DEFINITION OF PROP

CLASSIFICATION OF PROP
ART415
1.Luna v. Encarnacion
F: deed designated as chattel mortgage was executed by
Jose A. Luna in favor of Trinidad Reyes. The document was
registered in the office of the register of deeds for the
Province of Rizal. The sheriff acceded to the request and
sold the property to the mortgagee for the amount
covering the whole indebtedness with interest and costs.
the mortgagee demanded from the mortgagor the
surrender of the possession of the property, but the later
refusedJose A. Luna, the mortgagor, opposed the petition
on the following grounds.
(1) that Act No. 3135 as amended by Act No. 4118 is
applicable only to a real estate mortgage;
(2) that the mortgage involved herein is a chattel
mortgage; and
(3) that even if the mortgage executed by the parties
herein be considered as real estate mortgage
I: WON the mortgage property is a real property
H: the mortgage in question is not a real estate mortgage
and, besides, it does not contain an express stipulation
authorizing the mortgagee to foreclose the mortgage
extra-judicially. the property given as security is a house of
mixed materials which by its very nature is considered as
personal property.
ct No. 3135, as amended, only covers real estate
mortgages and is intended merely to regulate the extra-
judicial sale of the property mortgaged if and when the
mortgagee is given a special power or express authority to
do so in the deed itself, or in a document annexed thereto.
These conditions do not here obtain. The mortgage before
us is not a real estate mortgage nor does it contain an
express authority or power to sell the property extra-
judicially.

2. Leung Yee Strong Machinery Co.
The "Compaia Agricola Filipina" bought a considerable
quantity of rice-cleaning machinery company from the
defendant machinery company, and executed a chattel
mortgage thereon to secure payment of the purchase
price.
A few weeks thereafter "Compaia Agricola Filipina"
executed a deed of sale of the land upon which the
building stood to the machinery company, but this deed of
sale, although executed in a public document, was not
registered
Chattel Mortgage Law contemplates and makes provision
for mortgages of personal property; and the sole purpose
and object of the chattel mortgage registry is to provide
for the registry of "Chattel mortgages," that is to say,
mortgages of personal property executed in the manner
and form prescribed in the statute.
WON the rice cleaning machinery installed by Compania
Agricola Filipina was a real property
appearing that he had full knowledge of the machinery
company's claim of ownership when he executed the
indemnity bond and bought in the property at the sheriff's
sale, and it appearing further that the machinery
company's claim of ownership was well founded, he
cannot be said to have been an innocent purchaser for
value. He took the risk and must stand by the
consequences; and it is in this sense that we find that he
was not a purchaser in good faith.
Old Civil Code: Should there be no entry, the property shall
belong to the person who first took possession of it in
good faith, and, in the absence thereof, to the person who
presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
It has been suggested that since the provisions of article
1473 of the Civil Code require "good faith," in express
terms, in relation to "possession" and "title," but contain
no express requirement as to "good faith" in relation to
the "inscription" of the property on the registry, it must be
presumed that good faith is not an essential requisite of
registration in order that it may have the effect
contemplated in this article
3.Sibal v. Valdez
Plaintiff sold to defendant the sugar cane planted by the
plaintiff.In one year defendant Valdez satisfied the price
covered in his debt. Valdez refused to accept the money
and return the sugar cane to the plaintiff
Plaintiff:
1.Valdez attempted to harvest the palay
2. 300 cavans belonged to the plaintiff
Defendant averred that he is the owner of the sugar cane
WON the sugar cane is personal or real property.
It is clear from the foregoing provisions that Act No. 1508
was enacted on the assumption that "growing crops" are
personal property. This consideration tends to support the
conclusion hereinbefore stated, that paragraph 2 of article
334 of the Civil Code has been modified by section 450 of
Act No. 190 and by Act No. 1508 in the sense that
"ungathered products" as mentioned in said article of the
Civil Code have the nature of personal property. In other
words, the phrase "personal property" should be
understood to include "ungathered products."
4. Mindanao Bus Co v. City Assesor
Facts: Petitioner is a public utility company engaged
in the transport of passengers and cargo by motor
vehicles in Mindanao with main offices in Cagayan de
Oro (CDO). Petitioner likewise owned a land where it
maintains a garage, a repair shop and blacksmith or
carpentry shops. The machineries are placed thereon
in wooden and cement platforms. The City Assessor
of CDO then assessed a P4,400 realty tax on said
machineries and repair equipment. Petitioner
appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals but it sustained
the City Assessor's decision, while the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA) sustained the same.
Note: This is merely a case digest to aid in
remembering the important points of a case. It is still
advisable for any student of law to read the full text of
assigned cases.
Issue: Whether or not the machineries and
equipments are considered immobilized and thus
subject to a realty tax
Held: The Supreme Court decided otherwise and held
that said machineries and equipments are not subject
to the assessment of real estate tax.
Said equipments are not considered immobilized as
they are merely incidental, not esential and principal
to the business of the petitioner. The transportation
business could be carried on without repair or service
shops of its rolling equipment as they can be repaired
or services in another shop belonging to another

5. Berkenkotter v. Cu Unjieng e Hiyos
Facts:


Mabalacat Sugar obtained loan from Hijos secured by a land and
the existing and future attachments
thereto. Mabalacat Sugar decided to increase the milling capacity
of the sugar mill and installed
Machinery and equipment. Plaintiff advanced the amount and the
machineries and equipment were
installed.


Issue:


Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring that the
additional machinery and equipment, as improvement
incorporated with the central are subject to the mortgage
deed executed in favor of the defendants Cu Unjieng e Hijos.


Held:

Yes. The installation of a machinery and equipment in a
mortgaged sugar central, in lieu of another of less capacity,
for the purpose of carrying out the industrial functions of the
latter and increasing production, constitutes a permanent
improvement on said sugar central and subjects said
machinery and equipment to the mortgage constituted
thereon.

6. Ago v. CA
FACTS
Ago bought sawmill machineries and equipments from
Grace Park Engineer Domineering, Inc. (GPED) A chattel
mortgage was executed over the said properties to secure
the unpaid balance of P32,000, which Ago agreed to pay in
installment basis.
Because Ago defaulted in his payment, GPED instituted
extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings of the mortgage. To
enjoin the foreclosure, Ago instituted a special civil case in
the CFI of Agusan. The parties then arrived at a
compromise agreement.
However, a year later, Ago still defaulted in his payment.
GPED filed a motion for execution with the lower court,
which was executed on September 23, 1959.
Acting upon the writ of execution, the Provincial Sheriff of
Surigao levied upon and ordered the sale of the sawmill
machineries and equipment.
Upon being advised that the public auction sale was set on
December 4, 1959, Ago filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition on December 1, 1959 with the CA. He alleged
that his counsel only received the copy of the judgment on
September 25, 1959 two days after the execution of the
writ; that the order of sale of the levied properties was in
grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction; and
that the Sheriff acted illegally by levying the properties and
attempting to sell them without prior publication of the
notice of sale thereof in some newspaper of general
circulation as required by the Rules of Court.
The CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the
Sheriff, but it turned out that the properties were already
sold on December 4, 1959. The CA ordered the Sheriff to
suspend the issuance of the Certificate of Sale until the
decision of the case. The CA then rendered its decision on
November 9, 1960.

ISSUES
1. Is the fact that petitioner was present in open court as
the judgment was rendered, sufficient notice of the said
judgment?
2. Was the Sheriff's sale of the machineries and equipment
at a public auction valid despite lack of publication of the
notice of sale?

HELD
1) No. The mere pronouncement of the judgment in open
court does not constitute a rendition of judgment.
The filing of the judge's signed decision with the Clerk of
Court constitutes the rendition of a valid and binding
judgment.

