CHEONG V.

Adong
Cheong Boo died intestate in Zambaoanga. The deceased left an
estate which was claimed by Cheong Seng Gee and Mora Adong.
Cheong Gee, alleged that he was the legitimate child by a
marriage contracted between the deceased and Tan Dit in China.
But, Mora Adong claimed that she was the lawfully married to
Cheong Boo in the Philippines, and her daughters, Payang and
Rosalia.
Because of the conflicting claims to the estate, a case was filed
before the Court of First Instance of Zambaonga. The court ruled
that the marriage of Cheong Boo and Mora Adong was proven but
under our laws it is not considered as a valid marriage. The court
concluded that there should be a partion of the property of the
deceased and his natural children(Cheong Seng Gee, Payang and
Rosalia).
WON the marriage between Cheong Boo and Tan Dit was valid?
No. The Supreme Court stated that for a foreign marriage to be
valid, it must be ascertained that the foreign law as a question of
fact. No testimony as to what marriage law govern in China in the
province of Amoy. Unfortunately, from the evidence give, the
Court did not sustain the marriage of Tan Dit and Cheong Boo.
Moreover, the immigration documents does not adequately prove
Cheong Boos alleged first marriage, but only show the relation of
the deceased and his son.
Won the Mohammedan marriage between Cheong Boo and
Adong was valid?
Yes. Section V of the Marriage Law provides that "Marriage may
be solemnized by either a judge of any court inferior to the
Supreme Court, justice of the peace, or priest A Mohammedan
Iman is a "priest or minister of the Gospel," and Mohammedanism
is a "denomination," within the meaning of the Marriage Law
We find the Mohammedan marriage to be proved and to be valid,
thus giving to the widow and the legitimate children of this union
the rights accruing to them under the law.
People v. Patalin
Accused-appelants Alex Mijaque and Alfonso Patalin were
charged with crime of robbery with multiple rape. The Regional
Trial Court sentenced them to a death penalty. However, a
ratification of the 1987 Constitution stated in its provision that
the death penalty was abolished. The Congress was given the
prerogative to revive the punishment at its discretion. ongress
eventually restored the death penalty by virtue of Republic Act
No. 7659 or the Death Penalty Law which took effect on January
1, 1994.
Accused-appelants averred that the ratification of the
Constitution should have a retroactive effect, being beneficial to
them. Moreover, they are not covered by the reinstatement of
the death penalty in The Death Penalty Law.
WON the accused are entitled to the retroactivity effect of the
death penalty.
Yes. At the time of such ratification, the instant case was still at its
trial stage. No penalty had as yet then been imposed.
Considering that the provision provides that *a+ny death penalty
already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua, it is
clear that the framers intended said provision to have a
retroactive effect on cases pending without any penalty of death
having been imposed yet. Thus, their penalty is reducted to
reclusion perpetua.
Cui v. Arellano University
Emetoro Cui, a scholar, was a student in the College of Law at the
Arellano University. Cuis scholarship was granted with an
agreement that: "In consideration of the scholarship granted to
me by the University, I hereby waive my right to transfer to
another school without having refunded to the University
(defendant) the equivalent of my scholarship cash. When he
enrolled for the last semester of his law studies, he failed to pay
his tuition. Cui decided to transfer and finished his law degree at
Abad Santos University. After his graduation he returned to
Arellano University, in satisfaction for application in the bar, he
requested for his transcripts of records. The school refused on the
ground that the plaintiff must pay the last semester of his last
year.
The Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum no. 38,
stated that, the students should not be subsequently charged to
the recipient students when they decide to quit school or to
transfer to another institution. Scholarship should not be offered
merely to attract and keep students in a school.
Plantiff asked the assistance of the Bureau of Private Schools.The
defendant, however, refused to release the transcript of record
even if the Bureau released a written order. The defendant even
challenged the validity of the memorandum released by the
Director of Private Schools.
WON the plaintiff waived his right to transfer to another school
without refunding Arellano University the equivalent of his
scholarships in cash. "In consideration of the scholarship granted
to me by the University, I hereby waive my right to transfer to
another school without having refunded to the University
(defendant) the equivalent of my scholarship cash. The aforesaid
memorandum merely incorporates a sound principle of public
policy
No. The defendant should have understood the real essence of
scholarships and realized that asking plaintiff to sign a waiver, was
a direct violation of the Memorandum. The contract is void
because it is against public policy and morals.
