Peralta v.

Director of Prisons
(1945
Petitioner, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary,
was prosecuted for the crime of robbery as defined by the
National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the
Philippines. He was found guilty and sentenced to
serve time by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
Jurisdiction created in sec. 1 of Ordinance no. 7
promulgated by the President of the Republic. The petition
for habeas corpus is based on the ground that the Courts
existence was void ab initio because it was created as a
political instrumentality under the command of the
Japanese Imperial Army; that the provisions of said
ordinance violate his constitutional rights; that the
penalties provided for are much more severe than the
RPC. SolGen is of the opinion that the petition should be
granted because the Ordinance mentioned in creating said
court is tinged with political complexion, that the
procedure does not afford a fair trial and violates
constitutional right of accused persons under a legitimate
Constitution. The court is of the opinion that:
As to the validity of the creation of the Court of Special
and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction by Ordinance No. 7, the
only factor to be considered is the authority of the
legislative power which promulgated said law or
ordinance. It is well established in International Law that
"The criminal jurisdiction established by the invader in the
occupied territory finds its source neither in the laws of
the conquering or conquered state, it is drawn entirely
from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations.
The authority thus derived can be asserted either through
special tribunals, whose authority and procedure is
defined in the military code of the conquering state, or
through the ordinary courts and authorities of the
occupied district." (Taylor, International Public Law, p.
598.)
The so-called Republic of the Philippines, being a
governmental instrumentality of the belligerent occupant,
had therefore the power or was competent to create the
Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. No
question may arise as to whether or not a court is of a
political complexion, for it is mere governmental agency
charged with the duty of applying the law to cases falling
within its jurisdiction. Its judgments and sentences may be
of a political complexion or not depending upon the
nature or character of the law so applied. There is no room
for doubt, therefore, as to the validity of the creation of
the court in question.
The validity of the sentence rendered by the Court of
Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which imposes
life imprisonment upon the herein petitioner, depends
upon the competence or power of the belligerent
occupant to promulgate Act No. 65 which punishes the
crime of which said petitioner was convicted.
It appears clear that it was within the power and
competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate,
through the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of
the Philippines, Act No. 65 of the said Assembly, which
penalizes the crimes of robbery and other offenses by
imprisonment ranging from the maximum period of the
imprisonment prescribed by the laws and ordinances
promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic as
minimum, to life imprisonment or death as maximum.
Although these crimes are defined in the Revised Penal
Code, they were altered and penalized by said Act No. 65
with different and heavier penalties, as new crimes and
offenses demanded by military necessity, incident to a
state of war, and necessary for the control of the country
by the belligerent occupant, the protection and safety of
the army of occupation, its support and efficiency, and the
success of its operations.
The last question is the legal effect of the reoccupation of
the Philippines and restoration of the Commonwealth
Government; that is, whether or not, by the principle of
postliminy, the punitive sentence which petitioner is now
serving fell through or ceased to be valid from that time.
We have already held in our recent decision in the case of
Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, supra, that all
judgment of political complexion of the courts during the
Japanese regime, ceased to be valid upon reoccupation of
the islands by virtue of the principle or right of
postliminium. Applying that doctrine to the present case,
the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a
political complexion must be considered as having ceased
to be valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation or liberation
of the Philippines by General Douglas MacArthur.

