Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 144057 January 17, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON NAGUIT, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J.:
This is a PetitionforReviewonCertiorariunder Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to review the Decision1 of the Sixth
Division of the Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 51921. The appellate court affirmed the decisions of both the Regional
Trial Court (RTC),2 Branch 8, of Kalibo, Aklan dated February 26, 1999, and the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)3 of Ibajay-Nabas,
Aklan dated February 18, 1998, which granted the application for registration of a parcel of land of Corazon Naguit (Naguit), the respondent
herein.
The facts are as follows:
On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and married to Manolito S. Naguit, filed with the MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a
petition for registration of title of a parcel of land situated in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan. The parcel of land is designated as Lot No. 10049,
Cad. 758-D, Nabas Cadastre, AP 060414-014779, and contains an area of 31,374 square meters. The application seeks judicial confirmation
of respondents imperfect title over the aforesaid land.
On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the application. The public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Jose
Angeles, representing the heirs of Rustico Angeles, opposed the petition. On a later date, however, the heirs of Rustico Angeles filed a
formal opposition to the petition. Also on February 20, 1995, the court issued an order of general default against the whole world except
as to the heirs of Rustico Angeles and the government.
The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of Ramon Urbano
(Urbano) in 1945 under Tax Declaration No. 3888 until 1991.4 On July 9, 1992, Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs
of Honorato Maming (Maming), wherein he renounced all his rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale made by his father to
Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956.5Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit
who thereupon started occupying the same. She constituted Manuel Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The administrator
introduced improvements, planted trees, such as mahogany, coconut and gemelina trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were
then 50 to 60 years old, and paid the corresponding taxes due on the subject land. At present, there are parcels of land surrounding the
subject land which have been issued titles by virtue of judicial decrees. Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land
openly and in the concept of owner without any objection from any private person or even the government until she filed her application
for registration.
After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public prosecutor manifested that the government did not intend to present any evidence
while oppositor Jose Angeles, as representative of the heirs of Rustico Angeles, failed to appear during the trial despite notice. On
September 27, 1997, the MCTC rendered a decision ordering that the subject parcel be brought under the operation of the Property
Registration Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that the title thereto registered and confirmed in the name of Naguit.6
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The OSG stressed
that the land applied for was declared alienable and disposable only on October 15, 1980, per the certification from Regional Executive
Director Raoul T. Geollegue of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region VI.7 However, the court denied the motion
for reconsideration in an order dated February 18, 1998.81awphi1.nt
Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the order of the MCTC to the RTC, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8. On February 26, 1999, the
RTC rendered its decision, dismissing the appeal.9
Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On July 12, 2000, the
appellate court rendered a decision dismissing the petition filed by the Republic and affirmed intotothe assailed decision of the RTC.
Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure question of law was filed by the Republic on September 4, 2000.10
The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that the appellate court gravely erred in holding that there is no need for
the governments prior release of the subject lot from the public domain before it can be considered alienable or disposable within the
meaning of P.D. No. 1529, and that Naguit had been in possession of Lot No. 10049 in the concept of owner for the required period.11
Hence, the central question for resolution is whether is necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the subject
land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicants possession under a bonafideclaim of ownership could even start.
The OSG invokes our holding in DirectorofLandsv.IntermediateAppellateCourt12 in arguing that the property which is in open, continuous
and exclusive possession must first be alienable. Since the subject land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not
have maintained a bonafideclaim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, since
prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or disposable, the OSG argues.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration proceedings, bears close examination. It expressly provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
. . . .
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section 14(1) that the property in question
is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should have already been established since
June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies
its antecedent phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or
phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located.13 Adproximumantecedentsfiatrelation
nisiimpediatursentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would
be, adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945
would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation
renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to
reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering
that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already
alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not
yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right
to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in
good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an
intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republicv.CourtofAppeals.14 Therein, the Court noted that "to prove that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as
a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute."15In that case, the subject land had been certified by the DENR as alienable and disposable in 1980, thus the
Court concluded that the alienable status of the land, compounded by the established fact that therein respondents had occupied the land
even before 1927, sufficed to allow the application for registration of the said property. In the case at bar, even the petitioner admits that
the subject property was released and certified as within alienable and disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR.16
This case is distinguishable from Bracewellv.CourtofAppeals,17 wherein the Court noted that while the claimant had been in possession
since 1908, it was only in 1972 that the lands in question were classified as alienable and disposable. Thus, the bid at registration therein
did not succeed. In Bracewell, the claimant had filed his application in 1963, or nine (9) years before the property was
declared alienable and disposable.1awphi1.nt Thus, in this case, where the application was made years after the property had been
certified as alienable and disposable, theBracewellruling does not apply.
A different rule obtains for forest lands,18 such as those which form part of a reservation for provincial park purposes19 the possession of
which cannot ripen into ownership.20 It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private
persons. As held in Palomo v. Court of Appeals,21 forest land is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot
convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.22 In the case at bar, the property
in question was undisputedly classified as disposable and alienable; hence, the ruling in Palomo is inapplicable, as correctly held by the
Court of Appeals.23
It must be noted that the present case was decided by the lower courts on the basis of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
which pertains to original registration through ordinary registration proceedings. The right to file the application for registration derives
from a bonafideclaim of ownership going back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, by reason of the claimants open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which reads:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an
interest therein, but those titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the
land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title
to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which
provided that the bonafideclaim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. This new starting point is concordant
with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended. True, the Public Land Act does refer to "agricultural lands of the public domain," while the Property Registration Decree
uses the term "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain." It must be noted though that the Constitution declares that "alienable
lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands."24 Clearly, the subject lands under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree are of the same type.
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of
alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the application of "those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws."
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.25 There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties
classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least
thirty (30) years.26 With such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2), and
thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public
land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor
may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted with coconut trees now over fifty years old.27 The inherent
nature of the land but confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural. There is no impediment to the application of Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, as correctly accomplished by the lower courts.l^vvphi1.net
The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Naguit had been in possession in the concept of owner for the required
period. The argument begs the question. It is again hinged on the assertionshown earlier to be unfoundedthat there could have been
no bonafideclaim of ownership prior to 1980, when the subject land was declared alienable or disposable.
We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals that Naguit had the right to apply for registration
owing to the continuous possession by her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945. The basis of such conclusion is primarily
factual, and the Court generally respects the factual findings made by lower courts. Notably, possession since 1945 was established through
proof of the existence of 50 to 60-year old trees at the time Naguit purchased the property as well as tax declarations executed by Urbano
in 1945. Although tax declarations and realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are
good indiciaof the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his
actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary
declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property
and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to
the Government. Such an act strengthens ones bonafideclaim of acquisition of ownership.28
Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of land by the respondent can be traced back to that of her predecessors-in-interest
which commenced since 1945 or for almost fifty (50) years, it is indeed beyond any cloud of doubt that she has acquired title thereto which
may be properly brought under the operation of the Torrens system. That she has been in possession of the land in the concept of an
owner, open, continuous, peaceful and without any opposition from any private person and the government itself makes her right thereto
undoubtedly settled and deserving of protection under the law.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.























Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17652 June 30, 1962
IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG, and ESTEBAN CALALUNG, respondents.
BartolomeGuiraoandAntonioM.Oraraforpetitioners.GonzalesandFernandezforrespondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia Grande, from the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R.
No. 25169-R) reversing that of the Court of First Instance of Isabela (Civil Case No. 1171), and dismissing petitioners' action against
respondents Domingo and Esteban Calalung, to quiet title to and recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly occupied by the latter
without petitioners' consent.
The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares,
located at barrio Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini), province of Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased mother
Patricia Angui (who inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name said land appears registered, as shown by
Original Certificate of Title No. 2982, issued on June 9, 1934). Said property is identified as Lot No. 1, Plan PSU-83342. When it was surveyed
for purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River (the same boundary stated in the title).
Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place, by action of the current of the Cagayan
River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded to a distance of about 105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposit
of 19,964 square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been added to the registered area (Exh. C-1).
On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela against respondents, to quiet title to
said portion (19,964 square meters) formed by accretion, alleging in their complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 1171) that they and their
predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in peaceful and continuous possession thereof, until September, 1948, when respondents entered
upon the land under claim of ownership. Petitioners also asked for damages corresponding to the value of the fruits of the land as well as
attorney's fees and costs. In their answer (dated February 18, 1958), respondents claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they have
been in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to the year 1933 to the present.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a decision adjudging the ownership of the portion in question to
petitioners, and ordering respondents to vacate the premises and deliver possession thereof to petitioners, and to pay to the latter P250.00
as damages and costs. Said decision, in part, reads:
It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed by the gradual deposit of alluvium brought about by the action
of the Cagayan River, a navigable river. We
are inclined to believe that the accretion was formed on the northeastern side of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982
after the survey of the registered land in 1931, because the surveyors found out that the northeastern boundary of the land surveyed by
them was the Cagayan River, and not the land in question. Which is indicative of the fact that the accretion has not yet started or begun in
1931. And, as declared by Pedro Laman, defendant witness and the boundary owner on the northwest of the registered land of the plaintiffs,
the accretion was a little more than one hectare, including the stony portion, in 1940 or 1941. Therefore, the declarations of the defendant
Domingo Calalung and his witness, Vicente C. Bacani, to the effect that the land in question was formed by accretion since 1933 do not only
contradict the testimony of defendants' witness Pedro Laman, but could not overthrow the incontestable fact that the accretion with an
area of 4 hectare more or less, was formed in 1948, reason for which, it was only declared in that same year for taxation purposes by the
defendants under Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") when they entered upon the land. We could not give credence to defendants' assertion that
Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") cancelled Tax Dee. No. 28226 (Exh. "1"), because Exh. "2" says that "tax under this declaration begins with the
year 1948. But, the fact that defendants declared the land for taxation purposes since 1948, does not mean that they become the owner
of the land by mere occupancy, for it is a new provision of the New Civil Code that ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by
occupation (Art. 714, New Civil Code). The land in question being an accretion to the mother or registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion
belongs to the plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil Code; Art. 366, Old Civil Code). Assuming arguendo, that the accretion has been occupied by
the defendants since 1948, or earlier, is of no moment, because the law does not require any act of possession on the part of the owner of
the riparian owner, from the moment the deposit becomes manifest (Roxas v. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Cortez v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567).
Further, no act of appropriation on the part of the reparian owner is necessary, in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial formation, as
the law does not require the same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp. 321-326).
This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants, granting that they have been in possession of the alluvium since 1948,
could have acquired the property by prescription. Assuming that they occupied the land in September, 1948, but considering that the action
was commenced on January 25, 1958, they have not been in possession of the land for ten (10) years; hence, they could not have acquired
the land by ordinary prescription (Arts. 1134 and 1138, New Civil Code). Moreover, as the alluvium is, by law, part and parcel of the
registered property, the same may be considered as registered property, within the meaning of Section 46 of Act No. 496: and, therefore,
it could not be acquired by prescription or adverse possession by another person.
Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on September 14, 1960, the decision adverted to at the
beginning of this opinion, partly stating:
That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of alluvium, which started in the early thirties, is a fact conclusively
established by the evidence for both parties. By law, therefore, unless some superior title has supervened, it should properly belong to the
riparian owners, specifically in accordance with the rule of natural accession in Article 366 of the old Civil Code (now Article 457), which
provides that "to the owner of lands adjoining the banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of
the current of the waters." The defendants, however, contend that they have acquired ownership through prescription. This contention
poses the real issue in this case. The Courtaquo, has resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs, on two grounds: First, since by accession, the land
in question pertains to the original estate, and since in this instance the original estate is registered, the accretion, consequently, falls within
the purview of Section 46 of Act No. 496, which states that "no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall
be acquired by prescription or adverse possession"; and, second, the adverse possession of the defendant began only in the month of
September, 1948, or less than the 10-year period required for prescription before the present action was instituted.
As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not quite correct. An accretion to registered land, while declared by
specific provision of the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land as a natural accession thereof, does not ipsojurebecome entitled to
the protection of the rule of imprescriptibility of title established by the Land Registration Act. Such protection does not extend beyond the
area given and described in the certificate. To hold otherwise, would be productive of confusion. It would virtually deprive the title, and the
technical description of the land given therein, of their character of conclusiveness as to the identity and area of the land that is registered.
Just as the Supreme Court, albeit in a negative manner, has stated that registration does not protect the riparian owner against the erosion
of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream (Payatas Estate Development Co. v. Tuason, 53 Phil.
55), so registration does not entitle him to all the rights conferred by Land Registration Act, in so far as the area added by accretion is
concerned. What rights he has, are declared not by said Act, but by the provisions of the Civil Code on accession: and these provisions do
not preclude acquisition of the addition area by another person through prescription. This Court has held as much in the case of Galindez,
etal.v.Baguisa,etal., CA-G.R. No. 19249-R, July 17, 1959.
We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial court, regarding the length of time that the defendants have been
in possession. Domingo Calalung testified that he occupied the land in question for the first time in 1934, not in 1948 as claimed by the
plaintiffs. The area under occupancy gradually increased as the years went by. In 1946, he declared the land for purposes of taxation (Exhibit
1). This tax declaration was superseded in 1948 by another (Exhibit 2), after the name of the municipality wherein it is located was changed
from Tumauini to Magsaysay. Calalung's testimony is corroborated by two witnesses, both owners of properties nearby. Pedro Laman, 72
years of age, who was Municipal president of Tumauini for three terms, said that the land in question adjoins his own on the south, and
that since 1940 or 1951, he has always known it to be in the peaceful possession of the defendants. Vicente C. Bacani testified to the same
effect, although, he said that the defendants' possession started sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area thereof, he said, was then less than
one hectare.
We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater weight and credence than that of the plaintiff Pedro Grande and his
lone witness, Laureana Rodriguez. The first stated that the defendants occupied the land in question only in 1948; that he called the latter's
attention to the fact that the land was his, but the defendants, in turn, claimed that they were the owners, that the plaintiffs did not file an
action until 1958, because it was only then that they were able to obtain the certificate of title from the surveyor, Domingo Parlan; and that
they never declared the land in question for taxation purposes or paid the taxes thereon. Pedro Grande admitted that the defendants had
the said land surveyed in April, 1958, and that he tried to stop it, not because he claimed the accretion for himself and his co-plaintiffs, but
because the survey included a portion of the property covered by their title. This last fact is conceded by the defendants who, accordingly,
relinquished their possession to the part thus included, containing an area of some 458 square meters.1wph1.t
The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their possession from 1933 to 1958 is not only preponderant in itself,
but is, moreover, supported by the fact that it is they and not the plaintiffs who declared the disputed property for taxation, and by the
additional circumstance that if the plaintiff had really been in prior possession and were deprived thereof in 1948, they would have
immediately taken steps to recover the same. The
excuse they gave for not doing so, namely, that they did not receive their copy of the certificate of title to their property until 1958 for lack
of funds to pay the fees of the surveyor Domingo Parlan, is too flimsy to merit any serious consideration. The payment of the surveyor's
fees had nothing to do with their right to obtain a copy of the certificate. Besides, it was not necessary for them to have it in their hands, in
order to file an action to recover the land which was legally theirs by accession and of which, as they allege, they had been illegally deprived
by the defendants. We are convinced, upon consideration of the evidence, that the latter, were really in possession since 1934, immediately
after the process of alluvion started, and that the plaintiffs woke up to their rights only when they received their copy of the title in 1958.
By then, however, prescription had already supervened in favor of the defendants.
It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be reviewed by us.
The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have acquired the alluvial property in question through prescription.
There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and Article 366 of the old, petitioners are the lawful owners of
said alluvial property, as they are the registered owners of the land which it adjoins. The question is whether the accretion becomes
automatically registered land just because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property
imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of Appeals that it does not, just as an unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the
adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipsofactoregistered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under
the Torrens system of that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by
the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral
Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it
imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the registration
laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided. The fact remain, however, that petitioners never sought registration of said
alluvial property (which was formed sometime after petitioners' property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 was registered
on June 9, 1934) up to the time they instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela in 1958. The increment, therefore,
never became registered property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property
under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through acquisitive prescription? This is a question which requires
determination of facts: physical possession and dates or duration of such possession. The Court of Appeals, after analyzing the evidence,
found that respondents-appellees were in possession of the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under a
claim of ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958. This finding of the existence of these facts, arrived at by the Court of Appeals after
an examination of the evidence presented by the parties, is conclusive as to them and can not be reviewed by us.
The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the provisions of the Civil Code, since the possession
started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of the old Civil Code were not in force and before the effectivity of the new Civil Code
in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the respondents acquired alluvial lot in question by acquisitive prescription is
in accordance with law.
The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners. So ordered.











Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26127 June 28, 1974
(Civil Case No. 3621)
VICTOR BENIN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL., defendants. J. M. TUASON & CO., INC.,
defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-26128 June 28, 1974
(Civil Case No. 3622)
JUAN ALCANTARA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL., defendants. J.M. TUASON & CO., INC.,
defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-26129 June 28, 1974
(Civil Case No. 3623)
DIEGO PILI, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL., defendants. J.M. TUASON & CO., INC., defendant-
appellant.
JosePalarcaLawOfficesforplaintiffs-appellees.
ManuelO.Chan&RodolfoM.Caluagfordefendant-appellant.
ZALDIVAR, J.:p
Appeal from the decision, dated January 18, 1965, of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the Hon. Judge Eulogio Mencias, presiding in Civil
Cases Nos. 3621, 3622, and 3623. 1
On May 19, 1955 three sets of plaintiffs filed three separate complaints containing substantially the same allegations. 2
In Civil Case No. 3621, the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of the three parcels of agricultural lands, described
in paragraph V of the complaint, located in the barrio of La Loma (now barrio of San Jose) in the municipality (now city) of Caloocan, province
of Rizal, having an aggregate area of approximately 278,928 square meters; that they inherited said parcels of land from their ancestor Sixto
Benin, who in turn inherited the same from his father, Eugenio Benin; that they and their predecessors in interest had possessed these
three parcels of land openly, adversely, and peacefully, cultivated the same and exclusively enjoyed the fruits harvested therefrom; that
Eugenio Benin, plaintiff's grandfather, had said parcels of land surveyed on March 4 and 6, 1894, that during the cadastral survey by the
Bureau of Lands of the lands in Barrio San Jose in 1933 Sixto Benin and herein plaintiffs claim the ownership over said parcels of land; that
they declared said lands for taxation purposes in 1940 under Tax Declaration No. 2429; that after the outbreak of the last World War, or
sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places, after having secured the permission of the
plaintiffs, constructed their houses thereon and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs.
In Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of two parcels of agricultural land, described in
paragraph V of the complaint, located in the Barrio of La Loma (now Barrio San Jose) in the municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal,
having an aggregate area of approximately 148,118 square meters; that these parcels of land were inherited by them from their deceased
father Bonoso Alcantara, who in turn inherited the same from his father, Juan Alcantara; that plaintiffs Juan Alcantara and Jose Alcantara
were the children of Bonoso Alcantara; that these two brothers inherited the land from their father, and they and their predecessors in
interest had been in open, adverse and continuous possession of the same, planting therein palay and other agricultural products and
exclusively enjoying said products; that on March 28, 1894 plaintiffs' grandfather, Juan Alcantara, had said lands surveyed; that during the
cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in Barrio San Jose in 1933 Bonoso Alcantara and the plaintiffs filed and registered their
claims of ownership over said lands; that plaintiffs had said lands declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 2390, of Quezon
City; that after the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other
places, after having secured permission from plaintiffs, settled and constructed their houses on said lands and plaintiffs collected monthly
rentals from them.
In Civil Case No. 3623, plaintiffs alleged that they are the owners and possessors of a parcel of agricultural land located in the Barrio of La
Loma (now San Jose), municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an area of approximately 62,481 square meters; that this parcel of
land was inherited by plaintiffs from their ancestor Candido Pili who in turn inherited the same from his parents; that Candido Pili and his
predecessors in interest owned, possessed, occupied and cultivated the said parcel of land from time immemorial; that upon the death of
Candido Pili his children Luisa Pili, Pascual Pili, Diego Pili and Manuel Pili succeeded to the ownership and possession and cultivation of said
land; that plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest, as owners and possessors of said land, had openly, adversely and continuously
cultivated the land, planting thereon palay and other agricultural products and enjoying exclusively the products harvested therefrom; that
during his lifetime, Candido Pili ordered the survey of said land sometime on March 11, 1894, and when the cadastral survey of said land
was conducted by the Bureau of Lands in 1933 Candido Pili and plaintiffs filed and registered their claim of ownership over the said parcel
of land; that plaintiffs had the land declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 2597, Quezon City, Philippines; that after the
outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places, after securing
permission from plaintiffs, settled and constructed their houses in said land and plaintiffs collected monthly rentals from their lessees or
tenants.
The plaintiffs in these three civil cases uniformly alleged, in their respective complaint, that sometime in the year 1951 while they were
enjoying the peaceful possession of their lands, the defendants,
particularly the defendant J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc., through their agents and representatives, with the aid of armed men, by force and
intimidation, using bulldozers and other demolishing equipment, illegally entered and started defacing, demolishing and destroying the
dwellings and constructions of plaintiffs' lessees, as well as the improvements consisting of rice paddies (pilapiles), bamboos and fruit trees,
and permanent improvements such as old roads, old bridges and other permanent landmarks within and outside the lands in question,
disregarding the objections of plaintiffs, and as a result plaintiffs were deprived of the rentals received from their lessees; that plaintiffs
made inquiries regarding the probable claim of defendants, and in 1953 they discovered for the first time that their lands, as described in
their respective complaint, had either been fraudulently or erroneously included, by direct or constructive fraud, in what appears as Parcel
No. 1 (known as Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Land Records of the province of Rizal in the names of the
original applicants for registration, now defendants, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason
y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz.
The plaintiffs in each of the three complaints also alleged that the registered owners mentioned in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had
applied for the registration of two parcels of land (known as the Santa Mesa Estate and the Diliman Estate), located in the municipalities of
Caloocan and San Juan del Monte, province of Rizal, of which parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) contained an area of 8,798,617 square
meters; that the registration proceedings were docketed as LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration; that the application for
registration in LRC No. 7681, containing the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas of parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) and parcel No.
2 (Diliman Estate) was published in the Official Gazette; that before the decision was handed down in LRC No. 7681, the area, boundaries
and technical descriptions of parcel No. 1 were altered and amended; that the amendments and alterations, which were made after the
publication of the original application, were never published; that on March 7, 1914 a decision was rendered in LRC No. 7681 based on the
amended plan; that pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 a decree of registration was issued on July 6, 1914, known as Decree No.
17431, decreeing the registration in the names of the applicants of the two parcels of land (Santa Mesa Estate and Diliman Estate); that the
decision dated March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is null and void because the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to render the decision
for lack of publication; that Decree No. 17431 issued pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is likewise null and void
from the beginning, because it was issued pursuant to a void decision and because the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas
appearing in the decree are different and not identical with the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas in the application for
registration as published in the Official Gazette; that the area of parcel No. 1 as mentioned in Decree No. 17431 is bigger than the area of
parcel No. 1 appearing in the application for registration as published in the Official Gazette; that Original Certificate of Title No. 735,
referring to parcel 1 (Santa Mesa Estate), is also null and void from the beginning because it was issued pursuant to a void decree of
registration; that the area, boundaries and technical description of Parcel No. 1 appearing in Decree of Registration No. 17431 and in the
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 are different from the area, boundaries and technical description appearing in the application for
registration as published in the Official Gazette; that the plaintiffs had not been notified of the proceedings in LRC No. 7681 although the
applicants knew, or could have known, by the exercise of necessary diligence, the names and addresses of the plaintiffs and their
predecessors in interest who were then, and up to the time the complaints were filed, in possession and were cultivating the lands described
in paragraph V of their respective complaint; and that during, before, and even after the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 the
defendants had tacitly recognized the ownership of the plaintiffs over their respective lands because said defendants had never disturbed
the possession and cultivation of the lands by the plaintiffs until the year 1951; and that all transfer certificates of title issued subsequently,
based on Original Certificate of Title No. 735, are also null and void. 3
The plaintiffs in each of the three cases prayed the court: (1) to declare them owners and entitled to the possession of the parcel, or parcels,
of land described in their respective complaint, as the case may be; (2) to revoke the decision of the Court of Land Registration, dated
March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681, and to declare Decree No. 17431, dated July 6, 1914 null and void from the beginning with respect to Parcel
No. 1(Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 which include the lands of the plaintiffs; (3) to declare Original Certificate
of Title No. 735, particularly as it refers to Parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) also null and void; (4) to declare null and void all transfer
certificates of titles issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal and of Quezon City subsequent to, and based on, Original Certificate of Title No.
735; (5) to order the defendants, in the event Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is declared valid, to reconvey and transfer title over the
land described in their respective complaint in favor of the plaintiffs in each case, as the case may be; (6) to order the defendants to pay
the plaintiffs the market value of the lands in question in case of defendants' inability to reconvey the same; (7) to order the defendants to
pay damages to the plaintiffs; (8) to issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendants, their lawyers, their agents and
representatives from disturbing the ownership and possession of the plaintiffs during the pendency of these cases.
The plaintiffs, in the three cases, were allowed by the trial court to litigate as paupers.
Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was actually served with summons. The other defendants were ordered summoned by publication
in accordance with Sections 16 and 17 of the Rules of Court. Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. appeared. The other defendants were
all declared in default.
On June 23, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss in each of the three cases. This motion to dismiss was denied
by the trial court on July 20, 1955.
On July 18, 1955 the trial court issued an order granting the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the plaintiffs in their complaints.
The preliminary injunction, however, was lifted by order of the trial court on October 3, 1955, upon the posting by defendant J.M. Tuason
& Co., Inc. of bonds in the total amount of P14,000.00 pursuant to the order of the court of September 26, 1955.
On August 11, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed in the three cases a motion for reconsideration of the order of July 20, 1955
denying the motion to dismiss. This motion for reconsideration was denied by order of the court of September 26, 1955.
On November 29, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed an answer in each of the three cases. In its answer, this defendant, among
others, specifically denied plaintiffs' claim of ownership of the lands involved in each case. The answer contains special and affirmative
defenses, to wit: (1) that the plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by prior judgment and resjudicatain view of the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal in its Civil Case No. Q-156 which was subsequently elevated to the Supreme Court as G.R. No. L-4998, in which latter
case the Supreme Court affirmed in toto the order of the lower court dismissing the case; (2) that the complaints failed to state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants; (3) that the plaintiffs' action, assuming that their complaints state sufficient
cause of action, had prescribed either under Act No. 496 or under statutes governing prescription of action; (4) that defendant J.M. Tuason
& Co., Inc. is a buyer in good faith and for valuable consideration of the parcels of land involved in the three cases; (5) that the registration
proceedings had in LRC No. 7681 instituted by the defendant's predecessors in interest was in accordance with law, and the requirements
for a valid registration of title were complied with. By way of counterclaim the defendant prayed that the plaintiffs be ordered to pay
damages as therein specified.
The plaintiffs, amended their complaints in the three cases, by including additional parties as plaintiffs, and the amended complaints were
admitted by the trial court. The defendant, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., filed a manifestation that it was reproducing and realleging its answers
to the original complaints as its answers to the amended complaints in view of the fact that the amendments to the complaints consist
merely in the inclusion of additional indispensable as well as necessary parties-plaintiffs. 4
On June 7, 1962, after the plaintiffs had presented their evidence, defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. presented a motion to dismiss the
cases upon grounds that (1) the actions were barred by the statute of limitations; (2) that the actions barred by a prior judgment; and (3)
that plaintiffs had not presented any evidence to prove their claim of ownership. The defendant later filed a motion to withdraw the third
ground of its motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss, as well as to the motion of defendant to
withdraw its third ground to dismiss. The trial court, in an order dated December 3, 1962, granted defendant's motion to withdraw the
third ground of its motion to dismiss but denied the motion to dismiss. 5
After trial, on January 18, 1965, the lower court rendered a decision for the three cases, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants as follows:
A Declaring that the decision, the decree and the title issued in LRC No. 7681, are null and void,abinitio, and of no effect whatsoever; B
Declaring that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 found on page 136 Vol. A-7 of the Registration Book of Rizal is null and void from the
very beginning (and) of no effect whatsoever;
C Declaring that all Transfer Certificates of Title emanating or allegedly derived from Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Province
of Rizal are likewise null and void;
D Declaring that the plaintiff in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 are the owners and entitled to the possession of the parcels of land
claimed and described in paragraph V of their respective complaints;
E Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming under them to vacate and restore to the plaintiffs the possesion of the parcels of
land described in paragraph V of the complaint in Civil Case No. 3621 and indicated as ParcelA,ParcelBandParcelC, in SWO-40187 (Exh.
"UU" and Exh. "VV");
F Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming under them to vacate and restore to the plaintiffs the possession of the parcels of
land described in paragraph V of the complaint in Civil Case No. 3623 and indicated as ParcelDand ParcelF, in SWO-40187 (Exh. "UU" and
Exh. 'VV");
G Ordering the Defendants and all persons claiming under them to vacate and restore to the plaintiffs the possession of the parcels of
land described in paragraph V of the complaint in Civil Case No. 3623 and indicated in Parcel E, in SWO-491187 (Exh. "UU and Exh. "VV");
H Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621 the sum of P600.00 a month as actual damages for uncollected rentals
from 1951 until such possession is restored to them;
I Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 the sum of P600.00 a month, as actual damages for uncollected
rentals from 1951 until such possession is restored to them;.
J Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 the sum of P150.00 a month as actual damages for uncollected
rentals from 1951 until such possession is restored to them; .
K Ordering the defendants to pay the costs; .
L The defendants' counterclaim is hereby declared dismissed for lack of merit." 6
A motion for new trial was filed by defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. on January 30, 1965. However, before the motion for new trial was
resolved by the court, said defendant, on February 11, 1965, filed a notice of appeal to this Court and an appeal bond, and on February 12,
1965 he filed the record on appeal. 7 The record on appeal, after it had been corrected and amended, as ordered and/or authorized by the
trial court, was approved on September 29, 1965. 8
Appellant J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc., in this appeal, contends that the trial court committed the following errors:
I. The lower court erred in holding that the Land Registration Court in GLRO No. 7681 lacked or was without jurisdiction to issue decree No.
17431 for the alleged reason that:
(1) The amendment to the original plan was not published;
(2) The description of Parcel 1 in the decree is not identical with the description of Parcel 1 as applied for and as published in the Official
Gazette;
(3) Parcel 1 as decreed is bigger in area than Parcel 1 as applied for;
(4) A. Bonifacio Road is the only boundary on the West of Parcel 1.
II. The trial court erred in finding that the transcription of the decree No. 17431 was not in accordance with the law and that, therefore,
said OCT 735 was a complete nullity and the land remains unregistered.
III. The trial court erred in taking cognizance of these cases despite its lack of jurisdiction to hear and decide the same.
IV. The trial court erred in not dismissing these cases on the grounds of prescription and laches, and in denying the motions to dismiss filed
on said grounds.
V. The trial court erred in not dismissing these cases on the ground of resjudicataand in denying the motion to dismiss filed on said ground.
VI. The trial court erred in declaring null and void all certificates of title emanating from OCT 735.
VII. The trial court erred in holding that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is not a purchaser in good faith and for value.
VIII. The trial court erred in awarding ownership of the lands claimed by, and in awarding damages to, the appellees.
IX. The trial court erred in denying and in dismissing appellant's counterclaim and in sentencing appellant to pay the costs of these suits.
