10 31 13 72675 65630 63341 71437 607 599 Filing and Voxox Fax Proof With 4 4 13 Fax Header's Motion To Strike Remand and Sentencing Memor and Extension of Time Sought Appt of Counsel Etc. Vacate Epo

." . " ... ,." .. -.. trOll: zilcncooqnl1n HH-13 p.
2 I)f 12
Case No.
RCR
2011-063341
Pearson might have now
Department No. ________________ _
IN THE JUSTICE COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
State of Nevada EXPEDITED
Plaintiff,
vs.
REQUEST FOR AUDIO COPY
OF PROCEEDINGS
Zach coughlin
Defendant.
I
The Plaintiff x Defendant has requested an audio copy
of proceedings of the following:
1)
2)
3)
4)
Hearing Date
2/4/13 10 am video arraingment
2/ 5/13 OSC 8 , 30 am
Hear ing Date ______________________ _
Hearing Date
Healing Date
2/5/ 13 Reconsideration Hearing at around
8 :45am to 9 am or so in be tween two
portions of trial in r c r 12-065630
Date resubmitting 4/4/13 . 20. __ _
Zach Coughl in
"
Addrr:.u
Reno, NV 89512
Oty, S!::au., ZIp
tel and fax 949 667 7402
QlIIt:act telephone number
Please ma il the CD to me if, no charge to, other wise, please fax
A $35.00 fee is due at the time ofthe request. or leav:e voicemail when ready
thA'lms'\k>!!i<.ate by I FP Order .
Call (775)325-6575 if you have any questions.
ALL FEES HAVE BEEN WAIVED BY ifp ord
4/12/13
Mr. Coughlin:
Re: RCR2011-063341, THE STATE OF NEVADA VS. ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN
The Appeal was filed and the Appeal process began on 12/3/2012. The Second Judicial District Court
issued the Order Granting In Forma Pauperis on 1/9/13 as it pertained to Reno Justice Court Case
Number RCR2011-063341, and thereafter Second Judici al District Court Case Number CR12202S. The
hearings held on 2/4/13 and 2/5/13, as requested in the Request for Audio Copy of Proceedings, were
not included in the Appeal as filed.
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- 1/41 -
MOTION TO STRIKE 10/23/13 SENTENCING MEMORANDUM,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
NV Bar 9473 (temporarily suspended but authorized
to practice on his own behalf in Reno Justice Court),
license not suspended before the USPTO
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Self Representing Attorney Defendant

IN THE RENO JUSTICE COURT
COUNTY OF WASHOE; STATE OF NEVADA

STATE OF NEVADA,
PLAINTIFF

vs.

ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN;

DEFENDANT
----------------------------------------------------/
WASHOE COUNTY, APPLICANT (OBO
WCPD) V. ZACH COUGHLIN, ADVERSE
PARTY IN RCP2012-000599
/
STATE BAR OF NEVADA, APPLICANT
V.
ZACH COUGHLIN, ADVERSER PARTY
IN RCP 2012-000607.
------------------------------------------------/
)
)
)
)
)
)

RCR2013-072675 D5
RCR2011-063341 D2, THEN D4
RCR2012-065630 D1, THEN D5
RCR2013-071437 D2, THEN D4
D5, then reassigned
Rcp2012-000607
Rcp2012-000599

MOTION TO STRIKE 10/23/13 SENTENCING MEMORANDUM in rcr2013-072675, and to STRIKE
MOTIONS TO REMAND IN RCR2011-063341 AND RCR2012-065630 (IS DDA STEGE
SUBSTITUTING IN FOR DDA YOUNG?), AND FOR CONTINUANCE OF 11/6/13 SENTENCING
HEARING GIVEN COUGHLIN HAS BEEN UNABLE TO FIND COUNSEL WILLING TO ACCEPT
HIS CASE AND GOOD CAUSE INCIDENT TO FACT THAT COUGHLINS HAS CRIMINAL TRIAL
IN THE RMC SET FOR DAY AFTER SENTENCING HEARING IN THE CASE AT BAR, AND
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT COUGHLIN AT ALL CRITICAL
PHASES OF THIS CASE, WHERE SENTENCING IS JUST SUCH A CRITICAL PHASE; AND
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE OPPOSITION TO ALL MOTIONS TO REMAND, AND
SENTENCING MEMORANDUM; MOTION TO VACATE OR MODIFY TPO AND EPO IN 599 AND
607 AND FOR ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENAS DETAILED HEREIN.AND NOTICE OF APPEAL OF ALL
ORDERS 599 AND 607 AND REQUEST TO PROCEED IFP THEREIN, IN APPEAL TO THE 2JDC;
motion to CONFLICT OUT WCDAS OFFICE AND RJC AND ITS BAILIFFS

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- 2/41 -
I, Zachary Barker Coughlin declare pursuant to NRS 53.045, under penalty of perjury that the
following is true and correct and based upon my own first hand knowledge except those matters stated upon
information and belief (even where implicitly so stated), and as to those matters, I believe them to be true.
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
Coughlin is indigent, meeting numerous of the presumptive threshold standards in the 1/4/08
Indigent Defense Order set forth in ADKT 0411 (Coughlins yearly income is less than $8,000, well less
than the 200% of the 2013 Federal Poverty Guideline for a family of 1 (where such figure is $11,500,
therefore, twice thereof would be $23,000) in addition to the fact that Coughlin receives both food
stamps/SNAP, and has his medications and doctors visits paid for by Northern Nevada Adult Mental Health
(NNAMHS), Coughlin owns only a 1996 Honda Accord worth less than $500 (which has recently not
worked for one month), owns not stocks, bonds, or real property, and has not income, though is kept busy on
a full time basis defending himself against a raft of vindictive prosecutions, and in the appeal of the
recommendation to permanently disbar him in 62337 before the NSCT). Coughlins requests the
appointment of counsel in any and every case and every stage in which he is at all entitled to such under the
laws of the United States and the State of Nevada (where SCR 111(6) presents issue preclusion as to a NRS
199.280 charge being a serious crime, and the 1/4/08 Indigent Defense Orders established that Coughlin is
entitled to counsel for all serious charges (states are permitted to go beyond the Scott v. Illinois federal
standard (Wegg v. Oregon) in providing greater protection to individual rights). The complete and utter
breakdown of the adversary system in this matter is well illustrated in DDA Steges purported 10/23/13
Sentencing Memorandum. Whereas Coughlin has had a large number of filings and requests for access to
his files in criminal cases and for dockets and audio transcripts rejected by the RJC, where such rejections
have been premised upon some application of JCRRT 10 and 11 via the implementation of the Procedural
Rules Applicable to all Filings by Zachary Coughlin set forth in Admin Order 2013-06 (which the RJC
purports applies even in criminal and landlord tenant/TPO/EPO matters despite JCRRT 2 making clear that
the JCRRT do not apply to such variety of proceedings and cases), DDA Steges 10/23/13 Sentencing
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- 3/41 -
Memorandum completely lackign in any Points and Authorities whatsoever, and contains numerous of
the very sort of RJC dockets that Coughlin has been denied (even where offering to pay for such), by the
RJC. While Judge Glasson seemed to indicate he did not see the utility of such types of dockets, NRS 4.240
and DDA Steges own use thereof provide support for the view that dockets, indeed, are useful, especially
in the justice court setting, and the the RJC, in violating Knox v. District Court, NRS 178.600, .610,
and .608 (by way of both Admin Order 2012-01 (RCR2013-071437) and Admin Order 2013-06), has
greatly prejudiced Coughlins ability to defend himself in this matter, particularly where the RJC has already
ruled Coughlin indigent in 72675 (else how could Bruce Lindsay, Esq. Possibly become appointed counsel
sufficient to justify (as he was sole counsel in Judge Cliftons view) the RJC refusing to file or
recognized as filed Coughlins numerous filings prior to Lindsays requesting to be removed in his 6/17/13
Motion to Withdraw (which makes quite clear, as does the audio transcript of the 7/18/13 hearing in 72675,
that Coughlin did not move to have Lindsay removed (Lindsay did so before even conferring with Coughlin
at all, and the admitted direct appointment of Lindsay by the RJC is violative of ADKT 0411, which is
mandatory authority in Nevada, as have been the purported denials of Coughlins various Motions for
Appointed Counsel and to proceed Informa Pauperis by the RJC, Judge Glasson, and RJC Chief Bailiff
Sexton (and it is particularly inappropriate for Bailiff Sexton to be making such beyond ministerial
rejections of Coughlins requests for the audio of the trial, the hearings of 5/30/13, 6/6/13, and 9/24/13. The
RJC has already provided Coughlin the hearing of 7/18/13 in RCR2013-072675, which could not and would
not have been done absent a finding and ruling that Coughlin is indigent, further undermining the rationale
profferred by Chief Bailiff Sexton for refusing to release to Coughlin to audio transcript of the 10/14/13 trial
in 72675, which contains testimony by three different bailiffs Sexton is in charge of supervising and where
the subject matter of the charge in question (NRS 199.280 resisting a public officer, strongly implicate
Sextons performance (as does his bailiff Reyes fraudulent remixing of the names and subject matter of
Washoe County Code (WCC) 53.140, 53.200, where Reyes police report reveals the extent to which he
knows full well is is a peace officer (actually, a Class II police officer), an not a public officer, else why
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would Reyes originally remix the title of WCC 53.200 from resisting a public officer to
resisting/obstructing/delaying officer and remix WCC 53.140s disturbing the peace to
resisting/obstructing/delaying a peace officer in his 5/28/13 police report (see Reyes Declaration of
Probable Cause and Arrest Report of 5/23/13 and the five page 5/28/13 report and Narrative therein by
Reyes in 72675).
This entirely inappropriate refusal by Sexton and the RJC (which accepts checks from some for
audio recordings but would not from Coughlin...even where no payment of any sort is required from
Coughlin) to release the various audio transcripts and dockets Coughlin seeks (and copies of the
submissions from Coughlins jail cell between 5/23/13 and 6/8/13 (speaking of which, the exhibit offered by
Stege from a totally different case in CR13-0614 should be stricken particularly where the placement of
such purported kited letter by Coughlin was place in such district court matter, rather than in the instant
case for strategic purposes by the WCDAs Officer, RJC, and pre-trial services (all of which are adopting the
difficult position of attempting to justify the refusal to countenance the various filings by Coughlin from his
jail cell in 72675 and other matters, whilst selectively filing in CR13-0614 that which Stege offered as an
exhibit at Trial...where such rejections of Coughlins filings (they are filed according to the prisoner mailbox
rules upon Coughlin placing such in a position for pickup by deputies at the jail, regardless of any refusal to
place a file stamp thereon by the RJC (see Whitman, Donoho, Barnes, Sullivan, and other Nevada cases)
were integral to the approach taken by the RJC and Judge Clifton in refusing to allow Coughlin to make any
filings based upon the contention that Bruce Lindsay was Coughlins sole counsel at such time. Further,
such approach has now backfired where the purported rationale for refusing the indigent Coughlin counsel
in connection with yet another violation (presiding judges are not permitted to rule on applications for
appointment of counsel at public expense, such must be referred to another) of ADKTs 0411 1/4/08
Indigent Defense Order (ie, the contention of 9/24/13 by Judge Clifton and of 10/14/13 by Judge Glasson)
that Coughlin has somehow fired Lindsay or refused counsel is clearly not supported by the record in this
matter (which, again, the RJC and Sexton are refusing to release, though Coughlins filing of a Notice of
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Appeal on 10/24/13, per NRS 189.030(1) now makes required that the transcript of all hearings and the trial
in this case be transcribed (typed...as NRS 189.030(3) makes clear merely transmitting the audio is not
sufficient under such statutory dictate, which a court of limited jurisdiction is not free to ignore).
I. COUGHLIN SEEKS A CONTINUANCE OF THE 11/6/13 SENTENCING HEARING
Further good cause now exists for continuing the 11/6/13 Sentencing Hearing where Coughlin has
been unable to find an attorney willing to accept his case despite making dilligent efforts to do so. Further,
Coughlin now has two trials scheduled for the day after the 11/6/13 sentencing hearing in 72675 in RMC 13
CR 3913, and RMC 13 CR 3914. The difficulty in preparing for all three of these trials in such close
proximity to one another is entirely prejudicial, particularly in conjunction with the rampant violations of
ADKT 0411s 1/4/08 Indigent Defense Orders dictates, particularly where an order by the RJC now
exposes Coughlin to criminal prosecution for merely attempting to have served a subpoena on a necessary
