FISA NSA Surveillance 193 Countries

SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR,
,
,
,
NZL
Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
Dated: 20070108
Declassify On: 20340801
SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR NZL
T//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR NZL
Dated: 20070108
SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR NZL

Non-targetable 2
nd
Party Countries, Territories & Individuals
(U//FOUO) USSID 18 prohibits the targeting of the United States and its
territories and NSA SIGINT Directorate policy prohibits the targeting of
Second Party countries and territories.
(U//FOUO) USSID 18 prohibits the targeting of the United States and its
territories and NSA SIGINT Directorate policy prohibits the targeting of
Second Party countries and territories.
US & territories: US & territories:
"US" United States "US" United States
"AS" American Samoa "AS" American Samoa
"GU" Guam "GU" Guam
"PR" Puerto Rico "PR" Puerto Rico
"VI" Virgin Islands (US) "VI" Virgin Islands (US)
also: Baker Island, Howland Island, Jarvis Island, Johnston Atoll, Kingman Reef, Midway Islands,
Navassa Island, Northern Mariana Islands, Palmyra Atoll, Wake Island
also: Baker Island, Howland Island, Jarvis Island, Johnston Atoll, Kingman Reef, Midway Islands,
Navassa Island, Northern Mariana Islands, Palmyra Atoll, Wake Island
AU and territories: AU and territories:
"AU" Australia "AU" Australia
"CC" Cocos (Keeling) Islands "CC" Cocos (Keeling) Islands
"CX" Christmas Island "CX" Christmas Island
"HM" Heard & McDonald Islands "HM" Heard & McDonald Islands
"NF" Norfolk Island "NF" Norfolk Island
also: Ashmore and Cartier Islands, and Coral Sea Islands also: Ashmore and Cartier Islands, and Coral Sea Islands
CA (no territories) CA (no territories)
"CA" Canada "CA" Canada
UK and territories: UK and territories:
"UK" United Kingdom "UK" United Kingdom
"AI" Anguilla Island "AI" Anguilla Island
"BM" Bermuda "BM" Bermuda
"FK" Falkland Islands "FK" Falkland Islands
"GS" South Georgia & Sandwich Islands "GS" South Georgia & Sandwich Islands
"IO" British Indian Ocean Territories "IO" British Indian Ocean Territories
"KY" Cayman Islands "KY" Cayman Islands
"PN" Pitcairn Island "PN" Pitcairn Island
"MS" Montserrat "MS" Montserrat
"SH" Saint Helena Island "SH" Saint Helena Island
"TC" Turk & Caicos Island "TC" Turk & Caicos Island
"VG" Virgin Islands (British) "VG" Virgin Islands (British)
"GI" Gibraltar "GI" Gibraltar
also: Guernsey, Jersey, Isle of Man, and Montserrat, Channel Is. also: Guernsey, Jersey, Isle of Man, and Montserrat, Channel Is.
NZ and territories: NZ and territories:
"NZ" New Zealand "NZ" New Zealand
"CK" Cook Islands (individual persons) "CK" Cook Islands (individual persons)
SECR NZL

SECR NZL
ET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR,
Dated: 20070108
ET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR,
"NU" Niue (individual persons)
"TK" Tokelau

(U//FOUO) In addition to these physical territories there are also the
following Internet Country Top Level Domains (ccTLD) for protected
entities:
"AC" Ascension Island (UK, administered by the Saint Helena Island)
"GB" Great Britain
"UM" U.S. minor outlying islands
"NP" Northern Mariana Island (US)
"GG" Guernsey (UK)
"JE" Jersey (UK)
"IM" Isle of Man (UK)

