Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 142943 April 3, 2002
Spouses ANTONIO and LORNA QUISUMBING, petitioners,
vs.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO), respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J .:
Under the law, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) may immediately disconnect electric service
on the ground of alleged meter tampering, but only if the discovery of the cause is personally
witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or by a duly authorized representative of the
Energy Regulatory Board.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the February 1,
2000 Decision
1
and the April 10, 2000 Resolution
2
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No.
49022. The decretal portion of the said Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the challenged decision in Civil Case No. Q-95-23219 is hereby SET
ASIDE and the complaint against defendant-appellant MERALCO is hereby DISMISSED.
Plaintiffs-appellees are herebyORDERED to pay defendant-appellant MERALCO the
differential billing of P193,332.00 representing the value of used but unregistered electrical
consumption."
3

The assailed Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:
"Defendant-appellant Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a private corporation,
authorized by law to charge all persons, including the government, for the consumption of
electric power at rates duly authorized and approved by the Board of Energy (now the
Energy Regulatory Board).
"Plaintiffs-appellees Spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are owners of a house and lot
located at No. 94 Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City, which they bought on April 7, 1994
from Ms. Carmina Serapio Santos. They alleged to be business entrepreneurs engaged in
the export of furnitures under the business name 'Loran Industries' and recipient of the 1993
Agora Award and 1994 Golden Shell Award. Mrs. Quisumbing is a member of the
Innerwheel Club while Mr. Quisumbing is a member of the Rotary Club, Chairman of Cebu
Chamber of Commerce, and Director of Chamber of Furniture.
"On March 3, 1995 at around 9:00 a.m., defendant-appellant's inspectors headed by
Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a routine-on-the-spot inspection of all single
phase meters at Greenmeadows Avenue. House no. 94 of Block 8, Lot 19 Greenmeadows
Avenue owned by plaintiffs-appellees was inspected after observing a standard operating
procedure of asking permission from plaintiffs-appellees, through their secretary which was
granted. The secretary witnessed the inspection. After the inspection, defendant-appellant's
inspectors discovered that the terminal seal of the meter was missing; the meter cover seal
was deformed; the meter dials of the meter was mis-aligned and there were scratches on the
meter base plate. Defendant-appellant's inspectors relayed the matter to plaintiffs-appellees'
secretary, who in turn relayed the same to plaintiff-appellee, Lorna Quisumbing, who was
outraged of the result of the inspection and denied liability as to the tampering of the meter.
Plaintiffs-appellees were advised by defendant-appellant's inspectors that they had to detach
the meter and bring it to their laboratory for verification/confirmation of their findings. In the
event the meter turned out to be tampered, defendant-appellant had to temporarily
disconnect the electric services of plaintiffs-appellees. The laboratory testing conducted on
the meter has the following findings to wit:
'1. Terminal seal was missing.
'2. Lead cover seals ('90 ERB 1-Meralco 21) were tampered by forcibly pulling out
from the sealing wire.
'3. The 1000th, 100th and 10th dial pointers of the register were found out of
alignment and with circular scratches at the face of the register which indicates that
the meter had been opened to manipulate the said dial pointers and set manually to
the desired reading. In addition to this, the meter terminal blades were found full of
scratches.'
"After an hour, defendant-appellant's head inspector, E. Orlina returned to the residence of
plaintiffs-appellees and informed them that the meter had been tampered and unless they
pay the amount ofP178,875.01 representing the differential billing, their electric supply would
be disconnected. Orlina informed plaintiffs-appellees that they were just following their
standard operating procedure. Plaintiffs-appellees were further advised that questions
relative to the results of the inspection as well as the disconnection of her electrical services
for Violation of Contract (VOC) may be settled with Mr. M. Manuson of the Special Accounts,
Legal Service Department. However, on the same day at around 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon defendant-appellant's officer through a two-way radio instructed its service
inspector headed by Mr. Orlino to reconnect plaintiffs-appellees' electric service which the
latter faithfully complied.
"On March 6, 1995, plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint for damages with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, despite the immediate reconnection,
to order defendant-appellant to furnish electricity to the plaintiffs-appellees alleging that
defendant-appellant acted with wanton, capricious, malicious and malevolent manner in
disconnecting their power supply which was done without due process, and without due
regard for their rights, feelings, peace of mind, social and business reputation.
"In its Answer, defendant-appellant admitted disconnecting the electric service at the
plaintiffs-appellees' house but denied liability citing the 'Terms and Conditions of Service,'
and Republic Act No. 7832 otherwise known a 'Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission
Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994.'
"After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment, ruling in favor of plaintiffs-
appellees."
4
(Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court held that Meralco (herein respondent) should have given the Quisumbing spouses
(herein petitioners) ample opportunity to dispute the alleged meter tampering.
It held that respondent had acted summarily and without procedural due process in immediately
disconnecting the electric service of petitioners. Respondent's action, ruled the RTC, constituted
a quasi delict.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals overturned the trial court's ruling and dismissed the Complaint. It held that
respondent's representatives had acted in good faith when they disconnected petitioners' electric
service. Citing testimonial and documentary evidence, it ruled that the disconnection was made only
after observing due process. Further, it noted that petitioners had not been able to prove their claim
for damages. The appellate court likewise upheld respondent's counterclaim for the billing differential
in the amount of P193,332
5
representing the value of petitioners' used but unregistered electrical
consumption, which had been established without being controverted.
Hence, this Petition.
6

The Issues
In their Memorandum,
7
petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:
"4.1 Whether a prima facie presumption of tampering of electrical meter enumerated under
Sec. 4 (a) iv of RA 7832 (Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage
Act of 1994) may be had despite the absence of an ERB representative or an officer of the
law?
"4.2 Whether the enumeration of instances to establish a prima facie presumption of
tampering of electrical meter enumerated under Sec. 4 (a) iv of RA 7832 (Anti-Electricity and
Electric Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994) is exclusive?
"4.3 What constitutes notice prior to disconnection of electricity service? Corollarily, whether
the definition of notice under Meralco v. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 243) applies to the
case at bar?
"4.4 Whether a prima facie presumption may contradict logic?
"4.5 Whether documentary proof is pre-requisite for award of damages?"
8

In sum, this Petition raises three (3) main issues which this Court will address: (1) whether
respondent observed the requisites of law when it disconnected the electrical supply of petitioners,
(2) whether such disconnection entitled petitioners to damages, and (3) whether petitioners are liable
for the billing differential computed by respondent.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Compliance with Requisites of Law
Petitioners contend that the immediate disconnection of electrical service was not validly effected
because of respondent's noncompliance with the relevant provisions of RA 7832, the "Anti-Electricity
and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994." They insist that the immediate
disconnection of electrical supply may only be validly effected only when there is prima facie
evidence of its illegal use. To constitute prima facie evidence, the discovery of the illegal use must
be "personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative
of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB)."
Respondent, on the other hand, points out that the issue raised by petitioners is a question of fact
which this Court cannot pass upon. It argues further that this issue, which was not raised in the court
below, can no longer be taken up for the first time on appeal. Assuming arguendo that the issue was
raised below, it also contends that petitioners were not able to specifically prove the absence of an
officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the ERB when the discovery was made.1wphi1.nt
Prima facie Evidence of Illegal Use of Electricity
We agree with petitioners. Section 4 of RA 7832 states:
(a) The presence of any of the following circumstances shall constitute prima facie evidence
of illegal use of electricity, as defined in this Act, by the person benefitted thereby, and shall
be the basis for: (1) the immediate disconnection by the electric utility to such person after
due notice, x x x
x x x x x x x x x
(viii) x x x Provided, however, That the discovery of any of the foregoing circumstances, in
order to constituteprima facie evidence, must be personally witnessed and attested to by an
officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board
(ERB)."
9
(Italics supplied)
Under the above provision, the prima facie presumption that will authorize immediate disconnection
will arise only upon the satisfaction of certain requisites. One of these requisites is the personal
witnessing and attestation by an officer of the law or by an authorized ERB representative when the
discovery was made.
As a rule, this Court reviews only questions of law, not of facts. However, it may pass upon the
evidence when the factual findings of the trial court are different from those of the Court of Appeals,
as in this case.
10

A careful review of the evidence on record negates the appellate court's holding that "the actions of
defendant-appellant's service inspectors were all in accord with the requirement of the law."
11

Respondent's own witnesses provided the evidence on who were actually present when the
inspection was made. Emmanuel C. Orlino, the head of the Meralco team, testified:
"Q When you were conducting this inspection, and you discovered these findings you
testified earlier, who was present?
A The secretary, sir."
12

"ATTY. REYES - Who else were the members of your team that conducted this inspection at
Greenmeadows Avenue on that day, March 3, 1995?
A The composition of the team, sir?
Q Yes.
A Including me, we are about four (4) inspectors, sir.
Q You were four (4)?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who is the head of this team?
A I was the head of the team, sir."
13

Further, Catalino A. Macaraig, the area head of the Orlino team, stated that only Meralco personnel
had been present during the inspection:
"Q By the way you were not there at Green Meadows on that day, right?
A Yes, sir.
Q Only Mr. Orlino and who else were there?
A Two or three of his men.
Q All members of the inspection team?
A Yes, sir."
14

These testimonies clearly show that at the time the alleged meter tampering was discovered, only
the Meralco inspection team and petitioners' secretary were present. Plainly, there was no officer of
the law or ERB representative at that time. Because of the absence of government representatives,
the prima facie authority to disconnect, granted to Meralco by RA 7832, cannot apply.
Neither can respondent find solace in the fact that petitioners' secretary was present at the time the
inspection was made. The law clearly states that for the prima facie evidence to apply, the discovery
"must be personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized
representative of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB)."
15
Had the law intended the presence of the
owner or his/her representative to suffice, then it should have said so. Embedded in our
jurisprudence is the rule that courts may not construe a statute that is free from doubt.
16
Where the
law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have no
choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed.
17

In fact, during the Senate deliberations on RA 7832, Senator John H. Osmea, its author, stressed
the need for the presence of government officers during inspections of electric meters. He said:
"Mr. President, if a utility like MERALCO finds certain circumstances or situations which are
listed in Section 2 of this bill to be prima facie evidence, I think they should be prudent
enough to bring in competent authority, either the police or the NBI, to verify or substantiate
their finding. If they were to summarily proceed to disconnect on the basis of their findings
and later on there would be a court case and the customer or the user would deny the
existence of what is listed in Section 2, then they could be in a lot of trouble."
18
(Italics
supplied)
Neither can we accept respondent's argument that when the alleged tampered meter was brought to
Meralco's laboratory for testing, there was already an ERB representative present.
The law says that before immediate disconnection may be allowed, the discovery of the illegal use of
electricity must have been personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or by an
authorized ERB representative. In this case, the disconnection was effected immediately after the
discovery of the alleged meter tampering, which was witnessed only by Meralco's employees. That
the ERB representative was allegedly present when the meter was examined in the Meralco
laboratory will not cure the defect.
It is undisputed that after members of the Meralco team conducted their inspection and found
alleged meter tampering, they immediately disconnected petitioners' electrical supply. Again, this
verity is culled from the testimony of Meralco's Orlina:
"A When she went inside then she came out together with Mrs. Lourdes Quis[u]mbing at
that time. We did tell our findings regarding the meter and the consequence with it. And she
was very angry with me.
Q When you say consequence of your findings, what exactly did you tell Mrs.
Quisumbing?
A We told her that the service will be temporarily disconnected and that we are referring
to our Legal Department so could know the violation, sir."
19