Sec. 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court require that all
judgments be rendered in writing, personally and directly
prepared by the judge, and signed by him, stating clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,
filed with the clerk of the court.

Prior to the filing, the decision could still be subject to
amendment and change and may not constitute the real
judgment of the court.

Moreover, the hearing of the judgment in open court does
not constitute valid notice thereof. No judgment can be
notified to the parties unless it has previously been
rendered.
Sec.7 of Rule 27 expressly requires that final orders or
judgments be served either personally or by registered
mail.

The signed judgment not having been served upon the
petitioner, said judgment could not be effective upon him
who had not received it. As a consequence, the issuance of
the writ of execution is null and void, having been issued
before petitioner was served a copy of the decision,
personally or by registered mail.

2) The subject sawmill machineries and equipment
became real estate properties in accordance with the
provision of Art. 415 (5) of the NCC:

ART. 415 The following are immovable property:

xxxx

(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements
intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or
works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece
of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the
said industry or works;

The installation of the sawmill machineries in the building
of Gold Pacific Sawmill, Inc., for use in the sawing of logs
carried on in the said building converted them into Real
Properties as they became a necessary & permanent part
of the building or real estate on which the same was
constructed.

And if they are judicially sold on execution without the
necessary advertisement of sale by publication in a
newspaper as required in Sec.16 of Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, the sale made by the sheriff would be null and void.
7.Presbiterio v. Fernandez
RICARDO PRESBITERO vs, FERNANDEZ(Immovable
Calinisan)
Facts:1) ESPERIDION Presbitero failed to furnish Nava the
value of the properties under litigation.2) Presbitero was
ordered by the lower court to pay Nava to settle his
debts.3) Nava's counsel still tried to settle this case with
Presbitero, out of court. But to no avail.4) Thereafter, the
sheriff levied upon and garnished the sugar quotas allotted
to the plantationand adhered to the Ma-ao Mill District
and registered in the name of Presbitero as the
originalplantation owner.5) The sheriff was not able to
present for registration thererof to the Registry of
Deeds.6) The court then ordered Presbitero to segregate
the portion of Lot 608 pertaining to Nava fromthe mass of
properties belonging to the defendant within a period to
expire on August 1960.7) Bottomline, Presbitero did not
meet his obligations, and the auction sale was
scheduled.8) Presbitero died after.9) RICARDO Presbitero,
the estate administrator, then petitioned that the sheriff
desist in holdingthe auction sale on the ground that the
levy on the sugar quotas was invalid because the
noticethereof was not registered with the Registry of
Deeds.Issue: W/N the sugar quotas are real (immovable)
or personal properties.Held:1) They are real properties.2)
Legal bases:a) The Sugar Limitation Lawxxx attaching to
the land xxx (p 631)b) RA 1825xxx to be an improvement
attaching to the land xxx (p 631)c) EO # 873"plantation"
xxx to which is attached an allotment of centrifugal
sugar.3) Under the express provisions of law, the sugar
quota allocations are accessories to the land,and cannot
have independent existence away from a plantation.4)
Since the levy is invalid for non-compliance with law, xxx
the levy amount to no levy at all.
8. Board of Assessment Appeals v. Meralco
FACTS
On November 15, 1955, the QC City Assessor declared the
MERALCO's steel towers subject to real property tax. After
the denial of MERALCO's petition to cancel these
declarations, an appeal was taken to the QC Board of
Assessment Appeals, which required respondent to pay
P11,651.86 as real property tax on the said steel towers
for the years 1952 to 1956.
MERALCO paid the amount under protest, and filed a
petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) which
rendered a decision ordering the cancellation of the said
tax declarations and the refunding to MERALCO by the QC
City Treasurer of P11,651.86.

ISSUE
Are the steel towers or poles of the MERALCO considered
real or personal properties?

HELD
Pole long, comparatively slender, usually cylindrical piece
of wood, timber, object of metal or the like; an upright
standard to the top of which something is affixed or by
which something is supported.

MERALCO's steel supports consists of a framework of 4
steel bars/strips which are bound by steel cross-arms atop
of which are cross-arms supporting 5 high-voltage
transmission wires, and their sole function is to
support/carry such wires. The exemption granted to poles
as quoted from Part II, Par.9 of respondent's franchise is
determined by the use to which such poles are dedicated.

It is evident that the word poles, as used in Act No. 484
and incorporated in the petitioner's franchise, should not
be given a restrictive and narrow interpretation, as to
defeat the very object for which the franchise was
granted. The poles should be taken and understood as
part of MERALCO's electric power system for the
conveyance of electric current to its consumers.

Art. 415 of the NCC classifies the following as immovable
property:

(1) Lands, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds
adhered to the soil;

xxx

(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed
manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated
therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration
of the object;

xxx

(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements
intended by the owner pf the tenement for an industry ot
works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece
of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the
said industry or works;

Following these classifications, MERALCO's steel towers
should be considered personal property. It should be
noted that the steel towers:

(a) are neither buildings or constructions adhered to the
soil;

(b) are not attached to an immovable in a fixed manner
they can be separated without breaking the material or
deterioration of the object;

are not machineries, receptacles or instruments, and
even if they are, they are not intended for an industry to
be carried on in the premises.
9.Meralco v. Board of Assessment Appeals
FACTS:
This case is about the imposition of the realty tax on two
oil storage tanks installed in 1969 by Manila Electric
Company on a lot in leased in 1968 from Caltex (Phil.), Inc.
The tanks are within the Caltex refinery compound.
It is not anchored or welded to the concrete circular wall.
Its bottom plate is not attached to any part of the
foundation by bolts, screws or similar devices.
The municipal treasurer required Meralco to pay realty
taxes on both tanks.

ISSUE:
WON the tanks should be considered as real property.

HELD:
The two storage tanks are not embedded in the land, they
may, nevertheless, be considered as improvements on the
land, enhancing its utility and rendering it useful to the oil
industry. It is undeniable that the two tanks have been
installed with some degree of permanence as receptacles
for the considerable quantities of oil needed by Meralco
for its operations.
10.Davao Sawmill Co v. Castillo
Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., is the holder of a lumber
concession from the Government of the Philippine Islands.
However, the land upon which the business was
conducted belonged to another person. On the land the
sawmill company erected a building which housed the
machinery used by it. Some of the implements thus used
were clearly personal property, the conflict concerning
machines which were placed and mounted on foundations
of cement. In the contract of lease between the sawmill
company and the owner of the land there appeared the
following provision: That on the expiration of the period
agreed upon, all the improvements and buildings
introduced and erected by the party of the second part
shall pass to the exclusive ownership of the lessor without
any obligation on its part to pay any amount for said
improvements and buildings; which do not include the
machineries and accessories in the improvements.

In another action wherein the Davao Light & Power Co.,
Inc., was the plaintiff and the Davao, Saw, Mill Co., Inc.,
was the defendant, a judgment was rendered in favor of
the plaintiff in that action against the defendant; a writ of
execution issued thereon, and the properties now in
question were levied upon as personalty by the sheriff. No
third party claim was filed for such properties at the time
of the sales thereof as is borne out by the record made by
the plaintiff herein

It must be noted also that on number of occasion, Davao
Sawmill treated the machinery as personal property by
executing chattel mortgages in favor of third persons. One
of such is the appellee by assignment from the original
mortgages.

The lower court rendered decision in favor of the
defendants herein. Hence, this instant appeal.

Issue:
whether or not the machineries and equipments were
personal in nature.

Ruling/ Rationale:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower
court.

Machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes
immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the
property or plant, but not when so placed by a tenant, a
usufructuary, or any person having only a temporary right,
unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.
11. Marcelo r. Soriano v. sps. Ricardo and Rosalina Galit
2003
FACTS;
Petitioner was issued a writ of possession in Civil Case No.
6643[1] for Sum of Money by the Regional Trial Court of
Balanga, Bataan, Branch 1. The writ of possession was,
however, nullified by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 65891[2] because it included a parcel of land which
was not among those explicitly enumerated in the
Certificate of Sale issued by the Deputy Sheriff, but on
which stand the immovables covered by the said
Certificate. Petitioner contends that the sale of these
immovables necessarily encompasses the land on which
they stand.

HELD:
The foregoing provision of the Civil Code enumerates land
and buildings separately. This can only mean that a
building is, by itself, considered immovable.[39] Thus, it
has been held that

. . . while it is true that a mortgage of land necessarily
includes, in the absence of stipulation of the
improvements thereon, buildings, still a building by itself
may be mortgaged apart from the land on which it has
been built. Such mortgage would be still a real estate
mortgage for the building would still be considered
immovable property even if dealt with separately and
apart from the land.[40] (emphasis and italics supplied)

In this case, considering that what was sold by virtue of
the writ of execution issued by the trial court was merely
the storehouse and bodega constructed on the parcel of
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-40785,
which by themselves are real properties of respondents
spouses, the same should be regarded as separate and
distinct from the conveyance of the lot on which they
stand.


12. Meralco Securities Industrial Corporation v Central
Board of Assessment Appeals 1982
MERALCO SECURITIES INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION V.
CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS

FACTS:

In this special civil action of certiorari, Meralco Securities
Industrial Corporation assails the decision of the Central
Board of Assessment Appeals (composed of the Secretary
of Finance as chairman and the Secretaries of Justice and
Local Government and Community Development as
members) dated May 6, 1976, holding that Meralco
Securities' oil pipeline is subject to realty tax.

HELD:
Meralco Securities insists that its pipeline is not subject to
realty tax because it is not real property within the
meaning of article 415. This contention is not sustainable
under the provisions of the Assessment Law, the Real
Property Tax Code and the Civil Code.

Article 415[l] and [3] provides that real property may
consist of constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil and
everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in
such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without
breaking the material or deterioration of the object.

The pipeline system in question is indubitably a
construction adhering to the soil (Exh. B, p. 39, Rollo). It is
attached to the land in such a way that it cannot be
separated therefrom without dismantling the steel pipes
which were welded to form the pipeline.

Insofar as the pipeline uses valves, pumps and control
devices to maintain the flow of oil, it is in a sense
machinery within the meaning of the Real Property Tax
Code.

It should be borne in mind that what are being
characterized as real property are not the steel pipes but
the pipeline system as a whole. Meralco Securities has
apparently two pipeline systems.
13.Fels, Inc. v Province of Batangas 2007
FACTS:
1. NPC entered into a lease contract with Polar Energy, Inc.
over 3x30 MW diesel engine power bargesmoored at
Balayan Bay in Calaca, Batangas. The contract,
denominated as an Energy Conversion Agreement
(Agreement), was for a period of five years.2. Article 10
reads: NAPOCOR shall be responsible for the payment of
(a)all taxes, import duties, fees,charges and other levies
imposed by the National Government of the Republic of
the Philippines or any agency or instrumentality thereof
(b)all real estate taxesand assessments, rates and other
charges in respect of thePower Barges
. 3. Subsequently, Polar Energy, Inc. assigned its rights
under the Agreement to FELS. FELS received anassessment
of real property taxes on the power barges from Provincial
Assessor of Batangas City.4. FELS referred the matter to
NPC, reminding it of its obligation under the Agreement to
pay all realestate taxes.5.NPC sought reconsideration of
the Provincial Assessors,which motion was denied.Hence,
NPC fileda petition with the Local Board of Assessment
Appeals (LBAA) for the setting aside of the assessmentand
the declaration of the barges as non-taxable items;
LBAA ruling:
the owner of the barges
FELS, a private corporation
is the one being taxed, not NPC. A mereagreement making
NPC responsible for the payment of all real estate taxes
and assessments willnot justify the exemption of FELS;
such a privilege can only be granted to NPC and cannot
beextended to FELS.6.
Aggrieved, FELS appealed the LBAAs ruling to the Central
Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA).

CBAA ruling:
Initiall, it ruled that the power barges exempt from real
property tax. The CBAA reasoned that thepower barges
belong to NPC; since they are actually, directly and
exclusively used by it, thepower barges are covered by the
exemptions
In a complete volte face, the CBAA issued a Resolution
reversing its earlier decision. Affirming thereal property
tax assessment on FELS.7. FELS filed a petition for review
before the CA
CA ruling:
Denied or lack of merit. Affirmed the assessment.
Petition filed out of time
14.Benguet Corp v. CBAA 1993

BENGUET CORP. vs. CBAAGR No. 106041. January 29,
1993. 218 SCRA 271
A dam is an immovable property by nature and by
incorporation.Hence, it is subject to realty tax.Issue:
Should tailings dams be classified as real property?
FACTS
BENGUET CORP. owned a mine and a dam. The
Provincial Assessor of Zambales classified the dam as a
taxableimprovement of the mine. On appeal by BENGUET
CORP. to the CENTRALBOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS
(CBAA), the latter declared that thetailings dam and the
land submerged under it are subject to realty tax.
BENGUET CORP. then filed a petition to the SC via
certiorari asking thecourt set aside the resolution of
CBAA. It contended that the dam should not be subject to
tax because it wasnot an assessable improvement of the
mine but rather an integral part of the mines operation.
The Sol. Gen argued however that the dam was an
assessableimprovement because it enhanced the value
and utility of the mine likeholding waste from the mine
and impounding water for recycling.
ISSUEWhether or not the dam was an assessable
improvement of themine and thus subject to realty
tax.RULING

YES
, the dam was an assessable improvement of the mine and
subjectto realty tax. The mine can operate without the
dam because the primary function of the dam is merely to
receive and retain the wastes and water coming fromthe
mine. There was no allegation that it was the only source
of water as to makethe dam an integral part of the mine.
The Real Property Code did not define what is real
property that thedefinition in Art. 415 of the Civil Code
shall apply. The dam was an immovable under pars. 1 and
3 of Art. 415 hence it wastaxable realty. Under par. 1,
the dam was an immovable property since itwas a
construction adhered to the soil. Under par. 3, it was an
immovable since it was fixed in a manner that itcannot be
separated from the land without breaking or deteriorating
416
15.US v. Carlos
Ignacio Carlos has been a consumer of electricity furnished
by the Manila ElectricRailroad and Light Company for a
buildingcontaining the residence of the accused and
3other residences. Representatives of thecompany
believing that more light is consumedthan what is shown
in the meter installed anadditional meter on the pole
outside Carloshouse to compare the actual consumption
andfound out that the latter used a jumper. Further,a
jumper was found in a drawer of a smallcabinet in the
room of the defendants housewere the meter was
installed. In the absence of any explanation for Carlos
possession of saiddevice, the presumption raised was that
Carloswas the owner of the device whose only usewas to
deflect the current from the meter. Thushe was charged
with the crime of theftamounting to 2,273KW of electric
power worth909.20 pesos.
Whether or not the court erred in declaring thatthe
electrical energy may be stolen.
Held:
It is true that electricity is no longer, asformerly, regarded
by electricians as a fluid, butits manifestation and effects,
like those of gas,may be seen and felt. The true test of
what is aproper subject of larceny seems to be notwhether
the subject is corporeal, but whether itis capable of
appropriation by another than theowner. The court ruled
that electricity, the same asgas, is a valuable article of
merchandise,bought and sold like other personal
propertyand is capable of appropriation by another. It
isalso susceptible of being severed from a massor larger
quantity, and of being transportedfrom place to place. So
no error was committedby the trial court in holding that
electricity is asubject of larceny
16. Luis Marcos P. Laurel v. Hon. Zeus Abrogar 2009
FACTS
Laurel was charged with Theft under Art. 308 of the RPC
for allegedly taking, stealing, and using PLDT's
international long distance calls by conducting
International Simple Resale (ISR) a method of outing
and completing international long-distance calls using
lines, cables, antennae, and/or air wave frequency which
connect directly to the local/domestic exchange facilities
of the country where the call is destined. PLDT alleged
that this service was stolen from them using their own
equipment and caused damage to them amounting to
P20,370,651.92.
PLDT alleges that the international calls and business of
providing telecommunication or telephone service are
personal properties capable of appropriation and can be
objects of theft.
Personal Property anything susceptible of appropriation
and not included in Real Property

Thus, the term personal property as used in Art.308, RPC
should be interpreted in the context of the Civil Code's
definition of real and personal property. Consequently,
any personal property, tangible or intangible, corporeal or
incorporeal, capable of appropriation may be the subject
of theft (*US v Carlos; US v Tambunting; US v Genato*), so
long as the same is not included in the enumeration of
Real Properties under the Civil Code.