SEAFDEC VS. NLRC
G.R. Nos. 97468-70, September 2 1993, 241 SCRA 580
FACTS:
Two labor cases were filed by the herein private
respondents against
the petitioner, Southeast Asian Fisheries Development
Center (SEAFDEC), before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch, Iloilo
City. In these cases, the private respondents claim having
been wrongfully terminated from their employment by the
petitioner.
The petitioner, who claims to be an international inter-
government organization composed of
various Southeast Asian countries, filed a Motion to
Dismiss, challenged the jurisdiction of the public
respondent in taking cognizance of the above cases.
The private respondents, as well as respondent labor
arbiter, allege that the petitioner is not immune from suit
and assuming that if, indeed, it is an international
organization, it has, however, impliedly, if not expressly,
waived its immunity by belatedly raising the issue of
jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is immune from suit.
HELD:
The Court ruled for the petitioner. It is beyond question
that petitioner SEAFDEC is an international agency
enjoying diplomaticimmunity. It has already been held
in Southeast Asian FisheriesDevelopment Center-
Aquaculture Department vs. National Labor Relations
Commission (G.R. No. 86773, 206 SCRA 283/1992).
Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-
Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an
international agency beyond the jurisdiction of
public respondent NLRC.
Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC
including its Departments (AQD), enjoys functional
independence and freedom from control of the state in
whose territory its office is located. One of the basic
immunities of an international organization
is immunityfrom local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune
from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals
of the country where it is found. The obvious reason for
this is that the subjection of such an organization to the
authority of the local courts would afford a
convenient medium thru which the host government may
interfere in their operations or even influence or control
its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such
objection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of
such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on
behalf of its member-states.

KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO, respondents
FACTS:
Khosrow Minucher, an Iranian national and a Labor
Attach for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, Japan and
Manila came to the country to study in 1974 and
continued to stay as head of the Iranian National
Resistance Movement.
In May 1986, Minucher was charged with an Information
for violation of Republic Act No. 6425, Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972. The criminal charge followed a buy-bust
operation conducted by the Philippine police narcotic
agents in his house where a quantity of heroin was said to
have been seized. The narcotic agents were accompanied
by private respondent Arthur Scalzo who became one of
the principal witnesses for the prosecution.
In August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) for damages on the trumped-
up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo.
ISSUE:
WON private respondent Arthur Scalzo can be sued
provided his alleged diplomatic immunity conformably
with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
RULING:
The SC DENIED the petition.
Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions of
the diplomatic mission involve, the representation of the
interests of the sending state and promoting friendly
relations with the receiving state. Only diplomatic
agents, are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity
from civil and criminal suits. Indeed, the main yardstick in
ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to
immunity is the determination of whether or not he
performs duties of diplomatic nature. Being an Attache,
Scalzos main function is to observe, analyze and interpret
trends and developments in their respective fields in the
host country and submit reports to their own ministries or
departments in the home government. He is not generally
regarded as a member of the diplomatic mission. On the
basis of an erroneous assumption that simply because of
the diplomatic note, divesting the trial court of jurisdiction
over his person, his diplomatic immunity is contentious.

Under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit,
the precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a
foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary
international law. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those
of a foreign government done by its foreign agent,
although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but
acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be
barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit
without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is
believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The
proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual
but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim
par in parem, non habet imperium that all states are
sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one
another. The implication is that if the judgment against an
official would require the state itself to perform an
affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages
decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being
against the state itself, although it has not been formally
impleaded
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be
cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can
be established that he is acting within the directives of the
sending state. The consent of the host state is an
indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the
two sovereigns.
The buy-bust operation and other such acts are
indication that the Philippine government has given its
imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within
Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States
Drug Enforcement Agency. In conducting surveillance
activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer
during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a
principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher,
Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope
of his official function or duties.

Phil Tourism Authority vs PGDE
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, to annul the decision1
dated December 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA G.R. SP No. 90402. This CA decision dismissed the
petition for annulment of judgment which sought to set
aside the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Muntinlupa City, Branch 203, in Civil Case No. 03-212. The
RTC held the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) liable for
its unpaid obligation to Philippine Golf Development &
Equipment, Inc. (PHILGOLF).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On April 3, 1996, PTA, an agency of the Department of
Tourism, whose main function is to bolster and promote
tourism, entered into a contract with Atlantic Erectors, Inc.
(AEI) for the construction of the Intramuros Golf Course
Expansion Projects (PAR 60-66) for a contract price of
Fifty-Seven Million Nine Hundred Fifty-Four Thousand Six
Hundred Forty-Seven and 94/100 Pesos (P57,954,647.94).
The civil works of the project commenced. Since AEI was
incapable of constructing the golf course aspect of the
project, it entered into a sub-contract agreement with
PHILGOLF, a duly organized domestic corporation, to build
the golf course amounting to Twenty-Seven Million Pesos
(P27,000,000.00). The sub-contract agreement also
provides that PHILGOLF shall submit its progress billings
directly to PTA and, in turn, PTA shall directly pay
PHILGOLF.3
On October 2, 2003, PHILGOLF filed a collection suit
against PTA amounting to Eleven Million Eight Hundred
Twenty Thousand Five Hundred Fifty and 53/100 Pesos
(P11,820,550.53), plus interest, for the construction of the
golf course. Within the period to file a responsive pleading,
PTA filed a motion for extension of time to file an answer.
On October 30, 2003, the RTC granted the motion for
extension of time. PTA filed another motion for extension
of time to file an answer. The RTC again granted the
motion.
Despite the RTCs liberality of granting two successive
motions for extension of time, PTA failed to answer the
complaint. Hence, on April 6, 2004, the RTC rendered a
judgment of default, ruling as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the
defendant to pay plaintiff:
1. The amount of Eleven Million, Eight Hundred Twenty
Thousand, Five Hundred Fifty Pesos and Fifty Three
Centavos (P11,820,550.53), representing defendants
outstanding obligation, plus interest thereon of twelve
percent (12%) per annum from the time the unpaid billings
of plaintiff were due for payment by the defendant, until
they are fully paid.
2. The amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000.00), as attorneys fees.
3. The amount of One Hundred Twenty Eight Thousand,
Five Hundred Twenty Nine Pesos and Fourteen Centavos
(P128,529.14), as filing fees and other costs of litigation.
4. The amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P300,000.00), as moral damages.
5. The amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand (Pesos
(P150,000.00), as nominal damages, and
6. The amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P250,000.00), as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.4
On July 11, 2005, PTA seasonably appealed the case to the
CA. But before the appeal of PTA could be perfected,
PHILGOLF already filed a motion for execution pending
appeal with the RTC. The RTC, in an Order dated June 2,
2004, granted the motion and a writ of execution pending
appeal was issued against PTA. On June 3, 2004, a notice
of garnishment was issued against PTAs bank account at
the Land Bank of the Philippines, NAIA-BOC Branch to fully
satisfy the judgment.
PTA filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, imputing
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC for
granting the motion for execution pending appeal. The CA
ruled in favor of PTA and set aside the order granting the
motion for execution pending appeal.
On July 11, 2005, PTA withdrew its appeal of the RTC
decision and, instead, filed a petition5 for annulment of
judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. The petition
for annulment of judgment was premised on the argument
that the gross negligence of PTAs counsel prevented the
presentation of evidence before the RTC.
On December 13, 2006, the CA dismissed the petition for
annulment of judgment for lack of merit. PTA questions
this CA action in the present petition for certiorari.
THE PETITION
The petition cites three arguments: first, that the
negligence of PTAs counsel amounted to an extrinsic
fraud warranting an annulment of judgment; second, that
since PTA is a government entity, it should not be bound
by the inactions or negligence of its counsel; and third,
that there were no other available remedies left for PTA
but a petition for annulment of judgment.
OUR RULING
We find the petition unmeritorious.
The Rules of Court specifically provides for deadlines in
actions before the court to ensure an orderly disposition
of cases. PTA cannot escape these legal technicalities by
simply invoking the negligence of its counsel. This practice,
if allowed, would defeat the purpose of the Rules on
periods since every party would merely lay the blame on
its counsel to avoid any liability. The rule is that "a client is
bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the
realm of procedural technique[,]and unless such acts
involve gross negligence that the claiming party can prove,
the acts of a counsel bind the client as if it had been the
latters acts."6
In LBC Express - Metro Manila, Inc. v. Mateo,7 the Court
held that "[g]ross negligence is characterized by want of
even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation
where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully
and intentionally with a conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons may be affected."
This cannot be invoked in cases where the counsel is
merely negligent in submitting his required pleadings
within the period that the rules mandate.
It is not disputed that the summons together with a copy
of the complaint was personally served upon, and received
by PTA through its Corporate Legal Services Department,
on October 10, 2003.8 Thus, in failing to submit a
responsive pleading within the required time despite
sufficient notice, the RTC was correct in declaring PTA in
default.
There was no extrinsic fraud
"Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the
prevailing party in the litigation which is committed
outside of the trial of the case, whereby the unsuccessful
party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by
fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent."9
Under the doctrine of this cited case, we do not see the
acts of PTAs counsel to be constitutive of extrinsic fraud.
The records reveal that the judgment of default10 was
sent via registered mail to PTAs counsel. However, PTA
never availed of the remedy of a motion to lift the order of
default.11 Since the failure of PTA to present its evidence
was not a product of any fraudulent acts committed
outside trial, the RTC did not err in declaring PTA in
default.
Annulment of judgment is not the proper remedy
PTAs appropriate remedy was only to appeal the RTC
decision. "Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court is a recourse equitable in character and
allowed only in exceptional cases where the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no
fault of petitioner."12
In this case, appeal was an available remedy. There was
also no extraordinary reason for a petition for annulment
of judgment, nor was there any adequate explanation on
why the remedy for new trial or petition for relief could
not be used. The Court is actually at a loss why PTA had
withdrawn a properly filed appeal and substituted it with
another petition, when PTA could have merely raised the
same issues through an ordinary appeal.
PTA was acting in a proprietary character
PTA also erred in invoking state immunity simply because
it is a government entity. The application of state
immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
sovereign transactions and not in cases of commercial
activities or economic affairs. The State, in entering into a
business contract, descends to the level of an individual
and is deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be
sued.13
Since the Intramuros Golf Course Expansion Projects
partakes of a proprietary character entered into between
PTA and PHILGOLF, PTA cannot avoid its financial liability
by merely invoking immunity from suit.
A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper
only when there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy
Lastly, a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is only available in cases when a tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is
not a mode of appeal, and cannot also be made as a
substitute for appeal. It will not lie in cases where other
remedies are available under the law.1wphi1
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,14 the
Court had the occasion to state:
The general rule is that a [certiorari] will not issue where
the remedy of appeal is available to the aggrieved party.
The remedies of appeal in the ordinary course of law and
that of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
cumulative. Hence, the special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 is not and cannot be a substitute for an
appeal, where the latter remedy is available. xxx
xxxx
The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision
of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Court. On the other hand, if the
error subject of the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the
act complained of was perpetrated by a quasi-judicial
officer or agency with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy
available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the said Rules. [emphases supplied;
citations omitted]
In sum, PTA had the remedy of appealing the RTC decision
to the CA and, thereafter, to us. Under the circumstances,
we find no adequate reason to justify the elevation of this
case to the CA and then to us, under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court.

SSS vs. CA(120 SCRA 707)
FACTS:Spouses David and Socorro Cruz, applied and
granted a real estate loan by the SSS withresidential lot
located at Pateros, Rizal as collateral. The spouses Cruz
complied with their monthlypayments. When delayed
were incurred in their monthly payments SSS filed a
petition for foreclosure of their real estate mortgage
executed by the spouses Cruz on the ground that the
spouses Cruz defaultedin payment, Pursuant for these
application for foreclosure notices were published on the
second noticethe counsel for spouses Cruz sent a letter to
SSS informing the latter that his clients are up to date
intheir payment of the monthly amortization and the
SSS should discontinued the publication of thenotices of
foreclosure. This request remain unheaded, this spouses
Cruz filed an action for damagesagainst SSS before RTC in
Rizal. SSS invoking its immunity from suit being an agency
of the governmentperforming government function. The
trial court and court of appeal nevertheless awarded
damages infavor of spouses Cruz which was affirmed by
court of appeal, Hence this petitio.
ISSUE: Whether or not SSS is immune from suit.
HELD:Negative.. The SSS has a distinct legal personality
and it can be sued for damages. The SSS doesnot enjoy
immunity from suit by express statutory consent.It has
corporated power separate and distinct from the
government. SSS own organic act
specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in court.
These words sue and be sued embrace all
civil process incident to a legal action. So that even
assuming that the SSS, as it claims, enjoys immunityfrom
suit as an entity performing governmental function, by
virtue of the explicit provision of theaforecited enabling
law, the government must be deemed to have waived
immunity in respect of theSSS, although it does not
thereby concede its liability that statutory law has given to
the private citizen aremedy for the enforcement and
protection of his rights. The SSS thereby has been required
to submitto the jurisdiction of the court; subject to its right
to interpose any lawful defense

BUREAU OF PRINTING, SERAFIN SALVADOR and
MARIANO LEDESMA, vs. THE BUREAU OF PRINTING
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (NLU), et al.
G.R. No. L-15751 January 28, 1961
Facts:
The action in question was upon complaint of the
respondents Bureau of Printing Employees Association
(NLU)Pacifico Advincula, Roberto Mendoza, Ponciano
Arganda and Teodulo Toleran

filed by an acting prosecutor of theIndustrial Court against
herein petitioner Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador, the
Acting Secretary of the Department of General Services,
and Mariano Ledesma the Director of the Bureau of
Printing. The complaint alleged that SerafinSalvador and
Mariano Ledesma have been engaging in unfair labor
practices by interfering with, or coercing theemployees of
the Bureau of Printing particularly the members of the
complaining association petition, in the exercise of their
right to self-organization an discriminating in regard to
hire and tenure of their employment in order to
discouragethem from pursuing the union activities.The
petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador and
Mariano Ledesma denied the charges of unfair labor
practicesattributed to the and, by way of affirmative
defenses, alleged, among other things, that respondents
Pacifico Advincula,Roberto Mendoza Ponciano Arganda
and Teodulo Toleran were suspended pending result of an
administrativeinvestigation against them for breach of Civil
Service rules and regulations petitions; that the Bureau of
Printing has no juridical personality to sue and be sued;
that said Bureau of Printing is not an industrial concern
engaged for the purposeof gain but is an agency of the
Republic performing government functions. For relief, they
prayed that the case bedismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Thereafter, before the case could be heard, petitioners
filed an "Omnibus Motion"asking for a preliminary hearing
on the question of jurisdiction raised by them in their
answer and for suspension of thetrial of the case on the
merits pending the determination of such jurisdictional
question. The motion was granted, butafter hearing, the
trial judge of the Industrial Court in an order dated January
27, 1959 sustained the jurisdiction of thecourt on the
theory that the functions of the Bureau of Printing are
"exclusively proprietary in nature," and,consequently,
denied the prayer for dismissal. Reconsideration of this
order having been also denied by the court inbanc.
Note: The Bureau of Printing is an office of the
Government created by the Administrative Code of 1916
(Act No. 2657). As suchinstrumentality of the Government,
it operates under the direct supervision of the Executive
Secretary, Office of the President, and is"charged with the
execution of all printing and binding, including work
incidental to those processes, required by the
National Government and such other work of the same
character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the
(Secretary of Finance)Executive Secretary, be authorized
to undertake . . .." (See. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code). It has no
corporate existence, and itsappropriations are provided
for in the General Appropriations Act. Designed to meet
the printing needs of the Government, it is primarily a
service bureau and obviously, not engaged in business or
occupation for pecuniary profit.
Issue:
whether or not Bureau of Printing can be sued.
Ruling:
No. Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any
corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of
Printingcannot be sued. Any suit, action or proceeding
against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually
be a suit, actionor proceeding against the Government
itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot
be sued without itsconsent, much less over its objection.It
is true that the Bureau of Printing receives outside jobs
and that many of its employees are paid for overtime work
onregular working days and on holidays, but these facts do
not justify the conclusion that its functions are
"exclusivelyproprietary in nature." Overtime work in the
Bureau of Printing is done only when the interest of the
service so requires.As a matter of administrative policy,
the overtime compensation may be paid, but such
payment is discretionary withthe head of the Bureau
depending upon its current appropriations, so that it
cannot be the basis for holding that thefunctions of said
Bureau are wholly proprietary in character. Clearly, while
the Bureau of Printing is allowed toundertake private
printing jobs, it cannot be pretended that it is thereby an
industrial or business concern. The additional work it
executes for private parties is merely incidental to its
function, and although such work may be deemed
proprietary in character, there is no showing that the
employees performing said proprietary function are
separate and distinct from those employed in its general
governmental functions

Department of Agriculture vs NLRC
Facts: Petitioner Department of Agriculture (DA) and
Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security
services to be provided by the latter to the said
governmental entity. Pursuant to their
arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security
Agency in the various premises of the DA. Thereafter,
several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of
wages, nonpayment of 13th month pay,
uniformallowances, night shift differential pay, holiday
pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the
DA and the security agency.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA
jointly and severally liable with the security agency for the
payment of money claims of the complainant security
guards. The DA and the security agency did not appeal the
decision. Thus, the decision became final and executory.
The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and
execute the judgment against the property of the DA and
the security agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on
execution the motor vehicles of the DA.


Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the
State applies in the case


Held: The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution
that the State may not be sued without its consent
reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign
character of the State and an express affirmation of the
unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction
of courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. A
sovereign is exempt from suit based on the logical and
practical ground that there can be no legal right as against
the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends.

The rule is not really absolute for it does not say that the
State may not be sued under any circumstances. The State
may at times be sued. The States consent may be given
expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made
through a general law or a special law. Implied consent, on
the other hand, is conceded when the State itself
commences litigation, thus opening itself to a
counterclaim, or when it enters into a contract. In this
situation, the government is deemed to have descended
to the level of the other contracting party and to have
divested itself of its sovereign immunity.

But not all contracts entered into by the government
operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must
still be made between one which is executed in the
exercise of its sovereign function and another which is
done in its proprietary capacity. A State may be said to
have descended to the level of an individual and can this
be deemed to have actually given its consent to be sued
only when it enters into business contracts. It does not
apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its
sovereign functions.

In the case, the DA has not pretended to have assumed a
capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when
it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could
have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character.

But, be that as it may, the claims of the
complainant security guards clearly constitute
money claims. Act No. 3083 gives the consent of the State
to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability
arising from contract, express or implied. Pursuant,
however, to Commonwealth Act 327, as amended by PD
1145, the money claim must first be brought to the
Commission on Audit.

Case Digest: Sanders and Moreau, Jr. vs. Veridiano II
FACTS:
Rossi and Wyer were advised that their employment had
been converted from permanent full-time to permanent
part-time. Their reaction was to protest this conversion
and to institute grievance proceedings conformably to the
pertinent rules and regulations of the US DoD. Moreau
sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change
of employment status of the two from which Rossi and
Wyer filed in the Court of First Instance of Olongapo City a
complaint for damages against the herein petitioners
claiming that the letters contained libellous imputations
against the two. Due to the failure to appear in the court,
Moreau and Sanders were declared in default.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners were performing their official
duties when they did the acts for which they have been
sued for damages.
RULING:
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for
which the petitioners are being called to account were
performed by them in the discharge of their official
duties. Sanders, as director of the special services
department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over
its personnel and had a hand in their employment, work
assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related
matters. The same can be said for Moreau. Given the
official character of the above-described letters, it can be
concluded that the petitioners were being sued as officers
of the United States government. There should be no
question by now that such complaint cannot prosper
unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable
has given its consent to be sued.

Republic vs. Sandoval 220 SCRA 124
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic
WritesLabels:Case Digests,Political Law
Facts:
Farmer-rallyists marched to Malacanang calling for a
genuine landreform program. There was a marchers-police
confrontation which resultedin the death of 12 rallyists
and scores were wounded. As a result, then Pres.Aquino
issued AO 11 creating the Citizens Mendiola Commission
for thepurpose of conducting an investigation. The
mostsignificant recommendation of the Commission was f
or the heirs of thedeceased and wounded victims to be
compensated by the government.Based on such
recommendation, the victims of Mendiola massacre filed
anaction for damages against the Republic and the
military/police officersinvolved in the incident.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not there is a valid waiver of immunity
(2) Whether or not the State is liable for damages
Held:
The Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunity
asclaimed by the petitioners. The recommendation made
by the Commission toindemnify the heirs of the deceased
and the victims does not in any waymean that liability
attaches to the State. AO 11 merely states the purpose
of the creation of the Commission and, therefore,
whatever is the finding of theCommission only serves as
the basis for a cause of action in the event
anyparty decides to litigate the same. Thus, the recommen
dation of theCommission does not in any way bind the Stat
e.The State cannot be made liable because the
military/police officers whoallegedly were responsible for
the death and injuries suffered by themarchers acted
beyond the scope of their authority. It is a settled rule that
the State as a person can commit no wrong. The military
and police officerswho were responsible for the atrocities
can be held personally liable fordamages as they exceeded
their authority, hence, the acts cannot beconsidered
official.

US Vs. Ruiz 136 SCRA 487
Facts:

The usa had a naval base in subic, zambales. The base was
one of those provided in the military bases agreement
between phils. and the US. Respondent alleges that it won
in the bidding conducted by the US for the constrcution of
wharves in said base that was merely awarded to another
group. For this reason, a suit for specific preformance was
filed by him against the US.

Issue: Whether the US naval base in bidding for said
contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to
invoke state immunity.

Held:

The traditional role of the state immunity excempts a state
from being sued in the courts of another state without its
consent or waiver. This rule is necessary consequence of
the principle of indepemndence and equality of states.
Howecer, the rules of international law are not petrified;
they are continually and evolving and because the
activities of states have multiplied. It has been necessary
to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental
acts and private, commercial and proprietory acts. the
result is that state immunity now extends only to
sovereign and governmental acts.

The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only
when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign. Its commercial
activities of economic affairs. A state may be descended to
the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have
tacitly given its consent to be sued. Only when it enters
into business contracts. It does not apply where the
conracts relates the exercise of its sovereign function. In
this case, the project are integral part of the naval base
which is devoted to the defense of both US and phils.,
indisputably, a function of the government of highest
order, they are not utilized for , nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes.

Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. Nos. 89898-99 October 1, 1990
Facts: Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a
portion of land owned by private respondents, Admiral
Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After proceedings, the
RTC of Makati determined the cost of the said land which
the petitioner must pay to the private respondents
amounting to P5,291,666.00 minus the advanced payment
of P338,160.00. It issued the corresponding writ of
execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of
funds of the petitioner which was deposited in PNB.
However, such order was opposed by petitioner through a
motion for reconsideration, contending that its funds at
the PNB could neither be garnished nor levied upon
execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of
public funds without the proper appropriation required
under the law, citing the case of Republic of the
Philippines v. Palacio.The RTC dismissed such motion,
which was appealed to the Court of Appeals; the latter
affirmed said dismissal and petitioner now filed this
petition for review.
Issue: Whether or not funds of the Municipality of Makati
are exempt from garnishment and levy upon execution.
Held: It is petitioner's main contention that the orders of
respondent RTC judge involved the net amount of
P4,965,506.45, wherein the funds garnished by
respondent sheriff are in excess of P99,743.94, which are
public fund and thereby are exempted from execution
without the proper appropriation required under the law.
There is merit in this contention. In this jurisdiction, well-
settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy
and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute.
Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and
market fees, and which are intended primarily and
exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental
activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt
from execution. Absent a showing that the municipal
council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating
the said amount from its public funds deposited in their
PNB account, no levy under execution may be validly
effected. However, this court orders petitioner to pay for
the said land which has been in their use already. This
Court will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle
its legal obligation arising from expropriation of land they
are already enjoying. The State's power of eminent
domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play
and justice.

SPOUSES FONTANILLA VS HON. MALIAMAN
Posted by Pius Morados on November 8, 2011
GR # 55963 and 61045, Feb. 27, 1991 (Constitutional Law
Government Agency, Proprietary Functions)
FACTS: National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a
government agency, was held liable for damages resulting
to the death of the son of herein petitioner spouses
caused by the fault and/or negligence of the driver of the
said agency. NIA maintains that it is not liable for the act of
its driver because the former does not perform primarily
proprietorship functions but governmental functions.
ISSUE: Whether or not NIA may be held liable for damages
caused by its driver.
HELD: Yes. NIA is a government agency with a corporate
personality separate and distinct from the government,
because its community services are only incidental
functions to the principal aim which is irrigation of lands,
thus, making it an agency with proprietary functions
governed by Corporation Law and is liable for actions of
their employees

Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace Panel on
Ancestral Domain
Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read
the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!

Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace Panel on
Ancestral Domain

Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the
powers of the President in pursuing the peace process.
While the facts surrounding this controversy center on the
armed conflict in Mindanao between the government and
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the legal issue
involved has a bearing on all areas in the country where
there has been a long-standing armed conflict. Yet again,
the Court is tasked to perform a delicate balancing act. It
must uncompromisingly delineate the bounds within
which the President may lawfully exercise her discretion,
but it must do so in strict adherence to the Constitution,
lest its ruling unduly restricts the freedom of action vested
by that same Constitution in the Chief Executive precisely
to enable her to pursue the peace process effectively.


Facts:

On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons
of their respective peace negotiating panels, were
scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the
Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF
Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia.

The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF
was not to materialize, however, for upon motion of
petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before
the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from
signing the same.

The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of
negotiation and the concluding of several prior
agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996,
when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On July 18,
1997, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the
Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. The
following year, they signed the General Framework of
Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998.

On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and Vice-
Governor Emmanuel Piol filed a petition, docketed as
G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with
Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and Temporary Restraining Order. Invoking the right to
information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek
to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the
complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its
attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the
MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the
MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon.
Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be
declared unconstitutional.

Issues:

1. Whether the petitions have become moot and
academic

(i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of
the disclosure of official copies of the final draft of the
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); and

(ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local
Government Units is concerned, if it is considered that
consultation has become fait accompli with the finalization
of the draft;

2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the
MOA is ripe for adjudication;

3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the
Philippines Peace Panel committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when
it negotiated and initiated the MOA vis--vis ISSUES Nos. 4
and 5;

4. Whether there is a violation of the people's right to
information on matters of public concern (1987
Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest
(1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public
consultation under Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)[;]

If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an appropriate
remedy;

5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING itself

a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity
(BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or
political subdivision not recognized by law;

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to
conform to the MOA;

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of
Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS
ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII
(DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL
DOMAINS)[;]

If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the
authority to so bind the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines;

6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of
North Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela,
and the Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from
the areas covered by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland
is a justiciable question; and

7. Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates
any prior valid commitments of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines.

Held:

The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands,
namely, Concepts and Principles, Territory, Resources, and
Governance.

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or
controversies. Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or
to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere
academic questions. The limitation of the power of judicial
review to actual cases and controversies defines the role
assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power,
to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas
committed to the other branches of government.

As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of
paramount public interest or of transcendental
importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-
in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite
locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo.

Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-
signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the
GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the Court
finds that the present petitions provide an exception to
the "moot and academic" principle in view of (a) the grave
violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional
character of the situation and paramount public interest;
(c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements
necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on
Peace signed by the government and the MILF back in
June 2001. Hence, the present MOA-AD can be
renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain
similar or significantly dissimilar provisions compared to
the original.

That the subject of the information sought in the present
cases is a matter of public concern faces no serious
challenge. In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is
indeed of public concern. In previous cases, the Court
found that the regularity of real estate transactions
entered in the Register of Deeds, the need for adequate
notice to the public of the various laws, the civil service
eligibility of a public employee, the proper management of
GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials,
the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth,
and the identity of party-list nominees, among others, are
matters of public concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD
subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving
as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large.

In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to
carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated
by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No.
8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was
designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the
legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious,
oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It
illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present
Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but
the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative
relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are
unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the
associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on
its way to independence.

The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain
Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of
2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution.