons for HSBC TRUSTEE was tendered to the In House Counsel of HSBANK
(Makati Branch) at the Enterprise Center, Tower 1, Ayala Avenue corner Paseo de
Roxas, Makati. Without submitting itself to the jurisdiction of the RTC, HSBC
TRUSTEE filed a Special Appearance for Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint, questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC over it. HSBC TRUSTEE alleges
that tender of summons through HSBANK Makati did not confer upon the RTC
jurisdiction over it because: (a) it is a corporation separate and distinct from HSBANK;
(b) it does not hold office at the HSBANK Makati or in any other place in the
Philippines; (c) it has not authorized HSBANK Makati to receive summons for it; and,
(d) it has no resident agent upon whom summons may be served because it does not
transact business in the Philippines.
Subsequently, HSBC TRUSTEE filed a Submission, dated November 15, 2001,
attaching the Affidavit executed in Hongkong by Phoenix Lam, Senior Vice-President
of HSBC TRUSTEE, attesting to the fact that: 1) HSBC TRUSTEE has not done nor
is it doing business in the Philippines; 2) it does not maintain any office in Makati or
anywhere in the Philippines; 3) it has not appointed any agent in Philippines; and 4)
HSBANK Makati has no authority to receive any summons or court processes for
HSBC TRUSTEE.

ISSUE :
1. WON RTC acquired jurisdiction over it for improper service of summons

HELD/RATIO:
1. YES.
The Rules of Court provides that a court generally acquires jurisdiction over a person
through either a valid service of summons in the manner required by law or the
persons voluntary appearance in court.
In holding that it acquired jurisdiction over HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE, the RTC
held that both voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by setting up in their
Motions to Dismiss other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand,
the CA ruled that HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE are estopped from challenging the
jurisdiction of the RTC because they filed their respective answers before the RTC.
We find that both lower courts overlooked Section 20 of Rule 14 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that the inclusion in a motion to
dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. Nonetheless, such
omission does not aid HSBANKs case.
The filing by HSBC TRUSTEE of a motion to dismiss cannot be considered a
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the RTC. It was a conditional appearance,
entered precisely to question the regularity of the service of summons. It is settled
that a party who makes a special appearance in court challenging the
jurisdiction of said court, e.g., invalidity of the service of summons, cannot be
considered to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
Admittedly, HSBC TRUSTEE is a foreign corporation, organized and existing under
the laws of the British Virgin Islands. For proper service of summons on foreign
corporations, Section 12 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. When the defendant is a
foreign private juridical entity which has transacted business in the Philippines,
service may be made on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that
purpose, or if there be no such agent, on the government official designated by law to
that effect, or on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.
Besides, there is no allegation in the amended complaint that HSBANK is the
domestic agent of HSBC TRUSTEE to warrant service of summons upon it. Thus, the
summons tendered to the In House Counsel of HSBANK (Makati Branch) for
HSBC TRUSTEE was clearly improper.
There being no proper service of summons, the RTC cannot take cognizance of
the case against HSBC TRUSTEE for lack of jurisdiction over it. Any proceeding
undertaken by the RTC is therefore null and void.Accordingly, the complaint against
HSBC TRUSTEE should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over it.

30


SANTOS V. PNOC EXPLORATION CORPORATION
GR No. 170943, (September 23, 2008)

DOCTRINE/S: Sec 14 Rule 14
SEC. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown. In
any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or
whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by
diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for
such times as the court may order. (emphasis supplied)
The in rem/in personam distinction was significant under the old rule because it was
silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was applicable. Because of this
silence, the Court limited the application of the old rule to in rem actions only.
The rules do not require that the affidavit of complementary service be executed by
the clerk of court. While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its
orders and processes, the duty to make the complementary service by registered
mail is imposed on the party who resorts to service by publication.