Targeting Authorization Requirements
Country National in ...* National overseas Foreign national in ... Foreign national overseas
Australia
(DSD)
Warrant and
Ministerial
Authorization
Ministerial
authorization
International comms OK;
warrant if domestic
Lawful without specific
authorization
Canada
(CSEC)
Cannot target
Canadians
Cannot target
Canadians
Considered to be
Canadian - CSEC cannot
target
authorization, but ministerial
authorization needed if CSEC
intercepts private
communications of
Canadians in relation to the
activity or class of activities
specified in the authorization
New
Zealand
(GCSB)
Cannot target
unless Agent of a
Foreign Power; if
so, international
comms OK;
warrant required if
domestic
Cannot do it unless
Agent of a Foreign
Power
International comms ok;
Warrant if domestic
authorization
UK (GCHQ) Warrant STA Warrant Lawful without specific
authorization
USA (NSA) FISA warrant and
probable agent of
a foreign power
FISA warrant and
agent of a foreign
power
Generally a FISA warrant,
however rules depend on
situation - very complex
authorization
(TS//SI//REL)
(TS//SI//REL)
SECRET
UNITED STATES
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
WASHINGTON, D.C.
)
IN RE DNI/AG CERTIFICATION 2010-A. )
)
ORDER
Docket Number 702(i)- 10-02
For the reasons stated in the Memorandum Opinion issued contemporaneously herewith,
and in reliance on the entire record in this matter, the Court finds, in the language of 50 U.S.C.
1881 a(i)(3)(A), that the certification submitted in the above-captioned docket, as amended,
"contains all the required elements and that the [amended] targeting and minimization procedures
adopted in accordance with [50 U.S.C. 188 la(d)-(e)] are consistent with the requirements of
those subsections and with the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States."
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 188 la(i)(3)(A), that such
certification, as amended, and the use of such procedures, as amended, are approved.
ENTERED this ~day of August 2010.
JOHN D. BATES
Judge, United States Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court
I,Beverly C. Queen, Deputy Clerk,
FISC, certify that this document
is a true and correct copy of
the original ~
SECRET
TOP SECRET//NOFOPJq
EXHIBIT F
THE MATTER OF FO~IGN GOVEP~MENTS, FO~IGN FACTIONS, E~G~
~~
If: 0 9
ENTITIES, ~D FOREIGN-BASED POLITIC~
DNUAG 702(g) Cerfifieatio~ 2010-A
Foreign Governments or A_ny Components Thereof, V~hether or Not Recognized by the
United States (50 U.S.C. 180!(a)(1)):
Afghanistan; Albania; Algeria; Andorra; Angola; Antigua and Barbuda; Argentina;
Armenia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahamas; Babaain; Bangladesh; Barbados; Belarus;
Belgimn; Belize; Benin; Bhutan; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil;
Bmnei; Bulgaria; Burkina Faso; Burma (Myamnar); Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon;
Cape Verde; Central African Republic; Chad; Chile; China; Colombia; Comoros; Congo,
Democratic Republic; Congo, Republic; Costa Rica; Cote dIvoire; Croatia; Cuba;
Cyprus; Czech Republic; Demnark; Djibouti; Dominica; Dominican Republic; East
Timor (Timor-Leste); Ecuador; Egypt; E1 Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Efitrea; Estonia;
Ethiopia; Fiji; Finland; France; Gabon; Gambia; Geor~a; Germany; Ghana; Greece;
Grenada; Guatemala; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Hungary;
Iceland; India; Indonesia; Iran; Iraq; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; Japan; Jordan;
Kazakhstan; Kenya; Kiribati; Korea, Democratic Peoples Republic of (DPRK); Korea,
Republic of (ROK); Kosovo; Kuwait; Kyrgyzstan; Laos; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho;
Liberia; Libya; Liechtenstein; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Macedo~ia; Madagascar; Malawi;
Malaysia; Maldives; Mall; Malta; Marshall Islands; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico;
Micronesia; Motdova; Monaco; Mongolia; Montenegro; Morocco; Mozambique;
Namibia; Nam-u; Nepal; Netherlands; Nicaragua; Niger; Nigeria; No~avay; Oman;
Pakistan; Palau; Panama; Papua New Guinea; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland;
Portugal; Qatar; Romania; Russia; Rwanda; Saint Kitts and Nevis; Saint Lucia; Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines; Samoa; San Marino; Sao Tome and Principe; Saudi Arabia;
Senegal; Serbia; Seychelles; Siena Leone; Singapore; Slovakia; Slovenia; Solomon
Islands; Somalia; South Afi~ica; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sudan; Suriname; Swaziland; Sweden;
Switzerland; Syria; Taiwan; Tajikistan; Tanzania; Thailand; Togo; Tonga; Trinidad and
Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Tuvalu; Uganda; Ukraine; United Arab
Emirates; Uruguay; Uzbekistan; Vanuatu; Vatican City (Holy See); Venezuela; Vietnam;
Westeru Sahara; Yemen; Zambia; Zimbabwe. (TS//NF)
Factio~as of ~oreigrt Natf.ons, Not Substan{~aily Composed of United States Persons
(50 UoS.C. 1801(a)(2)):
Palestinian Authority; Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. (TSi/NF)
Classified by: The Attorney General
Reason: 1.4(c)
Declassify on: 15 July 2035
Entities Openly Acknowledged by a Foreign Government or Governments to be Directed
and Controlled by Such Foreign Government or Governments (50 U.S.C. !801(a)(3)):
United Nations; International Atomic Energy Agency; World Bank Group; Intenlational
Monetary Fund; Inter-American Development Ba~k; European Central Ba~k; European
Union; African Union; Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries; Afl-ican
Development B auk; Asian Development Bank; B ai~k for International Settlements;
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; Financial Action Task Force; Gas
Producers Forum; Islamic Development Ba~; League of Arab States; Mercosur.
Foreign-Based PoIitieal Organizations, Not SubstantiaIly Composed of United States
Persorts (50 UoS.C. 1801(a)(5)):
Areal; Bharatiya Janata Party; Bolivaria Continental Coordinator; Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood; National Salvation Front; Pakistan Peoples Party. (TS//NF)
Entities Directed and Controlled by a Foreign Government or Governments (50 U.S.C.
I801(a)(6)):
Bolivarian Alternative office Americas, PetroCaribe, S.A. (TSi/NF)
TOP SECRET/,qqOFORN
2
SECRET//ORCON,NOFORN
C E R T I F I C A T I O N O F T . E D m C T O R O V N A T I O N A I N T E L L I G E C D T . E
ATTO~EY GENE~L PURSUANT TO SUBSECTION 702(g) OF T~E~R~G~,~
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILL~CE ACT OF 1978, AS ~E~
~
~ o ~,.~ ~: [~
~N THE MATTER OF FOREIGN GOVE~MENTS, FO~IGN FACT~0NS; FON~IGN :
ENTITIES, ~D FOREIGN-BASED POLITICAL ORG~IZATi0NS ~ .....
DNI/AG 702(g) Certification 2010-A
Based on the representations made in the supporting affidavits of General Keith B.
Alexander, United States Army, Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), Leon E.
Panetta, Director, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Robert S. Mueller, Ill, Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in the above-referenced matter, the Director of National
Intelligence and the Attorney General, being duly sworn, hereby certify that: (S//OC,NF)
(1) there are procedures in place that will be submitted with this certification for approval
by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that are reasonably designed to --
a. ensure that an acquisition authorized pursuant to subsection 702(a) of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended ("the Act"), is limited to
targeting persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States; and
b. prevent the intentional acquisition of any comlnunication as to which the sender
and all intended recipients are known at the time of acquisition to be located in
the United States;
(2) the minimization procedures with respect to such acquisition --
a. lneet the definition of minimization procedures under sulosections 101 (h) and
301 (4) of the Act; and
Classified by: The Attorney General
Reason: 1.4(c)
Declassify on: 15 July 2035
b. wilI be submitted with this certification for approval by the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court;
(3) guidelines have been adopted in accordance with subsection 702(f) of the Act to
ensure compliance with the limitations in subsection 702(b) of the Act and to ensure
that an application for a court order is filed as required by the Act;
(4) the procedures and guidelines refened to in sub-paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) above are
consistent with the requirements of the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the
United States;
(5) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain foreign intelligence information;
(6) the acquisition involves obtaining foreign intelligence information from or with the
assistance of an electronic communication service provider; and
(7) the acquisition complies with the limitations in subsection 702(b) of the Act. (S)
As described in the above-referenced affidavit of General Alexander, the foreigna
intelligence information to be acquired pursuant to this certification concerns foreign powers as
defined in 50 U.S.C. 1801(a)(1) ("foreign governments or any components thereof, whether or
not recognized by the United States"); 50 U.S.C. 1801(a)(2) ("factions of foreign nations, not
substantially composed of United States persons"); 50 U.S.C. 1801(a)(3) ("entities openly
acknowledged by a foreign govert~nent or governments to be directed and controlled by such
foreign government or goverm-nents"); 50 U.S.C. 1801(a)(5) ("foreign-based political
organizations, not substantially composed of United States persons"); and 50 U. S.C. 1801 (a)(6)
("entities directed and controlled by a foreign govermnent or goverrm~ents"). A list of foreign
powers satisfying these statutory definitions is attached herewith as Exhibit F. IfNSA seeks to
acquire forei~ox~ intelligence information concerning additional foreign powers as defined in
SECRET/iORCON,NOFOR_N
2
S E CRET//ORC ON,NOFOPdN
50 U.S.C. 1801(a)(1), (2), (3), (5), or (6), NSA may target consistent with this certification
non-United States persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States who
possess, are expected to receive, and/or are likely to communicate foreign intelligence
information concerning those additional foreign powers, provided that NSA notifies the Attorney
General and Director of National Intelligence within five business days of implementing such
targeting. Such notification will include a description of the factual basis for NSAs
determination that the additional government, faction, entity, or political organization is a foreign
power as defined in 50 U.S.C. 1801(a)(!), (2), (3), (5), or (6). (S//OC,NF)
On the basis of the foregoing, the targeting of non-United States persons reasonably
believed to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information, as
described above, is authorized, and such authorization shall be effective on August 17, 2010, or
on the date upon which the Foreign Intelligence Smweillance Court issues an order pursuant to
subsection 702(i)(3) of the Act, whichever is later. Such targeting is authorized for a period of
one year from the effective date of this authorization. This authorization reauthorizes DNI/AG
702(g) Certification 2009-A ("In the Matter of Foreign Governments, Foreign Factions, Foreign
Entities, and Foreign-Based Political Organizations"), which was authorized by the Director of
National Intelligence and Attorney Genera! pursuant to section 702(g) of the Act on July 29,
2009. (S//OC,NF)
A m endm ent 1 to D N I [/A G 702(g) C ertifications 20~)8-A and 2009-A
Furthermore, in accordance with subsection 702(i)(1)(C) of the Act, the NSA, FBI, and
CIA minimization procedures authorized for use under DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications 2008-A
and 2009-A are hereby amended. Specifically, the use of the NSA, FBI, and CIA minimization
procedures attached herewith as Exhibits B, D, and E, respectively, in connection with foreign
3
SECRET//ORCON~NOFORN
intelligence information acquired in accordance with DNI/AG 702(g) Certifications 2008-A and
2009-A is auttaorized.
I
Such authorization shall be effective on August 17, 2010, or on the date
upon which the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court issues an order concerning these
amendments pursuant to subsection 702(i)(3) of the Act, whichever is later. (S//OC,NF)
.... The remainder of this page intentionally left blank ....
1 As certified above, these ntinimization procedures aneet the definition of minimization procedures under
subsections 101 (h) and 3 01 (4) of the Act and will be submitted herewith for approval by the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court. (S//OC,NF)
SECRET/!ORCON,NOFORN
4
VERIFICATION (U)
I declare under penalty of perjury that the facts set forth in the foregoing certification in
the Matter of Foreign Goverm:aents, Foreign Factions, Foreign Entities, and Foreign-Based
Politica! Organizations, DNI/AG 702(g) Certification 2010-A, are true and COl~ect to the best of
nay knowledge and belief. I further declare under penalty of perjury that the facts set forth in the
foregoing amendments to the minimization procedures to be used in connection with foreign
intelligence information acquired in accordance with DNIiAG 702(g) Certifications 2008-A and
2009-A are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. Executed pursuant to
28 U.S.C. 1746 on July ~
4~
, 2010. (S)
Holder, Jr.
Attorney General of the United S~at,
SECRET//ORCON~NOFORN
VERI[gI{CATI[ON (U)
I declare under penalty ofp~iury that the facts se~ fo~h in the foregoing certification in
the Matter of Groups Engaged in international Tenorism or Activities in Preparation Therefor,
DNI/AG 702(g) Certification 2010-B, are true aad correct to the best of my knowledge and
belief. I fm~er declare under penalty of perjury that the facts set forth in the foregoing
amendme1~t to the minimization procedures to be used tn cormectton with foreign intelligence
info~>~ation acquired in accordance with DNI/AG 702(g) Cet~tifications 2008-B and 2009-B are
true m~.d correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. Executed pursuant ~o 28 U.S.C. 1746
on July ~9~.., 2010. (S)
Dav(d C. Gompert
Acting Director of National Intelligence
SE CRETi/ORCON,NOFON2t
6
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108
Dated: 20070108

