CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Art. III, Secs.

15 19)
Lambda Epsi!" #i $%O&E' C!e(e !) La*
Section 15 The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall NOT be suspended EXCEPT in cases of invasion or
rebellion when the public safety requires it.
1. Suspension of the privilege: seat and limits of the power under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. (p. 46!
Villavicencio v. Lukban (1919)
Its essential object and purpose is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person there from if such restraint is
illegal.
It was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further
rights of the parties are left untouched by decision of the writ, whose principal purpose is
to set the individual at liberty.
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY
It is defned as a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of the
prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of his caption and detention, to do, submit to,
and receive whatever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf.
Tan Me Nio v. Collector of Customs (1916)
From the very nature of the writ, a prime requisite for its availability is actual deprivation of personal liberty.
Caunca v. Salazar
Liberty may be lost NOT by physical compulsion ALONE: Freedom may be lost due to external and
moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an
imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if N! blindly obeyed, to any other
psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered
exercise of the will.
"f the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of
another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of #ustice A$ %&'( A$ the
individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress of physical coercion.
PRIOR to the Philippine Bill, the legislative branch of the Philippine government enjoyed absolute power
over the suspension of the writ.
Power to set at liberty any person arrested in pursuance to military orders was denied to all courts of
the Islands.
First Phil. Bill both guaranteed the right to writ and set limit to its availability.
Barcelon v. Baker (1905)
Facts: This was a petition for issuance of writ of habeas corpus in favor of Felix Barcelon against 2 Constabulary
ofcers. The former was being detained in Batangas where the privilege of writ of habeas corpus had been
suspended by Governor-General by authority of Phil. Commission. The suspension was predicated on existence
of open insurrection in Cavite and Batangas. The existence of such disorder, however, was denied by petitioner.
Held: The SC in DENYING the petition, declared that the conclusion set forth in the said resolution
and the said executive order, as to the fact that there existed in the )rovince of 'avite
and *atangas open insurrection against the constituted authorities, was a conclusion
entirely within the discretion of the legislative and executive branches of the +overnment,
after an investigation of the facts and that one branch of the &$ +overnment in the )hil.
"slands had N right to interfere of inquire into, for the purpose of N&,,"F-"N+ the same,
the discretionary acts of another independent department of the +ov.t.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Art. III, Secs. 15 19)
Lambda Epsi!" #i $%O&E' C!e(e !) La*
Issue: Reviewability of the joint executive-legislative decision regarding the existence of factual situation, which
would warrant suspension.
Following strictly the doctrine of separation of powers, the SC REFUSED to interfere with action of
political departments.
Phil. Autonomy Act
Change was made. The Governor-General was given authority to suspend the writ without the joint action of
legislature and conversely, legislature was deprived of its role in the suspension of the writ. Thus, the law stood
until the adoption of 1935 Constitution.
2 Provisions on the suspension of writ of habeas corpus in 1935 Constitution
1. Bill of Rights - guaranteed the availability of the writ and set the ground for suspension.
2. Executive Department - set grounds for suspension and specifed the seat of the power to suspend
Since the power to suspend belongs to the EXECUTIVE, it is the Executive who must at least initially
decide whether the ground for suspension exist.
2 OVERRULED cases: Whether the action of Executive should be subject to judicial review
Barcelon v. Baker (1905)
NO. The validity of action taken by Governor General was a political question NOT subject to judicial review.
Montenegro v. Castaeda (1952)
NO. President Quirino suspended the privilege in 1950. SC reiterated the rule the question was political.
The case which OVERRULED Barcelon and Montenegro
Lansang v. Garcia (1971)
President Marcos suspended the privilege in 1971. SC said that for the validity of suspension of privilege, 2
CONDITIONS must concur:
1. There is invasion, insurrection, rebellion, or imminent danger thereof;
2. That public safety requires the suspension.
Issue: The Presidential Proclamation stated that there was an actual state of rebellion and that public safety
requires that immediate and efective action be taken in order to maintain peace and order, secure the safety of
people and preserve the authority of State. Was this fnding made by President subject to judicial review?
Held: YES. But it UPHELD the validity of suspension.
The court was unanimous in the conviction that it had the authority to inquire into the
existence of factual bases in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof.
SC OVERRULED Barcelon case arguing that Barcelon had relied chiefy on Martin v. Mott which invoked NOT the
power to suspend the privilege BUT the much broader power to call the militia.
The suspension in Barcelon was the act of the American Governor-General, whose act, as representative of the
Sovereign, afecting the freedom of its subjects, can hardly be equated with that of the President of the
Philippines dealing with the freedom of Filipino people, in whom sovereignty resides, and from whom all
government authority emanates.