EMERGENCY RECIT:
PNOC Exploration filed a complaint for sum of money against Santos. Personal service of
summons failed because he could not be located in his last known address. On PNOC's motion,
TC allowed service by publication. PNOC published summons in Remate, a newspaper of gen
circulation and submitted the required affidavits. Santos failed to file his answer within period
thus PNOC moved that the case be set for reception of evidence ex parte. TC granted moton
and case was submitted for decision. Santos filed an Omnibus Motion for Recon and to admit
attached answer. TC denied motion. CA also ruled against him. Thus, this appeal. SC: 1.
Service by publication is proper. Pursuant to Section 14, Rule 14, since petitioner cannot be
personally served despite diligent efforts to locate him, Santos was granted LOC to effect
service by publication in a NP of gen. circulation. 2. Rule on service by publication applies to
both actions in the present rule as compared to the old rule which as silent as to the kind of
action. 3. The rules do not require that the affidavit of complementary service be executed by
the clerk of court.

FACTS:
Respondent PNOC Exploration Corporation filed a complaint for a sum of money
against petitioner Santos in RTC Pasig to collect the amount of 698, 502. 10 which is
Santos' unpaid balance of a car loan advanced to him by PNOC, when he was still a
member of its board of directors.
Personal service of summons to petitioner failed because he could not be located in
his last known address despite efforts to do so.
Subsequently, on PNOC's motion, the TC allowed service of summons by publication.
PNOC published the summons in Remate, a newspaper of gen circulation in the
Phils. After such publication, PNOC submitted the 1.) affidavit of publication of the
advertising manager of Remate and 2.) an affidavit of service of PNOC's employee
that he sent a copy of the summons by registered mail to the petitioner's last known
address.
Santos failed to file his answer within the prescribed period this respondent moved
that the case be set for reception of its evidence ex parte.
TC granted motion
Case was then submitted for decision.
Santos filed an Omnibus Motion for Recon and to Admit Attached answer. He sought
reconsideration alleging that the affidavit of service submitted by respondent failed to
comply with Sec 19, Rule 14 of the ROC as it was not executed by the clerk of court.
TC denied the motion of Santos.
Petitioner Santos appealed in CA via certiorari. CA ruled against him.
Thus this appeal. Petitioner Santos contends that:
o there is lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of
summons,
o failure of the trial court to furnish him with copies of its orders and
processes including the September 11, 2003 order and preference for
technicality rather than justice and equity.
o In particular, he claims that the rule on service by publication under
Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court applies only to actions in
rem, not actions in personam like a complaint for a sum of money.
o He also contends that the affidavit of service of a copy of the summons
should have been prepared by the clerk of court, not respondents
messenger.
ISSUE:
1. WON the service by publication is proper?
2. WON rule on service by publication under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court applies
only to actions in rem, not actions in personam like a complaint for a sum of money.
3. WON affidavit of service of a copy of the summons should have been prepared by the clerk
of court, not respondents messenger?

HELD/RATIO:
1.) WON the service of publication is proper? Yes.
Basing from Section 14, Rule 14 (on Summons), since petitioner could not be
personally served with summons despite diligent efforts to locate his whereabouts,
respondent sought and was granted leave of court to effect service of summons upon
him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Thus, petitioner was properly served with summons by publication.
2.) WON rule on service by publication under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
applies only to actions in rem, not actions in personam like a complaint for a sum of
money? No. Petitioner is wrong.
The in rem/in personam distinction was significant under the old rule because it was
silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was applicable. Because of this
silence, the Court limited the application of the old rule to in rem actions only.
This has been changed. The present rule expressly states that it applies [i]n any
action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or
whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent
inquiry. Thus, it now applies to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in
rem.
3.) WON affidavit of service of a copy of the summons should have been prepared by the
clerk of court, not respondents messenger?
the relevant portion of Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court simply speaks of the
following:
o an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for
publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by
registered mail to his last known address.
Service of summons by publication is proved by the affidavit of the printer, his
foreman or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager of the
newspaper which published the summons.
The rules do not require that the affidavit of complementary service be executed by
the clerk of court. While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its
orders and processes, the duty to make the complementary service by registered mail
is imposed on the party who resorts to service by publication.
Moreover, even assuming that the service of summons was defective, the trial court
acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner by his own voluntary
appearance in the action against him.
Petitioner voluntarily appeared in the action when he filed the Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer. This was equivalent to service of
summons and vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the person of petitioner.