FISA Amendments Act of 2008
Section 702

Summary Document

Prepared by the Office of General Counsel (OGC)
Formatting, Section Titles, and the Outline in the left margin added by ADET

23 December 2008
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108 2
Table of Contents:

Introduction to FAA section 702.........................................................................................................3
Compel Providers...................................................................................................................... 3
FISC orders for US persons or persons located inside the United States................................. 3
Time sensitive targets and high volume of targets................................................................ 3
The means used:........................................................................................................................ 3
Certification details............................................................................................................... 3
Day to day Analysts attention.............................................................................................. 4

Certification 2008-A: Targeting Directed at Foreign Governments and Similar Entities...................5
DIRNSAs affidavit.................................................................................................................. 5
Targeting Procedures (Exhibit A)............................................................................................. 6
Part 1 Location................................................................................................................... 6
Part 2 Detecting target location or status changes............................................................. 7
Part 3 Identifying the foreign power.................................................................................. 7
Part 4 Oversight and reporting........................................................................................... 7
Minimization Procedures (Exhibit B)....................................................................................... 8
The definitions section.......................................................................................................... 8
Section 3 Acquisition and processing................................................................................ 9
Section 4 Attorney-Client communications....................................................................... 9
Section 5 Domestic communications................................................................................. 9
Section 6 Foreign communications of US persons.......................................................... 10
Section 7 Foreign communications of US persons.......................................................... 11
Section 8 FAA and collaboration with other governments.............................................. 11
The foreign government groups that are the subject of Certification 2008-A (Exhibit F) ..... 12