As stated by the trial court in its decision, "These cases involve the validity of the decision and the decree issued in LRC No. 7681 resulting
in the issuance of Title No. 735, and the ownership and possession of several parcels of land, claimed by the plaintiffs in their respective
complaints...."
The lower court, summarizing its findings, among others, concluded that: (1) the decision and the decree in LRC No. 7681 are null and void
abinitio, having been rendered without jurisdiction; (2) Original Certificate of Title No. 735 issued pursuant to the decree in LRC No. 7681
is null and void, having been issued pursuant to a void degree; (3) Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is null and void because the No. 17431
in LRC No. 7681, assuming the degree to be valid, had not been inscribed in accordance with the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496; (4) all
Transfer Certificates of Title allegedly emanating and derived from the void Original Certificate of Title No. 735 are likewise null and void;
and (5) the plaintiffs in these three civil are the owners and entitled to the possession of the parcels of land described in their respective
complaints.
We have carefully examined and studied the voluminous records, and the numerous documentary evidence, of these three cases, and We
find that the conclusions of the trial court are not supported by the evidence and the applicable decisions of this Court.
The Original Certificate of Title No. 735 that had been declared null and void ab initio by the trial court covers two big parcels of land,
mentioned in said title as Parcel 1, having an area of 8,778,644.10 square meters more or less, known as the Santa Mesa Estate; and Parcel
2, having an area of 15,961,246 square meters more or less, known as the Diliman Estate. The three parcels of land involved in Civil Case
No. 3621, having an aggregate area of 278,853 square meters, more or less; the two parcels of land involved in Civil Case No. 3622 having
an aggregate area of 154,119.7 square meters, more or less; and the one parcel of land involved in Civil Case No. 3623, having an area of
62,481 square meters, more or less, are all included in the area of Parcel 1. 9 The trial court, in its decision, states that the identity of the
parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs is not disputed and that both the plaintiffs and the defendant admit that the parcels of land litigated
are found within the boundaries of the present Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision (Parcel 1) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. 10
It is shown in the survey plans, presented by both the plaintiffs and the defendant, that the six parcels of lands involved in these three cases
are located at the northwestern portion of Parcel 1. (Exhs. UU, VV; and Exh. 29).
The records show, and it is established by the evidence, that sometime in 1911 Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason
y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, filed with the
Court of Land Registration an application for the registration of their title over two parcels of land, designated in the survey plans
accompanying the application as Parcel 1 with an area of 8,798,617 square meters, and Parcel 2 with an area of 16,254,037 square meters.
The application was docketed as LRC No. 7681. There was another application covering three other parcels of land, docketed as LRC No.
7680. The application in LRC No. 7681 was set for hearing on November 20, 1911 (Exh. X). The application and the notice of hearing,
containing the technical descriptions of the two parcels of land applied for, were published in the issue of the Official Gazette of October
25, 1911 (Exh. YY). On November 20, 1911 the Court of Land Registration issued an order of general default against the whole world except
the Insular Government, the Director of Lands and the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte (Exh. 28). On December 23, 1911
the court issued an order authorizing the amendment of the plan in LRC No. 7681 (Exh. 23). November 11, 1913 the applicants and the
Government entered into an agreement whereby the Government agreed to withdraw its opposition to the application for registration of
title over the portion known as Hacienda Diliman (Parcel 2) on condition that the roads existing on said tract of land be allowed to remain,
and it was further agreed "that the issuance, of the title to applicants shall be made subject to all the exceptions established by Section 39
of Act 496 as amended by Section 1 of Act 2011" (Exh. 21). On December 29, 1913 the Court of Land Registration rendered a decision (Exh.
24) in both LRC No. 7680 and LRC No. 7681 which, among others, stated that during the registration proceedings the plans accompanying
the two applications were amended in order to exclude certain areas that were the subject of opposition, that the order of general default
was confirmed, that the Chief of the Surveyor's Division of the Court of Land Registration was ordered to submit a report as to whether or
not the new (amended) plans had included lands which were not by the original plans, and whether or not the new plans had excluded the
lands that had already been covered by the decree in LRC No. 3563. The decision further stated that in the event that the new plans did
not include new parcels of land and that the lands that were the subject of the proceedings in LRC No. 3563 had been excluded, an additional
decision would be made decreeing the adjudication and registration of the lands that were the subject of the registration proceedings in
favor of the applicants, as follows: To Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, two sixths (2/6) undivided portion to Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de
la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion; to Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion; to Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y
de la Paz, one sixth (1/6)undivided portion; and to Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion.
In compliance with the order contained in the decision of December 29, 1913, the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land
Registration, on January 24, 1914, submitted a report (Exh. 22) to the court which, among others, stated that the new plan of Parcel 1 in
LRC No. 7681 did not include any land that had not been previously included in the original plan.
On March 7, 1914 the Court of Land Registration rendered a supplemental decision declaring that, on the basis of the decision of December
29, 1913 and of the report of the Surveyor of Court of Land Registration, the applicants Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz and others were
the owners of the land applied for, as described in the amended plan, in the proportion mentioned in the decision, and ordering that the
land applied for be registered in the names of the applicants and that a decree of registration be issued in accordance with the decision
and the amended plan. On March 27, 1914 the Chief of the Survey Division addressed a communication to the registration court, in
connection with LRC No. 7681, suggesting that the decision of the court of March 7, 1914 be modified such that the decree of registration
be based upon the original plan as published and not upon the amended plan (Exh. Z-3). The Court of Land Registration did not follow the
recommendation of the Chief of the Survey Division. On July 6, 1914 Decree of Registration No. 17431 was issued by the Chief of the General
Land Registration Office pursuant to the decision of the Court of Land Registration of March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681. The decree contains
the technical description of the two parcels of land in accordance with the plan as amended. It appears in the decree that Parcel 1 has an
area of 8,798,644.10 square meters, more or less, or an increase of 27.10 square meters over the area of 8,798,617 square meters that
was stated in the application for registration and in the notice of hearing which were published in the Official Gazette of October 25, 1911;
and that Parcel 2 has an area of 15,961,246 square meters, more or less, or a decrease of 292,791 square meters from the area of
16,254,037 square meters that was stated in the application and in the notice of hearing that were published in the Official Gazette (Exhs.
25 and YY). All in all, there is a decrease of 292,763.90 square meters in the aggregate area of the two parcels of land sought to be registered.
Subsequently, on July 8, 1914, the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal issued Original Certificate of Title No. 735 in the names of the
applicants, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason
y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz (Exh. 30).
1. We shall now deal with the first error assigned by the appellant.
The lower court declared Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void abinitiobecause, according to said court, that title was based on
Decree of Registration No. 17431 in LRC No. 7681 that was null and void, said decree having been issued pursuant to a decision of the Court
of Land Registration in LRC No. 7681 which had no jurisdiction to render said decision.
As We have adverted to, Original Certificate of Title No. 735 covers two big parcels of land: Parcel 1, known as the Santa Mesa Estate, and
Parcel 2, known as the Diliman Estate. The records show that these two parcels of land had been subdivided into numerous lots, and most
of those lots had sold to numerous parties Parcel 1 having been converted into a subdivision known as the Santa Mesa Heights
Subdivision, and the lots had been sold to private individual and entities, such that in that subdivision now are located the National
Orthopedic Hospital, the station of Pangasinan Transportation Co. (Pantranco), Sto. Domingo Church, Lourdes Church and others.
Necessarily, as a result of the sales of the lots into which Parcel 1 was subdivided, transfer certificates of title were issued to the purchasers
of the lots, and these transfer certificates of title were based upon transfer certificates of title that emanated from Original Certificate of
Title No. 735. The trial court declared null and void all transfer certificates of title emanating, or derived, from Original Certificate of No.
735.
The decision of the trial court declaring null and void abinitioOriginal Certificate of Title No. 735 would invalidate the title over the entire
area included in Parcel 1 which admittedly includes the six parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs-and also the title over the entire area
included in Parcel 2. Let it be noted that Parcel 1 has an area of 8,798,644.10 square meters, more or less, and Parcel 2 has an area of
15,961,246 square meters, more or less; while the six parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs have an aggregate area of only 495,453.7
square meters, more or less. In other words, the area of the six parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs is only a little over two per cent (2%)
of the aggregate area of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2. But the decision of the trial court nullified Original Certificate of Title No. 785, without any
qualification.
The trial court held that the Court of Land Registration had no jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC No. 7681 because during the
registration proceedings, after the original application and notice of hearing had been duly published, the plan of Parcel 1 was amended
and no publication regarding the amended plan was made. The trial court pointed out that the area and the description of Parcel 1 in
Decree of Registration No. 17431 are not identical with the area and description of Parcel 1 applied for and published in the Official Gazette.
The trial court stressed on the point that publication is one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide an
application for registration and to order the issuance of a decree of registration, as provided in Act 496 (Land Registration Act).
We believe that the lower court erred when it held that the Land Registration Court was without jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC
No. 7681. Under Section 23 of Act 496, the registration court may allow, or order, an amendment of the application for registration when
it appears to the court that the amendment is necessary and proper. Under Section 24 of the same act the court may at any time order an
application to be amended by striking out one or more parcels or by severance of the application. The amendment may be made in the
application or in the survey plan, or in both, since the application and the survey plan go together. If the amendment consists in the inclusion
in the application for registration of an area or parcel of land not previously included in the original application, as published, a new
publication of the amended application must be made. The purpose of the new publication is to give notice to all persons concerned
regarding the amended application. Without a new publication the registration court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the area or parcel of
land that is added to the area covered by the original application, and the decision of the registration court would be a nullity insofar as the
decision concerns the newly included land. 11 The reason is because without a new publication, the law is infringed with respect to the
publicity that is required in registration proceedings, and third parties who have not had the opportunity to present their claim might be
prejudiced in their rights because of failure of notice. 12 But if the amendment consists in the exclusion of a portion of the area covered by
the original application and the original plan as previously published, a new publication is not necessary. 13 In the latter case, the jurisdiction
of the court over the remaining area is not affected by the failure of a new publication. 14
In the case at bar We find that the original plan covering Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 that accompanied the application for registration in LRC No.
7681 was amended in order to exclude certain areas that were the subject of opposition, or which were the subject of another registration
case; and the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration was ordered to determine whether the amended plan included
lands or areas not included in the original plan. In compliance with the order of the registration court said Chief of the Survey Division
informed the court that nonewparcelswereincludedin the new (or amended) plan. Thus, in the decision of the Court of Land Registration
in LRC Nos. 7680 and 7681, dated December 29, 1913 (Exh. 24), We read the following:
Despues de las notificaciones y avisos de las dos solicitudes en ambos expedientes, se enmendaronlos planos unidos a los mismos para
excluir ciertas porciones que habian sido objeto de oposicion.
xxx xxx xxx
POR TANTO, ratificando como por la presente se ratifica la declaracion de rebeldia general, se ordena:
"1.o Que el Jefe de la Division de Agrimensores de este Tribunal terreno que no haya sido comprendido en los planos originales ...." 15
On January 24, 1914, the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration made a report to the court (Exh. 22), from which the
report We read the following:.
Cumpliendo lo mandado por el Tribunal en el No. 1 de la parte dispositiva de su Decision de fecha 29 de Diciembre proximo pasado, el que
suscribe, despues de un detenido estudio de los planos unidos a los Expedientes arriba citados, tiene el honor de informar:
1.o Que los nuevos planos presentados por los solicitantes corresponden a las parcelas 1.a 2.a, y 3.a, del Expedients No. 7680 y a la 1.a
parcela del No. 7681, que son las mismas a que se refiere el plano Exhibito A del No. 7680.
xxx xxx xxx
4. Que los nuevos planos presentados de las parcelas 1.a, 2.a y 3.a del Expediente 7680, y de la 1.a del 7681 no incluyen terreno alguno
que no haya sido comprendido en los planos originales. 16
And so, in the supplemental decision of the Court of Land Registration in LRC No. 7681, dated March 7, 1914 (Exh. 24-A), the report of the
Chief of the Survey Division was taken into consideration and the court ordered the registration of the lands applied for by the applicants
as described in the amended plan ("como esta descrito en el plano enmendado"). It is thus shown that the amended plan in LRC No. 7681
did not cover parcels, or areas, that were not previously included in the original plan which accompanied the application that had been
published in the Official Gazette. There was, therefore, no necessity for a new publication of the amended plan in order to vest the Court
of Land Registration with jurisdiction to hear and decide the application for registration in LRC No. 7681 and to order the issuance of Decree
of Registration No. 17431 upon which Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was based.
Way back in 1933, this Court had occasion to rule on the validity of the very same Original Certificate of Title No. 735 which the trial court
had declared null and void in the three cases now before this Court. In the case of the Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acua (59 Phil. 183)
the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was assailed by the appellants (Pascual Acua and others) precisely upon the ground that
during the registration proceedings, which brought about the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, the original plan of the
applicants was ordered amended, and no new publication was made of the amended plan and so it was urged that the registration court
did not have jurisdiction to order the issuance of the decree of registration in favor of the applicants. The action in this case was instituted
by the Bank of the Philippine Islands as receiver of the Tuason Entail for the purpose, among others, of recovering from Pascual Acua and
others certain lands included in the Santa Mesa and Diliman hacienda located in the barrios of Bagobantay and Diliman, in the municipalities
of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte Province of Rizal. Upon hearing, the Court of First Instance of Rizal declared that none of the defendants
owned any part of the land in controversy. On appeal, this Court observed that the character in which the plaintiff sued was not open to
question, and the material facts were as follows: The heirs of the Tuason estate, referred to as the Tuason Entail, held a Torrens title to a
tract of land with an area of about 1,600 hectares located in the province of Rizal. This property was then covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 3792 issued in lieu of older certificates dating from July 8, 1914. This Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3792 emanated from Or
Certificate of Title No. 735. 17 The appellants precisely sought to nullify the title of the heirs of the Tuason estate, which emanated from
Original Certificate of Title No. 735, upon the ground, as now urged by the appellees in the three cases at bar, that during the registration
proceedings the original plan of the lands known as the Sta. Mesa and Diliman was amended, and no publication was made of the amended
plan. Regarding the question of the non-publication of the amended plan, this Court said:
Among the arguments made by the appellants of the Bagobantay group, it is alleged that the Torrens title relied by the plaintiff is void, and
in support of this contention it stated that, during the course of the registration proceedings, an order was made by the court for the
amendment of the applicants and that this order was not followed by new publication, wherefore, it is supposed the court was without
jurisdiction to decree the title to the applicants. In this connection reliance is placed upon the doctrine stated in the Philippine
ManufacturingCo.vs.Imperial(49 Phil. 122). But the brief for the appellants fails to call attention to the fact that the rule stated in the case
cited has reference to an amendment of the plan by which additionalland, different from that included in the original survey is intended
to be brought within the process of registration. In the case before us, the order referred to was for the exclusion of certain portions of the
land covered by the original survey, and the doctrine of the case cited cannot apply. Apart from this it does not appear that the portion
intended to be excluded comprehended any part of the land which had been usurped. 18
The appellees, however, asserts that the case of the BankofthePhilippineIslandsvs.Acua,supra, is not applicable to the three cases now
before this Court because what was involved in said case was Parcel 2 of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, and not Parcel 1 which is the
land involved in these cases. This assertion of the appellees is not correct. The decision in that case states that the action was instituted by
the Bank of the Philippine Islands, as receiver of the Tuason Entail, for the purpose, among others, of recovering from Pascual Acua and
others "certain lands contained in the Sta. Mesa and Diliman Hacienda located in the barrios of Bagobantay and Diliman in the municipalities
of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte." 19 But what matters is the doctrine that was laid down by this Court in that case that is: that when
the original survey plan is amended, after the publication of the application in order to include land not previously included in the original
survey, a new publication of the amended plan is necessary in order to confer jurisdiction upon the registration court to order the
registration of the land that is added to what was included in the original survey plan. The ruling of this Court in the Bank of the Philippine
Islands case has a decisive application in the three cases now before this Court.
The trial court laid stress on the point that publication of the amended plan of Parcel 1 should have been made because it appears in the
Decree of Registration No. 17431, and as reproduced in Original Certificate of Title No. 735, that the area of said parcel is "bigger" than the
area stated in the application as published in the Official Gazette; and, also, that the boundaries of Parcel 1 stated in the decree are not
identical with the boundaries stated in the application as published in the Official Gazette. We paid particular attention on this point of the
lower court's decision, and our impression is that the trial court had exploited certain minor discrepancies between the description of Parcel
1 in the decree of registration and its description in the original application, in order to bolster its ruling that "to render a decision on the
amended plan, boundary descriptions, and additional lands comprised within Parcel 1 in Decree No. 17431, a republication of such amended
plan, boundary description, technical description and additional areas is necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the Court." 20
Oddly enough, when the lower court said that the area of Parcel 1 in the decree of registration is biggerthan the area of Parcel 1 in the
application as published, it did not mention the fact that thedifferenceinareaisonly27.10squaremeters. We believe that this difference
of 27.10 square meters is too minimal to be of decisive consequence in the determination of the validity of Original Certificate of Title No.
735. It was error on the part of the lower court to lay stress on this circumstance and made it a basis for ruling that because in the amended
plan there is this increase in area as compared to the area appearing in the application as published, the Land Registration Court did not
have jurisdiction to render the decision decreeing the registration of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681. The Chief of the Survey Division of the Court
of Land Registration, in his report to the court of January 24, 1914 (Exh. 22), stated that the new plan of Parcel 1 didnotincludeany land
that was not included in the original plan. That report was made precisely in compliance with the order of the registration court, in the
decision of December 29, 1913 in LRC No. 7681, to inform the court "si los nuevos planos incluyen o no terreno que no haya sido
comprendido en los planos originales". That report was submitted by the Chief Surveyor "despues de un detenido estudio de los planos
unidos a los expedientes". Under the foregoing circumstances, our inference is that the area of 27.10 square meters was already included
in the original plan, and that the computation of the area in the original survey must have been inaccurate; and the error was corrected in
the recomputation of the area when the amended plan was prepared. We made a careful study and comparison of the technical description
of Parcel 1 appearing in the application as published, and the technical description appearing in Decree of Registration No. 17431 (Exhs. 19,
19-A and Z-6), and We accept the explanation of counsel for the appellant that this seeming increase of 27.10 square meters had been
brought about "by the fact that when the amendment of the plan was made,
the distances and bearings in a few points along the southwestern boundary (Please see Exh. 19) were brought to the nearest millimeter
and to the nearest second respectively; whereas, the computation of the survey in the original plan was to the nearest decimeter and to
the nearest minute only". 21 We believe that this very slight increase of 27.10 square meters would not justify the conclusion of the lower
court that "the amended plan ... included additional lands which were not originally included in Parcel 1 as published in the Official Gazette."
It being undisputed that Parcel 1 has an area of more than 8,798,600 square meters (or 879.86 hectares), We believe that this difference
of 27.10 square meters, between the computation of the area when the original plan was made and the computation of the area when the
amended plan was prepared, can not be considered substantial as would affect the identity of Parcel 1.
Moreover, no evidence was presented to identify this area of 27.10 square meters, nor to show its location, in relation to the entire area
of Parcel 1. The appellees did not even attempt to show that this excess area of 27.10 square meters is included within the parcels that
they are claiming. We cannot, therefore; consider this area of 27.10 square meters as an area that was separate and distinct from, and was
added to, the land that was covered by the original survey plan, such that the publication of the amended plan would be necessary in order
that the registration court could acquire jurisdiction over that area. As We have pointed out, this increase of 27.10 square meters was
simply the result of the recomputation of the area when the original plan was amended. There is no showing that the recomputation is
incorrect. Neither is there a showing that this small area of 27.10 square meters belongs to any person and that person had been deprived
of his property, or had failed to claim that particular area because of the non-publication of the amended plan. On the other hand, there is
the report of the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration (Exh. 22) stating that the amended plan of Parcel 1 in LRC
No. 7681 did not include any land which was not included in the original plan.
It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that only in cases where the original survey plan is amended during the registration proceedings by
theadditionof lands not previously included in the original plan should publication be made in order to confer jurisdiction on the court to
order the registration of the area that was added after the publication of the original plan. 22
The settled rule, further, is that once the registration court had acquired jurisdiction over a certain parcel, or parcels, of land in the
registration proceedings in virtue of the publication of the application, that jurisdiction attaches to the land or lands mentioned and
described in the application. If it is later shown that the decree of registration had included land or lands not included in the original
application as published, then the registration proceedings and the decree of registration must be declared null and void in so far but
only in so far as the land not included in the publication is concerned. This is so, because the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
land not included in the publication-the publication being the basis: of the jurisdiction of the court. But the proceedings and the decree of
registration, relating to the lands that were included in the publication, are valid. Thus, if it is shown that a certificate of title had been
issued covering lands where the registration court had no jurisdiction, the certificate of title is null and void insofarasitconcernstheland
orlandsoverwhichtheregistrationcourthadnotacquiredjurisdiction. 23
And so in the three cases now before this Court, even granting that the registration court had no jurisdiction over the increased area of
27.10 square meters (as alleged by appellees), the most that the lower court could have done was to nullify the decree and the certificate
of title insofar as that area of 27.10 square meters is concerned, if that area can be identified. But, certainly, the lower court could not
declare, and should not have declared, null and void the whole proceedings in LRC No. 7681; and, certainly, the lower court erred in
declaring null and voidabinitioOriginal Certificate of Title 735 which covers not only the supposed excess area of 27.10 square meters but
also the remaining area of 8,798,617 square meters of Parcel 1 and the entire area of 15,961,246 square meters of Parcel 2. The trial court,
in its decision, declared Original Certificate of Title No. 735 "null and void from the very beginning and of no effect whatsoever", without
any qualification. This declaration by the lower court, if sanctioned by this Court and given effect, would nullify the title that covers two big
parcels of land (Parcels 1 and 2) that have a total area of 24,759,890.10 square meters, or almost 2,476 hectares. And not only that. The
trial court declared null and void all transfer certificates of title that are derived, or that emanated, from Original Certificate of Title No. 735,
regardless of whether those transfer certificates of title are the results of transactions done in good faith and for value by the holder of
those transfer certificates of title.
It must be noted that the appellees in the present cases claim six parcels that have an area of some 495,453.7 square meters (about 49.5
hectares), whereas the combined area of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 is 24,759,890.10 square meters (about 2,476 hectares). It must also be noted
that both Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 have been subdivided into numerous lots (Exhs. 14 and 14-B) which have already been acquired by numerous
persons and/or entities that are now holding certificates of title which can be traced back to Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The decision
of the lower court, however, would render useless Original Certificate of Title No. 735 and all transfer certificates of title emanating, or
derived, therefrom. The decision of the lower court would certainly prejudice the rights of the persons, both natural and juridical, who had
acquired portions of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2, relying on the doctrine of the indefeasibility of Torrens title. The decision of the lower court
would, indeed, prejudice the rights of persons who are not parties in the present cases. And this is so, because the trial court, in its decision,
did not adhere to the applicable decisions of this Court in resolving the pertinent issues in these cases.
Another reason mentioned by the lower court to support its ruling that Decree of Registration No. 17431 is null and void is that the
description of Parcel 1 in the decree of registration is different from the description of the same parcel in the notice of hearing of the
original application for registration as published in the Official Gazette. The different description that appears in the decree of registration,
according to the lower court, is an amendment to the Original survey plan that accompanied the application and the amended survey plan
should have been republished; and because there was no such republication the registration court was without jurisdiction to issue the
decree of registration. The lower court also committed an error in making this ruling. We find that the lower court incorrectly laid stress on
differences in the names of the owners, and on differences in the designations, of the lands that adjoin Parcel 1 along its southwestern
boundary. We find, however, that these differences are well explained in the record.
In the notice of hearing in LRC No. 7681 (Exhibits YY and YY-2) the boundaries of Parcel 1 are stated as follows:
Bounded on the N. by property of Rosario Negrao and others (Maysilo Estate); E. by the San Juan River; SW. by Parcel 3, properties of Benito
Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios, by Parcel 2, Santa Clara Monastery, by Parcel 1; and W. by a road, Cementerio del Norte and the
Roman Catholic Church.
As described in Decree of Registration No. 17431 (Exh. 25), the boundaries of Parcel 1 are as follows:
PARCEL 1. Bounded on the N. by property of Rosario Negrao y Escobar, et al., (Maysilo Estate): On the E. by San Juan River; on the SW. by
properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios and C.W. Rosenstock & Co.; and on
the W. by a road, Cementerio del Norte and property of the Roman Catholic Church ...
It will thus be noted that the boundaries of Parcel 1 on the northern, eastern, and western sides, as they appear in the notice of hearing
that was published and in Decree of Registration No. 17431, are the same. It is in the southwestern boundary where there appear some
differences in the names of the owners, or in the designations, of the adjoining lands. Thus, in the published notice of hearing, it appears
that the names of the owners, or the designations, of the lands that bound Parcel 1 (of LRC No. 7681) on the Southwest are parcel 3,
properties of Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios, parcel 2, Monasterio de Santa Clara and parcel 1; while in the decree of
registration it appears that the lands that bound Parcel 1 (of LRC No. 7681) on the Southwest are the properties of Mariano Severo Tuason
y de la Paz, et al., Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios and C.W. Rosenstock & Co. Upon a careful examination of the records, We
find that the lands that adjoin Parcel 1 at its southwestern boundary, as indicated in the notice of hearing that was published in the Official
Gazette, are the same lands that are indicated in the decree of registration as the lands that adjoin Parcel 1 at its southwestern boundary.
There is simply a change in the names of the owners or in the designations, of the lands. We find that parcels 3, 2 and 1, appearing as the
boundary lands on the southwestern side of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681, as published, are in fact parcels of land that are owned, and had been
applied for registration, by Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al. in LRC No. 7680. This LRC No. 7680 was heard and decided jointly with
LRC No. 7681 by the Land Registration Court (Exh. 24). These parcels 3, 2 and 1 of LRC No. 7680, being lands owned by Mariano Severo
Tuason y de la Paz, et al., it may as well be stated in the decree of registration that those lands on the southwestern side of Parcel 1 in LRC
No. 7681 are the properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., instead of designating them as parcel 3, parcel 2, and parcel 1 (of
LRC 1680). And so, what appears in Decree of Registration No. 17431 as the properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., at the
southwestern side of Parcel 1 are no other than those very parcels 3, 2 and 1 that appear in the notice of hearing as the lands that bound
Parcel 1 on the southwest.
In the description of Parcel 1 as published, it appears that one of the boundaries on the southwestern side is Santa Clara Monastery, while
in the decree of registration the words "Santa Clara Monastery" do not appear but, instead, are replaced by the words "C. W. Rosenstock
& Co." It will be remembered that during the registration proceedings the plan of Parcel 1 was ordered amended, and the surveyor, who
prepared the amended plan must have found that what used to be the property of the Santa Clara Monastery at the time of the original
Survey was already the property of C. W. Rosenstock & Co. when the amended plan was prepared. This can simply mean that there was a
change of ownership from Santa Clara Monastery to C.W. Rosenstock & Co. It must be considered that the original survey took place from
December, 1910 to June, 1911 (Exhibits 18 and 19), while the registration case was decided on March 7, 1914.
Under Section 40 of Act 496, the decree of registration "shall contain a description of the land as finally determined by the court." Evidently,
the Court of Land Registration acted in consonance with this provision of the law when, in its decision in LRC 7681, it took into consideration
the actual description of Parcel 1 as shown in the amended survey plan, and when it disregarded the recommendation of the Chi ef of the
Survey Division, dated March 27, 1914, that the decision of the court of March 7, 1914 "be based upon the original plans, as published, and
not upon the amended plan." It may well be said that Decree of Registration N. 17431 simply contains the correct area of Parcel 1 and the
correct names of the owners of the lands that bound Parcel 1 in LRC No. 1681 as of the time when the decision of the land registration
court was rendered.
In this connection, the following pronouncement of this Court in the case of Domingovs.Ongsiako,55Phil.361,373-4, is pertinent:
We may further observe that underlying the contention of the plaintiffs is the idea that errors in the plans nullify the decrees of registration.
This is erroneous. It is the land and not the plan which is registered. Prior to the enactment of Act No. 1875, practically all plans for land
registration were defective especially in regard to errors of closures and areas, but so far no such errors have been permitted to affect the
validity of the decrees. If the boundaries of the land registered can be determined, the technical description in the certificate of title may
be corrected without cancelling the decree. Such corrections have been made in this case by approved surveys which embrace all of the
land here in question. To nullify and cancel final decrees merely by reason of faulty technical descriptions would lead to chaos.
We have taken note of the fact that the six parcels of land that are claimed by the plaintiffs in the three cases now before this Court are on
the northwestern portion of Parcel 1 (parcels labelled A, B, C, D, E and F, in Exh. UU; and Exhs. 17, 29 and 29-B). They are far from the
southwestern boundary. The circumstance, therefore, regarding the dissimilarity in the names of the owners, or the designations, of the
lands that adjoin the southwestern side of Parcel 1 is of no moment insofar as the lots claimed by appellees are concerned. What matters
is that the lots claimed by the appellees are included in Parcel 1 of LRC No. 1681 and are located at the northwestern portion of said Parcel
1. Indeed, it was error on the part of the lower court to make as one of the bases in declaring Decree of Registration No. 17431 and Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void and of no effect whatsoever the aforestated dissimilarities in the names of the owners, or in the
designations, of the lands on the southwestern side of Parcel 1, because those dissimilarities are well explained in the records of these
cases.
The lower court committed still another error when it made the finding that the only boundary of Parcel 1 on the western side is "A.
Bonifacio road" and then declared that the lands situated west of the A. Bonifacio road were never the subject of the registration
proceedings in LRC No. 7681. The lower court declared the lands west of A. Bonifacio road as unregistered lands and awarded the ownership
of those lands to the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621 and 3622 (appellees in G.R. Nos. L-26127 and L-26128). This finding of the lower
court is contrary to the evidence presented by the parties in these cases. Both the appellees and the appellant submitted as their evidence
the notice of hearing of the application as published in the Official Gazette (Exhibit X, YY and YY-2; and Exhibit 26) and the decree of
registration No. 17431 (Exhibit Y, and Exh. 25) wherein are clearly stated that the boundaries of Parcel 1 on the West are: (1) a road, (2)
Cementerio del Norte and (3) Roman Catholic Church (Exhs. Z-6, UU, and Exhs. 6, 18, 19 and 20). But the lower court considered the A.