Scholarships are granted not to attract and to keep brilliant
students in school for their propaganda mine but to reward merit
or help gifted students in whom society has an established
interest or a first lien.
The defendant sentenced by the court to pay plaintiff.

Ang Pin v. RTC
An ejectment case was filed in the MTC. The res Julio Ko and
Zenaida Ko were ordered to vacate the premises and pay the the
rental fee to the pet Ang pin. The aggrieved party filed a case in
RTC. RTC modified the judgement. In, IAC the respondents
question the decision of the MTC on the ground that the judge
had already retired.
RTC affirmed the judges decision and modified the rental fee to
paid to pet from 5,000 per month rentals their pre-litigation level
of P500.
Pet filed for motion for recon and entry of judgement but was
deinied. Subsequently, they filed a motion for execution of the
judgement inMTC. The private res opposed on the ground that a
complaint for annulment of sale which they filed with the RTC was
decided in their favor.RTC promulgated there decision that the
sale was null and void, on grouds of equity under article 19 of the
civil code.
MTC granted and executed the motion for execution in the
ejectment case
Pet filed on the appellate courts. They contend that RTCs
nullification of sale and title and reconveyance case does not as
yet confer on the res any enforceable right whereas this Court has
alredy entered judgement in the ejectment case.
WON respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion
and/or acted or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction.
Yes. The respondent judge of CFI acted with grave abuse of
discretion in preventing the executory judgement of the municipal
court in the ejectment case because another possessory action
was pending in his court involving the same land.
From the foregoing, it is plain that the law is on the side of the
petitioners. The injunction was improperly issued. The
Intermediate Appellate Court ruled that the promulgation of the
trial court's decision was defective and ordered it repromulgated
but this Court set aside the appellate decision and reinstated the
metropolitan trial court and regional trial court decisions.
The only function of a lower court, when the judgment of a higher
court is returned to it, is the ministerial one of issuing the order of
execution. A lower court is without supervisory jurisdiction to
interpret or to reverse the judgment of the higher court.
Aquino-july 1, 2014

A case was filed before the Supreme Court assailing the
constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program(DAP).
Petitioners contend that the DAP should be unconstitional on the
ground that it contravenes section 29(1) of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution that *n+o money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.The DAP
provided the Executive a gateway to allocate public money pooled
from programmed and unprogrammed funds of its various
agencies in the guise of the President exercising his constitutional
authority.
In his privilege speech, Sen. Jinggoy Estrada revealed that some
Senators including himself, had been allotted an additional 50
million each asincentive for voting in favor the impeachment of
Chief Justice Renato Corona.
In response to Estradas revelation, Secretary Florencio Abad of
the Department of Budget and Management explained that the
funds released to Senators had been part of DAP, which was
designed to ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion.
He also claim that the DAP releases has been sourced from
savings generated by the Government
hether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution, which provides: No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law
Article 7 of the Civil Code provides: Article 7. Laws are repealed
only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance
shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the
contrary. When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with
the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations
shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution
A legislative or executive act that is declared void for being
unconstitutional cannot give rise to any right or obligation
In order to sustain their constitutional challenges against official
acts of the Government, the petitioners must discharge the basic
burden of proving that the constitutional infirmities actually
existed
Doctrine of operative fact was applicable After declaring the DAP
and its implementing issuances constitutionally infirm, we must
now deal with the consequences of the declaration.
In order to sustain their constitutional challenges against official
acts of the Government, the petitioners must discharge the basic
burden of proving that the constitutional infirmities actually
existed.
Article 7 of the Civil Code provides: Article 7. Laws are repealed
only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance
shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the
contrary. When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with
the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations
shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution
A legislative or executive act that is declared void for being
unconstitutional cannot give rise to any right or obligation
In order to sustain their constitutional challenges against official
acts of the Government, the petitioners must discharge the basic
burden of proving that the constitutional infirmities actually
existed.205 Simply put, guesswork and speculation cannot
overcome the presumption of the constitutionality of the assailed
executive act
We find the doctrine of operative fact applicable to the adoption
and implementation of the DAP. Its application to the DAP
proceeds from equity and fair play. The consequences resulting
from the DAP and its related issuances could not be ignored or
could no longer be undone.