31

PCIB V. SPOUSES WILSON DY HONG PI ET AL.
G.R. No. 171137 (June 5, 2009)

DOCTRINE:
As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court [no more summons needed here], the only
exception being special appearance
but it must comply with the following:
o objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant
must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and
o failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking
affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution

EMERGENCY RECIT:
PCIB (creditor) sued the Amadeo spouses for having fraudulently sold their properties to
spouses Dy and spouses Chuyaco instead of using the properties to pay their debt to PCIB.
Now, PCIB wanted to annul the deeds of absolute sale executed by the parties. The summons,
however, were only served upon the Amadeos. PCIB initially wanted to have summons for Dys
and Chuyacos published but was denied by the court as it was an action in personam. A year
after, however, it filed an amended complaint praying to a writ of attachment for the properties in
question. The court granted the writ but was not implemented for a long time, prompting the Dys
and Chuyacos to file successively (1) Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of Jurisdiction- as no
summons have been served on them yet, (2) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute-
nothing was happening with the case for a long time, and (3) Motion For Inhibition Without
Submitting Themselves To The Jurisdiction Of This Honorable Court. Issue was WON there has
been voluntary appearance by the Dys and Chuyacos as to confer the trial court with jurisdiction
over their persons. The SC held that the designation or caption of their motion is not controlling
and that their second motion was tantamount to voluntary appearance as it amounted to an
affirmative relief. Jurisdiction over them was duly acquired, albeit late.

FACTS:
Spouses Damian and Tessie Amadeo failed to pay the promissory notes they
executed in favor PCIB, as sureties for Streamline Cotton Development Corp
Respondent PCIB, having found out that about a month before, the spouses have
disposed of their properties (3 parcels of land) to Spouses Dy and Spouses Chuyaco
for grossly inadequate consideration, filed for the annulment of the deeds of absolute
sale and damages, as the transfers were allegedly done in fraud of creditors
Upon service of summons, the Amadeo spouses filed a motion to dismiss but it was
denied, hence they filed an answer alleging that PCIB failed to release the loans to
SCDC, constraining them to incur loans from third parties at high interest rates to
keep the company afloat, later prompting them to sell the properties in question so
they would be able to cover the postdated checks they issued to their creditors, lest
the spouses face criminal prosecution for bouncing checks [blaming PCIB]
PCIB later filed an ex parte motion for leave to serve summons by publication on
spouses Dy and Chuyaco- denied, action in personam, publication not allowed
the following year, PCIB filed an amended complaint praying for a writ of attachment
then presented evidence in relation thereto- granted, but not yet implemented (this
technically transformed the case into an in rem proceeding?)
another 2 years passed and the writ has not yet been implemented so court asked
PCIB whether it still wanted to pursue the case; for failing to heed to the order, the
case was dismissed but later revived upon MR by PCIB alleging the difficulty of
locating properties against which the writ could be enforced
Amadeos, Dys and Chuyacos filed an Omnibus Motion to dismiss and to Annul all the
proceedings taken against them due to lack of jurisdiction
But the court treated this motion as a mere scrap of paper for failing to provide for a
notice of hearing to the plaintiff
Nevertheless, the court noted that it has acquired jurisdiction over the Amadeos
through the summons issued before and it likewise issued alias summonses to the
Dys and Chuyacos or PCIB could now avail of publication if they wish (kasi in rem na
sya?)
Dys and Chuyacos subsequently filed a Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of Jurisdiction,
alleging that PCIB failed to cause issuance of summons and that it already lost
interest in the case- denied
PCIB filed motion for the service of summons by publication- no action yet
Dys and Chuyacos filed Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute as nothing was
really happening with the case: court has not decided on the publication request,
PCIB has not "lifted a finger" to pursue the case
Dys and Chuyacos later filed personally, and not through their counsel (who later
adopted the motion), filed a Motion For Inhibition Without Submitting Themselves To
The Jurisdiction Of This Honorable Court, as the case was taking ages to finish-
denied, 15 days to answer
RTC ruled that the fact that the heading said "without submitting themselves to the
jurisdiction xxx" can not qualify the clear import of Rule 14 section 20 which states:
o Voluntary appearance. The defendant's voluntary appearance in the
action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion
to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
Dys and Chuyacos filed certiorari 65 with CA- reversed, no voluntary appearance!
PCIB appeals to SC

