New Regent Sources vs.

Tanjuatco
Facts:
The petitioner filed a complaint on rescission/declaration of nullity
of contract, reconveyance and damages against the respondent.
Petitioner allegedly authorized Vicente Cuevas being its Chairman
and President to apply on its behalf to acquire two parcels of land by
right of accretion. Cuevas applied the lot in his name and while
pending approval of the application with the Bureau of Lands he
assigned his rights to the respondent. An order from the Director of
Lands was issued transferring rights from Cuevas to Tanjuatco.
During the preliminary hearing, respondent filed a motion for
demurrer of evidence after the petitioner presented their evidence.
The RTC dismissed the case for insufficiencies of evidence and ruled
that respondent is an innocent purchaser hence
this petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in dismissing the case upon
demurrer of evidence?
Whether or not the respondent is an innocent purchaser of the
property in dispute?

Ruling:
As to the first issue the court held that it is a question of fact which
is improper for a petition for review since the Supreme Court can
only review a question of law. A question of fact exists if the doubt
centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. There is a
question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of
the probative value of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of
facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application
of law and jurisprudence on the matter.

The court held that to warrant a reconveyance of land where the
mode of acquiring a property is by accretion, the following requisites
should be met: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual
and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action
of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where accretion
takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers. It is not enough to be a
riparian owner in order to enjoy the benefits of accretion. One who
claims the right of accretion must show by preponderant
evidence that he has met all the conditions provided by law.
Petitioner has notably failed in this regard as it did not offer any
evidence to prove that it has satisfied the foregoing
requisites. Respondent derived his title to the lands from Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 245 registered in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines. A certification was issued confirming
that said lands were verified to be Alienable and Disposable
property of the State entitling it to transfer ownership to
the respondent. Moreover, petitioners failed to establish fraudulent
registration of ownership of the title to respondent since they did
not provide evidence that Cuevas is empowered by the
petitioner to apply a registration of the property in their behalf.
The respondent may safely rely on what appears on the face of the
registered title hence he is a buyer in good faith. Petitioner was not
able to substantiate its claim for ownership of the property
therefore their claim for reconveyance should be denied.

Capitol Subdivisions vs. Province of Negros Oriental

FACTS: Lot 378, which is the subject matter of this case, is part of
Hacienda Madalagan, registered under the name of Agustin
Amenabar and Pilar Amenabar, covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 1776 issued in the name of the aforementioned in 1916.

Sometime in 1920, the Amenabars sold the aforementioned
Hacienda to Jose Benares for the purchase price of P300,000,
payable in instalments. In 1924, the Original Certificate of Title
issued in the name of the Amenabars was cancelled, and in lieu
thereof, Benares obtained a Transfer Certificate of Title under his
name.

Meanwhile, in 1921, Benares mortgaged the Hacienda including Lot
378 to Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. And then later in 1926, he again
mortgaged the Hacienda, including said Lot 378, on the Philippine
National Bank, subject to the first mortgage held by the Bacolod-
Murcia Milling Co.

These transactions were duly recorded in the office of the Register
of Deeds of Negros Occidental.

The mortgage in favor of the Bank was subsequently foreclosed and
the Bank acquired the Hacienda, including Lot 378, as purchaser at
the foreclosure sale.

Accordingly, the TCT in the name of Benares was cancelled and
another TCT was issued in the name of the Bank.

In 1935, the Bank agreed to sell the Hacienda to the son of Jose
Benares, Carlos Benares, for the sum of P400,000, payable in annual
installments, subject to the condition that the title will remain with
the Bank until full payment.

Thereafter, Carlos Benares transferred his rights, under his contract
with the Bank, to plaintiff herein, which completed the payment of
the installments due to the Bank in 1949.

Hence, the Bank executed the corresponding deed of absolute sale
to the plaintiff and a transfer certificate of title covering Lot 378 was
issued.

It should be noted that, despite the acquisition of the Hacienda in
1934 by the Bank, the latter did not take possession of the property
for Jose Benares claimed to be entitled to retain it under an alleged
right of lease.

For this reason, the deed of promise to sell, executed by the Bank in
favour of Carlos P. Benares, contained a caveat emptor stipulation.