FAA Certification 2008-B - Counterterrorism..................................................................................13
DIRNSAs affidavit................................................................................................................ 13
Targeting Procedures (Exhibit A)........................................................................................... 13
Minimization Procedures (Exhibit B)..................................................................................... 13
The foreign terrorist groups that are the subject of Certification 2008-B (Exhibit F)............ 13

FAA Certification 2009-C WMD/Proliferation..............................................................................14
DIRNSAs affidavit................................................................................................................ 14
Targeting Procedures (Exhibit A)........................................................................................... 14
Minimization Procedures (Exhibit B)..................................................................................... 15

FAA Certification 2009-A Certification - Foreign Governments..16

FAA Certification 2009-B - Counterterrorism..................................................................................17

Introduction to FAA section 702
Compel Providers
As described in the briefing accompanying this training, in J uly 2008,
Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA.) One of the primary purposes in
enacting the FAA was the creation of a new way for the US
Government to compel providers of electronic communications
services to assist the Government in acquiring foreign intelligence
information concerning non-US persons located outside the United
States. This process is described in Section 702 of FAA. Almost all of
the 1978 law remained intact, and Section 702 of FAA is best
understood as an exception to FISA for such targets.
FISC orders for US persons or persons located
inside the United States
The definitions of electronic surveillance in FISA were not changed,
so any collection that uses methods that fall within them and is directed
at anyone inside the United States or at US persons abroad still requires
a court order. The Government must give the court probable cause to
believe that each target is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power
before the court will issue an order compelling a communications
service provider to assist with the targeting.
Time sensitive targets and high volume of targets
Under section 702 of FAA, however, the Government may compel the
same type of assistance in a way that is much more time-sensitive and
more suitable for collection directed at a higher volume of targets.
The means used:
The means used by the Government to compel this assistance is in the
form of certifications issued jointly by the Attorney General and the
Director of National Intelligence that are approved by the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) and directives to the
providers ordering them to assist the government.
Certification details
In a certification, the DNI and AG certify that specific requirements
of the law have been met, and describe how this has been done. When
the collection is being done by NSA, DIRNSA also makes
representations to support the certification. If the court determines that
the statutory requirements for a certification have been met, it issues an
order to this effect, and the collection may begin.
I. Introduction to
FAA section 702

1. Compel Providers
a. Non-US persons

b. Outside the United
States

c. FAA 702 =an
exception

2. Court Orders
a. FISA section F1-F4
did not change
b. Non-US persons &
persons inside the
United States need a
FISC order
c. FISC orders need a
probable cause case.

3. FAA 702 for:
a. fast targeting and
b. a high volume of
targets

4. The means:
a. AG/DNI
certifications (certs)
approved by FISC
b. Directives to
providers

5. Certs
a. DNI & AG approve
b. At NSA DIRNSA
approves

Since this video was recorded in December 2008, a FAA
Certification 2009-C WMD/Proliferation certification
has been approved. Refer to pg. 14 of this document.

For this reason, NSA personnel who are going to be involved in the
collection, processing or dissemination of data gathered pursuant to
Section 702 of FAA must understand the requirements and
responsibilities associated with a certification to ensure they are acting
in accordance with the representations made to the FISC by the DNI,
AG and DIRNSA. In other words, the various parts of a certification lay
out the rules of the road for collection and handling of data pursuant to
FAA, and this training is designed to assist you in becoming familiar
with their terms. (A certification may also contain representations made
by other federal agencies that assist in the collection and/or are
authorized to receive the proceeds of what NSA is collecting pursuant to
FAA. Their terms are only of peripheral interest to most NSA personnel,
so they will not be discussed in great detail.)

Although Section 702 of the FAA provides a framework of requirements
for issuance of a certification, it does not say how that framework must
be used. To date, the AG and DNI have issued certifications that are
topically based: a certification that authorizes targeting directed at
foreign governments, factions, entities and foreign based political
organizations (Certification 2008-A) and a certification that authorizes
targeting directed at groups engaged in international terrorism or
activities in preparation therefore (Certification 2008-B). Each will be
discussed in turn.

Day to day Analysts
attention
As described in the briefing, on a day-to-day basis, most analysts will
need to be particularly concerned with:
- the portions of the certifications that describe which
foreign intelligence targets have been authorized for
collection in general terms by the Attorney General
and DNI (typically, Exhibit F to a certification),
- the procedures for determining that there is a
reasonable belief that a particular target is a non-US
person located outside the United States (typically
Exhibit A to a certification) and
- the minimization procedures that govern handling of
US person (USP) information acquired in the course
of collection directed at non-US persons reasonably
believed to be located outside the US who fit within
the terms of the authorization (typically Exhibit B
to a certification.)
Thus, at the end of this training, NSA personnel should know how to
find out whether a proposed target fits within the terms of a certification,
I. Introduction to FAA
section 702 contd

c. Individual certs
have unique
handling rules.

d. AG/DNI have
issued topical certs

i. 2008-A =Foreign
Govt (FG)

ii. 2008-B =
Counterterrorism
(CT)

6. Analysts concern:

a. Authorized targets
(Exhibit F)

b. Foreignness
procedures
(Exhibit A)

c. Minimization
procedures
(Exhibit B)

d. Trained to know
when a target fits
the cert

know where to find the rules for targeting, and know where to find the
rules for handling the US person information they acquire. Because the
certifications and the associated rules are subject to change,
understanding where to find NSAs responsibilities and restrictions is
every bit as important as becoming familiar with the specifics of their
terms at the current time.

Certification 2008-A: Targeting Directed at
Foreign Governments and Similar Entities

DIRNSAs affidavit

DIRNSAs affidavit to Certification 2008-A states the following:

NSA has adopted procedures that are reasonably designed to ensure that
all targeting is directed at non-US persons reasonably believed to be
outside the United States (Exhibit A, described below)

This collection will be accomplished by a variety of means at switches
and other parts of the infrastructure of companies that provide electronic
communications services to people abroad from within the United
States.