Having disposed of Barcelon, the Court also added that it had thereby disposed of Montenegro v. Castaeda, which
was based mainly upon the *arcelon case, and, hence, 'ANN! have more weight than the same.
Since the power to suspend the privilege was surrounded by constitutional limitations li/e limitations and
restrictions imposed by Fundamental ,aw upon legislative department, adherence thereto and
compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be inquired into by courts of justice.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Art. III, Secs. 15 19)
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What are theses proper bounds on the power of courts?
Court frst gave general answer that its power was merely to chec/ 0 N! to supplant 0 the
1xecutive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond constitutional limits of
his #urisdiction, NOT to exercise power vested in him or to determine wisdom of his
act.
More specifcally, the Court said that its power was NOT even comparable with its power over
civil or criminal cases elevated thereto by appeal 2 in which cases the appellate
court has all the powers of the court of origin, nor to its power over quasi-judicial
administrative decision where the Court is limited to asking whether there is some evidentiary basis
for the administrative fnding.
Instead, the Court accepted the Solicitor Generals suggestion that it go no further than to
satisfy itself N! that the )resident.s decision is correct and that public safety
was endangered by the rebellion and #ustified the suspension of the writ, *&! that in
suspending the writ, the )resident did N! act arbitrarily.
3e entertain 2 No doubts about the existence of a si4able group of men who have publicly
risen in arms2 engaged in rebellion against the +overnment of the )hilippines.
Baker v. Carr (1962)
Three faces of political question doctrine, each representing a way of approaching constitutional law problems:
1. Textual approach - What does the letter of the constitution say?
2. Functional approach - Are we capable of resolving the problem posed?
3. Prudential or political approach - Whether there are overriding considerations which prevent the Court
from entering the thicket.
In arriving at a political question conclusion, SC had done so on a combination of all three approaches.
1. Textual : When the law grants discretionary authority to a person to be exercised upon his opinion of
certain facts, he alone is judge of the existence of those facts.
2. Functional : The executive and legislative departments have the machinery for verifying the existence of
those facts whereas the courts do NOT.
3. Prudential : Interference by the courts in the decision can result in tying the hands of those charged with
maintaining order.
Montenegro v. Castaeda is not doctrinally signifcant because it merely accepted and applied doctrine of
Barcelon.
Lansang v. Garcia, in reversing Barcelon, also took the textual approach BUT arrived at an opposite
conclusion: Lansang concluded that discretion indeed had been granted to the Executive, but NOT
absolute discretion. However, aware of the inconveniences that a narrow textual approach could entail,
Lansang limited the review function of the Court to a very prudentially narrow test of arbitrariness.
Padilla-Garcia v. Enrile (1983)
Found Barcelons textual conclusion preferable and judged the test of arbitrariness in Lansang both functionally
and prudentially nave.
Factors which make Padillas textual approach stronger than the Barcelon arguments:
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Art. III, Secs. 15 19)
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A. 1973 Constitution had a textually broader source of constitutional power in that it made imminent
danger of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion sufcient ground for suspension of the privilege,
WHEREAS, the Philippine Bill of 1902 did not use the phrase imminent danger.
B.Barcelon involved the power delegated to a colonial government inferior in status to the power of a duly
elected President of an independent Republic.
". #ffe$t of the suspension of the privilege under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions (p.477!
Function of writ of habeas corpus is to achieve immediate determination of the
legality of a detention.
Efect of suspension of privilege of writ prevent courts, temporarily, from enquiring into the
legality of detention.
WON a person accused of an ofense covered by the suspension is entitled release on bail
Nava v. Gatmaitan (1951)
J. Tuason held the view that the suspension does NOT afect the right to bail argued thus:
All persons detained for investigation by the Executive department are under
executive control. "t is where the Constitution tells the court to /eep their hands
off &N,1$$ the cause of the detention be for an offense other than rebellion or
insurrection, which is another matter.
"f and when formal complaint is presented, the court steps in and the executive steps
out. !he detention ceases to be an executive and becomes a #udicial concern.
!hereupon the corresponding court assumes its role and the #udicial process ta/es its
course to the exclusion of executive or the legislative departments. (enceforward,
the accused is entitled to demand all the constitutional safeguards and privileges
essential to due process.
[Note: President Marcos himself accepted this argument based on waiver: %he disposal of the &od' of a$$used( as
an' law'er will inform 'ou( is now within the powers of the )%C of Ce&u and *+% within the powers of ,resident.- ] this
pronouncement applies mutatis mutandis to Padilla and Morales.
Padilla-Garcia v. Enrile (1983)
Main opinion: $uspension of privilege of writ of habeas corpus %&$! carry with it the
suspension of right to bail, if government.s campaign to suppress rebellion is to be
enhanced and rendered effective.
