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JURISDICTION

1. G.R. No. 167702
LOURDES L. ERISTINGCOL, Petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RANDOLPH C. LIMJOCO, Respondents.
NATURE: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which assails
the Court of Appeals RTC for lack of jurisdiction.
FACTS: Petitioner Eristingcol is an owner of a residential lot in Urdaneta Village. On the other hand,
respondents Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre are members of the board of Urdaneta Village Association
Inc. (UVAI), which is an association of homeowners at Urdaneta Village.
UVAI through respondents imposed a penalty upon the petitioner amounting to P400,000.00 and
barred her workers and contractors from entering the village and working on her property for
constructing a house on her lot with "concrete canopy directly above the main door and highway"
which is in violation of the Construction Rules and Regulations.
Petitioner Eristingcols filed an action against the respondents on the allegations that petitioner has
complied with the National Building Code and UVAIs approved of her building plans and acceptance
of the construction bond and architects fee. Stating further that the Construction Rules and
Regulations is contrary to law and that the penalty is unwarranted and excessive.
A day after the filing of the complaint, the parties reached a temporary settlement whereby UVAI
through respondents executed an undertaking which allowed Eristingcols workers, contractors and
suppliers to leave and enter the village, subject only to normal security regulations of UVAI.
Later on, UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre filed a motion to dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action. They argued that it is the Home Insurance Guaranty
Corporation which has jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes involving homeowners
associations.
Opposing the motion, Eristingcol alleged, UVAI are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
RTC after they voluntarily appeared therein and embraced its authority by agreeing to sign an
Undertaking.
RTC then now rendered a decision denying both motions filed and stating that UVAI through
respondents may not assail its jurisdiction after they voluntarily entered their appearance, sought
reliefs therein, and embraced its authority by agreeing to sign an undertaking. In so ruling, it applied
the doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.
UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre elevated the dispute before CA via a petition for certiorari alleging
that the RTC acted without jurisdiction.
The CA issued a decision reversing the RTC Order and dismissing Eristingcols complaint for lack of
jurisdiction.
Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Which court has jurisdiction over the case.
WON respondents are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC after they voluntarily
appeared and agreeing to sign an Undertaking.
HELD:
On the first issue, it is well-settled in jurisprudence is the rule that in determining which body has
jurisdiction over a case, we should consider not only the status or relationship of the parties, but
also the nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy. To determine the nature of an
action and which court has jurisdiction, courts must look at the averments of the complaint or
petition and the essence of the relief prayed for.
A scrutiny of the allegations contained in Eristingcols complaint reveals that the nature of the
question subject of this controversy only delves into the validity of UVAIs Construction Rules. The
complaint actually goes into the proper interpretation and application of UVAIs by-laws, specifically
its construction rules.
Therefore, the HIGC assuming the SECs original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
involving controversies arising from intra-corporate or partnership relation but with advent of
Republic Act No. 8763, the foregoing powers and responsibilities vested in the HIGC, with respect to
homeowners associations, were transferred to the HLURB.
On the second issue, UVAI are not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction and is different from
the case of Tijam VS Sibonghanoy. As found by the CA, respondents appearance before the RTC was
pursuant to a subpoena issued by that court in connection with Eristingcols application for a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). The landmark case of Tijam is, in fact, only an exception to the
general rule that an objection to the courts jurisdiction over a case may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, as the lack of jurisdiction affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of a
case. In the case at bar, fifteen days after UVAI and Eristingcol entered into a temporary
undertaking, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss. Certainly, this successive and continuous chain
of events cannot be characterized as laches as would bar defendants from questioning the RTCs
jurisdiction.

2.G.R. No. 131282
GABRIELL. DUERO, petitioner,
vs. HON.COURT OF APPEALS, and BERNARDO A. ERADEL, respondents.

NATURE: The action of the case is for the recovery of possession or title to the property.
FACTS: Respondent Eradel entered and occupied the lot of petitioner. Despite petitioners demands,
respondent Eradel refused to vacate the lands. Petitioner Duero then filed before the RTC a
complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership with damages and attorneys fees against
Eradel and two others respondent namely Apolinario and Inocencio Ruena. The Ruenas asked for an
extension of time to file an answer. Meanwhile, the Ruenas and the petitioner came to a compromise
agreement to the effect that the Ruenas recognized and bound themselves to respect the ownership
and possession of Petitioner. Eradel, however, was not part of the agreement and was declared in
default for failure to file his answer. An ex-parte judgment by the RTC was rendered in favor of the
petitioner Duero.
Respondent Eradel then filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that he has been occupying the land as
a tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr., since 1958 explaining that he turned over the complaint and
summons to Laurente in the belief that as landlord, the latter had a better right to the land and was
responsible to defend any adverse claim on it. However, the trial court denied the motion.
Respondernt Eradel filed a Motion for Relief of Judgment reiterating the allegations in his Motion for
New Trial which was then again denied. A Motion for Reconsideration was then filed by Eradel
alleging that RTC has no jurisdiction since the value of the land was only P5,240 and therefore it was
under the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. The RTC, for the third time, denied the motion.

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Execution which was granted by the RTC while Eradel
filed his petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.

Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition, maintaining that private respondent is not
estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC.

ISSUE
Petitioner appeals stating that the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion on the issue on:

a) WON THE LOWER COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE
CASE
b) WON RESPONDENT ERADEL IS ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF THE
LOWER COURT EVEN AFTER IT SUCCESSFULLY SOUGHT AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF.
HELD:
On the first issue, the MTC has jurisdiction over the case. Petitioner annexed documents and stated
that the said the zonal value at the time the complaint was filed before the RTC at P57,113.98, hence
beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal court and within the jurisdiction of the regional trial court.
However, the SC finds that the annexes are xerox copies and therefore without evidentiary weight
or value.

Recalling that Petitioner who filed the complaint against private respondent believing
that the RTC had jurisdiction over his complaint. But by then, Republic Act 7691, amending BP 129
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had become effective, such that jurisdiction already belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC pursuant
to said amendment.

On the second issue, Eradel was not estopped. Defendant is a farmer and as such, he could not be
expected to know the nuances of jurisdiction and related issues. This farmer, ought not to be
penalized when he claims that he made an honest mistake when he initially submitted his motions
before the RTC, before he realized that the controversy was outside the RTC's cognizance but within
the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. To hold him in estoppel as the RTC did would amount to
foreclosing his avenue to obtain a proper resolution of his case.

For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and intentional because, if
misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of injustice.

The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived by
the parties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by their express consent. Further, a
party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and
even on appeal. The appellate court reiterated the doctrine that estoppel must be applied only in
exceptional cases, as its misapplication could result in a miscarriage of justice.