Doctrine of operative fact In short, it nullifies the void law or
executive act but sustains its effects
To be clear, the doctrine of operative fact extends to a void or
unconstitutional executive act. The term executive act is broad
enough to include any and all acts of the Executive, including
those that are quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial in nature.
Disbursement Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular No.
541 and related executive issuances UNCONSTITUTIONAL for
being in violation of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution a
Edencia and jugo v. David(collector of internal rev)

nder the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Perfecto
vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes from the
salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution of
their compensation and therefore was in violation of the
Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said
taxes.
section 9, Article VIII of our Constitution: They shall receive such
compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office.
Congress promulgated Republic Act No. 590, if not to counteract
the ruling in that decision, at least now to authorize and legalize
the collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers.
SEC 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the
Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from
the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be
dimunition of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by
law.
WON collection of income tax is diminutive
Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a
decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of
interpretation
When a judicial officer assumed office, he does not exactly ask for
exemption from payment of income tax on his salary, as a
privilege . It is already attached to his office, provided and secured
by the fundamental law, not primarily for his benefit, but based
on public interest, to secure and preserve his independence of
judicial thought and action.
collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a
diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. We further
hold that the interpretation and application of the Constitution
and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of
the Judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the
Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted
in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition,
thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later
interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation sought
and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous
interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the
land.
Angelo-concur-s an invasion of the province and jurisdiction of the
judiciary
Parasconcur and dissent-I disagree with the majority in ruling that
no legislation may provide that it be held valid although against a
provision of the Constitution.

Rosales v. CFI Lanao del norte
On January 12, 1980, the petitioners advised the private
respondent that he would have to vacate the leased premises on
March 1, 1980, not only because of the lapse of the agreed term
but also because he had subleased the property in violation of
their agreement. claiming that his verbal agreement with them
was for a period of ten years, which was the reason he had
introduced permanent and costly improvements in the building,
and moreover they had also consented to his sublease of the
property. ivate respondents beat his adversaries to the draw, so
to speak, by filing on February 21, 1980, with the Court of First
Instance of Iligan City an action 4 for the continued enforcement
of the lease contract and for damages. The said court on February
28, 1980, one day before the expiration of the lease, issued a
restraining order that maintained the status quo between the
parties. Ten days later, the petitioners filed their own complaint,
this time for unlawful detainer, 7 with the City Court of Iligan City.
a motion to dismiss the private respondents' complaint before the
Court of First Instance on the ground inter alia of the pendency of
the ejectment case, and for the lifting of the temporary
restraining order. 9 For his part, the private respondent moved to
dismiss the ejectment suit also on the ground of lis pendens, his
argument being that the case he had filed earlier should be
decided first before the petitioners' complaint could be
entertained. petitioners' motion was in effect denied with its
Order dated May 27, 1981, that the "determination of the said
motion is hereby deferred until the trial
Thus failing in both courts, the petitioners have come to this
Court, praying for a reversal of the said orders on the ground that
they were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction.
WON the respondent judge of CFI cavite.
WON real issue between the parties is whether or not the lessee
should be allowed to continue occupying the land as lessee.
We find the petition to be meritorious.
The provision of the lease contract entered into between
petitioner and respondent is apparently clear that unless the
lessor and lessee agreed to a renewal thereof at least thirty days
prior to the date of expiration, the lease shall not be renewed.
The facts on record show that despite the exchange of
communication, proposals and counter-proposals, between the
parties regarding a renewal of the lease, they were not able to
arrive at an agreement within said period for while the lessor
wanted an increased rental the lessee, on the other hand,
proposed for a reduction. With this failure of an agreement, it is
to be presumed that the lessee was aware that an ejectment case
against him was forthcoming.
When lessee filed the ejectment case one day before the
expiration of the lease contract was to block the action for
ejectment case.
Precedents are helpful in deciding cases when they are on all
fours or at least substantially identical with previous litigations.
Argumentum a simili valet in lege. Earlier decisions are guideposts
that can lead us in the right direction as we tread the highways
and byways of the law in the search for truth and justice. These
pronouncements represent the wisdom of the past. They are the
voice of vanished judges talking to the future.
The petition is granted and judgment is hereby rendered
NACTOR V. IAC
The plaintiffs-respondents(spouses Melchor) allowed
Guillermo Nactor(one of the defendants-petitioner) to build
a shanty on their property without any contract or rental.