The only requirement for personal property to capable of
theft, is that it be subject to appropriation.

Art. 416 (3) of the Civil Code deems Forces of Nature
which are brought under the control of science, as
Personal Property.

The appropriation of forces of nature which are brought
under control by science can be achieved by tampering
with any apparatus used for generating or measuring such
forces of nature, wrongfully redirecting such forces of
nature from such apparatus, or using any device to
fraudulently obtain such forces of nature.

In the instant case, the act of conducting ISR operations by
illegally connecting various equipment or apparatus to
PLDTs telephone system, through which petitioner is able
to resell or re-route international long distance calls using
PLDTs facilities constitute Subtraction.

Moreover, interest in business should be classified as
personal property since it is capable of appropriation, and
not included in the enumeration of real properties.

Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication or
telephone service are personal property which can be the
object of theft under Art. 308 of the RPC. The act of
engaging in ISR is an act of subtraction penalized under
the said article.

While international long-distance calls take the form of
electrical energy and may be considered as personal
property, the said long-distance calls do not belong to
PLDT since it could not have acquired ownership over such
calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments, enhances, decodes
and transmits said calls using its complex communications
infrastructure and facilities.

Since PLDT does not own the said telephone calls, then it
could not validly claim that such telephone calls were
taken without its consent.

What constitutes Theft is the use of the PLDT's
communications facilities without PLDT's consent. The
theft lies in the unlawful taking of the telephone services
& businesses.

The Amended Information should be amended to show
that the property subject of the theft were services and
business of the offended party.
417
17.Involuntary Insolvency of Strochecker v. Ramirez
FACTS:

The half-interest in the business (Antigua Botica Ramirez)
was mortgaged with Fidelity & Surety Co. on 10 March
1919, and registered in due time in the registry of
property, while another mortgage was made with
Ildefonso Ramirez on 22 September 1919 and registered
also in the registry. Raised in the lower court, the trial
court declared the mortgage of Fidelity & Surety Co.
entitled to preference over that of Ildefonso Ramirez and
another mortgage by Concepcion Ayala. Ayala did not
appeal, but Ramirez did.
ISSUE:
Whether or not half-interest over a business is a movable
property
RULING: Yes.
1. Interest in business may be subject of mortgage With
regard to the nature of the property mortgaged which is
one-half interest in the business, such interest is a
personal property capable of appropriation and not
included in the enumeration of real properties in articles
335 of the Civil Code, and may be the subject of mortgage.
All personal property may be mortgaged. (Sec. 7, Act
1508.)


2. Description of mortgage property sufficient The
description contained in the document is sufficient. The
law (sec. 7, Act 1508) requires only a description of the
mortgaged property shall be such as to enable the parties
to the mortgage, or any other person, after reasonable
inquiry and investigation, to identify the same. In the case
at bar, his half interest in the drug business known as
Antigua Botica Ramirez, located at Calle Real Nos. 123 and
125, District of Intramuros, Manila Philippine Islands" is
sufficient.