Here, we find that petitioner, who claims ownership of a parcel of land, filed his complaint before a
court without appropriate jurisdiction. Any judgment made by a court without jurisdiction is VOID
and without effect.
3. SPS. RENE GONZAGA and LERIO GONZAGA vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Second
Division, Manila, HON. QUIRICO G. DEFENSOR, Judge, RTC, Branch 36, Sixth Judicial
Region, Iloilo City, and LUCKY HOMES, INC., represented by WILSON JESENA, JR..(G.R. No.
144025. December 27, 2002)
Corona, J.:
FACTS: The records disclose that, sometime in 1970, petitioner-spouses purchased a parcel of
land from private respondent Lucky Homes, Inc., situated in Iloilo and containing an area of
240 square meters. Said lot was specifically denominated as Lot No. 19 under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 28254 and was mortgaged to the Social Security System (SSS) as
security for their housing loan. Petitioners then started the construction of their house, not on
Lot No. 19 but on Lot No. 18, as private respondent mistakenly identified Lot No. 18 as Lot No.
19. Upon realizing its error, private respondent, through its general manager, informed
petitioners of such mistake but the latter offered to buy Lot No. 18 in order to widen their
premises. Thus, petitioners continued with the construction of their house. However,
petitioners defaulted in the payment of their housing loan from SSS. Consequently, Lot No. 19
was foreclosed by SSS and petitioners certificate of title was cancelled and a new one was
issued in the name of SSS. After Lot No. 19 was foreclosed, petitioners offered to swap Lot Nos.
18 and 19 and demanded from private respondent that their contract of sale be reformed and
another deed of sale be executed with respect to Lot No. 18, considering that their house was
built therein. However, private respondent refused. This prompted petitioners to file, on June
13, 1996, an action for reformation of contract and damages with the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City, Branch 36, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 17115.
On January 15, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint for lack of
merit and ordering herein petitioners to pay private respondent the amount of P10,000 as
moral damages and another P10,000 as attorneys fees.
On June 22, 1998, a writ of execution was issued by the trial court. Thus, on September 17,
1998, petitioners filed an urgent motion to recall writ of execution, alleging that the court a
quo had no jurisdiction to try the case as it was vested in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB) pursuant to PD 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective
Decree). Conformably, petitioners filed a new complaint against private respondent with the
HLURB. Likewise, on June 30, 1999, petitioner-spouses filed before the Court of Appeals a
petition for annulment of judgment, premised on the ground that the trial court had no
jurisdiction to try and decide Civil Case No. 17115.
In a decision rendered on December 29, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied the petition
for annulment of judgment, relying mainly on the jurisprudential doctrine of estoppel as laid
down in the case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition by applying the principle
of estoppel, even if the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36 of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to
decide Civil Case No. 17115.
HELD:At the outset, it should be stressed that petitioners are seeking from us the annulment of
a trial court judgment based on lack of jurisdiction. Because it is not an appeal, the correctness
of the judgment is not in issue here. Accordingly, there is no need to delve into the propriety of
the decision rendered by the trial court.
Petitioners claim that the recent decisions of this Court have already abandoned the doctrine
laid down in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy. We do not agree. In countless decisions, this Court has
consistently held that, while an order or decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity
and may be assailed at any stage, active participation in the proceedings in the court which
rendered the order or decision will bar such party from attacking its jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, it was petitioners themselves who invoked the jurisdiction of the court a quo
by instituting an action for reformation of contract against private respondents. It appears
that, in the proceedings before the trial court, petitioners vigorously asserted their cause from
start to finish. Not even once did petitioners ever raise the issue of the courts jurisdiction
during the entire proceedings which lasted for two years. It was only after the trial court
rendered its decision and issued a writ of execution against them in 1998 did petitioners first
raise the issue of jurisdiction and it was only because said decision was unfavorable to them.
Petitioners thus effectively waived their right to question the courts jurisdiction over the case
they themselves filed.
Petitioners should bear the consequence of their act. They cannot be allowed to profit from
their omission to the damage and prejudice of the private respondent. This Court frowns upon
the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the
judgment but only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction if not.
4. ARNEL ESCOBAL, petitioner, vs. HON. FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, Presiding Justice of
the Sandiganbayan, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez, Executive Clerk of Court IV of the
Sandiganbayan, Hon. David C. Naval, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Naga
City, Branch 21, Luz N. Nueca, respondents.
(G.R. No. 124644. February 5, 2004)
Callejo, Sr. J.:
FACTS: The petitioner is a graduate of the Philippine Military Academy, a member of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine Constabulary, as well as the Intelligence Group of
the Philippine National Police. On March 16, 1990, the petitioner was conducting surveillance
operations on drug trafficking at the Sa Harong Caf Bar and Restaurant located along Barlin St.,
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Naga City. He somehow got involved in a shooting incident, resulting in the death of one Rodney
Rafael N. Nueca. On February 6, 1991, an amended Information was filed with the RTC of Naga
City, Branch 21, docketed as Criminal Case No. 90-3184 charging the petitioner and a certain
Natividad Bombita, Jr. alias Jun Bombita with murder.
On March 19, 1991, the RTC issued an Order preventively suspending the petitioner from the
service under Presidential Decree No. 971, as amended by P.D. No. 1847. When apprised of the
said order, the General Headquarters of the PNP issued on October 6, 1992 Special Order No. 91,
preventively suspending the petitioner from the service until the case was terminated.
When arraigned on April 9, 1991, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged. Thereafter, on December 23, 1991, the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the
Information alleging that as mandated by Commonwealth Act No. 408, in relation to Section 1,
Presidential Decree No. 1822 and Section 95 of R.A. No. 6975, the court martial, not the RTC, had
jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP members and officers.
Pending the resolution of the motion, the petitioner on June 25, 1993 requested the Chief of the
PNP for his reinstatement. He alleged that under R.A. No. 6975, his suspension should last for
only 90 days, and, having served the same, he should now be reinstated. On September 23,
1993, the PNP Region V Headquarters wrote Judge David C. Naval requesting information on
whether he issued an order lifting the petitioners suspension. The RTC did not reply. Thus, on
February 22, 1994, the petitioner filed a motion in the RTC for the lifting of the order of
suspension. He alleged that he had served the 90-day preventive suspension and pleaded for
compassionate justice. The RTC denied the motion on March 9, 1994. Trial thereafter
proceeded, and the prosecution rested its case. The petitioner commenced the presentation of
his evidence. On July 20, 1994, he filed a Motion to Dismiss the case. Citing Republic of the
Philippines v. Asuncion, et al., he argued that since he committed the crime in the performance
of his duties, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case. On October 28, 1994,
the RTC issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss. On July 31, 1995, the trial court issued
an Order declaring that the petitioner committed the crime charged while not in the
performance of his official function. On November 24, 1995, the RTC made a volte face and
issued an Order reversing and setting aside its July 31, 1995 Order. It declared that based on the
petitioners evidence, he was on official mission when the shooting occurred. It concluded that
the prosecution failed to adduce controverting evidence thereto. It likewise considered Luz
Nacario Nuecas admission in her complaint before the PLEB that the petitioner was on official
mission when the shooting happened.
The RTC ordered the public prosecutor to file a Re-Amended Information and to allege that the
offense charged was committed by the petitioner in the performance of his duties/functions or
in relation to his office; and, conformably to R.A. No. 7975, to thereafter transmit the same, as
well as the complete records with the stenographic notes, to the Sandiganbayan.
On January 8, 1996, the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan ordered the Executive Clerk of
Court IV, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez, to return the records of Criminal Case No. 90-3184 to the
court of origin, RTC of Naga City, Branch 21. It reasoned that under P.D. No. 1606, as amended
by R.A. No. 7975, the RTC retained jurisdiction over the case, considering that the petitioner had
a salary grade of 23. Furthermore, the prosecution had already rested its case and the
petitioner had commenced presenting his evidence in the RTC; following the rule on continuity
of jurisdiction, the latter court should continue with the case and render judgment therein after
trial.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of
his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the remand of the case to
the RTC.
HELD:
The respondent Presiding Justice acted in accordance with law and the rulings of this Court
when he ordered the remand of the case to the RTC, the court of origin. The jurisdiction of the
court over criminal cases is determined by the allegations in the Information or the Complaint
and the statute in effect at the time of the commencement of the action, unless such statute
provides for a retroactive application thereof. The jurisdictional requirements must be alleged
in the Information. Such jurisdiction of the court acquired at the inception of the case continues
until the case is terminated.
Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan had
exclusive jurisdiction in all cases involving the following:
(1 Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(2 Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their
office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple
or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00 .
However, for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over
crimes committed by public officers in relation to their office, it is essential that the facts
showing the intimate relation between the office of the offender and the discharge of official
duties must be alleged in the Information. It is not enough to merely allege in the Information
that the crime charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office because that
would be a conclusion of law. The amended Information filed with the RTC against the
petitioner does not contain any allegation showing the intimate relation between his office and
the discharge of his duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over the offense charged when on
November 24, 1995, it ordered the re-amendment of the Information to include therein an
allegation that the petitioner committed the crime in relation to office. The trial court erred
when it ordered the elevation of the records to the Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that R.A.
No. 7975 amending P.D. No. 1606 was already in effect and under Section 2 of the law.
Under the law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his office but
occupies a position corresponding to a salary grade below 27, the proper Regional Trial Court
or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In
this case, the petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade 23. He was charged
with homicide punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over
the crime charged conformably to Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended
by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.
The petitioners contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively has no legal
basis. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 is a substantive procedural law which may be applied
retroactively.




5. ASIAS EMERGING DRAGON VS DOTC GR 169914
18 April 2008
FACTS:
Banking on this Court's declaration in the case of Agan that the award of the NAIA IPT III Project to
PIATCO is null and void, Asia's Emerging Dragon Corporation (AEDC) filed before this Court the
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present Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition (with Application for Temporary Restraining
Order), praying of this Court that:
It prayed that judgment be rendered commanding the Respondents, their officers, agents,
successors, representatives or persons or entities acting on their behalf, to formally award the
NAIA-APT [sic] III PROJECT to Petitioner AEDC and to execute and formalize with Petitioner AEDC
the approved Draft Concession Agreement embodying the agreed terms and conditions for the
operation of the NAIA-IPT III Project and directing Respondents to cease and desist from awarding
the NAIA-IPT Project to third parties or negotiating into any concession contract with third parties.
Accordingly, pending resolution on the merits, a Temporary Restraining Order be issued enjoining
Respondents, their officers, agents, successors or representatives or persons or entities acting on
their behalf from negotiating, re-bidding, awarding or otherwise entering into any concession
contract with PIATCO and other third parties for the operation of the NAIA-IPT III Project.
ISSUE:
WON the petition of AEDC is already barred by res judicata
HELD:
In the case of Agan, it was noted that on 16 April 1997, the AEDC instituted before the RTC of Pasig
City Civil Case No. 66213, a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of the Proceedings, Mandamus and
Injunction, against the DOTC Secretary and the PBAC Chairman and members.
Despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 66213, the DOTC issued the notice of award for the NAIA IPT
III Project to PIATCO on 9 July 1997. The DOTC and PIATCO also executed on 12 July 1997 the 1997
Concession Agreement.
AEDC then alleges that on September 3, 1998, then Pres. Joseph Ejercito Estrada convened a
meeting with the members of the Board of Petitioner AEDC to convey his "desire" for the dismissal
of the mandamus case filed by Petition AEDC and in fact urged AEDC to immediately withdraw said
case.
Further, it alleges that the President's direct intervention in the disposition of this mandamus case
was a clear imposition that Petitioner AEDC had not choice but to accept. To do otherwise was to
take a confrontational stance against the most powerful man in the country then under the risk of
catching his ire, which could have led to untold consequences upon the business interests of the
stakeholders in AEDC. Thus, Petitioner AEDC was constrained to agree to the signing of a Joint
Motion to Dismiss and to the filing of the same in court.

On 30 April 1999, the RTC of Pasig City issued an Order dismissing with prejudice Civil Case No.
66213 upon the execution by the parties of a Joint Motion to Dismiss.
AEDC, however, invokes the purported pressure exerted upon it by then President Joseph E.
Estrada, the alleged fraud committed by the DOTC, and paragraph 2 in the afore-quoted Joint Motion
to Dismiss to justify the non-application of the doctrine of res judicata to its present Petition.
The elements of res judicata, in its concept as a bar by former judgment, are as follows: (1) the
former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it
was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the
trial of the case; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of
parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. All of the elements are present herein so as to bar
the present Petition.
First, the Order of the RTC of Pasig City, dismissing Civil Case No. 66213, was issued on 30 April
1999. The Joint Motion to Dismiss, deemed a compromise agreement, once approved by the court is
immediately executory and not appealable.
Second, the Order of the RTC of Pasig City dismissing Civil Case No. 66213 pursuant to the Joint
Motion to Dismiss filed by the parties constitutes a judgment on the merits.
The Joint Motion to Dismiss stated that the parties were willing to settle the case amicably and,
consequently, moved for the dismissal thereof. It also contained a provision in which the parties
released and forever discharged each other from any and all liabilities, whether criminal or civil,
arising in connection with the case. It is undisputable that the parties entered into a compromise
agreement. Essentially, it is a contract perfected by mere consent, the latter being manifested by the
meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the
contract. Once an agreement is stamped with judicial approval, it becomes more than a mere
contract binding upon the parties; having the sanction of the court and entered as its determination
of the controversy, it has the force and effect of any other judgment. Article 2037 of the Civil Code
explicitly provides that a compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata.
Because of the compromise agreement among the parties, there was accordingly a judicial
settlement of the controversy, and the Order, dated 30 April 1999, of the RTC of Pasig City was no
less a judgment on the merits which may be annulled only upon the ground of extrinsic fraud. Thus,
the RTC of Pasig City, in the same Order, correctly granted the dismissal of Civil Case No. 66213 with
prejudice.
Third, there is no question as to the jurisdiction of the RTC of Pasig City over the subject matter and
parties in Civil Case No. 66213. The RTC can exercise original jurisdiction over cases involving the
issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction.51 To recall, the Petition of AEDC before the RTC of Pasig City was for the declaration of
nullity of proceedings, mandamus and injunction. The RTC of Pasig City likewise had jurisdiction
over the parties, with the voluntary submission by AEDC and proper service of summons on the
DOTC Secretary and the PBAC Chairman and members.
Lastly, there is, between Civil Case No. 66213 before the RTC of Pasig City and the Petition now
pending before this Court, an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.
There is an identity of parties. In both petitions, the AEDC is the petitioner. The respondents in Civil
Case No. 66213 are the DOTC Secretary and the PBAC Chairman and members. The respondents in
the instant Petition are the DOTC, the DOTC Secretary, and the Manila International Airport
Authority (MIAA). While it may be conceded that MIAA was not a respondent and did not participate
in Civil Case No.