"A Yes, sir. At that time, I referred her to Mr. Macaraig, sir.
Q What is the fist name of this supervisor?
A Mr. Catalino Macara[i]g, sir.
Q Then after talking to Mr. Catalino Macara[i]g, this is over the telephone, what
happened?
A The supervisor advised her that the service will be temporarily disconnected and she
has to go to our Legal Department where she could settle the VOC, sir.
Q You are talking of 'VOC,' what is this all about Mr. Orlino?
A 'VOC' is violation of contract, sir."
20

As to respondent's argument that the presence of an authorized ERB representative had not been
raised below, it is clear, however, that the issue of due process was brought up by petitioners as a
valid issue in the CA. The presence of government agents who may authorize immediate
disconnections go into the essence of due process. Indeed, we cannot allow respondent to act
virtually as prosecutor and judge in imposing the penalty of disconnection due to alleged meter
tampering. That would not sit well in a democratic country. After all, Meralco is a monopoly that
derives its power from the government. Clothing it with unilateral authority to disconnect would be
equivalent to giving it a license to tyrannize its hapless customers.
Besides, even if not specifically raised, this Court has already ruled that "[w]here the issues already
raised also rest on other issues not specifically presented, as long as the latter issues bear
relevance and close relation to the former and as long as they arise from matters on record, the
Court has the authority to include them in its discussion of the controversy as well as to pass upon
them."
21

Contractual Right to Disconnect
Electrical Service
Neither may respondent rely on its alleged contractual right to disconnect electrical service based on
Exhibits "10"
22
and "11,"
23
or on Decisions of the Board of Energy (now the Energy Regulatory
Board). The relevant portion of these documents concerns discontinuance of service. It provides:
"The Company reserves the right to discontinue service in case the Customer is in arrears in
the payment of bills or for failure to pay the adjusted bills in those cases where the meter
stopped or failed to register the correct amount of energy consumed, or for failure to comply
with any of these terms and conditions, or in case of or to prevent fraud upon the Company.
Before disconnection is made in case of or to prevent fraud, the Company may adjust the bill
of said Customer accordingly and if the adjusted bill is not paid, the Company may
disconnect the same. In case of disconnection, the provisions of Revised Order No. 1 of the
former Public Service Commission (now the Board of Energy) shall be observed. Any such
suspension of service shall not terminate the contract between the Company and the
Customer."
24

Petitioners' situation can fall under disconnection only "in case of or to prevent fraud upon the
Company." However, this too has requisites before a disconnection may be made. An adjusted bill
shall be prepared, and only upon failure to pay it may the company discontinue service. This is also
true in regard to the provisions of Revised Order No. 1 of the former Public Service Commission,
which requires a 48-hour written notice before a disconnection may be justified. In the instant case,
these requisites were obviously not complied with.
Second Issue
Damages
Having ruled that the immediate disconnection effected by Meralco lacks legal, factual or contractual
basis, we will now pass upon on the right of petitioners to recover damages for the improper
disconnection.
Petitioners are asking for the reinstatement of the RTC Decision, which awarded them actual, moral
and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees. All these were overturned by the CA.
As to actual damages, we agree with the CA that competent proof is necessary before our award
may be made. The appellate court ruled as follows:
"Considering further, it is a settled rule that in order for damages to be recovered, the best
evidence obtainable by the injured party must be presented. Actual and compensatory
damages cannot be presumed but must be duly proved and proved with reasonable degree
and certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guess work as to the fact and
amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have been suffered
and on evidence of actual amount thereof. If the proof is flimsy and unsubstantial, no
damages will be awarded."
25

Actual damages are compensation for an injury that will put the injured party in the position where it
was before it was injured.
26
They pertain to such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and
susceptible of measurement.
27
Except as provided by law or by stipulation, a party is entitled to an
adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss as it has duly proven.
28

Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, not only must the amount of loss be capable of
proof; it must also be actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof or the best evidence obtainable.
29

Petitioners' claim for actual damages was premised only upon Lorna Quisumbing's bare testimony
as follows:
"A Actually that da[y] I was really scheduled to go to that furniture exhibit. That furniture
exhibit is only once a year.
Q What is this furniture exhibit?
A The SITEM, that is a government agency that takes care of exporters and exclusive
marketing of our products around the world. We always have that once a year and that's the
time when all our buyers are here for us to show what we had that was exhibited to go
around. So, my husband had to [fly] from Cebu to Manila just for this occasion. So we have
an appointment with our people and our buyers with SITEM and also that evening we will
have to treat them [to] dinner.
Q Whereat?
A At our residence, we were supposed to have a dinner at our residence.
Q What happened to this occasion?
A So when they disconnected our electric power we had to get in touch with them and
change the venue.
Q Which venue did you transfer your dinner for your buyers?
A We brought them in a restaurant in Makati at Season's Restaurant. But it was very
embar[r]assing for us because we faxed them ahead of time before they came to Manila.
Q Now as a result of this change of your schedule because of the disconnection of the
electric power on that day, Friday, what damage did you suffer?
A I cancelled the catering service and that is so much of a h[a]ssle it was so
embarras[s]ing for us.
Q Can you tell us how much amount?
A Approximately P50,000.00."
30

No other evidence has been proffered to substantiate her bare statements. She has not shown how
she arrived at the amount of P50,000; it is, at best, speculative. Her self-serving testimonial
evidence, if it may be called such, is insufficient to support alleged actual damages.
While respondent does not rebut this testimony on the expenses incurred by the spouses in moving
the dinner out of their residence due to the disconnection, no receipts covering such expenditures
have been adduced in evidence. Neither is the testimony corroborated. To reiterate, actual or
compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly proved with a reasonable degree of
certainty. It is dependent upon competent proof of damages that petitioners have suffered and of the
actual amount thereof.
31
The award must be based on the evidence presented, not on the personal
knowledge of the court; and certainly not on flimsy, remote, speculative and unsubstantial
proof.
32
Consequently, we uphold the CA ruling denying the grant of actual damages.
Having said that, we agree with the trial court, however, that petitioners are entitled to moral
damages, albeit in a reduced amount.
The RTC opined as follows:
"This Court agrees with the defendant regarding [its] right by law and equity to protect itself
from any fraud. However, such right should not be exercised arbitrarily but with great caution
and with due regard to the rights of the consumers. Meralco having a virtual monopoly of the
supply of electric power should refrain from taking drastic actions against the consumers
without observing due process. Even assuming that the subject meter has had history of
meter tampering, defendant cannot simply assume that the present occupants are the ones
responsible for such tampering. Neither does it serve as a license to deprive the plaintiffs of
their right to due process. Defendant should have given the plaintiffs simple opportunity to
dispute the electric charges brought about by the alleged meter-tampering, which were not
included in the bill rendered them. Procedural due process requires reasonable notice to pay
the bill and reasonable notice to discontinue supply. Absent due process the defendant may
be held liable for damages. While this Court is aware of the practice of unscrupulous
individuals of stealing electric curre[n]t which causes thousands if not millions of pesos in lost
revenue to electric companies, this does not give the defendant the right to trample upon the
rights of the consumers by denying them due process."
33

Article 2219 of the Civil Code lists the instances when moral damages may be recovered. One such
case
34
is when the rights of individuals, including the right against deprivation of property without due
process of law, are violated.
35

Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
36
Although
incapable of pecuniary computation, such damages may be recovered if they are the proximate
results of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.
37

Case law establishes the following requisites for the award of moral damages: (1) there is an injury --
whether physical, mental or psychological -- clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) there is a culpable
act or omission factually established; (3) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the
proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages is predicated
on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
38

To reiterate, respondent had no legal right to immediately disconnect petitioners' electrical supply
without observing the requisites of law which, in turn, are akin to due process. Had respondent been
more circumspect and prudent, petitioners could have been given the opportunity to controvert the
initial finding of alleged meter tampering. Said the RTC:
"More seriously, the action of the defendant in maliciously disconnecting the electric service
constitutes a breach of public policy. For public utilities, broad as their powers are, have a
clear duty to see to it that they do not violate nor transgress the rights of the consumers. Any
act on their part that militates against the ordinary norms of justice and fair play is considered
an infraction that gives rise to an action for damages. Such is the case at bar."
39

Indeed, the Supreme Court has ruled in Meralco v. CA
40
that respondent is required to give notice of
disconnection to an alleged delinquent customer. The Court said:
"x x x One can not deny the vital role which a public utility such as MERALCO, having a
monopoly of the supply of electrical power in Metro Manila and some nearby municipalities,
plays in the life of people living in such areas. Electricity has become a necessity to most
people in these areas, justifying the exercise by the State of its regulatory power over the
business of supplying electrical service to the public, in which petitioner MERALCO is
engaged. Thus, the state may regulate, as it has done through Section 97 of the Revised
Order No. 1 of the Public Service Commission, the conditions under which and the manner
by which a public utility such as MERALCO may effect a disconnection of service to a
delinquent customer. Among others, a prior written notice to the customer is required before
disconnection of the service. Failure to give such prior notice amounts to a tort."
41

Observance of the rights of our people is sacred in our society. We cannot allow such rights to be
trifled with or trivialized. Although the Court sympathizes with respondent's efforts to stamp out the
illegal use of electricity, such action must be done only with strict observance of the rights of our
people. As has been we succinctly said: "there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time for
the right reason."
42

However, the amount of moral damages, which is left largely to the sound discretion of the courts,
should be granted in reasonable amounts, considering the attendant facts and
circumstances.
43
Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are designed to
compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty.
44
Moral damages are
not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the defendant.
45
They are awarded only to obtain a
means, a diversion or an amusement that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering the injured party
has undergone by reason of the defendant's culpable action.
46
They must be proportionate to the
suffering inflicted.
47