ISSUE:
1. WON there has been voluntary appearance on the part of respondent Spouses Dy
and Chuyaco as to confer the trial court with jurisdiction over their persons

HELD/RATIO:
Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the
coercive power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary
appearance in court.
As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, the only exception being special appearance
but it must comply with the following:
o objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant
must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and
o failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking
affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution
in this case:
o respondents have acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the trial court when they
filed their Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute
o their motion to inhibit did not categorically and expressly raise the
jurisdiction of the court over their persons as an issue and it failed to qualify
the capacity in which respondents were appearing and seeking recourse
o it merely (i) reminded the court of its purportedly conflicting Orders in
respect of summons by publication, (ii) alleged that because petitioner has
not lifted a finger to pursue this case against movants-defendants, the
case may be dismissed for failure to prosecute, and (iii) prayed additionally
for the deletion of the Notice of Lis Pendens indicated at the back of the
transfer certificates of title covering the subject properties
o their motion seeks a sole relief: inhibition of Judge Napoleon Inoturan from
further hearing the case. Evidently, by seeking affirmative relief other than

32


dismissal of the case, this is tantamount to participation in the trial, hence,
voluntary appearance
o allegations in a pleading or motion are determinative of its nature; the
designation or caption thereof is not controlling. Also, no amount of caveat
can change the fact that respondents tellingly signed the motion to inhibit in
their own behalf and not through counsel, let alone through a counsel
making a special appearance.


33

NM ROTHSCHILD & SONS V. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY

OPTIMA REALTY CORPORATION V. HERTZ PHIL. EXCLUSIVE CARS INC.
G.R. No. 183035 (January 9 2013)

DOCTRINE: Rule 14 Section 20: Voluntary Appearance
Jurisdiction over the person may be acquired either by service of summons OR BY
THE DEFENDANTS VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE IN COURT AND SUBMISSION
TO ITS AUTHORITY (as in this case.)
One who seeks AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court, equivalent to voluntary submission to the courts jurisdiction.
Example: Filling motion to admit answer (as in this case), motion for additional time to
file an answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment and lifting of an order of
default.
o EXCEPTION: CONDITIONAL APPEARNACE TO CHALLENGE, among
others, the Courts jurisdiction over his person.

EMERGENCY RECIT
Optima Realty Corporation (Optima) entered into a contract of Lease with Hertz Phil.
Exclusive Cars, Inc. (Hertz) concerning an office unit and parking slot in Optima
Building. Hertz failed to pay rent and utilities as well as failed to give a notice of
negotiation and extension of their contract within the stipulated 90 days before the
contract expires. Optima then informed Hertz of the expiration of their contract and
requested Hertz to vacate and pay dues. Hertz failed to do so. Optima filed a case
with the MeTC a complaint for Unlawful detainer and damages.
Summons were served to the Quality control supervisor only. 14 days after the
service of Summons, Hertz filed a MOTION FOR LEAVE OF COURT to FILE
ANSWER with counterclaim and to ADMIT ANSWER WITH COUNTERCLAIM. The
MeTC ruled in-favor of Optima, the RTC Affirms.
CA reverses the decision and remands it back to the RTC because the summons
were served improperly, noting section 11 of Rule 14. Therefore the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person.
SC reverses CA, says that the MeTC already attained jurisdiction over Hertz by his
voluntary appearance, done by his filing of a motion to admit his answer.