The collection will seek to acquire foreign intelligence information
concerning foreign governments, factions thereof and similar types of
entities, and also states that a list of the entities that will be targeted is
included as Exhibit F (described below.) It also states that if NSA
wants to target a foreign government or other similar entity that is not on
this list, it may do so, but it has to notify the AG and DNI within 5 days
of implementing the targeting.

When NSA personnel come across information concerning US persons,
they will follow minimization procedures attached to the certification
(Exhibit B, described below)

NSA may disseminate to CIA unevaluated data that comes from
collection pursuant to this certification and that CIA requests in order to
carry out its clandestine espionage and counterintelligence activities
abroad.

NSA may also disseminate to FBI, at FBIs request, unevaluated data
that comes from collection pursuant to this certification.

II. Cert 2008-A
Foreign Govts

1. DIRNSAs
Affidavit
2008-A Affidavit

a. Non-US person
b. Outside of the
United States

c. Using US
electronic
communications
carriers

d. Purpose
i. Foreign
intelligence
ii. Concerning
Foreign Govt

e. Minimize US
person info

f. CIA/FBI sharing

Targeting Procedures (Exhibit A)

These procedures address one of the central requirements of the FAA:
determination that the targeting is limited to non-United States
persons outside the United States. It does so in four parts.

Part 1 Location
Part 1 discusses how NSA will make a determination that a person
being targeted is located outside the United States. It notes that the
determination is made in light of the totality of the circumstances.

NSA analysts look at lead information they have received on the
target; they conduct research in NSA databases available reports and
collateral information, and they conduct technical analyses of the
email addresses or other facilities to be targeted. They can use
information from any one or a combination of these categories of
information to determine that the potential target is outside the United
States. Part 1 addresses each of these categories in greater detail,
with examples of how they are applied to targeting of phone numbers
and email addresses.

It also notes that when NSA is seeking to acquire communications
about the target that are not to or from the target, it will employ IP
filters or similar technology to ensure that the collection is directed at
a party to communications reasonably believed to be outside the
United States.

Part 1 also provides similar guidance on assessment of a potential
targets status as a non-US person. It notes that information on a
potential targets location is frequently useful in determining his
status as well. It notes that in the absence of specific information
regarding a potential targets status, if a person is reasonably believed
to be located outside the United States, he will also be presumed to be
a non-US person, unless/until he can be positively identified as a US
person or the nature or circumstances of his communication give rise
to a reasonable belief to the contrary.

Because one of the things certified by the AG and DNI is that the
purpose of the collection is to gather foreign intelligence, part 1 also
addresses how NSA will assess whether the target possesses and/or is
likely to communicate information of foreign intelligence value
concerning a foreign power or foreign territory. NSA can not target
someone merely because he is located outside the US; there has to be
some reason to believe that the targeting will acquire foreign
intelligence. This requirement, and most of the factors listed in this
2. Targeting Procedures
(Exhibit A)
2008-A Exhibit A

a. Part I Location
i. Located outside of
the United States
ii. Totality of
circumstances

1. Lead information

2. Seeking info
about a target
requires filters

3. Presumption of
status based on
location

4. Target possesses
and is likely to
communicate
foreign
intelligence

section are intuitive to NSA analysts, and include information that
indicates the target has communicated with someone associated with
a foreign power or territory, information in public directories that link
a phone number to someone associated with a foreign power or
foreign territory.

Part 2 Detecting target location or status changes
Part 2 describes steps that will be taken by NSA after targeting has
begun to ensure that it detects when a target has entered the United
States, despite a reasonable belief to the contrary when targeting was
initiated. These steps are designed to prevent NSA from collecting
domestic communications as well as any targeting of persons who are
inside the United States. NSA looks at registers of roaming cell
phones, IP addresses of Internet communications and similar
technical information, but in many cases, it will be the content of a
communication that indicates that a target has entered the United
States. If NSA determines that a target has entered the United States
or that a target thought to be a non-US person is in fact a US person,
it must terminate collection without delay and take additional steps
described in Part 4 below.

Part 3 Identifying the foreign power
Part 3 states that before collection can begin, analysts must document
one or more citations to the information that led them to believe that a
target was located outside the United States. They must also identify
the foreign power or foreign territory about which they expect to
obtain foreign intelligence so that people conducting oversight of
NSAs collection can see how the Agency is meeting the
requirements established by the AG and DNI in their certification.

Part 4 Oversight and reporting
Part 4 describes oversight and compliance responsibilities associated
with collection done pursuant to Certification 2008-A. The SID
office of Oversight and Compliance (O&C), together with the OGC,
is required to develop training on the rules associated with FAA
collection. O&C must also ensure that raw traffic from FAA
collection is labeled and stored only in authorized repositories and
accessible only to those who have had such training. O&C is also
required to conduct periodic spot checks to ensure that NSA is
meeting its responsibilities with regard to targeting, dissemination
and other activities associated with FAA collection.

The Department of J ustice (DOJ ) and the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (ODNI) also conduct independent oversight of
NSAs activities, with reviews at least once every 60 days.
contd
2008-A Exhibit A

b. Part II Location
change detection

i. Detect if a target
enters the United
States

ii. Or if the target is
a US person

c. Part III identify the
foreign power

d. Part IV Oversight

i. O&C/OGC

ii. DOJ /ODNI


NSA must report to DOJ , the ODNI Office of General Counsel and
the to the ODNI Civil Liberties Protection Officer, any incidents of
noncompliance with targeting procedures that result in intentional
targeting of persons reasonably believe to be located in the United
States or the intentional acquisition of domestic communications.
These reports must be made within 5 days of NSA learning of the
incident. Any information acquired by intentionally targeting a US
person or a person nor reasonably believed to be outside the United
States at the time of targeting has to be purged from NSA
databases.

Part 4 also repeats the requirement that if NSA targets someone in
the reasonable belief that he is a non-United States person outside
the United States and later finds out that the target is inside the
United States or is in fact a US person (no matter where he is
located), it must cease the targeting without delay. Any
information gathered prior to determining that the target was a US
person or located inside the United States has to be handled in
accordance with the relevant minimization procedures (Exhibit B,
discussed below.) In addition, NSA must report the incident to
DOJ , the ODNI Office of General Counsel and the ODNI Civil
Liberties Officer within 5 days.