It is clear from the records that respondent was able to restore the electrical supply of petitioners on
the same day. Verily, the inconvenience and anxiety they suffered as a result of the disconnection
was thereafter corrected. Thus, we reduce the RTC's grant of moral damages to the more equitable
amount of P100,000.
Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are imposed by way of example or correction for the public
good in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
48
It is not given to enrich
one party and impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to
socially deleterious actions.
49
In this case, to serve an example -- that before a disconnection of
electrical supply can be effected by a public utility like Meralco, the requisites of law must be
faithfully complied with -- we award the amount of P50,000 to petitioners.
Finally, with the award of exemplary damages, the award of attorney's fees is likewise granted.
50
It is
readily apparent that petitioners needed the services of a lawyer to argue their cause, even to the
extent of elevating the matter to this Court;
51
thus, an award of P50,000 is considered sufficient.
Final Issue:
Billing Differential
Finally, this Court holds that despite the basis for the award of damages -- the lack of due process in
immediately disconnecting petitioners' electrical supply -- respondent's counterclaim for the billing
differential is still proper. We agree with the CA that respondent should be given what it rightfully
deserves. The evidence it presented, both documentary and testimonial, sufficiently proved the
amount of the differential.
Not only did respondent show how the meter examination had been conducted by its experts, but it
also established the amount of P193,332.96 that petitioners owed respondent. The procedure
through which this amount was arrived at was testified to by Meralco's Senior Billing Computer
Enrique Katipunan. His testimony was corroborated by documentary evidence showing the account's
billing history and the corresponding computations. Neither do we doubt the documents of
inspections and examinations presented by respondent to prove that, indeed there had been meter
tampering that resulted in unrecorded and unpaid electrical consumption.
The mere presentation by petitioners of a Contract to Sell with Assumption of Mortgage
52
does not
necessarily mean that they are no longer liable for the billing differential. There was no sufficient
evidence to show that they had not been actually residing in the house before the date of the said
document. Lorna Quisumbing herself admitted
53
that they did not have any contract for electrical
service in their own name. Hence, petitioners effectively assumed the bills of the former occupants
of the premises.
Finally, the CA was correct in ruling that the convincing documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by respondent, was not controverted by petitioners.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed CA Decision
is MODIFIED as follows: petitioners are ORDERED to pay respondent the billing differential
of P193,332.96; while respondent is ordered to pay petitioners P100,000 as moral
damages, P50,000 as exemplary damages, and P50,000 as attorney's fees. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., abroad on official business.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J .:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set aside
the Decision
1
of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16
October 1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil
Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of
promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid
trial court a complaint
2
for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to
get married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a
pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the
other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an
exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before
20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that
they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which
was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Baaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced
her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week
before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and
threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a confrontation with
a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner
repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is
already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering
the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual
expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and
remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim,
3
petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as
averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his Special
and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married
with the private respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to
live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he
discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no confrontation
took place with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint
is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court and
compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed
for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order
4
embodying
the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan,
while the defendant is single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment,
Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, 1987 up to the present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan City,
College of Medicine, second year medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez
Avenue, Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school
graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the Mabuhay
Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3,
1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16
October 1989 a decision
5
favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the
latter damages and attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand
(P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three thousand
(P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic)
litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied.
6

The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private
respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable
virtue who readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false
pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d) because of his persuasive promise to marry
her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private
respondent and her parents in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions made some
preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and
chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his
promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused
Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The
trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would not
have had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public
scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.
7

The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the evidence for the
private respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she
never had a boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few days after
they first met. He later proposed marriage to her several times and she accepted his
love as well as his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same day he
went with her to her hometown of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to
meet her parents and inform them of their relationship and their intention to get
married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of defendant with
members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that
occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that he intended
to marry her during the semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's
parents thought he was good and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to
marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep
with plaintiff during the few days that they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and
defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live together in
defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987, defendant
would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school, and he even gave her
medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her sleep the whole day and night
until the following day. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became
pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff
continued to live with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her
until he told her that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in
Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents,
and thereafter consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in
Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the
barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still convince him to marry plaintiff, but
defendant insisted that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl
in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that
defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed
them of his desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the wedding,
started preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and even
already invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming wedding.
8

Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the
case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief,
9
he contended that the trial court erred (a) in not
dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision
10
affirming in toto the
trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court
made the following analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was already
29 years old at the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is
uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate experience with
defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower court, a barrio
lass "not used and accustomed to trend of modern urban life", and certainly would
(sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise made
by the defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and
defendant must have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have thought because
of the deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to
be photographed with defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as
those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore,
defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a waitress at the
restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he went to plaintiff's
hometown of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta
on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party together with
the manager and employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50,
tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told
him to marry her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan
City where he was involved in the serious study of medicine to go to plaintiff's
hometown in Baaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of special
relationship between them? And this special relationship must indeed have led to
defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff, communicated not only to her
but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the restaurant where
plaintiff was working and where defendant first proposed marriage to her, also knew
of this love affair and defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she
declared was the reason why plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant after
she had accepted defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral character
and must think so low and have so little respect and regard for Filipino women that
he openly admitted that when he studied in Bacolod City for several years where he
finished his B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan City to study medicine, he had
a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other words, he also lived with another
woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff.
It is not surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or remorse in pretending to
love and promising to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order
to satisfy his lust on her.
11

and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's
fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that
made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the
honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these
(sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to
their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as
these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good customs,
and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to our
women, coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of
our people and taking advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our institutions
of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had
caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to do in its decision in this case.
12

Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises
therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar.
13

It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral
wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed
marriage to the private respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for
liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a
foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian
Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a
promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of his
Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take
four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not
posses good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as
their marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful
cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned
on him for the live-in relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an
illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he
had professed his love to the private respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts
would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of
promise is not actionable.
14

On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and the
petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the
parties to submit their respective Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of his
thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses,
are also raised. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's
findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having heard the witnesses and having had
the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court
had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might affect the result of the
case.
15

Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked
any fact of substance or values which could alter the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or
weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are,
however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, inMedina vs. Asistio, Jr.,
16
this Court took the time,
again, to enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3)
Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4)
When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v.
Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance
Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia
v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593
[1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition
as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised
on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record
(Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted exceptions
in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
17
Congress
deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so.
The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from
which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not
actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia.
18
The
history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has shown that no
other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous
men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called
Heart Balm suits in many of the American states. . . .
19

This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the
concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and
punish in the statute books.
20

As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or
determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the
statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they
have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it
necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the
following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the
nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made,
or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no
crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for
breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong
has been committed, and though the girl and family have suffered incalculable moral
damage, she and her parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the
proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe
adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible
for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes.
21

Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or
intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept
while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa
aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international criminal acts as well such
as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the
Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil
Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the
Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of
the Civil Code.
22
In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence
of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even
postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly
broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable
than the Anglo-American law on torts.
23

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that
where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a
woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the
giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying
her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to
accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant
to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and
the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that
such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage."
24
In
short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina,
not because of lust but because of moral seduction the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its
example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under
either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to
marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of
Appeals,
25
this Court denied recovery of damages to the woman because:
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not
only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant
who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former
high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be when she
became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because the
court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner
because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a
fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals,
26
while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if there had
been moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not convinced that such
seduction existed. The following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in the
Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had
been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere
sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the
idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the
seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S.
vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient
promise or inducementand the woman must yield because of the
promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust
and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43
Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56) She must be induced to depart from
the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and
wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and
which result in her person to ultimately submitting her person to the
sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement,
persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere
proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of
sexual desire of curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely
affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It
has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases would
tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward
for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to
profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole year,
from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain intimate
sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is
incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and
mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered
exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she
would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without
exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut
short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his
defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is
made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged,
no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint.
27

In his annotations on the Civil Code,
28
Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from
this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral
damages may be recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to
mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra
vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan.
29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT
be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal or moral
seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the other way
around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust has
intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the
wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino
29
is also of the same persuasion:
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos,
30
still subsists, notwithstanding the
incorporation of the present article
31
in the Code. The example given by the Code
Commission is correct, if there was seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in
the vulgar sense of deception. But when the sexual act is accomplished without any
deceit or qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or influence, but the woman,
already of age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an
injury which can be the basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the action
lies. The court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive
the woman under the circumstances, because an act which would deceive a girl
sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as to an experienced woman thirty
years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful act and a resulting injury, there
should be civil liability, even if the act is not punishable under the criminal law and
there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for
argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also
at fault. According to him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the
Civil Code and the doctrine laid down inBatarra vs. Marcos,
32
the private respondent cannot recover
damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had
"sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her own doing,
33
for:
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor sooner
or later. Take notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a mere employee . .
. (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and
without doubt, is in need of a man who can give her economic security. Her family is
in dire need of financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this
predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may have been offered by the
petitioner.
34

These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a
condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble
birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment.
Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest
motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not have even remotely occurred to him.
Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe,
entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want
her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who
honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able
to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and
brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the
petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which
directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not
have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual
congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms
of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going
to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari
delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault."
35
At most, it
could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his
transgression has been brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the
party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or where his
consent to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud.
36

In Mangayao vs. Lasud,
37
We declared:
Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no action
by one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been
interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both sides is, more or less,
equivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate or intelligent and the other
one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that this
Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together
in the same room in their house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of
parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of morality
and dignity.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS, respondents.
Atencia & Arias Law Offices for petitioners.
Romulo C. Felizmena for private respondent.