FACTS:
Optima Realty Corporation (Optima) is in the businesses of leasing/renting out
commercial spaces and buildings. Optima entered into a contract of Lease with Hertz
Phil. Exclusive Cars, Inc. (Hertz) over a 131 sq. meter office unit and parking slot in
Optima Building for a period of 3 years, which would be later be shortened by
amendment to 2 years and 5 months.
Renovation commenced in the building, Hertz alleges a drop by 50% in the sales and
productivity so it requested a 50% discount on its rent for certain months. The
discount was granted but Hertz still failed to pay rent and even its utility bills.
Hertz also failed to give notice to Optima of its wish to negotiate and extend the lease
contract within 90 days from the expiration of the contract, as stipulated in their lease
contract. Optima no longer entertained Hertz notice because it was late. Hertz filed a
complaint for specific performance, injuction and damages and/or sum of money with
a prayer for a TROand Writ of Preliminary Injuction.
Optima on the other hand demanded payment. Also, demanded Hertz to vacate the
premises. Because Hertz failed to do so, Optima filed with the MeTC a COMPLAINT
FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER and DAMAGES
o Summons were served to Henry Bobiles, Quality control Supervisor of
Hertz, who complied with the instructions of Manager Tirador.
o 14 days after the service of Summons, Hertz filed a MOTION FOR LEAVE
OF COURT to FILE ANSWER with counterclaim and to ADMIT ANSWER
WITH COUNTERCLAIM.
MeTC ruled in-favor of Optima, that he had the right to evict and to be paid the unpaid
balance of 420,967 pesos.
RTC Affirmed
CA REVERSED AND REMANDED TO MeTC
o Due to improper service of summons the jurisdiction over the person was
not acquired. Noted section 11 of Rule 14.

ISSUE:
1. RELATED - WON the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the person of Hertz.
2. Not related WON unlawful detainer case barred by litis pendentia
3. Not related WON ejectment of Hertz and award of damages, atty, fees, and costs
are proper.

HELD/RATIO:
1. Yes, MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the person of Hertz.
a. jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the
coercive power of legal processes exerted over his person (summons), or
by his voluntary appearance in court. In this case, the MeTC acquired
jurisdiction over the person of respondent Hertz by reason of the latters
voluntary appearance in court
b. In this case, the records show that the following statement appeared in
Hertz Motion for Leave to File Answer: In spite of the defective service of
summons, the defendant opted to file the instant Answer with Counterclaim
with Leave of Court, upon inquiring from the office of the clerk of court of
this Honorable Court and due to its notice of hearing.
c. Furthermore, the Answer with Counterclaim filed by Hertz never raised the
defense of improper service of summons. The defenses that it pleaded
were limited to litis pendentia, pari delicto, performance of its obligations
and lack of cause of action.
2. No, not barred by litis pendentia.(not relevant)
a. There may be identity of parties but the rights asserted and reliefs prayed
for are different. The Complaint for Specific Performance] seeks to compel
plaintiff-appellee Optima to: (1) renegotiate the contract of lease; (2)
reconnect the utilities at the leased premises; and (3) pay damages. On the
other hand, the unlawful detainer case sought the ejectment of defendant-
appellant Hertz from the leased premises and to collect arrears in rentals
and utility bills.
3. Yes, the eviction of respondent and the award of damages, attorneys fees and costs
were proper.

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[CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 14: SUMMONS JUDGE DELA ROSA ALSC2016]

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