3. Article 1922 (1-3) of the Civil Code applicable only to
mortgage property in possession Numbers 1, 2, and 3 of
the article 1922 of the Civil Code are not applicable as
neither the debtor, nor himself, is in possession of the
property mortgaged, which is, and since the registration of
the mortgage has been, legally in possession of the surety
company
4. Stipulation about personal property not a mortgage
upon property - In no way can the mortgage executed be
given effect as of the date of the sale of the store in
question; as there was a mere stipulation about personal
security during said date, but not a mortgage upon
property, and much less upon the property in question
420
18. Usero v. CA 2005
Facts: This is a consolidated petition assailing the decision
of the Court of Appeals (CA). Petitioners and the private
respondent are registered owners of neighboring parcels
of land wherein between the lots is a low-level strip of
land with stagnant body of water. Whenever there is a
storm or heavy rain, the water therein would flood
thereby causing damage to houses of the Polinars
prompting them to build a concrete wall on the bank of
the strip of land about 3meters from their house and
riprapped the soil in that portion.
The Useros claimed ownership of the strip, demanded the
halt of the construction but the Polinars never heeded
believing that the strip is part of a creek. However, the
Polinars offered to pay for the land. As the parties still
failed to settle, both filed separate complaints for forcible
entry. The Municipal Trial Court ruled in favor of the
petitioner, while the regional trial court reversed and
ordered the dismissal of the complaint and confirmed the
existence of the creek between the lots.
Issue: Whether or not the disputed strip of land is part of
the creek hence part of public domain
Held: YES. Art. 420 of the Philippine New Civil Code (NCC)
provides for properties which are part of public domain. A
creek is included in the phrase "and others of similar
character". A creek, which refers to a recess or arm of a
river is a property belonging to the public domain,
therefore not susceptible of private ownership. Being a
public water, it cannot be registered under the Torrens
system under the name of any individual.
19. Manila International Airport Authority v. CA
Facts:Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) is the
operator of the Ninoy International Airportlocated at
Paranaque City. The Officers of Paranaque City sent
notices to MIAA due to real estate taxdelinquency. MIAA
then settled some of the amount. When MIAA failed to
settle the entire amount, theofficers of Paranaque city
threatened to levy and subject to auction the land and
buildings of MIAA,which they did. MIAA sought for a
Temporary Restraining Order from the CA but failed to do
so withinthe 60 days reglementary period, so the petition
was dismissed. MIAA then sought for the TRO with
theSupreme Court a day before the public auction, MIAA
was granted with the TRO but unfortunately theTRO was
received by the Paranaque City officers 3 hours after the
public auction.MIAA claims that although the charter
provides that the title of the land and building are
withMIAA still the ownership is with the Republic of the
Philippines. MIAA also contends that it is
aninstrumentality of the government and as such
exempted from real estate tax. That the land and
buildingsof MIAA are of public dominion therefore cannot
be subjected to levy and auction sale. On the other hand,
the officers of Paranaque City claim that MIAA is a
government owned and controlled corporationtherefore
not exempted to real estate tax.Issues:Whether or not
MIAA is an instrumentality of the government and not a
government owned andcontrolled corporation and as such
exempted from tax.Whether or not the land and buildings
of MIAA are part of the public dominion and thus cannot
be the subject of levy and auction sale.Ruling:Under the
Local government code, government owned and
controlled corporations are notexempted from real estate
tax. MIAA is not a government owned and controlled
corporation, for to become one MIAA should either be a
stock or non stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock
corporation for its capital is not divided into shares. It is
not a non stock corporation since it has no members.
MIAA is aninstrumentality of the government vested with
corporate powers and government functions.Under the
civil code, property may either be under public dominion
or private ownership. Thoseunder public dominion are
owned by the State and are utilized for public use, public
service and for thedevelopment of national wealth. The
ports included in the public dominion pertain either to
seaports or airports. When properties under public
dominion cease to be for public use and service, they form
part of the patrimonial property of the State.The court
held that the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the
public dominion. Since theairport is devoted for public use,
for the domestic and international travel and
transportation. Even if MIAA charge fees, this is for
support of its operation and for regulation and does not
change the character of the land and buildings of MIAA as
part of the public dominion. As part of the public dominion
the landand buildings of MIAA are outside the commerce
of man. To subject them to levy and public auction
iscontrary to public policy. Unless the President issues a
proclamation withdrawing the airport land and buildings
from public use, these properties remain to be of public
dominion and are inalienable. As longas the land and
buildings are for public use the ownership is with the
Republic of the Philippines
20. Hacienda Bigas Inc. v. Epifanio Chavez 2010
Pet filed a complaint for ejectment and damages against
respondent forcivle entry. The complaint alleged that
Chavez, by force, strategy and/or stealth, entered on April
29, 1996 the premises of Hacienda Bigaa's properties
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 44695
and 56120 by cutting through a section of the barbed wire
fence surrounding the properties and destroying the lock
of one of its gates, subsequently building a house on the
property, and occupying the lots without the prior consent
and against the will of Hacienda Bigaa.
The Ayalas and/or the Zobels who were the original
owners of the land Hacienda Calagagan later ordered the
subdivision of the hacienda, including these excess areas,
and sold the subdivided lots to third parties.
Among the buyers or transferees of the expanded and
subdivided areas was Hacienda Bigaa which caused the
issuance of titles
he excess areas of TCT No. 722 were categorically declared
as unregisterable lands of the public domain such that any
title covering these excess areas are necessarily null and
void. In these cases, the Ayalas and the Zobels were
found to be mere usurpers of public domain making
Zobels TCT void.
TCT No. 722 in the Registry of Deeds of Batangas; that
Ayala y Cia, the Zobels, or Hacienda Calatagan, illegally
expanded the original area of TCT No. 722 by 2,000
hectares; that suits were filed to recover the expanded
area; that these suits reached the Supreme Court which
declared that these excess areas are part of the public
domain and ordered their reversion to the Republic
dismissed the petition for review, totally affirming the RTC
and MTC decisions.[28] Hacienda Bigaa timely filed a
motion for reconsideration. motion slipped into
hibernation for five years
1.Do the TCTs of Hacienda Bigaa have probative value in
determining the issues of ownership and possession of the
disputed lots?
(2) Is Chavez as successor-in-interest of government
lessee or fishpond permittee Zoila de Chavez entitled to
possession of these lots? We find the petition
unmeritorious.
all expanded subdivision titles issued in the name of Ayala
y Cia, the Zobels and/or Hacienda Calatagan covering
areas beyond the true extent of TCT No. 722 are null and
void because they cover areas belonging to the public
domain; (2) Ayala y Cia and the Zobels of Hacienda
Calatagan are mere usurpers of these public domain areas;
and that (3) these areas must revert to the Republic.
Significantly, we declared in De los Angeles that the
Republic, as the rightful owner of the expanded areas
portions of the public domain has the right to place its
lessees and permittees (among them Zoila de Chavez) in
possession of the fishpond lots whose ownership and
possession were in issue in the case.
Hacienda Bigaa's Titles Carry No Probative Value To
reiterate, lots and their titles derived from the Ayalas and
the Zobels TCT No. 722 not shown to be within the
original coverage of this title are conclusively public
domain areas and their titles will be struck down as
nullities.
What could have saved Hacienda Bigaa, as successor-in-
interest of the Ayalas and the Zobels, is competent
evidence that the subdivision titles in its possession do not
fall within the excess areas of TCT No. 722 that are null
and void because they are lands of the public domain.
Hacienda Bigaa however failed to discharge this burden.
In any event, Hacienda Bigaa can never have a better
right of possession over the subject lots above that of the
Republic because the lots pertain to the public domain.
All lands of the public domain are owned by the State
the Republic. Thus, all attributes of ownership, including
the right to possess and use these lands, accrue to the
Republic.

21. Pio Modesto v. Carlos Ubina2010
The Modestos mainly argued that at the time Urbina filed
his MSA and acquired tax declarations over the subject
property, the property was still government property,
being part of a military reservation. The property was thus
not alienable and disposable, and could not legally be
possessed by a private individual. Accordingly, Urbina
could not use the MSA and the tax declarations as proof of
a better right to possess the property as against the
Modestos.
Since their offer to buy the property from Urbina was
based on his false assertions, the principle of estoppel
cannot apply.
In finding for Urbina, both the RTC and the CA mainly
relied on the principle of estoppel, and focused on the
Modestos admission that they entered into a negotiated
contract of sale with Urbina. In the process, they
injudiciously ignored the other material issues that the
Modestos raised regarding the validity of Urbinas
possession of the property, specifically the Modestos
allegation that at the time Urbina began staking his claim
over the property, it was still government land.
Responding to this motion, the respondents, in their
Comment dated May 31, 2010, reiterated that the
petitioners are estopped from assailing Urbinas
possessory rights over the property after they entered into
a negotiated sales contract with him over the subject
property. They also accused the Modestos of employing
dilatory tactics in filing the present motion.
We GRANT the motion for reconsideration.
An accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to
determine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title.[9] Accion publiciana is also used to
refer to an ejectment suit where the cause of
dispossession is not among the grounds for forcible entry
and unlawful detainer, or when possession has been lost
for more than one year and can no longer be maintained
under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The objective of a
plaintiff in accion publiciana is to recover possession only,
not ownership.
First, the lot in question, situated in Barangay Lower
Bicutan, was part of the Fort Bonifacio Military
Reservation, and only became alienable and disposable
after October 16, 1987,
If prior to October 16 It is only after the property has been
declared alienable and disposable that private persons can
legally claim possessory rights over it.
Accordingly, even if we recognize that Urbina had been in
possession of the property as early as July 21, 1966, when
he filed his Miscellaneous Sales Application, his occupation
was unlawful and could not be the basis of possessory
rights, in keeping with Section 88 of the Public Land Act,
that states:
Section 88. The tract or tracts of land reserved under the
provisions of section eighty-three shall be non-alienable
and shall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease,
or other disposition until again declared alienable under
the provisions of this Act or by proclamation of the
President.(Dapat may declaration before proclaim)
After October 16: the Modestos were the actual
possessors of the property when it was declared alienable
and disposable on October 16, 1987, and continued to
possess the property until the present time.
n any case, even if we consider this certification as
sufficient proof that Urbina declared the subject property
for tax declaration purposes, it must be stressed that the
mere declaration of land for taxation purposes does not
constitute possession thereof nor is it proof of ownership
in the absence of the claimants actual possession.
It bears noting, however, that no estoppel arises where
the representation or conduct of the party sought to be
estopped is due to ignorance founded upon an innocent
mistake
22. Manuel Almagro et al v. Salvacion Kwan 2010
This case involves a lot(Lot No. 6278-M, a 17,181 square
meter parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-11397)located
at Maslog, Sibulan, Negros Oriental and was registered in
thename of spouses Kwan Chin and Zosima Sarana.
Respondents are thelegitimate children of spouses Kwan
Chin and Zosima Sarana, who both diedintestate(on 2
November 1986 and 23 January 1976, respectively)in
Dumaguete City. Upon thedeath of their parents,
respondents inherited the lot through
hereditarysuccession.On 18 September 1996, respondents
filed with the Municipal Trial Court(MTC) an action for
recovery of possession and damages against spouses
23. Jose Fernando jr. v. Leon Acuna 2011
Petitioners spouses Manuel Almagro and Elizabeth
Almagro were intervenorsas successors-in-interest of
spouses Delano Bangay and Maria Bangay.During pre-trial,
the parties agreed to refer the case to the Chief of the
LandManagement Services Division, PENRO-DENR,
Dumaguete City, to conducta verification survey of Lot No.
6278-M. When the PENRO personnel failed toconduct the
verification survey, the court and the parties designated a
geodetic engineer (
Jorge Suasin, Sr.)
as joint commissioner to do the task. Thewritten report
shown, among others,: A. That a big portion of the lot is
submerged under the sea and only a smallportion remain
as dry land.B. That some of the defendants have
constructed their buildings or housesinside the dry land
while others have constructed outside or only a
smallportion of their buildings or houses are on the said
dry land.
MTCdismissed the complaint on the ground that the
remaining dry portion of Lothas become foreshore land
and should be returned to the public domain. TheMTC
explained "he term "foreshore" refers to that part of the
land adjacent tothe sea which is alternately covered and
left dry by the ordinary flow of thetides. "Foreshore lands"
refers to the strip of land that lies between the highand
low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry
according to the flowof the tide. The MTC concluded that
the remaining dry portion of Lot No.6278-M is now
"foreshore land." A big portion of the said lot is
presentlyunderwater or submerged under the sea. When
the sea moves towards theestate and the tide invades it,
the invaded property becomes foreshore landand passes
to the realm of public domain. The subject land, being
foreshoreland, should therefore be returned to the public
domain. The MTC cited Article 420 of the Civil Code which
provides, that "those intended for publicuse, such as
roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed bythe State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and
others of similar character" areproperty of public
dominion.MTC said "plaintiff cannot use the doctrine of
indefeasibility of their Torrenstitle, as property in question
is clearly foreshore land. At the time of itsregistration,
property was along the shores. In fact, it is bounded by the
TaonStrait on the NW along lines 2-3-4. The property was
of public dominion andshould not have been subject of
registration. The survey showed that the seahad advanced
and the waves permanently invaded a big portion of
theproperty making the land part of the shore or the
beach. The remaining dryland is foreshore and therefore
should be returned to the public domain."Respondents
appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The
RTCconducted ocular inspections of Lot during low and
high tides. All the partiesand their lawyers were notified
before the two ocular inspections wereconducted and
observed that the small portion remained dry even during
hightide.