Nactor built houses for his relatives without the consent of
the spouses. Because the defendants-petitioners refused to
leave, the spouses filed a complaint with the Barangay
elevated to the Metropolitan Trial Court, ruled in favor of
the spouses.
The defendants-petitioners moved for reconsideration on
June 24,1985, which motion was denied by respondent
Judge, in an Omnibus Order dated October 22,1985, for
having been filed after the decision had become final and
executory. Petitioners file with the Court of Appeals but also
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court
THE DECISION ERRED IN RULING THAT THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION FILED ON THE 24 OF JUNE 1985 IS ALREADY
LATE BY ONE DAY, THE PRECEDING DAY, JUNE 23 BEING A
SUNDAY.
Petitioners contend that the motion for reconsideration was filed
on time with the Regional Trial Court on June 24, 1985 because
the fifteenth day, June 23, 1985 is a Sunday. There is merit in this
contention.
rt. 13. ...
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last
day included.
However, in case the last day is a Sunday or a legal holiday, it is
understood that where the time refers to a period prescribed or
allowed by the Rules of Court, by an order of the court, or by any
other applicable statute, the last day should really be the next
day, provided said day is neither a Sunday nor a legal holiday. The
law cannot require compliance on a day when entities supposed
to receive pleadings or documents are closed in view of the
holiday.
Bellis v. Bellis
Amos Bellis was a Texas citizen. His first wife whom he divorced
had five legitimate children. His second wife, Violet Kennedy had
3 legitimate children. Amos executed a will in the Philippines for
his distributable estate to be given accordingly to his heirs. The
three illegitimate children of Amos will be given stocks
When Amos Bellis died a resident of Texas, his will was admitted
to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila.The
executor(Peoples Bank and Trust Comapny) will divided the
residuary estate into 7 equal portions. However, Maria and
Miriam filed their opposition to the the partition on ground that
they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children.
The petitioners appealed to the lower court. Relying on Art 16 of
the Civil Code, this articles follows the nationality of the deceased.
The Texas Law should be followed where legitimes not included in
the will
WON Texas Law or Phil law be applied?
The Texas Law should govern. Decedent was both a national of
Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that
even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the
domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same
would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but
would still refer to Texas law.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good
customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has
not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign
nationals.
Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that
under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will
and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to
the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
UE v. Jader
Romeo Jader graduated at UE College of law from 1984-88.
During his last year, 1st semester, he failed to take the regular
final examination in Practical Court 1where he was given an
incomplete grade remarks. He filed an application for removal of
the incomplete grade given by Prof. Carlos Ortega on February 1,
1988 which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after the
payment of required fees. He took the exam on March 28 and on
May 30, the professor gave him a grade of 5.
The commencement exercise of UE College of law was held April
16, 1988, 3PM. In the invitation, his name appeared. In
preparation for the bar exam, he took a leave of absence from
work from April 20- Sept 30, 1988. He had his pre-bar class
review in FEU. Upon learning of such deficiency, he dropped his
review classes and was not able to take the bar exam.
Jader sued UE for damages resulting to moral shock, mental
anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, sleepless nights due to UEs negligence.
ISSUE: Whether UE should be held liable for misleading a student
into believing JADER satisfied all the requirements for graduation
when such is not the case. Can he claim moral damages?
However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable
to respondent for the latter's actual damages, we hold that
respondent should not have been awarded moral damages.
The negligent act of a professor who fails to observe the rules of
the school, for instance by not promptly submitting a student's
grade, is not only imputable to the professor but is an act of the
school, being his employer.
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith
Art. 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in
statutory law.
The ultimate thing in the theory of liability is justifiable reliance
under conditions of civilized society.9 Schools and professors
cannot just take students for granted and be indifferent to them,
for without the latter, the former are useless.
Petitioner cannot just give out its student's grades at any time
because a student has to comply with certain deadlines set by the
Supreme Court on the submission of requirements for taking the
bar. Petitioner's liability arose from its failure to promptly inform
respondent of the result of an examination and in misleading the
latter into believing that he had satisfied all requirements for the
course.