When, upon the execution of the deed of absolute sale 1949,
plaintiff took steps to take possession the Hacienda and it was
discovered that Lot 378 was the land occupied by the Provincial
Hospital of Negros Occidental. Immediately thereafter, plaintiff
made representations with or on October 4, 1949, plaintiff made
representations with the proper officials to clarify the status of said
occupation. Not being satisfied with the explanations given by said
officials, it brought the present action on June 10, 1950.

In its answer, defendant maintained that it had acquired the lot in
question in the year 1924-1925 through expropriation proceedings
and that it took possession of the lost and began the construction of
the provincial hospital thereon. They further claimed that for some
reason beyond their comprehension, title was never transferred in
its name and it was placed in its name only for assessment
purposes.

And that defendant acted in bad faith in purchasing the lot knowing
that the provincial hospital was situated there and that he did not
declare such property for assessment purposes only until 1950.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant herein had acquired the lot in
question in the aforementioned expropriation proceedings.

HELD: The Court held that defendant was not able to sufficiently
prove that they have acquired the legal title over Lot 378. Several
circumstances indicate that the expropriation had not been
consummated.

First, there, the entries in the docket pertaining to the expropriation
case refer only to its filing and the publication in the newspaper of
the notices. Second, there was an absence of a deed of assignment
and of a TCT in favour of the Province as regards Lot 378. Third, the
property was mortgaged to Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. Lot 378
could not have been expropriated without the intervention of the
Milling Co. And yet, the latter was not made a party in the
expropriation proceedings. And fourth, a second mortgage was
constituted in favour of the Back, which would not have accepted
the mortgage had Lot 378 not belonged to the mortgagor. Neither
could said lot have been expropriated without the Banks knowledge
and participation.

Furthermore, in the deed executed by the Bank promising to sell the
Hacienda Mandalagan to Carlos Benares, it was explicitly stated that
some particular lots had been expropriated by the Provincial
Government of Negros Occidental, thus indicating, by necessary
implication, that Lot 378 had not been expropriated.

BARANDA v. GUSTILO
FACTS: A parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral
Survey of Sta.Barbara, Iloilo covered by original certificate of title no.
6406 is the land subject of the dispute between petitioner (Eduardo
S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia) and respondents(Gregorio Perez,
Maria Gotera and Susan Silao). Both parties claimed ownership
andpossession over the said land. However during the trial, it was
found that the transfer certificate of title held by respondents was
fraudulently acquired. So the transfer certificate of title was ordered
to be put in the name of petitioners. In compliance with the order or
the RTC, the Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso annotated the
order declaring TCT T-25772 null and void, cancelled the same and
issued new certificate of titles in the name of petitioners. However,
by reason of a separate case pending inthe Court of Appeals, a
notice of lis pendens was annotated in the new certificate of title.
This prompted the petitioners to move for the cancellation of the
notice of lispendens in the new certificates. Judge Tito Gustilo then
ordered the Acting Register of Deeds for the cancellation of the
notice of lis pendens but the Acting Register of Deeds filed a motion
for reconsideration invoking Sec 77 of PD 1529.
ISSUE:
What is the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate
or annul anotice of lis pendens in a Torrens certificate of title?
HELD:
Judge Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting Register
of Deeds stand that the notice of lis pendens cannot be cancelled
on the ground of pendency of the case in the Court of Appeals. The
function of the Register of Deeds with reference to the registration
of deeds, encumbrances, instrument and the like is ministerial in
nature. The acting register of deeds did not have any legal standing
to file a motion for reconsideration of the Judges Order directing
him to cancel the notice of lis pendens. Sec. 10 of PD 1529 states
that: It shall be the duty of the register of deeds to immediately
register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or
personal property which complies with all the requisites for registrat
ion. If the instrument is not registerable, he shall forthwith deny
registration thereof and inform the present or such denial in writing,
stating the ground and reasons therefore, and advising him of his
right to appeal by consult a in accordance with Sec 117 of this
decree. On the other hand, Sec 117 of PD 117 states that: When
the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to
be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed,
mortgage or other instrument presented to him for registration or
where any party in interest does not agree with the action taken by
the Register of Deeds with reference to any such instrument,
the question shall be submitted to the Commission of Land
Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest thru
the Register of Deeds.