CORTES, J .:
Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Radio
Corporation (GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent and administrative
assistant to the engineering operations manager. In 1972, GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious
purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos.
According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered the anomalies and reported them
on November 10, 1972 to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C.
Hendry who was then the Executive Vice-President and General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY.
On November 11, 1972, one day after private respondent Tobias made the report, petitioner Hendry
confronted him by stating that he was the number one suspect, and ordered him to take a one week
forced leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave the
office keys.
On November 20, 1972, when private respondent Tobias returned to work after the forced leave,
petitioner Hendry went up to him and called him a "crook" and a "swindler." Tobias was then ordered
to take a lie detector test. He was also instructed to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature,
and initials for examination by the police investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies.
On December 6,1972, the Manila police investigators submitted a laboratory crime report (Exh. "A")
clearing private respondent of participation in the anomalies.
Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private investigator, retired Col. Jose G.
Fernandez, who on December 10, 1972, submitted a report (Exh. "2") finding Tobias guilty. This
report however expressly stated that further investigation was still to be conducted.
Nevertheless, on December 12, 1972, petitioner Hendry issued a memorandum suspending Tobias
from work preparatory to the filing of criminal charges against him.
On December 19,1972, Lt. Dioscoro V. Tagle, Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner, after
investigating other documents pertaining to the alleged anomalous transactions, submitted a second
laboratory crime report (Exh. "B") reiterating his previous finding that the handwritings, signatures,
and initials appearing in the checks and other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions
were not those of Tobias. The lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results.
Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from the anomalies and the fact that the
report of the private investigator, was, by its own terms, not yet complete, petitioners filed with the
City Fiscal of Manila a complaint for estafa through falsification of commercial documents, later
amended to just estafa. Subsequently five other criminal complaints were filed against Tobias, four
of which were for estafa through Falsification of commercial document while the fifth was for of
Article 290 of' the Revised Penal Code (Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of
Correspondence).lwph1. t Two of these complaints were refiled with the Judge Advocate General's Office,
which however, remanded them to the fiscal's office. All of the six criminal complaints were
dismissed by the fiscal. Petitioners appealed four of the fiscal's resolutions dismissing the criminal
complaints with the Secretary of Justice, who, however, affirmed their dismissal.
In the meantime, on January 17, 1973, Tobias received a notice (Exh. "F") from petitioners that his
employment has been terminated effective December 13, 1972. Whereupon, Tobias filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the labor arbiter's decision. However, the Secretary
of Labor, acting on petitioners' appeal from the NLRC ruling, reinstated the labor arbiter's decision.
Tobias appealed the Secretary of Labor's order with the Office of the President. During the pendency
of the appeal with said office, petitioners and private respondent Tobias entered into a compromise
agreement regarding the latter's complaint for illegal dismissal.
Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO).
However, petitioner Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating
that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty.
Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious,
oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. Petitioner Hendry, claiming illness, did not testify during
the hearings. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes
rendered judgment in favor of private respondent by ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand
pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral
damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs. Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the Court of
Appeals. On the other hand, Tobias appealed as to the amount of damages. However, the Court of
Appeals, an a decision dated August 31, 1987 affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Petitioners' motion
for reconsideration having been denied, the instant petition for review on certiorari was filed.
The main issue in this case is whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private
respondent.
Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for damages in the lawful exercise of their
right to dismiss private respondent.
On the other hand, private respondent contends that because of petitioners' abusive manner in
dismissing him as well as for the inhuman treatment he got from them, the Petitioners must
indemnify him for the damage that he had suffered.
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic
principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the
stability of the social order." [REPORT ON THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the Code, seeking to remedy the defect of the
old Code which merely stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated
certain fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the
fountain of good conscience" and which were also meant to serve as "guides for human conduct
[that] should run as golden threads through society, to the end that law may approach its supreme
ideal, which is the sway and dominance of justice" (Id.) Foremost among these principles is that
pronounced in Article 19 which provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets
certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone
his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation
on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be
observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which
does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19
lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social
order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either
Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law, provides that:
Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law since they
were merely exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent. This does not, however, leave
private respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
This article, adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of
moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury" [Id.]
should "vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is
impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes" [Id. it p. 40; See also PNB v.
CA, G.R. No. L-27155, May 18,1978, 83 SCRA 237, 247].
In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid test
which can be applied. While the Court has not hesitated to apply Article 19 whether the legal and
factual circumstances called for its application [See for e.g., Velayo v. Shell Co. of the Phil., Ltd., 100
Phil. 186 (1956); PNB v. CA, supra;Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. v. Espino, Jr., G.R. No. L-48250,
December 28, 1979, 94 SCRA 953; PAL v. CA, G.R. No. L-46558, July 31,1981,106 SCRA 391;
United General Industries, Inc, v. Paler G.R. No. L-30205, March 15,1982,112 SCRA 404; Rubio v.
CA, G.R. No. 50911, August 21, 1987, 153 SCRA 183] the question of whether or not the principle of
abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or other
applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. And in the instant case, the
Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances, finds that all
petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent
and for which the latter must now be indemnified.
The trial court made a finding that notwithstanding the fact that it was private respondent Tobias who
reported the possible existence of anomalous transactions, petitioner Hendry "showed belligerence
and told plaintiff (private respondent herein) that he was the number one suspect and to take a one
week vacation leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to
leave his keys to said defendant (petitioner Hendry)" [RTC Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 232]. This,
petitioners do not dispute. But regardless of whether or not it was private respondent Tobias who
reported the anomalies to petitioners, the latter's reaction towards the former upon uncovering the
anomalies was less than civil. An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has committed
dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action such as ordering an investigation and
directing the employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be
expected from such employer. But the high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was
certainly uncalled for. And this reprehensible attitude of petitioners was to continue when private
respondent returned to work on November 20, 1972 after his one week forced leave. Upon reporting
for work, Tobias was confronted by Hendry who said. "Tobby, you are the crook and swindler in this
company." Considering that the first report made by the police investigators was submitted only on
December 10, 1972 [See Exh. A] the statement made by petitioner Hendry was baseless. The
imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias
transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has
already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the
manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done
abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee [Quisaba v. Sta. Ines-Melale
Veneer and Plywood Inc., G.R. No. L-38088, August 30, 1974, 58 SCRA 771; See also Philippine
Refining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-21871, September 27,1966, 18 SCRA 107] Under the
circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner
their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation
to Article 21 of the Civil Code.
But petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. Several other tortious acts were
committed by petitioners against Tobias after the latter's termination from work. Towards the latter
part of January, 1973, after the filing of the first of six criminal complaints against Tobias, the latter
talked to Hendry to protest the actions taken against him. In response, Hendry cut short Tobias'
protestations by telling him to just confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases
against him until he landed in jail. Hendry added that, "You Filipinos cannot be trusted." The threat
unmasked petitioner's bad faith in the various actions taken against Tobias. On the other hand, the
scornful remark about Filipinos as well as Hendry's earlier statements about Tobias being a "crook"
and "swindler" are clear violations of 'Tobias' personal dignity [See Article 26, Civil Code].
The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO sometime in
October 1974, stating that Tobias had been dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty.
Because of the letter, Tobias failed to gain employment with RETELCO and as a result of which,
Tobias remained unemployed for a longer period of time. For this further damage suffered by
Tobias, petitioners must likewise be held liable for damages consistent with Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. Petitioners, however, contend that they have a "moral, if not legal, duty to forewarn other
employers of the kind of employee the plaintiff (private respondent herein) was." [Petition, p. 14;
Rollo, p. 15]. Petitioners further claim that "it is the accepted moral and societal obligation of every
man to advise or warn his fellowmen of any threat or danger to the latter's life, honor or property.
And this includes warning one's brethren of the possible dangers involved in dealing with, or
accepting into confidence, a man whose honesty and integrity is suspect" [Id.]. These arguments,
rather than justify petitioners' act, reveal a seeming obsession to prevent Tobias from getting a job,
even after almost two years from the time Tobias was dismissed.
Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal complaints against Tobias.
Petitioners contend that there is no case against them for malicious prosecution and that they cannot
be "penalized for exercising their right and prerogative of seeking justice by filing criminal complaints
against an employee who was their principal suspect in the commission of forgeries and in the
perpetration of anomalous transactions which defrauded them of substantial sums of money"
[Petition, p. 10, Rollo, p. 11].
While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free resort to the
courts for redress of wrongs and vindication of their rights [Buenaventura v. Sto. Domingo, 103 Phil.
239 (1958)], the right to institute criminal prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously and in bad
faith [Ventura v. Bernabe, G.R. No. L-26760, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 5871.] Hence, in Yutuk V.
Manila Electric Co., G.R. No. L-13016, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 337, the Court held that the right to
file criminal complaints should not be used as a weapon to force an alleged debtor to pay an
indebtedness. To do so would be a clear perversion of the function of the criminal processes and of
the courts of justice. And in Hawpia CA, G.R. No. L-20047, June 30, 1967. 20 SCRA 536 the Court
upheld the judgment against the petitioner for actual and moral damages and attorney's fees after
making a finding that petitioner, with persistence, filed at least six criminal complaints against
respondent, all of which were dismissed.
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a
design to vex and humiliate a person and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing
that the charges were false and groundless [Manila Gas Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. L-44190,
October 30,1980, 100 SCRA 602]. Concededly, the filing of a suit by itself, does not render a person
liable for malicious prosecution [Inhelder Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 52358, May 301983122 SCRA
576]. The mere dismissal by the fiscal of the criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of
damages for malicious prosecution if there is no competent evidence to show that the complainant
had acted in bad faith [Sison v. David, G.R. No. L-11268, January 28,1961, 1 SCRA 60].
In the instant case, however, the trial court made a finding that petitioners acted in bad faith in filing
the criminal complaints against Tobias, observing that:
x x x
Defendants (petitioners herein) filed with the Fiscal's Office of Manila a total of six (6)
criminal cases, five (5) of which were for estafa thru falsification of commercial
document and one for violation of Art. 290 of the Revised Penal Code "discovering
secrets thru seizure of correspondence," and all were dismissed for insufficiency or
lack of evidence." The dismissal of four (4) of the cases was appealed to the Ministry
of Justice, but said Ministry invariably sustained the dismissal of the cases. As above
adverted to, two of these cases were refiled with the Judge Advocate General's
Office of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to railroad plaintiffs arrest and detention
in the military stockade, but this was frustrated by a presidential decree transferring
criminal cases involving civilians to the civil courts.
x x x
To be sure, when despite the two (2) police reports embodying the findings of Lt.
Dioscoro Tagle, Chief Document Examiner of the Manila Police Department, clearing
plaintiff of participation or involvement in the fraudulent transactions complained of,
despite the negative results of the lie detector tests which defendants compelled
plaintiff to undergo, and although the police investigation was "still under follow-up
and a supplementary report will be submitted after all the evidence has been
gathered," defendants hastily filed six (6) criminal cases with the city Fiscal's Office
of Manila, five (5) for estafa thru falsification of commercial document and one (1) for
violation of Art. 290 of the Revised Penal Code, so much so that as was to be
expected, all six (6) cases were dismissed, with one of the investigating fiscals, Asst.
Fiscal de Guia, commenting in one case that, "Indeed, the haphazard way this case
was investigated is evident. Evident likewise is the flurry and haste in the filing of this
case against respondent Tobias," there can be no mistaking that defendants would
not but be motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause
damage to plaintiff.
x x x
[RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 235-236].
In addition to the observations made by the trial court, the Court finds it significant that the criminal
complaints were filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case filed by Tobias against
petitioners. This explains the haste in which the complaints were filed, which the trial court earlier
noted. But petitioners, to prove their good faith, point to the fact that only six complaints were filed
against Tobias when they could have allegedly filed one hundred cases, considering the number of
anomalous transactions committed against GLOBE MACKAY. However, petitioners' good faith is
belied by the threat made by Hendry after the filing of the first complaint that one hundred more
cases would be filed against Tobias. In effect, the possible filing of one hundred more cases was
made to hang like the sword of Damocles over the head of Tobias. In fine, considering the haste in
which the criminal complaints were filed, the fact that they were filed during the pendency of the
illegal dismissal case against petitioners, the threat made by Hendry, the fact that the cases were
filed notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from involvement in the anomalies
committed against GLOBE MACKAY, coupled by the eventual dismissal of all the cases, the Court is
led into no other conclusion than that petitioners were motivated by malicious intent in filing the six
criminal complaints against Tobias.
Petitioners next contend that the award of damages was excessive. In the complaint filed against
petitioners, Tobias prayed for the following: one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) as actual
damages; fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages; eight hundred thousand pesos
(P800,000.00) as moral damages; fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as attorney's fees; and costs.
The trial court, after making a computation of the damages incurred by Tobias [See RTC Decision,
pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 154-1551, awarded him the following: eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as
actual damages; two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages; twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages; thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees;
and, costs. It must be underscored that petitioners have been guilty of committing several actionable
tortious acts, i.e., the abusive manner in which they dismissed Tobias from work including the
baseless imputation of guilt and the harassment during the investigations; the defamatory language
heaped on Tobias as well as the scornful remark on Filipinos; the poison letter sent to RETELCO
which resulted in Tobias' loss of possible employment; and, the malicious filing of the criminal
complaints. Considering the extent of the damage wrought on Tobias, the Court finds that, contrary
to petitioners' contention, the amount of damages awarded to Tobias was reasonable under the
circumstances.
Yet, petitioners still insist that the award of damages was improper, invoking the principle of damnum
absqueinjuria. It is argued that "[t]he only probable actual damage that plaintiff (private respondent
herein) could have suffered was a direct result of his having been dismissed from his employment,
which was a valid and legal act of the defendants-appellants (petitioners herein).lwph1.t " [Petition, p. 17;
Rollo, p. 18].
According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not constitute a
violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable [Escano v. CA, G.R. No. L-
47207, September 25, 1980, 100 SCRA 197; See also Gilchrist v. Cuddy 29 Phil, 542 (1915); The
Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw, G.R. No. L-18805, August 14, 1967, 20 SCRA 987]. This principle
finds no application in this case. It bears repeating that even granting that petitioners might have had
the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised
amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the damage
incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive manner in which he was dismissed
but was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners.
Petitioners next question the award of moral damages. However, the Court has already ruled
in Wassmer v. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964, 12 SCRA 648, 653, that [p]er express
provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases
mentioned in Article 21 of said Code." Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no error in awarding
moral damages to Tobias.
Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by petitioners. Although Article 2231 of the
Civil Code provides that "[i]n quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant
acted with gross negligence," the Court, in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., G.R. No. L-
28589, January 8, 1973, 49 SCRA 1, ruled that if gross negligence warrants the award of exemplary
damages, with more reason is its imposition justified when the act performed is deliberate, malicious
and tainted with bad faith. As in the Zuluetacase, the nature of the wrongful acts shown to have been
committed by petitioners against Tobias is sufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages to
the latter.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 09055 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., took no part.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 132344 February 17, 2000
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner,
vs.
ROMEO A. JADER, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
May an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a student into believing that
the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case? This is the
issue in the instant petition for review premised on the following undisputed facts as summarized by
the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals (CA),
1
to wit:
Plaintiff was enrolled in the defendants' College of Law from 1984 up to 1988. In the first
semester of his last year (School year 1987-1988), he failed to take the regular final
examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an incomplete grade (Exhibits "2",
also Exhibit "H"). He enrolled for the second semester as fourth year law student (Exhibit
"A") and on February 1, 1988 he filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade
given him by Professor Carlos Ortega (Exhibits "H-2", also Exhibit "2") which was approved
by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after payment of the required fee. He took the examination on
March 28, 1988. On May 30, 1988, Professor Carlos Ortega submitted his grade. It was a
grade of five (5). (Exhibits "H-4", also Exhibits "2-L", "2-N").1wphi 1. nt
In the meantime, the Dean and the Faculty Members of the College of Law met to deliberate
on who among the fourth year students should be allowed to graduate. The plaintiff's name
appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for graduation for the Degree of Bachelor of
Laws (LL.B) as of Second Semester (1987-1988) with the following annotation:
JADER ROMEO A.
Def. Conflict of Laws x-1-87-88, Practice Court I Inc., 1-87-88 C-1 to submit transcript with
S.O. (Exhibits "3", "3-C-1", "3-C-2").
The 35th Investitures & Commencement Ceremonies for the candidates of Bachelor of Laws
was scheduled on the 16th of April 1988 at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, and in the invitation
for that occasion the name of the plaintiff appeared as one of the candidates. (Exhibits "B",
"B-6", "B-6-A"). At the foot of the list of the names of the candidates there appeared however
the following annotation:
This is a tentative list Degrees will be conferred upon these candidates who
satisfactorily complete requirements as stated in the University Bulletin and as
approved of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (Exhibit "B-7-A").
The plaintiff attended the investiture ceremonies at F. dela Cruz Quadrangle, U.E., Recto
Campus, during the program of which he went up the stage when his name was called,
escorted by her (sic) mother and his eldest brother who assisted in placing the Hood, and his
Tassel was turned from left to right, and he was thereafter handed by Dean Celedonio a
rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of the Law Diploma. His relatives took pictures of the
occasion (Exhibits "C" to "C-6", "D-3" to "D-11").
He tendered a blow-out that evening which was attended by neighbors, friends and relatives
who wished him good luck in the forthcoming bar examination. There were pictures taken too
during the blow-out (Exhibits "D" to "D-1").
He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. He took a leave of absence without
pay from his job from April 20, 1988 to September 30, 1988 (Exhibit "G") and enrolled at the
pre-bar review class in Far Eastern University. (Exhibits "F" to "F-2"). Having learned of the
deficiency he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar examination.
2

Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered moral shock, mental
anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights when he
was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the latter's negligence. He prayed for an
award of moral and exemplary damages, unrealized income, attorney's fees, and costs of suit.
In its answer with counterclaim, petitioner denied liability arguing mainly that it never led respondent
to believe that he completed the requirements for a Bachelor of Laws degree when his name was
included in the tentative list of graduating students. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant ordering the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of THIRTY FIVE
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY PESOS (P35,470.00) with legal rate of interest
from the filing of the complaint until fully paid, the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00) as attorney's fees and the cost of suit.
Defendant's counterclaim is, for lack of merit, hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
3

which on appeal by both parties was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) with modification. The
dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the lower Court's Decision is hereby AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that defendant-appellee, in addition to the sum adjudged by the
lower court in favor of plaintiff-appellant, is also ORDERED to pay plaintiff-appellant the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS for moral damages. Costs against
defendant-appellee.
SO ORDERED.
4

Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner UE elevated the case to this Court on a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, arguing that it has no liability to respondent
Romeo A. Jader, considering that the proximate and immediate cause of the alleged damages
incurred by the latter arose out of his own negligence in not verifying from the professor concerned
the result of his removal exam.
The petition lacks merit.
When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning institution, a contract of education is
entered into between said institution and the student. The professors, teachers or instructors hired
by the school are considered merely as agents and administrators tasked to perform the school's
commitment under the contract. Since the contracting parties are the school and the student, the
latter is not duty-bound to deal with the former's agents, such as the professors with respect to the
status or result of his grades, although nothing prevents either professors or students from sharing
with each other such information. The Court takes judicial notice of the traditional practice in
educational institutions wherein the professor directly furnishes his/her students their grades. It is the
contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to
each and every student as to whether he or she had already complied with all the requirements for
the conferment of a degree or whether they would be included among those who will graduate.
Although commencement exercises are but a formal ceremony, it nonetheless is not an ordinary
occasion, since such ceremony is the educational institution's way of announcing to the whole world
that the students included in the list of those who will be conferred a degree during the
baccalaureate ceremony have satisfied all the requirements for such degree. Prior or subsequent to
the ceremony, the school has the obligation to promptly inform the student of any problem involving
the latter's grades and performance and also most importantly, of the procedures for remedying the
same.
Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal examination, particularly at
a time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted
in good faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by
the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes
an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and
technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render
the transaction unconscientious.
5
It is the school that has access to those information and it is only
the school that can compel its professors to act and comply with its rules, regulations and policies
with respect to the computation and the prompt submission of grades. Students do not exercise
control, much less influence, over the way an educational institution should run its affairs, particularly
in disciplining its professors and teachers and ensuring their compliance with the school's rules and
orders. Being the party that hired them, it is the school that exercises general supervision and
exclusive control over the professors with respect to the submission of reports involving the students'
standing. Exclusive control means that no other person or entity had any control over the
instrumentality which caused the damage or injury.
6

The college dean is the senior officer responsible for the operation of an academic program,
enforcement of rules and regulations, and the supervision of faculty and student services.
7
He must
see to it that his own professors and teachers, regardless of their status or position outside of the
university, must comply with the rules set by the latter. The negligent act of a professor who fails to
observe the rules of the school, for instance by not promptly submitting a student's grade, is not only
imputable to the professor but is an act of the school, being his employer.
Considering further, that the institution of learning involved herein is a university which is engaged in
legal education, it should have practiced what it inculcates in its students, more specifically the
principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory
law.
8
In civilized society, men must be able to assume that others will do them no intended injury
that others will commit no internal aggressions upon them; that their fellowmen, when they act
affirmatively will do so with due care which the ordinary understanding and moral sense of the
community exacts and that those with whom they deal in the general course of society will act in
good faith. The ultimate thing in the theory of liability is justifiable reliance under conditions of
civilized society.
9
Schools and professors cannot just take students for granted and be indifferent to
them, for without the latter, the former are useless.
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait
for the latter to inquire from the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or
welfare of the person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can support a claim for
damages.
10
Want of care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious
knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to produce them would make the erring party
liable.
11
Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the essence in the performance of its
obligation to inform respondent of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance that respondent will not
prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the immediate concern after graduation of
an LL.B. graduate. It failed to act seasonably. Petitioner cannot just give out its student's grades at
any time because a student has to comply with certain deadlines set by the Supreme Court on the
submission of requirements for taking the bar. Petitioner's liability arose from its failure to promptly
inform respondent of the result of an examination and in misleading the latter into believing that he
had satisfied all requirements for the course. Worth quoting is the following disquisition of the
respondent court:
It is apparent from the testimony of Dean Tiongson that defendant-appellee University had
been informed during the deliberation that the professor in Practice Court I gave plaintiff-
appellant a failing grade. Yet, defendant-appellee still did not inform plaintiff-appellant of his
failure to complete the requirements for the degree nor did they remove his name from the
tentative list of candidates for graduation. Worse, defendant-appellee university, despite the
knowledge that plaintiff-appellant failed in Practice Court I, again included plaintiff-appellant's
name in the "tentative list of candidates for graduation which was prepared after the
deliberation and which became the basis for the commencement rites program. Dean
Tiongson reasons out that plaintiff-appellant's name was allowed to remain in the tentative
list of candidates for graduation in the hope that the latter would still be able to remedy the
situation in the remaining few days before graduation day. Dean Tiongson, however, did not
explain how plaintiff appellant Jader could have done something to complete his deficiency if
defendant-appellee university did not exert any effort to inform plaintiff-appellant of his failing
grade in Practice Court I.
12

Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its own negligence that led to the
delayed relay of information to respondent. When one of two innocent parties must suffer, he
through whose agency the loss occurred must bear it.
13
The modern tendency is to grant indemnity
for damages in cases where there is abuse of right, even when the act is not illicit.
14
If mere fault or
negligence in one's acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with more
reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. A person should be protected only when he acts
in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith, but not
when he acts with negligence or abuse.
15

However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to respondent for the latter's actual
damages, we hold that respondent should not have been awarded moral damages. We do not agree
with the Court of Appeals' findings that respondent suffered shock, trauma and pain when he was
informed that he could not graduate and will not be allowed to take the bar examinations. At the very
least, it behooved on respondent to verify for himself whether he has completed all necessary
requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. As a senior law student, respondent should
have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, specifically those pertaining to his
academic achievement, are in order. Given these considerations, we fail to see how respondent
could have suffered untold embarrassment in attending the graduation rites, enrolling in the bar
review classes and not being able to take the bar exams. If respondent was indeed humiliated by his
failure to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the
requirements including his school records, before preparing himself for the bar examination.
Certainly, taking the bar examinations does not only entail a mental preparation on the subjects
thereof; there are also prerequisites of documentation and submission of requirements which the
prospective examinee must meet.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY respondent the sum of Thirty-five Thousand Four Hundred Seventy
Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal interest of 6% per annum computed from the date of filing of the
complaint until fully paid; the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees; and
the costs of the suit. The award of moral damages is DELEIED.1wphi 1. nt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J .:
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez,
for legal separation and one million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the
defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,
1
all surnamed "Escao," respectively.
2