Morales v. Enrile (1983)
Main opinion: *ut because the privilege of writ of habeas corpus remains suspended 5with
respect to persons at present detained as well as others who may hereafter be similarly
detained for crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and for all other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance
of or on occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith the natural
consequence is that the 6"+(! ! *A", for commission of anyone of said offenses is also
$&$)1N717. !o hold otherwise would defeat the very purpose of suspension.
3. Changes made &' the 197 Constitution (p.45!
Article VII Section 18
President may suspend privilege for NOT more than 60 days.
Congress is given power to REVOKE suspension and President may NOT set aside revocation.
Congress, upon the initiative of the President, may also EXTEND the suspension.
20
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Art. III, Secs. 15 19)
Lambda Epsi!" #i $%O&E' C!e(e !) La*
SC, upon initiative of any citizen, may review the sufciency of factual basis of suspension and
must promulgate its decision thereon within 30 days from fling. Citizen need NOT be taxpayer.
Scope of review power of SC in Lansang: go N further than to satisfy itself N! that the
)resident.s decision is correct and that public safety was endangered by the rebellion and
#ustified the suspension of writ, but that in suspending the writ, the )resident did N! act
arbitrarily.
Scope of review power of SC - NOW: power to determine executive arbitrariness in the manner of arriving at the
suspension AND the sufficiency of the FA'!&A, basis of suspension. Court is empowered to determine
whether in fact actual invasion and rebellion exists and whether public safety requires the suspension.
197 Constitution drops insurrection as ground for suspension.
Phrase imminent danger was fraught with possibilities of abuse. Limit grounds for suspension of
privilege to ACTUAL invasion and ACTUAL rebellion when public safety requires it. Article VII Section 18:
.%he president shall &e the $ommander in $hief of all armed for$es of the ,hilippines and whenever it &e$omes ne$essar'( he ma' $all su$h
armed for$es to prevent or suppress lawless violen$e( invasion or re&ellion.-
Scope of suspension severely limited by Article VII Section 18: .%he suspension of the privilege of the writ shall appl' +*/0 to
persons 1udi$iall' $harged for re&ellion or offenses inherent in or dire$tl' $onne$ted with invasion.-
1. The suspension can only validly afect persons judicially charged for rebellion or ofenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
2. Invasion itself is NOT a crime; but crimes may arise during invasion Title I Book II of RPC.
3. Person, to lose privilege must be JUDICIALLY CHARGED. It is not enough that a complaint is
under investigation by fscal or that a charge has been fled before the fscals ofce; it is
necessary that criminal charge has been fled IN COURT.
4. Section 18 adds: 2uring the suspension of the privilege of the writ( an' person thus arrested or detained shall &e 1udi$iall'
$harged within 3 days( otherwise( he shall &e released.
General purpose of requiring a judicial charge: to prevent a situation similar to past regime when
innocent persons were arrested, detained and confned in prison sometimes for 1 month, 1 year, or even
more, without any criminal charge fled against them who oftentimes did NOT even understand why
they had been arrested or detained.
Suspension of privilege will NOT apply until they are placed in custody of a JUDICIAL ofcer to
preserve life of detained person.
SUSPENSION OF PRIVILEGE DOES NOT SUSPEND RIGHT TO BAIL!
Section 16 All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial, or administrative bodies.
1. Speed' disposition of $ases (p. 49!
Justice delayed is justice denied.
First introduced as Section 16, Article IV of 1973 Constitution.
Covers period BEFORE, DURING, and AFTER trial.
Applies to civil, criminal and administrative cases.
SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES
Its concept, like speedy trial is a relative term and must be a fexible concept. It is consistent with reasonable
delay.

21
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Art. III, Secs. 15 19)
Lambda Epsi!" #i $%O&E' C!e(e !) La*
Factors to consider:
1. Length of delay
2. Reason for the delay
3. Assertion of right or failure to assert it
4. Prejudice caused by the delay
Padua v. Ericta (1988)
!he desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases should N!, if possible, result in
precipitate loss of a party.s right to present evidence and either in plaintiff.s being non0
suited or the defendant.s being pronounced liable under an ex parte #udgment.
Harmful speed
Magat v. CA (1982)
Accused was charged at 4:30 p.m. and by 11:35 the next morning he already had his due process and a
conviction!
Under Martial Law decree, crimes against tourists had to be disposed of by courts within 24 hours. SC said it
was enough that the accused had ample opportunity to confer with counsel during cross-examination and after
the prosecution had rested its case the night before.
Section 17 No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
1. Self3in$rimination (p. 494!
Whether or not Spanish law in the Philippines allowed self-incrimination
US v. Navarro (1904)
Majority: YES.
J. Mapa: NO.
Justifcation of guarantee: IT was established on grounds of public policy and humanity: Of POLICY, because, if
the party were required to testify, it would place the witness under the strongest temptation to commit perjury;
and of HUMANITY, because it would prevent the extorting of confessions by duress.
US v. Tan Teng (1912)
The main purpose of the provision is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of prisoners before the trial, or
upon trial, for the purpose of extorting unwilling confession or declarations implicating them in the commission
of a crime.
(provision on duress however has been place together with the rules on custodial investigation in Section 12)
US v. Junio (1910)
Under the right against self-incrimination, the accused may NOT be compelled to take the witness stand.
Note: A mere witness who is NOT an accused, in order to avail himself of his right, must await the incriminating
question; the ACCUSED, however, may refuse to be a witness altogether. Recent jurisprudence has extended this
right of accused to respondents in administrative investigations partaking of the nature of a criminal proceeding
or analogous to a criminal proceeding.
Cabal v. Kapunan (1962)
The proceeding for forfeiture of property under Anti-Graft Law was deemed criminal and respondent was
accorded the right to refuse to take the witness stand.
Pascual Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners (1969)
22
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Art. III, Secs. 15 19)
Lambda Epsi!" #i $%O&E' C!e(e !) La*
Respondent in an administrative investigation for immorality and malpractice was accorded a similar right since
the revocation of his license, as a medical practitioner could even be a more serious deprivation than forfeiture
of property.
The guaranty does NOT prohibit every form of preliminary investigation.
People v. Badilla (1926)
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be
reasonably charged with a crime so as to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or
information. "n one form or another, similar investigations are permitted under all systems
of procedure.
Gonzales v. Secretary of Labor (1954)
Nor does the guarantee prohibit a party litigant from using his adversary as a witness when the case is NOT a
criminal case where the intended witness is the accused himself.
The time to raise the privilege (for persons other than the accused) is when an incriminating question is asked.
To violate this right, it is NOT necessary that a categorical admission of a specifc ofense be sought.
Isabela Sugar Co. v. Macadaeg (1953)
'hief 8ustice %arshall explained that usually a crime or a criminal act may contain two or
more elements and that a question would have a tendency to incriminate, even if it tends to
elicit only one of said elements.
Fernando v. Maglanoc (1954)
The right thus includes a right to refuse to testify to a fact which would be a necessary lin!
in a chain of evidence to prove the commission of a crime by a witness.
What is prohibited is use of PHYSICAL or MORAL compulsion to extort communication from the witness, NOT an
inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material.
US v. Tan Teng (1912)
Substance emitting from the body of defendant was received as evidence in a prosecution for acts of
lasciviousness.
People v. Tranca (1994)
Subjection to ultra-violet examination is allowed.
People v. Gamboa (1991)
So is parafn test.
US v. Ong Siu Hong (1917)
Morphine forced out of the mouth of accused was received.
People v. Otadora (1950)
An order by judge for the witness to put on a pair of pants for size was allowed.
Villafor v. Summers (1920)
Kernel of privilege was the prohibition of testimonial compulsion, the Court was even willing to compel a
woman accused of adultery to submit to the indignity of being tested for pregnancy. This harsh rule was justifed
by J. Malcolm: N rule is intended to be so rigid as to embarrass the administration of
#ustice in its endeavor to ascertain the truth.
23
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Art. III, Secs. 15 19)
Lambda Epsi!" #i $%O&E' C!e(e !) La*
SC added: 3e must enforce constitutional provision 2 undeterred by merely sentimental
influences. The only proviso imposed was that torture or force should be avoided.
Rule on permissibility of requiring a witness to write in order to furnish a sample of his HANDWRITING
Beltran v. Samson (1929)
Since witnesses in a preliminary investigation are protected by the prohibition, they may NOT be compelled to
take a dictation in order to compare their handwriting with that found in a supposedly falsifed document.
writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or the fngers; writing is NOT a purely
mechanical act because it requires the application of intelligence and attention
there is similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to
furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence
against himself.
here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which does
NOT exist
Note: When a person voluntarily answers an incriminating question, he is deemed to have waived his right. After
accused has pleaded guilty, for the purpose of ascertaining the proper penalty to be imposed or for any other
legal purposes, the court may properly ask such questions as are necessary to that end.
US v. Binayoh (1916)
By this plea of guilty, he is deemed to have waived his right to the extent, at least of N! allowing
him subsequently to claim error by reason of such questions or answers thereto2
Arnault v. Nazareno (1950)
If the witness has insisted that the transaction which is the subject of investigation was completely legal, there
is NO basis upon which to sustain the claim that to reveal the name of a party to the transaction might be
incriminating. Besides, it is the courts which determine whether or not a question is in fact incriminating.
Isabela Sugar Co. v. Macadaeg (1953)
An invariable answer of I do NOT remember is equivalent to refusal to answer and does NOT constitute waiver.
Bermudez v. Castillo
It was contended that since the witness had denied that the documents in question were in her handwriting, she
should be deemed to have waived her right by such denial and could therefore be required to produce a sample
of her handwriting.
MAJORITY, however, believed that mere denial, which discloses nothing, does NOT constitute waiver. Laurel, in
his concurrence, added that since there was authority to support both positions: !he provisions should be
construed with utmost liberality in favor of right of individual intended to be secured.
The privilege can be rendered meaningless if silence of witness may be used against him.
US v. Lim Buanco (1909)
Refusal of an accused to be a witness or of a witness to answer should in NO manner be used against them.
US v. Sarikala (1918)
This rule does NOT prohibit an unfavorable inference form failure of one party to produce evidence that is in his
control.
24
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Art. III, Secs. 15 19)
Lambda Epsi!" #i $%O&E' C!e(e !) La*
". 2o$uments and re$ords (p. 495!
Phil. jurisprudence prior to Stonehill v. Diokno (1967) had linked the inadmissibility of illegally
obtained evidence with the self-incrimination clause.
Boyd v. US
A compulsory production of private books and papers of the owner is compelling him to be a witness against
himself, within the meaning of 5
th
Amendment.
SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE COVERS DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE.
Bache & Co. v. Ruiz (1971)
Unlike the search and seizure clause which protects both natural persons and corporations
US v. White (1944)
the privilege against self-incrimination is a personal one, applying only to natural individuals.
Hale v. Henkel (1906)
A corporation may be compelled to submit to the visitorial powers of the state even if this results in disclosure of
criminal acts of corporation.
Wilson v. US
A corporate ofcer may NOT prevent the production of corporate papers on the ground that they may incriminate
him personally, (for in such a situation it would NOT be a case the ofcer incriminating himself but he
corporation incriminating him.)
Self-incrimination clause protects private papers of a natural individual, is NOT without exception.
Shapiro v. US (1948)
The case arose out of a prosecution for violation of regulations made under the Emergency Price Control Act of
1942. When defendants records, which he was required to keep by the Ofce of Price Administration, were
ordered produced, defendant claimed protection by the constitutional privilege.
The high tribunal RULED that the privilege which exists as to private papers 'ANN! be
maintained in relation to 5records re"uired by law to be !ept in order that there may be
suitable information of transactions which are the appropriate subjects of governmental
regulation and the enforcement of restrictions validly established#.
US v. Sullivan (1927)
Court REJECTED a taxpayers claim that the requirement of an income tax return was incriminating because the
completed return would show his criminal gains and a blank return would invite the curiosity of investigators.
Kimpo v. Sandiganbayan (1995)
Court ACCEPTED in ofcial forms which an accountable public ofcer was required to keep.
Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board (1965)
In more recent cases, however, the US-SC has struck down certain registration requirements that presented real
and appreciable risk of self-incrimination. These involved statutes directed at inherently suspect groups in areas
permeated by criminal statutes, a circumstance which laid the subjects open to real risk of self-incrimination.
Section 18 (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted.
25
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Art. III, Secs. 15 19)
Lambda Epsi!" #i $%O&E' C!e(e !) La*
1. 5reedom of politi$al &elief (p. 497!
Section 18(1) was authored by Commissioner Jose Nolledo.
IT does NOT add anything substantive to due process clause, nor to the guarantee of freedom of
speech, press, and expression in Section 4.
". 6nvoluntar' servitude (p. 497!
Slavery was devoid of historical signifcance in our country.
Rubi v. Provincial Board (1919)
$lavery and involuntary servitude, together with their corollary, )1NA+1, all denote 5a
condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another#
Hodges v. US (1906)
It has been applied to any servitude in fact involuntary, no matter under what form such servitude may have
been disguised.
In re Brooks (1901)
The frst case on involuntary servitude involved an American soldier who had been given an absolute discharge
from the Army and who subsequently entered into a work contract with the Army. Refusing to perform the
service promised, he was detained for deportation.
Upon petition for release on a writ of habeas corpus, SC said: 2 "nasmuch as a private person who
contracts obligations of this sort toward the Army 'ANN!, by any law2 be compelled to
fulfill them by imprisonment and deportation from his place of residence, we deem it wholly
improper to sustain such means of compulsion which are N! #ustified either by law or by
contract.
US v. Cabanag
While the constitutional prohibition operated to nullify agreements violative of it, suppletory legislation was
required to give the prohibition penal efect..
De los Reyes v. Alojado (1910)
Domestic services are always to be remunerated, and NO agreement may subsist in law in which it is stipulated
that any domestic service shall be absolutely gratuitous, UNLESS it be admitted that slavery may be established
in this country through a covenant entered into between interested parties.
Kaisahan v. Gotamco Sawmills (1948)
Section 19 of Commonwealth Act 103, which authorized a judicial return-to-work order in labor disputes, was
challenged as being in contravention of the Constitution.
The Court rebufed the challenge and argued: An employee entering into a contract of employment
after said law went into effect, voluntarily accepts, among other conditions, those
prescribed in said section 9:2.!he voluntariness of the employee.s entering into it or not ;
with such implied condition, negatives the possibility of involuntary servitude ensuing2
[Whether employees who entered into contracts prior to Commonwealth Act 103 could have been made subject to return-to-
work orders? No answer.]
Sarmiento v. Tuico (1988)
A person who refuses to follow a return to work order, while he can be dismissed from his job, CANNOT be
imprisoned for so doing.
Aclaracion v. Gatmaitan (1975)
Court concluded that a former court stenographer may be compelled under pain of contempt to transcribe
stenographic notes he had failed to attend to while still in service. Such compulsion is NOT the condition of
26
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Art. III, Secs. 15 19)
Lambda Epsi!" #i $%O&E' C!e(e !) La*
enforced, compulsory service referred to by the Constitution. And the former stenographer did reluctantly
agree to do the transcription during his spare time.
J. Fernando in concurrence: The matter could become tricky should a stenographer stubbornly refuse to obey and
the court insist on keeping him in jail. The detention could then become punitive and could give rise to the issue
of involuntary servitude.
Section 19 (1) Excessive fnes shall NOT be imposed, NOR cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inficted.
Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress
hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee, or the
use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
1. Cruel( degrading or inhuman punishment7 e8$essive fines. (p. 541!
1935 Constitution: Excessive fnes shall NOT be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inficted.
1973 Constitution: cruel or unusual punishment.
Constl. limit must be reckoned on basis of nature and mode of punishment measured in terms of physical pain
Legarda v. Valdez (1902)
CRUEL and UNUSUAL embodied an inseparable pair: !o be prohibited by this provision the
punishment must N! N,- be unusual *&! it must also be cruel. !here is N reason why
unusual punishments, which were N! cruel, should have been prohibited. "f that had been
done it would have been impossible to change the punishments that existed when the
'onstitution was adopted. A law which changes a penalty so as to ma/e it less severe would
be unconstitutional if the new penalty were an unusual one.
)unishments are CRUEL when they involve torture or a lingering death< but the punishment of
death is N! cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the 'onstitution. "t implies
there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishments of
life.
Represented the next step in understanding of phrase
Weems v. US
Weems was convicted of falsifcation of an ofcial and public document and was sentenced to 15 years of cadena
temporal together with the accessory penalties of civil interdiction, perpetual absolute disqualifcation, and
subjection to surveillance during life.
CADENA, in the SCs translation of the Spanish code, meant labor for the beneft of the state. They shall
always carry chain at the ankle, hanging from the wrist; they shall be employed at hard and painful labor,
and shall receive N assistance whatsoever from without the institution!
The penalty, the Court said, has N fellow in American legislation. "t is cruel in its excess of
imprisonment and that which accompanies and follows imprisonment. "t is unusual in
character. "ts punishments come under the condemnation of the *ill of 6ights, both on
account of their degree and /ind2
US v. Pico (1911)
!here is N!("N+ in the decision in that case which would justify the inference that the
court was of the opinion that imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for life or for long
term of years followed by the life surveillance of discharged convict, is to be regarded as
cruel and unusual punishment when prescribed for such crimes as treason, parricide,
assassination, and other heinous offenses, or even for less grave offenses when they are
mar/ed by attendant circumstances which, in the sound discretion of legislature, justify and
necessitate the imposition of extraordinary harsh penalties to secure their repression.
27
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Art. III, Secs. 15 19)
Lambda Epsi!" #i $%O&E' C!e(e !) La*
A penalty may be declared unconstitutional on the basis solely of glaring disproportion between
punishment and crime.
People v. Estoista (1953)
An excessive penalty was upheld as constitutional and was imposed but with recommendation for executive
clemency. Tuason said: !he constitutionality of an act of legislature is N! to be #udged in
the light of exceptional cases.
SC: !o come under the ban, the punishment must be flagrantly and plainly oppressive,
wholly disproportionate to the nature of offense as to shoc/ the moral sense of the
community.
". 9&olition of death penalt'. (p. 547!
Automatic review of capital cases found in Article X, Sec. 5(2) 1973 Constitution was an implicit afrmation that
capital punishment was NOT PER SE constitutionally objectionable.
The matter should be left to legislative discretion.
Furman v. Giorgia (1972)
US-SC ruled that death penalty as it existed in Georgia was UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Only Justices Brennan and Marshall considered death penalty unconstitutional per se.
Brennans 4 Basic Principles for judging severe punishment:
1. A punishment must NOT be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings.
2. It must NOT be applied arbitrarily.
3. It must NOT be unacceptable to contemporary society.
4. It must NOT be excessive, i.e., it must serve a penal purpose more efectively than a less severe
punishment would.
He said that a punishment may be deemed cruel and unusual for any of 4 reasons:
1. There are certain punishments, which inherently involve so much pain, and sufering that civilized
people CANNOT tolerate them, e.g., the rack, the thumbscrew, torture.
2. There are unusual punishments in the sense of being previously unknown for a given ofense.
3. A penalty may be cruel and unusual because it is excessive and serves NO legislative purpose.
4. Finally, a punishment that is NOT excessive and possessing a legislative purpose may nevertheless be
INVALID if popular sentiment abhors it.
Commissioner Bernas summed up the reasons which persuaded the Bill of Rights Committee to propose the
abolition of capital punishment:
1. Capital punishment is inhuman because its imposition, even if NOT carried out, traumatizes NOT ONLY
the convict but also the members of his family;
2. There is NO solid evidence to show that the death penalty has served as efective deterrent against the
commission of serious ofenses; hence, life must NOT be destroyed just on the mere hope that
extinguishing life will save other lives;
3. Assuming mastery over the life of another man is just too presumptuous for any human;
4. The fact that the death penalty is an old institution should NOT be allowed to become an obstacle to
reviewing it because human life is more valuable than institutions designed to save human life.
The people through initiative and referendum may reimpose death penalty. Congress may
reimpose it for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
The phrase shall be reduced is NOT a description of some future act but a command that is
immediately efective.
28
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Art. III, Secs. 15 19)
Lambda Epsi!" #i $%O&E' C!e(e !) La*
When the death penalty CANNOT be imposed because of the constitutional ban, what becomes of the 3 grades into
which a penalty is divided where the maximum penalty is death?
People v. Guevara (1987)
The Court resolved the problem saying that the penalty is reduced to 2 grades only.
3. Custodial $ruelties and inade:uate penal fa$ilities. (p. 549!
Sec. 19(1) : speaks of punishment which, if embodied in a penal law, render the entire law invalid.
Sec. 19(2) : concerns itself NOT with the validity of a penal law BUT with the manner of treating prisoners
in detention.
Commissioner Maambong: 2 shoc/ing to the conscience of reasonably civili4ed people. ,ife,
safety and health of human beings are at sta/e2 Facilities of the penitentiary should be
brought up to a level of constitutional tolerability%.
The provision embodies constitutional authorization for the Commission of Human Rights to take action in
accordance with Article XIII, Section 18.
Parallel with Article III, Section 12(4), there is a command addressed to Congress to pass whatever civil or penal
legislation might be required for the subject.
Section 20 No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.
1. 6mprisonment for de&t. (p.511!
First extended to the Phil. by Phil. Bill of 1902.
Tan Cong v. Stewart (1907)
What is DEBT?
In Webster+s I"ter"ati!"a $icti!"ar, debt is defned as that which is due from one person to another, whether
money, goods, or services; that which one person is bound to pay to another, or to perform for his benefit; thing owed;
obligation; liability.
In a*, it is an action to recover a certain specific sum of money alleged to be due.
-!./ier, in his law dictionary, defnes it as a term used in bookkeeping to express the left-hand page of the ledger of
an account to which are carried all of the articles supplied or amounts paid on the subject of an account or which are
charged to that account; the balance of an account where it shows that something remains due to the party keeping the
account.
-ac0, in his law dictionary, defnes debt as a sum of money due by a certain and express agreement or as a sum of
money due by a contract.
The SC !) Ii"!is in defning the meaning of the word debt as used in the constitution said: hat any
liability to pay money growing out of a contract, express or implied, constitute a debt within the meaning of this provision of
the constitution.
Fist case which may be classed as one on imprisonment for debt., which actually pre-dated Phil. Bill.
In re Prautch (1902)
At ISSUE was the application of Article 412 of the Code of Civil Procedure to a contractual litigation. This article
authorized the arrest of a defendant in certain types of civil cases. The article was challenged NOT as
authorizing imprisonment of debt BUT as authorizing impairment of obligation of contract.
HELD: right to imprison for debt is NOT part of contract .. If the right to imprison for debt is NOT part of
contract, the converse of proposition is also true, that the right to exemption from imprisonment for debt does NOT
from part of contract
29
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Art. III, Secs. 15 19)
Lambda Epsi!" #i $%O&E' C!e(e !) La*
Such statutes are regarded as penal rather than remedial. They are enacted to prevent fraud in the making of
contracts, or to prevent the subsequent fraudulent conduct of parties with reference to their obligation and are
properly invoked as punishment for dishonesty.
What the provision does NOT prohibit
Ramirez v. Orozco (1916)
Ramirez had requested Santos to pay the municipal treasurer the sum of P16 owed by him for unpaid cedulas on
the promise to render personal service to Santos in payment for the sum. Once in possession of his cedulas,
Ramirez refused to render the promised service. Prosecuted under Section 1 of Act No 2098 of Phil. Legislature,
which described a certain form of estafa, Ramirez was convicted and imprisoned.
Upon demand for release on a habeas corpus petition, the Court answered that the incarceration was NEITHER
imprisonment for debt NOR involuntary servitude BUT merely a penalty for crime of estafa.
In re Tamboco (1917)
The obligation incurred by debtor was to pay an ordinary contractual obligation. Guardianship proceeding,
moreover, was civil in nature. The COURT did NOT allow enforcement of civil obligation by an order of
imprisonment.
Freeman v. US (1910)
Freeman, having been convicted of embezzlement, was ordered to refund the amount embezzled or sufer
subsidiary imprisonment. Answering the objection that such subsidiary imprisonment amounted to prohibited
imprisonment for debt The Court said: $tatutes relieving from imprisonment for debt were N!
intended to ta/e away right to enforce criminal statutes and punish wrongful embe44lement or
conversions of money2. the money payment was part of punishment, and was N! imposed as an
imprisonment for nonpayment of debt regardless of the criminal offense committed 2
NO person may be imprisoned for debt in virtue of an order in a civil proceeding, either as a substitute for
satisfaction of a debt or as a means of compelling satisfaction; BUT a person may be imprisoned a s a
penalty for a crime arising from a contractual debt and imposed in a proper criminal proceeding.
Ajeno v. Judge Inserto (1976)
Thus, the conversion of a criminal fne into a prison term does NOT violate the provision because in such a case
imprisonment is imposed for a monetary obligation arising NOT ex contractu BUT ex delicto.
Whether the constitutional prohibition applies to fraudulent debts.
Ganaway v. Quillen (1922)
The case was a civil case and at issue was Article 412 of Code of Civil Procedure already litigated and upheld in In
re Prautch. Art. 412 reads thus:
A defendant may be arrested in the following cases=
9. "n an action for the recovery of money or damages on a cause of action arising upon
contract, express or implied, when the defendant is about to depart from the )hil.
"slands with intent to defraud his creditors.
>. "n an action for money or property embe&&led in the course of his employment or for
willfully violating his duty.
?. "n an action to recover the possession of personal property unjustly detained, when
the property or any part thereof has been concealed, removed, or disposed of to
prevent its being found or ta/en by the officer.
@. 3hen the defendant has been guilty of fraud in contracting a debt or incurring the
obligation upon which the action is brought< or in concealing or disposing of the
property for the ta/ing, detention or conversion of which the action is brought.
A. 3hen the defendant has removed or disposed of his property or is about to do so,
with intent to defraud his creditors.
30
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Art. III, Secs. 15 19)
Lambda Epsi!" #i $%O&E' C!e(e !) La*
2 important observations made by SC:
1. Code of Civil Procedure took efect on October 1, 1901, that is, prior to the enactment of Phil. Bill 1902;
". Constitution of Phil., unlike some States in American Union makes NO exception in cases of fraud. The
prohibition in Phil. Bill, reproduced in Jones Law, is that NO person shall be imprisoned for debt.
1973 Constitution copied 1935 provision. So has the 1987 Constitution. And jurisprudence on
the subject has NOT changed. Delegate Laurel, insisted on the retention of existing ABSOLUTE
prohibition as explained in Ganaway v. Quillen.
". *on3pa'ment of poll ta8 (p. 517!
POLL TAX or a CEDULA TAX
- is a capitation tax imposed on all persons of a certain age. At present, it is tax one pays for residence
certifcate, which serves as personal identifcation instrument.
- NOT progressive and antiquated
*Prior to 1935 Constitution, imprisonment for nonpayment of poll tax was AUTHORIZED under Revised
Administrative Code.
People v. Linsangan (1935)
The ONLY case on poll tax so far, held that under the 1935 Constitution, NO conviction could be based on such
provision of Administrative Code.
*Article V Section 1 of Phil. Constitution when it prohibits the imposition of literacy, property, or other substantive
requirement on exercise of right of sufrage can be read as a prohibition of poll tax imposed as prerequisite for
voting. This prohibition frst appeared in Article IV, Section 1 of 1973 Constitution and has been carried into the
1987 Constitution.
31