Minimization Procedures (Exhibit B)

The minimization procedures for Certification 2008-A are modeled
on NSAs Standard Minimization Procedures (Annex A to USSID
18), but contain some significant differences. It is important to
keep in mind that they govern the
processing/retention/dissemination of information concerning US
persons that is collected in the course of targeting non-United
States persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States.
Any restrictions on the handling of data that does not concern US
persons come from another source (e.g., concerns about the
potential risk to sources and methods.) All of the requirements in
the procedures will not be repeated verbatim here, but NSA
personnel working with FAA data should review their terms
closely.

The definitions section is the first substantive portion of the
procedures and should be reviewed carefully for obvious reasons.
Restrictions on the handling of information concerning US
persons can not be properly applied unless one understands what
contd - 2008-A Exhibit A

iii. Reporting incidents
to ODNI CLPO, DOJ , and
ODNI OJ C for:

1. Intentional
violations

2. Mistakes

3. Minimization
Procedures (Exhibit B)
2008-A Exhibit B

a. Govern info
concerning US
persons obtained
while targeting non-
US persons

b. Definitions
falls within the definition of US person. The same is true for
foreign communication and similar terms.

Section 3 Acquisition and processing
Highlights of section 3, which addresses acquisition and
processing in general, include the following:

- inadvertently acquired communications of or
concerning US persons can be retained no
longer than 5 years (unless the Signals
Intelligence Director authorizes a longer
retention period in accordance with Section 5)
- computer selection terms used for scanning
collected data to identify communications for
analysis shall not include US person names or
identifiers
- if NSA is targeting someone in the reasonable
belief that he is a non-US person outside the
United States and subsequently learns that
either of these beliefs is incorrect, it must
terminate the targeting without delay. Any
communications collected through such
targeting, prior to the determination that the
persons status or location was incorrect, must
be handled in accordance with the procedures
governing domestic communications,
discussed in Section 5)

Section 4 Attorney-Client communications
Section 4 states that privileged attorney-client communications
must be handled with particular care. Any proposed
dissemination of information from privileged attorney-client
communications must be reviewed by the NSA OGC

Section 5 Domestic communications
Section 5 governs the handling of domestic communications.
Generally, domestic communications shall be promptly
destroyed. However, DIRNSA can authorize an exception to
this requirement if he determines, in writing, that the
communications in question fall within one of 4 specified
categories:
- domestic communications reasonably
believed to contain significant foreign
intelligence shall be disseminated to the FBI,
3. Minimization Procedures
contd
2008-A Exhibit B

c. Section 3 -
Acquisition

i. Inadvertent
communications
retained 5 yrs

ii. No US person
names in
querying

iii. Stop targeting of
US location or
US status is
identified

d. Section 4
Attorney- Client

e. Section 5
Domestic
Communications

i. Normally
Destroy
ii. Waiver if:

1. foreign
intelligence

for possible further dissemination in
accordance with its minimization
procedures
- domestic communications that do not
contain foreign intelligence information but
are reasonably believed to contain evidence
of a crime may be referred to the NSA
OGC for possible further dissemination in
accordance with procedures established
within the Executive Branch
- domestic communications that do not
contain foreign intelligence or evidence of
a crime, but contain technical database
information or information necessary to
understand or assess a communications
security vulnerability may be disseminated
to the FBI and other elements of the US
Government
- the communication contains information
pertaining to a threat of serious harm to life
or property

Section 5 also states that ordinarily the maximum amount of
time that unencrypted domestic communications may be
retained in technical databases is 5 years, unless the Signals
Intelligence Director determines in writing that retention for a
longer period is required to respond to authorized foreign
intelligence requirements. Notwithstanding any of these
limitations, if a domestic communication indicates that a
target has entered the United States, NSA may advise the FBI
of that fact.

Section 6 Foreign communications of US
persons
Section 6 governs the handling of foreign communications of
or concerning US persons. Unencrypted foreign
communications can be retained for up to 5 years, while they
are being evaluated, unless the Signals Intelligence Director
determines in writing that a longer retention period is
required. They can also be retained if dissemination of the
communications would be permissible with the US person
information included or if they contain evidence of a crime.

Ordinarily, reports based on foreign communications of or
concerning US persons are supposed to be disseminated in a
manner that masks the US person identities. However, US
contd
2008-A Exhibit B
ii. Waiver if: contd

2. Evidence of
a crime

3. Technical
database
information

4. Threat of
serious
harm to life
or property

iii. The ordinary
storage limit of
raw data is 5
years

f. Section 6 - Foreign
communications of
US persons

i. The ordinary
storage limit of
raw data is 5
years

ii. Ordinarily mask
US person
identities

person identity information may be disseminated to
recipients requiring it for the performance of their official
duties if the identity is necessary to understand or assess
foreign intelligence information or otherwise fits within the
criteria outlined in Section 6 (b).

Section 7 Foreign communications of Non-
US persons
Section 7 states that information from foreign
communications concerning non-United States persons can
be disseminated in accordance with NSAs normal rules for
handling intercept.

Section 8 FAA and collaboration with other
governments
Section 8 provides the rules for handling information
collected pursuant to Section 702 of FAA in the context of
collaboration with foreign governments. It is distinct from
the dissemination of reporting to foreign governments,
which is governed by Section 6. NSA can share or
exchange foreign communications with the governments of
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and New Zealand,
but only with their written assurance that they will use the
communications subject to the limits on retention and
dissemination within the procedures. Domestic
communications may not be shared with them, and
ordinarily, NSA analysts must remove US person identifiers
that are not necessary to understand or assess the foreign
intelligence contained within foreign plain text
communications.