The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City,
where she was then enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta Escao, 27 years of
age (scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered
colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-
army officer and of undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic
chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage was the
culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local civil register.
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply
in love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they had planned out
their marital future whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they started saving
money in a piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken;
Vicenta returned the engagement ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor
beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This time they planned to get married and
then elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to the room of
Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual trysting place.
Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however,
materialize because when Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who got
wind of the intended nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home
where she admitted that she had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escao were
surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of the
great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The
following morning, the Escao spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a
recelebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the
Church, due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating
chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not take place, because on 26 February
1948 Mamerto Escao was handed by a maid, whose name he claims he does not remember, a
letter purportedly coming from San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous relationship
between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and
thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the house of Mrs.
Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his
job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her husband's welfare,
was not as endearing as her previous letters when their love was aflame.
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it. She fondly
accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her parents from communicating
with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escao"), but her letters became less frequent as the days passed. As of June,
1948 the newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2-Escao"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez,
Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a
lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She
did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her non-
appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her
application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City,
and that she intended to return after two years. The application was approved, and she left for the
United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein
plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe,
on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of
divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escao filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their
daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation
of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives
with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8
August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escao, her parents,
Mamerto and Mena Escao, whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from
joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for
having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an
equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that
they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his
wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto
Escao and Mena Escao for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the
plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escao liable for
damages and in dismissing the complaint;.
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doa Mena
Escao liable for damages;.
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the defendant
parents on their counterclaims; and.
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee,
Vicenta Escao, were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly
established by the record before us. Both parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise
qualified; and both consented to the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic priest (army
chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was
not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary, as
required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separation of Church
and State but also because Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in
force at the time) expressly provided that
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the
contracting parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and, therefore,
not essential to give the marriage civil effects,
3
and this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage
act, which provided the following:
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be declared invalid
because of the absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it
was performed, the spouses or one of them believed in good faith that the person who
solemnized the marriage was actually empowered to do so, and that the marriage was
perfectly legal.
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be
presumed until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs.
Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of
the solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father
Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in abandoning her original
action for annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that her marriage to
plaintiff was valid and binding.
Defendant Vicenta Escao argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the undue
influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez.
Even granting, for argument's sake, the truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent
was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did not render her marriage ab initio void, but
merely voidable, and the marriage remained valid until annulled by a competent civil court. This was
never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis
was dismissed for non-prosecution.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta
Escao remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of
absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial
District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in
character." At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escao, like her husband, was still a
Filipino citizen.
4
She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo
matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the
matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery
of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only
provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly
prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute
divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state,
specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect,
give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of
those members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute
divorces outside the Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the
Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private
parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-
resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95
Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in this
jurisdiction Vicenta Escao's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for
her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows,
likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion
of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled
to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit
nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim,
adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically
"intercourse with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles
plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery"
(Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce are in
accord with the previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly those that
were rendered under our laws prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the
Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a
vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and the present Civil Code of the Philippines,
in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the subject prevailing
before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Act above-
mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of
particular interest. Said this Court in that case:
As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the marriage of
Dr. Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations;
and the circumstance that they afterwards passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until
her death is wholly without legal significance. The claims of the very children to participate in
the estate of Samuel Bishop must therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to
legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural children. The children of adulterous
relations are wholly excluded. The word "descendants" as used in Article 941 of the Civil
Code cannot be interpreted to include illegitimates born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis
supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage to
Leo Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is authority
for the proposition that such union is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action
for legal separation on the part of the innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands undissolved
in Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial court committed error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person (whether
divorced or not) would depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind are
not new in the Philippines, and the answer to them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:
The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known to the
members of the Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as
written by Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are
too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escao and his wife,
the late Doa Mena Escao, alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct
toward her husband are not supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez
about the Escao's animosity toward him strikes us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and
are belied by Pastor's own letters written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-Escao" and "Vicenta,"
Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized to the defendants for
"misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful
pride," "effrontery and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escao house to visit and court
Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that he would not have been accepted to marry
Vicente had he openly asked for her hand, as good manners and breeding demanded. Even after
learning of the clandestine marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected event, the parents
of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in strict conformity with the
canons of their religion upon advice that the previous one was canonically defective. If no
recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it was not due to defendants Mamerto Escao and
his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses Escao did not seek to
compel or induce their daughter to assent to the recelebration but respected her decision, or that
they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation of affections. Neither does the
fact that Vicenta's parents sent her money while she was in the United States; for it was natural that
they should not wish their daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur in her decision to
divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her
original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently,
and being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be
respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the
absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith being always
presumed until the contrary is proved.
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. The law distinguishes between the right
of a parent to interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a
stranger to intermeddle in such affairs. However, such distinction between the liability of
parents and that of strangers is only in regard to what will justify interference. A parent
isliable for alienation of affections resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he
wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless
he acts maliciously, without justification and from unworthy motives. He is not liable where he
acts and advises his child in good faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the
interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not terminating his right and liberty
to interest himself in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and happiness, even
where his conduct and advice suggest or result in the separation of the spouses or the
obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or where he acts under mistake or misinformation, or
where his advice or interference are indiscreet or unfortunate, although it has been held that
the parent is liable for consequences resulting from recklessness. He may in good faith take
his child into his home and afford him or her protection and support, so long as he has not
maliciously enticed his child away, or does not maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay
away, from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently been applied in the case of
advice given to a married daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case of advice given to
a son.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and
with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably
caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have
been impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts
and circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or
spleen.
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from
defendant Vicente Escao, it is proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable claim
for a million pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not
characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived
together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant had originally agreed to the annulment of the
marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ.
Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a consequence of the
indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather
than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion that appellant should
recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's fees.
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escao and Mena
Escao, by the court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of this unfounded
suit must have wounded said defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no
way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a
common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the
decision of the court below, is that said defendants were not guilty of any improper conduct in the
whole deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.
Summing up, the Court rules:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the
present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and
neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the
foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country;
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful
husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to
recover damages;
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the
absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from
defendant Vicenta F. Escao;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount
of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escao and the estate of
his wife, the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
Neither party to recover costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar,
JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46061 November 14, 1984
ST. LOUIS REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CONRADO J. ARAMIL, respondents.
Romeo Z. Comia for petitioner.
Roman R. Bersamin for private respondent.

AQUINO, J .:
This case is about the recovery of damages for a wrongful advertisement in the Sunday
Times where Saint Louis Realty Corporation misrepresented that the house of Doctor Conrado J.
Aramil belonged to Arcadio S. Arcadio.
St. Louis Realty caused to be published with the permission of Arcadio S. Arcadio (but without
permission of Doctor Aramil) in the issue of the Sunday Times of December 15, 1968 an
advertisement with the heading "WHERE THE HEART IS". Below that heading was the photograph
of the residence of Doctor Aramil and theArcadio family and then below the photograph was the
following write-up:
Home is where the heart is. And the hearts of MR. AND MRS. ARCADIO S.
ARCADIO and their family have been captured by BROOKSIDE HILLS. They used to
rent a small 2-bedroom house in a cramped neighborhood, sadly inadequate and
unwholesome for the needs of a large family. They dream(ed) of a more pleasant
place free from the din and dust of city life yet near all facilities. Plans took shape
when they heard of BROOKSIDE HILLS. With thrift and determination, they bought a
lot and built their dream house ... for P31,000. The Arcadios are now part of the
friendly, thriving community of BROOKSIDE HILLS... a beautiful first-class
subdivision planned for wholesome family living.
The same advertisement appeared in the Sunday Times dated January 5, 1969. Doctor Aramil a
neuropsychiatrist and a member of the faculty of the U. E. Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Hospital,
noticed the mistake. On that same date, he wrote St. Louis Realty the following letter of protest:
Dear Sirs:
This is anent to your advertisements appearing in the December 15, 1968 and
January 5, 1969 issues of the Sunday Times which boldly depicted my house at the
above-mentioned address and implying that it belonged to another person. I am not
aware of any permission or authority on my partfor the use of my house for such
publicity.
This unauthorized use of my house for your promotional gain and much more the
apparent distortions therein are I believe not only transgression to my private
property but also damaging to my prestige in the medical profession I have had
invited in several occasions numerous medical colleagues, medical students and
friends to my house and after reading your December 15 advertisement some of
them have uttered some remarks purporting doubts as to my professional and
personal integrity. Such sly remarks although in light vein as "it looks like your
house," "how much are you renting from the Arcadios?", " like your wife portrayed in
the papers as belonging to another husband," etc., have resulted in no little mental
anguish on my part.
I have referred this matter to the Legal Panel of the Philippine Medical Association
and their final advice is pending upon my submission of supporting ownership
papers.
I will therefore be constrained to pursue court action against your corporation unless
you could satisfactorily explain this matter within a week upon receipt of this letter.
The letter was received by Ernesto Magtoto, an officer of St. Louis Realty in charge of advertising.
He stopped publication of the advertisement. He contacted Doctor Aramil and offered his apologies.
However, no rectification or apology was published.
On February 20, 1969, Aramil's counsel demanded from St. Louis Realty actual, moral and
exemplary damages of P110,000 (Exh. D). In its answer dated March 10, St. Louis Realty claimed
that there was an honest mistake and that if Aramil so desired, rectification would be published in
the Manila Times (Exh. 3).
It published in the issue of the Manila Times of March 18, 1969 a new advertisement with the
Arcadio family and their real house. But it did not publish any apology to Doctor Aramil and an
explanation of the error.
On March 29, Aramil filed his complaint for damages. St. Louis Realty published in the issue of
the Manila Times of April 15, 1969 the following "NOTICE OF RECTIFICATION" in a space 4 by 3
inches:
This will serve as a notice that our print ad 'Where the Heart is' which appeared in
the Manila Timesissue of March 18, 1969 is a rectification of the same ad that
appeared in the Manila Times issues rectification of the same ad that appeal of
December 15, 1968 and January 5, 1969 wherein a photo of the house of another
Brookside Homeowner (Dr. Aramil-private respondent) was mistakenly used as a
background for the featured homeowner's the Arcadio family.
The ad of March 18, 1969 shows the Arcadio family with their real house in the
background, as was intended all along.
Judge Jose M. Leuterio observed that St. Louis Realty should have immediately published a
rectification and apology. He found that as a result of St. Louis Realty's mistake, magnified by its
utter lack of sincerity, Doctor Aramil suffered mental anguish and his income was reduced by about
P1,000 to P1,500 a month. Moreover, there was violation of Aramil's right to privacy (Art. 26, Civil
Code).
The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000
as attorney's fees. St. Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Appellate Court affirmed that judgment, with Acting Presiding Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan
as ponente, and Justices Sixto A. Domondon and Samuel F. Reyes concurring.
The Appellate Court reasoned out that St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under
articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful
house which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed by that
contretemps.
In this appeal, St. Louis Realty contends that the Appellate Court ignored certain facts and resorted
to surmises and conjectures. This contention is unwarranted. The Appellate Court adopted the facts
found by the trial court. Those factual findings are binding on this Court.
St. Louis Realty also contends that the decision is contrary to law and that the case was decided in a
way not in conformity with the rulings of this Court. It argues that the case is not covered by article
26 which provides that "every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind of his neighbors and other persons". "Prying into the privacy of another's residence" and
"meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another" and "similar acts", "though
they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention
and other relief".
The damages fixed by Judge Leuterio are sanctioned by Articles 2200, 2208 and 2219 of the Civil
Code. Article 2219 allows moral damages for acts and actions mentioned in Article 26. As lengthily
explained by Justice Gatmaitan, the acts and omissions of the firm fan under Article 26.
St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in
a widely circulated publication like the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written
apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ".
Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the distorted, lingering
impression that he was renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him.
Either way, his private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of
income and mental anguish.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Escolin and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988
LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANIIA,
BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B.
ABAYAN, respondents.
Leopoldo P. Dela Rosa for petitioner.
Emiterio C. Manibog for private respondent.
City Fiscal of Manila for public respondent.