66213, it may be considered a successor-in-interest of the PBAC. When Civil Case No. 66213 was
initiated, PBAC was then in charge of the NAIA IPT III Project, and had the authority to evaluate the
bids and award the project to the one offering the lowest or most advantageous bid. Since the
bidding is already over, and the structures comprising NAIA IPT III are now built, then MIAA has
taken charge thereof. Furthermore, it is clear that it has been the intention of the AEDC to name as
respondents in their two Petitions the government agency/ies and official/s who, at the moment
each Petition was filed, had authority over the NAIA IPT III Project.
There is an identity of subject matter because the two Petitions involve none other than the award
and implementation of the NAIA IPT III Project.
There is an identity of cause of action because, in both Petitions, AEDC is asserting the violation of
its right to the award of the NAIA IPT III Project as the original proponent in the absence of any
other qualified bidders. As early as in Civil Case No. 66213, AEDC already sought a declaration by
the court of the absence of any other qualified proponent submitting a competitive bid for the NAIA
IPT III Project, which, ultimately, would result in the award of the said project to it.
AEDC attempts to evade the effects of its compromise agreement by alleging that it was compelled
to enter into such an agreement when former President Joseph E. Estrada asserted his influence and
intervened in Civil Case No. 66213. This allegation deserves scant consideration. Without any proof
that such events did take place, such statements remain mere allegations that cannot be given
weight. One who alleges any defect or the lack of a valid consent to a contract must establish the
same by full, clear and convincing evidence, not merely by preponderance thereof.52 And, even
assuming arguendo, that the consent of AEDC to the compromise agreement was indeed vitiated,
then President Estrada was removed from office in January 2001. AEDC filed the present Petition
only on 20 October 2005. The four-year prescriptive period, within which an action to annul a
voidable contract may be brought, had already expired.53
For the foregoing substantive and procedural reasons, the instant Petition of AEDC should be
dismissed.


RECENT JURISPRUDENCE - CIVIL LAW
6. AGAN, JR. v. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC. (PIATCO) G.R. Nos.
155001, 155547 & 155661, 05 May 2003, En Banc (Puno, J.)

FACTS:
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Considering that at the pre-qualification stage, the maximum amounts which the Paircargo
Consortium may invest in the project fell short of the minimum amounts prescribed by the PBAC,
Paircargo Consortium was not a qualified bidder. Thus the award of the contract to the Paircargo
Consortium is null and void. While a winning bidder is not precluded from modifying or amending
certain provisions of the contract bidded upon, such changes must not constitute substantial or
material amendments that would alter the basic parameters of the contract and would constitute a
denial to the other bidders of the opportunity to bid on the same terms.
On October 5, 1994, Asias Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) submitted an unsolicited proposal to the
Government through the DOTC/MIAA for the development of NAIA International Passenger
Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) under a build-operate-and-transfer arrangement pursuant to RA 6957 as
amended by RA 7718 (BOT Law). Acting on the proposal, the DOTC constituted the Pre-qualification
Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) for the project and submitted with its endorsement the
proposal to the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), which approved the project.
On June 7, 14, and 21, 1996, DOTC/MIAA caused the publication in two daily newspapers of an
invitation for competitive or comparative proposals on AEDCs unsolicited proposal, in accordance
with Sec. 4-A of RA 6957, as amended.
On September 20, 1996, the consortium composed of Peoples Air Cargo and Warehousing Co., Inc.
(Paircargo), Phil. Air and Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS) and Security Bank Corp. (Security Bank)
(collectively, Paircargo Consortium) submitted their competitive proposal to the PBAC. On the
following day, September 24, 1996, the PBAC pre-qualified the Paircargo Consortium. Two days
later, AEDC informed the PBAC in writing of its reservations as regards the Paircargo Consortium,
which includes, inter alia: the lack of financial capability of PAIRCARGO and the prohibition imposed
by RA 337, the General Banking Act, on the amount that Security Bank could legally invest in the
project.
On October 16, 1996, the PBAC opened the envelope submitted by AEDC and the Paircargo
Consortium containing their respective financial proposals. Both proponents offered to build the
NAIA Passenger Terminal III for at least $350 million at no cost to the government. In addition,
AEDC offered to pay the government a total of P135 million as guaranteed payment for 27 years
while Paircargo Consortium offered to pay the government a total of P17.75 billion for the same
period.
Thus, the PBAC formally informed AEDC that it had accepted the price proposal submitted by the
Paircargo Consortium, and gave AEDC 30 working days within which to match the said bid,
otherwise, the project would be awarded to Paircargo. As AEDC failed to match the proposal, then
DOTC Secretary Lagdameo, issued a notice to Paircargo Consortium regarding AEDCs failure to
match the proposal.
On February 27, 1997, Paircargo Consortium incorporated into Philippine International Airport
Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO).
AEDC subsequently protested the alleged undue preference given to PIATCO and reiterated its
objections as regards the pre-qualification of PIATCO. AEDC then filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of the Proceedings, Mandamus and Injunction against
the Secretary of the DOTC, the Chairman of the PBAC, the voting members of the PBAC and
Pantaleon D. Alvarez, in his capacity as Chairman of the PBAC Technical Committee.
On July 9, 1997, the DOTC issued the notice of award for the project to PIATCO.
On July 12, 1997, the Government, through then DOTC Secretary Enrile, and PIATCO, through its
President, Henry T. Go, signed the Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and- Transfer
Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III (1997 Concession
Agreement).
On November 26, 1998, the Government and PIATCO signed an Amended and Restated Concession
Agreement (ARCA). Subsequently, the Government and PIATCO also signed three Supplements to
the ARCA.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. WhetherornotPIATCOwasaqualifiedbidder.
2. Whether or not the 1997 concession agreement is valid.
3. Whether or not a direct government guarantee is contrary to the law.
4. WhetherornotPIATCOcanobligatethegovernmenttopayforthecostofthereasonable use of the
terminal in the exercise of its power to temporarily takeover a business affected with public
interest.
5. Whether or not the exclusive right to operate the terminal granted to piatco is subject to the
regulation and supervision by the government.
HELD:
Under the BOT Law, the contract shall be awarded to the bidder who, having satisfied the minimum
financial, technical, organizational and legal standards required by the law, has submitted the
lowest bid and most favorable terms of the project. Paircargo consortium or any challenger to the
unsolicited proposal of AEDC has to show that it possesses the requisite financial capability to
undertake the project in the minimum amount of 30% of the project cost. PAGS Audited Financial
Statements as of 1995 indicate that it has approximately P26,735,700.00 to invest as its equity for
the
project. Security Banks Audited Financial Statements as of 1995 show that it has a net worth
equivalent to its capital funds in the amount of P3,523,504,377.00. The Court agrees with public
respondents that with respect to Security Bank, the entire amount of its net worth could not be
invested in a single undertaking in view of the provisions of the General Banking Act. Thus, the
maximum amount that Security Bank could validly invest in the Paircargo Consortium is only
P528,525,656.55, representing 15% of its entire net worth. The total net worth therefore of the
Paircargo Consortium, after considering the maximum amounts that may be validly invested by each
of its members is P558,384,871.55 or only 6.08% of the project cost, an amount substantially less
than the prescribed minimum equity investment required for the project in the amount of
P2,755,095,000.00 or 30% of the project cost. Considering that at the pre-qualification stage, the
maximum amounts which the Paircargo Consortium may invest in the project fell short of the
minimum amounts prescribed by the PBAC, we hold that Paircargo Consortium (later incorporated
to PIATCO) was not a qualified bidder. Thus the award of the contract to the Paircargo Consortium
is null and void.
An essential element of a publicly bidded contract is that all bidders must be on equal footing. Not
simply in terms of application of the procedural rules and regulations imposed by the relevant
government agency, but more importantly, on the contract bidded upon. While a winning bidder is
not precluded from modifying or amending certain provisions of the contract bidded upon, such
changes must not constitute substantial or material amendments that would alter the basic
parameters of the contract and would constitute a denial to the other bidders of the opportunity to
bid on the same terms. A close comparison of the draft Concession Agreement attached to the Bid
Documents and the 1997 Concession Agreement reveals that the documents differ in at least two
material respects: a.) Modification on the Public Utility Revenues and Non-Public Utility Revenues
that may be collected by PIATCO and b.) Assumption by the Government of the liabilities of PIATCO
in the event of the latters default thereof. The changes under the 1997 Concession Agreement with
respect to reduction in the types of fees that are subject to MIAA regulation and the relaxation of
such regulation with respect to other fees clearly gives PIATCO more favorable terms than what was
available to other bidders at the time the contract was bidded out. Also, the assumption by the
government of the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of latters default grants PIATCO a financial
advantage or benefit which was not previously made available during the bidding process. The fact
that substantial amendments were made on the 1997 Concession Agreement renders the same null
and void for being contrary to public policy. These amendments convert the 1997 Concession
Agreement to an entirely different agreement from the contract bidded out or the draft Concession
Agreement.
The provisions of the 1997 Concession Agreement constitute a direct government guarantee which
is prohibited by law. The fact that the ARCA superseded the 1997 Concession Agreement did not
cure this fatal defect. It is clear that the ARCA provides for a direct guarantee by the government to
pay PIATCOs loans not only to its Senior Lenders but all other entities who provided PIATCO funds
or services upon PIATCOs default in its loan obligation with its Senior Lenders. The proscription
against government guarantee in any form is one of the policy considerations behind the BOT Law.
To declare the PIATCO contracts valid despite the clear statutory prohibition against a direct
government guarantee would not only make a mockery of what the BOT Law seeks to prevent --
which is to expose the government to the risk of incurring a monetary obligation resulting from a
6
contract of loan between the project proponent and its lenders and to which the Government is not
a party to -- but would also render the BOT Law useless for what it seeks to achieve - to make use
of the resources of the private sector in the financing, operation and maintenance of infrastructure
and development projects which are necessary for national growth and development but which the
government, unfortunately, could ill-afford to finance at this point in time.
PIATCO cannot, by mere contractual stipulation (Article V, Section 5.10 (c) of the 1997 Concession
Agreement), contravene the Constitutional provision on temporary government takeover and
obligate the government to pay reasonable cost for the use of the Terminal and/or Terminal
Complex. Article XII, section 17 of the 1987 Constitution envisions a situation wherein the
exigencies of the times necessitate the government to temporarily take over or direct the operation
of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest. It is the welfare and
interest of the public which is the paramount consideration in determining whether or not to
temporarily take over a particular business. Clearly, the State in effecting the temporary takeover is
exercising its police power. Thus, requiring the government to pay reasonable compensation for the
reasonable use of the property pursuant to the operation of the business contravenes the
Constitution.
PIATCO, under the 1997 Concession Agreement and the ARCA, is granted the exclusive right to
operate a commercial international passenger terminal within the Island of Luzon at the NAIA IPT
III. In entering into a BuildOperate-and-Transfer contract for the construction, operation and
maintenance of NAIA IPT III, the government has determined that public interest would be served
better if private sector resources were used in its construction and an exclusive right to operate be
granted to the private entity undertaking the said project, in this case PIATCO. Nonetheless, the
privilege given to PIATCO is subject to reasonable regulation and supervision by the Government
through the MIAA, which is the government agency authorized to operate the NAIA complex, as well
as DOTC, the department to which MIAA is attached. This is in accord with the Constitutional
mandate (Article XII, Section 19 of the 1987 Constitution) that a monopoly which is not prohibited
must be regulated. The right granted to the public utility may be exclusive but the exercise of the
right cannot run riot. Thus, while PIATCO may be authorized to exclusively operate NAIA IPT III as
an international passenger terminal, the Government, through the MIAA, has the right and the duty
to ensure that it is done in accord with public interest. PIATCOs right to operate NAIA IPT III cannot
also violate the rights of third parties.