Encrypted communications may also be shared, as may
communications for which the Second Parties linguistic or
technical assistance is required. However, there are
significant limitations on what the Second Parties can do
with such unevaluated communications and NSA has
additional responsibilities with regard to ensuring that the
material is handled properly.

contd
2008-A Exhibit B

g. Section 7 - Foreign
communications of
non-US persons

h. Section 8 FAA
and collaboration

1. This is not
sharing reports

2. NSA can share
raw data with
Second Party
partners

3. NSA may not
share Domestic
Communications
and ordinarily
minimize data

4. Encrypted
communications
may be shared
unminimized
with limitations

The foreign government groups that are the
subject of Certification 2008-A (Exhibit F)
The foreign governments, factions, foreign entities and
foreign based political organizations that are the subject of
Certification 2008-A (Exhibit F)

In 2008-A, the DNI and AG state that the foreign
intelligence information to be acquired pursuant to the
certification concerns foreign powers as defined in specific
parts of FISA. They also state that the entities listed in
Exhibit F fit within these definitions. This means that NSA
can target individuals reasonably believed to be non-US
persons located outside the United States to acquire
information concerning these entities. If NSA wants to
target an individual who is reasonably believed to be a non-
United States person located outside the United States in
order to obtain information concerning a foreign power that
fits within these definitions, but which is not on the list it
may do so. However, it must notify the AG and DNI within
5 days of implementing such targeting. The notification
must include a description of the factual basis for NSAs
determination that the additional government, faction, entity
or political organization is a foreign power that fits within
the specified definitions in FISA.

4. Target list (Exhibit F)
2008-A Exhibit F

FAA Certification 2008-B - Counterterrorism
DIRNSAs affidavit
The only difference between this affidavit and the affidavit for
2008-A is that it reflects that the certification concerns a different
set of targets. The collection in this case will seek to acquire
foreign intelligence information concerning groups engaged in
international terrorism. Similar to 2008-A, the certification for
foreign governments and similar entities, it states that a list of the
terrorist groups that will be targeted is included as Exhibit F
(described below). It also states that if NSA wants to target a
foreign terrorist group that is not on this list, it may do so, but it
has to notify the AG and DNI within 5 days of implementing the
targeting.
These procedures are the same as those for 2008-A.
The foreign terrorist groups that are the subject
of Certification 2008-B (Exhibit F)

In 2008-B, the DNI and AG state that the foreign intelligence
information to be acquired pursuant to the certification concerns
terrorist groups that are foreign powers as defined in a specific
part of FISA. They also state that the groups listed in Exhibit F
fit within this definition. This means that NSA can target
individuals reasonably believed to be non-US persons located
outside the United States to acquire information concerning these
groups. If NSA wants to target an individual who is reasonably
believed to be a non-US person located outside the United States
in order to obtain information concerning a foreign terrorist group
that fits within this definition, but which is not on the list it may
do so. However, it must notify the AG and DNI within 5 days of
implementing such targeting. The notification must include a
description of the factual basis for NSAs determination that the
additional foreign terrorist group is a foreign power that fits
within the specified definition in FISA.
1. DIRNSAs Affidavit

The only difference from
2008-A is the TARGET
SET

(Exhibit A)

(Exhibit B)

4. Target List
(Exhibit F)

The only difference from
2008-A is the TARGET
SET

(Targeting Directed at Foreign Terrorist Groups)
(Targeting Directed at Persons, Groups and Entities Involved in the Proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Advanced Conventional Weapons, Disruptive
Technologies and their Deliver Systems)
FAA Certification 2009-C WMD/Proliferation
DIRNSAs affidavit
DIRNSAs affidavit for 2009-C is quite different from those for
2008-A and 2008-B. 2008-A and 2008-B contained lists of
specific targets, in an Exhibit F attached to the certifications.
2009-C does not contain a similar list. Instead, DIRNSAs
affidavit describes the entities that can be targeted pursuant to
this certification by giving examples of groups or persons that
possess and/or are likely to communicate information
concerning one or more of the following activities: (1)
proliferating weapons of mass destruction (WMD), to include
nuclear, radiological biological or chemical weapons, their
deliver means, and related materials or technology by state or
non-state actors (2) operating supplier networks used by state
and non-state actors to acquire WMD capabilities, delivery
means or related materials or technology, (3) developing, selling
or purchasing emerging and disruptive technologies that pose a
threat to the United States, its people or its allies, or (4)
developing selling or purchasing advanced conventional
weapons that pose a threat to the United State, its people or its
allies.

The examples that are included in the affidavit are not the only
types of entities that may be targeted, but should be reviewed by
analysts who are interested in conducting targeting pursuant to
this certification. If a potential target falls clearly within one of
the descriptions, it is clearly suitable for tasking. However, the
key determinations are that the potential targets are reasonably
believed to be non-US persons located outside the United States
and that they possess and/or are likely to communicate
information concerning the 4 categories of activities listed
above.
1. DIRNSAs Affidavit

2009-C has no Exhibit F

Instead of identifying
target affiliations, 2009-C
describes activities
1. Proliferating WMD

2. Supply of WMD parts

3. Sales of disruptive
technologies

4. Sales of advanced
conventional
weapons

(Exhibit A)


These procedures differ in two relatively minor ways from the
minimization procedures for 2008-A and 2008-B. Both of
these differences appear in section 8. First, they make it clear
that NSA may disseminate intelligence reports that contain
properly minimized US person information to foreign
governments, and that any dissemination of US person
information to a foreign government must be done in a manner
consistent with subsections 6(b) and 7 of the minimization
proceduresessentially the same rules that govern
dissemination of US person information to other federal
agencies. Because NSA always interpreted this portion of the
minimization procedures in this manner, this clarification
has no meaningful practical consequences. Second, they
expand NSAs capability to obtain technical and linguistic
assistance from foreign governments beyond the Second
Parties. The conditions and limitations under which such
assistance may be sought/provided remain unchanged, but as
long as they are met, NSA may obtain the assistance from
other foreign governments as well.

(Exhibit B)

Focus on Section 8
1. NSA may
dissemination
instruction

2. Expanded NSA
capability to obtain
technical and
linguistic assistance
FAA Certification 2009-A - Foreign Governments

This certification replaced certification 2008-A. The list of
governments/entities in Exhibit F is slightly different from
that which was included in the 2008 version. As always, if
an analyst wants to target a selector pursuant to this
certification, he should make sure that the targeting concerns
a listed entity. NSA may modify the list by notification to
the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence
within 5 business days of implementing collection directed at
an entity that does not appear on the list, but that is not a
decision that can be made by an individual analyst.
Questions about modifying the list should be addressed to the
OGC.