GANCAYCO, J .:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the question for the resolution
of the Court is whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court of First Itance of
Manila should be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial
question. The respondent judge ruled in the negative. We sustain him.
The pertinent facts as set forth in the records follow. On January 23, 1979, the City Fiscal of Manila
acting thru Assistant City Fiscal Amado N. Cantor filed an information for bigamy against herein
petitioner, Leonilo C. Donato with the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 43554 and assigned to Branch XXXII of said court. The information was filed based on the
complaint of private respondent Paz B. Abayan.
On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's arraignment, private respondent filed with the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a civil action for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978, which action was docketed as Civil
Case No. E-02627. Said civil case was based on the ground that private respondent consented to
entering into the marriage, which was petitioner Donato's second one, since she had no previous
knowledge that petitioner was already married to a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping on June 30, 1978.
Petitioner Donato's answer in the civil case for nullity interposed the defense that his second
marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence,
intimidation and undue influence were employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent
to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the subsequent or second marriage, petitioner and
private respondent had lived together and deported themselves as husband and wife without the
benefit of wedlock for a period of at least five years as evidenced by a joint affidavit executed by
them on September 26, 1978, for which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with
pursuant to Article 76 of the New Civil Code pertaining to marriages of exceptional character.
Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 43554, petitioner filed a motion to
suspend the proceedings of said case contending that Civil Case No. E-02627 seeking the
annulment of his second marriage filed by private respondent raises a prejudicial question which
must first be determined or decided before the criminal case can proceed.
In an order dated April 7, 1980. Hon. Artemon D. Luna denied the motion to suspend the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 43554 for bigamy. Respondent judge's basis for denial is the
ruling laid down in the case of Landicho vs. Relova.
1
The order further directed that the proceedings in
the criminal case can proceed as scheduled.
A motion for reconsideration was flied by herein petitioner thru counsel citing as one of his grounds
for suspension of proceedings the ruling laid down by this Court in the case of De la Cruz vs.
Ejercito
2
which was a much later case than that cited by respondent judge in his order of denial.
The motion for reconsideration of the said order was likewise denied in an order dated April 14,
1980, for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction.
A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which
question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal.
3
It is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend
the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised
in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
4
A prejudicial
question usually comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action may proceed,
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de
jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal case.
5

The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted that the
issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second
marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy.
Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the herein private respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed
the complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained
through deceit.
Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage should have been declared null and
void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed against him by private
respondent only sometime later when he was required to answer the civil action for anulment of the
second marriage. The doctrine elucidated upon by the case of Landicho vs. Relova
6
may be applied
to the present case. Said case states that:
The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the
accused in a bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are
automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the case. In order
that the case of annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the
bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown that the petitioner's consent to
such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress, force and
intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and
cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. The situation in the
present case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy
on February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted
appeared to be indisputable. And it was the second spouse, not the petitioner who
filed the action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. And it was
only on June 15, 1963, that petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, filed a third-
party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be
declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. Assuming that
the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, the fact
would not be material to the outcome of the case. Parties to the marriage should not
be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. The lower court therefore, has not abused much
less gravely abused, its discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as sought by
petitioner.
In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his consent to the second marriage
has been obtained by the use of threats, force and intimidation.
Petitioner calls the attention of this Court to the fact that the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito is a later
case and as such it should be the one applied to the case at bar. We cannot agree. The situation in
the case at bar is markedly different. In the aforecited case it was accused Milagros dela Cruz who
was charged with bigamy for having contracted a second marriage while a previous one existed.
Likewise, Milagros dela Cruz was also the one who filed an action for annulment on the ground of
duress, as contra-distinguished from the present case wherein it was private respondent Paz B.
Abayan, petitioner's second wife, who filed a complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the
ground that her consent was obtained through deceit since she was not aware that petitioner's
marriage was still subsisting. Moreover, in De la Cruz, a judgment was already rendered in the civil
case that the second marriage of De la Cruz was null and void, thus determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In the present case, there is as yet no such judgment
in the civil case.
Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule
on prejudicial questions since a case for annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial
question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner's consent to
such marriage was obtained by means of duress, violence and intimidation in order to establish that
his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the
basis for conviction. The preceding elements do not exist in the case at bar.
Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of the
criminal case. The records reveal that prior to petitioner's second marriage on September 26, 1978,
he had been living with private respondent Paz B. Abayan as husband and wife for more than five
years without the benefit of marriage. Thus, petitioner's averments that his consent was obtained by
private respondent through force, violence, intimidation and undue influence in entering a
subsequent marriage is belled by the fact that both petitioner and private respondent executed an
affidavit which stated that they had lived together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage
for five years, one month and one day until their marital union was formally ratified by the second
marriage and that it was private respondent who eventually filed the civil action for nullity.
Another event which militates against petitioner's contentions is the fact hat it was only when Civil
Case No. E-02627 was filed on September 28, 1979, or more than the lapse of one year from the
solemnization of the second marriage that petitioner came up with the story that his consent to the
marriage was secured through the use of force, violence, intimidation and undue influence.
Petitioner also continued to live with private respondent until November 1978, when the latter left
their abode upon learning that Leonilo Donato was already previously married.
In the light of the preceding factual circumstances, it can be seen that the respondent Judge did not
err in his earlier order. There is no pivotal issue that must be pre-emptively resolved in Civil Case
No. E-02627 before proceedings in the criminal action for bigamy can be undertaken.
Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued by the
respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
We make no pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 147902 March 17, 2006
SPOUSES VICENTE YU AND DEMETRIA LEE-YU, Petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J .:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision
1
dated November 14, 2000 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 58982 and the CA Resolution dated April 26, 2001,
which denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
Under a Real Estate Mortgage dated August 15, 1994
2
and Amendments of Real Estate Mortgage
dated April 4, 1995
3
and December 4, 1995,
4
spouses Vicente Yu and Demetria Lee-Yu (petitioners)
and spouses Ramon T. Yu and Virginia A. Tiu, or Yu Tian Hock aka Victorino/Vicente Yu, mortgaged
their title, interest, and participation over several parcels of land located in Dagupan City and
Quezon City, in favor of the Philippine Commercial International Bank (respondent) as security for
the payment of a loan in the amount of P9,000,000.00.
5

As the petitioners failed to pay the loan, the interest, and the penalties due thereon, respondent filed
on July 21, 1998 with the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial
Court of Dagupan City a Petition for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage on the
Dagupan City properties.
6
On August 3, 1998, the City Sheriff issued a Notice of Extra-Judicial Sale
scheduling the auction sale on September 10, 1998 at 10:00 oclock in the morning or soon
thereafter in front of the Justice Hall, Bonuan, Tondaligan, Dagupan City.
7

At the auction sale on September 10, 1998, respondent emerged as the highest bidder.
8
On
September 14, 1998, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of respondent.
9
On October 1, 1998,
the sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Dagupan City.
About two months before the expiration of the redemption period, or on August 20, 1999, respondent
filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Writ of Possession before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City,
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 99-00988-D and raffled to Branch 43 (RTC Branch
43).
10
Hearing was conducted on September 14, 1999 and respondent presented its evidence ex-
parte.
11
The testimony of Rodante Manuel was admitted ex-parte and thereafter the petition was
deemed submitted for resolution.
On September 30, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss and to Strike Out Testimony of
Rodante Manuel stating that the Certificate of Sale dated September 14, 1998 is void because
respondent violated Article 2089 of the Civil Code on the indivisibility of the mortgaged by conducting
two separate foreclosure proceedings on the mortgage properties in Dagupan City and Quezon City
and indicating in the two notices of extra-judicial sale that petitioners obligation
is P10,437,015.20
12
as of March 31, 1998, when petitioners are not indebted for the total amount
of P20,874,031.56.
13

In the meantime, petitioners filed a complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Sale before the
Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-03169-D and raffled to Branch
44 (RTC Branch 44).
On February 14, 2000, RTC Branch 43 denied petitioners Motion to Dismiss and to Strike Out
Testimony of Rodante Manuel, ruling that the filing of a motion to dismiss is not allowed in petitions
for issuance of writ of possession under Section 7 of Act No. 3135.
14

On February 24, 2000, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, further arguing that the
pendency of Civil Case No. 99-03169-D in RTC Branch 44 is a prejudicial issue to Spec. Proc. No.
99-00988-D in RTC Branch 43, the resolution of which is determinative on the propriety of the
issuance of a writ of possession.
15

On May 8, 2000, RTC Branch 43 denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, holding that the
principle of prejudicial question is not applicable because the case pending before RTC Branch 44 is
also a civil case and not a criminal case.
16

On June 1, 2000, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA.
17
On November 14, 2000, the
CA dismissed petitioners Petition for Certiorari on the grounds that petitioners violated Section 8 of
Act No. 3135 and disregarded the rule against multiplicity of suits in filing Civil Case No. 99-03169-D
in RTC Branch 44 despite full knowledge of the pendency of Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D in RTC
Branch 43; that since the one-year period of redemption has already lapsed, the issuance of a writ of
possession in favor of respondent becomes a ministerial duty of the trial court; that the issues in Civil
Case No. 99-03169-D are not prejudicial questions to Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D because: (a) the
special proceeding is already fait accompli, (b) Civil Case No. 99-03169-D is deemed not filed for
being contrary to Section 8 of Act No. 3135, (c) the filing of Civil Case No. 99-03169-D is an
afterthought and dilatory in nature, and (d) legally speaking what seems to exist is litis pendentia and
not prejudicial question.
18

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration
19
but it was denied by the CA on April 26, 2001.
20

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Petitioners pose two issues for resolution, to wit:
A. Whether or not a real estate mortgage over several properties located in different locality
[sic] can be separately foreclosed in different places.
B. Whether or not the pendency of a prejudicial issue renders the issues in Special
Proceedings No. 99-00988-D as [sic] moot and academic.
21