As a senior law student, respondent should have been responsible
enough to ensure that all his affairs, specifically those pertaining
to his academic achievement, are in order. Given these
considerations, we fail to see how respondent could have suffered
untold embarrassment in attending the graduation rites, enrolling
in the bar review classes and not being able to take the bar
exams. If respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure to take
the bar, he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has
satisfied all the requirements
Felipe v. Leuterio
On March 12, 1950 an inter-collegiate oratorical competition was
held in Naga City. Felipe was one of the Judges and was the
chairman. Nosce was awarded the first price and Imperial the
second price. Imperial addressed a letter to the Board of Judges
protesting the verdict and alleged that one of the judges
committed a mathematical error on computing the scores. The
Board refused to amend their award, Imperial filed a complaint in
court. She asserts that she should have ranked 3rd place in the
vote, which makes her score 9 or the First place.
The issue in this litigation is whether the courts have the authority
to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical
competition.
Held: Members of the court sometimes are members of the board
of judges in an oratorical contest. But it is UNWRITTEN in the law
that in such contests the decisions of the board of judges be final
and cannot be appealed. The contestants do not have the right to
the prizes because theirs is only a privilege to compete for the
prize and did not become a demandable right. The respondent
judge erred in his reasoning that where there is a wrong there is
remedy. To quote The flaw in his reasoning lies in the
assumption that Imperial suffered some wrong at the hands of
the board of judges. If at all, there was error on the part of one
judge, at most. Error and wrong do not mean the same thing.
"Wrong" as used in the aforesaid legal principle is the deprivation
or violation of a right. As stated before, a contestant has no right
to the prize unless and until he or she is declared winner by the
board of referees or judges. Granting that Imperial suffered some
loss or injury, yet in law there are instances of "damnum absque
injuria". This is one of them. If fraud or malice had been proven, it
would be a different proposition. But then her action should be
directed against the individual judge or judges who fraudulently
or maliciously injured her. Not against the other judges.
RCPI V. CA
A telegram sent through its Manila Office to the offended party,
Loreto Dionela- SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA
DIYAN-WALA-KANG PADALA DITO KAHIT BULBUL MO
alleges that the defamatory words on the telegram sent to him
not only wounded his feelings but also caused him undue
embarrassment and affected adversely his business as well
because other people have come to know of said defamatory
words.
Defendant corporation as a defense, alleges that the additional
words in Tagalog was a private joke between the sending and
receiving operators and that they were not addressed to or
intended for plaintiff and therefore did not form part of the
telegram and that the Tagalog words are not defamatory. The
telegram sent through its facilities was received in its station at
Legaspi City. Nobody other than the operator manned the
teletype machine which automatically receives telegrams being
transmitted. The said telegram was detached from the machine
and placed inside a sealed envelope and delivered to plaintiff,
obviously as is. The additional words in Tagalog were never
noticed and were included in the telegram when delivered.
RTC-Tagalog words libelous. ART. 19.- Every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.
ART. 20.-Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently
causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.
CA-confirmed
Petitioner's contentions do not merit our consideration.
Libelous matters were included in the message transmitted,
without the consent or knowledge of the sender. There is a clear
case of breach of contract by the petitioner in adding extraneous
and libelous matters in the message sent to the private
respondent. As a corporation, the petitioner can act only through
its employees. Hence the acts of its employees in receiving and
transmitting messages are the acts of the petitioner. To hold that
the petitioner is not liable directly for the acts of its employees in
the pursuit of petitioner's business is to deprive the general public
availing of the services of the petitioner of an effective and
adequate remedy. In most cases, negligence must be proved in
order that plaintiff may recover. However, since negligence may
be hard to substantiate in some cases, we may apply the doctrine
of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing speaks for itself), by considering
the presence of facts or circumstances surrounding the injury.
Wassmer v. Velez
their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set
September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez
left this note for his bride-to-be:Postpone the wedding because
the mother opposed. And the next day another telegram that he
will be returning.
Velez did not appear
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was
declared in default. defendant failed to appear before court.
Instead, on the following day his counsel filed a motion to defer
for two weeks the resolution on defendants petition for relief.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in
its order of July 6, 1956 calling the parties and their attorneys to
appear on July 13, 1956. This time. however, defendant's counsel
informed the court that chances of settling the case amicably
were nil. Appealed in this court, it was stated that defendant filed
no answer in the belief that an amicable settlement was being
negotiated.
"That he has a good and valid defense against plaintiff's cause of
action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been
due to fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his control.
Defendant mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an
actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately
eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions
that would have it so.
must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts
not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not
limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage,
which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was
set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and
distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh.
C). The bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel
for the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for
the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A
matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers
were given and gifts received
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As
stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable
wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the
above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it
when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different.
This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for
which defendant must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
Lirag v. CA
defendant Felix Lirag was a member of the Board of Directors of
the Philippine Chamber of Industries. plaintiff worked in a
temporary capacity with defendant Lirag Textile Mills, Inc.
defendant Lirag Textile Mills, Inc. wrote a letter to plaintiff
(Alcantara) advising him that, effective May 11, 1960, his
temporary designation as Technical Assistant to the
Administrative Officer was made permanent. defendant Lirag
Textile Mills, Inc. wrote plaintiff (Alcantara) a letter advising him
that because the company 'has suffered some serious reverses,
both in terms of pecuniary loss and in market opportunities,' the
company was terminating his services and effecting his separation
from defendant corporation
CA- the trial court did not commit any error in its evaluation of
the evidence when it found that it was not true that petitioner
Lirag Textile Mills (then defendant) suffered pecuniary loss and in
market opportunities which it used as a justification to terminate
the services of plaintiff Alcantara
Petitioners are now before Us questioning the respondent
Appellate Court's decision- warding moral damages to the
respondent Alcantara by the mere fact alone that the respondent
Alcantara was separated by the petitioner corporation from his
employment without just cause in the absence of any finding that
the employer acted with malice or evident bad faith
It necessarily follows that if the petitioner-employer Lirag Textile
Mills terminates the employment without a "valid cause or
causes", as it admittedly did, it committed a breach of the
contract of employment executed by and between the parties.
he trial court found no truth nor basis for petitioner Lirag Textile
Mills' contention that the valid cause for terminating private
respondent Alcantara's employment was that the former "has
suffered serious reverses, both in terms of pecuniary loss and in
market opportunities. " On the contrary, the trial court found that
petitioner Lirag Textile Mills, Inc.'s original capital of five million
pesos was, on May 2, 1961, or just two months prior to
defendants sending the note of separation (Exh. "C"), increased to
fifteen million
We see no compelling reason to disturb both the trial court's and
the respondent Appellate Court's rulings that the written contract
of employment was violated by petitioner Lirag Textile Mills, Inc.
when it terminated the employment of private respondent
Alcantara without a valid cause, what remains to be determined is
whether or not there was fraud or bad faith on the part of
petitioner Its bad faith in committing the breach of the contract
of employment was compounded when petitioners as appellants
in the respondent Appellate Court tried to raise for the first time
the question of private respondent Alcantara's alleged lack of skill
in its desperate effort to find a "valid cause" for that wrongful
breach. The very act of petitioners in trying to pull the wool over
the eyes of both the trial court and the respondent Appellate
Court as to its true financial condition in its attempt to establish a
false "valid cause" for its wrongful act is not only indicative of
fraud and bad faith
The act was attended with bad faith and deceit because said
petitioner made false allegations of a supposed valid cause
knowing them to be false, thus making itself liable for payment of
actual, moral and exemplary damages
Petitioner Felix Lirag should also be held liable to private
respondent Alcantara for having induced the latter to leave a
permanent position in the Philippine Chamber of Industries to
accept a job in the Lirag Textile Mills, Inc., and when private
respondent Alcantara was dismissed without any valid cause,
petitioner Felix Lirag did not do anything to help him although he
was in a position to do so by reason of his eminent position in the
petitioner corporation. His responsibility is not only moral but also
legal as under Art. 21 of the Civil Code: "Any person who willfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good custom or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.
Shookat v. CA
n August 1986, while working as a waitress in Dagupan City,
Pangasinan, Marilou Gonzales, then 21 years old, met Gashem
Shookat Baksh, a 29 year old exchange student from Iran who was
studying medicine in Dagupan. The two got really close and
intimate. On Marilous account, she said that Gashem later
offered to marry her at the end of the semester. Marilou then
introduced Gashem to her parents where they expressed their
intention to get married. Marilous parents then started inviting
sponsors and relatives to the wedding. They even started looking
for animals to slaughter for the occasion.
Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem in his apartment
where they had sexual intercourse. But in no time, their
relationship went sour as Gashem began maltreating Marilou.
Gashem eventually revoked his promise of marrying Marilou and
he told her that he is already married to someone in Bacolod City.
So Marilou went home and later sued Gashem for damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and awarded her P20k in
moral damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court.
On appeal, Gashem averred that he never proposed marriage to
Marilou and that he cannot be adjudged to have violated Filipino
customs and traditions since he, being an Iranian, was not familiar
with Filipino customs and traditions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
HELD: Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for damages in favor of Marilou
not really because of his breach of promise to marry her but
based on Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. In
this case, it is the deceit and fraud employed by Gashem that
constitutes a violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code. His promise
of marrying Marilou was a deceitful scheme to lure her into sexual
congress. As found by the trial court, Marilou was not a woman of
loose morals. She was a virgin before she met Gashem. She would
not have surrendered herself to Gashem had Gashem not
promised to marry her. Gashems blatant disregard of Filipino
traditions on marriage and on the reputation of Filipinas is
contrary to morals, good customs, and public policy. As a
foreigner who is enjoying the hospitality of our country and even
taking advantage of the opportunity to study here he is expected
to respect our traditions. Any act contrary will render him liable
under Article 21 of the Civil Code.
The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article 21 was meant to
expand the concepts of torts and quasi delict. It is meant to cover
situations such as this case where the breach complained of is not
strictly covered by existing laws. It was meant as a legal remedy
for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the
statute books such as the absence of a law penalizing a the
breach of promise to marry.
The Supreme Court however agreed with legal luminaries that if
the promise to marry was made and there was carnal knowledge
because of it, then moral damages may be recovered (presence of
moral or criminal seduction), Except if there was mutual lust; or if
expenses were made because of the promise (expenses for the
wedding), then actual damages may be recovered.
AMONOY v. Spouses Guitierrez-art19

In 1965, Atty. Sergio Amonoy represented Alfonso Fornilda
(Formida in some records) in a partition case. Since Fornilda had
no money to pay, he agreed to make use of whatever property he
acquires as a security for the payment of Amonoys attorneys
fees which amounts to P27k. In July 1969, Fornilda died. A month
later, the property was finally adjudicated and Fornilda, through
his heirs, got his just share from the property in dispute. Fornilda
was however unable to pay Amonoy. Hence, Amonoy sought to
foreclose the property in 1970. The heirs of Fornilda, the spouses
Jose Gutierrez and Angela Fornilda then sued Amonoy
questioning the validity of his mortgage agreement with Fornilda.
It was their claim that the attorneys fees he was collecting was
unconscionable and that the same was based on an invalid
mortgage due to the existing att0rney-client relationship between
him and Fornilda at the time the mortgage was executed.
The spouses lost in the trial court as well as in the Court of
Appeals but they appealed to the Supreme Court, docketed as
G.R.No. L-72306. Meanwhile, in 1973, Amonoy was able to
foreclose the property. Amonoy was also the highest bidder in the
public sale conducted in view of the foreclosure. He was able to
buy the property of Fornilda for P23k. But constructed on said
property was the house of the spouses Gutierrez.
Pending the spousess appeal with the Supreme Court, Amonoy
was able to secure a demolition order and so on May 30, 1986,
Amonoy started demolishing the houses of the spouses. But on
June 2, 1986, the Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) against the demolition order. On June 4, 1986,
Amonoy received a copy of the TRO. Finally, on June 24, 1989, the
Supreme Court promulgated a decision on G.R.No. L-72306 where
it ruled that the mortgage between Amonoy and Fornilda is void,
hence, Amonoy has no right over the property. But by this time,
the house of the spouses was already demolished because it
appears that despite the TRO, Amonoy continued demolishing the
house until it was fully demolished in the middle of 1987.
The spouses then sued Amonoy for damages. It is now the
contention of Amonoy that he incurred no liability because he
was merely exercising his right to demolish (pursuant to the
demolition order) hence what happened was a case of damnum
absque injuria (injury without damage).
ISSUE: Whether or not Amonoy is correct.
HELD: No. Amonoy initially had the right to demolish but when he
received the TRO that right had already ceased. Hence, his
continued exercise of said right after the TRO was already
unjustified. As quoted by the Supreme Court: The exercise of a
right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is
abused, especially to the prejudice of others.
What Amonoy did is an abuse of right. Article 19, known to
contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in
the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones
duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to
give everyone his due; recognizes the primordial limitation on all
rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set
forth in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong
is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible.
Clearly then, the demolition of the spousess house by Amonoy,
despite his receipt of the TRO, was not only an abuse but also an
unlawful exercise of such right.