***di na kailangan basahin ang naka italic, for additional infos only
7. THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL, petitioner, vs. THE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA,
HON. JOSE ATIENZA, JR., and THE CITY COUNCIL OF MANILA, respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay National (Liga for brevity) is the national organization of all the
barangays in the Philippines, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991, constitutes
the duly elected presidents of highly-urbanized cities, provincial chapters, the metropolitan Manila
Chapter, and metropolitan political subdivision chapters.

On 16 March 2000, the Liga adopted and ratified its own Constitution and By-laws to govern its
internal organization. Section 1, third paragraph, Article XI of said Constitution and By-Laws states:

All other election matters not covered in this Article shall be governed by the "Liga Election Code" or
such other rules as may be promulgated by the National Liga Executive Board in conformity with the
provisions of existing laws.

By virtue of the above-cited provision, the Liga adopted and ratified its own Election
Code.

Respondent City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002, providing, among
other things, for the election of representatives of the District Chapters in the City Chapter of Manila
and setting the elections for both chapters thirty days after the barangay elections.

In July 2002, upon being informed that the ordinance had been forwarded to the Office of the City
Mayor, the Liga sent respondent Mayor of Manila a letter requesting him that said ordinance be
vetoed considering that it encroached upon, or even assumed, the functions of the Liga through
legislation, a function which was clearly beyond the ambit of the powers of the City Council.

Respondent Mayor, however, signed and approved the assailed city ordinance to implement the
ordinance.

In support of its petition, the Liga argues that City Ordinance No. 8039, and Executive Order No.
011, Series of 2002, contradict the Liga Election Code and are therefore invalid. The subject
ordinance is an ultra vires act of the respondents and, as such, should be declared null and void.

In September 2002, Barangay Chairman Arnel Pea, in his capacity as a member of the Liga ng mga
Barangay in the City Chapter of Manila, filed a Complaint in Intervention with Urgent Motion for the
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction.

The assailed ordinance prescribing for an "indirect manner of election" amended, in effect, the
provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991, which provides for the election of the Liga officers
at large. It also violated and curtailed the rights of the petitioner and intervenor, as well as the other
896 Barangay Chairmen in the City of Manila, to vote and be voted upon in a direct election.

The issue of non-observance by the petitioners of the hierarchy-of-courts rule, the OSG
posits that technical rules of procedure should be relaxed in the instant petition. While Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, grants original jurisdiction over cases of this nature to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), the exigency of the present petition, however, calls for the relaxation of this rule.
Section 496 (should be Section 491) of the Local Government Code of 1991 primarily intended that
the Liga ng mga Barangay determine the representation of the Liga in the sanggunians for the
immediate ventilation, articulation, and crystallization of issues affecting barangay government
administration. Thus, the immediate resolution of this petition is a must.

The respondents defend the validity of the assailed ordinance and executive order and pray for the
dismissal of the present petition on the following grounds: (1) certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court is unavailing; (2) the petition should not be entertained by this Court in view of the
pendency before the Regional Trial Court of Manila of two actions or petitions questioning the
subject ordinance and executive order; (3) the petitioner is guilty of forum shopping; and (4) the act
sought to be enjoined is fait accompli.

The respondents also asseverate that the petitioner cannot claim that it has no other recourse in
addressing its grievance other than this petition for certiorari. As a matter of fact, there are two
cases pending before Branches 33 and 51 of the RTC of Manila (one is for mandamus; the other, for
declaratory relief) and three in the Court of Appeals (one is for prohibition; the two other cases, for
quo warranto), which are all akin to the present petition in the sense that the relief being sought
therein is the declaration of the invalidity of the subject ordinance. Clearly, the petitioner may ask
the RTC or the Court of Appeals the relief being prayed for before this Court. Moreover, the
petitioner failed to prove discernible compelling reasons attending the present petition that would
warrant cognizance of the present petition by this Court.

ISSUE: WON the petitioners disregarded the hierarchy of courts by filing the petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 before the Honorable Supreme Court.
HELD:
After due deliberation on the pleadings filed, we resolve to dismiss this petition for certiorari.

Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
7
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

Elsewise stated, for a writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be
directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the
tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the
declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and
executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which this
Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution
provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
As such, this petition must necessary fail, as this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a
petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.

Third, even granting arguendo that the present petition is ripe for the extraordinary writ of
certiorari, there is here a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts. No special and important reason
or exceptional and compelling circumstance has been adduced by the petitioner or the intervenor
why direct recourse to this Court should be allowed.

We have held that this Courts original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari (as well as of
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive, but is
concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals in certain cases.

This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of
the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will
be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of
appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed
with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct
invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only
when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon
the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket.

The propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial
system by seeking relief directly from this Court must be put to a halt for two reasons: (1) it would
be an imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and (2) it would cause an inevitable and
resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to
be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as
better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.

Forum-shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or when a final judgment
in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. For litis pendentia to exist, the following
requisites must be present: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as are representing the
same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being
founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two
cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.

In the instant petition, and as admitted by the respondents, the parties in this case and in the alleged
other pending cases are different individuals or entities; thus, forum-shopping cannot be said to
exist. Moreover, even assuming that those five petitions are indeed pending before the RTC of
Manila and the Court of Appeals, we can only guess the causes of action and issues raised before
those courts, considering that the respondents failed to furnish this Court with copies of the said
petitions.

8. HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 162059, January 22, 2008

FACTS: Petitioner was a senior student of UP-Cebu as a government scholar. She was appointed by
then Pres. Estrada on Dec. 21, 1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a 1 yr. term starting Jan. 1,
2000 and ending on Dec. 31, 2000.

In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with Pres. Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall
Annex in UP Diliman. On Sept. 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the
SEC the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).

One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex. Pres. Estrada gave
P15,000,000.00 to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the
funds, according to the information, was the Office of the President.

The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The succeeding student regent
consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the
Ombudsman.

On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict petitioner
and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed in the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any
jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent.

Petitioner claimed that R.A. No. 3019(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), as amended by R.A. No.
8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. It has no
jurisdiction over the crime of estafa. It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered by Title VII,
Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the RPC. Estafa falling under
Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction.

She also argued that it was Pres. Estrada, not the government, that was duped. Even assuming that
she received the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada, not from the coffers of the
government.

Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person. As a student
regent, she was not a public officer since she merely represented her peers, in contrast to the other
8
regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity. She addsed that she was a simple student
and did not receive any salary as a student regent.

She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or funds. Such power
was vested with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it was not alleged in the information
that it was among her functions or duties to receive funds, or that the crime was committed in
connection with her official functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
citing the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.

The Ombudsman opposed the motion. It disputed petitioners interpretation of the law. Section 4(b)
of P.D. No. 1606 clearly contains the catch -all phrase "in relation to office," thus, the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction over the charges against petitioner. In the same breath, the prosecution countered
that the source of the money is a matter of defense. It should be threshed out during a full-blown
trial.

According to the Ombudsman, petitioner was a public officer. As a member of the BOR, she had the
general powers of administration and exercised the corporate powers of UP. Based on Mechems
definition of a public office, petitioners stance that she was not compensated, hence, not a public
officer, is erroneous. Compensation is not an essential part of public office. Parenthetically,
compensation has been interpreted to include allowances. By this definition, petitioner was
compensated.

In a Resolution, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for lack of merit. It ratiocinated:
xxxxxxxxxxxx
xxx-As correctly pointed out by the prosecution, Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides that the
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other offenses committed by public officials and
employees in relation to their office. From this provision, there is no single doubt that this Court has
jurisdiction over the offense of estafa committed by a public official in relation to his office.

Accused-movants claim that being merely a member in representation of the student body, she was
never a public officer since she never received any compensation nor does she fall under Salary
Grade 27, is of no moment, in view of the express provision of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249
which provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
(A) x x x
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
x x x x
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations,
state universities or educational institutions or foundations.

It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive
jurisdiction over all offenses involving the officials enumerated in subsection (g), irrespective of
their salary grades, because the primordial consideration in the inclusion of these officials is the
nature of their responsibilities and functions.

A meticulous review of the existing Charter of UP reveals that the BOR, to which accused-movant
belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of administration and corporate powers in the
university, such as: 1) To receive and appropriate to the ends specified by law such sums as may be
provided by law for the support of the university; 2) To prescribe rules for its own government and
to enact for the government of the university such general ordinances and regulations, not contrary
to law, as are consistent with the purposes of the university; and 3)xxxxxx

It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only through its board of
directors, or board of trustees in the case of non-stock corporations. The board of directors or
trustees, therefore, is the governing body of the corporation.