The only other somewhat significant difference between
2008-A and 2009-A is a change in the calculation of some
requirements for notification. In 2008-A, NSA was required
to notify the AG and DNI of additions to the list in Exhibit F
within 7 days. NSA was also required to inform DOJ and
the ODNI of certain incidents of noncompliance with the
targeting procedures as well as inadvertent targeting of
persons located inside the US within 7 days. All of these
requirements have been changed to 5 business days in
2009-A to ensure consistent calculation of the timeframes for
notification.

Changes from 2008-A:

Exhibit F is updated

New method to update
Exhibit F target list

Some notifications are
changed from
7 days to
5 business days

(Targeting Directed at Foreign Governments and Similar Entities)
FAA Certification 2009-B - Counterterrorism

This certification replaced certification 2008-B. The list of
terrorist groups in Exhibit F is slightly different from that
which was included in the 2008 version. As always, if an
analyst wants to target a selector pursuant to this
certification, he should make sure that the targeting
concerns a listed terrorist group. NSA may modify the list
by notification to the Attorney General and Director of
National Intelligence within 5 business days of
implementing collection directed at a group that does not
appear on the list, but that is not a decision that can be made
by an individual analyst. Questions about modifying the list
should be addressed to the OGC.

The only other somewhat significant difference between
2008-B and 2009-B is a change in the calculation of some
requirements for notification which mirrors the change
made in 2009-A (discussed above). In 2008-B, NSA was
required to notify the AG and DNI of additions to the list in
Exhibit F within 7 days. NSA was also required to
inform DOJ and the ODNI of certain incidents of
noncompliance with the targeting procedures as well as
inadvertent targeting of persons located inside the US
within 7 days. All of these requirements have been
changed to 5 business days in 2009-B to ensure consistent
calculation of the timeframes for notification.

Changes from 2008-B:

Exhibit F is updated

New method to update
Exhibit F target list

Some notifications are
changed from
7 days to
5 business days

(Targeting Directed at Foreign Terrorist Groups)
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN\
FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY

Dated: 20070108

TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN

AFFIDAVIT OF GENERAL KEITH B. ALEXANDER, UNITED STATES ARMY,
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

IN THE MATTER OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, FOREIGN FACTIONS, FOREIGN
ENTITIES, AND FOREIGN-BASED POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

DNI/AG 702(g) Certification 2010-A

(S) Pursuant to subsection 702(g)(2)(C) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as
amended ("the Act"), and in support of DNI/AG 702(g) Certification 2010-A, I affirm that the
following is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief:

1. (U//FOUO) There are reasonable procedures in place that the National Security Agency
(NSA) will use to ensure that any acquisition under this certification is limited to
targeting non-United States persons reasonably believed to be located outside of the
United States. In addition, these targeting procedures are reasonably designed to prevent
the intentional acquisition of any communication as to which the sender and all intended
recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be located in the United States.
These targeting procedures are attached herewith as Exhibit A.

2. (TS//SI//NF) As described below, NSA's acquisition of foreign intelligence information
pursuant to this certification involves obtaining foreign intelligence information from or
with the assistance of electronic communication service providers, as that term is defined
in subsection 701(b)(4) of the Act.

3-4 (U//FOUO) COMPARTMENTED

5. (TS//SI//NF) Pursuant to the above-referenced certification, NSA seeks to acquire foreign
intelligence information concerning foreign powers as defined in 50 U.S.C. 1801(a)(1)
("foreign governments or any components thereof, whether or not recognized by the
United States"); 50 U.S.C. 1801(a)(2) ("factions of foreign nations, not substantially
composed of United States persons"); 50 U.S.C. 1801(a)(3) ("entities openly
acknowledged by a foreign government or governments to be directed and controlled by
such foreign government or governments"); 50 U.S.C. 1801(a)(5) ("foreign-based
political organizations, not substantially composed of United States persons"); and
50 U.S.C. 1801(a)(6) ("entities directed and controlled by a foreign government or
governments"). A list of such foreign powers is attached herewith as Exhibit F. NSA

2
believes that the non-United States persons reasonably believed to be located outside the
United States who will be targeted for collection under this certification possess, are
expected to receive, and/or are likely to communicate foreign intelligence information
concerning these foreign powers. Thus, a significant purpose of the acquisition is to
obtain:
(1) information that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is
necessary to, the ability of the United States to protect against --
a. actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power
or an agent of a foreign power;
b. sabotage, international terrorism, or the international proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction by a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power; or
c. clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network
of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or
(2) information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates
to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary to --
a. the national defense or the security of the United States; or
b. the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.

If NSA seeks to acquire foreign intelligence information concerning additional
foreign powers as defined in 50 U.S.C. 1801(a)(1), (2), (3), (5), or (6), NSA
may target under this certification non-United States persons reasonably believed
to be located outside the United States who possess, are expected to receive,
and/or are likely to communicate foreign intelligence information concerning
those additional foreign powers, provided that NSA notifies the Attorney General
and Director of National Intelligence within five business days of implementing
such targeting. Such notification will include a description of the factual basis for
NSA's determination that the additional government, faction, entity, or political
organization is a foreign power as defined in 50 U.S.C. 1801(a)(1), (2), (3), (5),
or (6).

6. (U//FOUO) With respect to the information NSA acquires pursuant to the above-
referenced certification, NSA will follow the minimization procedures attached herewith
as Exhibit B.

7. (S//SI//NF) NSA may provide to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) unminimized
communications acquired pursuant to the above-referenced certification. CIA will
identify to NSA targets for which NSA may provide unminimized communications to
CIA. CIA will process any such unminimized communications received from NSA in
accordance with the CIA minimization procedures adopted by the Attorney General, in
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, pursuant to subsection 702(e) of
the Act.


3

8. (S//SI) NSA may provide to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) unminimized
communications acquired pursuant to the above-referenced certification. The FBI will
identify to NSA targets for which NSA may provide unminimized communications to the
FBI. The FBI will process any such unminimized communications received from NSA in
accordance with the FBI minimization procedures adopted by the Attorney General, in
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, pursuant to subsection 702(e) of
the Act.
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN\

4
(U) I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Signed this ______ day of July, 2010.

______________________________
KEITH B. ALEXANDER
General, U.S. Army
Director, National Security Agency

This affidavit was signed by DIRNSA on 15 July 2010

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