Bonifacio road as the only boundary on the West, and ignored the two other boundaries on the West that are mentioned both in the notice
of hearing as published and in the decree of registration. The sketches and the survey plans, forming part of the evidence on record, show
that the road, labelled as "A. Bonifacio", goes alongside the western boundary of Parcel 1 (separating Parcel 1 and the Cementerio del
Norte), until it reaches a point where it traverses the northwestern portion of Parcel 1, such that from the point where it enters the area of
Parcel 1 what is left as the boundaries on the western side are the Cementerio del Norte and the Roman Catholic Church (Exhibits UU, VV,
17, 19 and 29). Ignoring the existence of the Cementerio del Norte and the Roman Catholic Church as the other boundaries of Parcel 1 on
the West, the lower court declared that the lands west of the A. Bonifacio road, which form part of the lands that are claimed by the
plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621 and 3622, are outside the boundary of Parcel 1 on the west and that those particular areas had remained
as unregistered lands and are not covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This finding of the lower court is contrary to the very
admission of the appellees in these three cases that all the lands (six parcels in all) that they claim are included in the area of Parcel 1
mentioned in Original Certificate of Title No. 735. In paragraph XIV of the original, as well as in the amended complaint, in each of these
three cases, the plaintiffs alleged that the lands that they claim "had either been fraudulently or erroneously included ... in Parcel 1 (known
as Santa Mesa Estate) of the Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Land Records of the Province of Rizal." 24 In their appeal brief, the
appellees categorically stated that "Both the appellees and the appellant admit that these parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs in these
three (3) civil cases are located within Parcel 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735". 25 In the pre-trial order
of the lower court of
December 18, 1957, it was stated that the parcels of land litigated in these are portions of the lands covered by OCT No. 735. 26 The lower
court itself, at the earlier part of its decision, stated that "both the plaintiffs and the defendants admit that the parcels of land litigated in
Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 are found within the boundaries of the present Santa Mesa Heights Subdivision covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 735" 27 The appellees in these two cases had never asserted that part of the lands that they claim are outside the
boundaries of Parcel 1, nor did they assert that part of the lands that they claim have remained unregistered and not covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 735. The lower court had made a finding not only contrary to the evidence of the appellees but even more than what
the appellees asked when it said in its decision that the western boundary of Parcel 1 is only the A. Bonifacio road and that the lands claimed
by the appellees west of this road had never been registered. This Court certainly cannot give its approval to the findings and rulings of the
lower court that are patently erroneous.
2. The lower court also erred when it declared Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void upon the ground that the decree of
registration was not transcribed in the Registration Book in accordance with the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496. In its decision, the
lower court said:
During the trial, the Book of Original Certificate of Title was brought to the Court. The Court had occasion to see and examine the `ENTRY'
made in the Registration Book. The Court found that the Face of the Title which, under ordinary circumstances, should be Page 1 is found
as Page 2. The sheet containing the technical description which should be page 2 is Page 1. The FACE of the Title, which should have been
Page 1, contained the last portion of the description of the land described in the decree. The sheet containing the bulk of the description
of the lands decreed should have been Page 2. The so-called Original Certificate of Title No. 735 found on Page 138, Book A-7 of the Register
of Deeds of Rizal is, therefore, null and void because the provisions of Section 41 of the Land Registration Law have not been complied with.
Said Section requires that the entry in the Registration Book must be a transcription of the Decree and the paging should consist of a leaf
or leaves in consecutive order .... 28
The pertinent provisions of Section 41 of Act 496 reads, as follows:
SEC. 41. Immediately after final decision by the court directing the registration of any property, the clerk shall send a certified copy of such
decision to the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, who shall prepare the decree in accordance with section forty of Act numbered
four hundred and ninety-six, and he shall forward a certified copy of said decree to the register of deeds of the province or city in which the
property is situated. The register of deeds shall transcribe the decree in a book to be called the "Registration Book" in which a leaf, or leaves
in consecutive order, shall be devoted exclusively to each title. The entry made by the register of deeds in this book in each case shall be
the original certificate of title, and shall be signed by him and sealed with the seal of his office....
The pertinent provisions of Section 40 of Act 496 reads, as follows:
SEC. 40. Every decree of registration shall bear the day of the year, hour, and minute of its entry, and shall be signed by the clerk. It shall
state whether the owner is married or unmarried, and if married, the name of the husband or wife. If the owner is under disability, it shall
state the nature of the disability, and if a minor, shall state his age. It shall contain a description of the land as finally determined by the
court , . . The decree shall be stated in a convenient form for transcription upon the certificates of title hereinafter mentioned.
Section 29 of Act 496 provides that as soon as the decree of title has been registered in the office of the register of deeds, as provided in
Section forty-one, the property included in said decree shall become registered land under the Act. Section 42 of Act 496 provides that the
certificate shall take effect upon the date of the transcription of the decree.
This Court has held that as defined in Section 41 of Act 496, the certificate of title is the transcript of the decree of registration made by the
register of deeds in the registry. 29
The appellant presented as evidence a photostat of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, as found in the Registration Book in the office of
the register of deeds of Rizal (Exhibit 50). 30 We have examined this document very carefully, and We find that it is a copy of the original
that satisfies all the requirements of a valid Torrens title as provided for in Sections 40 and 41 of Act 496.
On the face, or on the first page, of this title, there is the certification of the Chief of the Land Registration Office that the decree of
registration was registered in Manila on July 6, 1914 at 7:41 a.m.; and the certification of the Register of Deeds of Rizal that the decree was
received for transcription in his office on July 8, 1914 at 3:30 P.M. It is also stated on the face of this title that it was entered pursuant to
Decree No. 17431 of the Court of Land Registration, dated at Manila on the 7th day of March 1914, in Case No. 7681 of said court. The
names of the declared owners, their civil status, their spouses if married, and their respective interest or share in the lands covered by the
title are stated on the face of this title. We have noted that the technical descriptions of the lands (Parcels 1 and 2) covered by the title are
copied on the sheets constituting the title. We have compared the technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 as they appear on this photostat
of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 (Exhibit 50) with the technical descriptions of these lands as they appear in the decree of registration
(Exhibit Y for the plaintiffs, and Exhibit 25 for the defendant), and We find that the technical descriptions appearing on the title are the
complete and faithful reproduction, or transcription, of the technical descriptions appearing in the decree of registration.
We have noted what the lower court found, that the technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 do not begin on the face, or on the first page,
of this title, as a technical description is ordinarily copied on the certificate of title. What appears on the face of this title is the last part of
the technical description of Parcel 2. The technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 begin on the second page and end on the first page. This
circumstance, that is, that the technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 do not begin on the face, or on the first page, of the title, is the basis
of the lower court in ruling that the decree of registration was not transcribed in the registration book in accordance with Section 41 of Act
496, and so Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is null and void. We have noted, however, that in its decision the lower court made no
mention that in the transcription of the decree in the registration book any of the data that is required in Section 40 of Act 496 to be
included had been omitted. We have also noted and this fact is undenied that the technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 as they
appear in Decree of Registration No. 17431 are fully and faithfully transcribed on the photostat of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 (Exhibit
50). There is no showing that the manner of transcribing the decree, as it appears on that photostat, was done for a fraudulent purpose, or
was done in order to mislead. Considering that the decree of registration is fully transcribed in the Registration Book, and also as copied in
Original Certificate of Title No. 735, the circumstance that the beginning of the technical descriptions is not found on the face, or on the
first page, of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is not a ground to nullify the said certificate of title. We agree with the lower court that the
transcription of the technical descriptions should begin, or should have been started, on the face, or on the first page, of the title. We hold,
however, that the fact that this was not so done in the case of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 should not be taken as a factor in
determining the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This defect in the manner of transcribing the technical descriptions should
be considered as a formal, and not a substantial, defect. What matters is that the original certificate of title contains the full transcription
of the decree of registration, and that the required data provided for in Section 40 of Act 496 are stated in the
original certificate of title. The lower court made a literal construction of the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496 and strictly applied its
construction in the determination of the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. We believe that the provisions of Section 41 of Act
496 should be interpreted liberally, in keeping with Section 123 of said Act which provides that "This Act shall be construed liberally so far
as may be necessary for the purpose of effecting its general intent." If We adopt a literal construction of the provisions of Section 41 of Act
496, as was done by the lower court, such that the defect in the manner or form of transcribing the decree in the registration book would
render null and void the original certificate of title, then it can happen that the validity or the invalidity of a certificate of title would depend
on the register of deeds, or on the personnel in the office of the register of deeds. The register of deeds, or an employee in his office, can
wittingly or unwittingly render useless a decree of registration regularly issued pursuant to a decision of a registration court and thus nullify
by the error that he commits in the transcription of the decree in the Registration Book an original certificate of title that has been existing
for years. This strict interpretation or construction of Section 41 of Act 496 would certainly not promote the purpose of the Land Registration
Law (Act 496), which generally are to ascertain once and for all the absolute title over a given landed property 31; to make, so far as it is
possible, a certificate of title issued by the court to the owner of the land absolute proof of such title 32; to quiet title to land and to put a
stop forever to any question of legality of title 33; and to decree that land title shall be final, irrevocable and indisputable. 34
We, therefore, hold that the formal defect in the transcription of Decree of Registration No. 17431 in the Registration Book did not render
null and void Original Certificate of Title No. 735. Consequently, We declare that the two parcels of land (Parcel 1 which includes the lands
claimed by the appellees, and Parcel 2) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 are properly registered under the Torrens System of
registration.
3. The principal issue that has to be resolved in the present appeal is whether or not the lower court had correctly declared that "Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 ... is null and void from the very beginning and of no effect whatsoever. 35
In the preceding discussions, We have held that the lower court erred when it declared null and void Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
We have found that the registration proceedings that brought about the decree of registration upon which was based the issuance of
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 were in accordance with the provisions of Act 496, as amended. We have held that the Land Registration
Court that ordered the issuance of the decree of registration had jurisdiction to hear and decide the application for registration filed by
Mariano Severo, Teresa Eriberta, Juan Jose, Demetrio Asuncion, and Augusto Huberto, all surnamed Tuason y de la Paz. The records show
that the notice of hearing of the application, which embodied the technical descriptions of the two parcels of land (Parcel 1, known as the
Sta. Mesa Estate, and Parcel 2, known as the Diliman Estate), was duly published as required by law. The records show that the hearing on
the application was regularly held, and that the registration court had seen to it that no land which was not included in the original survey
plan and not covered by the original application was made the subject of the registration proceedings. We have found that the decree of
registration was properly issued by the Land Registration Office pursuant to the decision of the Land Registration Court, and that said decree
of registration was fully transcribed in the Registration Book in the office of the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal. We have found
also that the six parcels of land that are claimed by the appellees. in the three cases now before Us are all included in Parcel 1 that is covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
In view of Our findings and conclusion that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued in accordance with the provisions of Act 496, and
that the six parcels of land that are claimed by the appellees in the present cases are covered by said certificate of title, what is left for this
Court to
decide is whether or not the appellees still have any legal right over the six parcels of land that they claim.
Let it be noted that, as maintained by counsel for the appellees, the action of the appellees is principally to recover the ownership and
possession of the six parcels of land mentioned and described in their complaints. The appellees would accomplish their objective through
alternative ways: (1) secure the nullification of the decision of the Land Registration Court in LRC No. 6781, the nullification of the Decree
of Registration No. 17431 and the nullification of Original Certificate of Title No. 735; (2) if they fail in their efforts to secure the desired
nullifications, with Original Certificate of Title No. 735 being considered valid and effective, they seek the reconveyance to them by the
defendants named in their complaints, including herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., of the six parcels of land that they claim; and (3)
if they cannot secure a reconveyance, they seek to secure payment to them by the defendants named in their complaints of the actual
value of the six parcels of land that they claim.
It appears to Us that the appellees are not sure of their stand, or have not adopted a definite stand, in asserting the rights that they claim.
It is the settled rule that a party seeking the reconveyance to him of his land that he claims had been wrongly registered in the name of
another person must recognize the validity of the certificate of title of the latter. It is also the rule that a reconveyance may only take place
if the land that is claimed to be wrongly registered is still registered in the name of the person who procured the wrongful registration. No
action for reconveyance can take place as against a third party who had acquired title over the registered property in good faith and for
value. And if no reconveyance can be made, the value of the property registered may be demanded only from the person (or persons) who
procured the wrongful registration in his name. 36
The lower court accepted, and sustained, the assertion of the appellees that the proceedings in LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land
Registration were null and void and that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is null and void abinitioand of no effect. The trial court even
went to the extent of declaring that some of the parcels of land claimed by the appellees in Civil Cases Nos. 3621 and 3622 (now G.R. Nos.
L-26127 and L-26128 before this Court) were not covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The lower court forthwith declared the
appellees the owners of the parcels of land claimed by them, as described in their complaints. Strangely enough, the lower court, upon
declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void, did not make any statement, or observation, regarding the status or situation of
the remaining lands (Parcels 1 and 2) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 after adjudicating to the appellees the six parcels of
land claimed by them in their complaints.
In the present appeal counsel for the appellees had maintained, and has endeavored to show, that the lower court was correct in annulling
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 and in adjudicating in favor of the appellees the ownership and possession of the six parcels of land
claimed by them in their complaints.
But, as hereinbefore held by Us, the lower court erred in declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 735 void and of no effect. We have held
that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued as a result of the registration proceedings in LRC No, 7681 which was regular and that
said certificate of title is valid and effective. The proceedings in LRC 7681 being in rem, the decree of registration issued pursuant to the
decision rendered in said registration case bound the lands covered by the decree and quieted title thereto, and is conclusive upon and
against all persons, including the government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice or
citation, or included in the general inscription "To whom it may concern", and such decree will not be
opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceedings in any court for
reversing judgment or decree. Such decree may only be reopened if any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by
decree of registration obtained by fraud would file in the competent court of first instance a petition for review within one year after entry
of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value had acquired an interest on the land, and upon the expiration of said period of one
year, the decree, or the certificate of title issued pursuant to the decree, is incontrovertible (See. 38, Act 496). In the case now before Us,
the Decree of Registration No. 17431 in LRC 7681 was entered on July 8, 1914. It is undisputed that no person had filed any petition for
review of the decree of registration in LRC 7681 within the period of one year from July 8, 1914. That decree of registration, and Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 issued pursuant thereto, therefore, had been incontrovertible since July 9, 1915.
Moreover, innocent purchases for value had acquired interest in the lands covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. 37
The Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued on July 8, 1914 in the names of the original an applicants for registration, namely,
Mariano Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de l a Paz and
Augusta Huberto Tuason y de la Paz. Herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. isnotoneof those who were registered as the original owners
mentioned in Original Certificate of Title No. 735. When the original complaints were filed in these three cases in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal the parties named defendants in each of the three cases were Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la
Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, Augusta Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, the heirs of each one of these
defendants (without naming them), and J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Of all the defendants named in the three complaints only defendant J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. appeared and filed its answer to the complaints. All the other defendants did not appear, and so they were all declared
in default. 38 It had to happen that way because as of the time when the three complaints were filed on May 19, 1955 the ownership of
Parcel 1 that was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had already passed to defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. In fact
this defendant had caused Parcel 1 to be subdivided and had sold the subdivision lots.
The records show that Parcel 1 in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was part of the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason (Tuason Entail)
which became involved in a litigation in the Court of First Instance of Manila. 39 During the pendency of the case the properties of the
Mayorasgo Tuason were administered by the Bank of the Philippine Islands as the judicial receiver. In the order of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, dated May 5, 1938, in Civil Case No. 24803, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, as receiver, was authorized, directed and ordered
to execute, upon payment to it of the sum of P763,925.75, a deed of transfer and assignment in favor of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. of the
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997, which was originally Parcel 1 included in Original Certificate of Title No. 735
(Exh. 13-B). On June 13, 1938 the receiver Bank of the Philippine Islands executed the deed of transfer and assignment (Exh. 13-A). Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 34853 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal was forthwith issued in the name of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. (Exhs. 12-b
and 36). The deed of transfer and assignment was approved by the court in an order dated June 17, 1938. This conveyance to the Heirs of
D. Tuason, Inc. took place at a time when the Supreme Court had already decided the case of Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acua (59
Phil. 183) wherein this Court upheld the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 and also the validity of the transfer certificate of title
emanating therefrom. 40
The circumstances attending the acquisition by the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997
which was formerly Parcel 1 covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 clearly indicate that said corporation acquired its title in a
regular transaction as purchaser in good faith and for value. On June 15, 1938 the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. in turn sold the
same property to J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35073 was issued in the name of the latter (Exhs. 12-c and
37).
The lower court declared that herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was a purchaser in bad faith. We do not find any evidence in the
record that would sustain such a finding of the lower court. One reason given by the lower court in declaring appellant J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. a purchaser in bad faith is the fact that the incorporators of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. and the incorporators of J. M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. were practically the same persons belonging to the same Tuason family. We do not see anything wrong if some incorporators of the
Heirs of D. Tuason Inc. are also incorporators of the J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. During these days when businesses are promoted, operated,
and managed, through corporate entities, it is not surprising to see two or more corporations organized by the same persons or group of
persons with different purposes, for different lines of business and with distinct or separate assets and interests. Besides, as has been
shown, the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. acquired the land (Parcel 1 in Original Certificate of Title No. 735) from the Bank of the Philippine Islands,
the receiver of the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason, in a sale that was authorized, and subsequently approved, by the court. The Heirs
of D. Tuason, Inc. paid the sum of P763,950.80 for the property. Certainly if the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. had acquired the land originally
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 in a transaction that was authorized by the court, for a valuable consideration, thereby
acquiring a good title over the property as a purchaser in good faith and for value, the title that it transferred to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
when it sold same property to the latter was also a good title, and J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was also a purchaser in good faith and for value
even if it appears that the incorporators of the two corporations belong to the same Tuason family. The records of these cases are bereft
of any evidence which would indicate that the sale of Parcel 1 in question by the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was
fraudulent.
Another reason given by the lower court in declaring appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. a buyer in bad faith is that when said appellant
bought Parcel 1 originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 it was aware of the fact that the appellees or their predecessors
in interest were in possession of, and were cultivating, the six parcels of land that they now claim in these cases. The conclusion of the
lower court is too strained. It should be remembered that the registered property bought by J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had an area of some
879 hectares. It could happen that certain relatives or ancestors of appellees had been squatting on some portions of the land and claimed
certain areas as their own, to the extent of having the areas claimed by them declared for taxation purposes in their names. Thus the
appellees presented in evidence tax declarations that appear to have taken effect as of 1941. We have noted, however, that at the back of
those tax declarations are written the words "This parcel is a duplicate of the land under Tax No. 764-J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc." (Exhs. E-
Alcantara, F-Alcantara, FF-1-Benin, GG-Benin, HH-Benin, BBB-Pili, and BBB-1-Pili). 41 These annotations simply reveal that when the
predecessors of the appellees had those tax declarations made to cover the lands that they claim, those lands were already included in the
tax declaration of appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had been exercising, and asserting, its proprietary
rights over the lands in question after it bought the same from the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. 42This is borne by the statement in the order,
dated September 26, 1955, issued by Judge Juan P. Enriquez who at the time was presiding the branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
where these three were pending, as follows:
3. It having been shown that J. M. Tuason & Co. had title covering the land in question which they are subdividing into small lots for sale
and in view of the observation under paragraph 2 hereof the Court finds that there is no justifiable reason to maintain the writ of preliminary
injunction that has been issued. This is particularly true in Civil Case No. 2622, defendants having secured a final judgment against plaintiffs
Juan Alcantara and Jose Alcantara for ejectment before the Municipal court of Quezon City; and such injunction would annul the order of
the
execution issued by the Quezon City courts. It should be noted that the herein plaintiffs at the beginning pleaded to the Court that the area
on which their respective houses stand be not touched and their possession thereof be respected by defendant J. M. & Co. In other words,
each plaintiff is merely asking for about 250 square meters each which represents the land on which the house stands and their immediate
yard, and not the whole land covered by these three or 68 hectares. On the other hand, the Court requires J. M. Tuason & Co. to put up a
bond of P2,000 in favor of each of the defendant (sic) to answer for whatever damages he may suffer by reason of the continuance during
the action of the acts complained of. 43
Besides, the possession by the appellees, either by themselves or through their predecessors in interest, if there was such possession at all,
would be unavailing against title holder of a Torrens certificate of title covering the parcels Of lands now in question. From July 8, 1914
when Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued, no possession by any person of any portion of the lands covered by said original certificate of
title, or covered by a subsequent transfer certificate of title derived from said original certificate of title, could defeat the title of the
registered owner of the lands covered by the certificate of title. In this connection, let it be noted that appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
became the registered owner of Parcel 1, which was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735, only on June 15, 1938, or
almost 24 years after Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued.
It can well be said that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had relied on the title of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. when it bought the land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No.34853, and the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. likewise had relied on the title of the Mayorasgo Tuason (Mariano
Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al.) when it bought the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997 from the judicial receiver, duly
authorized and approved by the court. We, therefore, can not agree with the lower court when it declared appellant J. M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. a purchaser on bad faith.
The evidence shows that appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had converted the land originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735,
including the six parcels claimed by appellees into a subdivision, and numerous persons and entities had purchased the subdivision lots,
and the purchasers in turn were issued transfer certificates of title covering the lots that they bought, based on the transfer certificate of
title in the name of J. M Tuason & Co., Inc. The buyers of the lots relied upon the certificate of title in the name of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
and because they paid for the lots they certainly are purchasers in good faith and for value. The purchasers of these lots have built thereon
residential houses, office buildings, shops, hospital, even churches. But the lower court, disregarding these circumstances, declared null
and void all transfer certificates of title that emanated, or that were derived, from Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This is a grave error
committed by the lower court. And the error is compounded when the lower court ordered appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and all those
claiming under said appellant, to vacate and restore to the appellees the possession of the parcels of lands that are claimed by them in the
present cases. The possessors of the lots comprised within the six parcels of land in question, and who hold certificates of title covering the
lots that they bought, are not parties in the present cases, and yet the decision of the lower court would annul their titles and compel them
to give up the possession of their properties. To give effect to the decision of the lower court is to deprive persons of their property without
due process of law. 44 The decision of the lower court would set at naught the settled doctrine that the holder of a certificate of title who
acquired the property covered by the title in good faith and for value can rest assured that his title is perfect and incontrovertible. 45
In view of the foregoing discussions, it is obvious that the action of the appellees in the three cases now before this Court must fail..
It has been shown that appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had acquired a valid title over the land which includes the six parcels that are
claimed by the appellees. The fact, that the predecessors in interest of the appellees or any person, for that matter had not filed a
petition for the review of the decree of registration in LRC No. 7681 within a period of one year from July 8, 1914 when the decree of
registration was issued, is a circumstance that had forever foreclosed any proceeding for the review of said decree. As We have adverted
to, that decree of registration had become incontrovertible. An action, similar to one brought by the appellees in each of the present cases,
which attack collaterally the said decree of registration cannot be entertained. 46 Neither may the action of the appellees for reconveyance
of the lands in question be entertained because such action had already prescribed, barred by laches, considering that Original Certificate
of Title No. 735 had been issued way back in 1914 and the complaint in the present cases were filed only on May 19, 1955, or after a lapse
of some 41 years. Moreover, as of the time when these complaints were filed the six parcels of land claimed by the appellees are no longer
covered by the certificate of title in the names of the persons who procured the original registration of those lands. The title to Parcel 1,
which includes the six parcels of land claimed by the appellees, had passed to the hands parties who were innocent purchase for value. This
Parcel 1 which was one of the two parcels originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735, was subsequently covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 31997. As has been shown, this Parcel 1 was part of the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason and it was conveyed by
order of the court in Civil Case No. 24803 of the Court of First Instance of Manila to the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc., and the latter in turn
conveyed the same to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34853 in the name of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. was cancelled
and transfer Certificate of Title No. 35073 was issued in the name of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. It has also been shown that J. M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. had converted Parcel 1 to a subdivision. Numerous persons and entities bought those subdivision lots, and to those buyers were issued
transfer certificates of title covering the lots that they acquired. It is very clear, therefore, that an action for reconveyance cannot prosper
against appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., much less against the registered owners of the lots that form parts of the six parcels of land that are
claimed by the appellees. 47
Neither may the appellees have a cause of Action for damages against appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., considering that said appellant is
not one of the original registered owners that procured the registration of the land. There is no evidence that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had
anything to do with the registration proceedings which brought about the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 even supposing
that the registration was procured fraudulently.
4. Numerous cases have been decided by this Court, dealing on questions regarding the validity and ineffectiveness of Original Certificate
of Title No. 735. The rulings of this Court in those cases are necessarily relevant to, and of decisive bearing in, the resolution of the issues
involved in the three cases now at bar.
(a) We have earlier cited the case of the BankofthePhilippineIslandsvs.Acua(59Phil.,183), where the jurisdiction of the Court of Land
Registration that issued the decree which was the basis of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was questioned, and this Court upheld the
jurisdiction of the registration court and categorically pronounced the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
(b) There is the case of JoseAlcantara,etal.,versusMarianoTuasonydelaPaz,etal.(G.R.No.L-4998,Mar.13,1953,92Phil.796), where
this Court declared that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is incontrovertible and is conclusive against all persons claiming, either by
themselves or by their predecessors in interest, rights over the lands covered by said certificate of title.
We find that the Alcantara case is intimately related to the three cases at bar, and the rulings of this Court in that former case are of decisive
application to these three cases.
On August 29, 1950 a complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) by Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin, Pascual
Pili, Alejandro de Dios, Tomas Bagagonio, Quintina Sandoval, and Tomasa Lazaro against Mariano Tuason y de la Paz, Heirs of Mariano
Tuason, J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-156. It will be noted that three of the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-156, namely, Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin, and Pascual Pili, are among the original plaintiffs in the three cases
now before this Court; Elias Benin, in Civil Case No. 3621; Jose Alcantara, in Civil Case No. 3622; and Pascual Pili, in Civil Case No. 3623. Jose
Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili, as plaintiffs in that Civil Case No. Q-156 claimed that they were the lawful owners of six (of the ten)
parcels of land described in paragraph 2 of their complaint Jose Alcantara claiming two parcels, Elias Benin claiming three parcels, and
Pascual Pili claiming one parcel. Substantially, it is alleged in the complaint 48 that each plaintiff, by himself and by his predecessors in
interest, as lawful owner, had been in the actual, open and continuous possession of his own respective parcel, or parcels, of land from
time immemorial until January 1950 when the defendants by force and by the use of armed men started to convert their lands into a
subdivision; that on July 8, 1914 the defendants had obtained Original Certificate of Title No. 735 over a parcel of land which included the
lands possessed by them (plaintiffs) and which they and their ancestors had been enjoying as owners, for more than thirty years before the
issuance of the title; that the silence and inaction of the defendants since the date of their original certificate of title showed that said
certificate of title did not express the status of the their claim to the said parcels, that plaintiffs were not given formal notice by the
defendants of the registration of the lands, such that defendants' certificate of title No. 735 was not in accordance with law, and that
defendants did not have proper title for registration to the parcels of land owned by the plaintiffs, as described in the complaint; and that
because the certificate of title issued by the register of deeds was still in the names of the defendants, successors in interest of the Tuasons
y de la Paz, and has not passed to innocent parties for valuable consideration, the conveyance of the same to the plaintiffs was in order.
The plaintiffs prayed that therein defendants be ordered to execute deeds of conveyance of the parcels of land described in their complaint
in favor of the plaintiffs, that the defendants' certificate of title be cancelled and the corresponding certificate be ordered issued in the
names of the plaintiffs. We quote from the decision:
The material allegations of the complaint are: that plaintiffs are owners of the parcels of land set forth in their complaint, which parcels are
situated along Bonifacio street, barrio of San Jose, Quezon City, and that they have been in actual, open, and continuous possession and
enjoyment thereof without molestation from defendants from time immemorial to the present; that on July 8, 1914, defendants obtained
a certificate of title (No. 735) over a parcel of land, which included the lands by plaintiffs, and which they and their ancestors had been
enjoying as owners more than 30 years before the issuance of said title; that on June 23, 1950, defendants caused the removal of two
houses of plaintiffs on the land; and that defendants did not file any action against plaintiffs before the inclusion of the lands in their title,
in violation of the "due process of law" clause of the Constitution. There are other allegations which really are arguments of legal discussion,
thus: that defendants could not acquire title by the registration proceedings against the lawful holder, especially without formal notice,
because registration is to confirm title, not to acquire it; that the silence of the defendants since the issuance of their title shows that this
does not express the lawful status of their claim, etc. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it states no of
action and that, if it does, the same is barred by the statute of limitations. The court sustained this motion on the second ground.
Subsequently, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with the same substantial allegations, but with new ones, i.e., that it was in January,
1950, that they learned that their lands were included in the registration proceedings which culminated in the issuance of defendants' title;
that defendants never claimed ownership to the lands, but directly or indirectly allowed plaintiffs to continue exercising their rights of
ownership over the same. This amended complaint was
denied admission, and the motion for the reconsideration of the order of dismiss was also denied. Hence the appeal.
In affirming the order of the lower court dismissing the complaint, this Court held:
Without considering whether the trial court's refusal to admit the amended complaint is erroneous or not we are constrained to hold that
the dismissal of the action, even with the amended complaint is a basis thereof, is correct. From the allegations of both the original and
amended complaints, it appears that the defendants are holders of a certificate of title issued on July 8, 1914 as a consequence of
registration proceedings. There is no allegation in both original and amended complaints that the plaintiffs were not notified, or were not
aware, of the registration proceedings. It is presumed, therefore, that as occupants proper notices thereof were served on them and that
they were aware of said proceedings. If this is so, then the plaintiffs, who were, or whose predecessors in interest were, on the land during
the registration proceedings, were bound by said proceedings. The latter are inremand bind the whole world, whether served with notice
personally or not. (Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil., 49). And the decree of registration, in pursuance of which defendants' title was issued,
bindsthelandandquietstitlethereto, and is conclusive against the plaintiffs. (Section 38, Land Registration Act). The supposed right of
plaintiffs by reason of their alleged continued possession for thirty years was, therefore, destroyed fully and completely by the registration
proceedings, and their supposed ignorance of the inclusion of the lands can not exclude them from the effects of the registration
proceedings, and the supposed conduct of defendants in allowing plaintiffs to continue on the land after registration can not serve as basis
of any title or right thereto, because acts of a possessory character by tolerance of an owner does not constitute possession (Article 1942,
Spanish Civil Code), and because no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription
or adverse possession (Section 46, Land Registration Act).
Thus, in the Alcantaracase, as in the BankofthePhilippineIslandvs.Acuacase,supra, this Court upheld the validity of the registration
proceedings which culminated in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This Court declared that "the decree of registration,
in pursuance of which defendants' title was issued, binds the land and quiets title thereto and is conclusive against the plaintiffs." In other
words, in virtue of that decision, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-156, among them Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili, and their
successors-in-interest, could no longer question the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, nor claim any right of ownership over
any portion of the land that is covered by said certificate of title.
But Elias Benin, Jose Alcantara, and Pascual Pili again came to court to claim ownership over portions of the land covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 735. On May 19, 1955 Elias Benin, joined by his brother Victor Benin and his sister Marta Benin, filed Civil Case No.
3621; Jose Alcantara joined by his brother Juan Alcantara, filed Civil Case No. 3622; and Pascual Pili, joined by his sister Luisa Pili, filed Civil
Case No. 3623. These are the three cases which originated in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) which are now before
this Court on appeal.
In the earlier part of this decision, We have pointed out that the complaints in these three cases had been amended so as to include as
parties plaintiffs all the heirs of the persons who were alleged to be the owners of the parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs in each case.
Thus, the complaint in Civil Case No. 3621 was amended to include all the heirs of Sixto Benin, the alleged owner of the three parcels of
land described in the complaint and the common predecessor in interest of all the plaintiffs in the case. The complaint in Civil Case No.
3622 was amended to include all the heirs of Bonoso Alcantara, the alleged owner of the two parcels of land described in the complaint
and the common predecessor in interest of all the plaintiffs in the case. The complaint in Civil Case No. 3623
was amended to include all the heirs of Candido Pili, the alleged owner of the one parcel of land described in the complaint and the common
predecessor in interest of all the plaintiffs in the case.