Almirol v. Register of Deeds of Agusan
FACTS: On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio
Abalo a parcel of land situated in the municipality of Esperanza,
province of Agusan, and covered by original certificate of title P-
1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo."
Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol went to the office of the Register of
Deeds of Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed of sale and to
secure in his name a transfer certificate of title. Registration was
refused by the Register of Deeds upon the following grounds:
1. That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered in
the name of Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo,
and by legal presumption, is considered conjugal
property;
2. That in the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the
effectivity of the New Civil Code it is necessary that both
spouses sign the document; but
3. Since, as in this case, the wife has already died when the
sale was made, the surviving husband cannot dispose of
the whole property without violating the existing law.

In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance
of Agusan on a petition for mandamus to compel the Register of
Deeds to register the deed of sale and to issue to him the
corresponding transfer certificate of title. In its resolution of October
16, 1963 the lower court, declaring that the Mandamus does not
lie because the adequate remedy is that provided by Section 4 of
Rep. Act 1151 dismissed the petition, with costs against the
petitioner. Hence, this present appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Register of Deeds was justified in refusing
to register the transaction appealed to by the petitioner.
HELD: No. Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent show
a sincere desire on his part to maintain inviolate the law on
succession and transmission of rights over real properties, these do
not constitute legal grounds for his refusal to register the deed.
Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the register of deeds t
o determine; this function belongs properly to a court of competent
jurisdiction.
A register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic
Act 1151 from exercising his personal judgment and discretion when
confronted with the problem of whether to register a deed or
instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For under the said
section, when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken with
respect to any deed or other instrument presented to him
for registration all that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify
the question to the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall,
after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step to be
taken on the doubtful question.

Gallarado v. Intermediate Appellate Court
FACTS: Petitioners were nephew and niece of the late Pedro
Villanueva and first cousin of the private respondent Marta
Villanueva vda. de Agana, the latter being the daughter of Pedro
Villanueva. The subject matter of this controversy involves a parcel
of land situated in Cavinti, Laguna consisting of 81,300 square
meters, more or less, initially covered by an original Certificate of
Title No. 2262, issued on April 2, 1924 owned and registered in the
name of the late Pedro Villanueva. On August 10, 1937, petitioner
claimed that the aforestated land was sold to them in a private
document, an unnotarized deed of sale written in Tagalog that was
allegedly signed by the late Pedro Villanueva conveying and
transferring the property in question in favor of the petitioners.
Subsequently, the Original Certificate of Title was cancelled and a
new certificate of title was issued in the name of the petitioners
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT- 6293 (No. 23350) on
January 4, 1944. On November 17, 1976, defendant Marta
Villanueva together with Pedro Villanueva, Jr., and Restituto
R.Villanueva executed and filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim with
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna. When petitioners
learned of this Affidavit of Adverse Claim, attempt was made to
settle said controversy amicably, but they failed. So, petitioners
instituted court suit against the private respondent and her
husband, Dr. Marcelo S. Agana, Sr. by filing a complaint for Quieting
of Title and Damages with the Court of First Instance of Laguna on
February 3, 1977.
The Court of First Instance of Laguna rendered its decision declaring
the deed of sale of August 10, 1937, as well as
the reconstituted transfer certificate of title of petitioners, void ab in
itio.
Thus, petitioners filed notice of appeal to the Intermediate Appellate
Court. However, the Intermediate Appellate Court, on May 22, 1984,
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid reconstitution of Transfer
Certificate of TitleNo. RT-6293 (No. 23350) issued in the names of
petitioners.
HELD:No. Section 127 of Act 496 which requires, among other things
, that the conveyance be executed "before the judge of a court of
record or clerk of a court of record or a notary public or a justice of
the peace, who shall certify such acknowledgment substantially in
form next hereinafter stated was violated.
The action of the Register of Deeds of Laguna in allowing the
registration of the private deed of sale was unauthorized and did
not lend a bit of validity to the defective private document of sale.
With reference to the special law, Section 127 of the Land
Registration Act, Act 496 Deeds of Conveyance, affecting lands,
whether registered under this act or unregistered shall be sufficient
in law when made substantially in accordance with the following
forms, and shall be as effective to convey, encumber or bind the
lands as though made in accordance with more prolix forms
heretofore in use.
It is therefore evident that Exhibit "E" in the case at bar is definitely
not registerable under the Land Registration Act. Also, the
contention that ownership over registered property may be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession is absolutely without
merit. No title to registered land in derogation of that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered
owner but also against his hereditary successors.