RTC concluded that the disputed remaining portion of
subjectLot was not foreshore land.The appealed judgment
was reversed andset aside insofar as it stated that
plaintiffs were not entitled to recover possession of the
property in question.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which the RTC
denied
.
Petitioners filedseparate petitions for review with the
Court of Appeals, alleging that thedisputed portion of Lot
No. 6278-M is no longer private land but has
becomeforeshore land and is now part of the public
domain.The CA denied the petition, affirmed but modified
the RTC judgement andordered all to vacate except whose
buildings or houses are outside thepremises.Hence, these
consolidated petition
The Issue
Whether the disputed portion of Lot No. 6278-M is still
private land or hasbecome foreshore land which forms
part of the public domain.
The Ruling
In this case, it was clearly proven that the disputed land
remained dry evenduring high tide. Indeed, Supreme Court
(SC) held all the evidence supportsthe conclusion that the
disputed portion of the Lot "is not foreshore land
butremains private land owned by respondents." Although
the MTC concluded that the subject land is foreshore land,
we findsuch conclusion contrary to the evidence on
record.It is undisputed that the subject land is registered
in the name of respondents'parents, Kwan Chin and
Zosimo Sarana. In fact, as found by the Court of Appeals,
even the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Officer (PENRO) declared in May 1996 that Lot No. 6278-M
is a private propertycovered by a Torrens Title and that
petitioners should vacate the disputedproperty or make
other arrangements with respondents.Furthermore, from
the report of the geodetic engineer, it can be
clearlygleaned that the contested land is the
small portion of dry land
. Thegeodetic was adamant in stating that the remaining
portion was
notforeshore
because "it is already dry land" and is "away from
theshoreline."

Because of this apparent contradiction between the
evidence andthe conclusion of the MTC, the RTC
conducted ocular inspection twice, duringlow tide and
high tide, and observed that the disputed portion of Lot
No. 6278-M actually remained dry land even during high
tide. Thus, the RTC concludedthat the said land is not
foreshore land. On appeal, the Court of Appealsadopted
the findings and conclusion of the RTC that the disputed
land is notforeshore land and that it remains as private
land owned by respondents.SC are in accord with the
conclusion of the Court of Appeals and the RTC thatthe
disputed land is not foreshore land. To qualify as foreshore
land, it mustbe shown that the land lies between the high
and low water marks and isalternately wet and dry
according to the flow of the tide.
The land's proximity tothe waters alone does not
automatically make it a foreshore land

421
24.De la Cruz v. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner contracted a loan from Villanuevas parents,
mortgaging the subject parcel of land as security. Years
after, the parcel of land became the subject for an
application for registration by the Ramos brothers. They
insisted that they had a better claim over the land than
petitioner. After trial, the case was dismissed as the land
has not been reclassified for other purposes and
remained a part of the forest reserve. Consequently,
the brothers were able to secure reclassification of the
land and the same was registered in their name as
owners, and they later sold the land to
Villanueva. Thereafter, petitioner came to know of
the registration and filed a complaint, which was
dismissed.

HELD:

Petitioner possessed and occupied the land after it
had been declared by the government as part of the
forest reserve. In fact, the land remained as part of the
forest reserve until such time it was reclassified into
alienable or disposable land at the behest of the Ramoses.
A positive act of the government is needed to declassify
land which is classified as forest, and to convert it into
alienable and disposable land for other purposes. Until
such lands have been properly declared to be
available for other purposes, there is no disposable
land to speak of. Absent the fact of reclassification
prior to the possession and cultivation in good faith
by petitioner, the property occupied by him remained
classified as forest or timberland, which he could not
have acquired by prescription

422
25.Cebu Oxygen etc v. Bercilles
In 1968, a terminal portion of a street in Cebu was
excluded in the citys development plan hence the council
declared it as abandoned and was subsequently opened
for public bidding. Cebu Oxygen was the highest bidder
@P10,800.00. Cebu Oxygen applied for the lands
registration before CFI Cebu but the provincial fiscal
denied it, so did the court later, alleging that the road is
part of the public domain hence beyond the commerce of
man.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cebu Oxygen can validly own said
land.
HELD: Yes. Under Cebus Charter (RA 3857), the city
council may close any city road, street or alley, boulevard,
avenue, park or square. Property thus withdrawn from
public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose
for which other real property belonging to the City may be
lawfully used or conveyed. Since that portion of the city
street subject of Cebu Oxygens application for registration
of title was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such
withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which
can be the object of an ordinary contract.
Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that
Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for
public use or for public service, shall form part of the
patrimonial property of the State.

423,424

26.In the Matter of Reversion/ Recallof Reconstituted
OCT G.R NO 171304 october 2007
officials of the Municipal Government of Paniqui, headed
by Maximo Parazo, built a school, a public market, and a
cemetery on an untitled parcel of land. espectively, in the
name of the Municipal Government of Paniqui, by virtue of
the judicial confirmation of its title to the subject property
RTC the titles were lost thus the old public market was
demolished to build a new one
On 28 March 2005, petitioners filed the Petition for
Annulment of Judgment[4] with the Court of Appeals,
praying for the cancellation of the TCTs and for the
reconveyance in their favor of the title to the parcels of
land.
According to petitioners, their ascendants were not given
a chance or opportunity to appear or answer and present
their side at the cadastral proceedings involving the
subject properties, from which resulted the issuance of the
OCTs in the name of the Municipality of Paniqui.
Likewise, petitioners presented neither any evidence nor
any legal argument in support of their claim of lack of
jurisdiction of the court which took cognizance of the
cadastral proceedings in which the OCTs over the subject
property were issued in the name of the Municipality of
Paniqui.