It is unmistakably evident that the BOR of UP is performing functions similar to those of the Board
of Trustees of a non-stock corporation. This draws to fore the conclusion that being a member of
such board, accused-movant undoubtedly falls within the category of public officials upon whom
this Court is vested with original exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she does not
occupy a position classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.

Finally, this court finds that accused-movants contention that the P15 Million was received from
former President Estrada and not from the coffers of the government, is a matter a defense that
should be properly ventilated during the trial on the merits of this case.

On Nov. 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied with finality
in a Resolution dated Feb. 4, 2004.

ISSUE: W/n the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or
excess of jurisdiction in not quashing the information and dismising the case notwithstanding that is
has no jurisdiction over the offense charged in the information.

The petitioners argument: (a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; (b) petitioner is
not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged was
not committed in relation to her office.

HELD:
A.
We first address petitioners contention that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is determined by
Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. We note that petitioner refers to Section 4 of the said law yet quotes
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to quash before the Sandiganbayan. She
repeats the reference in the instant petition for certiorari and in her memorandum of authorities.

Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606(Creation of the Sandiganbayan), as amended, rather
than R.A. No. 3019(Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), as amended, that determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative history of the statute creating the
Sandiganbayan is in order. The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then
Pres. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct
required of public officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees
shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall
remain at all times accountable to the people.

As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of
the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a)xxxxx;
(b) xxxxx;
9
(c) xxxxxx;
(d) xxxxxx;
(e) xxxxxxx;
(f) xxxxx;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.
(2) xxxx;
(3) xxxxxxxx;
(4)xxxxxxxxxxx; and
(5) xxxxxxxx.

B. xxxxxxxx
C. xxxxxxxx.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17, 1960. The said law
represses certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt
practices or which may lead thereto. Pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for
violation of the said law should be filed with the Sandiganbayan.

R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private individuals.

In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt practices and provides
for their penalties.

Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not among those crimes
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this argument, petitioner isolated the
first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the
said provision.
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in
relation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the
offenses included in Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The
jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public
officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the
offense is committed in relation to their office.

B.
In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, We ruled that it is difficult to pin down the definition of a
public officer. The 1987 Constitution does not define who are public officers. Rather, the varied
definitions and concepts are found in different statutes and jurisprudence.

Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition
fee-paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers
enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People, we held that while the first part of Section 4(A)
covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other
executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express
provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law.

Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over
Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations,
state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As
the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of
a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as
contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.

Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At
most, it is merely incidental to the public office.

C.
Petitioner argues that even assuming that she is a public officer, the Sandiganbayan would still not
have jurisdiction over the offense because it was not committed in relation to her office.

According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the approval of the BOR. She
adds there was no Board Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to contract with then Pres.
Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by the governing body of the state university.
Resultantly, her act was done in a private capacity and not in relation to public office.

It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information. More than that,
jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant or respondent in an
answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent
almost entirely upon the whims of defendant or respondent.

In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner, being then a
student regent of U.P., "while in the performance of her official functions, committing the offense in
relation to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her
brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud the government x x x."

Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it did not
quash the information based on this ground.

9. G.R. No. 175457; July 6, 2011
RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 175482
ALEXANDRINO R. APELADO, SR vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari were filed by petitioner Ruperto A.
Ambil, Jr. and petitioner Alexandrino R. Apelado Sr. assailing the Decision promulgated on
September 16, 2005 and Resolution dated November 8, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
No. 25892.

The present controversy arose from a letter of Atty. David B. Loste, President of the Eastern
Samar Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), to the Office of the Ombudsman,
praying for an investigation into the alleged transfer of then Mayor Francisco Adalim, an accused in
Criminal Case No. 10963 for murder, from the provincial jail of Eastern Samar to the residence of
petitioner, then Governor Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. In a Report dated January 4, 1999, the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) recommended the filing of criminal charges against petitioner Ambil,
Jr. for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as theAnti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended. On September 22, 1999, the new President of the IBP,
Eastern Samar Chapter, informed the Ombudsman that the IBP is no longer interested in pursuing
the case against petitioners. Thus, he recommended the dismissal of the complaint against
petitioners.

Nonetheless, in an Information dated January 31, 2000, petitioners Ambil, Jr. and Alexandrino
R. Apelado, Sr. were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, together with SPO3
Felipe A. Balano. Upon reinvestigation, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Memorandum dated
10
August 4, 2000, recommending the dismissal of the complaint as regards Balano and the
amendment of the Information to include the charge of Delivering Prisoners from Jail under Article
156 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, (RPC) against the remaining accused.

On arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty and posted bail.
At the pre-trial, petitioners admitted the allegations in the Information. They reason, however, that
Adalims transfer was justified considering the imminent threats upon his person and the dangers
posed by his detention at the provincial jail. According to petitioners, Adalims sister, Atty. Juliana A.
Adalim-White, had sent numerous prisoners to the same jail where Mayor Adalim was to be held.

Consequently, the prosecution no longer offered testimonial evidence and rested its case after the
admission of its documentary exhibits. Petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to
Evidence with Reservation to Present Evidence in Case of Denial but the same was denied.

At the trial, petitioners presented three witnesses: petitioner Ambil, Jr., Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-
White and Mayor Francisco C. Adalim.

Petitioner Ambil, Jr. testified that he was the Governor of Eastern Samar from 1998 to 2001.
According to him, it was upon the advice of Adalims lawyers that he directed the transfer of
Adalims detention to his home. He cites poor security in the provincial jail as the primary reason
for taking personal custody of Adalim considering that the latter would be in the company of
inmates who were put away by his sister and guards identified with his political opponents.

For her part, Atty. White stated that she is the District Public Attorney of Eastern Samar and the
sister of Mayor Adalim. She recounted how Mayor Adalim was arrested while they were attending a
wedding in Sulat, Eastern Samar, on September 6, 1998. According to Atty. White, she sought the
alternative custody of Gov. Ambil, Jr. after Provincial Warden and herein petitioner Apelado, Sr.
failed to guarantee the mayors safety.

Meanwhile, Francisco Adalim introduced himself as the Mayor of Taft, Eastern Samar. He confirmed
his arrest on September 6, 1998 in connection with a murder case filed against him in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Borongan, Eastern Samar. Adalim confirmed Atty. Whites account. Adalim
admitted staying at Ambil, Jr.s residence for almost three months before he posted bail after the
charge against him was downgraded to homicide.

Petitioner Apelado, Sr. testified that he was the Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern Samar. He recalls
that on September 6, 1998, SPO3 Felipe Balano fetched him at home to assist in the arrest of Mayor
Adalim. Allegedly, Atty. White was contesting the legality of Mayor Adalims arrest and arguing with
the jail guards against booking him for detention. At the provincial jail, petitioner was confronted
by Atty. White who informed him that he was under the governor, in the latters capacity as a
provincial jailer. Petitioner claims that it is for this reason that he submitted to the governors order
to relinquish custody of Adalim. Further, petitioner Apelado, Sr. described the physical condition of
the jail to be dilapidated and undermanned.

On September 16, 2005, the Sandiganbayan, First Division, promulgated the assailed Decision
finding petitioners guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The court ruled that in moving
Adalim to a private residence, petitioners have conspired to accord him unwarranted benefits in the
form of more comfortable quarters with access to television and other privileges that other
detainees do not enjoy. It stressed that under the Rules, no person under detention by legal process
shall be released or transferred except upon order of the court or when he is admitted to bail.

The Sandiganbayan brushed aside petitioners defense that Adalims transfer was made to ensure
his safety. It observed that petitioner Ambil, Jr. did not personally verify any actual threat on
Adalims life but relied simply on the advice of Adalims lawyers. The Sandiganbayan also pointed
out the availability of an isolation cell and nipa huts within the 10-meter-high perimeter fence of the
jail which could have been used to separate Adalim from other prisoners. Finally, it cited petitioner
Ambil, Jr.s failure to turn over Adalim despite advice from Assistant Secretary Jesus Ingeniero of the
Department of Interior and Local Government.

Consequently, the Sandiganbayan sentenced petitioner Ambil, Jr. to an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and four (4)
months. In favor of petitioner Apelado, Sr., the court appreciated the incomplete justifying
circumstance of obedience to a superior order and sentenced him to imprisonment for six (6) years
and one (1) month to nine (9) years and eight (8) months. Hence, the present petitions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over a suit where one of the 2 accused
has a Salary Grade classified to be cognizable before the lower courts.

HELD: There is no question that petitioners are public officers discharging official functions and that
jurisdiction over them lay with the Sandiganbayan. Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over public
officers charged with violation of the Anti-Graft Law is provided under Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 8249. The pertinent portions of Section 4, P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, read as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of
the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads[;]
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary
Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial
court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case
may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended.

Thus, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over petitioner Ambil, Jr. is beyond question. The same
is true as regards petitioner Apelado, Sr. As to him, a Certification from the Provincial Government
Department Head of the HRMO shows that his position as Provincial Warden is classified as Salary
Grade 22. Nonetheless, it is only when none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to
salary grade 27 or higher shall exclusive jurisdiction be vested in the lower courts. Here, petitioner
Apelado, Sr. was charged as a co-principal with Governor Ambil, Jr., over whose position the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Accordingly, he was correctly tried jointly with said public officer in
the proper court which had exclusive original jurisdiction over them the Sandiganbayan.






10. CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA, Petitioner
versus
SANDIGANBAYAN and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents

THIRD DIVISION, VELASCO JR.

11
CASE: These two (2) consolidated petitions under Rule 65, each interposed by petitioner Clarita D.
Garcia, with application for injunctive relief.

1ST Petition- mandamus and/or certiorari, petitioner seeks to nullify and set aside the August 5,
2005 Order,1 as reiterated in another Order dated August 26, 2005, both issued by the
Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, which effectively denied the petitioners motion to dismiss and/or
to quash Civil Case No. 0193, a suit for forfeiture commenced by the Republic of the Philippines
against the petitioner and her immediate family.

2nd Petition- for certiorari, seeks to nullify and set aside the November 9, 2005 Resolution2 of the
Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, insofar as it likewise denied the petitioners motion to dismiss
and/or quash Civil Case No. 0196, another forfeiture case involving the same parties but for
different properties.