witness in RCP2012-000607, where Steges Sentencing Memorandum has now brought into play in this
case such matter wherein the State Bar of Nevada successfully obtained a Workplace Harassment Protection
Order against Coughlin from RJC Chief Judge Pearson on 12/20/12, the very same day of the issuance of
the Admin Order 2012-01 at issue in this matter. Further, the RJCs continued refusal to release the audio
transcripts of all the hearings in RCR2011-063341 and RCR2012-065630 (with all the attendnat NCJC
Canon 2, Rule 2.15, Canon 1, Rule 1.1, and NRS 178.405 and extra judicial source rule violations at issue
therein) has further prejudiced both Coughlins defense at trial and ability to participate in the sentencing
hearing in a meaningful manner. Additionally, coughlins requests a stay of such sentencing hearing
pending the outcome of Coughlins Younger absention Motion for TRO in NVD 13 CV 539.
For both the 11/7/13 trials in RMC 3913 and 3914 and the sentencing hearing in 72675 Coughlin
need subpoena several individuals fromm the State Bar of Nevada, and the TPO/EPO in RCP2012-000607
now makes such impossible, particularly where RMC Judge W. Gardner has made clear that his view of the
TPO, at least, was that Coughlin was precluded from , in any manner whatsoever, submitted filing to the
SBNs Clerk of Court Laura Peters during the pendency of such TPO (between 12/20/12 and 1/4/13...which
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makes all the more ridiculous Peters testimony that Coughlin had nothing pending before the SBN during
such time and no legitimate reason to contact the SBN, which is further undermined by Peters admission to
having lied at the 1/4/13 extension hearing TPO EPO in 607 to Judge Pearson in alleging she personally eye
witnessed Coughlin being present at or near the SBNs Officers on 1/4/13, where Peters testimony of
10/29/13 in RMC 3913 and 3914 also make clear Peters was lying in her written police report where
alleging as much as well.
In the exercise of this discretion, a balance should be struck between the defendant's interest in being
represented by chosen counsel against the convenience of the court, parties, and witnesses,[FN3] and the in-
terests of the public in an efficient and effective judicial system.[FN4]
In deciding whether to grant a continuance in order to permit the substitution of new counsel, the trial
court must consider several factors: (1) whether other continuances have been requested or granted; (2) the
inconvenience to the litigants, witnesses, and the court; (3) whether the request is dilatory or contrived; (4)
the degree to which the defendant has contributed to the delay; (5) whether the defendant has attempted to
arrange for competent additional counsel; (6) the degree of identifiable prejudice which would flow from
the continuance; and (7) the complexity of the case.[FN5] Accordingly, a motion for a continuance based on
the intended replacement of a particular counsel may be denied where it is groundless,[FN6] where the ac-
cused has been ably represented,[FN7] or where the defendant's tactics are dilatory,[FN8] and even though
as a result of the denial of a continuance, the accused is unrepresented at trial.[FN9] Likewise, such motion
may be denied where the right to counsel has been waived.[FN10]
The exercise of the discretion of the trial court has been upheld even where such a motion is based on
the asserted ineffective assistance of, or dissatisfaction with, counsel,[FN11] appointed by the court,[FN12]
where the accused has not in fact retained another counsel,[FN13] and is unlikely to do so.[FN14] This is
particularly so where the request for such a continuance is untimely.[FN15]
On the other hand, a proper exercise of the court's discretion may require the granting of a motion for a
continuance where a replacement of counsel is required due to incompetence, demonstrable prejudice
against the accused, or a conflict of interests,[FN16] or where a replacement of counsel is requested jointly
by the accused and counsel.[FN17] Moreover, the trial court may be required to grant the defendant's mo-
tion for a continuance to secure private counsel, where the defendant has not sought any other continuances,
and nothing in the record indicates that a dilatory motive has precipitated the request, and a continuance
would not significantly inconvenience the court, nor would it prejudice the state.[FN18] [FN1] Ga.-Blake v.
State, 273 Ga. 447, 542 S.E.2D 492 (2001). - Ill.-People v. Segoviano, 189 Ill. 2D 228, 244 Ill. Dec. 388,
725 N.E.2D 1275 (2000). - Minn.-State v. Courtney, 696 N.W.2D 73 (Minn. 2005). - N.D.-State v.
Schneeweiss, 2001 ND 120, 630 N.W.2D 482 (N.D. 2001). - R.I.-State v. Snell, 892 A.2D 108 (R.I. 2006). -
A.L.R. Library Withdrawal, discharge, or substitution of counsel in criminal case as ground for continuance,
73 A.L.R.3D 725. [FN2] Cal.-People v. Rhines, 131 Cal. App. 3D 498, 182 Cal. Rptr. 478 (2D Dist. 1982).
- Minn.-State v. Courtney, 696 N.W.2D 73 (Minn. 2005). - Pa.-Com. V. Nicolella, 307 Pa. Super. 96, 452
A.2D 1055 (1982). - R.I.-State v. Snell, 892 A.2D 108 (R.I. 2006). - [FN3] U.S.-U.S. V. Studley, 783 F.2D
934 (9th Cir. 1986). - Mass.-Com. V. Ruiz, 442 Mass. 826, 817 N.E.2D 771 (2004). - Tex.-Brown v. State,
630 S.W.2D 876 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 1982). Codefendant ready to proceed Del.-Hicks v. State, 434 A.2D
377 (Del. 1981). [FN4] U.S.-U.S. V. Mitchell, 777 F.2D 248 (5th Cir. 1985). - N.D.-State v. Schneeweiss,
2001 ND 120 (N.D., 2001). - Pa.-Com. V. Carroll, 306 Pa. Super. 152, 452 A.2D 260 (1982). - R.I.-State v.
Snell, 892 A.2D 108 (R.I. 2006). - One-day continuance Neb.-State v. Denbeck, 219 Neb. 672, 365 N.W.2D
469 (1985). [FN5] D.C.-Pinkney v. U.S., 851 A.2D 479 (D.C. 2004). - [FN6] Ark.-Pickens v. State, 6 Ark.
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App. 58, 638 S.W.2D 682 (1982). - Kan.-State v. Galloway, 238 Kan. 415, 710 P.2D 1320 (1985). - Mich.-
People v. Keith, 119 Mich. App. 699, 326 N.W.2D 612 (1982). - [FN7] U.S.-U.S. V. Bailey, 327 F.3D
1131, 61 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 853 (10Th Cir. 2003). - Ga.-Storey v. State, 162 Ga. App. 763, 292 S.E.2D 483
(1982). - Pa.-Com. V. Carroll, 306 Pa. Super. 152, 452 A.2D 260 (1982). - R.I.-State v. Cochrane, 443 A.2D
1249 (R.I. 1982). - Wyo.-Sincock v. State, 2003 WY 115, 76 P.3D 323 (Wyo. 2003). - [FN8] Del.-Waltman
v. State, 840 A.2D 642 (Del. 2003). - Ga.-Brown v. State, 278 Ga. 724, 609 S.E.2D 312 (2004). - Ind.-
Lewis v. State, 730 N.E.2D 686 (Ind. 2000). - Minn.-State v. Courtney, 696 N.W.2D 73 (Minn. 2005). -
R.I.-State v. Snell, 892 A.2D 108 (R.I. 2006). - [FN9] U.S.-U.S. V. Studley, 783 F.2D 934 (9th Cir. 1986). -
[FN10] Okla.-Bewley v. State, 1985 OK CR 11, 695 P.2D 1357 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985). - R.I.-State v.
Bruyere, 751 A.2D 1285 (R.I. 2000). - [FN11] Conn.-State v. Watson, 198 Conn. 598, 504 A.2D 497
(1986). - Ga.-Brown v. State, 278 Ga. 724, 609 S.E.2D 312 (2004). - Ky.-Williams v. Com., 2005 WL
2045397 (Ky. 2005). - Me.-State v. Brown, 2000 ME 25, 757 A.2D 768 (Me. 2000). - Ohio-State v. Mur-
phy, 91 Ohio St. 3D 516, 2001-Ohio-112, 747 N.E.2D 765 (2001). [FN12] Ga.-Clark v. State, 159 Ga. App.
438, 283 S.E.2D 666 (1981). - Me.-State v. Winchenbach, 501 A.2D 1282 (Me. 1985). - Pa.-Com. V.
McCool, 311 Pa. Super. 536, 457 A.2D 1312 (1983). - [FN13] Ark.-Clay v. State, 290 Ark. 54, 716 S.W.2D
751 (1986). - Pa.-Com. V. Szuchon, 506 Pa. 228, 484 A.2D 1365 (1984). - [FN14] Ill.-People v. Free, 112
Ill. App. 3D 449, 68 Ill. Dec. 81, 445 N.E.2D 529 (4th Dist. 1983). - [FN15] U.S.-U.S. V. Hull, 792 F.2D
941 (9th Cir. 1986). - Conn.-State v. Myers, 193 Conn. 457, 479 A.2D 199 (1984). - Mich.-People v. Jack-
son, 113 Mich. App. 620, 318 N.W.2D 495 (1982). - Neb.-State v. Keithley, 218 Neb. 707, 358 N.W.2D
761 (1984). - Nev.-Brinkley v. State, 101 Nev. 676, 708 P.2D 1026 (1985). - Pa.-Com. V. Carroll, 306 Pa.
Super. 152, 452 A.2D 260 (1982). [FN16] Okla.-Henegar v. State, 1985 OK CR 56, 700 P.2D 659 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1985). - [FN17] Ohio-State v. Bronaugh, 3 Ohio App. 3D 307, 445 N.E.2D 262 (1st Dist. Ham-
ilton County 1982). - Breakdown of attorney-client relationship The trial court abused its discretion in not
allowing the defendant a continuance to obtain different counsel, in that the case was simple, the prosecutor
joined the defense in asking for a continuance, there was sufficient evidence to suggest that the attorney-
client relationship had broken down; furthermore, the attorney's method of attempting to withdraw from the
case tended to undermine the attorney-client relationship since he essentially told the trial judge that his cli-
ent was going to perjure himself. Alaska-Newcomb v. State, 651 P.2D 1176 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). [FN18]
Mont.-State v. Garcia, 2003 MT 211, 317 Mont. 73, 75 P.3D 313 (2003). -

1. SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Basics 5
th
amendment Miranda right to counsel vs. 6
th
am (14
th
DP) right to counsel
US v. Gonzales-Lopez (2006) denial of right to either is structural error, per se reversible;
Argersinger v. Hamlin (1972) must show actual jail sentence to have
attorney appointed, which gives no guidance to judges when appointing attys Scott v. IL (1979) if
given fine only, no cons right to an atty Nichols v. US (1994) if didnt get lawyer in past misdemeanor
case that wasnt fine only, can collaterally attack lack in past case if will affect current case AL v. Shel-
ton (2002) I: does suspended sentence = jail time for right to atty o rule: even 1 day suspended jail
sentence is enough to trigger right to atty in misdemeanor case; overrules Argersinger jail time
When does right to counsel attach? generally, at critical stage of prosecution Kirby v. IL
right to counsel attaches at adversary judicial proceedings, whether by way of formal charge, pre-
liminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment
US v. Moody IEC challenge, when does right to counsel attach; H: happens at formal adversarial
proceeding or during critical stage, not during pre-charge plea bargaining; Examples of critical stages in-
clude preliminary hearing, post-indictment plea bargaining, significant pre-trial
hearings, trial, jury selection, guilty plea hearing, sentencing Mempa v. Rhay critical stages in-
clude sentencing, etc Glover v. US critical stages include sentencing, etc
Parole/probation cases not automatic right to counsel Gagnon v. Scarpelli Morrissey v.
Brewer
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Outright denial of right to counsel during critical stage Prophylactic rule presumption of prejudice
to D, generally leads to automatic reversal of conviction, not subject to harmless error analysis
Waiver of right to counsel Johnson v. Zerbst see above Farretta v. CA right to proceed pro se
in trial (can waive right to counsel in
trial)
o rule: cons right to represent self, and if judge doesnt allow it, thats automatic reversible error on ap-
peal; need meaningful warning of dangers of representing self
IA v. Tovar simpler waiver of right; if going to plead guilty, dont need lawyer Equality princi-
ple/right to counsel on appeal 3
Griffin v. IL (1956) court requires free transcript of trial be given to people so can do pro se appeal
(dont want to limit appeals to rich people)
o rule: right to free copy of trial transcript for appeal purposes Douglas v. CA (1963) right to
lawyer on appeal; based on DP and incorporation clause, required to provide lawyer for first round of appeal
Halbert v. MI (2005) Ross v. Moffit (1974) Faretta v. CA see above McKaskle v.
Wiggins standby counsel appointed over Ds objection; H: if standby tries to dominate Ds defense, thats
a constitutional violation (that is exactly what WCPD Jim Leslie did in RCR2011-063341 on 11/19/12 and
11/20/12)
Ake v. OK if can show expert is necessary to defense, and it comes under rules of E, then state may
have to provide money for expert, b/c considered basic tool for defense (Coughlin requests money to hire
mental health experts, judicial, prosecutorial and police misconduct experts, and other forensic experts, and
constitutional law experts)
17 Am. Jur. 2d Continuance III. Continuances in Criminal Cases 51. --Factors considered in
grant or denial of continuance 52. Right to continuance; good cause standard 53. Factors to be con-
sidered
Coughlin needs dockets in various matters (including the instant case) and to be able to subpoena and
serve such subpoenas on witness whom have protection orders against Coughlin issued by the RJC (the
Washoe County Public Defender and the State Bar of Nevada) that preclude Coughlin, or, obstensibly, his
agents, from contacting (which the RCA and RMC has ruled includes mailing, having an agent do so, etc.,
etc.) such proposed witnesses, where even the certified mailing under NRS 174.375 would be tantamount to
contacting and where indigent Coughlin cannot afford the cost of such mailing, etc., and where, given the
exigencies of time deadlines and the RJCs refusal to simply issue subpoenas and its claim that Coughlin (a
licensed attorney authorized (indeed forced to) practice on his own behalf in the RJC) is not permitted to is-
sue his own subpoenasbut rather, where the RJC takes weeks, if not months, (if not ever per the Cathy A.
Reyes proposed subpoena in 72675 matter) to decide whether or not to issue Coughlin such subpoenas, a
continuance is warranted.
2. Absence, Death or Disability of Party, Witness, or Evidence a. In General 56. Relevancy and
materiality of evidence or testimony 57. Competency and credibility of evidence or testimony 58. Cu-
mulative evidence 59. Probability of securing desired evidence or testimony 60. Documents or papers b.
Diligence in Attempting to Obtain Evidence or Testimony 61. Generally 62. Issuance of subpoena or
other process 63. Depositions of absent witnesses c. Admissions to Avoid Continuance 64. Generally
65. --Effect of constitutional right to compulsory process 66. --Truth of testimony of witness 67. --
Conclusiveness and effect of admissions 3. Absence, Death, or Disability of Counsel 68. Generally 69.
Withdrawal, discharge, or substitution of counsel; constitutional limitations 71. Opportunity to select
new counsel 72. Time for preparation by new counsel 73. Illness or death of counsel or counsel's rela-
tive 74. --Representation by other counsel 75. Counsel engaged elsewhere in professional capacity 76.
Counsel in attendance upon legislature 4. Surprise; Amendment of Pleadings (the WCDAs Offices
5/31/13 Criminal Complaint failed to plead much of anything in the first place, as such everything presented
at trial (and all that contained in the Sentencing Memorandum in 71437, and the utter paucity of any actual
Points and Authorities in the Motion to Remand in RCR2011-063341 and RCR2012-065630) dictate a
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continuance) or Change of Parties 77. Generally 78. Amendment of indictment or information 79. Un-
expected evidence, testimony, or witness 5. Mental or Physical Illness or Incapacity of Accused or Others
(2JDC Judge Stiglich, according to Richard Cornell, Esq., spoke with Cornell for an hour on 9/27/13 to at-
tempt to get Cornell to take on Coughlins cases and get him into Mental Health Court, presenting a NRS
178.405 issue requiring the suspension of all proceedings in all departments). 80. Generally 81. Pro-
spects for improvement 82. Mental disability (the voluminous vindictive arrests, prosecutions, and expo-
sure to legion instances of judicial misconduct has exacerbated Coughlins Major Depressive Disorder and
ADD/ADHD, the effect thereof being heightedned by Coughlins indigency and the judicial misconduct in-
cident to the complete and utter affront to ADKT 0411s Indigent Defense Order of 1/4/08). 6. Other
Grounds 83. Want of time for preparation of case (as RMC Judge Dilworth admitted on the record in 13
CR 3913 on 8/14/13, the RJC has attempted to conspire with the RJC in exorting the RMC to enter a copy
cat Admin Order (which the RMC did in its AO13-01 of 1/16/13, which was served on Coughlin purport-
edly in the RJCs horseshoe, and RJC Chief Bailiff Sexton attempted to watch Coughlins entire trial
on 10/29/13 in the RMC in 13 CR 3913, and 3914, which absolutely creates the appearance of improprie-
tyfunny, the 10/11/14 Order Reassigning the case to Judge Glasson has not resulted in any reassign-
ment of the duties of the RJC Bailiffs incident to the Admin Orders in the RJC (AND, CORRECTION,
COUGHLIN WAS WRONG to whatever extent he has previously indicated the rjc provided the audio tran-
script of the 7/18/13 hearing in rcr2013-072675, as it was only the 7/16/13 hearing in 63341 that has been
provided (where the providing of such makes the 4/12/13 puported basis for refusing to provide Coughlin
other hearings in 63341 post-conviction baseless (ie, Coughlin reiterates his request for copies of the audio
of all ccp court hearings etc (including that of 5/23/13 wherein the grandstanding and falsehoods told by
Sgt. Mullens have become at issue in 72675).and in the RMC, an 8/14/13 recusal by Judge Dilworth has
not prevented RCA Wong and Dilworths replacement, Judge W. Gardner from attempting to apply whole-
sale an earlier Order Granting RCA Wongs Motion in Limine seeking to apply the Truesdale decision to
preclude collateral attack on the validity of the Workplace Harassment TPO EPO in RCP2012-
000607despite the fact that, one, such order should be vacated given the recusal occurred so soon after its
issuance, and two, neither the order nor Truesdale precludes a collateral attack on such orders as to whether
they are void or voidable which are legally distinct concepts in comparision to whether such are valid
or invalid) 84. --Factors considered 85. --Accused's lack of diligence or neglect 86. --Tardily dis-
closed evidence 87. Popular excitement or prejudice; pretrial publicity 88. --Alternative means of pro-
tection IV. Procedure A. Application Research References 89. Generally; form of application 90. Sup-
porting affidavits 91. Who may apply 92. --Strangers to proceedings 93. Time for application 94. --
Stage of trial or proceedings 95. Second or further continuance B. Hearing and Order Research References
96. Hearing; evidence 97. --Opposing motion 98. Order of court; operation and effect 99. --Period of
continuance 100. Continuances granted upon conditions 101. --Imposing costs and expenses
2 5 13 hearing in RCR2011-063341(first of two of that date) 020513coughlin
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Ib70ldGUQw
an NRS 178.405 order at 8:45 am in rcr2011-063341, and Judge Cliftons immediately thereafter being
served notice in writing and a copy of Judge Pearsons 2/5/13 Order for Competency Evaluation in
RCR2011-063341 stamped 8:50 a.m. makes all that occurred thereafter in 65630 and 63341 illegal, a NCJC
Canon 1, Rule 1.1 and Canon 2, Rule 2.15 violation, etc., etc. (not to mention indicative of numerous viola-
tions of the RPC by DDA Zachary Norman Young, Esq.)
2 5 13 hearing in rcr2012-065630 part 1 0205131: http://youtu.be/3dq2LNYJb5E
2 5 13 hearing in rcr2012-065630 part 2 0205132: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=02w5JV8sxJo
020513coughlin2ndhearing in RCR2011-063341 in violation of NRS
178.405: http://youtu.be/JZhLYqdibAE

2 5 13 hearing part 3 in 65630 020513 part 3: http://youtu.be/eU8tTqsVQN8
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Continuance III. Continuances in Criminal Cases B. Grounds 3. Absence, Death, or Disability of Coun-
sel 72. Time for preparation by new counsel Criminal Law 590(2), 593 A.L.R. Library Withdrawal, dis-
charge, or substitution of counsel in criminal case as ground for continuance, 73 A.L.R. 3D 725 Forms Affi-
davit in support of motion for continuanceBy counselNew counsel on complex case. Am. Jur. Pleading
and Practice Forms, Continuance 72 AffidavitIn support of motion for continuanceComplexity of
case; new defense counsel. Federal Procedural Forms, L. Ed. 20:659 Once the trial court has determined
that a change in counsel is to be permitted, the new counsel must be accorded sufficient time to prepare for
trial,[FN1] and it may be an abuse of discretion to deny a continuance to allow new counsel adequate time
to prepare.[FN2] Even a last-minute change in counsel may occasion or require a continuance in order to
give the attorney time to prepare.[FN3] If a change of counsel would require the postponement of a trial be-
cause of inadequate time for the new attorney to properly prepare the defendant's case, a court may consider
such factors as the reasons for the change, whether other counsel has already been identified, whether the
defendant has acted diligently in seeking the change, and whether the denial is likely to result in any preju-
dice to the defendant.[FN4] The benefit of prior counsel's preparation is a factor in favor of refusing a con-
tinuance.[FN5] Further, the fact that the new or substituted counsel had been involved in the case for a suffi-
cient time may dictate that the defendant is not entitled to a continuance for inadequate time to pre-
pare.[FN6] Likewise, a de- 17 Am. Jur. 2D Continuance 72 fendant in a criminal case may not be entitled
to a continuance for the purpose of permitting new counsel additional time to prepare for trial if the original
counsel was discharged by the defendant without sufficient grounds or withdrew for reasons attributable to
the defendant.[ FN7] [FN1] Greene v. State, 335 Ark. 1, 977 S.W.2D 192 (1998). New counsel must be af-
forded an opportunity to prepare properly. Sharp v. State, 786 So. 2D 372 (Miss. 2001). As to the want of
time for preparation of a criminal case as grounds for a continuance, generally, see 83 to 85. [FN2] Butler
v. State, 339 Ark. 429, 5 S.W.3D 466 (1999). [FN3] Butler v. State, 339 Ark. 429, 5 S.W.3D 466 (1999). As
to last-minute changes of counsel, see 70. [FN4] Edwards v. State, 321 Ark. 610, 906 S.W.2D 310 (1995).
[FN5] Carter v. State, 686 N.E.2D 1254 (Ind. 1997). [FN6] Goins v. State, 318 Ark. 689, 890 S.W.2D 602
(1995), cert. Denied, 2001 WL 729314 (Ark. 2001); State v. Clemons, 273 Kan. 328, 45 P.3D 384 (2002);
State v. Lund, 168 Vt. 102, 718 A.2D 413 (1998). [FN7] Fry v. State, 165 Ind. App. 1, 330 N.E.2D 367 (3d
Dist. 1975); People v. DeChiaro, 48 A.D.2D 54, 367 N.Y.S.2D 353 (3d Dep't 1975); Yeargain v. State, 1975
OK CR 84, 535 P.2D 693 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975). AMJUR CONTIN 72
sel 69. Withdrawal, discharge, or substitution of counsel; constitutional limitations Criminal Law 593
A.L.R. Library Withdrawal, discharge, or substitution of counsel in criminal case as ground for continuance,
73 A.L.R. 3D 725 It is within the trial court's discretion to grant or refuse a motion for continuance where
the accused's counsel withdraws from the case or is discharged therefrom.[FN1] Likewise, the decision
whether to grant a continuance based upon a desire to change or substitute counsel rests soundly within the
trial court's discretion,[FN2] and the decision will not be overturned absent a showing of abuse.[FN3] A de-
fendant need not raise a claim of ineffective assistance to establish an abuse of discretion in denying a con-
tinuance request to obtain new counsel, as the defendant's burden on appeal is to show that the trial court
acted arbitrarily in light of the information available at the time of its decision and thereafter, if an abuse of
discretion has been established, that the defendant's ability to defend himself or herself has thereby been
demonstrably prejudiced.[FN4] The discretion of the trial court in granting or denying a continuance upon
the withdrawal or discharge of the defendant's counsel is limited by the Sixth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution, which provides a federal criminal defendant with the right to have the assistance of counsel for
his or her own defense[FN5] and by the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees the same right to a de-
fendant charged with a state crime.[FN6] This right includes a fair opportunity to secure counsel of the de-
fendant's own choice[FN7] and encompasses the right to the appointment of different counsel when a legit-
imate difference of opinion develops between a defendant and appointed counsel as to a fundamental trial
tactic.[FN8] However, the accused's right to counsel of one's choice is not absolute and may not be used to
frustrate the inherent power of a court to command the orderly, efficient, and effective administration of jus-
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tice.[FN9] Therefore, in determining whether to grant a continuance due to the with- 17 Am. Jur. 2D Con-
tinuance 69 drawal or discharge of counsel, the court must attempt to strike a proper balance between the
accused's right to counsel and the requirement of prompt administration of justice.[FN10] Observation: A
defendant who elects to proceed pro se while assisted by standby counsel is not entitled to a continuance
when he or she agrees, on the morning of trial, to be represented by standby counsel, and the standby coun-
sel is not prepared to try the case, and a trial judge does not abuse his or her discretion in deciding to pro-
ceed with trial, especially when the defendant has had two lawyers assigned previously removed and waits
until the morning of trial to request counsel to represent him or her.[FN11] Inconvenience alone is an insuf-
ficient reason for denying a motion for continuance in the substitution of new counsel, where no inquiry is
made as to the length of the continuance needed and where no specific finding is made that the defendant's
motion is an attempt to thwart the administration of justice.[FN12] CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT Cases:
District Court's denial of defendant's motion for a continuance so that substitute counsel could prepare for
trial deprived defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, in prosecution for
being a felon in possession of a firearm; continuance requested was for 30 days which would not have de-
layed trial unreasonably, there were no other continuances in the case, government did not allege any incon-
venience for itself or its witnesses if continuance were granted, delay was not purposeful or caused by de-
fendant, and without the continuance, defense counsel did not have enough time to investigate and pursue
the only defense available to defendant. U.S. V. McClendon, 146 Fed. Appx. 23, 2005 FED App. 0707N
(6th Cir. 2005). Trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a substitution of retained counsel and a contin-
uance was arbitrary and violated due process and defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice in
prosecution for sexual assault of a child; although the trial court cited administration problems and juvenile
complainant's needs, the case was a simple one to try, only requiring three witnesses, defendant had already
retained new counsel, did not seek a lengthy continuance, and was clearly not simply trying to delay his tri-
al, as he would have remained in custody during the delay, nothing suggested that a continuance would have
harmed or even inconvenienced the complainant, and complainant's initial complaint came four to six years
after alleged assaults, and thus he would not have appeared at risk for forgetting information a few months
later. Carlson v. Jess, 526 F.3D 1018 (7th Cir. 2008). Trial court's erroneous denial of defendant's motion for
a substitution of retained counsel and a continuance had an adverse effect on the presentation of his case, as
required for reversal of sexual assault conviction; new counsel would have pursued a reasonable alternative
defense, including exploring complainant's motives for making the allegations, complainant's prior incon-
sistent statements, and engaging an expert. Carlson v. Jess, 526 F.3D 1018 (7th Cir. 2008). Denial of de-
fendant's motion for continuance for the purpose of substituting trial counsel was warranted, in prosecution
for possession of child pornography; although case was complex because of the nature of the computer evi-
dence involved and the theory that the defense sought to present, that the pornographic images were on de-
fendant's computer because of network intrusions, counsel was retained 10 months before trial started,
counsel had access to computer data necessary to prepare the defense for several months before trial started,
defendant requested continuance based on his purported dissatisfaction with counsel only two weeks before
trial, despite being aware of counsel's alleged shortcomings for months, there was no showing when substi-
tute counsel would be ready for trial, and although defendant was dissatisfied that his computer expert did
not have access to the data until shortly before trial, the prosecution was not at fault, and there was no show-
ing that continuance would have resulted in successful defense. U.S. V. Cordy, 560 F.3D 808 (8th Cir.
2009), Cert. Denied, 130 S. Ct. 271 (2009). Refusing to grant defendant's third motion for continuance, so
as to permit defendant to be represented solely by newly hired counsel, was not abuse of discretion that vio-
lated defendant's Sixth Amendment right to be represented by counsel of his choice, given that district court
did not deny continuance for unreasonable or arbitrary concerns, that age of case was concern, as was its in-
volvement of multiple instances of fraud, which required testimony of numerous witnesses, and that defend-
ant did not show how denial of continuance affected his trial preparation or strategy, or that his defense was
negatively affected by his hybrid representation by appointed and retained counsel. U.S. V. Flanders, 491
F.3D 1197 (10th Cir. 2007). Trial court's denial of counsel's motion for a continuance and effective denial of
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potentially new counsel's representation of defendant did not violate defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel; potentially new counsel filed the motion for a four-month continuance two hours after the jury had
been sworn in and up to that point defendant had never expressed any concerns about his court-appointed
counsel, and, the trial court balanced defendant's right to choose counsel against the hardships the parties,
witnesses, and jury would have to endure if it granted counsel's request for a four-month continuance. Jones
v. Bradshaw, 489 F. Supp. 2D 786 (N.D. Ohio 2007). [END OF SUPPLEMENT] [FN1] Ungar v. Sarafite,
376 U.S. 575, 84 S. Ct. 841, 11 L. Ed. 2D 921 (1964). [FN2] Blake v. State, 273 Ga. 447, 542 S.E.2D 492
(2001); People v. Segoviano, 189 Ill. 2D 228, 244 Ill. Dec. 388, 725 N.E.2D 1275 (2000); State v.
Schneeweiss, 2001 ND 120, 630 N.W.2D 482 (N.D. 2001). [FN3] Edwards v. State, 321 Ark. 610, 906
S.W.2D 310 (1995); People v. Segoviano, 189 Ill. 2D 228, 244 Ill. Dec. 388, 725 N.E.2D 1275 (2000).
[FN4] State v. Hamilton, 228 Conn. 234, 636 A.2D 760 (1994). [FN5] U.S. V. Harris, 2 F.3D 1452 (7th Cir.
1993). [FN6] Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 75 S. Ct. 1, 99 L. Ed. 4 (1954). [FN7] Chandler v. Fretag, 348
U.S. 3, 75 S. Ct. 1, 99 L. Ed. 4 (1954). A district court's denial of a defendant's request for a continuance so
that the defendant could obtain a new attorney after the defendant had discharged four attorneys, the last on
the morning of trial, did not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel where the only reason
for the delay was the defendant's persistent inability to get along with his attorneys. U.S. V. Harris, 2 F.3D
1452 (7th Cir. 1993). [FN8] People v. Williams, 386 Mich. 565, 194 N.W.2D 337 (1972); Com. V. Atkins,
233 Pa. Super. 202, 336 A.2D 368 (1975). [FN9] Roseby v. State, 329 Ark. 554, 953 S.W.2D 32 (1997)
(overruled on other grounds by, MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2D 293 (1998)). A defendant
may not demand a continuance to delay the proceedings or by arbitrarily attempting to substitute another at-
torney at the time of trial. State v. Worthy, 583 N.W.2D 270 (Minn. 1998). [FN10] Ungar v. Sarafite, 376
U.S. 575, 84 S. Ct. 841, 11 L. Ed. 2D 921 (1964). [FN11] Com. V. Johnson, 424 Mass. 338, 676 N.E.2D
1123 (1997). [FN12] People v. Young, 207 Ill. App. 3D 130, 152 Ill. Dec. 67, 565 N.E.2D 309 (4th Dist.
1990). AMJUR CONTIN 69
071613coughlin rcr2011-063341 2013 07 16 08 45 42 000 1: http://youtu.be/zV5xspJEP7w
Coughlin declares under penalty of perjury all materials linked to herein are true and correct copies of
that which they purport to be.
sel 75. Counsel engaged elsewhere in professional capacity Criminal Law 593 Forms Affidavit in support
of motion for continuance when counsel engaged elsewhere in professional capacity. Am. Jur. Pleading and
Practice Forms, Continuance 73, 75 AffidavitIn support of motion for continuanceCalendar conflict
with state criminal proceedings where attorney appointed counsel Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms,
Federal Criminal Procedure 145 AffidavitIn support of motion for continuanceCalendar conflict with
state proceedings involving incarcerated defendant; federal defendant on bail. Federal Procedural Forms, L.
Ed. 20:656 AffidavitIn support of motion for continuanceUnexpected unavailability of retained coun-
sel; counsel presently engaged in trial of unexpected length. Federal Procedural Forms, L. Ed. 20:661 Mo-
tionBy defendant for continuance based on prior engagement of defense counsel. Federal Procedural
Forms, L. Ed. 20:662 AffidavitBy defense counsel in support of motion for continuance based on coun-
sel's prior engagement. Federal Procedural Forms, L. Ed. 20:663 OrderGranting continuance based on
prior engagement of defense counsel. Federal Procedural Forms, L. Ed. 20:664 A trial court has discretion
to allow a continuance of criminal proceedings because of the absence of counsel while occupied in another
court.[FN1] Under some circumstances, 17 Am. Jur. 2D Continuance 75 however, the refusal of a continu-
ance sought on this ground may amount to an abuse of discretion.[ FN2] In determining whether the court
has abused its discretion, the reviewing court may consider the nature of the charge, the evidence, and the
complexity of the case.[FN3] For example, a continuance is properly denied where the crime charged is not
complicated or difficult to analyze and any defenses the accused may have are immediately obvious to any
lawyer, requiring no more than a few days at most by way of preparation.[FN4] [FN1] Majeske v. U.S., 266
F.2D 947 (9th Cir. 1959); Gilmore v. U.S., 273 F.2D 79 (D.C. Cir. 1959). [FN2] People v. Kerber, 172 A.D.
755, 159 N.Y.S. 215 (1St Dep't 1916); State v. Spencer, 177 S.C. 346, 181 S.E. 217 (1935). Not only the
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convenience of the court and prosecution but also the rights of persons accused of a crime must be consid-
ered, and the trial court should exercise care not to handicap to his or her prejudice a defendant who is not
responsible for the fact that counsel is engaged in the trial of another case. People v. Manchetti, 29 Cal. 2D
452, 175 P.2D 533 (1946). [FN3] Gilmore v. U.S., 273 F.2D 79 (D.C. Cir. 1959). [FN4] Gilmore v. U.S.,
273 F.2D 79 (D.C. Cir. 1959). AMJUR CONTIN 75.

Coughlin respectfully submits this seeking an extension of time to file his objections, citing
good cause for so granting relative to the enormously challenging and disorienting effects of being
wrongfully arrested at least 21 times since August 20, 2011, and the lack of anything in the way of a
just response by the state court judiciary in Washoe County, which is entirely beholden to local law
enforcement and prosecutors, punishing Coughlin for the misconduct of each, as its just the easier
softer way for these judges, as opposed to doing anything just. The attached materials in Exhibit 1
are incorporated herein by reference in further establishing showing of good cause for granting an
extension of time to file Coughlins objections to the Report and Recommendation by the
Honorable Magistrate Judge Cobb. Coughlin does greatly appreciate Judge Cobbs granting his
various informa pauperis motions, noting that Coughlin has had no less than six recent instances of
such IFP motions and requests for the appointment of counsel rejected by state court judges (muni,
justice, and Second Judicial District Court, all in violation of ADKT 0411, the Nevada Supreme
Courts 1/4/08 Indigent Defense Order etc.) in even criminal matters.
Of late Coughlin has been forced to defend himself in three criminal trials, (one on 10/14/13
in RCR2013-072675 in the RJC (denied counsel despite his indigency and the serious crime of
NRS 199.280 as defined in SCR 111(6), with a sentencing hearing for such wrongful conviction (a
justice court bailiff is neither elected nor appointed sufficient to qualify as a public officer that
one might resist or obstruct under NRS 169.164, 193.019, nor NRS 281.005) set for 11/6/13
(Coughlin has been denied counsel in the sentencing phase of such, in addition to incident to the
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trial, and has no reason to believe he will not be similarly denied counsel in response to the
WCDAs Offices Motion to Remand Coughlin in RCR2011-063341 and RCR2012-065630 (where
the WCDA seeks to revoke two different 180 suspended sentences incident to the recent conviction
in a matter wherein Coughlin was denied court appointed counsel, RCR2013-071437, which
prosecution was premised upon the illegal Admin Order 2012-01 (RCR2013-071437). Further, in a
raft of appeal of criminal convictions in which Coughlin has been forced to defend himself, the
district court judge before whom all those matters were transferred to en masse has now purportedly
taken to seeking to entice Coughlin into dropping all of his various civil actions (including,
obviously, those in federal court 13 CV 446, 474, 484, 539, etc) in exchange for Coughlin entering
mental health court. Coughlin has absolutely no problem participating in mental health court and
simply wants to move forward in life
Additionally, Coughlin had two trials on 10/29/13 lasting most of the day (in RMC 13 CR
3913 and 3914) that will be continuing on 11/7/13. 3913 and 3914 featured RMC Judge W.
Gardner admitting to Coughlin he would rule as contacting the State Bar of Nevada sufficient to
amount to a violation of the 12/20/12 Workplace Harassment Protection Order the SBN obtained
against Coughlin from the RJC in RCP2012-000607, Coughlins having submitted a tolling motion
in response to the fraudulent 12/14/12 NNDB Panels Findings of Fact; Conclusions of Law (which
seeks to permanently disbar Coughlin, and which is now on appeal in 62337 before the NSCT) by
any modality or means whatsoever (carrier pigeon, facsimile, USPS mailing, courier, personal
delivery). Such brazen deprivation of due process are completely beneath the judiciary and this tag
team by the RJC, RMC, WCDAs Office, RPD, WCSO, and Reno City Attorneys Office is exactly
the sort barbaric spectacle our founding fathers knew the principles of federalism must address.
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Coughlin seeks the appointment of counsel to assist him in this matter, and, with a promise to utilize
such judiciously, seeks at least some door being left open to at least a few subpoenas at public
expense being permitted.
For context, it is important to point out that the first of a strong of 21 wrongful arrests of
Coughlin occurred on August 20
th
, 2011, by RPD Officer Nicholas Duralde. At the 10/29/13 trials
in the RMC in 13 CR 3913 and 3914, Coughlin was rebuked for even seeking to put on evidence or
ask questions of RPD Detective Yturbide, whom fraudulently had Coughlin arrested and
overcharged with a felony and gross misdemeanor where, even had Coughlin violated the
Workplace Harassment Protection Order the SBN obtained, such would have only been a felony.
The fact that the purported violations consisted of nothing more than Coughlin allegedly seeking to
file tolling motions in his disciplinary proceeding then pending before the State Bar of Nevada and
otherwise address issues involving the record (see 62337) makes such prosecution a complete
affront to out system of justice that must not be countenanced. Where RPD Detective Yturbides
wife is an ECOMM 911 dispatcher, and Yturbide ordered Coughlin arrested on 2/8/13 (which
involved the RPD pointing a loaded gun at Coughlins head from four feet away after entering his
back yard unannounced), and the misuse of 911 trail in RCR2012-065630 was to resume on
2/12/13 (which the WCDAs Office plead down for SCR 111(6) leveraging to a NRS 199.280
resisting a public officer (a 911 operator is not a public officer either), and Coughlins Brief in the
appeal of the recommendation to permanently disbar him was due on 2/14/13, and such
overcharging resulted in $5,000 worth of bail, and where the same RPD Officer Duralde was to be
cross-examined (an ultimately was) in that 065630 case (which included a 1/13/12 pulling over of
Coughlin by Duralde and the same Sargent McCauley whom approved of the 2/8/13 arrest by
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Yturbide, along with four other officers pulling Coughlin over that night just an hour after Coughlin
bailed out of jail incident to a custodial arrest for jaywalking on 1/12/12)that same Officer
Duraldes wife is also an ECOMM 911 dispatcher.None of that is relevant to the RMCs Judge
W. GardnerThe Wal-Mart arrest occurred just 9 days after Coughlin was released from a 7 day
jail stay incident to the wrongful arrest by Duralde, during which Coughlin was denied his
medications.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/178700319/10-23-13-submission-of-Petition-for-Cert-or-Mandamus-re-Merliss-1708-03628-
61383-receipt-pending-eFlex-pdf
There are three exceptions to Younger abstention:
1. Where the prosecution is in bad faith (i.e. the state knows the person to be innocent); or
2. Where the prosecution is part of some pattern of harassment against an individual; or
3. Where the law being enforced is utterly and irredeemably unconstitutional (e.g., if the state were to pass a law making it a
crime to say anything negative about its governor under any circumstances).
The arrest underlying
Attorney disciplineAbstention found unwarranted: The courts in the following cases
ruled that abstention under the Younger doctrine was not warranted with regard to claims relating to
state attorney disciplinary proceedings or challenges to disciplinary rules or rules of professional
conduct under the particular facts and circumstances.
The court in Schneider v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, 546 F. Supp. 1251
(D.P.R. 1982), held that abstention was not appropriate in the attorneys' federal action, purportedly
challenging the constitutional validity of commonwealth laws providing for an integrated bar
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association and mandatory dues, alleging civil rights and constitutional violations. The original
action in the case, a state court action, was related to issues that gave rise to disbarment proceedings
against the two attorneys, commenced by the Puerto Rican bar association (the "Colegio") for the
nonpayment of the annual dues. Upon the attorneys' failure to pay the dues owed, a Puerto Rican
court ordered their disbarment. The attorneys later filed the federal action, seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief, as well as damages, against the defendants. The defendants argued that the court
had been asked to intervene in an ongoing judicial proceeding in violation of the Younger doctrine.
The district court noted that the Puerto Rican court unequivocally stated that its judgment was "final
and unappealable," and thus, the attorneys' rights as to the past dues had been finally adjudicated.
Those rights, however, were not before the court in the federal action, the court determined,
observing that the attorneys sought only to prevent prospective enforcement of the statutes
providing for an integrated bar association and annual dues as interpreted by the Puerto Rican court.
The court thus concluded there was no ongoing state disbarment proceeding involving that issue so
Younger abstention was not applicable.
The court in Bishop v. State Bar of Texas, 736 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1984), held that
abstention was not appropriate where an attorney filed a federal complaint alleging that the state bar
had prosecuted disciplinary proceedings against him for many years and that such proceedings had
been taken in bad faith and had violated due process. The district court dismissed the complaint
without prejudice on the ground that injunctive relief against pending bar disciplinary proceedings
was barred by the Younger abstention doctrine. The court on appeal stated that although the factors
for Younger abstention were present, that did not end the analysis. Other courts had recognized that
a showing of "bad faith, harassment or other exceptional circumstances" might justify federal
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intervention, the court explained, noting that courts had applied Younger's exception for "bad faith
prosecutions" in two major circumstances: (1) when a State commences a prosecution or proceeding
to retaliate for or to deter constitutionally protected conduct and (2) when the prosecution or
proceeding is taken in bad faith or for the purpose to harass. In either case, said the court,
irreparable injury under Younger is established by a sufficient showing of retaliatory or bad-faith
prosecution, and a federal injunction may issue. The court observed that the attorney alleged that
the State Bar's efforts to discipline him had proceeded for many years and that they had been taken
"in bad faith and for an improper motive." As the court was ruling on a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12 and had to take the attorney's allegations as true, the court found that the attorney stated a claim
for injunctive relief. The court thus reversed the dismissal of the attorney's complaint by the district
court and remanded for further proceedings.
The court in Leaf v. Supreme Court of State of Wis., 979 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1992), held
that the time for abstention had expired, and thus, it would not affirm, under the Younger abstention
doctrine, the district court's dismissal of the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction where an
attorney and the attorney's nonlegal associate brought a civil-rights action arising from state
attorney disciplinary proceedings. The Board of Attorneys' Professional Responsibility's
investigation of the attorney had already begun at the time the federal complaint was filed. Because
of the ongoing investigation and proceeding in the state court, the district court entered an order to
abstain and stay proceeding under Younger. The district court ordered the case closed for statistical
purposes, but the district court indicated that either party could reopen the case at any time by
advising the court and opposing counsel that the party was ready to proceed with the case and that
the state proceedings had reached a final resolution. The attorney later moved to reinstate the cause
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of actions and for leave to file an amended complaint. The district court denied the motion for
reconsideration indicating that it should have dismissed the case in the first instance under Younger.
On appeal the defendants argued that the court should affirm under the Younger abstention doctrine.
The court, however, stated it could not affirm on this basis because the abstention doctrine only
applies when there is an ongoing state proceedingand the state proceedings terminated before the
district court's dismissal and before the current decision. Therefore, the court concluded that the
time for abstention had expired.
The court in Adams v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Com'n of Supreme Court
of Illinois, 600 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1984), held that abstention was not appropriate where the
federal court was unable to remand the declaratory action to the state court and there could be no
state court proceedings. A declaratory judgment action was brought for a determination of the
constitutionality of an attorney disciplinary rule. Following removal of that action from state court,
a motion to remand and to dismiss was filed. The court stated that because it was unable to remand
the declaratory action to state court, abstention was not appropriate and there was no state
proceeding towards which the court could show deference. It could be argued that the court could
conceivably stay the federal action to allow the defendant to bring a state action seeking prospective
relief against the attorneys based upon the disciplinary rule in question, the court pointed out,
observing that the United States Supreme Court had only applied Younger in cases where a state
enforcement proceeding followed an alleged violation of a state statute or rule even if only in civil
proceedings. The court added that the Seventh Circuit had explicitly required some sort of violation
and the existence of subsequent enforcement proceedings for a Younger abstention to be allowed. In
the present case, the court indicated, the attorneys chose to litigate their constitutional claims in the
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federal court; they had not, at the time of filing, violated the disciplinary rule; and after a hearing,
enforcement of the rule against them was deferred. The court concluded that in the Seventh Circuit
at least, the State could not now bring an enforcement action that would require the court to abstain.
The court in Canatella v. State of California, 304 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2002), held that
dismissal of the federal action was not warranted on Younger abstention grounds where a state bar
had initiated a disciplinary investigation into multiple sanctions orders entered against an attorney,
and in response, the attorney sued the State, the Board of Governors for the State Bar, and related
entities and individuals in federal court under 42 U.S.C.A. 1983, challenging the constitutionality
of state bar statutes and one state rule of professional conduct. The district court dismissed the
claims on Younger abstention grounds. Pending appeal, the state bar filed formal charges against the
attorney. The attorney filed a second 1983 action; the district court dismissed the attorney's
complaint under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine[FN16] and on Younger abstention grounds; and the
attorney appealed. The court, on appeal, initially noted that a district court must abstain and dismiss
a suit on the basis of Younger where: (1) state proceedings are ongoing; (2) important state interests
are involved; and (3) the plaintiff has an adequate opportunity to litigate federal claims in the state
proceedings. The court saw the relevant issue as whether the attorney was involved in an ongoing
proceeding for purposes of Younger and thus looked to whether the state court proceedings were
ongoing as of the time when the federal action was filed. At the time the attorney filed his federal
complaint, said the court, the magistrate judge's sanctions order had issued, and thus, the court had
to decide whether the attorney's act of reporting to the State Bar the sanctions order, as required
under the terms of his stipulation, gave rise to ongoing judicial proceedings for Younger purposes.
The court observed that no affirmative action had been taken by the state bar against the attorney at
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the initiation of the federal suit. In fact, the court pointed out, the attorney successfully secured an
order from the magistrate judge staying any state bar disciplinary proceedings pending the outcome
of the attorney's direct appeal of the sanctions order to the court, and the only procedural step that
had occurred at the time when the federal complaint was filed was the attorney's act of self-
reporting. The court next noted that the filing of an initial pleading commenced a state bar court
proceeding, which is a "notice of disciplinary charges." A preliminary investigation before issuing a
notice of disciplinary charges or a mere complaint to the bar does not commence a disciplinary
action, said the court, nor would a mere report of sanctions by the attorney. Thus, the court
concluded that there was no ongoing disciplinary proceeding to which Younger abstention would
apply.
On reconsideration of a previous decision, the court in Miller v. Washington State Bar
Ass'n, 691 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1982), held that abstention was not appropriate where an attorney
brought a civil-rights action claiming that a letter of admonition received from the Disciplinary
Board of the State Bar interfered with the exercise of his First Amendment rights. The district court
dismissed the action, and the attorney appealed. The court of appeals reversed and remanded. The
State Bar filed a petition for rehearing, asking the court to reconsider its opinion in this matter in
light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Middlesex County Ethics Committee v.
Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 102 S. Ct. 2515, 73 L. Ed. 2d 116 (1982), discussed in 6,
which was decided after the court's opinion had been submitted for filing. The court observed that
when the attorney filed his federal action, the State Bar had completed its proceedings, and the
attorney was without any right to obtain review by the state supreme court. The court thus found
that the case involved no intrusion into ongoing state proceedings nor was there an adequate
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opportunity for state court review. The court determined that Younger abstention was, therefore, not
appropriate in the case.
The court in Rapp v. Disciplinary Bd. of Hawaii Supreme Court, 916 F. Supp. 1525 (D.
Haw. 1996), held that Younger abstention was not appropriate where an attorney brought a federal
action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief claiming that the State Rule of Professional Conduct
barring ex parte communications with jurors "except as permitted by law" was an unconstitutional
prior restraint on his free-speech rights. The attorney, as a pro se plaintiff in a state case, desired to
speak with the jurors after they rendered their verdict but was precluded by the judge in that case
from doing so. The attorney believed that members of the jury would be willing to speak with him
but that he could not talk with them because of the threat of suspension or disbarment from the state
bar, leading him to challenge the rule in federal court. The defendants argued that the court should
abstain from adjudicating the merits of the attorney's action under the Younger abstention doctrine.
The court explained that before Younger abstention can be applied to dismiss a federal claim, three
requirements must be met:
(1) there must be ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the state judicial proceedings must implicate
important state interests; and (3) the state judicial proceedings must afford the federal plaintiff an
adequate opportunity to raise constitutional claims. The court observed that abstention was
improper in the case because there were no ongoing state judicial proceedings. The court was
unaware of any pending disciplinary proceedings against the attorney in connection with the federal
case. Rather, there was only the potential for the institution of disciplinary proceedings against the
attorney, which the court found was insufficient for abstaining under Younger
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Coughlin requests the RJC issue subpoenas for the State Bar of Nevadas Laura Peters and Patrick
King, as well as SBN Execu Director Kimberly Farmer and then President Francis Flaherty for any
and all sentencing and remand hearings, including that of 11/7/13, as well as for WCPD Biray
dogan, and Jim Leslie, and WCDAs Office D. Watts-vial, and modify the TPO/EPO in rcp2012-
000607 and rcp2012-000699 to allow for Coughlin to embrace his rights to subpoena witnesses and
compulsory process without the constant threat of arrest and abuse of the contempt power.

NRS 4.370(n) provided the RJCs Chief Judge Pearson jurisdiction: (n) In an action for the
issuance of a temporary or extended order for protection against harassment in the workplace
pursuant to NRS 33.200 to 33.360, inclusive..
Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions 20. Restraints on exercise of legal or constitutional rights
Injunction 1, 3, 9, 13
Courts have no discretion to grant injunctive relief violative of constitutional rights.1 Furthermore,
a person generally may not be enjoined from performing a lawful act designed to protect or enforce
the person's personal or property rights,2 even though the action may damage another,3 unless the
conduct was clearly engaged in maliciously to annoy or injure another.4
The carrying on of a lawful business that injures another will not be restrained any further than is
necessary to protect the rights of the complainant.7
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Footnotes: 1 Operation Rescue-National v. Planned Parenthood of Houston and Southeast Texas,
Inc., 975 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1998). 2 Crouch v. Central Labor Council of Portland and Vicinity, 134
Or. 612, 293 P. 729, 83 A.L.R. 193 (1930). 3 Saulsberry v. Coopers' International Union, 147 Ky.
170, 143 S.W. 1018 (1912).
4 Hasselbring v. Koepke, 263 Mich. 466, 248 N.W. 869, 93 A.L.R. 1170 (1933). 7 Strickler v.
Schaaf, 199 Wash. 372, 91 P.2d 1007, 123 A.L.R. 226 (1939). 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions 20.
Am. Jur. Injunctions 16. Court's discretionConstraints on exercise thereof:
Injunction 1, 9, 21
Although generally exercised as a matter of discretion, the power to grant or deny injunctive
relief is not arbitrary or unlimited but must be exercised with the guidance of established principles
of equity jurisprudence.[FN1] A court's inherent authority over litigation matters does not free the
court from procedural requirements regarding injunctions. [FN2] (NOTE: in 607 the RJC erred
in issuign a TPO without the posting of the jurisdictional prerequisite bond (failing to post even the
mandatory minimum set by the AOC). Further, King, and employee of the SBN, applied for and
advocated for a protection order that he admits was sought to, in part, protect himself, which is
impermissible under Nevada law (ie, the employer must apply for such an order for the employee
(where Peters originally filled out the application then whited out her name, such is the functional
equivalent thereof as to Peters impermissibly so applying for a TPO for herself as well. Further, by
statute under NRS 33.270, a separate EPO application is required for an EPO, and the SBN failed to
provide any such separate EPO application).
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Additionally, the purported service of the TPO (especially where such TPO expressly provides
which law enforcement entities may serve the TPO, and not listed thereamong are the RJCs Bailiffs
(likely due to the appearance of partiality and impropreity attendant to the RJC Bailiffs continually
harassing Coughlin by purporting to serve him various Admin Orders, this TPO, another in
RCP2012-00599, etc., etc., while Coughlin was either inside the court house going to or leaving
court, or accessing the filing office or DAS) upon Coughlin was purportedly done by the RJCs
Bailiff Anthony English, whom is not authorized to do such given Washoe County has less than
700,000 population and as such NRS 4.353(6) is not availing as a basis for such action,
furthermore, the TPO itself (which, without which, given such was the only purported notice to
Coughlin of the EPO hearing of 1/4/13 beyond RJC Chief Judge Pearson denying (without
specifying the date set for the extension hearing) Coughlins 12/20/12 Emergency Ex Parte
Telephonic Motion for an Emergency Teleconference or Hearing (with Coughlin seeking to have
the SBN a party to such) to Dissolve or Modify the TPO in 607 given the exigencies of SCR 105(4)
and SCR 119(3)s incorporation of NRCP 52, 59, 60, and DCR 13(7), WDCR 12(6), etc.). During
such Ex Parte Teleconference with Judge Pearson, Chief Judge Pearson indicated to Coughlin that
Coughlins filing of any documents in his formal disciplinary proceeding, by whatever means,
would not fall within the purview of contacting the SBN, of course, given such is plainly a lawful
act under NRS 33.360(2)).
In granting or denying injunctive relief, a court abuses its discretion when it lacks
jurisdiction,[FN3] fails to consider and make a record of the factors relevant to its determination,
(Pearson, whilst, to his credit, putting the question to King at least, committed clear error in
accepting from King a vague and meritless explanation as to whether Coughlin has any lawful right
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to contact the SBN (notice that Judge Pearson, of course, did not deign to extend his jurisdiction
to in any way limit Coughlins right to file documents in NG12-0204, etc., his then pending formal
disciplinary proceeding in the SBN (especially where the SBNs King and Peters lied in asserting
that Peters was merely the Paralegal/Investigator for the SBN (whereas at other times they hold
Peters out to Respondents in disciplinary hearings as the SBNs Clerk of Court (something she
fraudulently failed to mention to RPD Detective Yturbide as well, in addition to Peters lying during
the 1/4/13 extension hearing in alleging, under oath, that she saw Coughlin in what Peters alleges is
Coughlins vehicle on 1/3/13 in connection with the purported violation of the TPO) despite Peters
indicating to Detective Yturbide that she did not see Coughlin in the vehicle on 1/3/13). [FN4] relies
on clearly erroneous factual findings, (NOTE: it was clearly erroneous for Judge Pearson to deem
an alleged email from Coughlin to the WCPDs Officer (addressed to Jim Leslie, Esq.) as a threat
(either direct or indirect) to the SBN (whom were ccd on such email), especially where the SBNs
King lied under oath (whilst violating RPC 3.7, attorney as witness) in alleging the link contained
within the first paragraph of such email was to a violent video showing a character in a movie
whom has just shot his public defender (especially where such patently does not occur at any point
in the movie purportedly linked to (though the purported link was a mere audio clip related to
learning, reading, and philosophy, containing nothing in the way of a threat of violence whatsoever)
[FN5] considers clearly irrelevant or improper factors, (it was clearly error for Judge Pearson to
allow and consider Kings testimony as to what we read about in that newspapers and who
knows what Coughlin is capable of and Kings non-expert opinion as to Coughlins mental state
and other speculation) (NOTE: it was clearly inappropriate to excuse SBN Clerk of Court from
providing sworn testimony at the 1/4/13 hearing in RCP2012-000607, but rather, to allow the
SBNs Pat King (whom is not able to appear as an attorney in that matter, but did (violating RPC
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3.7 (attorney as witness) as well) where he admitted he was seeking the TPO/EPO, in part, for his
own protection (under NRS 33.370 an employer, not the employee, must apply for a Workplace
Harassment TPO/EPO) [FN6] gives too much weight to one factor,[FN7] relies on erroneous
conclusions of law or equity,[FN8] or misapplies its factual or legal conclusions.[FN9]
Courts have no discretion to grant injunctive relief violative of constitutional guarantees
[FN10] or injunctions compelling the performance of an unlawful act.[FN11]
A trial court abuses its discretion in granting or denying injunctive relief if its ruling is
based on an erroneous interpretation of the law. West's Ga.Code Ann. 958. Georgia Soc.
of Ambulatory Surgery Centers v. Georgia Dept. of Community Health, 309 Ga. App. 31, 710
S.E.2d 183 (2011). 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions 16
[FN1] 13. [FN2] Rosen v. Siegel, 106 F.3d 28, 36 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1222 (2d Cir. 1997).
[FN3] 216. [FN4] Hoffmann v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 2003 WI 64, 262 Wis. 2d 264, 664
N.W.2d 55 (2003). [FN5] Cargill, Inc. v. U.S., 173 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 1999); Fogie v. THORN
Americas, Inc., 95 F.3d 645 (8th Cir. 1996); Tri-County Funeral Service, Inc. v. Eddie Howard
Funeral Home, Inc., 330 Ark. 789, 957 S.W.2d 694 (1997); Teachers' Retirement System
of State of Ga. v. Forehand, 234 Ga. App. 437, 506 S.E.2d 913, 130 Ed. Law Rep.
1347 (1998); Musgrave v. Brookhaven Lake Property Owners Ass'n, 990 S.W.2d 386
(Tex. App. Texarkana 1999).
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[FN6] Winkler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 101 F.3d 1196, 36 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 23 (7th Cir.
1996); Hoffmann v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 2003 WI 64, 262 Wis. 2d 264, 664
N.W.2d 55 (2003). [FN7] Hoffmann v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 2003 WI 64, 262 Wis. 2d 264,
664 N.W.2d 55 (2003). [FN8] Cargill, Inc. v. U.S., 173 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 1999); Tri-County Funeral
Service, Inc. v. Eddie Howard Funeral Home, Inc., 330 Ark. 789, 957 S.W.2d 694 (1997); Branch v.
Occhionero, 239 Conn. 199, 681 A.2d 306 (1996); Teachers' Retirement
System of State of Ga. v. Forehand, 234 Ga. App. 437, 506 S.E.2d 913, 130 Ed. Law
Rep. 1347 (1998). [FN9] Cargill, Inc. v. U.S., 173 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 1999); Hayworth v. Schilli
Leasing, Inc., 669 N.E.2d 165 (Ind. 1996); Oklahoma Sports Properties, Inc. v. Independent
School Dist. No. 11 of Tulsa County, Okl., 1998 OK CIV APP 40, 957 P.2d 137, 126
Ed. Law Rep. 486 (Div. 1 1998); Musgrave v. Brookhaven Lake Property Owners
Ass'n, 990 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. App. Texarkana 1999).
[FN10] 20. [FN11] Hutchins v. Carrillo, 27 Va. App. 595, 500 S.E.2d 277 (1998).
[FN12] Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717, 128 Ed. Law Rep. 624 (7th Cir. 1998),
judgment rev'd on other grounds, 529 U.S. 217, 120 S. Ct. 1346, 146 L. Ed. 2d 193,
142 Ed. Law Rep. 624 (2000).
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NRS 33.360: Limitations on effect of provisions The provisions of NRS 33.200 to 33.360,
inclusive, do not:...2. Prohibit a person from engaging in any constitutionally protected exercise of
free speech...;.
Pursuant to NV JCRCP 81, the RJC, a court of limited jurisdiction, does not have the inherent
authority, nor the discretion, to issue TPOs or EPOS under NRS 33 (given the express statutory
scheme enaced by the Legislature
42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions 21 Restraints on exercise of legal or constitutional rights
Freedom of speech; 1, 3, 9, 13: A preliminary injunction is a prior restraint, and a party seeking to
justify a prior restraint on speech carries a heavy burden of justifying the restraint.1 To obtain a
temporary restraining order involving a prior restraint on pure speech, the speech must threaten an
interest more fundamental than the First Amendment itself.2 Freedom of speech may not be
suppressed by injunction on the ground that its exercise may incidentally lead to a tort or breach of
contract.3 There are, however, exceptions to the general principle that forbids the issuance of
injunctions impinging on First Amendment rights.4 Preliminary injunctions restricting the activities
of protesters may or may not be lawful, depending on the particulars of the order and the degree
of restrictiveness of the order. (NOTE: clearly the Reno City Attorneys alleged interpretation it
seeks this Court to adopt (ie, that contacting means Coughlin submitting filings in his disciplinary
matter to the SBN even by USPS mailing, faxing, or having a third party (whether an independent
contractor, an employee, or an agent, or some sort of courier) is compltely unsupportable. Were that
how Judge Pearson or the RMCs Judge W. Gardner to now interpret such TPO, such would have
precluded Coughlin from (especially in light of Judge Pearsons refusal to grant Coughlin an
hearing on Coughlins motion to vacate, modify, or dissolve the TPO (made via telephone on
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12/20/12) submitting even by USPS mail to the SBN an filings in his disciplinary matter, much less
the typical correspondences incident to litigation (which, say in the case of SCR 105(3)s dictates
respecting the record and appendix (by way of NRAP 10, 11, 28, 30, and 32, or the rules associated
with seeking continuances, were acts required of Coughlin) 5
Footnotes: 1 Paradise Hills Associates v. Procel, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1528, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 514 (4th
Dist. 1991), opinion modified on other grounds, (Dec. 11, 1991) (holding that the deprivation of
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, even for minimal periods, constitutes irreparable harm
in the context of an action for injunctive relief). 2 Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78
F.3d 219, 1996 FED App. 0076P (6th Cir. 1996), opinion clarified on other grounds, (May 8, 1996).
3 Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup 1977). 4 Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.
v. F.C.C., 507 U.S. 1301, 113 S. Ct. 1806, 123 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1993). 5 Schenck v. Pro-Choice
Network Of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357, 117 S. Ct. 855, 137 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1997). Political
protesters failed to allege any threat of imminent injury, and thus, they lacked standing to sue the
Director of the United States Secret Service for injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent the
Secret Service from establishing protest zones and thereby interfering with their exercise of First
Amendment rights at future political events, although they alleged that the Secret Service had
violated their rights at an earlier protest during a political event which the president had attended,
where they did not allege that the president was scheduled to return for an appearance at the same
venue where the earlier protest was held, and they did not allege any unlawful conduct at a
presidential appearance since the incident at the earlier protest. Elend v. Sun Dome, Inc., 370 F.
Supp. 2d 1206 (M.D. Fla. 2005), aff'd on other grounds, 471 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2006).
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Any such interpretation of either the TPO or EPO as to somehow impinge upon the means with
which Coughlin may submit filings in his disciplinary matter to the SBN would clearly be an
imperssible infringement upon not just Coughlins right to free speach, guaranteed under the state
and federal constitutions, but also Coughlins right to access the courts (where the SBN serves as
the situs of either a court or administrative tribunal and holds Peters out at its Clerk of Court) and
protect what has been declared a protected property right under the Fourteenth Amendment (ie, his
law license).
42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions 25. Injunctions specifically authorized by statute Injunction 1, 3,
6
A statute may impose upon a court the positive duty to grant injunctive relief under specified
conditions.1 A statutory request for injunctive relief is governed by the requirements of the statute,
and express statutory language supersedes common-law requirements.2 ..
Courts should not seek to apply their equitable discretion to grant an injunction when such
discretion is explicitly precluded by use of word "shall" or similarly prescriptive statutory
language.6 (NOTE: there are appearances of just this sort of mandatory language in NRS 33.280,
33.250, 33.270, etc., all of which were violated by Judge Pearsons TPO and EPO) If the statute
does not expressly or implicitly limit the court's equity jurisdiction, however, the issuance of
injunctive relief remains within the court's discretion.7
Footnotes 1 Worthington v. Kenkel, 684 N.W.2d 228 (Iowa 2004); Pinnacle Gas Resources, Inc. v.
Diamond Cross Properties, LLC, 2009 MT 12, 349 Mont. 17, 201 P.3d 160 (2009); Levisa Coal Co.
v. Consolidation Coal Co., 276 Va. 44, 662 S.E.2d 44 (2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2158, 173 L.
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Ed. 2d 1156 (2009); Timberline Four Seasons Resort Management Co., Inc. v. Herlan, 223 W. Va.
730, 679 S.E.2d 329 (2009). 2 Henderson v. Burd, 133 F.2d 515, 146 A.L.R. 714 (C.C.A. 2d Cir.
1943); Stone v. Kerr, 194 Miss. 646, 10 So. 2d 845 (1942); Recon Exploration, Inc. v. Hodges, 798
S.W.2d 848 (Tex. App. Dallas 1990). The legislature may impose a duty to grant an injunction by
specifying conditions in a statute; when this is done, the conditions specified in the statute
supersede the traditional equitable requirements. Max 100 L.C. v. Iowa Realty Co., Inc., 621
N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 2001).
3 In re Bradshaw, 233 B.R. 315 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1999). However, where injunctions are creatures of
statute, all that need be proven is a statutory violation. Burnett v. Gloucester County Bd. of Chosen
Freeholders, 409 N.J. Super. 219, 976 A.2d 444 (App. Div. 2009).
4 In re Bradshaw, 233 B.R. 315 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1999). Where an injunction is authorized by
statute, the traditional equity grounds for injunctive relief need not be proven; it is sufficient if the
statutory conditions are satisfied. U.S. v. Pugh, 2010-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P 50445, 105
A.F.T.R.2d 2010-2662, 2010 WL 2266069 (E.D. N.Y. 2010). A showing of irreparable harm is
required for preliminary injunctive relief under the False Claims Act; the statutory language
supports the position that customary equitable considerations should apply. Bedrossian v.
Northwestern Memorial Hosp., 409 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2005).
5 Wadena Implement Co. v. Deere & Co., Inc., 480 N.W.2d 383 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
6 Waterfront Com'n of New York Harbor v. Construction and Marine Equipment Co., Inc., 928 F.
Supp. 1388 (D.N.J. 1996).
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7 U.S. v. Marine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d 1329 (5th Cir. 1996); Ross v. Federal Highway Admin.,
972 F. Supp. 552 (D. Kan. 1997), decision aff'd on other grounds, 162 F.3d 1046 (10th Cir. 1998).
8 Summit Water Distribution Co. v. Summit County, 2005 UT 73, 123 P.3d 437 (Utah 2005).
The plaintiff was not entitled to injunctive relief under the Housing Act provision that Congress
suspended 17 days prior to the date on which the plaintiff was granted a judgment under the
provision. Nielsen v. Stepping Stones Associates, L.P., 930 F. Supp. 910 (S.D. N.Y. 1996) (referring
to United States Housing Act of 1937 8(t), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. 1437f(t)).
Both the TPO and EPO in RCP2012-000607 are lacking in that which is mandated by statute,
and were issued in error where jurisdictional prerequisites required to be present by statute were
missing from both the orders and application at issue.
NRS 33.250. Verified application for temporary order; contents of application 1. An employer
or an authorized agent of an employer who reasonably believes that harassment in the workplace
has occurred may file a verified application for a temporary order for protection against harassment
in the workplace against the person who allegedly committed the harassment.

2. The verified application must include, without limitation: (c) A detailed description of the
events that allegedly constituted harassment in the workplace and the dates on which these events
occurred.

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NRS 33.280. Effect of temporary or extended order; court may not issue order against
more than one person; contents of order...2. A court may not issue a temporary or extended
order for protection against harassment in the workplace that is against more than one person.
Clearly, the charge in 13 CR 3913 is violative of RPC 3.8 where such is premised upon the
contention that one other than Coughlin purportedly submitting a filing to the SBN in person was
someone violative of the TPO.
NRS 33.280 continues: 3. A temporary or extended order for protection against harassment
in the workplace must: (c) State the reasons for granting the order; and 4. In addition to the
requirements of subsection 3, if the court granted a temporary order for protection against
harassment in the workplace without notice, the order must: (a) Include a statement that the
person who allegedly committed the harassment is entitled to a hearing on the order pursuant
to NRS 33.270;...(e) Define the irreparable injury, loss or damage resulting from the harassment and
state why it is irreparable; (NOTE: the TPO and EPO in 607 both fail to meet this standard) and (f)
Set forth the reasons for granting the order without notice.
Judge Pearsons refusing to grant Coughlin a hearing on the TPO, incident to Coughlins
application for such on 12/20/12 was violative of the requirement that one be afforded Coughlin
(beyond the 1/4/13 hearing to determine whether to extend the TPO in granting an EPO) for just the
sort of reasons that arose in this matter (ie, the chance of irreparable harm to Coughlin by the
granting of such an order given the exigencies of deadlines involved in a pending disciplinary
matter involving Coughlins Fourteenth Amendment protected property right, his law license).
Judge Pearson did, in fact, grant the TPO in 607 without notice to Coughlin.
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Further, such 12/20/12 TPO was violative of NRS 33.280(3)(c),4(f) in that, beyond a boilerplate
copying fo the plain language of such statutory subsection, there is nothing in such order
approaching the sort of specifity required therein as to the reasons for granting the order, much less
the reasons for doing so without notice to Coughlin (especially where any purported notice to
Coughlin consisted of an alleged emailing or faxing of the TPO application from Peters to
Coughlin, where the SBN then turns right around and claims any emailing or faxing by Coughlin of
even a filing in his disciplinary matter would somehow be tantamount to a harassing violating of a
TPO or EPO.
Additional mandatory language Judge Pearsons TPO and EPO failed to comply with (making such
void and voidable, which is a legally distinct characterization from the test set forth in Truesdale as
to whether such an orders validity or invalidity may be collaterally attacked) is contained in
NRS 33.270. Requirements for issuance of temporary or extended order; expiration; right to
challenge temporary order; award of costs and attorney's fees to prevailing party; interlocutory
appeal of extended order
1. The court may issue a temporary order for protection against harassment in the workplace if it
appears to the satisfaction of the court from specific facts shown by a verified application (NOTE:
the one application involved in 607 is not verified and contains no specific facts whatsoever,
especially where the materials included in the exhibit 1 et seq thereto are not incorporated by
reference, and not made on or in connection with the mandatory form 4 applicants are required to
use in connection therewith) filed pursuant to NRS 33.250 that harassment in the workplace has
occurred.
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2. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 4, a temporary order for protection against
harassment in the workplace must not be issued without notice to the person who allegedly
committed the harassment. A temporary order for protection against harassment in the workplace
must not be issued without the giving of security by the employer ... (NOTE: no such security was
given by the SBN, and Judge Pearson did not in any way address or waive such statutory
requirement (nor could he pursuant to NV JCRCP 81 and NRS 33.270).
4. A court may issue a temporary order for protection against harassment in the workplace without
written or oral notice to the person who allegedly committed the harassment or the persons attorney
only if:(a) A verified application is accompanied by an affidavit that contains specific facts which
clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to the employer, an
employee of the employer while the employee performs the duties of the employees employment
(NOTE: the SBNs 12/20/12 TPO application was neither verified not accompanied by an affidavit,
(or even a Declaration containing specific facts of the required showing) ... (b) The employer and
the employer's attorney, if any, set forth in the affidavit:(1) The efforts, if any, that have been made
to give notice to the person who allegedly committed the harassment; and (2) The facts supporting
waiver of notice requirements...(NOTE: the SBNs 12/20/12 application contains neither an
affidavit nor even a declaration in lieu thereof setting forth either of that required in NRS
33.270(4)(b)(1)-(2)).
6. If a temporary order for protection against harassment in the workplace is granted, with or
without notice, the employer or the employers authorized agent may apply for an extended order
for protection against harassment in the workplace by filing a verified application for an extended
order for protection against harassment in the workplace. If such an application is filed, the
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temporary order remains in effect until the hearing on the application for an extended order is held.
The application must:
(a) In addition to the information required by subsection 2 of NRS 33.250, set forth the facts that
provide the basis for granting an extended order for protection against harassment in the
workplace;
(b) Be filed before the expiration of the temporary order for protection against harassment in the
workplace;...
7. At the hearing on an application filed pursuant to subsection 6, the employer must present
evidence sufficient to support the granting of the application for an extended order for protection
against harassment in the workplace. ...
9. Upon 2 days' notice to an employer who obtained a temporary order for protection against
harassment in the workplace without notice or on such shorter notice to the employer as the court
may prescribe, the person who allegedly committed the harassment may appear and move the
dissolution or modification of the temporary order for protection against harassment in the
workplace...
11. If a court issues an extended order for protection against harassment in the workplace, an
interlocutory appeal lies to the district court, which may affirm, modify or vacate the order in
question...
On at least two occasions, including on or about 7/26/13 Coughlin filed a Notice of Appeal as
to both the TPO and EPO in RCP2012-000607, which the RJC has refused to transmit to the
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District Court in violation of NV Const Art. 4. Sec. 21 and Knox v. District Courts express
prohibition against courts of limited jurisdiction creating special rules that only apply to certain
people (especially where the 8/14/13 Admin Order 2013-06 that the RJC has now put in place was
not in existence at such time and where JCRRT 2 makes clear that the JCRRT (especially JCRRT 10
and its formatting requirements) do not apply to these protection order matters.

B. Procedural Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals against the deprivation of liberty or property by the
government without due process. Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th
Cir.1993). Procedural due process claims require proof of two elements: (1) a protectable liberty or
property interest; and (2) a denial of adequate procedural protections. Thornton v. City of St. Helens,
425 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir.2005). As noted, Coughlin has asserted a protectable liberty interest on
the basis of his allegations.

Property interests are not created by the Constitution, but by existing rules or understandings from
an independent source such as state law rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that
support claims of entitlement to those benefits. Id. (quoting Board of Regents of State Colleges v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). (NOTE: SCR 105 and SCR 119, in addition to NRCP 52, 69, 60,
and WDCR 12 and DCR 13 provide just such a set of rules here). To have a property interest in a
benefit, a person must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. A benefit
is not a protected entitlement where government officials may grant or deny it in their discretion.
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Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005); Ky. Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson,
490 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1989). Protected entitlements arise only when the relevant state law
provisions truly make the conferral of the benefit mandatory. Or. Entm't Corp. v. City of Beaverton,
233 Fed. App'x 618, 619 (9th Cir.2007) (unpublished disposition).
Whether a substantive interest created by an independent source such as state law constitutes a
property interest for purposes of the 14th Amendment is ultimately a question of federal
constitutional law. Town of Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 757. The analysis is two-pronged: first, the
court determines what the state law provides; and second, if state law provides an entitlement, the
court determines whether that entitlement rises to the level of a property interest for the purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 757, 766-67.
A. Due Process
Fourteenth Amendment due process falls into one of two classes: (1) substantive due process; and
(2) procedural due process. To prove a violation of either substantive or procedural due process, the
plaintiff must show a deprivation of a cognizable liberty or property interest protected by the
Constitution. Williby v. City of Oakland, 2008 WL 686014, at *4 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 13, 2008).
Coughlin alleges that both due process, ie, those that are procedural or substantive were violated in
607.

i. Substantive Due Process
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Substantive due process protects individuals from arbitrary deprivation of their life, liberty, or
property by the government. Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 991 (9th Cir.2006). Only the most
egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in a constitutional sense. Id. (quoting County
of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998)). To establish this claim, a plaintiff must show
both (1) a deprivation of life, liberty, or property, and (2) conscience shocking behavior by the
government. Id.
Any interpretation of the TPO here (especially in conjunction with RJC Chief Judge Pearsons ex
parte refusal to grant Coughlin a hearing on the TPO or even an emerency teleconference with the
SBN under NRS 33.270(9), and denying outright Coughlins motion to vacate, modify, or dissolve
such TPO) that interprets the order and its reference to contacting the SBN to preclude Coughlin
from in any way, via any manner, submitting filings to the SBN in his formal disciplinary hearing
would clearly be violative of both substanive and procedural due process, especially as to Coughlins
Fourteenth Amendment protected property right (his law license) and his consitutional right to free
speech and to access the courts.
Further, the SBN and Judge Pearson had judicial notice of Coughlins indigency at the time in
question (see RCR2012-001048, RCR2011-063341) precluding any interpretation of the allusion to
contacting the SBN that would operate to place a greater burden on Coughlin to file documents
with the SBN (especially where the SBN had never instructed or ordered Coughlin not to fax it, but
rather, Clerk of Court Peters expressly indicated to Coughlin that he may submit filings and serve
such on the SBN via facsimile).
Am. Jur. Injunctions 24. Difficulty or impossibility of performance or enforcement; lack of
benefit to complainantEffect of defendant's financial condition
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AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030
The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain the social security
number of any person. DATED 10/30/13
/s/ Zach Coughlin, signed electronically
Zach Coughlin Pro Per Self Representing Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE:
Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I do hereby certify that, on this date, I, Zach Coughlin I deposited in the United
States mail at Reno, Nevada, in a sealed envelope, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document and or electronically served (via electronic method of transmission previously given express
permission to utilize by those with requisite authority to provide it, upon which Couglin reasonably relied
and or relies), Mikohn satisfactory, and NRS 178.590 facsimiled prior to 5 pm and personally delivered to
wcda too:
AMOS R. STEGE, ESQ. ZACHARY N. YOUNG, ESQ. Washoe County DA Office Address: 1 South Sierra
P.O. Box 30083 Reno, NV 89520 Phone Number: 775-328-3200 Fax number: 775-325-6703 Email:
astege@da.Washoecounty.Us DATED THIS: Dated this 10/30/2013

Served upon whomever Coughlin is legally allowed to serve such upon by whatever means Coughlin is
allowed to so serve such as to WCDA/WCPD in 599 and SBN in 607.
/s/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin, Defendant
INDEX TO EXHIBITS: Exhibit 1: Various relevant materials already propounded In disc form and found at
skydrive links
Exhibit 1: 1. Exhibit 1: Various relevant materials on a cd/dvd/discovery already propounded
https://skydrive.live.com/redir?resid=43084638F32F5F28!9135
https://skydrive.live.com/redir?resid=43084638F32F5F28!8413

10/31/13 Outlook Print Message
https://bay176.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=954bfcdf-4283-11e3-93e5-b4b52f561842,m&isSafe=true&FolderID=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000 1/1
FW: Outbound fax report
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Thu 10/31/13 4:24 PM
To: zyoung@da.washoecounty.us (zyoung@da.washoecounty.us);
astege@da.washoecounty.us (astege@da.washoecounty.us);
msexton@washoecounty.us (msexton@washoecounty.us); rsweet@nvcourts.nv.gov
(rsweet@nvcourts.nv.gov); kpickering@nvcourts.nv.gov (kpickering@nvcourts.nv.gov);
bhutchins@judicial.state.nv.us (bhutchins@judicial.state.nv.us)
1 attachment
10 30 13 72675 Motion to Strike 10 23 13 Sentencing Memorandum, Motion for Mistrial
and for Continuance of 11 6 13 Sentencing Hearing final.pdf (230.0 KB)
Zachary Barker Coughlin 1471 E. 9th St. Reno, NV 89512 Tel and Fax: 949 667
7402 ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: noreply@voxox.com
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Subject: Outbound fax report
Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2013 16:21:46 -0700
Hi zachcoughlin,
Your Fax was successfully sent to 18ff53cc-a121-4c3b-95aa-65913d1341c6general693298 (
17753283844).
Your Fax was delivered @ 11:21:48 PM on 2013-10-31.
xoxo,
The Voxox Team
This message was intended for zachcoughlin@hotmail.com. Want to control which emails you
receive from Voxox? Get Voxox: http://download.voxox.com and adjust your Notifications in the
Settings/Preferences window. 2013 Voxox 9276 Scranton Road, Suite 300, San Diego, CA
92121.
10/31/13 Outlook Print Message
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FW: Outbound fax report
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Thu 10/31/13 4:24 PM
To: zyoung@da.washoecounty.us (zyoung@da.washoecounty.us);
astege@da.washoecounty.us (astege@da.washoecounty.us);
msexton@washoecounty.us (msexton@washoecounty.us); rsweet@nvcourts.nv.gov
(rsweet@nvcourts.nv.gov); kpickering@nvcourts.nv.gov (kpickering@nvcourts.nv.gov);
bhutchins@judicial.state.nv.us (bhutchins@judicial.state.nv.us)
1 attachment
10 30 13 72675 Motion to Strike 10 23 13 Sentencing Memorandum, Motion for Mistrial
and for Continuance of 11 6 13 Sentencing Hearing final.pdf (230.0 KB)
Zachary Barker Coughlin 1471 E. 9th St. Reno, NV 89512 Tel and Fax: 949 667
7402 ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: noreply@voxox.com
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Subject: Outbound fax report
Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2013 16:21:46 -0700
Hi zachcoughlin,
Your Fax was successfully sent to 18ff53cc-a121-4c3b-95aa-65913d1341c6general693298 (
17753283844).
Your Fax was delivered @ 11:21:48 PM on 2013-10-31.
xoxo,
The Voxox Team
This message was intended for zachcoughlin@hotmail.com. Want to control which emails you
receive from Voxox? Get Voxox: http://download.voxox.com and adjust your Notifications in the
Settings/Preferences window. 2013 Voxox 9276 Scranton Road, Suite 300, San Diego, CA
92121.

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