In order to cover up for the lack of evidence to prove the
grounds for an annulment of judgment, petitioners relied
on an erroneous interpretation of a very old case.
Properties of local government units under the Spanish
Civil Code were limited to properties for public use and
patrimonial property.[14] The same is still true under the
1950 Civil Code which governs us today. The principle has
remained constant: property for public use can be used by
everybody, even by strangers or aliens, in accordance with
its nature; but nobody can exercise over it the rights of a
private owner.
the case at bar, a school, a public market, and a cemetery
were built upon the subject property. Unlike a public
square as that in Nicolas or a playground as that in the
Province of Zamboanga del Norte, schools, public markets
and cemeteries are not for the free and indiscriminate use
of everyone. The determination of the persons allowed to
study in such schools, or put up stalls in the public market,
or bury their dead in public cemeteries are regulated by
the government. As such, the subject property is, under
the Civil Code classification, patrimonial property, and the
Municipality may have the same registered in its name.
This brings us to the final reason for the denial of the
present petition. The records of the case are bereft of any
proof on the part of petitioners that they are indeed the
successors-in-interest of the supposed former owners of
the subject property.
425
27.Register of Deeds v. CBC
WON an alien-owned bank can acquire ownership of
the residential lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 32230 by virtue of the deed of transfer
the deed of transfer in question can in no sense be
considered as a sale made by virtue of a judgment, decree,
mortgage, or trust deed held by appellant bank. In the
same manner it cannot be said that the real property in
question was purchased by appellant "to secure debts due
to it", considering that, as stated heretofore, the term
debt employed in the pertinent legal provision can
logically refer only to such debts as may become payable
to appellant bank as a result of a banking transaction.
The constitutional prohibition under consideration has for
its purpose the preservation of the patrimony of the
nation can not be denied
28.Director of Lands v. IAC
FACTS:
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by
Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano and Acer
Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land
possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before
the Philippines was discovered by Magellan
land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to
RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the
non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their
ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable
public land or within the public domain
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more
than P45M worth of improvements
ownership and possession of the land sought to be
registered was duly recognized by the government when
the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela
donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon
Isabela
IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of
ISSUES:
W/N the land is already a private land - YES
W/N the constitutional prohibition against their
acquisition by private corporations or associations applies-
NO
HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc
YES
already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a
grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not
necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in
order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an
application therefore is sufficient
it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had
become private property, at least by presumption
The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack
of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as
would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to
be issued upon the strength of said patent.
The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer
title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
decree, if not by earlier law
29.Halili v. CA


G.R. No. 113539 March 12, 1998
CELSO R. HALILI and ARTHUR R. HALILI,
petitioners,vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HELEN MEYERS GUZMAN, DAVID REY
GUZMAN and EMILIANO CATANIAG,
respondents.I. FACTSSimeon de Guzman, an American
citizen, died sometime in 1968, leaving real properties in
the Philippines. His forcedheirs were his widow, defendant
appellee Helen Meyers Guzman, and his son, defendant
appellee David Rey Guzman,both of whom are also
American citizens. On August 9, 1989, Helen executed a
deed of quitclaim, assigning, transferringand conveying to
David Rey all her rights, titles and interests in and over six
parcels of land which the two of theminherited from
Simeon. Among the said parcels of land is that now in
litigation, . . . situated in Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria,Bulacan,
containing an area of 6,695 square meters. On February 5,
1991, David Rey Guzman sold said parcel of land
todefendant-appellee Emiliano Cataniag.II. ISSUESa.
Whether or not the subjected land was ruralb. Whether or
not the sale to Cataniag was valid
ale to Cataniag valid
Helen Guzmans quitclaim, which she assigned, transferred
and conveyed to David Rey all her rights, titles and
interests over the property, collided with the Constitution
which states that only the qualified, can acquire lands of
thepublic domain with the exception of hereditary
succession.In the 1935 Constitution, aliens cannot acquire
public as well as private lands. In fine, non-Filipinos cannot
acquire or holdtitle to private lands or to lands of the
public domain, except only by way of legal succession.

Jurisprudence is consistent that if land is invalidly
transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a
citizen or
transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction
is considered cured and the title of the transferee is
rendered
valid. Since the disputed land is now owned by Cataniag,
a Filipino citizen, the prior invalid transfer can no longer be
assailed
30.Krivenko v. Register of Deeds

Krivenko vs Register of Deeds, GR No. L-630,November 15,
1947; 79 Phil 461
(Land Titles and Deeds

Aliens disqualified from acquiring public and private lands)

Facts
: An alien bought a residential lot and itsregistration was
denied by the Register of Deeds onthe ground that being
an alien, he cannot acquire landin this jurisdiction. When
the former brought the caseto the CFI, the court rendered
judgement sustainingthe refusal of the Register of Deeds.
Issue
: WON an alien may own private lands in thePhilippines.
Held
. No. Public agricultural lands mentioned in Sec.
1, Art. XIII of the 1935 Constitution, include
residential,commercial and industrial lands, the Court
stated:
Natural resources, with the exception of
publicagricultural land, shall not be alienated, and with
respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation
islimited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutionalpurpose
conserving agricultural resources in the handsof Filipino
citizens may easily be defeated by theFilipino citizens
themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in
favor of aliens.Thus Section 5, Article XIII provides:Save in
cases of hereditary succession, no privateagricultural lands
will be transferred or assignedexcept to individuals,
corporations or associationsqualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domainin the Philippines
31. Ramirez v. Vda De Ramirez
Facts: The deceased was survived by his spouse, 2
grandnephews, and his companion. The
administratorsubmitted a partition to the court which
divided the estate into 2: one-half would go to the widow
insatisfaction of her legitime; the other half, which is the
free portion, would go to the grandnephews;
however, 1/3 of the free portion is charged with the
widows usufruct and the remaining 2/3 with a
usufruct in favor of the companion.The grandnephews
opposed the substitution on the ground that the 1
st
heirs are not related to thesubstitutes within the 1
st
degree.Issue: Whether the fideicommissary substitution is
valid if the substitutes are related to the companionwithin
one degree.Decision: SC ruled that the fideicommissary
substitution is void. The substitutes (grandnephews) are
notrelated to the companion within one degree. In
effect, the SC ruled that one degree means
onegeneration and not one designation. So, it
follows
that the fideicommissary can only be either a childor a
parent of the 1stheir
OWNERSHIP

428
32.Ayala Land v. Ray Burton
FACTS: On December 22, 1995, Ayala Inc. and Ray Burton
Corp. entered into a contract denominated as a Contract
to Sell, with a Side Agreement of even date. In these
contracts, petitioner agreed to sell to respondent a parcel
of land situated at Muntinlupa City. The purchase price of
the land is payable as follows:

On contract date: 26%, inclusive of option money

Not later than 1-6-96: 4%

In consecutive quarterly installments for a period of 5
years: 70%

Respondent paid thirty (30%) down payment and the
quarterly amortization. However in 1998, respondent
notified petitioner in writing that it will no longer continue
to pay due to the adverse effects of the economic crisis to
its business. Respondent then asked for the immediate
cancellation of the contract and for a refund of its previous
payments as provided in the contract.

Petitioner refused to cancel the contract to sell. Instead, it
filed with the RTC Makati City, a complaint for specific
performance against respondent, demanding from the
latter the payment of the remaining unpaid quarterly
installments inclusive of interest and penalties.

Respondent, in its answer, denied any further obligation to
petitioner, asserting that it (respondent) notified the latter
of its inability to pay the remaining installments.
Respondent invoked the provisions of paragraphs 3 and
3.1 of the contract to sell providing for the refund to it of
the amounts paid, less interest and the sum of 25% of all
sums paid as liquidated damages.

The trial court rendered a Decision in favor of Ayala and
holding that respondent transgressed the law in obvious
bad faith. It ordered the defendant ordered to pay Ayala
the unpaid balance, interest agreed upon, and penalties.
Defendant is further ordered to pay plaintiff for attorneys
fees and the costs of suit. Upon full payment of the
aforementioned amounts by defendant, plaintiff shall, as it
is hereby ordered, execute the appropriate deed of
absolute sale conveying and transferring full title and
ownership of the parcel of land subject of the sale to and
in favor of defendant.

On appeal, the CA rendered a Decision reversing the trial
courts Decision. Hence, the instant petition for review on
certiorari.

ISSUE:
nder the doctrine of estoppel, an admission or
representation is rendered conclusive upon the person
making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against
the person relying thereon. A party may not go back on
his own acts and representations to the prejudice of the
other party who relied upon them.*45+ Here, we find no
admission, false representation or concealment that can
be attributed to AYALA relied upon by RBDC.

What is clear from the record, however, is that RBDC was
the party guilty of misrepresentation and/or concealment
when it resorted to the fraudulent scheme of submitting
two (2) sets of building plans, one (1) set conformed to the
Deed Restrictions, which was submitted to and approved
by AYALA
33. Fajardo v. Freedom to Build
Facts: Freedom to Build Inc., an owner-developer and
seller of low-cost housing sold to petitioner-spouses a
house and lot in the De La Costa Homes, in Barangka,
Marikina, Metro Manila. The Contract to sell executed
between the parties, contained a Restrictive Covenant
providing certain prohibitions, to wit:

Easements. For the good of the entire community, the
homeowner must observe a two-meter easement in front.
No structure of any kind (store, garage, bodega, etc.) may
be built on the front easement.

Upward expansion. A second storey is not prohibited. But
the second storey expansion must be placed above the
back portion of the house and should not extend forward
beyond the apex of the original building.

Front expansion: 2nd Storey: No unit may be extended in
the front beyond the line as designed and implemented by
the developer in the 60 sq. m. unit. In other words, the
2nd floor expansion, in front, is 6 meters back from the
front property line and 4 meters back from the front wall
of the house, just as provided in the 60 sq. m. units.

The above restrictions were also contained in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. N-115384 covering the lot issued in
the name of petitioner-spouses.

The controversy arose when the petitioners despite
repeated demand from the respondent, extended the roof
of their house to the property line and expanded the
second floor of their house to a point directly above the
original front wall. Respondent filed before the RTC an
action to demolish the unauthorized structures.

The RTC rendered a judgment against the petitioner
ordering them to immediately demolish and remove the
extension of their expanded housing unit that exceeds the
limitations imposed by the Restrictive Covenant, otherwise
the Branch Sheriff of this Court will execute the this
decision at the expense of the defendants.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence,
this petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not the for the lack of a specific
provision, prescribing the penalty of the demolition in the
Restrictive Covenant in the event of the breach thereof,
the prayer of the respondent to demolish the structure
should fail.

Ruling:

The Court held that the argument of the petitioner-
spouses has no merit; Article 1168 of the New Civil Code
states that: When the obligation consists in not doing and
the obligor does what has been forbidden him, it shall be
undone at his expense.

This Court is not unaware of its ruling in Ayala Corporation
vs. Ray Burton Development Corporation, which has
merely adjudged the payment of damages in lieu of
demolition. In the aforementioned case, however, the
elaborate mathematical formula for the determination of
compensatory damages which takes into account the
current construction cost index during the immediately
preceding 5 years based on the weighted average of
wholesale price and wage indices of the National Census
and Statistics Office and the Bureau of Labor Statistics is
explicitly provided for in the Deed of Restrictions entered
into by the parties. This unique and peculiar circumstance,
among other strong justifications therein mentioned, is
not extant in the case at bar.

In sum, the Court holds that since the extension
constructed exceeds the floor area limits of the Restrictive
Covenant, petitioner spouses can be required to demolish
the structure to the extent that it exceeds the prescribed
floor area limits.
Wherefore, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
34.Tayag v. Lacson 2004
Tayag v Lacson
A group of farmers/tillers, who farmed on the land owned
by the Lacson family, entered into separate Deeds of
Assignment with Tayag. According to the Deeds, each of
the farmers would waive in favor of Tayag his right tothe
actual area of land being tilled, provided that there be no
legal impediment prejudicing the smooth transferof lawful
ownership of the property in Tayags name. The going
price would be P50.00 per square meter of land actually
being tilled by each farmer. Tayag then started paying
various sums to each of the farmers, tobe taken as partial
payments under the Deeds terms. To further expedite the
process, Tayag called a meetingto work out the
implementation of the terms of their separate
agreements. However, the farmers wrote backto Tayag,
saying that they werent planning to attend the meeting,
and that they were planning to sell theirrights and
interests over the land to the Lacson family instead. They
also claimed that they were tricked intoagreeing on the
Deeds, and that they received the various sums from
Tayag in the form of loans, not aspayments under the
Deeds. In his response, Tayag claimed that the farmers
were being coerced by theLacsons to renege on their
previous commitments to him and that the Deeds must be
honored in the interestof law. The trial court ruled in favor
of Tayag (granting him injunctive relief) but the CA
reversed, andenjoined the trial court from proceeding with
the civil case.
Can the Lacsons be enjoined from the disposal or
encumbrance of the property?
the petitioner was burdened to establish the following: (1)
a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right tobe
protected; (2) a violation of that right; (3) that there is an
urgent and permanent act and urgent necessityfor the writ
to prevent serious damageNo. They were not parties to
the Deeds of Assigment between Tayag and the farmers.
(1) As dulyregistered owners of the property, the Lacsons
have the right to enjoy and dispose of the property
without anyother limitations than those established by
law. They may enter into contracts covering their property
withanother under such terms and conditions as they may
deem beneficial provided they are not contrary to
law,morals, good conduct, public order or public policy.(2)
In addition, the Deeds stated that such right in favor of
Tayag would be available only if thereexisted no legal
obstacle to his acquisition of the property. There is no
showing in the petitioners complaintthat the respondents
had agreed to sell their property, and that the legal
impediments to the agreement nolonger existed. The
petitioner and the defendants-tenants had yet to submit
the Deeds of Assignment to theDepartment of Agrarian
Reform which, in turn, had to act on and approve or
disapprove the same.In this case, the defendants-tenants-
subtenants, under the deeds of assignment, granted to
thepetitioner not only an option but the exclusive right to
buy the landholding. But the grantors were merely
thedefendants-tenants, and not the respondents, the
registered owners of the property. Not being the
registeredowners of the property, the defendants-tenants
could not legally grant to the petitioner the option, much
lessthe exclusive right to buy the property.He never
even came close to having a claim to the land; there is no
right to speak of. It must also benoted that Tayags
supposed scheme is truly revolting to the conscience. For
the measly sum of fifty bucks persquare meter, hed be
depriving the farmers/tillers of their interests over the
land they work so hard tocultivate.
35. Ross Rica Sales Center v. Sps. Ong 2005

429
36. German Management and Services Inc v. CA
37.Grand Union Supermarket Inc. v. Espino
38.UCPB, et al v. Basco 2004

432
39. Tan v. Standard Oil Co

434

40.Cornelio del Fierro et al v. Rene Sequuan 2011
41.Datu Kiram Sampaco v. Hadji Serad Minag Lantud
2011
42.Rogelio Jakosalem et al. v. Roberto Barangan 212

435
43.ATO V. MCIAA v. Gopuco 2005
44. Republic v. Lim 2005
45.Napocor v. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangakay 2011