FACTS:
1.To recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties in the aggregate amount of PhP
143,052,015.29 that retired Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, his wife, herein petitioner Clarita, children
Ian Carl, Juan Paulo and Timothy Mark (collectively, the Garcias) had allegedly amassed and
acquired, the Republic, through the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), pursuant to Republic Act No.
(RA) 1379,3 filed with the Sandiganbayan (SB) on October 29, 2004 a petition for the forfeiture of
those properties.

This petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 0193, was eventually raffled to the Fourth Division of the
anti-graft court.

2.Civil Case No. 0193 was followed by the filing on July 5, 2005 of another forfeiture case, docketed
as Civil Case No. 0196, this time to recover funds and properties amounting to PhP 202,005,980.55.
Civil Case No. 0196 would eventually be raffled also to the Fourth Division of the SB. (Civil Case No.
0193 shall hereinafter be also referred to as Forfeiture I and Civil Case No. 0196 as Forfeiture II).

3.Prior to the filing of Forfeiture II, but subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture I, the OMB charged the
Garcias and three others with violation of RA 7080 (plunder) under an Information dated April 5,
2005 which placed the value of the property and funds plundered at PhP 303,272,005.99. Docketed
as Crim. Case No. 28107, the Information was raffled off to the Second Division of the SB. The
plunder charge, as the parties pleadings seem to indicate, covered substantially the same properties
identified in both forfeiture cases.
4.After the filing of Forfeiture I, the following events transpired in relation to the case:
(1) The corresponding summons were issued and all served on Gen. Garcia at his place of detention.
Per the Sheriffs Return4 dated November 2, 2005, the summons were duly served on respondent
Garcias. Earlier, or on October 29, 2004, the SB issued a writ of attachment in favor of the Republic,
an issuance which Gen. Garcia challenged before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 165835.
Instead of an answer, the Garcias filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of the SBs lack of
jurisdiction over separate civil actions for forfeiture. The OMB countered with a motion to expunge
and to declare the Garcias in default. To the OMBs motion, the Garcias interposed an opposition in
which they manifested that they have meanwhile repaired to the Court on certiorari, docketed as
G.R. No. 165835 to nullify the writ of attachment SB issued in which case the SB should defer action
on the forfeiture case as a matter of judicial courtesy.
5. (2) By Resolution of January 20, 2005, the SB denied the motion to dismiss; declared the same
motion as pro forma and hence without tolling effect on the period to answer. The same resolution
declared the Garcias in default.
Another resolution denied the Garcias motion for reconsideration and/or to admit answer, and set
a date for the ex-parte presentation of the Republics evidence.
A second motion for reconsideration was also denied on February 23, 2005, pursuant to the
prohibited pleading rule.
6. (3) Despite the standing default order, the Garcias moved for the transfer and consolidation of
Forfeiture I with the plunder case which were respectively pending in different divisions of the SB,
contending that such consolidation is mandatory under RA 8249.7
On May 20, 2005, the SB 4th Division denied the motion for the reason that the forfeiture case is not
the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the criminal case of
plunder.
7. (4) On July 26, 2005, the Garcias filed another motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture I on,
inter alia, the following grounds: (a) the filing of the plunder case ousted the SB 4th Division of
jurisdiction over the forfeiture case; and (b) that the consolidation is imperative in order to avoid
possible double jeopardy entanglements.
ISSUES:
A.Whether or not SB 4th Division has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Forfeitures I and II.
B. Whether or not the Fourth Division of the SB has acquired jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner and her three sons for that matter.
C. Whether or not special appearance to question a courts jurisdiction is not voluntary appearance.
HELD:
Partly meritorious.
A. Plunder Case in Crim. Case No. 28107 Did Not Absorb the Forfeiture Cases in Civil Case Nos. 0193
and 0196

1. Petitioners contention is untenable. And in response to what she suggests in some of her
pleadings, let it be stated at the outset that the SB has jurisdiction over actions for forfeiture under
RA 1379, albeit the proceeding thereunder is civil in nature.
2. Executive Order No. (EO) 14, Series of 1986, albeit defining only the jurisdiction over cases
involving ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his immediate family and business
associates, authorizes under its Sec. 317 the filing of forfeiture suits under RA 1379 which will
proceed independently of any criminal proceedings. The Court, in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,
interpreted this provision as empowering the Presidential Commission on Good Government to file
independent civil actions separate from the criminal actions.
3. Petitioners posture respecting Forfeitures I and II being absorbed by the plunder case, thus
depriving the 4th Division of the SB of jurisdiction over the civil cases, is flawed by the assumptions
holding it together, the first assumption being that the forfeiture cases are the corresponding civil
action for recovery of civil liability ex delicto. As correctly ruled by the SB 4th Division in its May 20,
2005 Resolution, the civil liability for forfeiture cases does not arise from the commission of a
criminal offense.
B. Sandiganbayan Did Not Acquire Jurisdiction over the Persons of Petitioner and Her Children
1. Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides for the requirements
of a valid substituted service of summons, thus:
SEC. 7. Substituted service.If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided
in the preceding section [personal service on defendant], service may be effected (a) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion
then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business
with some competent person in charge thereof.
It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be bound by its decision
or orders. Valid service of summons, by whatever mode authorized by and proper under the Rules,
is the means by which a court acquires jurisdiction over a person.22
In the instant case, it is undisputed that summons for Forfeitures I and II were served personally on
Maj. Gen. Carlos Flores Garcia, who is detained at the PNP Detention Center, who acknowledged
receipt thereof by affixing his signature. It is also undisputed that substituted service of summons
for both Forfeitures I and II were made on petitioner and her children through Maj. Gen. Garcia at
the PNP Detention Center. However, such substituted services of summons were invalid for being
irregular and defective.
2. it is apparent that no valid substituted service of summons was made on petitioner and her
children, as the service made through Maj. Gen. Garcia did not comply with the first two (2)
requirements mentioned above for a valid substituted service of summons. Moreover, the third
requirement was also not strictly complied with as the substituted service was made not at
12
petitioners house or residence but in the PNP Detention Center where Maj. Gen. Garcia is detained,
even if the latter is of suitable age and discretion. Hence, no valid substituted service of summons
was made.
The stringent rules on valid service of summons for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person
of the defendants, however, admits of exceptions, as when the party voluntarily submits himself to
the jurisdiction of the court by asking affirmative relief.25 In the instant case, the Republic asserts
that petitioner is estopped from questioning improper service of summons since the improvident
service of summons in both forfeiture cases had been cured by their (petitioner and her children)
voluntary appearance in the forfeiture cases. The Republic points to the various pleadings filed by
petitioner and her children during the subject forfeiture hearings. We cannot subscribe to the
Republics views.
C. Special Appearance to Question a Courts Jurisdiction Is Not Voluntary Appearance.
1. The second sentence of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly
provides:
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance.The defendants voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
2. Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court
over his person, together with other grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared
voluntarily before the court. What the rule on voluntary appearancethe first sentence of the
above-quoted rulemeans is that the voluntary appearance of the defendant in court is without
qualification, in which case he is deemed to have waived his defense of lack of jurisdiction over his
person due to improper service of summons.
3. The pleadings filed by petitioner in the subject forfeiture cases, however, do not show
that she voluntarily appeared without qualification
4. the motions to dismiss, were filed by petitioner solely for special appearance with the purpose of
challenging the jurisdiction of the SB over her person and that of her three children. Petitioner
asserts therein that SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her person and of her three children for lack
of valid service of summons through improvident substituted service of summons in both Forfeiture
I and Forfeiture II.
5. And the other subsequent pleadings, likewise, did not abandon her stance and defense of lack of
jurisdiction due to improper substituted services of summons in the forfeiture cases. Evidently, from
the foregoing Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, petitioner and her sons
did not voluntarily appear before the SB constitutive of or equivalent to service of summons.
6. Moreover, the leading La Naval Drug Corp. v. Court of Appeals26 applies to the instant case. Said
case elucidates the current view in our jurisdiction that a special appearance before the court
challenging its jurisdiction over the person through a motion to dismiss even if the movant invokes
other groundsis not tantamount to estoppel or a waiver by the movant of his objection to
jurisdiction over his person; and such is not constitutive of a voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court.
7. Thus, it cannot be said that petitioner and her three children voluntarily appeared before the SB
to cure the defective substituted services of summons. They are, therefore, not estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the SB over their persons nor are they deemed to have waived such
defense of lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, there being no valid substituted services of summons
made, the SB did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of petitioner and her children.
8. And perforce, the proceedings in the subject forfeiture cases, insofar as petitioner and her three
children are concerned, are null and void for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the order declaring them in
default must be set aside and voided insofar as petitioner and her three children are concerned. For
the forfeiture case to proceed against them, it is, thus, imperative for the SB to serve anew summons
or alias summons on the petitioner and her three children in order to acquire jurisdiction over their
persons.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and mandamus are PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division has not acquired jurisdiction over petitioner Clarita D. Garcia and
her three children. The proceedings in Civil Case Nos. 0193 and 0196 before the Sandiganbayan,
Fourth Division, insofar as they pertain to petitioner and her three children, are VOID for lack of
jurisdiction over their persons. No costs.

11. PLATINUM TOURS AND TRAVEL, INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. JOSE M. PANLILIO,
respondent.

FACTS:
1. Platinum Tours and Travel Inc. (Platinum) filed a complaint for a sum of money with damages
against Pan Asiatic Travel Corporation (PATC) and its president Nelida G. Galvez to collect payment
for the airline tickets which PATC bought from it. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1634.

2. Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 62, rendered a judgment[3] by default in favor of
Platinum and ordered PATC and Nelida G. Galvez to solidarily pay Platinum actual damages

3. Writ of execution was issued on motion of Platinum. Pursuant to the writ, Manila Polo Club
Proprietary Membership Certificate No. 2133 in the name of Nelida G. Galvez was levied upon and
sold for P479,888.48 to a certain Ma. Rosario Khoo.

4. Jose M. Panlilio filed a motion to intervene in Civil Case No. 94-1634. Panlilio claimed that, in
October 1992, Galvez had executed in his favor a chattel mortgage over her shares of stock in the
Manila Polo Club to secure her P1 million loan and that Galvez had already delivered to him the
stock certificates valued at P5 million.

5. The court denied his motion.

6. Panlilio filed against Galvez a collection case with application for a writ of preliminary attachment
of the disputed Manila Polo Club shares, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-365. The case was raffled to
Branch 146 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. In the meantime, Panlilio again attempted to
intervene in Civil Case No. 94-1634, this time by incorporating in his complaint a motion to
consolidate Civil Case No. 96-365 and Civil Case No. 94-1634.

7. Judge Salvador Tensuan of Branch 146 granted the motion for consolidation on condition that
Judge Roberto Diokno of Branch 62, who was trying Civil Case No. 94-1634, would not object
thereto. Judge Diokno later issued an order allowing the consolidation of the two cases and setting
for hearing Panlilios application for a writ of preliminary attachment.

8. Platinum, as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 94-1634, moved to reconsider the order of Judge Diokno but
its motion was denied. On its petition before the CA, the latter annulled the assailed order but left it
to Judge Diokno to decide whether to return Civil Case No. 96-365 to Judge Tensuan in Branch 146,
or to keep it in his docket and decide it as a separate case.

9. Platinum filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals, praying
that Civil Case No. 96-365 be returned to Branch 146 or re-raffled to another RTC Branch of Makati.
However, the motion was denied by the CA.

10. Platinum insists that the Makati RTC, Branch 62, has no jurisdiction to try Civil Case No. 96-365.
It argues that, when Judge Dioknos order allowing the consolidation of the two cases was annulled
and set aside, RTC Branch 62s basis for acquiring jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 96-365 was
likewise extinguished.


ISSUE: Whether or not the court's jurisdiction over the civil case 96-365 was extinguished.

HELD:
1. No, jurisdiction over the nature of the action and subject matter is conferred by law. It is
determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled
to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.Jurisdiction over the person of the
plaintiff is acquired from the time he files his complaint; while jurisdiction over the person of the
13
defendant is acquired by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority, or by
the coercive power of legal processes exerted over his person.

2. Since jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine a particular case, it does not depend upon
the regularity of the exercise by the court of that power or on the correctness of its decisions.

3. In the case at bar, there is no doubt that Panlilios collection case docketed as Civil Case No. 96-
365 falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati, Branch 62. The fact that the Court of Appeals
subsequently annulled Judge Dioknos order granting the consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-365 and
Civil Case No. 94-1634, did not affect the jurisdiction of the court which issued the said order.

4. Jurisdiction should be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction refers to the
authority to decide a case, not the orders or the decision rendered therein. Accordingly, where a
court has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, as in the instant case, the decision on
all questions arising from the case is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that the court
may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment which does not affect
its authority to decide the case, much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over the case.

5. We find no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals when it left to Judge Diokno of
Branch 62 the discretion on whether to return Civil Case No. 96-365 to Branch 146 or to decide the
same as a separate case in his own sala.


12.MANILA BANKERS LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
EDDY NG KOK WEI, respondent.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision[1] dated March 26, 1999 and
Resolution[2] dated August 5, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40504, entitled Eddy
Ng Kok Wei vs. Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation.
FACTS:
The factual antecedents as borne by the records are:
Eddy Ng Kok Wei, respondent, is a Singaporean businessman who ventured into investing in the
Philippines. On November 29, 1988, respondent, in a Letter of Intent addressed to Manila Bankers
Life Insurance Corporation, petitioner, expressed his intention to purchase a condominium unit at
Valle Verde Terraces.
Subsequently or on December 5, 1988, respondent paid petitioner a reservation fee of P50,000.00
for the purchase of a 46-square meter condominium unit (Unit 703) valued at P860,922.00. On
January 16, 1989, respondent paid 90% of the purchase price in the sum of P729,830.00.
Consequently, petitioner, through its President, Mr. Antonio G. Puyat, executed a Contract to Sell in
favor of the respondent. The contract expressly states that the subject condominium unit shall
substantially be completed and delivered to the respondent within fifteen (15) months from
February 8, 1989 or on May 8, 1990, and that (S)hould there be no substantial completion and
fail(ure) to deliver the unit on the date specified, a penalty of 1% of the total amount paid (by
respondent) shall be charged against (petitioner).
Considering that the stipulated 15-month period was at hand, respondent returned to the
Philippines sometime in April, 1990.
On October 5, 1990, respondent returned to the Philippines only to find that his condominium unit
was still unlivable. Exasperated, he was constrained to send petitioner a letter dated November 21,
1990 demanding payment for the damages he sustained. But petitioner ignored such demand,
prompting respondent to file with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 150, Makati City, a complaint
against the former for specific performance and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-3440.
On December 18, 1992, the trial court rendered a Decision[3] finding the petitioner liable for
payment of damages due to the delay in the performance of its obligation to the respondent. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant, ordering
Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation to pay plaintiff Eddy Ng Kok Wei the following:
1. One percent (1%) of the total amount plaintiff paid defendant;
2. P100,000.00 as moral damages;
3. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. P25,000.00 by way of attorneys fees; and
Cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated March 26, 1999, affirmed in toto the trial courts
award of damages in favor of the respondent.
Unsatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Appellate Court in a
Resolution dated August 5, 1999.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner contends that the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the instant case. On petitioners contention that the trial court has no jurisdiction
over the instant case, Section 1 (c) of Presidential Decree No. 1344, as amended, provides:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in
addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority
[now Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)][4]shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases of the following nature:
x x x
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of
subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
x x x.
Pursuant to the above provisions, it is the HLURB which has jurisdiction over the instant case. We
have consistently held that complaints for specific performance with damages by a lot or
condominium unit buyer against the owner or developer falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
HLURB.[5]
While it may be true that the trial court is without jurisdiction over the case, petitioners active
participation in the proceedings estopped it from assailing such lack of it. We have held that it is an
undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting its case for decision
and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when
adverse.[6]
Here, petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction before the trial court and the Appellate
Court. In effect, petitioner confirmed and ratified the trial courts jurisdiction over this case.
Certainly, it is now in estoppel and can no longer question the trial courts jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated March 26, 1999 and Resolution
dated August 5, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Chairman), Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

13. G.R. No. 155206 October 28, 2003
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO M. SANTIAGO, substituted by his widow ROSARIO ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE SANTIAGO,
respondent.
FACTS
Deceased spouses Jose C. Zulueta and Soledad Ramos obtained various loans from defendant GSIS
for (the) period September, 1956 to October, 1957 in the total amount of P3,117,000.00 secured by
real estate mortgages over parcels of land. The Zuluetas failed to pay their loans to defendant GSIS
and the latter foreclosed the real estate mortgages dated September 25, 1956, March 6, 1957, April
4, 1957 and October 15, 1957.
On August 14, 1974, the mortgaged properties were sold at public auction by defendant GSIS
submitting a bid price of P5,229,927.84. Not all lots covered by the mortgaged titles, however, were
sold. Ninety-one (91) lots were expressly excluded from the auction since the lots were sufficient to
pay for all the mortgage debts.
14
On November 25, 1975, an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership was executed by defendant GSIS
over Zuluetas lots, including the lots, which as earlier stated, were already excluded from the
foreclosure.
On March 6, 1980, defendant GSIS sold the foreclosed properties to Yorkstown Development
Corporation which sale was disapproved by the Office of the President of the Philippines. The sold
properties were returned to defendant GSIS.
After defendant GSIS had re-acquired the properties sold to Yorkstown Development Corporation, it
began disposing the foreclosed lots including the excluded ones.
On April 7, 1990, representative Eduardo Santiago and then plaintiff Antonio Vic Zulueta executed
an agreement whereby Zulueta transferred all his rights and interests over the excluded lots.
Plaintiff Eduardo Santiagos lawyer, Atty. Wenceslao B. Trinidad, wrote a demand letter dated May
11, 1989 to defendant GSIS asking for the return of the eighty-one (81) excluded lots.
Subsequently, the petitioner, as defendant therein, filed its answer alleging inter alia that the action
was barred by the statute of limitations and/or laches and that the complaint stated no cause of
action. Subsequently, Zulueta was substituted by Santiago as the plaintiff in the complaint a quo.
Upon the death of Santiago on March 6, 1996, he was substituted by his widow, Rosario Enriquez
Vda. de Santiago, as the plaintiff.
The RTC rendered judgment against the petitioner ordering it to reconvey to the respondent,
Rosario Enriquez Vda. de Santiago, in substitution of her deceased husband Eduardo, the seventy-
eight lots excluded from the foreclosure sale.1awphi1.nt The dispositive portion of the RTC
decision reads:
The petitioner elevated the case to the CA which rendered the assailed decision affirming that of the
RTC. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the herein appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision
of December 17, 1997 of Branch 71 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City is hereby AFFIRMED
The petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the aforesaid decision but the same was denied in the
assailed CA Resolution of September 5, 2002. Hence, this petition.
The petitioner maintains that it did not act in bad faith when it erroneously included in its certificate
of sale, and subsequently consolidated the titles in its name over the seventy-eight lots ("subject
lots") that were excluded from the foreclosure sale. There was no proof of bad faith nor could fraud
or malice be attributed to the petitioner when it erroneously caused the issuance of certificates of
title over the subject lots despite the fact that these were expressly excluded from the foreclosure
sale.
The petitioner asserts that the action for reconveyance instituted by the respondent had already
prescribed after the lapse of ten years from November 25, 1975 when the petitioner consolidated its
ownership over the subject lots. According to the petitioner, an action for reconveyance based on
implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the time of its creation or upon the alleged
fraudulent registration of the property. In this case, when the action was instituted on May 7, 1990,
more than fourteen years had already lapsed. Thus, the petitioner contends that the same was
already barred by prescription as well as laches.
ISSUE
W/N THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT A)
PETITIONER WAS GUILTY OF BAD FAITH WHEN IN TRUTH AND IN FACT, THERE WAS NO
SUFFICIENT GROUND TO SUPPORT SUCH CONCLUSION; AND B) THERE WAS NO PRESCRIPTION IN
THIS CASE
HELD
A)The petitioners arguments fail to persuade.
At the outset, it bears emphasis that the jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is limited to reviewing only errors of law.
This Court is not a trier of facts. Case law has it that the findings of the trial court especially when
affirmed by the CA are binding and conclusive upon this Court. Although there are exceptions to the
said rule, we find no reason to deviate therefrom.6 By assailing the findings of facts of the trial court
as affirmed by the CA, that it acted in bad faith, the petitioner thereby raised questions of facts in its
petition.
Nonetheless, even if we indulged the petition and delved into the factual issues, we find the petition
barren of merit.
That the petitioner acted in bad faith in consolidating ownership and causing the issuance of titles in
its name over the subject lots, notwithstanding that these were expressly excluded from the
foreclosure sale was the uniform ruling of the trial court and appellate court. As declared by the CA:
The acts of defendant-appellant GSIS in concealing from the Zuluetas [the respondents
predecessors-in-interest] the existence of these lots, in failing to notify or apprise the spouses
Zulueta about the excluded lots from the time it consolidated its titles on their foreclosed properties
in 1975, in failing to inform them when it entered into a contract of sale of the foreclosed properties
to Yorkstown Development Corporation in 1980 as well as when the said sale was revoked by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos during the same year demonstrated a clear effort on its part to
defraud the spouses Zulueta and appropriate for itself the subject properties. Even if titles over the
lots had been issued in the name of the defendant-appellant, still it could not legally claim
ownership and absolute dominion over them because indefeasibility of title under the Torrens
system does not attach to titles secured by fraud or misrepresentation. The fraud committed by
defendant-appellant in the form of concealment of the existence of said lots and failure to return the
same to the real owners after their exclusion from the foreclosure sale made defendant-appellant
holders in bad faith. It is well-settled that a holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not entitled to
the protection of the law for the law cannot be used as a shield for fraud.
B)The petitioners defense of prescription is untenable. As held by the CA, the general rule that the
discovery of fraud is deemed to have taken place upon the registration of real property because it is
"considered a constructive notice to all persons" does not apply in this case. The CA correctly cited
the cases of Adille v. Court of Appeals14 and Samonte v. Court of Appeals,15 where this Court
reckoned the prescriptive period for the filing of the action for reconveyance based on implied trust
from the actual discovery of fraud. . In this case, as established by the CA, the respondent actually
discovered the fraudulent act of the petitioner only in 1989:
... [T]he prescriptive period of the action is to be reckoned from the time plaintiff-appellee (then
Eduardo M. Santiago) had actually discovered the fraudulent act of defendant-appellant which was,
as borne out by the records, only in 1989. Plaintiff-appellee Eduardo M. Santiago categorically
testified (TSN of July 11, 1995, pp. 14-15) that he came to know that there were 91 excluded lots in
Antonio Village which were foreclosed by the GSIS and included in its consolidation of ownership in
1975 when, in 1989, he and Antonio Vic Zulueta discussed it and he was given by Zulueta a special
power of attorney to represent him to recover the subject properties from GSIS. The complaint for
reconveyance was filed barely a year from the discovery of the fraud.
Following the Courts pronouncements in Adille and Samonte, the institution of the action for
reconveyance in the court a quo in 1990 was thus well within the prescriptive period. Having acted
in bad faith in securing titles over the subject lots, the petitioner is a holder in bad faith of
certificates of title over the subject lots. The petitioner is not entitled to the protection of the law for
the law cannot be used as a shield for frauds.18
Contrary to its claim, the petitioner unarguably had the legal duty to return the subject lots to the
Zuluetas. The petitioners attempts to justify its omission by insisting that it had no such duty under
the mortgage contract is obviously clutching at straw. Article 22 of the Civil Code explicitly provides
that "every person who, through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall
return the same to him."
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.1a\^/phi1.net The assailed Decision dated
February 22, 2002 and Resolution dated September 5, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 62309 are AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against the petitioner.




14. KATON V. PALANCA 437 SCRA

FACTS:
Petitioner caused the inspection investigation and survey of lands located in Sombrero Island in
Palawan for the purpose of its re-classification from forest to agricultural land and, thereafter for
15
him to apply for a homestead patent. In 1965, the Director of Lands favourably declared the land as
agricultural land.
"Records show that on November 8, 1996, [R]espondent Juan Fresnillo filed a homestead patent
application for a portion of the island comprising 8.5 hectares. Records also reveal that
[R]espondent Jesus Gapilango filed a homestead application on June 8, 1972. Respondent Manuel
Palanca, Jr. was issued Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 on March 3, 19775 with
an area of 6.84 hectares of Sombrero Island.
In 1999, Petitioner filed an action seeking to nullify the homestead patents and original certificates
of title issued in favor of the respondents covering certain portions of the Sombrero Island as well as
the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor. The petitioner claims that he has the exclusive
right to file an application for homestead patent over the whole island since it was he who requested
for its conversion from forest land to agricultural land.
Respondents filed their Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim in due
time. On June 30, 1999, they also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of the alleged defiance by
petitioner of the trial courts Order to amend his Complaint so he could thus effect a substitution by
the legal heirs of the deceased, Respondent Gapilango. The Motion to Dismiss was granted by the
RTC in its Order dated July 29, 1999. A MR was filed but was denied , for being a third and
prohibited motion. In his Petition for Certiorari before the CA, petitioner charged the trial court with
grave abuse of discretion on the ground that the denied Motion was his first and only Motion for
Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order. The CA dismissed the complaint because of prescription
invoking its residual prerogative. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Is the Court of Appeals correct in invoking its alleged residual prerogative under Section 1, Rule 9
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in resolving the Petition on an issue not raised in the Petition?

HELD:
Yes. Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4) prescription are evident from the
pleadings or the evidence on record. In the four excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio
dismiss the claim or action. In Gumabon v. Larin11 we explained thus:

"x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the court
clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear during trial,
failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or neglected to comply with the
rules or with any order of the court. Outside of these instances, any motu proprio dismissal would
amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying and expanding
Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure brought about no radical change. Under the new rules, a court may motu proprio
dismiss a claim when it appears from the pleadings or evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter; when there is another cause of action pending between the same parties for
the same cause, or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations. x x
x."12 (Italics supplied)

On the other hand, "residual jurisdiction" is embodied in Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
The "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court is normally
deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This
stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the
records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal.13 In
either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective
orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal,
and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.
The CAs motu proprio dismissal of petitioners Complaint could not have been based, therefore, on
residual jurisdiction under Rule 41. Undeniably, such order of dismissal was not one for the
protection and preservation of the rights of the parties, pending the disposition of the case on
appeal. What the CA referred to as residual prerogatives were the general residual powers of the
courts to dismiss an action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court and under authority of Section 2 of Rule 114 of the same rules.
To be sure, the CA had the excepted instances in mind when it dismissed the Complaint motu
proprio "on more fundamental grounds directly bearing on the lower courts lack of jurisdiction"15
and for prescription of the action. Indeed, when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter,
the only power it has is to dismiss the action.

(Note: the action was more of an action for reversion and not annulment of title nor reconveyance;
dismissal was proper because, the action being one for reversion, it is only the Sol Gen who can
bring said action, thus, the complaint states cause of action)

15. PECSON V. COMELEC 575 SCRA

FACTS:
Pecson and Cunanan were candidates for the mayoralty position in the Municipality of Magalang,
Province of Pampanga. Cunanan was proclaimed the winning candidate, garnering a total of 12,592
votes as against Pecson's 12,531, or a margin of 61 votes. Cunanan took his oath and assumed the
position of Mayor of Magalang. Soon thereafter, Pecson filed an election protest.
The RTC rendered a Decision in Pecson's favor. Cunanan filed a Notice of Appeal. The RTC issued an
Order noting the filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of appeal fee and directing the
transmittal of the records of the case to the Electoral Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) of
the COMELEC. Pecson, on the other hand, filed an Urgent Motion for Immediate Execution Pending
Appeal, claiming that Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests before the
Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials2 (Rules) allows this remedy.

The RTC granted Pecson's motion for execution pending appeal via a Special Order. Expectedly,
Cunanan moved to reconsider the Order, arguing that the RTC gravely abused its discretion: (1) in
ruling that there were good reasons to issue a writ of execution pending appeal; and (2) in
entertaining and subsequently granting the motion for execution pending appeal despite the
issuance of an order transmitting the records of the case.

Thereupon, Cunanan filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Application of Preliminary Injunction
with Prayer for Status Quo Ante Order/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) with Prayer for
Immediate Raffle. The Second Division of the COMELEC issued on January 4, 2008 a 60-day TRO but
eventually denied Cunanans petition. It ruled that the resolution of the motion for execution
pending appeal is part of the residual jurisdiction of the RTC to settle pending incidents.
On Cunanan's motion, the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution reversing the ruling of
the Second Division insofar as it affirmed the RTC's findings of good reasons to execute the decision
pending appeal. It affirmed the authority of the RTC to order execution pending appeal; it however
nullified the March 11, 2008 writ of execution on the ground that the RTC could no longer issue the
writ because it had lost jurisdiction over the case after transmittal of the records and the perfection
of the appeals of both Cunanan and Pecson (to be accurate, the lapse of Pecson's period to appeal).

The case was elevated to the SC via petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC en banc correctly nullified the writ of execution on the ground that
the RTC could no longer issue the writ because it had lost jurisdiction over the case after transmittal
of the records and the perfection of the appeals?

HELD:
No. Another legal reality is that the COMELEC is wrong in its ruling that the RTC could no longer
actually issue the writ on March 11, 2008 because it no longer had jurisdiction to do so after the
appeal period lapsed and after the records were transmitted to the ECAD-COMELEC. That the RTC is
still in possession of the records and that the period to appeal (of both contending parties) must
16
have not lapsed are important for jurisdictional purposes if the issue is the authority of the RTC to
grant a Special Order allowing execution pending appeal; they are requisite elements for the
exercise by the RTC of its residual jurisdiction to validly order an execution pending appeal, not for
the issuance of the writ itself. This is clearly evident from the cited provision of the Rules which
does not require the issuance of the implementing writ within the above limited jurisdictional
period.
The RTC cannot legally issue the implementing writ within this limited period for two reasons: (1)
the cited twenty-day waiting period under Section 11(b); and (2) the mandatory immediate
transmittal of the records to the ECAD of the COMELEC under Section 10 of the Rules.
Also, we reiterate here our consistent ruling that decisions of the courts in election protest cases,
resulting as they do from a judicial evaluation of the ballots and after full-blown adversarial
proceedings, should at least be given similar worth and recognition as decisions of the board of
canvassers.11 This is especially true when attended by other equally weighty circumstances of the
case, such as the shortness of the term of the contested elective office, of the case.
In light of all these considerations, we conclude that the COMELEC erred in nullifying the RTC's
Special Order in a manner sufficiently gross to affect its exercise of jurisdiction. Specifically, it
committed grave abuse of discretion when it looked at wrong considerations and when it acted
outside of the contemplation of the law in nullifying the Special Order.