4. Waiver after marriage .

5. Suppletory rules: Co-ownership

6. What constitutes ACP
7. What is excluded from ACP
8. Charges upon ACP
Luzon Surety Co.. In. v. De Gan:ia 0969)
Facts: LadisJao Chavez, as principal. am Luzon Surety Co., Inc., executed a surety booo in favor of the PNB, to
guaranty a crop loan granted to Chavez. On or about ~ same date, an iOOemnity agreement was signed by Chavez,
with two others (Garcia and Lacson), ill favor of Luzon Surety Co., Inc. On 1956, PNB filed a compJaint against
Chavez and Luzon SW"ety to recover the amount ofP4,577.95. Tlrn" a third-party compJaint against Chavez, and the
two others, based on the iIKlemnity agreement, was instituted by Luzon Surety. Tlr trial court granted both petitions,
and ordered ~ payment of the loan. A writ of garnishment was issued against Garcia, which was later declared void
by the CFI. '
Issue: WON a conjugal partnership coukl be held liable on an indemnity agreemem executed by the husband to
accommodate a 3Td party in favor of a surety company?
Held/Ratio: NO. As explained in the decision oow umer review: "It is true that the busoond is the administrator of
the conjugal property pursuant to the provisions of Art. 163 of the New Civil Code. However, as such administrator
the only 9bligations incurred by the husband that are chargeable against the conjugal property are those incunedin
the legitimate pursuit of his career, profession or business with tOO ronest belief that he is doing right for the benefit
of the family. This is not true in the case at bar for we believe tlBt the hus~ in acting as guarantor or surety for
another in an indemnity agreement as that involved in this case did not act for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
In Art. 161 of NCC, a conjugal partnership is liable only for such "debts and obligations contracted by the
husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." There must be the requisite showing ~ of some advantage
which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. There is oone in this case. Nor coukl there be, considering that
the benefit was clearly intended for a third party.
Gelano v. CA (1981)
Facts: Private resporxlent Insular Sawmill leased tIle paraphernal property of petionel"-wife Guillermina for its
business. During tIle lease, cash advances on 8CCOWlt of rentals were given by ~ corporation to petitioner -husbarrl
Carlos. The said sum was taken and received by petitioner Carbs on tOO agreement that private resporxlent could
deduct the same fiom the monthly rentals of ~ leased premises until said cash advances are fully paid. Only a
portion was used as payment, but Carlos refused to pay tOO baJance despite repeated demands. Meanwhile,
Guillerma refured to pay on he gro~ that said amount was for ~ personal account of 00r husband asked for by.
and given to him, without her knowledge and consent and did not benefit tre family.
There was also an occasion wherein the respoooent corporat~n accommodated the petitioners in renewing bans
with a bank by executing a joint aOO several promissory note with Carbs. As a result, ~ bank collected fiom the
respondent corporation by debiting from its accowlt with the bank. Only half of the ban was paid by Carlos.
Guillermina refused to pay on the gro..m that sre had no knowledge about the accommodation by the corporation in
favor of her husband.
Issue: WON Carlos is personally liable for t~ obligations contracted with respondent corporation?
Held/Ratio: NO. SilK:e the obligation contracted by petitioner Carlos redounded to tOO benefit of tOO family, tOO
inevitable conclusion is that 100 conjugal property is liable for his debt pursuant to paragraph I, Article 1408, Civil
Code of 1889 which provision incidentally can still be found in paragraph 1, Article 161 of the New Civil Code.
Only the conjugal partnership is liable, not joint am ~veral as erroneously described by the Court of Appeals, tOO
conjugal partnership being only a single entity.
G-Tractors. Inc. v. CA 11985)
Facts: In consonance with his business as producer and exporter of k>gs, private respoment Luis, who is legally
manied to priave respondent Josefina, entered into a contract of lease of heavy equipment with the petitioner.
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