In those three cases, in the court below, herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. (defendant therein) filed a motion to dismiss upon the
principal ground "that the cause of action (assuming there is one) is barred by prior judgment, or by the statute of limitation". In its motion
to dismiss J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. contended that the decision of the Supreme Court in the Alcantara case is a bar to the action of the
plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the Court of the First Instance of Rizal. The lower court, however, denied the motion to
dismiss. In its answer to the complaint in each of these three cases, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. set up as affirmative defenses the very grounds
of its motion to dismiss. After the plaintiffs had closed their direct evidence, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed another motion to dismiss upon
the ground that the action was barred by the statute of limitations and by a prior judgment, and that the plaintiffs had not presented
evidence to prove their claim of ownership. This second motion to dismiss was also denied by the lower court. 49
In its decision, which is now on appeal before this Court, the lower court held that the decision in the Alcantaracase was not a bar to the
action in these three cases, ruling that there is no identity, of the parties, of the subject matter, and of the cause of action, between Civil
Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622, and 3623, on the other.
It is now contended by appellant J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc., in the present appeal, that "the trial court erred in not dismissing these cases on
the ground of resjudicataand in denying the motion to dismiss filed on said ground." 50
Does the judgment in the aforementioned Alcantara case operate as a bar to the action of the appellees in the three cases at bar?
In order that the rule of resjudicatamay apply, the following requisites must be present: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d)
there must be, between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject-matter, and of cause of action (San Diego vs. Cardona,
70 Phil. 281-283).
We find that the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998) is a final judgment on the merits that was rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties. The only requisite for resjudicatawhich we have to determine is whether between
Civil Case Q-156 (G.R. No. 4998), on the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 8621, 3622 and 3623 (G.R. Nos. L-26127, 26128 and 26129), on the
other, there is identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.
In our examination of the records and the evidence, We find that there is identity of subject matter. In the lower court's pretrial order dated
December 18, 1957, which was based on the agreement of the parties, it is stated
That the parcels of land in litigation in Case No. Q-156 are substantially identical to the same parcels of land litigated in them cases Nos.
3621, 8622 and 3623. 51
We also find that there is identity of cause of action. It is apparent, upon reading the original complaint (Exhibit 1) in Civil Case Q-156 and
the decision in the Alcantara case (G.R. No. L-4998), that the cause of action in Civil Case Q-156 was based on the alleged fact that the
defendants had dispossessed and deprived the plaintiff therein of the parcels of land described in the complaint, which were claimed by
the plaintiffs as their own and of which they had been in actual, open and continuous possession from time immemorial, and that said lands
were wrongly included in Certificate of Title No. 735 that was obtained by the defendants. In the three cases at bar, plaintiffs (now appellees)
also complain of having been dispossessed and deprived by the defendants of the parcels of land of which they were absolute owners and
possessors, by themselves and through their predecessors in interest, since time immemorial and that their said lands wrongly included in
Parcel 1 of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 that was obtained by the defendants. In Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and in the
three cases now at bar, on the other, the plaintiffs therein seek the nullification of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, and the reconveyance
to them of the parcels of land that they claim as theirs. 52 It appears clear to Us that in Civil Case No. Q-156 and in the three cases at bar,
the object or purpose of the plaintiffs is to recover the ownership and possession of the same parcels of land.
As far as the parties are concerned, We find that there is no exact identity of parties between Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and
Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, on the other. It appears that of the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 only Elias Benin,
Jose Alcantara and Pascual Pili were plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-156. In Civil Case No. Q-156, the defendants were Mariano Tuason y de la
Paz, Heirs of Mariano Tuason, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc., while in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 the
defendants were Mariano Severo, Teresa Eriberta, Juan Jose, Demetrio Asuncion, Augusta Huberto, all surnamed Tuason y de la Paz (the
persons appearing as registered owners in Original Certificate of Title No. 735), their heirs, and J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. We find that the
natural persons surnamed Tuason, and the heirs, refer to the persons who belong to the Tuason family that secured the registration of
Parcel 1 in Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The defendant Gregorio Araneta Inc. in Civil Case No. Q-156 is the administrator of the
Tuason properties. So, the parties defendants in all these cases are practically the same. We find, however, that in Civil Case No. Q-156 as
well as in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, it was the defendant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. that actually controverted the claims of the
plaintiffs.
After a careful study, We are of the considered view that the judgment in the Alcantara case is a bar to the action of the plaintiffs who are
the heirs of Elias Benin in Civil Case No. 3621 (G.R. No. 26127), of plaintiff Jose Alcantara in Civil Case No. 3622 (G.R. No. 26128), and of
plaintiff Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. 3623 (G. R. No. 26129) under the doctrine of resadjudicata. We are likewise of the considered view
that the decision in the Alcantaracase would serve to rule out the action of the other plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623
under the doctrine of staredecisis.
In Civil Case No. 3621 the original plaintiffs were Victor Benin, Marta Benin, and Elias Benin--two brothers and a sister. In the amended
complaint it was alleged that these three original plaintiffs had another brother, and another sister, namely Esteban Benin and Felipa Benin.
But because all the five Benin brothers and sisters died, they were all substituted by their heirs, such that as of the time when Civil Case No.
3621 was decided the plaintiffs were: (1) the heirs of Victor Benin; (2) the heirs of Marta Benin; (3) the heirs of Elias Benin; (4) the heirs of
Esteban Benin, and (5) the heirs of Felipa Benin.
In Civil Case No. 3622 the original plaintiffs were Juan Alcantara and Jose Alcantara. Juan Alcantara died, and he was substituted by his heirs,
such that as of the time Civil Case No. 3622 was decided the plaintiffs were: (1) the heirs of Juan Alcantara, and (2) JoseA.Alcantara.
In Civil Case No. 3623 the original plaintiffs were Pascual Pili and Luisa Pili. In the amended complaint, it was alleged that Luisa Pili and
Pascual Pili had two brothers who were already dead, namely, Diego Pili and Manuel Pili, so they were substituted by their heirs. Luisa Pili
died, and she was substituted by her heirs, such that as of the time Civil Case No. 3623 was decided, the plaintiffs
were: (1) the heirs of Diego Pili; (2) the heirs of Manuel Pili; (3) the heirs of Luisa Pili, and (4) PascualPili.
It would thus appear that of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621 Elias Benin is the only one who was a plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-156; of the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3622 Jose E. Alcantara, who is still living, is the only one who was a plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-156; of the plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. 3623 Pascual Pili, who is still living, is the only one who was a plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-156.
It being Our finding that the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998-the Alcantaracase) is a final judgment on the merits that
was rendered by a court that had jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties, and that there is identity of subject matter and
cause of action between Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622, and 3623, on the other; and it appearing
that Elias Benin is a party-plaintiff both in Civil Case Q-156 and Civil Case No. 3621; that Jose Alcantara is a party-plaintiff in both Civil Case
No. Q-156 and Civil Case No. 3622; that Pascual Pili is a party-plaintiff in both Civil Case No. Q-156 and Civil Case No. 3623; and that the
defendants in Civil Case No. Q-156 and in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 are practically the same persons and/or entities, We hold
that the doctrine of bar by a previous judgment or resadjudicatasquarely applies to Elias Benin, or to his heirs and successors in interest
in Civil Case No. 3621; to Jose Alcantara and his heirs or successors in interest in Civil Case No. 3622; and to Pascual Pili and his heirs or
successors in interest in Civil Case No. 3623. 53
We now consider the case of the other plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623.
It will be noted that in Civil Case No. 3621 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the three parcels of land described in the complaint
on their being heirs or successors in interest of SixtoBeninwhodiedin1936. In Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership
over the two parcels of land described in their complaint on their being the heirs and successors in interest of BonosoAlcantarawhodied
in1934. In Civil Case No. 3623 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the one parcel of land described in their complaint on their
being the heirs and successors in interest of CandidoPiliwhodiedin1931.
When Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili, alleged in their complaint in Civil Case No. Q-156 (which was filed in 1950) that they were
the owners of the parcels of land specified in their complaint, having inherited the same from their ancestors and had been in possession
of the same from time immemorial, each was claiming a right as an heir of Bonoso Alcantara, Sixto Benin, and Candido Pili, respectively.
Similarly, in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, the source of the rights claimed by the plaintiffs Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual
Pili and all the other plaintiffs were their respective ancestor, or predecessor in interest, namely Bonoso Alcantara, Sixto Benin and Candido
Pili, as the case may be.
Inasmuch as Sixto Benin died in 1936, Bonoso Alcantara died in 1934, and Candido Pili died in 1931, it is obvious that during all the time
when the registration proceedings in LRC No. 7681 were taking place before the Court of Land Registration, which culminated in the
issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 on July 8, 1914, SixtoBenin,BonosoAlcantaraandCandidoPiliwereliving. The records show
that no one of these three persons, or their representative, had filed any opposition to the application for registration in said LRC 7681, nor
did any one of them, or their representative, file any petition for review of the decree of registration No. 17431 that was issued in said LRC
No. 7681.
It is Our view, therefore, that the decision of this Court, in G.R. No. L-4998, which affirmed the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
dismissing the complaint of Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili (along with four other plaintiffs) in Civil Case No. Q-156 should apply
not only against
the heirs, of Elias Benin, against Jose Alcantara, and against Pascual Pili, as plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, respectively,
but also against all the other plaintiffs in those cases. We find that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621 do not claim a right which is different
from that claimed by Elias Benin in Civil Case No. Q-156. Likewise, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3622 do not claim a right different from
that claimed by Jose Alcantara in Civil Case No Q-156. And, also, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 do not claim a right different from that
claimed by Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. Q-156. They all claim the same right, based on the alleged ownership of their respective common
predecessor in interest in Civil Case No. 3621 the common predecessor in interest being Sixto Benin; in Civil Case No. 3622 the common
predecessor in interest being Bonoso Alcantara; and in Civil Case No. 3623 the common predecessor in interest being Candido Pili. In Civil
Case No. Q-156 Elias Benin based his claim of ownership upon the ownership of his predecessor in interest who necessarily must be Sixto
Benin; Jose Alcantara, upon the ownership of his predecessor in interest who necessarily must be Bonoso Alcantara; and Pascual Pili, upon
the ownership of his predecessor in interest who necessarily must be Candido Pili. It follows, therefore, that the decision of this Court in
G.R. No. L-4998 (Civil Case No. Q-156), which held untenable the cause of action of the successors in interest, of Sixto Benin, of Bonoso
Alcantara and of Candido Pili, to recover the ownership and possession of any land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735, would
also foreclose a similar cause of action of all other persons who claim to be successors in interest of Sixto Benin, of Bonoso Alcantara and
of Candido Pili over any land covered by said certificate of title. As We have adverted to, Sixto Benin died in 1936, Bonoso Alcantara died in
1934, and Candido Pili died in 1931. These three predecessors in interest of the appellees died long after the issuance of Original Certificate
of Title No. 735, which took place on July 8, 1914.
And so, even if there are plaintiffs (now appellees) in these three cases who are not privies to plaintiffs Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin, and
Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998 the Alcantaracase) and were not parties in that case, still the ruling of this Court in
that former case, to the effect that therein plaintiffs or their predecessors in interest were bound by the proceedings in the registration
court which culminated in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, holds and applies to those plaintiffs in these three cases,
because the claim of ownership of these plaintiffs is based on the same predecessors in interest of plaintiffs Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and
Pascual Pili in said Civil Case No. Q-156. 54 It may well be said that the interests of the appellees in G.R. No. L-26127 (Civil Case No. 3621)
who claim rights as heirs or successors in interest of Sixto Benin were represented by Elias Benin in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998);
the appellees in G.R. No. 26128 (Civil Case No. 3622) who claim rights as heirs or successors in interest of Bonoso Alcantara were
represented by Jose Alcantara in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998); the appellees in G.R. No. 26129 (Civil Case No. 3623) who claim
rights as heirs or successors in interest of Candido Pili were represented by Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998).
(c) In the case of Albina Santiago, et al. vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. (G.R. No. L-14223, November 23, 1960) 55, where Original Certificate of
Title No. 735, was also in question, this Court ruled on issues akin to the issues involved in the three cases now at bar. Albina Santiago and
her co-plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-2918, against J. M. Tuason &
Co. Inc. alleging, substantially, that their ancestor, Inocencio Santiago, was the owner of a parcel of land, evidenced by a document (attached
to their complaint as Annex A) issued by the Spanish government on May 12, 1848 56; that Inocencio Santiago had since then been in
possession of the aforesaid land as owner, publicly, continuously and adversely until his death, when his two children, Isaias and Albina,
succeeded and continued to own and possess said land proindivisoin the same character as that of their predecessor that upon the death
of Isaias Santiago his one-half share of the land was inherited by his eleven children who, together with their aunt Albina, continued to own
and possess the land in the same character as that of their predecessors; that Albina and her co-plaintiffs came to know that J.M. Tuason
& Co., Inc. had previously filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City Civil Case No. Q-27 for "quieting of title and recovery of
possession" against five of the children of Isaias Santiago involving the parcel of land of which they were co-owners; that J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. had claimed that parcel to be part of the land covered by its Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119; that the judgment in Civil. Case No.
Q-27, in which they (Albina Santiago, et al.) were never impleaded as parties, had already become final 57; that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had
executed the judgment against them, excluding and rusting them from the enjoyment and possession of the land. Albina and her co-
plaintiffs also alleged that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 (37679) of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., as well as Original Certificate of Title No.
735 from which the former was derived, did not include the parcel claimed by them; that even granting that Transfer Certificate of Title No.
119 included the parcel claimed by them the inclusion of that parcel in the certificate of title of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was done through
fraud because they, nor their predecessors, were not actually notified of the registration proceedings. As ground for cancellation of the
certificate of title of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs further alleged that the technical description in Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 had been falsified to include areas never brought within the jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court, since
they were areas not included in the application and publication in the registration proceedings; that long before the predecessors of J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. applied for, and secured, registration of the land which included their parcel of land they had already acquired ownership
thereof not only by the document, Annex A of their complaint, but also by acquisitive prescription. Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs
prayed, that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. be ordered to desist from enforcing Civil Case No. Q-27 against them; that a resurvey be ordered to
determine whether or not Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 (37679) included the land described in their complaint; that a reconveyance
to them be ordered of whatever portion of the land claimed by them may be found included in transfer Certificate of Title No. 119; that
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 and Original Certificate of Title No. 735 be ordered cancelled and substituted with a new certificate of
title embracing only those lands included in the application, publication and/or decree in LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration.
Upon motion of defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dismissed the complaint of Albina Santiago,
et al., upon the grounds that there was no cause of action, that the case was barred by a prior judgment in Civil Case No. Q-27 which was
affirmed by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-5079, and that the action of the plaintiffs, if they had any, had prescribed.
This Court affirmed the order of the lower court dismissing the complaint of Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs.58 Regarding the
contention of Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs that the judgment in the previous case (Civil Case No. Q-27, affirmed in G.R. No. L-5079)
would not operate as resjudicataagainst them because they were not parties in that suit, and that they did not derive their title from the
defendants in the previous suit, this Court held:
We agree with appellants that the decision in the preceding suit to quiet title, prosecuted by the appellee Tuason & Co. against other heirs
of Ynocencio Santiago (99 Phil., 615; 50 Off. Gaz. 11, 5727), cannot constitute resjudicataagainst these appellants who were not parties to
that suit and do not derive their title from the defendants in the previous litigation (Rule 39, sec. 44 (b). There is authority for the proposition
that a judgment may be made binding in a subsequent litigation upon one who, although not a formal party to a previous suit, has actually
conducted or controlled the action or defense therein (65 ALR 1134), or who was adequately represented in such previous litigation; but
no clear proof of the existence of such exceptional circumstance is before us in the present case. On the other hand, the rule is that co-
owners are not privies intersein relation to the property owned in common.
xxx xxx xxx
But granting that the plaintiffs-appellants herein are not privies of the defendants Santiago in the former litigation over this same property
(S.C.G.R. No. L-5079), still the pronouncement of this Court, made in the former case, to the effect
that the Spanish document (Annex A) issued in favor of Ynocencio Santiago (ancestor of appellants herein) was neither a titulo de
informacionposesorianor a title by composicionconelestado, and, therefore, vested no ownership over the land therein described in favor
of Ynocencio Santiago, holds and applies to herein appellants, since the quality or the legal effect of the document does not depend upon
the person who invoke it.
If the late Ynocencio Santiago did not become the owner of the disputed property by virtue of the document Annex A, then appellants
herein, as heirs of Ynocencio have not acquired such ownership either. It follows that the first and second causes of action of their complaint,
predicated as they are on the assumption that such ownership and its consequential rights resulted from Annex A, must necessarily fail.
Not being owners, they can complain of no invasion of dominical rights.
It will thus be noted that in the aforementioned decision in the Santiago case, even if Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs were not
considered privies to the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-27, and even if they were not parties in that previous case, this Court nevertheless
applied to them the judgment (G. R. No. L-5079) in that previous case where it was pronounced that the document, Annex A of the complaint
of Albina Santiago, et al., was neither atitulodeinformacionposesorianor a title by composisionconelestado, and it did not establish the
right of ownership of their predecessor in interest, Inocencio Santiago, Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs had based their claim of
ownership on that document (Annex A). 59 This Court held in that previous case that the document was unavailing against Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 119 of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and against Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
And so, following the logic of this Court in its decision in the Santiagocase, in the three cases at bar We hold that even if the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 3621, except the heirs of Elias Benin, are not privies to Elias Benin and were not parties in Civil Case No. Q-156; even if the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3622, except Jose Alcantara, are not privies to Jose Alcantara and were not parties in Civil Case No. Q-156; and
even if the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623, except Pascual Pili, are not privies to Pascual Pili and were not parties in Civil Case No. Q156, still
the pronouncement of this Court in the judgment in that previous case (G.R. No. L-4998), to the effect that the plaintiffs in that case and
their predecessors in interest were bound by the registration proceedings which culminated in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title
No. 735, holds and applies to all the plaintiffs (now appellees) in these three cases. In that judgment this Court ruled out, or did not sustain,
the rights claimed by the predecessors in interest of herein appellees over the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. These
appellees, therefore, have not succeeded to any right that can derrogate the validity and conclusiveness of Original Certificate of Title No.
735, and of the certificates of title that are derived from said original certificate of title.
Coming back to the Santiago case, as regards the contention of Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs that the registration proceedings which
resulted in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 were irregular and fraudulent, this Court held:
(T)he mere fact that appellants herein were not personally notified of the registration proceedings that resulted in a decree of registration
of title in favor of the Tuasons in 1914 does not constitute in itself a case of fraud that would invalidate the decree. The registration
proceedings, as proceedingsin rem, operate as against the whole world and the decree issued therein is conclusive adjudication of the
ownership of the lands registered, not only against those parties who appeared in such proceedings but also against parties who were
summoned by publication but did not appear. The registration by the appellee's predecessors-in-interest freed the lands
from claims and liens of whatever character that existed against the lands prior to the issuance of the certificates of title, except those
noted in the certificate and legal encumbrances saved by law (Yumol vs. Rivera and Dizon, 64 Phil. 13, 17 and cases cited therein). In
addition, there being no allegation that the registered owners procured the non-appearance of appellants at the registration proceedings,
and very much more than one year having elapsed from the issuance of the decree of registration in 1914, neither revocation of such
decree nor a decree of reconveyance are obtainable any more.
Regarding the claim of Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs that they had acquired title by prescription over the parcel of land claimed by
them, this Court held:
It follows also that the allegation of prescriptive title in favor of plaintiffs does not suffice to establish a cause of action. If such prescription
was completed beforethe registration of the land in favor of the Tuasons, the resulting prescriptive title was cut off and extinguished by
the decree of registration. If, on the contrary, the prescription was either begun or completed afterthe decree of registration, it conferred
no title because, by express provision of law, prescription cannot operate against the registered owner (Act 496, section 46).
Thus, in this Santiago case, as in the Alcantara case, this Court declared conclusive and indefeasible Original Certificate of Title No. 735
which was issued as a result of the registration proceedings in L.R.C. No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration. There are many other cases
where this Court has made a similar pronouncement regarding Original Certificate of Title No. 735. 60
In view of the findings, and the rulings, that We have hereinbefore made, it follows that, as contended by the appellant, the lower court
also erred when it declared the appellees the owners of the lands claimed by them and in awarding damages to them, in these three cases.
61
We consider it unnecessary to rule on the counterclaim of appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., for damages and attorneys fees against the
appellees 62, considering, as the records show, that the appellees are persons who are not in a position to pay damages in any form. 63
We believe that the appellees had filed their complaints in the honest, but mistaken, belief that they have a good cause of action against
the appellant corporation and not because they meant to embarrass or humiliate the persons who are identified or connected with the
appellant.
WHEREFORE, the joint decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) in Civil Cages Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, appealed
from, is reversed and set aside. The bond filed by appellant in the three cases in the court below for the lifting of the writ of preliminary
injunction is ordered cancelled. No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.


Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-36637 July 14, 1978
GENEROSO MENDOZA, substituted by his wife and administratrix DIEGA DE LEON VDA. DE MENDOZA,petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, DANIEL GOLE CRUZ and DOLORES MENDOZA, respondents.
DemetrioB.Encarnacion&CarlosJ.Antipordaforpetitioner.
NorbertoS.Gonzalezforprivaterespondents.
SANTOS, J.:
This petition for review by certiorariseeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals * dated February 27, 1973 in CA-G.R. No.
46581-R entitled "GenerosoMendoza,applicants",applicant-appelleevs.DanielGoleCruz,etal.,movant, which upheld the registration in
the names of herein private respondents, purchasers of the landholdings subject matter of an application for registration, notwithstanding
that they were not parties in the original registration proceedings.
Relevant antecedent facts follow. On May 15, 1964, Generoso Mendoza, herein petitioner, 1 filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
an application for the registration of two parcels of land, with a residential house thereon, situated in the Poblacion of Sta. Maria Bulacan.
A notice was issued on December 3, 1964 setting the date of initial hearing on June 18, 1965. Said notice was duly published, posted and
served but nobody appeared nor filed an answer or opposition within the period allowed for that purpose. Consequently, the registration
court entered on July 6, 1965, an order of general default and allowed the applicant to present his evidence ex-parte. 2
From the evidence presented by applicant Generoso Mendoza, herein petitioner, it was proven that he and his wife, Diega de Leon, were
the owners of the parcels of land subject of the application but the same were sold by them, during the pendency of the case, to the spouses
Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza, herein private respondents, subject to the vendors' usufructuary rights. The instrument embodying
such sale was presented as Exhibit 1. On the basis of such evidence, the registration court rendered a decision on July 21, 1965, ordering
the registration of the two parcels of land in the names of the vendees, Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza, subject to the usufructuary
rights of the vendors, Generoso Mendoza and Diega de Leon. On the same day, a copy of said decision was received by Generoso Mendoza.
3
On November 5, 1965. after the decision had become final, the applicant-vendor, Generoso Mendoza, filed a motion for the issuance of
the decree. On May 16, 1967, Decree No. 114454 was issued confirming the title to the land of vendees Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores
Mendoza, and ordering the registration of the same in their names, subject to the usufructuary rights of the vendors. Consequently, Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-3787 was issued to spouses Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza. 4
On April 16, 1968, Generoso Mendoza filed an urgent petition for reconsideration praying that the decision dated July 21, 1965 and the
decree issued pursuant thereto dated May 16, 1967 be set aside and that Original Certificate of Title No. 03787 be cancelled, on the ground
that the vendees, the registered owners, had failed to pay the purchase price of the lands. 5
The registration court considered said urgent petition for reconsideration as a petition for review of the decree and issued an order dated
September 3, 1968 setting aside its decision, its order for the issuance of the decree, and the decree of registration, on the ground that it
did not have jurisdiction to order the registration of the lands in the names of the vendees, who were not parties to the application for
registration. Moreover, said court ordered the cancellation of O.C.T. No. 03787 and directed the registration of the lands in the names of
spouses, Generoso Mendoza and Diega de Leon, subject to the rights of vendees, Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza, stated in the
deed of sale. 6
On September 17, 1968, spouses Cruz and Mendoza moved to reconsider the order, but their motion was denied on October 17, 1968. On
December 19, 1968, said spouses appealed from the order dated September 3, 1968. On March 11, 1969, Mendoza filed a motion to dismiss
the appeal and on April 10, 1969, the registration court dismissed the appeal. 7
The spouses Cruz and Mendoza then filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari,mandamusand prohibition, which
was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 43250-R. The Court of Appeals on January 5, 1970, ordered the registration court to give due course to the
appeal. The registration court approved the Record on Appeal and forwarded the same to the Court of Appeals together with all the
evidence adduced during the trial. 8
Acting on said appeal which was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 46581- R, the Court of Appeals rendered on February 27, 1973, the decision,
subject matter of the present petition for review. It set aside the order of the land registration court of September 3, 1968 which set aside
its decision of July 21, 1965 and the decree issued pursuant thereto. It also denied applicant Mendoza's petition for reconsideration dated
April 15 (filed April 16), 1968, which was considered as a petition for review of the decree.
Hence, this Petition for Review which alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred
1. ... IN HOLDING THAT THE APPELLEE HIMSELF CAUSED THE REGISTRATION OF THE TITLE TO THE LAND IN QUESTION IN THE NAME OF THE
APPELLANTS.
2. ... IN HOLDING THAT ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NO FORMAL AMENDMENT OF THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION SUBSTITUTING THE
VENDEES FOR THE APPLICANT, THE REGISTRATION COURT COULD LEGALLY ORDER THE TITLE ISSUED IN THE NAME OF VENDEES BECAUSE
THE APPLICANT HIMSELF PROVIDED THE BASIS FOR ADJUDICATION; AND THAT THE APPLICATION COULD HAVE BEEN AMENDED TO
CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE ALREADY ADVANCED BY SUBSTITUTING THE VENDEES FOR THE SAID APPLICANT.
3. ... IN HOLDING THAT THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS NOT BASED ON FRAUD PERPETRATED ON THE APPELLEE BY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT. 9
The foregoing assigned errors question the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals ordering the registration of the landholdings subject
matter of the application for registration in the names of herein private respondents who are the purchasers of the landholdings,
notwithstanding that they were not parties in the original registration proceedings before the lower court.
In the first assignment of error, the petitioner assails the Court of Appeals' holding that he himself caused the registration of the land in
question in the name of the vendees, the herein private respondents. But whether or not the petitioner did in fact cause the registration
of the land in favor of private respondents is a question of fact which cannot properly be raised in the present petition for review inasmuch
as Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that in an appeal from the Court of Appeals to this Court, only questions of
law my be raised. 10 Thus, the finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner caused the registration of the land in favor of the private
respondents cannot now be raised in this Appeal much less disturbed by this Court.
However, by petitioner's insistence that he could not be deemed to have caused the registration of the land in the names of private
respondents as he never testified in court having sold the same to said Private respondents 11he, in effect, invokes the exception to the
above-stated rule of conclusiveness of the Court of Appeals' findings of fact, namely: that the Court of Appeals' finding is grounded entirely
on surmises or conjectures and has no basis in the evidence on record. 12 Consequently, We are tasked with the e petition of the records
of the case to determine the veracity of petitioner's claim that he never testified in court as having sold the property to the herein private
respondents. And it must here be emphasized that should the records confirm such claim of the petitioner, the Court of Appeals' holding
that he caused the registration of the land in the names of private respondents would have no basis in the evidence and should, thus, be
reversed.
A careful study and consideration of the records of the case, however, belie petitioner's claim that he did not testify relative to the
aforementioned deed of sale. The transcript of the stenographic notes of the hearing on the application for registration held on July 6, 1965
all too clearly show that petitioner and his wife testified before the deputed commissioner, Mr. Ricardo Cruz, that they sold the property
sought to be registered to the private respondents. Thus, the records show that petitioner testified as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Valentin:
Q. You said that you are the owners of these two parcels of land subject matter of this litigation, after you have caused the filing of this
application, was there any transaction that took place with respect to the same?
A. Yessir,wehavesoldthesetwoparcelsoflandtoDanielGoleCruzandhiswifeDoloresMendoza.
Q. ShowingtoyouthisdocumentwhichisanoriginalcarboncopyofadeedofsalewritteninTagalogandexecutedandratifiedonOctober
15,1964,wouldyoukindlytellthisHonorableCourtwhichisExhibitI,willyoutellthisHonorableCourtifyouknowthisExhibitI?(sic)
A. Yes,sir,thatisthecarboncopyofthedeedofsaleIhavejustmentioned.13 (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Similarly, applicant-petitioner's wife, Diega de Leon, testified as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. VALENTIN:
Q. Do you know the two parcels of land subject matter of this registration proceedings?
A. Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Do you know who are now in possession of these properties.
A. We, I, my husband and Daniel Gole Cruz and and his wife, Dolores Mendoza are in actual possession of the same.
Q. WhyareDanielGoleCruzandDoloresMendozaco-possessingwithyouthesetwoparcelsofland?
A. BecauseonOctober15,1964,wesoldthispropertytothemwithoneoftheconditionsthatuntilmyhusbandandmyselforanyoneofus
die,wewilllivewiththem.14 (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore, applicant-petitioner even presented the private respondent Daniel Gole Cruz to confirm the aforesaid sale of the subject
property. Thus, Cruz testified as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. VALENTIN:
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Do you know the property covered by this registration proceedings?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Why do you know the same?
A. BecausewehavebeenlivinginsaidplacesinceIgotmarriedandbesides,onOctober15,1964,thesaidtwoparcelsoflandweresoldto
usbythehereinapplicantandhiswife.
Q. Showing to you this Exhibit 1, would you Identify and tell this Honorable Court if you know the same?
A. Yes sir, Exhibit I is the carbon original of the deed of sale executed in our favor. 15(Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, even the registration court itself did not believe applicant-petitioner's claim that he did not previously cause the registration of the
subject property in the names of private respondents. For, while it granted applicant-petitioner's petition for review of the decree and
ordered the re-registration of the land in his name, the Court, nevertheless, expressly declared in the very same order that:
Generoso Mendoza was the original applicant in this case. At the hearing, hehimselfproducedevidencethatonOctober15,1964heandhis
wifesoldtheLandinfavorofthespousesDanielGoleCruzandDoloresMendozafor the amount of P6,000.00 payable in installments (Exh.
1). ... 16(Emphasis supplied).
In view of the foregoing, it is crystal clear that the respondent Court of Appeals did not incur any error when it held that applicant. Petitioner
himself caused the registration of the land in the names of private respondents.
Petitioner, however, insists in his second assignment of error, that the registration court could not legally order the registration of the land
in the names of the vendees-respondents, who were neither the applicants nor the oppositors in the registration case below. Petitioner
overlooks Section 29 of the Land Registration Act which expressly authorizes the registration of the land subject matter of a registration
proceeding in the name of the buyer or of the person to whom the land has been conveyed by an instrument executed during the interval
of time between the filing of the application for registration and the issuance of the decree of title, thus
SEC. 29. After the filing of the application and before the issuance of the decree of title by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office,
the land therein described may be dealt with and instruments relating thereto shall be recorded in the office of the register of said at any
time before issuance of the decree of title, in the same manner as if no application had been made. The interested Party may, however,
present such instruments to the Court of First Instance instead of presenting them to the office of the register of deeds, together with a
motion that the same be considered in relation with the application, and the court after notice to the parties, shall order such land registered
subject to the ecumbrance created by a said instruments, ororderthedecreeofregistrationissuedinthenameofthebuyeroroftheperson
towhomthepropertyhasbeenconveyedbysaidinstruments. ... (Emphasis supplied).
It is clear from the above-quoted provision that the law expressly allows the land subject matter of an application for registration to be
"dealt with", i.e., to be disposed of or encumbered during the interval of time between the filing of the application and the issuance of the
decree of title, and to have the instruments embodying such disposition or encumbrance presented to the registration court by the
,interested party" for the court to either "order such land registered subject to the encumbrance created by said instruments, ororderthe
decreeofregistrationissuedinthenameofthebuyerorofthepersontowhomthepropertyhasbeenconveyedbysaidinstruments. 17 The
law does not require that the application for registration be amended by substituting the "buyer" or the person to whom the property has
been conveyed" for the applicant. Neither does it require that the "buyer" or the "person to
whom the property has been conveyed" be a party to the case. He may thus be a total stranger to the land registration proceedings. The
only requirements of the law are: (1) that the instrument be presented to the court by the interested party together with a motion that the
same be considered in relation with the application; and (2) that prior notice be given to the parties to the case. And the peculiar facts and
circumstances obtaining in this case show that these requirements have been complied with.
As heretofore stated, the instrument embodying the sale of the subject property by the petitioner to the private respondents was duly
presented to the registration court for consideration. That the purpose was to have the land registered in the names of private respondents
subject to the usufructuary rights of petitioner and his wife is explicit in the following facts and circumstances. Firstly, it was the petitioner
himself, the applicant in the registration proceedings, who presented the deed of sale (Exh. I) to the court and testified before the same
that he did sell the land to the private respondents. This was done by him despite the fact that he could easily have the land registered in
his name as an order of general default had been issued and the hearing on the application for registration had been conducted EX-
PARTE. Secondly, as if to fully convince the court of the fact of sale, petitioner presented his wife, Diega de Leon, and pri vate respondent,
Daniel GolE Cruz, to confirm the said sale of the land and the stipulated usufructuary rights. Finally, the petitioner even filed the motion for
the issuance of the decree of confirmation of title after having received the decision of the court ordering the registration of the title to the
land in the names of vendees-respondents, subject to the stipulated usufructuary rights thereby signifying his full assent to the same.
It is true that no written motion was filed seeking the consideration of the deed of sale in relation with the application for registration. But
the law does not require that the motion accompanying the presentation of the instrument be in writing. And the above- enumerated acts
of the applicant-petitioner and the circumstances surrounding the same accept of no interpretation than that the applicant-petitioner did
in fact move the court to order the registration of the title to the land in the names of vendees- respondents, subject only to the stipulated
usufructuary rights of the petitioner and his wife. There was, therefore, sufficient compliance with the first requirement of the law.
Anent the second requirement of prior notice to the parties, the relevant fact to be considered is that an order of general default had been
issued prior to the presentation of the deed of sale by the applicant-petitioner, since nobody filed an opposition to the application for
registration. Thus, the only person who should have been entitled to a notice from the court was the applicant-petitioner himself, as the
only party with a legal standing in the proceedings. In view thereof, no legal objection to the court's jurisdiction to order the registration of
the lands in the names of vendees-respondents may be interposed on the ground of non-compliance with the requirement of prior notice
to the parties.
Since there was sufficient compliance with the aforestated requirements of the law, respondent Court of Appeals did not, therefore, err in
holding that the lower court had jurisdiction to order the registration of the lands in the names of vendees-respondents.
The petitioner, finally, contends in a desperate effort to justify the validity of the appealed order of September 3, 1968 that respondent
Court of Appeals erred in holding that he was not the victim of fraud perpetrated by the vendees, private respondents, herein, who allegedly
failed to pay the purchase price of the landholdings. This is also without merit. Section 38 of the Land Registration Act provides as follows

SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title as stated in his application or adverse claim and
proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered. ... Such decree shall not be opened
by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments or decree: subject,however,totherightofanypersondeprivedoflandorofanyestateorinterestthereinbydecreeofregistration
obtainedbyfraudtofileinthecompetentCourtofFirstInstanceapetitionforreviewwithinoneyearafterentryofthedecreeprovidedno
innocentpurchaserforvaluehasacquiredaninterest. ... (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the foregoing provision that the only ground upon which a decree of registration may be set aside isfraudinobtainingthe
same. In the instant case, applicant-petitioner cannot complain of fraud in obtaining the decree of registration for as heretofore stated, it
was solely upon his testimony and proof that the lots were ordered registered in the names of the vendees-respondents and it was also
upon his motion that the decree of registration was issued by the lower court. What the applicant-petitioner actually invokes in this case is
not fraud in obtaining the decree of registration but the alleged failure of the vendees-respondents to pay the purchase price of the
landholdings. But as correctly held by respondent Court of Appeals:
(B)reach of contract is not a ground for a petition for a review. And the registration court has no jurisdiction to decide the contentious issue
of whether or not the deed of sale, Exh. "1", should be rescinded for the alleged failure of the vendees to pay the purchase price. The issue
on the breach of contract has to be letigated in the ordinary court. 18
In view of all the foregoing, We hold that the Honorable Court of Appeals did not commit any error in setting aside the order of the lower
court dated September 13, 1968, and thus allowing the registration of the lots of the names of the vedees, herein private respondents.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 17, 1973 is hereby affirmed with costs against petitioner.
Fernando(Chairman),AntonioandGuererro,* JJ.,concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-29146 August 5, 1985
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE. BENITA SALAO, applicant-appellee, vs. BENITO CRISOSTOMO, oppositor-appellant.
ESCOLIN, J.:
This appeal, certified to Us by the Court of Appeals, poses the legal question of whether or not an applicant for a sales patent of a parcel of
land has the legal personality to oppose the application for registration of the same land filed by a party under Act No. 496.
Appellee Benita Salao applied for registration of two parcels of land, designated as Lot Nos. 1 and 2, Psu-204034, situated in Bo. Dampalit,
Malabon, Rizal. The application was docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-4753, LRC Record No. N-26218 of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal.
The appellee's claim of ownership is based on Article 457 of the Civil Code. 1 She alleged interaliathat the land applied for was formed by
accretion, having been deposited by the current of the Dampalit River which is contiguous to her property; and that she has occupied said
land since time immemorial, exercising open, continuous and exclusive possession thereof under a bonafideclaim of ownership.
Appellant Benito Crisostomo filed an opposition to the registration of Lot 1, Plan Psu-204034, with an area of 336 square meters. He alleged
that said lot is part of the public domain and subject of his Miscellaneous Sales Application No. V-51054, which had been approved by the
Bureau of Lands; that the lot was formed by filling up the land that was under water, not by alluvial accretion from the Dampalit River, as
alleged by the appellee; and that he has been in actual possession of the said lot by authority of the Bureau of Lands. He further alleged
that:
(a) That the court has no jurisdiction to hear the instant application insofar as Lot I PSU-204034, or for that matter the other lot shown in
the same plan, is concerned, the same land is the object of an application filed by the herein oppositor with the Bureau of Lands which
office having acquired an actual and prior cognizance over the same;
(b) That the applicant has no right to file the instant application before the Honorable Court-the land being public in nature and the subject
of an administrative investigation-applicant has not exhausted administrative remedies;
(c) That the instant application was filed by the herein applicant merely to harass the herein oppositor and to sidetrack the issues involved,
believing that she can do indirectly what she can not do directly.2
Appellee Salao filed a "Motion to Strike Out the Opposition from the Records of the Case," stating in support thereof that only the
government may appear as oppositor to the application, and that Crisostomo himself has no legal personality to oppose the same, the
latter's interest in the land in question being subordinate to, and dependent upon, the interest of the government. 3
After due hearing, the Land Registration Court issued a order granting the motion, which We quote:
Acting on the motion to strike out from the record of the case the opposition to oppositor Benito Crisostomo, dated December 5, 1966,
filed by the applicant thru counsel as well as the opposition thereto and finding the reason in support of the said motion to well- taken, the
Court hereby grants the same and the opposition Benito Crisostomo is hereby ordered striken off the records of this case. (pp. 36-37, Ibid).
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, Crisostomo interposed the instant appeal. His main thesis is that his legal personality
to oppose Salao's application for registration is distinct and separate from that of the government, and that the adjudication of the land in
question in favor of Salao would prejudice his right under the approve Miscellaneous Sales Application. He invokes Section 34 of Act 496
which provides:
Any person claiming an interest, whether named in the notice or not, may appear and file an answer on or before the return day, or within
such further time as may be allowed by the court. The answer shall state all the objections to the application, and shall set forth the interest
claimed by the party filing the same and apply for the remedy desired, and shall be signed and sworn to by him or by some person in his
behalf.
The appellant's challenge to the jurisdiction of the lower court is untenable. It is legal truism in procedural law that what determines the
jurisdiction of the court are the facts alleged in the complaint or petition, and not the facts averred in the answer or opposition of the
adverse party. The appellee's application alleges:
That she has acquired ownership of the said land by operation of law, in that, because of the waters of the Dampalit River, alluvion was
formed gradually and little by little along the bank of the said river adjacent to the property of the petitioner; that she has occupied the
land in question since time immemorial and has since then, exercise open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of the above mentioned property under a bona fide claim of ownership thereto. 4
Plainly, the court below has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for registration. If the above averments are true, then title to the
property was vested in the appellee under Article 457 of the Civil Code from the time the alluvial deposit was formed. Accordingly, the
registration court could properly declare "title thereto registered and confirmed in her (appellee's) name.
The lower court, however, erred in dismissing the opposition of Benito Crisostomo to the application for registration of Benita Salao covering
Lot No. 1 of Plan Psu-204034. His opposition is predicated on the fact that he is the actual possessor of the lot. He claimed that the lot was
formed by filling up the land that was under water and not by alluvial accretion from the Dampalit River, as pretended by applicant Salao.
On February 15, 1958, Benito Crisostomo filed with the Bureau of Lands Miscellaneous Sales Application No. V-51054 for the purchase of
said lot, a residential lot, whereas Salao filed her
application for registration only on June 16, 1964 for two lots of which Lot No. 1 is claimed by Benito Crisostomo.
On January 6, 1967, the Director of Lands, after due investigation, awarded Lot No. 1 to Benito Crisostomo for P187.50 to be used for
residential purposes. 5 As an awardee of said lot, he has sufficient interest to oppose Salao's application for registration. He is an adverse
claimant within the meaning of Section 34 of Act 496.
SECTION 34. Any person claiming an interest, whether named in the notice or not, may appear and file an answer on or before the return
day, or within such further time as may be allowed by the court. The answer shall state all the objections to the application, and shall set
forth the interest claimed by the party filing the same and apply for the remedy desired, and shall be signed and sworn to by him or some
person in his behalf.
It appears that Lot No. 2, the other land applied for Salao, was also sold by the government to Norberto Crisostomo, the father of Benito,
to whom Original Certificate of Title No. 111 was issued. 6
The records further disclose that applicant Salao had sued the brothers Menandro and Melquiades Crisostomo for the recovery of a parcel
of land with an area of 2,400 square meters, on the theory that the land was an accretion to a fishpond bordering the bank of the Dampalit
River. After trial in that case, 7 Judge Cecilia Muoz-Palma dismissed Salao's action and sustained the claim of the Crisostomo brothers that
they filled up the said land which used to be under water and then occupied it. That decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, but
whether the appellate court has already resolve this appeal is not shown in the records. Benito Crisostomo is the brother of Menandro and
Melquiades
Appellee Salao relies on the doctrine laid down in Leyvavs.Jandoc, 8 where this Court upheld the following ruling of the Court of Appeals:
Although Section 34 of Act 496 apparently authorizes any person claiming any kind of interest to file an opposition to an application for
registration, the opposition should be based on a right of dominion or some other real right independent, of, and not at all subordinate to
the rights of the Government. Where, as in the present case, the petitioners' right, that of being foreshore lessees of public land, is
completely subordinate to the interests of the government, and must necessarily be predicated upon the property in question being part
of the public domain, it is incumbent upon the duly authorized representative of the Government to represent its interests as well as private
claims intrinsically dependent upon it. Hence, petitioners have no right to appear as independent oppositors, but may collaborate with the
provincial fiscal.
The above ruling is not applicable to the case at bar because the oppositors therein, who opposed the application for registration
independently of the Director of Lands, were lessees under a foreshore lease executed between them and the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. It was held therein that inasmuch as their interest to the land in question was subordinate to the interest of the
government, their lawyer could just collaborate with the provincial fiscal but could not examine the witnesses over the fiscal's objection.
Here, the records do not show that the Director of Lands has filed an opposition to Salao's application. Such lack of opposition may be due
to the fact that one lot is already covered by a Torrens Title, while the other lot, Lot No. 1, has already been awarded to Benito Crisostomo
under his sales application.
The rule is that once a sales application is approved and entry is permitted, the land ceases to be part of the public domain. 9
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is set aside, and the opposition of Benito Crisostomo is given due course. Let the records be
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. Costs against the appellee Benita Salao. SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 167215 October 8, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF EVARISTO TIOTIOEN, respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before us is a PetitionforReviewonCertiorarifiled by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), seeking to set aside a part of the Decision1 dated February 15, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 71358 insofar as it sustained the denial of the NoticeofAppeal2 filed on January 11, 2002 by the
petitioner from theDecision3 dated August 30, 2001 of Branch 63 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, in Land
Registration Case (LRC) No. 93-LRC-0008.
*Additional Member as per Special Order No. 520.
LRC No. 93-LRC-0008 involves the second application filed by Evaristo Tiotioen on September 6, 1993 for judicial confirmation and
registration under the Torrens System of two parcels of land denominated as Lot Nos. 1 and 2 of Plan PSU-230646, situated in Pico, La
Trinidad, Benguet, with an aggregate area of 180,488 square meters. Evaristo Tiotioen was substituted by his heirs in the case when he
died on June 21, 1997. Santiago A. Santiago, the Municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet, and the petitioner opposed the aforesaid application.
In a NoticeofAppearance4 dated October 20, 1994, the OSG formally requested that its appearance be entered as counsel for the petitioner
and that all notices of hearings, orders, resolutions and decision be served to the OSG at its given address. The said notice of appearance
informed the court that the OSG authorized the Provincial Prosecutor of Benguet to appear in the case, subject to the conditi ons quoted
hereunder:
The Provincial Prosecutor, La Trinidad, Benguet, is authorized to appear in this case, and therefore, should also be furnished notices of
hearing, orders, resolutions, decisions and other processes. However, as the Solicitor General retains supervision and control of the
representation in this case and has to approve withdrawal of the case, non-appeal, or other actions which appear to compromise the
interest of the Government, only notices of orders, resolutions, and decisions served on him will bind the party represented.
The petitioner filed its Opposition5 dated October 20, 1994 and Supplemental Opposition6 dated June 20, 1995 on the ground that the
parcels of land, applied for registration by the respondents, belong to the communal forest of La Trinidad, Benguet, and are therefore
inalienable land of the public domain, which have not been classified and considered as disposable and alienable.
After trial, the land registration court rendered its Decisiondated August 30, 2001 which granted the application. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court, finding that the Applicants have shown their adverse, continuous and notorious possession and in the concept of
owners of the land applied for since time immemorial, and thus their title thereto is proper to be confirmed, and is hereby confirmed.
The applicants, namely: NICOLAS TIOTIOEN, single; ILDEFONSO TIOTIOEN, married to Adelaida Tiotioen; CONCEPCION TIOTIOEN-DIAZ,
married; NANCY TIOTIOEN-OGOY, married and FILOMENA TIOTIOEN-DULNUAN, married; all of legal age, Filipinos and residents of Pico, La
Trinidad, Benguet are hereby declared owners pro indiviso of a parcel of land situated at Pico, La Trinidad, Benguet containing an area of
ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THREE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY FIVE (123,935) SQUARE METERS for Lot 1 and FIFTY SIX THOUSAND
FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY THREE (56,553) SQUARE METERS for Lot 2. The subject land is particularly described in the Original Tracing Cloth Plan
(Exh. "AA-1"), Survey Plan (Exh. "A"), and in the Technical Description (Exhs. "B" & "B-2), subject to the claim of oppositor Santiago A.
Santiago as per agreement with the applicants and when the decision becomes final and executory, let a final decree be issued for the
issuance of title accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioner and the municipality received their respective notices of the above-mentioned decision on September 6 and 7, 2001. The
municipality filed its Motion for Reconsideration thereto on September 20, 2001. The petitioner, on the other hand, filed a Motion and
Manifestation7 on October 5, 2001 adopting the said motion of the municipality.
In the Resolution8 dated December 6, 2001, the land registration court denied for lack of merit the motion for reconsideration of the
municipality and declared the same as pro forma because the issues cited were already passed upon in the decision sought for
reconsideration. The municipality filed its notice of appeal on the following day it received its notice of the said resolution. The OSG was
not furnished by the land registration court with a copy of this resolution but it was informed of the said resolution only by the provincial
prosecutor on January 4, 20029, through a Letter10 dated December 19, 2001. Consequently, the OSG filed its subject notice of appeal for
the petitioner on January 11, 2002.
The land registration court denied the notice of appeal of the municipality on the ground that the latters pro formamotion for
reconsideration did not interrupt the reglementary period to appeal. The petitioners notice of appeal was also denied supposedly for
having been filed out of time11.
The petitioner sought the reconsideration of the denial of its notice of appeal which was again denied by the land registration court in an
Order12 dated April 23, 2002, quoted hereunder:
ORDER
For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) of the Order of the Court dated January
29, 2002 denying their Notice of Appeal having been filed beyond the reglementary period.
Be it noted that the OSG received the Decision dated August 30, 2001 on September 06, 2001 and filed its Notice of Appeal on January 11,
2002. Conformably with Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, prescribing a 15-day appeal period, the last day for the perfection
of
an appeal by OSG should have been on the 21st day of September 2001. Per se, it was filed beyond the reglementary period for which to
perfect an appeal.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that the right to appeal is a statutory right and a party who seeks to avail of the right must comply with
the rules. These rules, particularly the statutory requirement for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period laid down by law,
must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial
business (Ben Sta. Rita v. C.A., et al., G.R. No. 119891, August 21, 1995).
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no convincing and logical reasons to reconsider its Order dated January 29, 2002 and hereby denies
the Motion for Reconsideration. [Emphasis supplied]
The municipality and petitioner separately assailed before the CA the orders of the land registration court denying their respective notices
of appeal. The CA granted the petition filed by the municipality and gave due course to its appeal but denied the one filed by the petitioner.
The CA pointed out that the petitioner filed its motion and manifestation adopting the adverted motion for reconsideration of the
municipality beyond the reglementary period to file an appeal and, thus, the decision of the land registration court already attained finality
insofar as the petitioner was concerned. The "strong grounds" alleged by the petitioner were likewise rejected by the CA which explained
and ruled as follows:
The merit impressed in petitioner Republic of the Philippines position is, however, more apparent than real. Notwithstanding the studied
avoidance of direct references thereto, the fact remains that the Solicitor General received its copy of the 30 August 2001 decision rendered
in the case on 6 September 2001 and thus only had until the 21st of the same month to either move for a reconsideration of said decision or
perfect an appeal therefrom. There is, therefore, no gainsaying the ineluctable fact that the selfsame decision had already attained finality as
against petitioner Republic of the Philippines by the time the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Benguet filed the 4 October 2001
manifestation adopting petitioner municipalitys motion for reconsideration.
It thus matters little that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Benguet appears to have been duly furnished with a copy of the aforesaid
6 December 2001 resolution on December 10, 2001 or that it only informed the Office of the Solicitor General of said adverse ruling through
the 19 December 2001 missive the latter received on January 4, 2002. The rule that copies or orders and decisions served on the deputized
counsel, acting as agent or representative of the Office of the Solicitor General, are not binding until they are actually received by the latter
has little application where, as in the case at bench, said office had been duly furnished a copy of the decision in the main case which, for
reasons it alone can explain, it allowed to attain finality. Under the factual and legal milieu of the case, public respondent cannot be faulted
with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of or excess of jurisdiction for denying the 10 January 2002 Notice of Appeal filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General way beyond the reglementary period for petitioner Republic of the Philippines appeal.
Neither are we, finally, swayed by the strong grounds petitioner Republic of the Philippines purportedly has to pursue an appeal from public
respondents 30 August 2001 decision. Except on jurisdictional grounds, correction of a lower courts decision could, for one, only be done by
regular appeal within the period allowed by law. Our perusal of the grounds cited by petitioner Republic of the Philippines, for another, yielded
nothing which had not yet been raised and will once again be raised by petitioner municipality.
WHEREFORE, the petition filed by petitioner Municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet is GRANTED and the assailed 23 January 2002 order and
30 April 2002 resolution are, acoordingly, NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is entered GIVING DUE COURSE to said
petitioners appeal.
The petition filed by the Office of the Solicitor General for and in behalf of petitioner Republic of the Philippines is, however, DENIED for lack
of merit. [Emphasis supplied]
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioner claims that the OSG, as its principal counsel in the subject land registration case, is entitled to be furnished with copies of
orders, notices, and decision of the trial court, and that the date of service of such copies to the OSG is the reckoning period in counting
the timeliness of its appeal13. The petitioner contends that the OSG was not furnished with a notice of the Order [Resolution] dated
December 6, 2001 of the land registration court which denied the adverted motion for reconsideration of the municipality. The prescribed
period within which to file petitioners appeal did not commence to run and, therefore, its notice of appeal should not be treated as filed
out of time.
The petitioner prays in the alternative that issues of procedure should be set aside and its appeal should be given due course alleging again
the "strong grounds" that it has adduced against the decision of the land registration court.
In their Comment14 and Memorandum15, the respondents contend that the appellate court correctly denied the notice of appeal of the
petitioner for having been filed out of time. They stress the fact that the petitioner received the adverted decision of the trial court on
September 6, 2001 and that the petitioner filed its notice of appeal thereto only on January 11, 2002 which is way beyond the prescribed
period under the Rules of Court.
We find merit in the petition.
The relevant facts involving the procedural issues in this case are undisputed. The petitioner and the municipality received a notice of the
adverted decision of the land registration court on September 6 and 7, 2001, respectively. The municipality timely filed its motion for
reconsideration of the said judgment on September 20, 2001. The provincial prosecutor adopted this motion for reconsideration of the
municipality on October 5, 2001 which was beyond the fifteen-day period counted from receipt of the petitioner of a copy of the decision.
The land registration court denied the said motion for reconsideration of the municipality in its Resolutiondated December 6, 2001. The
OSG was not furnished with a notice of such resolution. The OSG was informed by the provincial prosecutor of such denial on January 4,
2002 when it received the Letterdated December 19, 2001 of the Provincial Prosecutor. The OSG filed the subject notice of appeal for the
petitioner only on January 11, 2002 which the land registration court denied for having been filed way beyond the fifteen-day reglementary
period to appeal which the said court reckoned from September 6, 2001. The CA affirmed the land registration courts denial of the subject
notice of appeal of the petitioner but gave due course to the appeal of the municipality.
In deciding this case, this Court is guided by the settled doctrine that the belated filing of an appeal by the State, or even its failure to file
an opposition, in a land registration case because of the mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents does not deprive the
government of its right to appeal from a judgment of the court. In DirectorofLandsv.Medina16, we said:
Considering the foregoing, the lower court gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the appeal of the government on the basis of what it
perceived as a procedural lapse. The lower court should be
reminded that the ends of substantial justice should be the paramount consideration in any litigation or proceeding. As this Court ruled in
Republicv.AssociacionBenevoladeCebu,"to dismiss the Republic's appeal merely on the alleged ground of late filing is not proper considering
the merits of the case" and to ignore the evidence presented by the provincial fiscal in behalf of the Director of Forestry which constituted
the crux of the government's case "would defeat the time-honored Constitutional precepts and the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation
of such patrimony."
In HeirsofMarinaC.Regaladov.Republic17, we ruled:
The failure of the Republic to file any opposition or answer to the application for registration, despite receipt of notice thereof, did not deprive
its right to appeal the RTC decision.
Relative to the allegation that the Director of Lands or that the government did not oppose the application of herein respondent, as in fact
on December 26, 1969 an order of general default was issued by the court against the whole world, suffice it to say that as stated by this
court in Luciano vs. Estrella, 34 SCRA 769, 'it is a well known and settled rule in our jurisdiction that the Republic, or its government, is usually
not estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents.' And, in an earlier case, Republic vs. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.,
32 SCRA 211, 'there was an enunciation of such a principle in this wise: 'Thus did the lower court, as pointed out by the then Solicitor
General, conclude that the government was bound by the mistaken interpretation arrived at by the national treasurer and the auditor
general.' It would consider estoppel as applicable. That is not the law. Estoppel does not lie. [Emphasis supplied]
Moreover, we have advised the lower courts, under exceptional circumstances, to be "cautious about not depriving of a party of the right
to appeal and that every party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause free
from the constraints of technicalities."18 In Tanenglianv.Lorenzo,etal.,19 we recognized the importance of the facts and issues involved
and gave due course to an appeal despite that it was the wrong mode of appeal and that it was even filed beyond the reglementary period
to do so, thus:
We have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules, allowing us, depending
on the circumstances, to set aside technical infirmities and give due course to the appeal. In cases where we dispense with the technicalities,
we do not mean to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. In those rare cases where we did not stringently apply the
procedural rules, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have
always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given
the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.
xxx xxx xxx
In Sebastian v. Morales, we ruled that rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when, for persuasive reasons, they may
be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure, thus:
[C]onsidering that the petitioner has presented a good cause for the proper and just determination of his case, the appellate court should
have relaxed the stringent application of technical rules of procedure and yielded to consideration of substantial justice.
The Court has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects and lapses. This is in keeping with the principle
that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and that strict and rigid application of rules which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided. It is a far better and more prudent
cause of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than
dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually
resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.
The vast tracts of land involved in this case are claimed by the petitioner to be a protected watershed area, which allegedly preserves the
main source of water of the Municipality of La Trinidad. Relative thereto, the petitioner raises substantial factual and legal issues which
should be decided on their merit instead of being summarily disposed of based on a technicality.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the appellate court is hereby
PARTIALLY MODIFIED so as to give due course to the NoticeofAppealfiled on January 11, 2002 by the petitioner from the Decisiondated
August 30, 2001 of Branch 63 of the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 93-LRC-0008.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-55152 August 19, 1986
FLORDELIZA L. VALISNO and HONORIO D. VALISNO, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE ANDRES B. PLAN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Isabela, Second Branch, and VICENCIO CAYABA, respondents.
FranciscoA.Lava,Jr.forpetitioners.
DiosdadoB.Ramirezforprivaterespondent.
FERNAN, J.:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order are two [2] orders issued by respondent judge in Land
Registration Case No. Branch 11-N-204 of the then Court of First Instance of Isabela, Second Branch, entitled, "ApplicationforRegistration
ofTitle,VicencioQ.Cayaba,Applicant,vs.FlordelizaValisnoandHonorioD.Valisno,Oppositors," the order dated July 2, 1980, dismissing
the opposition filed by petitioners on the ground of resjudicata, and the order dated September 19, 1980, denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedents are as follows:
On August 21, 1964, petitioners-spouses Flordeliza and Honorio Valisno purchased from the legal heirs of Agapita V. Blanco, namely,
Guillermo, Guillermo, Jr., Manuel and Rosario, all surnamed Blanco, two parcels of land, particularly described as follows:
[a] a tract of land situated at Sitio Sisim Barangay Cabaruan, Municipality of Cauayan, Province of Isabela, having an area of Five Thousand
(5,000) square meters or fifty (50) meters facing the Provincial Road by one hundred (100) meters long; bounded on the North by Pedro
del Rosario, on the South by Alberto Tungangui, on the East by the Provincial Road; and on the West, by Terreno del Estado, now Matias
del Rosario; and,
[c] a parcel of land situated in the Municipality of Cauayan, Province of Isabela, having an area of Six Thousand Two Hundred Fifty (6,250)
square meters or fifty (50) meters at the east side by one hundred twenty-five (125) meters at the North and South; bounded on the north
by Matias del Rosario, on the south by Alberto Tungangui, on the east by Agapita Blanco and on the west by Cauayan Diversion Road and
Matias del Rosario. [Annex "B", Petition, pp. 41-42, Rollo.]
Thereafter, petitioners declared the above-described parcels of land in their name for taxation purposes and exercised exclusive possession
thereof in the concept of owners by installing as caretaker one Fermin Lozano, who had his house built thereon.
On August 12, 1968, private respondent Vicencio Q. Cayaba, claiming to be the owner of the land in question by virtue of a deed of sale
executed in his and one Bienvenido G. Noriega's favor on June 30, 1967 by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano, ousted Fermin Lozano from
possession of the land. He subsequently erected a six-door apartment on said land.
On January 22, 1970, petitioners instituted before the then Court of First Instance of Isabela a complaint against private respondent for
recovery of possession of said parcels of land. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. Branch II-895, was in due time resolved in favor of
petitioners who were declared owners thereof. On appeal, however, by private respondent to the then Court of Appeals, the appeal being
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 60142-R, the appellate court in a decision promulgated on January 19, 1978, reversed the decision of the lower
court and dismissed the complaint of petitioners on a finding that:
Firstly, the 'land in question described in the complaint and sketched in Exhibit C ... by Dr. Guillermo Blanco,' is completely different from
the land appearing in the Subdivision Plan of the appelles appellant, their respective area and boundaries being completely dissimilar.
Clearly, we fail to see anything in the evidence of the appellees showing that their property encroaches, much less covers that of the
property presently occupied by the appellant, except the self-serving sketch prepared by the appellees' own witness, Dr. Blanco. We refuse
to give any weight to this piece of evidence because it was prepared by someone who' has an incentive to exaggerate or give false color to
his statement or to suppress or prevent the truth or to state what is false. [Deering v. Wisona Harvester Workers, 155 U.S. Sup. Ct. Rep.
238]
Therefore, as the land occupied by the appellant has not been successfully Identified with that described in the complaint, the instant action
should have been dismissed outright, in view of the provision of Article 434 of the New Civil Code which reads.
Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property must be Identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the
weakness of the defendant's claim' as well as the doctrine enunciated in a long line of decision [sic] starting from Limvs.DirectorofLands,
64 Phil. 343.
Secondly, it is undisputed that the appellant is the present occupant of the land since he purchased the same from Tomasita F. Verano on
June 30, 1967, having constructed a six-door apartment in the premises which he lets to both transients and residents of the locality. Being
the actual possessor of the property, he, therefore, possesses it with a just title and he need not show or prove why he is possessing the
same. [Arts. 433 and 541 of the New Civil Code].
Finally, between the evidence of the appellees and that of the appellant, We unhesitatingly choose the latter in the matter of Identifying
the property in question because it is a vicinity plan [Exhibit "8"] showing the position of the land in relation not only to the properties
adjoining the same but also with known boundaries and landmarks in the area. On the other hand, the appellees' evidence, particularly the
description in Tax Declaration No. 17009, is unreliable, since the area and boundaries of the property are mere estimations, reached thru
pure guess-work. [Smith Bell & Co. vs. Director of Lands, 50 Phil. 8791]. Expressing the same sentiment, one noted authority states:
The proposition that in Identifying a particular piece of land its boundaries and not the area are the main factors to be considered holds
true only when the boundaries given are sufficiently certain and the Identity of the land proved by the boundaries clearly indicates that an
erroneous statement concerning the area can be disregarded.' [Bilog, Effective Judicial Implementation of Land and Forestry Laws, Fourth
Advanced Course for Municipal Courts (1971), cit. Paterno v. Salud, L-15620, September 30, 19631. (Annex "C-l," Petition, pp. 5355, Rollo.]
A petition for review on certiorari of said decision filed by petitioners before this Court was denied due course.
Subsequently, on September 25, 1979, private respondent filed before the Court of First Instance of Isabela an application for registration
in his name of the title of the lands in question, basing his entitlement thereto on the aforementioned deed of sale as well as the decision
of the appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R, [Annex "A", Petition, pp. 32-40, Rollo).
On April 26, 1980, petitioners filed an opposition to the application. [Annex "B", Petition, p. 41, Rollo] Private respondent, however, moved
for the dismissal of said opposition on the ground that the same is barred by a prior judgment, i.e., the appellate court's decision in CA-G.R.
No. 60142-R. Despite the opposition of petitioners to said motion to dismiss, the lower court issued the first of the assailed orders dismissing
the petitioner's opposition on the ground of res judicata. [Annex "E", Petition, p. 83, Rollo] When their motion for reconsideration was
denied, petitioners filed the instant petition, raising as grounds therefor the following:
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS' OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENTS' APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF
TITLE, WHICH IS HIGHLY IRREGULAR IN LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN DISREGARDING THE PRECEDENT OF ABELLERAVS.FAROLTHAT RESJUDICATACANNOT BE SET UP
IN A LAND REGISTRATION CASE.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN HOLDING THAT THE REQUISITES FOR RES JUDICATAEXIST IN THE CASE AT BAR, ASSUMING
ARGUENDOTHAT A MOTION TO DISMISS OPPOSITION IS PROPER IN A LAND REGISTRATION CASE, AND THAT RESJUDICATAMAYBE RAISED
IN SAID MOTION TO DISMISS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN DEPRIVING PETITIONERS HEREIN OF THEIR DAY IN COURT, SPECIALLY IN THE FACE OF STRONG
INDICATIONS, ALREADY IN THE RECORD, THAT RESPONDENT CAYABA IS ACTUALLY TRYING TO SECURE TITLE TO WHAT REALLY IN THE LAND
OF THE PETITIONERS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY, WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING HIS ORDERS OF
JULY 2,1980 [ANNEX "E"] AND SEPTEMBER 19, 1980 [ANNEX "H"]. (pp. 18-19, Rollo)
On April 1, 1981, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their briefs. Petitioners did so on August 26,
1981. Private respondent, on the other hand, failed to file his brief within the given period which expired on October 9, 1981. Thus, the
case was consider submitted for decision without the brief of private respondent.
On July 8, 1985, this Court received a copy of the motion to amend application filed by Bienvenido G. Noriega, Sr., thru counsel, in LRC Case
No. Br. II-N-204, praying that he be included as co-applicant to the land sought to be registered.
In the course of our study of pertinent jurisprudence, We observe that the situation obtaining in the case at bar, i.e., a motion to dismiss
the opposition having been filed and more importantly, granted, is indeed unique and peculiar. But while this may be so, it is not highly
irregular as petitioners would characterize it.
Verily, the Land Registration Act [Act 496] does not provide for a pleading similar or corresponding to a motion to dismiss. Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, however, allows the application of the rules contained therein in land registration proceedings in a suppletory character or
whenever practicable and convenient. Thus, for the expeditious termination of the land registration case, this Court in Duran v.Oliva, 3
SCRA 154, sustained the dismissal of the application for registration of therein appellants upon a motion to dismiss filed by five [5]
oppositors, it having been indubitably shown that the court a quo did not have jurisdiction over the res as the lands sought to be registered
in appellants' name had previously been registered in the names of the oppositors. To have allowed the registration proceeding to run its
usual course would have been a mere exercise in futility. The same consideration applies to the case at bar.
It must be noted that the opposition partakes of the nature of an answer with a counterclaim. In ordinary civil cases, the counterclaim
would be considered a complaint, this time with the original defendant becoming the plaintiff. The original plaintiff, who becomes
defendant in the counterclaim may either then answer the counterclaim or be declared in default, or may file a motion to dismiss the same.
The latter choice was what respondent Cayaba opted for. Although as We have earlier said, such situation rarely, if ever, happens in land
registration cases, the irregularity that petitioners complain of stems basically from the infrequent use of a motion to dismiss in land
registration cases, and not from it being unauthorize.
The case of Abelleravs.Farol74 Phil. 284, heavily relied upon by petitioners needs re-evaluation. In said case, Mr. Justice Bocobo, speaking
for the Court, ruled that "while in a cadastral case, resjudicatais available to a claimant in order to defeat the alleged rights of another
claimant, nevertheless, prior judgment can not be set up in a motion to dismiss. " Concurring in said opinion were then Chief Justice Yulo
and Associate Justices Moran and Ozaeta. Mr. Justice Paras dissented, saying "in my opinion, Rule 132 in connection with Rule 8 of the
Rules of Court, instead of prohibiting expressly authorizes the lower court in land registration or cadastral proceedings to entertain a motion
for dismissal on the ground of resjudicataor prescription. Of course, the dismissal of petitioner's claim will not necessarily or automatically
mean adjudication of title to the individual respondents but it will certainly facilitate the consideration of their claims which cease to be
contested. Prompt disposal of cases or such claims is the main purpose of said rules. Let there be no retrogression in the application of
sound rules and doctrines." [Ibid, pp. 286-287) In support of his opinion, Justice Paras cited the cases of Menorv.Quintana, 56 Phil. 657,
Versozav.Nicolas, 29 Phil. 425 and Santiagov.Santos, 54 Phil. 619, wherein the Court invariably ruled that a "final judgment in an ordinary
civil case determining the ownership of certain land is resjudicatain a
registration case when the parties and the property are the same as in the former case. " [Menor v. Quintana,supra.]
There is no doubt that the principle of resjudicataoperates in the case at bar. For said principle to apply: [a] the former judgment must be
final, [b] it must have been' rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, [c] it must be a judgment on
the merits and [d] there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.
[Carandang v. Venturanza, 133 SCRA 344] The decision in CA-G. R. No. 60142-R is a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court which
had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. There is, between the registration case under consideration and the previous civil
action for recovery of property, identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. The inclusion of private respondent Cayaba's co-
owner, Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the application for registration does not result in a difference in parties between the two cases. One right
of a co-owner is to defend in court the interests of the co-ownership. [Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Vol. II, 7th Edition, p.
258] Thus, when private respondent Cayaba defended his ownership over the land in question, he was doing so in behalf of the co-
ownership. This is evident from the fact that one of the evidence he presented to prove ownership was the deed of sale executed by the
heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano is his and Bienvenido Noriega's favor.
With respect to the subject matter, there can be no question that the land sought to be recovered by petitioners are the very same parcels
of land being sought to be registered in Cayaba's and Noriega's names.
While the complaint in the first action is captioned for recovery of possession, the allegations and the prayer for relief therein raise the
issue of ownership. In effect, it is in the nature of an accion reinvidicatoria. The second case is for registration of title. Consequently, between
the two cases there is identity of causes of action because in accion reinvidicatoria, possession is sought on the basis of ownership and the
same is true in registration cases. Registration of title in one's name is based on ownership. In both cases, the plaintiff and the applicant
seek to exclude other persons from ownership of the land in question. The only difference is that in the former case, the exclusion is directed
against particular persons, while in the latter proceedings, the exclusion is directed against the whole world. Nonetheless, the cause of
action remains the same. In fact, this Court held in Daisv. Courtof FirstInstanceofCapiz, [51 Phil. 896] that the answers in a cadastral
proceedings partake of an action to recover title, as real rights are involved therein. It is only the form of action which is different. "But the
employment of two different forms of action, does not enable one to escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of
action shall not be twice litigated." [Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian, 42 SCRA 590 and the cases cited therein, Gonzales v. Gonzales, 26 SCRA 76;
Aguilar v. Tuason Co., 22 SCRA 690; Albano v. Coloma, 21 SCRA 411; Sumarariz v. Development Bank of the Phil., 21 SCRA 1378; Abes, et al.
v. Rodil, et al., 17 SCRA 824; Cayco, et al. v. Cruz et al., 106 Phil. 68; Ma. Garcia de Lim Toco v. Go Pay, 81 Phil. 258; San Diego v. Cardona,
et al., 70 Phil. 281].
It does not matter that the first case was decided by a court of general jurisdiction, while the second case is being heard by one of a limited
jurisdiction, such as a registration court. It is enough that the court which decided the first case on the merits had validly acquired jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties. That both courts should have equal jurisdiction is not a requisite of resjudicata.
If, as the Abellera case, supra, held that resjudicatacan be set up by a claimant to defeat the alleged right of another claimant, what useful
purpose would be served by allowing a party to present evidence of ownership over the land sought to be registered when the final result
would necessarily be in favor of the claimant who had set up the defense of resjudicata? And supposing
the land registration court finds that the party against whom the principle of resjudicataoperates does have a better right or title to the
land, what happens to the principle of resjudicata? Can a court sitting as a land registration court in effect, annul a final judgment of another
court of general jurisdiction?
To our mind, therefore, the better policy, both for practicality and convenience, is to grant the dismissal of either the application for
registration or the opposition thereto, once it has been indubitably shown, as in the case at bar, that one or the other is barred by a prior
judgment. The ruling in the Abellera case, should therefore be, as it is, hereby abandoned.
Petitioners complain that by dismissing their opposition, respondent court had denied them their day in court. It is well to remind petitioners
that they had their day in court in Civil Case No. Branch II-895 as well as CA-G.R. No. 60142-R, where their claim over the land in question
was fully aired and ventilated.
The conflicting claims of petitioners and respondent Cayaba [in behalf of the co-ownership] with respect to the land under consideration
had been put to rest in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R. Said decision having attained finality, the same remains the law of the case between the
parties.
Finding no error to have been committed by respondent judge in dismissing petitioners' opposition, such dismissal must be affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed. Cost against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.


















Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. L-62572-73 February 15, 1990
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (represented by the Director of Lands and Director of Forest Development), petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, JOSE ARQUILLO, PASTOR VALDEZ, NICOLAS MANAYAN, GERMAN MANAYAN, ROMAN MANAYAN, SANTIAGO MANAYAN, CLEMENTE
MANAYAN, SALVACION D. ARQUILLO AND COSME DAGUIO, respondents.
ArturoA.Romeroforprivaterespondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
From the consolidated decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. Nos. 56601, entitled "Jose Arquillo, et al., applicants-appellees, versus
Director of Lands, et al., oppositors-appellants", and 56602-R, entitled "Salvacion D. Arquillo, et al., applicants-appellees, versus Director of
Lands, et al., oppositors-appellants," which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (then Court of First Instance) of Ilocos Norte,
Branch 1, Laoag City ordering the registration of the parcels of land applied for in favor of herein appellants-private respondents, this appeal
by certiorari was filed in this Court on February 2, 1983.
This appeal stemmed from two (2) applications for original registration of two (2) different parcels of land situated in the barrio of Umnas,
Municipality of Vintar, Province of Ilocos Norte;
1. LRC Case No. N-125, LRC Record No. 39360: On August 14, 1970, herein private respondents Jose Arquillo, Pastor Valdez, Nicolas
Manayan, German Manayan and Clemente Manayan applied for the original registration of a parcel of land containing a total area of
972,016 square meters and more specifically and technically described and bounded according to plan Psu-169308 (Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4) as
approved by the Director of Lands on November 7, 1958 (p. 2, Record on Appeal).
2. LRCCaseNo.126,LRC Record No. 39361: On a date not appearing in the records, private respondents Salvacion D. Arquillo and Cosme
Daguio also applied for the original registration of a parcel of land containing 297,348 square meters and covering Lots 1 to 4 of Plan PSU-
169307.
The two applications were heard jointly. In both applications, the Director of Lands filed oppositions alleging that neither the applicants nor
their predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to said parcels of land; that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest
can avail of the provisions of Section 48 of the Public Land Act, it appearing that the application was filed after
December 31, 1968; and that the parcels applied for are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.
It appears that in LRC No. 126, the Director of Forestry opposed the registration of Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 of plan PSU-169307 on the ground
that certain portions thereof were within the Northern Ilocos Norte Forest Reserve declared as such by Executive Proclamation No. 338,
dated October 24, 1938, particularly a portion of 12.5801 hectares of lot 1; an area of 0.25 hectares of lot 2; and an area of 2.1159 hectares
of lot 4, (no definite portion of lot 3 was included) (p. 52, Record on Appeal). On the other hand, the Bureau of Lands claimed that said land
was intended as a Group Settlement Subdivision known as Gss366 for award to certain applicants (p. 53, Record on Appeal).
On July 8, 1971, after the jurisdictional facts had been established, the registration court issued an order of general default (p. 36, Record
on Appeal).
On October 6, 1971, the Director of Forestry in Ilocos Norte filed his answer in LRC No. 125; thru a special counsel Leandor G. Rafales. The
answer alleged that as to Lot 1 of Plan PSU-169308, a small portion thereof, consisting of 8.8786 hectares and all of Lots 2, 3 and 4, were
within forest land, the same forming part of Lot 1 of the Northern Ilocos Norte Forest Reserve declared as such per Executive Proclamation
No. 338, dated October 24, 1938 (pp. 36-37, Record on Appeal).
On December 13, 1972, the registration court rendered a decision in favor of the applicants (pp. 50-59, Record on Appeal). The dispositive
portion of the decision states:
Consequently, the Court, finding in both cases that applicants have shown their adverse, continuous, notorious possession and in the
concept of owners of the lands applied for since time immemorial, and thus their title thereto is proper to be confirmed, and is hereby
confirmed, orders that after the judgment shall have become final, a decree be issued adjudicating to:
In Land Reg. Case No. N-126, LRC Record No. N-39361: Lots 2 and 3 of Psu-169307, in the name of Salvacion D. Arquillo, married to Jose
Arquillo, Filipino, resident of Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte; and Lots 1 and 4 to Cosme Daguio, single, Filipino and resident of Pasuquin, Ilocos
Norte;
In Land Reg. Case No. N-1 25, LRC Record No. N-39360: Lot 3 of Psu-169308 to Jose Arquillo, married to Salvacion Daguio, Filipino, resident
of Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte; Lot 2 to Pastor Valdez, single, Filipino, resident of Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte Lot 4, to Nicolas Manayan, married to
Maria Alviar, Filipino, resident of Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte, and German Manayan, married to Florencia Pagaduan, Filipino, resident of
Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte; and Lot 1 to Roman Manayan, married to Rosita Agpaoa, Filipino, resident of Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte; Santiago
Manayan, married to Cresencia Bumagat, Filipino, resident of Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte; and Clemente Manayan, married to Enriqueta Maneja,
Filipino and resident of Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte.
SO ORDERED.
The trial court summarized the parties' evidence as follows:
In LRC No. N-126, LRC Case No. 39361:
The evidence discloses that the Lots 1 to 4, Psu-169307 are in the possession of the applicants Salvacion D. Arquillo and Cosme Daguio, the
tenants being Silvino Edu on Lot 1; Santiago Manayan on Lot 2 and Florencio Dalo-dalo on Lots 3 and 4; that these lots have been inherited
by the applicants who are sister and brother from their father Jose Daguio upon his death in 1935; that the applicants having discovered
that this land was not declared by their father Jose, the same was declared in 1957, when Salvacion who is the older was 22 years old, the
four (4) Lots having been declared under Tax No. 43868, Exh. K, lot 3; Tax No. 13379, Exh. J, lots 1 and 4; and Tax No. 43687, Exh. K-1, for
lot 2, and the same were subsequently declared to the present time, Exhs. M, N, O, P, Q, R and S; that also taxes had been paid since 1954,
Exhs. S, S-1 to S-8, T, T-1 to T-4; that these lots were planted, aside from rice, to mangoes, caimitos, oranges and other fruits by the
applicants and some fifty (50) heads of cattle, as shown in the pictures, Exhs. Z, Z-1, to Z-4; that applicants, together with their brother Tinio
Daguio and Carlomagno Daguio, registered their possession and claim of ownership in the office of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Norte on
October 21, 1957, Exh. U; that since the death of their father Jose in 1935 and their mother Ines in 1946, they have been in exclusive
possession of these lots peacefully, continuously and adversely and in the concept of owners.
That evidence likewise shows that these lots which comprised one lot before its survey had been in the possession of the father of Jose
Daguio named Lucio Daguio; that among the tenants during this time were Rufino Ida, Nicolas Manayan, Roman Manayan and Nenita
Manayan; that Rufino Ida who worked on the land when he was only 10 years old, being now 81 years old, and Nicolas Manayan, 66 years
old, are still tenants of the land; that also at this time rice was planted to about nine (9) hectares, mangoes and other fruit tress were
planted and two mango trees aged less than 100 years old are still existing, Exh. V-1 in lot 3 and Exh. V-2 in lot 4; that also cattle were raised
by Jose Daguio and some of which certificates of ownership dated back to 1923 and 1935, Exhs. Z, Z-1, Z-2, Z-3, and Z-4; that upon the
death of Lucio Daguio, his son Jose succeeded in the possession of the same until his death in 1935.
The Director of Forestry opposes the registration of lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 on the ground that certain portions are within the Northern Ilocos
Norte Forest Reserve by Executive Proclamation No. 338, dated October 24, 1938, particularly a portion of 12. 5801 has. of lot 1; and area
of 0.25 has. over lot 2; an area of 2.1159 has. of lot 4, which are within the forest reserve area aforesaid. The Bureau of Lands, on the other
hand, has premised its opposition on the ground that these lots have not been acquired by acquisitive title from the Spanish government
or possessory information and further the application was filed after December 31, 1968, hence, the applicants cannot avail themselves of
the provisions of section 48 of the Public Land Act. The overlapping of these claims is indicated in Exh. 3, the claim of the Bureau of Forestry
being enclosed in blue pencil covering lots 1 and 4 of Psu-169307 and portions of lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 26 of plan Gss-366, while lot 2 of
Psu-169307 overlaps lot 11 of plan Gss-366 and lot 3 of Psu-169307 overlaps lot 14 of Gss-366.
The evidence for the oppositor Bureau of Lands shows that a parcel of land comprised within the municipalities of Vintar, Burgos, and
Bangui, Ilocos Norte, was intended as a group settlement subdivision known as Gss-366, Exh. 3, X; that the parcel of land being agricultural,
applications for homestead were filed for lot 1 by one Isidro Peralta on September 8, 1965; lot 2, Irineo Gaces, on November 4, 1964; lot 3,
Paterna Albano, on September 8, 1965; lot 4, Teodoro Gervacio, on June 1, 1966; lot 5, Pablo Bautista, on October 16, 1964; lot 7, Ricarte
Bautista, on October
16, 1964; lot 8, Elmo Adam, new; lot 9, Bernardo Martinez, new; lot 10, Wilfredo Garvida, November 4, 1966, and others. It appears,
however, that the aforesaid group settlement subdivision was protested by the applicants as shown in Exh. W and which protest was
favorably considered by the Director of Lands; thus, the said plan was disapproved, Exh. Y. And furthermore, from the said disapproval, it is
indubitable that the Bureau of Lands recognizes as alienable and disposable the lands described in Psu-169307 and Psu-169308; and
likewise, by excluding the said land covered by the approved plan Psu-169307, it recognized them as '(c) Lands which have been acquired
and become private property (Exh. Y). Consequently, with this admission by the Bureau of Lands, the opposition interposed by the Bureau
of Forestry is unavailing; likewise, although the Bureau of Forestry had indeed claimed that a substantial portion of lot 1, a small portion of
lot 2 and the whole of lot 4, of plan Psu-169307, are within the Northern Ilocos Norte Forest Reserve according to Executive Proclamation
No. 338 of October 24, 1938, yet not only has the Bureau of Lands dispelled this claim as heretofore alluded to but also the evidence of
uninterrupted possession of the applicants since time immemorial had not been disproved. Furthermore, the evidence adduced by said
oppositor delineating the areas covered by the said proclamation and identifying the areas in plan Psu-169307 that are within the said
forest reserve has not been satisfactorily established. And added to this, the oppositor Bureau of Lands affirmed at the trial that a
verification of the reserved areas was jointly made by the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forestry and no area was found to be within
the forest reserve. Indeed, the executive proclamation, Exh. 8, itself provides that it shall be subject to private rights and having been issued
only on October 24, 1938, the same cannot despoil applicants' vested rights. (p. 63, Rollo; pp. 50-55, Record on Appeal)
In LRC No. N-125; Rec. No. 39361:
xxx xxx xxx
The evidence discloses that lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Plan Psu-169308 were originally owned by Mateo Manayan and passed on to his son
Anastacio Manayan who for himself had been in possession of the same for more than thirty (30) years; that his death before the war or in
1938, his heirs succeeded him, namely; Nicolas Manayan, German Manayan, Roman Manayan and Clemente Manayan; that however, the
said heirs, having received monetary contributions, labor and working animals for the development, cultivation and planting of other big
parcels of land, had ceded in 1954, but formalized the same only in 1970, Exh. U-1 to Jose Arquillo and Pastor Valdez, lots 2 and 3 of plan
Psu-169308, among others; that the entire land was planted to ace, fruit-growing trees and a big portion of grazing of cattle, Exhs. Z, Z-1 to
Z-20, V, W, X, X-1 to X-9, AA, AA-1 to AA-6; that an irrigation system was built over the area and a communal irrigators association was
established, Exh. Y and duly approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission, Exh. R; that a group settlement project was executed by
the Bureau of Lands under Gss-366, Project No. 7, Block XV, Exhs. EE & 3, on April 7-16, 1958, Exh. 4-2, but the same was protested by the
Manayans, Exh. T, and consequently was disapproved by the Director of Lands, Exh. CC, in spite of the report of Marcelo Ines, Exh. 4. Among
others, said Exh. CC states:
2. A considerable part of the total area covered by the survey are reported to be occupied and that the occupants thereof have been paying
due taxes therefor.
The foregoing appear strongly to indicate a violation of section 478, subsection (c) of the Philippine Land Surveyors Manual, to wit:
478. Extensive areas of public land classified as alienable and disposable shall be delimited and subdivided for disposal, excluding therefrom
the following:
(c) Lands which have been acquired and become private property.
For purposes of equity, the lots cited in the instances above are construed to fall in this category and should, therefore, have been excluded
from the survey, but were obviously not.
The Bureau of Lands claim that it has pending application for homestead of lots as delineated in its group settlement subdivision, Gss-366,
Exhs. Y, 1, CC, 3 & EE, which covers the lots in question, of which fifteen (15) persons filed in the year 1966, Exhs. 2, 2-1 to 2-14, although
only a few or only four (4) lots, Nos. 26,27,28 and 29, were in occupation while the rest have not occupied the same; neither have they
introduced any improvement; that lot 1 of Psu-169308 overlaps lot 17 of plan Gss-366; lots 2 and 3 of Psu-169308 overlaps lots 21, 22, 23
and 24 of Gss-366; that a party of land classification, LC for short, in 1957, consisting of ten (10) employees from the Bureau of Forestry
and Bureau of Lands, delineated the alienable and disposable portions and the areas in Exits. 1 and 3 are outside of the forest zone and are
alienable and disposable. (pp. 55-58, Record on Appeal).
On December 18, 1972, the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry filed a notice of appeal (p. 60, Rollo). On January 19, 1973,
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Florencio B. Cabanos filed a motion to lift order of general default and for new trial (p. 61, Record) which motion
was granted on February 28, 1973 and the decision in LRC No. 125 was set aside. The answer of the Bureau of Forestry was admitted and
it was allowed to present additional evidence (p. 51, Rollo).
On November 20, 1973, the trial court rendered a new decision in LRC No. 125, adjudicating the land applied for to the applicants. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads (pp. 7374, Record on Appeal):
Consequently, the Court, finding that the applicants have shown their adverse, continuous and notorious possession and in the concept of
owners of the lands applied for since time immemorial, and thus their title thereto is proper to be confirmed, and is hereby confirmed,
orders that after the judgment shall have become final, a decree be issued adjudicating to:
Lot 1 to Roman Manayan, married to Rosita Agpaoa, Filipino, resident of Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte Santiago Manayan, married to Cresencia
Bumagat, Filipino and resident of Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte and Clemente Manayan. married to Enriqueta Maneja, Filipino and resident of
Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte; Lot 2 to Pastor Valdez, single, Filipino, resident of Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte; Lot 3 to Jose Arquillo, married to Salvacion
Daguio, Filipino, resident of Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte, and Lot 4 to Nicolas Manayan, married to Maria Alviar, Filipino, resident of Pasuquin,
Ilocos Norte; and German Manayan, married to Florencia Pagaduan, Filipino, resident of Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte.
SO ORDERED.
The records of the case were elevated to the respondent Court of Appeals on November 25, 1974. On November 22, 1982, the respondent
Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the trial court's decision (pp. 50-62,Rollo). It was pointed out in the appellate court's decision
that oppositor Bureau of Forestry failed to file and perfect its appeal from the trial court's decision of November 20, 1973, hence, the
decision in LRC No. 125 has become final and executory insofar as it is concerned. The appeal treated in the appellate court was therefore
only the appeal of the Bureau of Lands in both cases and the appeal of the Bureau of Forestry in LRC N-126 (p. 52, Rollo).
Not satisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, Republic, through the office of the Solicitor General filed the instant appeal by
certiorari.
Petitioner Republic alleged that:
In rendering the questioned decision, the Court of Appeals decided questions in a manner that is not in accordance with law and the
applicable decisions of this Honorable Court. In particular, the Court of Appeals:
(a) Allowed the titling of lands which are part of a forest reservation and, therefore, inalienable as provided by law and declared repeatedly
in decisions of this Honorable Court.
(b) Allowed titling of land through confirmation of alleged imperfect title although the conditions laid down by law and the decisions of this
Honorable Court have not been complied with (p. 10-11, Rollo)
The instant appeal prays specifically that the private respondents be declared without any registrable title to the properties p subject to
their application in Land Registration Case No. 125 of the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte and that their application for original
registration be dismissed. (p. 147, Rollo).
1. It is petitioner's main contention that the evidence presented by them in the hearings conducted in the lower court positively proved
that the parcels of land in question are with the forest reserve established under Presidential Proclamation No. 338 dated October 24, 1938.
Private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the decision of the trial court in LRC No. 125 is already final and executory in view of
petitioner counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal (p. 156, Rollo).
The failure of petitioner Bureau of Forestry to file a notice of appeal with the trial court which rendered a new decision in LRC No. 125 is
not fatal. It has been the consistent pronouncement of this Court that estoppel does not lie against the Republic or its government. In the
case ofRepublicvs.Aquino,L-33983, January 27, 1983,120 SCRA 186, 191-192, the Bureau of Lands failed to file an opposition in a land
registration case and an order of general default was rendered therein. A decision decreeing registration was subsequently rendered which
the government appealed by way of a petition for review. We held therein that:
Relative to the allegation that the Director of Lands or that the government did not oppose the application of herein respondent, as in fact
on December 26, 1969 an
order of general default was issued by the court against the whole world, suffice it to say that as stated by this court in Lucianovs.Estrella,
34 SCRA 769,'it is a well-known and settled rule in our jurisdiction that the Republic, or its government is usually not estopped by mistake
or error on the part of its officials or agents.' And, in an earlier case, Republicvs.PhilippineRabbitBusLines,Inc.,32 SCRA 21 'there was an
enunciation of such a principle in this wise: 'Thus did the lower court, as pointed out by the then Solicitor General, conclude that the
government was bound by the mistaken interpretation arrived at by the national treasurer and the auditor general.' It would consider
estoppel as applicable. That is not the law. Estoppel does not lie. Such a principle dates back to AguinaldodeRomerovs.DirectorofLands,
a 1919 decision.
It is settled that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation and possession thereof, however long, cannot
convert them into private property (Republic v. CA, 154 SCRA 476 [1987]). Whether or not the land involved in a land registration case is a
forest land or forest reserve is a matter of proof. In the case at bar, petitioner's allegation that the parcels sought to be registered are within
the Northern Ilocos Norte Forest Reserve declared under Presidential Proclamation No. 338 has not been clearly established. "The case of
a party is constituted by his own affirmative allegations. Under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, each party must prove his own
affirmative allegations by the amount of evidence required by law (i.e., preponderance of evidence in civil cases, or proof beyond reasonable
doubt, in criminal cases). The party, whether plaintiff or defendants, who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of presenting
at the trial such amount of evidence required by law to obtain a favorable judgment." (Tai Tong Chuache and Co. v. Insurance Commission,
G.R. No. 55397, February 29, 1988).
The herein petitioner relies much on the report and testimony of Forest Warden Pedro Barreras to prove that some portions of the parcel
sought to be registered in LRC No. 125 are within the Northern Ilocos Norte Forest Reserve. However, on the same basis, the trial court
held and we agree on the failure of petitioner to substantiate its allegation. The trial court summarized the additional evidence presented
by oppositor Bureau of Forestry as follows:
The oppositor Bureau of Forestry claims that certain areas were reserved for forestry purposes known as the Northern Ilocos Norte Forest
Reserve indicated in a map thereof, Exh. 6, with the municipal boundaries shown therein, Burgos, Pasuquin, Bangui and Vintar as Exhs. 6-A
to 6-A-3 and the lots comprehended within the Northern Ilocos Norte Forest Reserve are lots 1, 5, 6, 8 & 10; that the technical descriptions
of the said forest reserve is Exh. 7; that the reservation was in accordance with Presidential Proclamation No. 338 dated October 24, 1938,
Exh. 8; that sometime on August 2-7, 1971, an investigation and inspection of the lots applied for was conducted by Forest Warden Pedro
Barreras and in his Report dated September 29, 1971, he said:
l. That in Lot 1, on its northern portion, 28.0 hectares more or less, enclosed in blue pencil is within the Alienable and Disposable, Block XV;
project No. 7, Bangui. On its southern portion, 8.8786 hectares more or less, enclosed in red pencil is within lot 1 of the Northern Ilocos
Norte Forest Reserve.
2. In Lot 2, the whole area falls within Lot 1 of the Northern Ilocos Norte Forest Reserve.
3. In Lot 3, the whole area also falls within Lot I of the Northern Ilocos Norte Forest Reserve.
4. In Lot 4, the whole area also falls inside Lot 1 of the Northern Ilocos Norte Forest Reserve.
(Exhs. 9 and 9-A)
In spite of this report, however, the witness testified that he knew only Lot 1.
COURT:
q. But he (Roman Manayan) was not actually in possession of the properties which you have delineated as disposable and alienable?
a. Only Lot 1, your Honor.
q. How about Lot 2?
a. I do not know the others, your Honor.
q. You know lot I only?
a. Yes, your Honor. (p. 393, t.s.11., July 30, 1973)
This same witness moreover admitted his incompetency in relating the lots applied for registration as within the Presidential Proclamation
ATTY. ROMERO:
q. You mean to say this portion you have just pointed before this Court labelled in Exh. 6 'portion applied for within the forest reserve is not
covered by the technical descriptions ii) this presidential proclamation marked Exh. 8?
a. It was not . . .
q. It is a part?
a. It is a part but maybe . . .
COURT:
You speak in Ilocano if you cannot express yourself in English.
a. It is not included here, sir. (Witness indicating Exh. 8 . . . pointing to the technical descriptions in Exh. 8)
ATTY. ROMERO:
q. So you mean to say that the technical descriptions in Exh. 8 is not complete insofar as Exh. 6 is concerned?
a. Yes. sir.
q. Why do you say that? What makes you say that the technical descriptions in Exh. 8 is not complete?
a. Because I do not know if these technical descriptions belong to lot 1, lot 2, or lot 3 or lot 4. (Witness referring to the technical descriptions
in Exh. 8)
q. So you are not now sure whether or not this portion which you have just pinpointed before the Court which is labelled as 'portion applied
for by the petitioners as within the forest reserve' is within these technical descriptions Exh. 9? You are not sure?
a. No, sir.
q. As a matter of fact, after examining these technical descriptions embodied in the presidential proclamation, as you stated you do not
know whether the portion you have just pointed out in Exh. 6 and which is labelled as the portion within the forest reserve i s covered by
the presidential proclamation as you have already stated?
a. No, sir.
COURT:
q. What do you mean by no? You mean you do not know whether the portion you have delineated and labelled 'portion applied for by the
petitioners as within the forest reserve' is covered by the technical descriptions in the presidential proclamation Exh. 8?
a. Yes, your Honor. (pp. 405-407, t.s.n., July 30, 1973) (pp. 65-69, Record on Appeal)
On the other hand, there is sufficient evidence on record which shows that the parcel of land applied for is alienable and disposable and
has been in the possession of the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial.
"If in this instance, we give judicial sanction to a private claim, let it be noted that the Government, in the long run of cases, has its remedy.
Forest reserves of public lands can be established as provided by law. When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the Government as to
a particular
piece of property collide, if the Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit
to the court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes. Great consideration, it may be
stated, should and undoubtedly will be, paid by the courts to the opinion of the technical expert who speaks with authority on forestry
matters. ButamereformaloppositiononthepartoftheAttorney-GeneralfortheDirectorofForestry,unsupportedbysatisfactoryevidence,
willnotstopthecourtsfromgivingtitletotheclaimant(Ramos v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175,186-187 (1918); Republic, et al. v. Hon. CA,
et al., G. R. L-46048, November 29, 1988; Emphasis supplied).
Finally, it was established during the trial and affirmed by respondent appellate court that the possession of the subject properties by the
applicants and their predecessors-in-interest has commenced since time immemorial while the alleged Presidential Proclamation No. 338
was issued only on October 24, 1938. Granting ingratiaargumentithat the land sought to be registered in fact lies within in Northern Ilocos
Norte Forest Reserve, private respondents' rights cannot be prejudiced. ... . While the Government has the right to class portions of public
land, the primary right of a private individual who possessed and cultivated the land in good faith much prior to such classification must be
recognized and should not be prejudiced by after-events which could not have been anticipated. Thus, we have held that the Government,
in the first instance may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered forestry land, unless private
interests have intervened before such reservation is made (Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 40 Phil. 10, 16 (1919); cited in
Republic, et al. v. Hon. CA, et al., G.R. L-46048, November 29, 1988).
ACCORDINGLY, this petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.








Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 167707 October 8, 2008
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION
VI, REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, DIRECTOR OF LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM
SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY, petitioners, vs. MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD,
and ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and in behalf of all those similarly situated, respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. G.R. No. 173775 October 8, 2008
DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by THE LANDOWNERS OF BORACAY SIMILARLY SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST, ANNEX "A"
OF THIS PETITION, petitioners, vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL
TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI, PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
OFFICER, KALIBO, AKLAN, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied lands.
There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review on certiorariof the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirming that2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-
claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for
prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 10645">[3] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay
into reserved forest and agricultural land.
The Antecedents
G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand beaches and warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier
Philippine tourist destination. The island is also home to 12,003 inhabitants4 who live in the bone-shaped islands three barangays.5
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay
Island,6 which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons.7
On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 18018 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands,
caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reservesunder the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority
(PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-829 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and
Aniceto Yap filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure
titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They
declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.10
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of
man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act
(CA) No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial
confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay
Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as "public forest," which was not available
for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code,11 as amended.
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial
confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable,
whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following facts: (1) respondents-claimants were presently in
possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and other natural growing trees;
(3) the coconut trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-
claimants declared the land they were occupying for tax purposes.12
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal: whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance
or impediment to the titling of the lands in Boracay. They
decided to forego with the trial and to submit the case for resolution upon submission of their respective memoranda.13
The RTC took judicial notice14 that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos.
5222 and 5262 filed before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.15 The titles were issued on
August 7, 1933.16
RTC and CA Dispositions
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, with a falloreading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to
the petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire title to their lands in Boracay, in accordance with the applicable laws and in the
manner prescribed therein; and to have their lands surveyed and approved by respondent Regional Technical Director of Lands as the
approved survey does not in itself constitute a title to the land.
SO ORDERED.17
The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to have their occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801
nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition.18 The Circular itself
recognized private ownership of lands.19 The trial court cited Sections 8720 and 5321 of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging
private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest reserve.22
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.23 The Republic then appealed to the CA.
On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed intotothe RTC decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING
the decision of the lower court.24
The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were
part of a forest reserve.
Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.25 Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.
G.R. No. 173775
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 106426 classifying
Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100
(628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a
fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the area
reserved for forest land protection purposes.
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,27 Wilfredo Gelito,28 and other landowners29 in Boracay filed with this Court
an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.30 They allege that the Proclamation infringed
on their "prior vested rights" over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since
time immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and building internationally renowned first class resorts
on their lots.31
Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as
neither mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first
Public Land Act.32 Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect
title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right over their occupied portions in the island.
Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island
are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts,
which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government
act in order to release the lots for disposition.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as they principally involve the same issues on the land
classification of Boracay Island.33
Issues
G.R. No. 167707
The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all
those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.34
G.R. No. 173775
Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:
I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY,
SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19,
1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF
IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705?
II.
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIPOVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY
LAND, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE?
III.
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-
REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLEUNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?
IV.
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF
PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION
1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.
V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE
APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY?35 (Underscoring supplied)
In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No.
173775) have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to secure title under other pertinent laws.
Our Ruling
RegalianDoctrineandpoweroftheexecutive
toreclassifylandsofthepublicdomain
Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill
of 190236 in relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141;37 (b) Proclamation No. 180138
issued by then President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 106439 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to
determine their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under these laws and executive acts.
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to reclassify lands of the public domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber.40 Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided
the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands, and
such other classes as may be provided by law,41 giving the government great leeway for classification.42 Then the 1987 Constitution
reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national parks.43 Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.44
Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May
22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.45 The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the 1935,
1973, and 1987 Constitutions.46
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.47Thus, all lands that have
not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.48
Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as
the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of public
lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of
what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.49
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands,
territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.50 The Regalian doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines
through the LawsoftheIndiesandtheRoyalCedulas,which laid the foundation that "all lands that were not acquired from the Government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain."51
The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the
systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims.52
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law53 partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It established
possessory information as the method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions which were set forth in said
decree.54 Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or possessory information title,55 when duly inscribed in the
Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which must
be actual, public, and adverse,56 from the date of its inscription.57 However, possessory information title had to be perfected one year
after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State.58
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded on royal concessions which took various forms, namely:
(1) titulorealor royal grant; (2) concesionespecialor special grant; (3) composicionconelestadoor adjustment title; (4) titulodecompra
or title by purchase; and (5) informacionposesoriaor possessory information title.59>
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under American rule was embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.60
By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral,
and timber or forest lands.61 The act provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute grant (freehold system)
and by lease (leasehold system).62 It also provided the definition by exclusion of "agricultural public lands."63 Interpreting the meaning of
"agricultural lands" under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapav.InsularGovernment:64
x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not
timber or mineral lands. x x x65 (Emphasis Ours)
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. The act established a
system of registration by which recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens system.66
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926, which was the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced
the homestead system and made provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public
lands. It permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of persons owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of the public
domain.67 Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10)
years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.68
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise known as the second Public Land Act. This new, more
comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave
Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title, possession and occupation en concepto dueo since time immemorial, or
since July 26, 1894, was required.69
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874 on December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended,
remains as the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral
lands,70 and privately owned lands which reverted to the State.71
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since
time immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942,72 which provided for a
simple thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD No. 1073,73 which
now provides for possession and occupation of the land applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.74
The issuance of PD No. 89275 on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings.76
Under the decree, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months
from the effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of all unregisteredlands77 shall be governed by Section
194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known as the Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to
codify the various laws relative to registration of property.78 It governs registration of lands under the Torrens system as well as
unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages.79
Apositiveactdeclaringlandasalienableanddisposableisrequired.In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time
and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,80 declassifying inalienable
public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.81 In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands
only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and classified."82
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.83 To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.84
There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or
a statute.85 The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the
required number of years is alienable and disposable.86
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court.
The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a
government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot
accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification
or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.87
AnkronandDeAldecoadidnotmakethewholeofBoracayIsland,orportionsofit,agriculturallands.Private claimants posit that Boracay was
already an agricultural land pursuant to the old cases Ankronv.GovernmentofthePhilippineIslands(1919)88 and DeAldecoav.TheInsular
Government(1909).89 These cases were decided under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. There is a statement
in these old cases that "in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is
shown."90
Private claimants reliance on Ankronand DeAldecoaismisplaced. These cases did not have the effect of converting the whole of Boracay
Island or portions of it into agricultural lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely provided the
manner through which land registration courts would classify lands of the public domain. Whether the land would be classified as timber,
mineral, or agricultural depended on proof presented in each case.
Ankronand DeAldecoawere decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no power to classify lands of the public domain
into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were
vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.91 This was the Courts ruling in HeirsoftheLate
SpousesPedroS.PalancaandSoterraneaRafolsVda.DePalancav.Republic,92 in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:
x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally released by an act of the Executive before it can be deemed
open to private ownership, citing the cases of Ramosv.DirectorofLandsandAnkronv.GovernmentofthePhilippineIslands.
x x x x
Petitioners reliance upon Ramosv.DirectorofLandsandAnkronv.Governmentis misplaced. These cases were decided under the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal
provision vesting in the Chief Executive or President of the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber
and agricultural so that the courts then were free to make corresponding
classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.93
To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then necessary to devise a presumption on land classification.
Thus evolved the dictum in Ankronthat "the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case
the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown."94
But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and DeAldecoa to an argument that all lands of the public domain had been
automatically reclassified as disposable and alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the presumption convert all lands
of the public domain into agricultural lands.
If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 would have automatically made all lands in the
Philippines, except those already classified as timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable lands. That would take these lands out of
State ownership and worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine.
The presumption in Ankronand DeAldecoaattaches only to land registration cases brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more
specifically those cases dealing with judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an applicant
for judicial or administrative conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to landowners, such as private
claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land remained
unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by the State.
In any case, the assumption in Ankronand DeAldecoawas not absolute. Land classification was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there
was proof that the land was better suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite the
presumption. In Ankron,this Court stated:
In the case of Jocsonvs.DirectorofForestry(supra), the Attorney-General admitted in effect that whether the particular land in question
belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of
itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent and present or
future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many definitions have been given for "agriculture," "forestry,"
and "mineral" lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the
proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No.
1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry
or mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by
reason of the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as agricultural today may be differently classified
tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its present or future value for one or the other
purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine
Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands
are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land
must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each
particular case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts
to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the other of said classes of l and. The
Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what porti ons of public land
shall be considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the
land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests have intervened, the Government, by virtue of the
terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the "public domain" shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral
land. (Ramosvs.DirectorofLands,39 Phil. 175; Jocsonvs.DirectorofForestry,supra)95 (Emphasis ours)
Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from the facts of each case, except those that have already
became private lands.96 Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive Department,
through the President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest.96-a
Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public domain.97
Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title in 1933,98 did not present a justiciable case for
determination by the land registration court of the propertys land classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the courts then
to resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874
in 1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having been filed by private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts
were no longer authorized to determine the propertys land classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.
We note that the RTC decision99 in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenkov.RegisterofDeedsofManila,100 which was decided in 1947
when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive with the sole power to classify lands of the public domain was already in effect. Krivenkocited the
old cases Mapa v. Insular Government,101 De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government,102 and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine
Islands.103
Krivenko,however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different issue. The pertinent issue inKrivenkowas whether residential
lots were included in the general classification of agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could acquire a residential lot. This Court
ruled that as an alien, Krivenkowas prohibited by the 1935 Constitution104 from acquiring agricultural land, which included residential lots.
Here, the issue is whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural.
Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned in Krivenkorelied on the old cases decided prior to the enactment of Act
No. 2874, including Ankronand DeAldecoa.105 As We have already stated, those cases cannot apply here, since they were decided when
the Executive did not have the authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or mineral.
PrivateclaimantscontinuedpossessionunderActNo.926doesnotcreateapresumptionthatthelandisalienable. Private claimants also
contend that their continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926106 ipso
factoconverted the island into private ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in their name.
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Colladov.CourtofAppeals.107 Collado,citing the separate opinion of now Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruzv.SecretaryofEnvironmentandNaturalResources,107-a ruled:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the
disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the
public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in
the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of town sites
and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants
in the Islands." Inshort,thePublicLandActoperatedontheassumptionthattitletopubliclandsinthePhilippineIslandsremainedinthe
government;andthatthegovernments titletopubliclandsprungfromtheTreatyofParisandothersubsequenttreatiesbetweenSpain
andtheUnitedStates.The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government and
are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands."
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private
individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.108 (Emphasis Ours)
Exceptforlandsalreadycoveredbyexistingtitles,BoracaywasanunclassifiedlandofthepublicdomainpriortoProclamationNo.1064.Such
unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705. The DENR109 and the National Mapping and Resource Information
Authority110 certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of the public domain.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705
defines a public forest as "a mass of lands of the public domain which hasnotbeenthesubjectofthepresentsystemofclassificationfor
the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not." Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including
those in Boracay Island, are ipsofactoconsidered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705 may seem to be out of touch with the present realities
in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for commercial developments. As a premier
tourist destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a forest land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach resorts on the island;111 that the island has already been
stripped of its forest cover; or that the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the islands tourism industry, do not negate
its character as public forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution112 classifying lands of the public domain into "agricultural,forest
ortimber,minerallands,andnationalparks," do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths
of trees and underbrushes.113 The discussion in HeirsofAmunateguiv.DirectorofForestry114 is particularly instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove
trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also
be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land
actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part
of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.115 (Emphasis supplied)
There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a classification of lands of the public
domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal
purposes.116 At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine thelegal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout. Hence,
even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically
converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.
PrivateclaimantscannotrelyonProclamationNo.1801asbasisforjudicialconfirmationofimperfecttitle.Theproclamationdidnotconvert
Boracayintoanagriculturalland. However, private claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978
entitles them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist zone. Private
claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay into an agricultural land. There is nothing in the law
or the Circular which made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to "private lands"117 and "areas declared
as alienable and disposable"118 does not by itself classify the entire island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not
only to private lands and areas but also to public forested lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from the PTA. All forested areas in public lands are declared forest
reserves. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely recognizes that the island can be classified by the Executive
department pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of Forest Developments
authority to declare areas in the island as alienable and disposable when it provides:
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development.
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If
President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits
of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the declaration of Boracay Island, together with other
islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA to ensure the
concentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in the development of the areas tourism potential with due regard for ecological
balance in the marine environment. Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourism and ecological purposes.
It does not address the areas alienability.119
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-four (64) other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the
Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron
Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the
designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas
mentioned would likewise be declared wide open for private disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly beyond, the intent of the
proclamation.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as alienable and opened the same to private ownership.
Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141120 provide that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who
has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands.121
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the
public domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive
Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do so.122 Absent such classification, the land remains
unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition.123
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The
Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each side of the center line of roads and trails, which are reserved for right
of way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much less unconstitutional, about the classification of
Boracay Island made by the President through Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such classification, subject to
existing vested rights.
ProclamationNo.1064doesnotviolatetheComprehensiveAgrarianReformLaw.Private claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064
violates the provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of public forests into agricultural
lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an agricultural land
without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced,
all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public
domain suitable for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral
lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental
and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain.
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar the Executive from later converting it into agricultural
land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified land of the public domain despite PD No. 705.
In HeirsoftheLateSpousesPedroS.PalancaandSoterraneaRafolsv.Republic,124 the Court stated that unclassified lands are public forests.
While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the islands are public forests, the fact that they were
unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified land
until released and rendered open to disposition.125 (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a "reclassification" of land. If the land had never been previously classified, as in
the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of the Department of
Justice126 on this point:
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section 4(a) is the word "reclassification." Wheretherehasbeenno
previousclassificationofpublicforest[referring,werepeat,tothemassofthepublicdomainwhichhasnotbeenthesubjectofthepresent
systemofclassificationforpurposesofdeterminingwhichareneededforforestpurposesandwhicharenot]intopermanentforestorforest
reservesorsomeotherforestusesundertheRevisedForestryCode,therecanbeno"reclassificationofforestlands"tospeakofwithinthe
meaningofSection4(a).
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands without a prior
law delimiting the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to those lands of the public domain, denominated as "public
forest" under the Revised Forestry Code, which have not been previously determined, or classified, as needed for forest purposes in
accordance with the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code.127
PrivateclaimantsarenotentitledtoapplyforjudicialconfirmationofimperfecttitleunderCANo.141.Neitherdotheyhavevestedrightsover
theoccupiedlandsunderthesaidlaw.There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141,
namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest under a bonafideclaim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of
the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.128
As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert portions of Boracay Island into an
agricultural land. The island remained an unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered State
property.
Private claimants bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No.
1801, must fail because of the absence of the second element of alienable and disposable land. Their entitlement to a government grant
under our present Public Land Act presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and disposable. This is clear
from the wording of the law itself.129Where the land is not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot
confer ownership or possessory rights.130
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands
which were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.
We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief that private claimants complied with the requisite period
of possession.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first element of possession. We note that the earliest of
the tax declarations in the name of private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to
convince this Court that the period of possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.
Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in possession of the island for a long time. They have invested
millions of pesos in developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession and investments give them a vested right
which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor
do these give them a right to apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. This Court is constitutionally bound to decide cases
based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for
a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued possession and considerable investment
in the island.
One Last Note
The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and
international tourism industry. The Court also notes that for a number of years, thousands of people have called the island their home.
While the Court commiserates with private claimants plight, We are bound to apply the law strictly and judiciously. This is the law and it
should prevail. Itoangbatasatitoangdapatumiral.
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and other areas
they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on their occupied alienable lands.
Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect
their possession. For another, they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by homestead131 or sales
patent,132 subject to the conditions imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from
certain requirements under the present land laws. There is one such bill133 now pending in the House of Representatives. Whether that
bill or a similar bill will become a law is for Congress to decide.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to open up the island to private ownership. This gesture
may not be sufficient to appease some sectors which view the classification of the island partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That the
island is no longer overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect its remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy
balance between progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as economic progress.
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations survival. Their promotion and protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians
and activists. These are needs that become more urgent as destruction of our environment gets prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly
observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in DirectorofForestryv.Munoz:134
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many
have written much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation, protection,
development and reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's natural resources. It is of
common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious
proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear.
Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed
away; geological erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property crops, livestock,
houses, and highways not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be written down in a lumbermans
decalogue.135
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The petition for certiorariin G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE.
2. The petition for certiorariin G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
























Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 123346 November 29, 2005
MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION, Petitioners, vs. CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 134385
ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE, INC., Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF JOSE B. DIMSON, represented by his Compulsory Heirs: His surviving
spouse, ROQUETA R. DIMSON and their children, NORMA and CELSO TIRADO, ALSON and VIRGINIA DIMSON, LINDA and CARLOS LAGMAN,
LERMA and RENE POLICAR, and ESPERANZA R. DIMSON; REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF MALABON, Respondents.
x------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 148767
STO. NINO KAPITBAHAYAN ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, vs. CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us for resolution are three petitions for review on certiorari:1
1. G.R. No. 123346
The petition in this case was filed by Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation against CLT Realty Development Corporation
assailing the Decision2 dated September 28, 1995 and Resolution dated January 8, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45255;
2. G.R. No. 134385
The petition was filed by Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc. against Jose B. Dimson (now deceased), represented by his surviving spouse
and children, and the Registry of Deeds of Malabon, challenging the Joint Decision3 dated May 30, 1997 and Resolution dated July 16, 1998
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41883 and CA-G.R. SP No. 34819; and
3. G.R. No. 148767
The petition here was filed by Sto. Nio Kapitbahayan Association, Inc. against CLT Realty Development Corporation questioning the
Decision4 of the Court of Appeals dated March 23, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 52549.
On March 6, 2002, these petitions were consolidated5 as the issue involved is the validity of the parties titles over portions of land known
as the Maysilo Estate located at Caloocan City and Malabon, Metro Manila, covered byOriginal Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 of the
Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. It is this same OCT No. 994 from which the titles of the parties were purportedly derived.
We shall state the antecedents of these cases separately considering their peculiar circumstances.
1. G.R. No. 123346
(Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation, petitioners, vs.CLT Realty Development Corporation, respondents)
On August 10, 1992, CLT Realty Development Corporation (CLT Realty) filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 129, Caloocan City a
complaint for annulment of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT), recovery of possession, and damages against Manotok Realty, Inc. and
Manotok Estate Corporation (Manotok Corporations) and the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City, docketed as Civil Case No. C-15539.
The complaint alleges interaliathat CLT Realty (plaintiff) is the registered owner of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estatelocated in Caloocan City,
covered by TCT No. T-177013 of the Registry of Deeds of said city; that this TCT was originally derived from OCT No. 994; that on December
10, 1988, CLT Realty acquired Lot 26 from its former registered owner, Estelita I. Hipolito, by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Real Estate
Mortgage; that she, in turn, purchased the same lot from Jose B. Dimson; that Manotok Corporations (defendants) illegally took possession
of 20 parcels of land (covered by 20 separate titles6) within said Lot 26 owned by CLT Realty; that based on the technical descriptions of
Manotok Corporations titles, their property overlap or embrace Lot 26 of CLT Realty; and that the titles of Manotok Corporations constitute
a cloud of doubt over the title of CLT Realty. The latter thus prays that the 20 titles of Manotok Corporations be cancelled for being void;
and that Manotok Corporations be ordered to vacate the disputed portions of Lot 26 and turn over possession thereof to CLT Realty, and
to pay damages.
In their answer with counterclaim, Manotok Corporations denied the material allegations of the complaint, alleging that Jose B. Dimsons
title (TCT No. R-15166) was irregularly issued, hence void; and that consequently, the titles of Estelita Hipolito (TCT No. R-17994) and CLT
Realty (TCT No. 177013) derived therefrom are likewise void. By way of affirmative defense, Manotok Corporations assert ownership of the
parcel of land being claimed by CLT Realty, alleging that they acquired the same from the awardees or vendees of the National Housing
Authority.
During the pre-trial conference, the trial court, upon agreement of the parties, approved the creation of a commission composed of three
commissioners tasked to resolve the conflict in their respective titles. On July 2, 1993, the trial court issued an Order7 defining the issues
to be resolved by the commissioners, thus:
"1. Whether or not the property covered by the Transfer Certificates of Title of defendants (Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok Estate
Corporation) pertain to or involved Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate presently titled in the name of the plaintiff (CLT Realty Development
Corporation); and
"2. Whether or not the property covered by the title of the plaintiff and the property covered by the titles of the defendants overlap."8
The commissioners chosen were Engr. Avelino L. San Buenaventura (nominated by CLT Realty), Engr. Teodoro I. Victorino (nominated by
Manotok Corporations), and Engr. Ernesto S. Erive (chosen by the two commissioners and the parties). Significantly, Engr. Ernesto Erive is
the Chief of the Surveys Division, Land Management Bureau, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Quezon City.9 On
July 2, 1993, the three took their oaths of office in open court.
On October 8, 1993, Ernesto Erive and Avelino San Buenaventura submitted an exhaustive Joint Final Report10(Majority Report) with the
following conclusion:
"h. Based on the foregoing, it is the conclusion of the undersigned Commissioners that defendants (Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok
Estate Corporation) titles overlap portions of plaintiffs (CLT Realty Development Corporation) title, which overlapping is due to the irregular
and questionable issuance of TCT Nos. 4211 (also of TCT No. 4210), 5261, 35486, 1368 to 1374. The inherent technical defects on TCT No.
4211 (from where defendants derive their titles) and TCT No. 4210 which were exhaustively elucidated above, point to the fact that there
was no approved subdivision of Lot 26 which served as legal basis for the regular issuance of TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211. Thus, as between
plaintiffs title, which was derived from regularly issued titles, and defendants titles, which were derived from irregularly issued titles,
plaintiffs title which pertains to the entire Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate should prevail over defendants titles."
On the other hand, Teodoro Victoriano submitted his Individual Final Report11 (Minority Report) dated October 23, 1993 with the following
findings:
"f. That viewed in the light of the foregoing considerations, there is no question that the different parcels of land which are covered by
defendants transfer certificates of title in question are parts of Lot 26 of then Maysilo Estate;
"g. That on the basis of the technical descriptions appearing on the certificates of titles of the defendants, it is ascertained that the parcels
of land covered therein overlap portions of the parcel of land which is covered by the plaintiffs certificate of title."
The trial court then scheduled the hearing of the two Reports. CLT Realty filed its objections to the Minority Report. For its part, Manotok
Corporations submitted their comment/objections to the Majority Report.
On February 8, 1994, the trial court issued an Order directing the parties to file their respective memoranda "to enable this court to adopt
wholly or partially the memorandum for either as the judgment herein, x x x."12
On April 6, 1994, Manotok Corporations submitted their Memorandum praying that the trial court approve the Minority Report and render
judgment in their favor.
CLT Realty likewise filed its Memorandum on April 15, 1994 praying that "the Majority Report be approved intoto,and that judgment be
rendered pursuant thereto."
In its Order of April 22, 1994, the trial court considered the case submitted for decision.13
On May 10, 1994, the trial court rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff (CLT Realty) and against defendants (Manotok
Corporations) as follows:
"1. Ordering the annulment and cancellation of defendants Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 4210 and 4211 of the Registry of Deeds of
Caloocan City which encroach on plaintiffs 201,288 square meters of Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate, Caloocan City;
"2. Ordering defendants to vacate said 201,288 square meters of Lot No. 26 registered in the name of plaintiff;
"3. Ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the sum of P201,288.00 annually from March 15, 1989, as reasonable
compensation for defendants occupancy and use of the 201,288 square meters involved in this case until the area is vacated;
"4. Ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs counsel (Villaraza & Cruz Law Office) the sum ofP50,000.00 as attorneys fees;
and
"5. Ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay the costs of suit.
"Defendants Counterclaim is dismissed for lack of merit.
"SO ORDERED."
The findings of fact and conclusions contained in the Majority Report, which the trial court adopted in its Decision, are quoted as follows:
"7. That the following facts were established by the undersigned Commissioners:
"a. Records show that Maysilo Estate was surveyed under Plan No. Psu-2345 on September 8 to 27, October 4 to 21 and November 17 to
18, 1991;
"b. That on the basis of the Decision rendered on December 3, 1912 by Hon. Norberto Romualdez in Land Registration Case No. 4429
pursuant to which the Decree No. 36455 was issued and the approved plan Psu-2345, the Maysilo Estate was registered under Republic
Act No. 496 and Original Certificate of Title No. 994, OCT-994, was issued by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, covering 34 parcels of land, Lots
1 to 6, 7-A, 8 to 15, 17 to 22, 23-A, 24, 25-A, 25-D and 26 to 33, all of Psu-2345.
"c. The original copy of OCT-994 in its original form although dilapidated is on file at the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City;
"d. That according to the documents submitted by the plaintiff, TCT-177013 in the name of plaintiff CLT Realty Development Corporation
specifically describes the parcel of land covered by its title as Lot 26, Maysilo Estate. TCT-177013 was a transfer from TCT-R-17994
registered in the name of Estelita Hipolito which in turn is a transfer from TCT-R-15166 registered in the name of Jose B. Dimson which also
is a transfer from OCT-994. TCT-R-17994 and TCT-R-15166 also specifically describe the parcel of land covered by the titles as Lot 26,
Maysilo Estate;
"e. That defendant Manotok Realty Inc.s properties are covered by TCT Nos. 7528, 7762, 8012, 9866, C-17272, 21107, 21485, 26405,
26406, 26407, 33904, 34255, C-35267, 41956, 53268, 55896, T-1214528, 163902 and 165119, while defendant Manotok Estate
Corporations property is covered by TCT No. T-232568, all of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City.
"f. That on the basis of the technical descriptions on the titles of defendants, the parcels of land covered thereinoverlap portions of the
parcel of land covered by plaintiffs title;
"g. That according to the documents of defendants, Lot 26 was apparently subdivided which led to the issuance of Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 4210 and 4211 which were registered on September 9, 1918 in the names of Messrs. Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio. All of
defendants titles are derived from TCT No. 4211.
"h. The original copy of OCT-994 does not contain the pages where Lot 26 and some other lots are supposedly inscribed;
"i. TCT No. 4211 was later cancelled by TCT No. 5261 in the name of Francisco J. Gonzales which was later cancelled by TCT No. 35486 in
the names of Jose Leon Gonzales, Consuelo Susana Gonzales, Juana Francisca Gonzales, Maria Clara Gonzales, Francisco Felipe Gonzales
and Concepcion Maria Gonzales;
"j. Upon examination of the original copy of OCT-994, it can be seen that the technical descriptions of the lots and the certificate itself are
entirely written in the English language. On the other hand, it was noticed that the technical descriptions on TCT Nos. 4211 (as well as TCT
No. 4210) 5261 and 35486 are inscribed in the Spanish language in these certificates;
"k. The dates of the original survey of the mother title OCT-994 (September 8-27, October 4-21 and November 17-18, 1911) are not
indicated on TCT Nos. 4211 (also on TCT No. 4210), 5261 and 35486. Rather, an entirely different date, December 22, 1917, is indicated at
the end of the Spanish technical descriptions on TCT No. 4211 (also on TCT No. 4210), 5261 and 35486;
"l. The parcel of land covered by the successive titles TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and 35486 is not identified by a lot number. There is no reference
or mention of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate in the technical description of said titles.
"m. That there is no subdivision survey plan number indicated on TCT No. 4211 (also on TCT No. 4210), 5261 and 35486 covering the
purported subdivision of Lot 26. Upon verification with the Bureau of Lands or in the Land Registration Authority, which are the official
depositories of all approved survey plans, no survey plan covering said subdivision could be found;
"n. The three (3) separate lots covered by TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211 which allegedly were the result of the subdivision of Lot 26 were not
designated or identified as Lot 26-A, Lot 26-B and Lot 26-C to conform with existing practice;
"o. That it appears that the parcel of land covered by the successive titles TCT No. 4211, then 5261 and lastly 35486 was again subdivided
under Plan Psu-21154. The alleged subdivision plan Psd-21154 had seven (7) resultant lots which are issued individuals certificates, TCT
Nos. 1368 thru 1374, six of which are in the names of each of the six children of Francisco J. Gonzales;
"p. Plan Psd-21154 appears to have been prepared on September 15, 21, 29 and October 5-6, 1946 according to the technical descriptions
appearing on TCT Nos. 1368 thru 1374;
"q. TCT Nos. 1368 thru 1374 are written in the English language and the technical descriptions of the lots covered therein indicate the
original survey of the mother title as September 8-27, October 4-21 and November 17-18, 1911 which dates are not found in the mother
title TCT No. 35486 or the antecedent titles TCT No. 5261 and 4211;
"r. It appears that these seven (7) properties covered by TCT Nos. 1368 thru 1374 were later expropriated by the Republic of the Philippines
through the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (now the National Housing Authority) after which they were consolidated and
subdivided into 77 lots under (LRC) Pcs-1828 for resale to tenants. Manotok Realty, Inc. appears to be one of the original vendees of said
lots having acquired Lot 11-B covered by TCT No. 34255. It appears that some of the tenants later sold their lots to various vendees some
of whom are the defendants, Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation;
"s. That Psd-21154, the plan which allegedly subdivided the lot covered by TCT No. 35486 (formerly covered by TCT No. 4211, then TCT No.
5261), could not be traced at the official depository of plans which is the Bureau of Lands. According to the EDPS Listings of the Records
Management Division of the Lands Management Bureau (formerly the Bureau of Lands), there is no record of the alleged plan Psd-21154.
Accordingly, said EDPS listings indicate those survey plans which were salvaged after the fire that gutted the Philippines from the Japanese
forces. It appears, however, from TCT Nos. 1368 thru 1374 that psd-21154 was done after the war on September 15, 21, 29 and October
5-6, 1946;
"t. Upon examination of the technical descriptions inscribed on TCT Nos. 1368 thru 1374, it was noticed that the tie lines deviated from the
mother lots tie point which is Bureau of Lands Location Monument No. 1, Caloocan City. Instead different location monuments of adjoining
Piedad Estate were used. The tie point used in TCT No. 1368 is B.M. 10, Piedad Estate while TCT Nos. 1369 and 1370 used B.M. No. 9, Piedad
Estate; and TCT Nos. 1371, 1372, 1373 and 1374 used B.M. No. 7, Piedad Estate. The changing of the tie points resulted in the shifting of
the position of the seven (7) lots do not fall exactly inside the boundary of the mother lot. The same is true when the lots described on the
titles of the defendants are plotted on the basis of their technical descriptions inscribed on said titles.
"8. In the light of the foregoing facts, the undersigned Commissioners have come to the following conclusions:
"a. There are inherent technical infirmities or defects on the face of TCT Nos. 4211 (also on TCT No. 4210), 5261 and 35486. The fact that
the technical descriptions in TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and 35486 are written in Spanish while those on the alleged mother title, OCT-994, were
already in English is abnormal and contrary to the usual practice in the issuance of titles. If OCT-994 is the mother title of TCT Nos. 4211,
5261 and 35486, then said titles should also be written in English because OCT-994 is already in English. It is possible that an ascendant title
be written in Spanish and the descendant title in English, the language now officially used, but the reverse is highly improbable and irregular.
"b. Also, the fact that the original survey dates of OCT-994 (September 8-27, October 4-21 and November 17-18, 1911) are not indicated
on the technical descriptions on TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and 35486 but an entirely different date, December 22, 1917, is instead indicated
likewise leads to the conclusion that TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and 35486 could not have been derived from OCT-994. It is the established
procedure to always indicate in the certificate of title, whether original or transfer certificates, the date of the original survey of the mother
title together with the succeeding date of subdivision or consolidation. Thus, the absence of the original survey dates of OCT-994 on TCT
Nos. 4211, 5261 and 35486 is the original survey date of the mother title, then OCT-994 is not the mother title of TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and
35486 not only because the original survey dates are different but because the date of original survey is always earlier than the date of the
issuance of the original title. OCT-994 was issued on May 3, 1917 and this is much ahead of the date of survey indicated on TCT Nos. 4210
and 4211 which is December 22, 1917;
"c. Granting that the date December 22, 1917 is the date of a subdivision survey leading to the issuance of TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211, there
are, however, no indications on the face of the titles themselves which show that a verified and approved subdivision of Lot 26 took place.
In subdividing a lot, the resulting parcels are always designated by the lot number of the subdivided lot followed by letters of the alphabet
starting from the letter A to designate the first resultant lot, etc., for example, if Lot 26 is subdivided into three (3) lots, these lots will be
referred to as Lot 26-A, Lot 26-N and Lot 26-C followed by a survey number such as Psd-_____ or (LRC) Psd-_____. However, the lots on
TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211 do not contain such descriptions. In fact, the parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211 are not even
described by lot number and this is again technically irregular and defective because the designation of lots by Lot Number was already a
practice at that time as exemplified by the technical descriptions of some sub-lots covered by OCT-994, i.e., 23-A, 25-A, 25-D, etc.;
"d. That TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211 which allegedly was the result of a subdivision of Lot 26 should not have been issued without a subdivision
plan approved by the Director of Lands or the Chief of the General Land Registration Office. Republic Act No. 496 which took effect on
November 6, 1902, particularly Section 58 thereof, provided that the Registry of Deeds shall not enter the transfer certificate to the grantee
until a plan of such land showing all the portions or lots into which it has been subdivided, and the technical description of each portion or
lot, have been verified and approved by the Director of Lands and as corroborated by Section 44, Paragraph 2, and that the plan has been
approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or by the Director of Lands as provided in Section fifty-eight of this Act, the
Registry of Deeds may issue new certificates of title for any lot in accordance with said subdivision plan;
"e. The absence of a lot number and survey plan number in the technical description inscribed on TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211 and the absence
of a subdivision survey plan for Lot 26 at the records of the Bureau of Lands or the Land Registration Authority leads to the conclusion that
there was no verified and approved subdivision survey plan of Lot 26 which is a compulsory requirement needed in the issuance of said
titles;
"f. Similarly, the absence of plan Psd-21154 from the files of the Bureau of Lands, the official depository of survey plans, is another indication
that the titles covered by TCT Nos. 1368 thru 1374 which were derived from TCT No. 4211 are again doubtful and questionable;
"g. Moreover, the changing of the tie points in the technical descriptions on TCT Nos. 1368 thru 1374 from that of the mother lots tie point
which is BLLM No. 1, Caloocan City to different location monuments of adjoining Piedad Estate which resulted in the shifting of the position
of the seven (7) lots in relation to the mother lot defeats the very purpose of tie points and tie lines since the accepted practice is to adopt
the mother lots tie point in order to fix the location of the parcels of land being surveyed on the earths surface."14
Manotok Corporations then interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. For its part, CLT Realty filed a motion to amend/correct the
dispositive portion of the above Decision alleging that "TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211" mentioned therein are mistakenly referred to as the titles
of Manotok Corporations; and that to conform to the body of the Decision, the correct numbers of the titles ordered to be cancelled should
be indicated. In its Order dated May 30, 1994, the trial court granted the motion, thus:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Amend/Correct Judgment dated May 23, 1994 filed by counsel for plaintiff is granted.
Accordingly, the first paragraph of the dispositive portion of the Decision of this Court dated May 10, 1994 is amended as follows:
x x x
"1. Ordering the annulment and cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7528, 7762, 8012, 9866, C-17272, 21107, 21485, 26405,
26406, 26407, 33904, 34255, C-35267, 41956, 53268, 55897, T-121428, 163902 and 165119 in the name of defendant Manotok Realty,
Inc. and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-232568 in the name of defendant Manotok Estate Corporation of the Registry of Deeds of
Caloocan City which encroach on plaintiffs 201,288 square meters of Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate, Caloocan City.
x x x.
"SO ORDERED."
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated September 28, 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 45255, affirmed the Decision of the trial court, except as
to the award of damages which was ordered deleted, thus:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the Decision dated May 10, 1994, as corrected by the
Order dated May 30, 1994, rendered by the trial court, with the modification that the award of damages in favor of plaintiff-appellee is
hereby DELETED.
"No costs.
"SO ORDERED."
Manotok Corporations motion for reconsideration was denied by the Appellate Court in its Resolution dated January 8, 1996.
Hence, the present petition of Manotok Corporations. They allege in essence that the Court of Appeals erred:
"1. In upholding the trial courts Decision which decided the case on the basis of the Commissioners Report; and
"2. In giving imprimatur to the trial courts Decision even though the latter overlooked relevant facts recited in the Minority Report of
Commissioner Victorino and in the comment of petitioners on the Majority Report of Commissioners San Buenaventura and Erive, detailing
the legal and factual basis which positively support the validity of petitioners title and ownership of the disputed parcels of land."
2. G.R. No. 134385
(Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc., petitioner, vs. Heirs of Jose B. Dimson, represented by his compulsory heirs: his surviving spouse,
Roqueta R. Dimson and their children, Norma and Celso Tirado, Alson and Virginia Dimson, Linda and Carlos Lagman, Lerma and Rene
Policar, and Esperanza R. Dimson; and Registry of Deeds of Malabon, respondents)
Records show that on December 18, 1979, Jose B. Dimson filed with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 33, Caloocan City a
complaint for recovery of possession and damages against Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc. (Araneta Institute), docketed as Civil Case
No. C-8050. Dimson alleged in his amended complaint that he is the absolute owner of a parcel of land located at Barrio Potrero, Malabon,
Metro Manila with an area of 50 hectares of the Maysilo Estate, covered by TCT No. R-15169 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City; that
he discovered that his land has been illegally occupied by Araneta Institute; that the latter has no legal and valid title to the land; and that
Araneta Institute refused to vacate the land and remove its improvements thereon despite his repeated demands.
In its answer, Araneta Institute admitted occupying the disputed land by constructing some buildings thereon and subdividing portions
thereof, claiming that it is the absolute owner
of the land by virtue of TCT No. 73715 and TCT No. 13574.16 It further alleged that Dimsons title of the subject land is void, hence, his
complaint has no cause of action.
On May 28, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision17 in favor of Dimson, thus:
"WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Jose B. Dimson and against defendant Araneta
Institute of Agriculture, ordering
"1) defendant Araneta Institute of Agriculture and all those claiming rights and authority under the said defendant Araneta, to vacate the
parcel of land covered by plaintiff Dimsons title TCT No. R-15169 of the Registry of Deeds of Metro Manila, District III, Caloocan City, with
a land area of 500,000 square meters, more or less; to remove all the improvements thereon; and to return full possession thereof to the
said plaintiff Dimson.
"2) defendant Araneta Institute of Agriculture to pay plaintiff Dimson the amount of P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees; and
"3) defendant Araneta Institute of Agriculture to pay costs.
"Defendant Aranetas counterclaim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
"All other counterclaim against plaintiff Dimson are, likewise, hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
"All claims of all the intervenors claiming rights against the title of plaintiff Dimson TCT R-15169 are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
"This is without prejudice on the part of the intervenors Heirs of Pascual David, Florentina David and Crisanta Santos to file the proper case
against the proper party/parties in the proper forum, if they so desire.
"The claim of Virgilio L. Enriquez as co-plaintiff in the instant case is dismissed for lack of merit.
"SO ORDERED."18
Araneta Institute interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 41883.
On May 30, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision affirming the Decision of the trial court in favor of Dimson.
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, in CA-G.R. CV No. 41883 (Civil Case No. C-8050 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 122, Caloocan City),
with MODIFICATION deleting the award for attorneys fees, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, with costs against defendant-
appellant. CA-G.R. SP No. 34819 is DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED for lack of merit.
"SO ORDERED."
In its Decision, the Appellate Court ruled that the title of Araneta Institute to the disputed land is a nullity, holding that:
"We now proceed to CA-G.R. CV No. 41883.
"In its first assignment of error, defendant-appellant (Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc.) contends that the trial court erred in giving more
weight to plaintiffs transfer certificate of title over the land in question notwithstanding the highly dubious circumstances in which it was
procured.
"This validity of plaintiff-appellees (Jose B. Dimson) title is actually the meat of the controversy.
"It was in the pursuit of this objective to nullify plaintiff-appellees title that CA-G.R. SP No. 34819 was belatedly filed on August 10, 1994,
long after plaintiff-appellees TCT No. R-15169 was issued on June 8, 1978.
"Unfortunately for defendant-appellant, in the light of applicable law and jurisprudence, plaintiff-appellees title must be sustained.
"Plaintiff-appellees TCT No. R-15169 covers Lot 25- A-2 with an area of 500,000 square meters. This was derived from OCT No. 994
registered on April 19, 1917. TCT No. R-15169 was obtained by plaintiff-appellee Jose B. Dimson simultaneously with other titles, viz: TCT
Nos. 15166, 15167, and 15168 by virtue of the Decision dated October 13, 1977 and Order dated October 18, 1977, in Special Proceedings
No. C-732. The Order dated October 18, 1977 directed the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City to issue in the name of Jose B. Dimson
separate transfer certificate of titles for the lot covered by plan (LRC) SWO-5268 and for the lots covered by the plans, Exhibits H, I and J.
"Upon the other hand, defendant-appellant Araneta Institute of Agricultures TCT No. 13574 was derived from TCT No. 26539, while TCT
No. 7784 (now TCT No. 21343) was derived from TCT No. 26538. TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 were both issued in the name of Jose
Rato. TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 both show Decree No. 4429 and Record No. 4429.
"Decree No. 4429 was issued by the Court of First Instance of Isabela. On the other hand, Record No. 4429 was issued for ordinary Land
Registration Case on March 31, 1911 in CLR No. 5898, Laguna (Exhs. 8, 8-A Rivera). The trial court ruled defendant-appellant Araneta
Institute of Agricultures TCT No. 13574 spurious because this title refers to a property in the Province of Isabela (RTC Decision, p. 19).
"Another point, Aranetas TCT No. 13574 (Exh. 6) and 21343 are both derived from OCT No. 994 registered onMay 3, 1917, which was
declared null and void by the Supreme Court in MetropolitanWaterworksandSewerageSystemvs.CourtofAppeals, 215 SCRA 783 (1992).
The Supreme Court ruled: Where two certificates of title purport to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails x x x. Since the land
in question has already been registered under OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, the subsequent registration of the same land on May 3,
1919 is null and void.
"In sum, the foregoing discussions unmistakably show two independent reasons why the title of defendant-appellant Araneta Institute of
Agriculture is a nullity, to wit: the factual finding that the property in Isabela, and the decision of the Supreme Court in the MWSScase."19
Araneta Institute then filed the present petition, ascribing to the Court of Appeals a long list of factual errors which may be stated
substantially as follows:
In CA-G.R. CV No. 41883
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the evidence presented by petitioner Araneta Institute clearly establish the fact
that it has the better right of possession over the subject property than respondent Jose B. Dimson.
A.) There is only one Original Certificate of Title No. 994 covering the Maysilo Estate issued on May 3, 1917pursuant to the Decree No.
36455 issued by the Court of Land Registration on April 17, 1917.
B.) Certifications of responsible government officials tasked to preserve the integrity of the Torrens System categorically confirm and certify
that there is only one OCT 994 issued on May 3, 1917.
C.) The Government in the exercise of its governmental function of preserving the integrity of the torrens system initiated a fact-finding
inquiry to determine the circumstances surrounding the issuance of OCT No. 994 and its derivative titles.
D.) The Government fact-finding committee correctly found and concluded that there is only one OCT No. 994 issued on May 3, 1917.
E.) The Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights and the Senate Committee on Urban Planning, Housing and Resettlement conducted
an Investigation and concluded that there is only one OCT 994 that was issued on May 3, 1917.
F.) The certifications issued by the government officials, notably from the Land Registration Authority, the Department of Justice Committee
Report and the Senate Committees Joint Report are all newly-discovered evidence that would warrant the holding of a new trial."20
3. G.R. No. 148767
(Sto. Nino Kapitbahayan Association, Inc., petitioner, vs.CLT Realty Development Corporation, respondent)
CLT Realty is the registered owner of a parcel of land known as Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate in Caloocan City, covered by TCT No. T-177013.21
It acquired the property on December 10, 1998 from the former registered owner Estelita I. Hipolito under TCT No. R-17994, who in turn,
acquired it from Jose B. Dimson.
On the other hand, Sto. Nio Kapitbahayan Association, Inc. (Sto. Nio Association), petitioner, is the registered owner of two parcels of
land likewise located in Caloocan City, covered by TCT Nos. T-158373 and T-158374. By virtue of these titles, Sto. Nio Association occupied
and claimed ownership over a portion of Lot 26.
Thus, on July 9, 1992, CLT Realty filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121, Caloocan City a complaint for annulment of titles22 and
recovery of possession with damages against Sto. Nio Association, docketed as Civil Case No. C-15491. In its complaint, CLT Realty alleged
that based on the technical descriptions on the titles of Sto. Nio Association, an overlapping exists between their respective titles; and
that the titles of Sto. Nio Association are void as they are derived from TCT No. 4211,23 a forged and fictitious title.
In its answer, Sto. Nio Association denied the material allegations of the complaint and asserted that its members have been in possession
of the disputed lots prior to 1987. The area had been identified by the government as slum and blighted.
At the pre-trial conference, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts, thus:
"(1) Both parties admit that the defendant (Sto. Nio Association) is presently occupying the property covered by TCT Nos. 158373 and
158374 located at Barrio Baesa, Caloocan City; and
(2) Both parties admit that the plaintiff (CLT) is also the registered owner of the same properties being occupied by the defendant and
covered by TCT No. 177013 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City."
Resolving the issue of whose title to the disputed land is valid, the trial court, on September 28, 1995, rendered a Decision in favor of Sto.
Nio Association and ordered the cancellation of TCT No. T-177013 in the name of CLT Realty.
However, upon motion for reconsideration by CLT Realty, the trial court, in its Amended Decision dated February 12, 1996, granted the
motion, rendered judgment in favor of CLT Realty, and ordered the cancellation of TCT Nos. T-158373 and T-158374, both in the name of
Sto. Nio Association, thus:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED and judgment is accordingly rendered in favor of
the plaintiff CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and against the defendant STO. NIO KAPITBAHAYAN ASSOCIATION, INC., ordering
the cancellation of TCT Nos. T-158373 and T-158374, both in the name of the defendant. The defendants counterclaim is hereby dismissed
for utter lack of merit.
"SO ORDERED."24
The Amended Decision is anchored on the trial courts finding that, based on the evidence, there was fraud in the issuance of TCT No. 4211
from which Sto. Nio Associations titles were derived. The irregularities which attended such issuance were discussed lengthily by the court
aquoas follows:
"The court finds the motion meritorious.
"The conflict stems from the fact that the plaintiffs and defendants titles overlap each other, hence, a determination of the respective
origins of such titles is of utmost importance.
"TCT No. T-177013 in the name of the plaintiff was derived from R-17994 T-89 in the name of Estelita Hipolito which title can trace its origin
from OCT 994. The boundaries of OCT 994 known as Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate are the same as that of the plaintiffs titles.
"On the other hand, TCT Nos. T-158373 and T-158374, both in the name of the defendants, are the latest in a series of titles which descend
from TCT No. 4211. A trace of the history of TCT No. 4211 reveals that it was succeeded by TCT No. 5261 which was in turn succeeded by
TCT No. 35486. TCT No. 35486 was allegedly subdivided into seven lots covered by TCT Nos. 1368 to 1374. One or two of these subdivided
lots were the predecessors of the defendants titles.
"It behooves this court to address the issue of whether or not TCT No. 4211 from which the defendants titles were originally derived can
validly trace its origin from OCT 994.
"There is pervasive evidence that TCT No. 4211 could not have been a true derivative of OCT No. 994.
"Firstly, the survey dates indicated in OCT No. 994 are September 8-27, October 8-21 and November 17-18, all in the year 1911. On the
other hand, these dates of original survey are conspicuously missing in TCT No. 4211 contrary to established procedure that the original
survey dates of the mother title should be indicated in succeeding titles. Instead, an examination of TCT No. 4211 reveals a different date
on its face. This date, December 22, 1971, could not be an original survey date because it differs from those indicated in the mother title.
Of equal importance is the fact that the date of original survey always comes earlier than the date of the issuance of the mother title. Since
OCT No. 994 was issued on April 19, 1917, it is highly irregular that the original survey was made only several months later or only on
December 22, 1917.
"Neither is the Court inclined to consider this date as the date a subdivision survey was made. The regular procedure is to identify the
subdivided lots by their respective survey or lot numbers, on the contrary, no such lot number is found in TCT No. 4211, pointing to the
inevitable conclusion that OCT No. 994 was never validly subdivided into smaller lots, of which one of them is covered by TCT No. 4211.
"Secondly, the assertion that TCT Nos. 1368 to 1374 which preceded the defendants titles were issued pursuant to subdivision plan PSD
21154 is not supported by the evidence. The Land Management Bureau which handles survey plans has no records of the said PSD 21154.
The Registry of Deeds of Rizal has a copy of the plan but the court finds such possession questionable since the Land Registration Authority
which supervises the Registry of Deeds does not have a copy of the same. The court therefore believes that the issuance of TCT Nos. 1368
to 1374 is attended by a serious irregularity which cannot be ignored as it affects the very validity of the alleged subdivisions of the land
covered by TCT No. 35486.
"Thirdly, the language of the technical descriptions of the land covered by OCT No. 994 is already in English, while its alleged derivative
titles TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and 35486 are still in Spanish. This is in direct violation of the practice that the language used in the mother title
is adopted by all its derivative titles. The reversion to Spanish in the derivative titles is highly intriguing and casts a cloud of doubt to the
genuineness of such titles.
"Fourthly, the tie points used in the mother lot were not adopted by the alleged derivative titles particularly TCT Nos. 1368 to 1374, the
immediate predecessors of the defendants titles. The pivotal role of tie points cannot be brushed aside as a change thereof could result to
the shifting of positions of the derivative lots in relation to the mother lot. Consequently, overlapping
could take place as in fact it did when the defendants titles overlapped that of CLT at the northwestern portion of the latters property.
"Fifthly, the results of laboratory analysis conducted by a Forensic Chemist of the NBI revealed that TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211 were estimated
to be fifty (50) years old as of March 1993 when the examination was conducted. Hence, the documents could have been prepared only in
1940 and not in 1918 as appearing on the face of TCT No. 4211.
"Based on the foregoing patent irregularities, the court finds the attendance of fraud in the issuance of TCT No. 4211 and all its derivative
titles which preceded the defendants titles. Evidently, TCT No. 4211 cannot be validly traced from OCT No. 994. Being void abinitio, it did
not give rise to any transmissible rights with respect to the land purportedly invalid, and resultantly, the defendants, being the holders of
the latest derivatives, cannot assert any right of ownership over the lands in question. The void abinitioland titles issued cannot ripen into
private ownership. (Republicvs.IntermediateAppellateCourt, 209 SCRA 90)
x x x
"The courts findings are consistent with a ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR No. 45255 entitled CLTRealtyDevelopmentCorp.vs.
ManotokRealty,Inc.,etal. promulgated on September 28, 1995, affirming the decision of the mother branch of this court ordering the
cancellation of TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211 which encroached on a specific area of Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate, Caloocan City. This court
is also aware that on January 8, 1996, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the defendants in the aforementioned
case for lack of merit."25 (underscoring supplied)
The above Amended Decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated May 23, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 52549, thus:
"WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the appealed Decision, We AFFIRM the same. Without pronouncement as to costs.
"SO ORDERED."26
Hence, the present petition based on the following assigned errors:
"1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING INTOTOTHE AMENDED DECISION OF THE COURT AQUO.
"2. THE JUDGMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS PREMISED ON THE MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS OF THE COURT AQUO.
"3. ASSUMING ARGUENDO, WITHOUT NECESSARILY ADMITTING THAT THE ARGUMENTS OF APPELLANT ARE UNAVAILING, THERE ARE
SUPERVENING FACTS AND EVENTS, SHOULD THIS HONORABLE COURT CONSIDER THE SAME, THAT WOULD WARRANT THE REVERSAL OF
THE CHALLENGED DECISION AND WILL IMPEL A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION."27
In sum, the three instant petitions assail the validity of: (1) TCT No. R-15169 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City in the name of Jose
B. Dimson, covering Lot 25-A-2 of the Maysilo
Estate;28 and (2) TCT No. T-177013 of the same Registry of Deeds in the name of CLT Development Corporation, covering Lot 26, also of
theMaysilo Estate.29
In the meantime, petitioners Manotok filed with this Court two separate Manifestations stating that a (1) Report of the Fact-Finding
Committee dated August 28, 1997 composed of the Department of Justice (DOJ), Land Registration Authority and the Office of the Solicitor
General, and (2) Senate Committee Report No. 1031 dated May 25, 1998 were issued by the DOJ and the Senate. Both reports conclude
that there is only one OCT No. 994issued, transcribed and registered on May 3, 1917.
The respondents in these cases vehemently opposed the said Manifestations alleging, among others, that the same are "nothing but a
crude attempt to circumvent and ignore time-honored judicial procedures and sabotage the orderly administration of justice by using
alleged findings in the alleged reports prepared by the DOJ and the Senate Committee that were never presented before the trial courts to
obtain a reversal of the questioned Decisions. At the very least, said procedure is highly irregular, improper and contrary to the dictates of
due process."30
Summary of the Contentions of the Parties
I. G.R. No. 123346
Petitioners Manotok Corporations mainly contend that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the lower courts Decision which was
rendered without conducting trial for the reception of evidence. It merely relied on the technical report of the commissioners appointed
by the court based on the parties nomination. They (petitioners) were thus denied due process as they were not able to present evidence
in a full-blown trial.
Respondent CLT Realty, on the other hand, maintains that the factual findings of the commissioners are supported by evidence. The
contending parties were accorded due process because they submitted their respective evidence to the commissioners in the course of the
proceedings. The same evidence became the basis of their Majority and Minority Reports. The two Reports were later heard and passed
upon by the trial court.
Respondent CLT Realty adds that the Decision of the trial court, upheld by the Court of Appeals, complies with the requirement of Section
14, Article VIII of the Constitution since it clearly and distinctly expresses the facts and the law upon which it is based.
II. G.R. 134385
Petitioner Araneta Institute basically submits that the case of MWSS vs. CA31 cited in the Decision dated May 30, 1997 of the Court of
Appeals is inapplicable to the present case. In that case, it upheld TCT No. 15167 of Dimson derived from OCT 994 issued and registered
earlier, or on April 19, 1917. Whereas, the MWSS title was derived from OCT 994 issued and registered later, or on May 3, 1917. The
Appellate Court erred when it relied on MWSSvs.CA.32
On the other hand, respondents heirs of Dimson counter that the validity of Dimsons title, TCT No. 15167, has been upheld by this Court
in MWSScase.
III. G.R. No. 148767
Like petitioner Araneta Institute in G.R. No. 134385 and petitioners Manotok Corporations in G.R. No. 123346, petitioner Sto. Nio
Association contends that there are supervening facts and events that transpired after the trial court rendered its Amended Decision that
if considered will result in a different conclusion. These are the two Reports of the DOJ and Senate Fact-Finding Committees that there is
only one OCT No. 994 issued on May 3, 1917. Thus, with a new trial, and with the presentation of these Reports as evidence, it could be
shown that the titles of Jose Dimson and CLT Realty are void.
Ruling of the Court
The present petitions must fail.
At the outset, it bears stressing that under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, our jurisdiction over cases brought to
us from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and correcting errors of lawcommitted by said court. The Supreme Court is not a trier
of facts. Thus, it is not our function to review factualissues and examine, evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented
by the parties.33 We are not bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below.34
Here, the paramount question being raised in the three petitions is whether TCT No. 15169 issued in the name of Jose B. Dimson and TCT
No. 177013 issued in the name of CLT are valid. Undoubtedly, such issue is a purequestion of fact a matter beyond our power to determine.
Where, as here, the findings of fact of the trial courts are affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the same are accorded the highest degree of
respect and, generally, will not be disturbed on appeal. Such findings are binding and conclusive on this Court.35
Be that as it may, to reinforce our conclusion, we shall still proceed to discuss why the present petitions have no merit.
As regards G.R. No. 123346 (Manotok Corporations vs. CLT Realty, involving Lot 26), the trial court acted properly when it adopted the
Majority Report of the commissioners as part and parcel of its Decision. That is allowed in Section 11, Rule 32 of the Revised Rules of Court
(now the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended), quoted below:
"SEC. 11. Hearinguponreport. Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred to in the preceding section, the report shall be
set for hearing, after which the court shall render judgment by adopting, modifying, or rejecting the report in whole or in part or it may
receive further evidence or may recommit it with instructions." (underscoring supplied)
The case of overlapping of titles necessitates the assistance of experts in the field of geodetic engineering. The very reason why
commissioners were appointed by the trial court, upon agreement of the parties, was precisely to make an evaluation and analysis of the
titles in conflict with each other. Given their background, expertise and experience, these commissioners are in a better position to
determine which of the titles is valid. Thus, the trial court may rely on their findings and conclusions.
It bears stressing that the parties opted to submit the case for decision on the bases, among others, of their respective objections/comments
on the commissioners reports.
Thus, petitioners Manotok Corporations, under the doctrine of estoppel, cannot now be permitted to assail the Decision of the trial court
which turned out to be adverse to them and insist that it should have conducted further reception of evidence before rendering its
judgment on the case.
We note further that while petitioners assail the trial courts Decision as being premature, however, they also assert that the said court
should have adopted the Minority Report which is favorable to them. Certainly, we cannot countenance their act of adopting inconsistent
postures as this is a mockery of justice.
We noted in the beginning of this Decision that the issue in all these three (3) cases involves the validity of the parties overlapping titles.
The titles of the respondents in these cases were derived from OCT No. 994 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City registered on April
19, 1917. The validity of such mother title has already been upheld by this Court in G.R. No. 103558, MWSSvs.CourtofAppeals,etal.dated
November 17, 199236earlier cited in the assailed Decisions. Significantly, the ruling in MWSSwas reiterated in G.R. No. 96259, HeirsofLuis
J.Gonzagavs.CourtofAppealsdated September 3, 1996.37
We cannot delve anymore into the correctness of the Decision of this Court in MWSS. The said Decision, confirming the validity of OCT No.
994 issued on April 19, 1917 from which the titles of the respondents in the cases at bar were derived, has long become final and executory.
Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified
in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless
of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land.38
The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice, and that, at the risk of
occasional errors, the judgments or orders of courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law; otherwise, there would be no
end to litigations, thus setting to naught the main role of courts of justice which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the
maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality.39
Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party likewise has the correlative right to
enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case. We held that "a final judgment vests in the prevailing party a right recognized and protected
by law under the due process clause of the Constitution. . . . A final judgment is a vested interest which it is right and equitable that the
government should recognize and protect, and of which the individual could not be deprived arbitrarily without injustice."40 In the present
cases, the winning parties, respondents herein, must not be deprived of the fruits of a final verdict.
Finally, we cannot consider the alleged newly-discovered evidence consisting of the DOJ and Senate Fact-Finding Committee Reports
invoked by petitioners herein. Certainly, such committee reports cannot override the Decisions of the trial courts and the Court of Appeals
upholding the validity of respondents titles in these cases. The said Decisions were rendered after the opposing parties have been accorded
due process. It bears stressing that the courts have the constitutional duty to adjudicate legal disputes properly brought before them. The
DOJ and Senate, or any other agencies of the Government for that matter, have clearly distinguishable roles from that of the Judiciary. Just
as overlapping of titles of lands is abhorred, so is the overlapping of findings of facts among the different branches and agencies of the
Government. This we unmistakably stressed in Agan,Jr.,etal.vs.PhilippineInternationalAirTerminalsCo.,Inc.,etal,41 thus:
"Finally, the respondent Congressmen assert that at least two (2) committee reports by the House of Representatives found the PIATCO
contracts valid and contend that this Court, by taking cognizance of the cases at bar, reviewed an action of a co-equal body. They insist that
the Court must respect the findings of the said committees of the House of Representatives. With due respect, we cannot subscribe to their
submission.There is a fundamental difference between a case in court and an investigation of a congressional committee. The purpose of
a judicial proceeding is to
settle the dispute in controversy by adjudicating the legal rights and obligations of the parties to the case. On the other hand, a congressional
investigation is conducted in aid of legislation (Arnaultvs.Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950). Its aim is to assist and recommend to
the legislature a possible action that the body may take with regard to a particular issue, specifically as to whether or not to enact a new
law or amend an existing one. Consequently, this Court cannot treat the findings in a congressional committee report as binding because
the facts elicited in congressional hearings are not subject to the rigors of the Rules of Court on admissibility of evidence. The Court in
assuming jurisdiction over the petitions at bar simply performed its constitutional duty as the arbiter of legal disputes properly brought
before it, especially in this instance when public interest requires nothing less." (Underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED and the assailed Decisions and Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in
toto. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.