Anent the first issue, petitioners contend that since a real estate mortgage is indivisible, the
mortgaged properties in Dagupan City and Quezon City cannot be separately foreclosed. Petitioners
further point out that two notices of extra-judicial sale indicated that petitioners obligation
is P10,437,015.20
22
each as of March 31, 1998 or a total ofP20,874,030.40,
23
yet their own
computation yields only P9,957,508.90 as of February 27, 1998.
As to the second issue, petitioners posit that the pendency of Civil Case No. 99-03169-D is a
prejudicial issue, the resolution of which will render the issues in Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D moot
and academic. Petitioners further aver that they did not violate Section 8 of Act No. 3135 in filing a
separate case to annul the certificate of sale since the use of the word "may" in said provision
indicates that they have the option to seek relief of filing a petition to annul the certificate of sale in
the proceeding involving the application for a writ of possession or in a separate proceeding.
Respondent contends
24
that, with respect to the first issue, the filing of two separate foreclosure
proceedings did not violate Article 2089 of the Civil Code on the indivisibility of a real estate
mortgage since Section 2 of Act No. 3135 expressly provides that extra-judicial foreclosure may only
be made in the province or municipality where the property is situated. Respondent further submits
that the filing of separate applications for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage involving several
properties in different locations is allowed by A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, the Procedure on Extra-Judicial
Foreclosure of Mortgage, as further amended on August 7, 2001.
As to the second issue, respondent maintains that there is no prejudicial question between Civil
Case No. 99-03169-D and Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D since the pendency of a civil action
questioning the validity of the mortgage and the extra-judicial foreclosure thereof does not bar the
issuance of a writ of possession. Respondent also insists that petitioners should have filed their
Petition to Annul the Certificate of Sale in the same case where possession is being sought, that is,
in Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D, and not in a separate proceeding (Civil Case No. 99-01369-D)
because the venue of the action to question the validity of the foreclosure is not discretionary since
the use of the word "may" in Section 8 of Act No. 3135 refers to the filing of the petition or action
itself and not to the venue. Respondent further argues that even if petitioners filed the Petition to
Annul the Certificate of Sale in Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D, the writ of possession must still be
issued because issuance of the writ in favor of the purchaser is a ministerial act of the trial court and
the one-year period of redemption has already lapsed.
Anent the first issue, the Court finds that petitioners have a mistaken notion that the indivisibility of a
real estate mortgage relates to the venue of extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings. The rule on
indivisibility of a real estate mortgage is provided for in Article 2089 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
Art. 2089. A pledge or mortgage is indivisible, even though the debt may be divided among the
successors in interest of the debtor or of the creditor.
Therefore, the debtors heir who has paid a part of the debt cannot ask for the proportionate
extinguishment of the pledge or mortgage as the debt is not completely satisfied.
Neither can the creditors heir who received his share of the debt return the pledge or cancel the
mortgage, to the prejudice of the other heirs who have not been paid.
From these provisions is excepted the case in which, there being several things given in mortgage or
pledge, each one of them guarantees only a determinate portion of the credit.
The debtor, in this case, shall have a right to the extinguishment of the pledge or mortgage as the
portion of the debt for which each thing is specially answerable is satisfied.
This rule presupposes several heirs of the debtor or creditor
25
and therefore not applicable to the
present case. Furthermore, what the law proscribes is the foreclosure of only a portion of the
property or a number of the several properties mortgaged corresponding to the unpaid portion of the
debt where, before foreclosure proceedings, partial payment was made by the debtor on his total
outstanding loan or obligation. This also means that the debtor cannot ask for the release of any
portion of the mortgaged property or of one or some of the several lots mortgaged unless and until
the loan thus secured has been fully paid, notwithstanding the fact that there has been partial
fulfillment of the obligation. Hence, it is provided that the debtor who has paid a part of the debt
cannot ask for the proportionate extinguishment of the mortgage as long as the debt is not
completely satisfied.
26
In essence, indivisibility means that the mortgage obligation cannot be divided
among the different lots,
27
that is, each and every parcel under mortgage answers for the totality of
the debt.
28

On the other hand, the venue of the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings is the place where each of
the mortgaged property is located, as prescribed by Section 2 of Act No. 3135,
29
to wit:
SECTION 2. Said sale cannot be made legally outside of the province in which the property sold is
situated; and in case the place within said province in which the sale is to be made is subject to
stipulation, such sale shall be made in said place or in the municipal building of the municipality in
which the property or part thereof is situated.
A.M. No. 99-10-05-0,
30
the Procedure on Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage, lays down the
guidelines for extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings on mortgaged properties located in different
provinces. It provides that the venue of the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings is the place where
each of the mortgaged property is located. Relevant portion thereof provides:
Where the application concerns the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages of real estates and/or
chattels in different locations covering one indebtedness, only one filing fee corresponding to such
indebtedness shall be collected. The collecting Clerk of Court shall, apart from the official receipt of
the fees, issue a certificate of payment indicating the amount of indebtedness, the filing fees
collected, the mortgages sought to be foreclosed, the real estates and/or chattels mortgaged and
their respective locations, which certificate shall serve the purpose of having the application
docketed with the Clerks of Court of the places where the other properties are located and of
allowing the extrajudicial foreclosures to proceed thereat. (Emphasis supplied)
The indivisibility of the real estate mortgage is not violated by conducting two separate foreclosure
proceedings on mortgaged properties located in different provinces as long as each parcel of land is
answerable for the entire debt. Petitioners assumption that their total obligation is P20,874,030.40
because the two notices of extra-judicial sale indicated that petitioners obligation
is P10,437,015.20
31
each, is therefore flawed. Considering the indivisibility of a real estate mortgage,
the mortgaged properties in Dagupan City and Quezon City are made to answer for the entire debt
of P10,437,015.29.
32

As to the second issue, that is, whether a civil case for annulment of a certificate of sale is a
prejudicial question to a petition for issuance of a writ of possession, this issue is far from novel and,
in fact, not without precedence. In Pahang v. Vestil,
33
the Court said:
A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of
the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It generally
comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there
exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may
proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative
juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the
principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. 1avvph!l. net
In the present case, the complaint of the petitioners for Annulment of Extrajudicial Sale is a civil
action and the respondents petition for the issuance of a writ of possession of Lot No. 3-A, Block 1,
Psd-07-021410, TCT No. 44668 is but an incident in the land registration case and, therefore, no
prejudicial question can arise from the existence of the two actions. A similar issue was raised in
Manalo v. Court of Appeals, where we held that:
At any rate, it taxes our imagination why the questions raised in Case No. 98-0868 must be
considered determinative of Case No. 9011. The basic issue in the former is whether the
respondent, as the purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, may be compelled to have
the property repurchased or resold to a mortgagors successor-in-interest (petitioner); while that in
the latter is merely whether the respondent, as the purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings, is entitled to a writ of possession after the statutory period for redemption has expired.
The two cases, assuming both are pending, can proceed separately and take their own direction
independent of each other.
34

In the present case, Civil Case No. 99-01369-D and Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D are both civil in
nature. The issue in Civil Case No. 99-01369-D is whether the extra-judicial foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage executed by the petitioners in favor of the respondent and the sale of their
properties at public auction are null and void, whereas, the issue in Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D is
whether the respondent is entitled to a writ of possession of the foreclosed properties. Clearly, no
prejudicial question can arise from the existence of the two actions. The two cases can proceed
separately and take their own direction independently of each other.
Nevertheless, there is a need to correct the CAs view that petitioners violated Section 8 of Act No.
3135 and disregarded the proscription on multiplicity of suits by instituting a separate civil suit for
annulment of the certificate of sale while there is a pending petition for issuance of the writ of
possession in a special proceeding.
Section 8 of Act No. 3135 provides:
Sec. 8. Setting aside of sale and writ of possession. The debtor may, in the proceedings in which
possession was requested, but not later than thirty days after the purchaser was given possession,
petition that the sale be set aside and the writ of possession cancelled, specifying the damages
suffered by him, because the mortgage was not violated or the sale was not made in accordance
with the provisions hereof, and the court shall take cognizance of this petition in accordance with the
summary procedure provided for in section one hundred and twelve of Act Numbered Four hundred
and ninety-six; and if it finds the complaint of the debtor justified, it shall dispose in his favor of all or
part of the bond furnished by the person who obtained possession. Either of the parties may appeal
from the order of the judge in accordance with section fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and
ninety-six; but the order of possession shall continue in effect during the pendency of the appeal.
(Emphasis supplied)
Under the provision above cited, the mortgagor may file a petition to set aside the sale and for the
cancellation of a writ of possession with the trial court which issued the writ of possession within 30
days after the purchaser mortgagee was given possession. It provides the plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in opposing the issuance of a writ of possession.
35
Thus, this provision
presupposes that the trial court already issued a writ of possession. In Sps. Ong v. Court of
Appeals,
36
the Court elucidated:
The law is clear that the purchaser must first be placed in possession of the mortgaged property
pending proceedings assailing the issuance of the writ of possession. If the trial court later finds
merit in the petition to set aside the writ of possession, it shall dispose in favor of the mortgagor the
bond furnished by the purchaser. Thereafter, either party may appeal from the order of the judge in
accordance with Section 14 of Act 496, which provides that "every order, decision, and decree of the
Court of Land Registration may be reviewedin the same manner as an order, decision, decree or
judgment of a Court of First Instance (RTC) might be reviewed." The rationale for the mandate is to
allow the purchaser to have possession of the foreclosed property without delay, such possession
being founded on his right of ownership.
37

Accordingly, Section 8 of Act No. 3135 is not applicable to the present case since at the time of the
filing of the separate civil suit for annulment of the certificate of sale in RTC Branch 44, no writ of
possession was yet issued by RTC Branch 43.
Similarly, the Court rejects the CAs application of the principle of litis pendentia to Civil Case No. 99-
03169-D in relation to Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D. Litis pendentia refers to that situation wherein
another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of actions and that the
second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. For litis pendentia to be invoked, the
concurrence of the following requisites is necessary: (a) identity of parties or at least such as
represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the
reliefs being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that
the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount
to res judicata in the other.
38

Applying the foregoing criteria in the instant case, litis pendentia does not obtain in this case
because of the absence of the second and third requisites. The issuance of the writ of possession
being a ministerial function, and summary in nature, it cannot be said to be a judgment on the merits,
but simply an incident in the transfer of title. Hence, a separate case for annulment of mortgage and
foreclosure sale cannot be barred by litis pendentiaor res judicata.
39
Thus, insofar as Spec. Proc. No.
99-00988-D and Civil Case No. 99-03169-D pending before different branches of RTC Dagupan City
are concerned, there is no litis pendentia.
To sum up, the Court holds that the rule on indivisibility of the real estate mortgage cannot be
equated with the venue of foreclosure proceedings on mortgaged properties located in different
provinces since these are two unrelated concepts. Also, no prejudicial question can arise from the
existence of a civil case for annulment of a certificate of sale and a petition for the issuance of a writ
of possession in a special proceeding since the two cases are both civil in nature which can proceed
separately and take their own direction independently of each other.
Furthermore, since the one-year period to redeem the foreclosed properties lapsed on October 1,
1999, title to the foreclosed properties had already been consolidated under the name of the
respondent. As the owner of the properties, respondent is entitled to its possession as a matter of
right.
40
The issuance of a writ of possession over the properties by the trial court is merely a
ministerial function. As such, the trial court neither exercises its official discretion nor judgment.
41
Any
question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for
refusing the issuance of a writ of possession.
42
Regardless of the pending suit for annulment of the
certificate of sale, respondent is entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice of course to the
eventual outcome of said case.
43

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice