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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEAS a!" MAR#OU T. GON$AES, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.

%A&#%E, 'R., J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
review and set aside the Decision
1
of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA
!.R. C" #o. $4$5% which affir&ed in toto the '% (ctober ')*) Decision of
+ranch *, -.ingayen/ of the Regional Trial Court -RTC/ of 0angasinan in Civil
Case #o. '%51*. 0resented is the issue of whether or not da&ages &ay be
recovered for a breach of pro&ise to &arry on the basis of Article $' of the Civil
Code of the 0hilippines.
The antecedents of this case are not co&plicated2
(n $3 (ctober '),3, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed
with the aforesaid trial court a co&plaint
(
for da&ages against the petitioner for
the alleged violation of their agree&ent to get &arried. 4he alleges in said
co&plaint that2 she is twentytwo -$$/ years old, single, 5ilipino and a pretty lass
of good &oral character and reputation duly respected in her co&&unity6
petitioner, on the other hand, is an 7ranian citi8en residing at the .o8ano
Apart&ents, !uilig, Dagupan City, and is an e9change student taking a &edical
course at the .yceu& #orthwestern Colleges in Dagupan City6 before $1 August
'),3, the latter courted and proposed to &arry her6 she accepted his love on the
condition that they would get &arried6 they therefore agreed to get &arried after
the end of the school se&ester, which was in (ctober of that year6 petitioner then
visited the private respondent:s parents in +a;aga, +ugallon, 0angasinan to
secure their approval to the &arriage6 so&eti&e in $1 August '),3, the petitioner
forced her to live with hi& in the .o8ano Apart&ents6 she was a virgin before she
began living with hi&6 a week before the filing of the co&plaint, petitioner:s
attitude towards her started to change6 he &altreated and threatened to kill her6
as a result of such &altreat&ent, she sustained in<uries6 during a confrontation
with a representative of the barangay captain of !uilig a day before the filing of
the co&plaint, petitioner repudiated their &arriage agree&ent and asked her not
to live with hi& any&ore and6 the petitioner is already &arried to so&eone living
in +acolod City. 0rivate respondent then prayed for <udg&ent ordering the
petitioner to pay her da&ages in the a&ount of not less than 045,111.11,
rei&burse&ent for actual e9penses a&ounting to 0%11.11, attorney:s fees and
costs, and granting her such other relief and re&edies as &ay be <ust and
e=uitable. The co&plaint was docketed as Civil Case #o. '%51*.
7n his Answer with Counterclai&,
3
petitioner ad&itted only the personal
circu&stances of the parties as averred in the co&plaint and denied the rest of
the allegations either for lack of knowledge or infor&ation sufficient to for& a
belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his
4pecial and Affir&ative Defenses. >e thus clai&ed that he never proposed
&arriage to or agreed to be &arried with the private respondent6 he neither
sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his
apart&ent6 he did not &altreat her, but only told her to stop co&ing to his place
because he discovered that she had deceived hi& by stealing his &oney and
passport6 and finally, no confrontation took place with a representative of the
barangay captain. 7nsisting, in his Counterclai&, that the co&plaint is baseless
and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into
court and co&pelled to incur e9penses, and has suffered &ental an9iety and a
bes&irched reputation, he prayed for an award of 05,111.11 for &iscellaneous
e9penses and 0$5,111.11 as &oral da&ages.
After conducting a pretrial on $5 ?anuary '),,, the trial court issued a 0reTrial
(rder
)
e&bodying the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit2
'. That the plaintiff is single and resident -sic/ of +a;aga, +ugallon, 0angasinan,
while the defendant is single, 7ranian citi8en and resident -sic/ of .o8ano
Apart&ent, !uilig, Dagupan City since 4epte&ber ', '),3 up to the present6
$. That the defendant is presently studying at .yceu& #orthwestern, Dagupan
City, College of @edicine, second year &edicine proper6
*. That the plaintiff is -sic/ an e&ployee at @abuhay .uncheonette , 5ernande8
Avenue, Dagupan City since ?uly, '),% up to the present and a -sic/ high school
graduate6
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the &anager of the
@abuhay .uncheonette, ?ohhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff
on August *, '),%.
After trial on the &erits, the lower court, applying Article $' of the Civil Code,
rendered on '% (ctober '),) a decision
*
favoring the private respondent. The
petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter da&ages and attorney:s fees6 the
dispositive portion of the decision reads2
7# T>A .7!>T of the foregoing consideration, <udg&ent is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
'. Conde&ning -sic/ the defendant to pay the plaintiff the su& of twenty thousand
-0$1,111.11/ pesos as &oral da&ages.
$. Conde&ning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the su& of three
thousand -0*,111.11/ pesos as atty:s fees and two thousand -0$,111.11/ pesos
at -sic/ litigation e9penses and to pay the costs.
*. All other clai&s are denied.
6
The decision is anchored on the trial court:s findings and conclusions that -a/
petitioner and private respondent were lovers, -b/ private respondent is not a
wo&an of loose &orals or =uestionable virtue who readily sub&its to se9ual
advances, -c/ petitioner, through &achinations, deceit and false pretenses,
pro&ised to &arry private respondent, d/ because of his persuasive pro&ise to
&arry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by hi&, -e/ by reason of that
deceitful pro&ise, private respondent and her parents B in accordance with
5ilipino custo&s and traditions B &ade so&e preparations for the wedding that
was to be held at the end of (ctober '),3 by looking for pigs and chickens,
inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, -f/ petitioner did not fulfill
his pro&ise to &arry her and -g/ such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner
and who has abused 0hilippine hospitality, have offended our sense of &orality,
good custo&s, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private
respondent:s testi&ony because, inter alia, she would not have had the te&erity
and courage to co&e to court and e9pose her honor and reputation to public
scrutiny and ridicule if her clai& was false.
7
The above findings and conclusions were culled fro& the detailed su&&ary of
the evidence for the private respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the
respondent Court as follows2
According to plaintiff, who clai&ed that she was a virgin at the ti&e and that she
never had a boyfriend before, defendant started courting her <ust a few days after
they first &et. >e later proposed &arriage to her several ti&es and she accepted
his love as well as his proposal of &arriage on August $1, '),3, on which sa&e
day he went with her to her ho&etown of +a;aga, +ugallon, 0angasinan, as he
wanted to &eet her parents and infor& the& of their relationship and their
intention to get &arried. The photographs A9hs. CAC to CAC -and their
sub&arkings/ of defendant with &e&bers of plaintiff:s fa&ily or with plaintiff, were
taken that day. Also on that occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents and
brothers and sisters that he intended to &arry her during the se&estral break in
(ctober, '),3, and because plaintiff:s parents thought he was good and trusted
hi&, they agreed to his proposal for hi& to &arry their daughter, and they
likewise allowed hi& to stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few
days that they were in +ugallon. Dhen plaintiff and defendant later returned to
Dagupan City, they continued to live together in defendant:s apart&ent. >owever,
in the early days of (ctober, '),3, defendant would tie plaintiff:s hands and feet
while he went to school, and he even gave her &edicine at 4 o:clock in the
&orning that &ade her sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a
result of this livein relationship, plaintiff beca&e pregnant, but defendant gave
her so&e &edicine to abort the fetus. 4till plaintiff continued to live with
defendant and kept re&inding hi& of his pro&ise to &arry her until he told her
that he could not do so because he was already &arried to a girl in +acolod City.
That was the ti&e plaintiff left defendant, went ho&e to her parents, and
thereafter consulted a lawyer who acco&panied her to the barangay captain in
Dagupan City. 0laintiff, her lawyer, her god&other, and a barangay tanod sent by
the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still convince hi& to &arry
plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not do so because he was already
&arried to a girl in +acolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at
the pretrial, is that defendant is still single.
0laintiff:s father, a tricycle driver, also clai&ed that after defendant had infor&ed
the& of his desire to &arry @arilou, he already looked for sponsors for the
wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and chickens,
and even already invited &any relatives and friends to the forthco&ing wedding.
+
0etitioner appealed the trial court:s decision to the respondent Court of Appeals
which docketed the case as CA!.R. C" #o. $4$5%. 7n his +rief,
9
he contended
that the trial court erred -a/ in not dis&issing the case for lack of factual and legal
basis and -b/ in ordering hi& to pay &oral da&ages, attorney:s fees, litigation
e9penses and costs.
(n ', 5ebruary '))', respondent Court pro&ulgated the challenged decision
1,

affir&ing in toto the trial court:s ruling of '% (ctober '),). 7n sustaining the trial
court:s findings of fact, respondent Court &ade the following analysis2
5irst of all, plaintiff, then only $' years old when she &et defendant who was
already $) years old at the ti&e, does not appear to be a girl of loose &orals. 7t is
uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate e9perience with
defendant and never had boyfriend. 4he is, as described by the lower court, a
barrio lass Cnot used and accusto&ed to trend of &odern urban lifeC, and
certainly would -sic/ not have allowed
Cherself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive pro&ise
&ade by the defendant to &arry her.C 7n fact, we agree with the lower court that
plaintiff and defendant &ust have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff &ust have
thought because of the deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would not
have allowed herself to be photographed with defendant in public in so -sic/
loving and tender poses as those depicted in the pictures A9hs. CDC and CAC. De
cannot believe, therefore, defendant:s pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to hi&
e9cept a waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact
ad&itted that he went to plaintiff:s ho&etown of +a;aga, +ugallon, 0angasinan,
at least thrice6 at -sic/ the town fiesta on 5ebruary $3, '),3 -p. 54, tsn @ay ',,
'),,/, at -sic/ a beach party together with the &anager and e&ployees of the
@abuhay .uncheonette on @arch *, '),3 -p. 51, tsn id./, and on April ', '),3
when he allegedly talked to plaintiff:s &other who told hi& to &arry her daughter
-pp. 555%, tsn id./. Dould defendant have left Dagupan City where he was
involved in the serious study of &edicine to go to plaintiff:s ho&etown in +a;aga,
+ugallon, unless there was -sic/ so&e kind of special relationship between the&E
And this special relationship &ust indeed have led to defendant:s insincere
proposal of &arriage to plaintiff, co&&unicated not only to her but also to her
parents, and -sic/ @arites Rabino, the owner of the restaurant where plaintiff was
working and where defendant first proposed &arriage to her, also knew of this
love affair and defendant:s proposal of &arriage to plaintiff, which she declared
was the reason why plaintiff resigned fro& her <ob at the restaurant after she had
accepted defendant:s proposal -pp. %3, tsn @arch 3, '),,/.
Fpon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a &an of good &oral
character and &ust think so low and have so little respect and regard for 5ilipino
wo&en that he openly ad&itted that when he studied in +acolod City for several
years where he finished his +.4. +iology before he ca&e to Dagupan City to
study &edicine, he had a co&&onlaw wife in +acolod City. 7n other words, he
also lived with another wo&an in +acolod City but did not &arry that wo&an, <ust
like what he did to plaintiff. 7t is not surprising, then, that he felt so little
co&punction or re&orse in pretending to love and pro&ising to &arry plaintiff, a
young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her.
11
and then concluded2
7n su&, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendantappellant:s
fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and pro&ise to &arry plaintiff
that &ade her surrender her virtue and wo&anhood to hi& and to live with hi&
on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said pro&ise, and it was
likewise these -sic/ fraud and deception on appellant:s part that &ade plaintiff:s
parents agree to their daughter:s livingin with hi& preparatory to their supposed
&arriage. And as these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against
&orals, good custo&s, and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply
derogatory and insulting to our wo&en, co&ing as they do fro& a foreigner who
has been en<oying the hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the
opportunity to study in one of our institutions of learning, defendantappellant
should indeed be &ade, under Art. $' of the Civil Code of the 0hilippines, to
co&pensate for the &oral da&ages and in<ury that he had caused plaintiff, as the
lower court ordered hi& to do in its decision in this case.
1(
Fnfa8ed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on $% @arch
'))'6 he raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article $' of the Civil
Code applies to the case at bar.
13
7t is petitioner:s thesis that said Article $' is not applicable because he had not
co&&itted any &oral wrong or in<ury or violated any good custo& or public
policy6 he has not professed love or proposed &arriage to the private
respondent6 and he has never &altreated her. >e critici8es the trial court for
liberally invoking 5ilipino custo&s, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact
that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such 5ilipino custo&s,
traditions and culture. As an 7ranian @osle&, he is not fa&iliar with Catholic and
Christian ways. >e stresses that even if he had &ade a pro&ise to &arry, the
subse=uent failure to fulfill the sa&e is e9cusable or tolerable because of his
@osle& upbringing6 he then alludes to the @usli& Code which purportedly allows
a @usli& to take four -4/ wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial
court erred in ruling that he does not posses good &oral character. @oreover, his
controversial Cco&&on law lifeC is now his legal wife as their &arriage had been
sole&ni8ed in civil cere&onies in the 7ranian A&bassy. As to his unlawful
cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner clai&s that even if
responsibility could be pinned on hi& for the livein relationship, the private
respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrange&ent. 5inally,
petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assu&ed arguendo that he had
professed his love to the private respondent and had also pro&ised to &arry her,
such acts would not be actionable in view of the special circu&stances of the
case. The &ere breach of pro&ise is not actionable.
1)
(n $% August '))', after the private respondent had filed her Co&&ent to the
petition and the petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course
to the petition and re=uired the parties to sub&it their respective @e&oranda,
which they subse=uently co&plied with.
As &ay be gleaned fro& the foregoing su&&ation of the petitioner:s argu&ents
in support of his thesis, it is clear that =uestions of fact, which boil down to the
issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. 7t is the rule in this
<urisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court:s findings as to the
credibility of witnesses, the latter court having heard the witnesses and having
had the opportunity to observe closely their deport&ent and &anner of testifying,
unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if
considered, &ight affect the result of the case.
1*
0etitioner has &iserably failed to convince Fs that both the appellate and trial
courts had overlooked any fact of substance or values which could alter the
result of the case.
A=ually settled is the rule that only =uestions of law &ay be raised in a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 7t is not the function
of this Court to analy8e or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the
parties before the lower court. There are, however, recogni8ed e9ceptions to this
rule. Thus, in Medina vs. Asistio, Jr.,
16
this Court took the ti&e, again, to
enu&erate these e9ceptions2
999 999 999
-'/ Dhen the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, sur&ises
or con<ectures -?oa=uin v. #avarro, )* 0hil. $53 G')5*H/6 -$/ Dhen the inference
&ade is &anifestly &istaken, absurb or i&possible -.una v. .inatok, 34 0hil. '5
G')4$H/6 -*/ Dhere there is a grave abuse of discretion -+uyco v. 0eople, )5 0hil.
45* G')55H/6 -4/ Dhen the <udg&ent is based on a &isapprehension of facts
-Cru8 v. 4osing,
.4,35, #ov. $3, ')5*/6 -5/ Dhen the findings of fact are conflicting -Casica v.
"illaseca, .)5)1 Ap. *1, ')536 unrep./ -%/ Dhen the Court of Appeals, in &aking
its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the sa&e is contrary to the
ad&issions of both appellate and appellee -Avangelista v. Alto 4urety and
7nsurance Co., '1* 0hil. 41' G')5,H/6
-3/ The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court
-!arcia v. Court of Appeals, ** 4CRA %$$ G')31H6 4acay v. 4andiganbayan, '4$
4CRA 5)* G'),%H/6 -,/ Dhen the findings of fact are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based -Ibid.,/6 -)/ Dhen the facts set forth
in the petition as well as in the petitioners &ain and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondents -Ibid.,/6 and -'1/ The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is
pre&ised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the
evidence on record -4ala8ar v. !utierre8, ** 4CRA $4$ G')31H/.
0etitioner has not endeavored to <oint out to Fs the e9istence of any of the above
=uoted e9ceptions in this case. Conse=uently, the factual findings of the trial and
appellate courts &ust be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The e9isting rule is that a breach of pro&ise to &arry per se is not an actionable
wrong.
17
Congress deliberately eli&inated fro& the draft of the #ew Civil Code
the provisions that would have &ade it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the
report of the 4enate Co&&ittees on the 0roposed Civil Code, fro& which De
=uote2
The eli&ination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of pro&ise to &arry is
not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De ?esus vs. 4y=uia.
1+

The history of breach of pro&ise suits in the Fnited 4tates and in Angland has
shown that no other action lends itself &ore readily to abuse by designing
wo&en and unscrupulous &en. 7t is this e9perience which has led to the abolition
of rights of action in the socalled >eart +al& suits in &any of the A&erican
states. . . .
19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article $', which is
designed to e9pand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this <urisdiction by
granting ade=uate legal re&edy for the untold nu&ber of &oral wrongs which is
i&possible for hu&an foresight to specifically enu&erate and punish in the
statute books.
(,
As the Code Co&&ission itself stated in its Report2
+ut the Code Co&&ission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or
deter&ined by positive law. 5ully sensible that there are countless gaps in the
statutes, which leave so &any victi&s of &oral wrongs helpless, even though
they have actually suffered &aterial and &oral in<ury, the Co&&ission has
dee&ed it necessary, in the interest of <ustice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil
Code the following rule2
Art. $*. Any person who wilfully causes loss or in<ury to another
in a &anner that is contrary to &orals, good custo&s or public
policy shall co&pensate the latter for the da&age.
An e9a&ple will illustrate the purview of the foregoing nor&2 CAC seduces the
nineteenyear old daughter of CIC. A pro&ise of &arriage either has not been
&ade, or can not be proved. The girl beco&es pregnant. Fnder the present laws,
there is no cri&e, as the girl is above nineteen years of age. #either can any civil
action for breach of pro&ise of &arriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous
&oral wrong has been co&&itted, and though the girl and fa&ily have suffered
incalculable &oral da&age, she and her parents cannot bring action for
da&ages. +ut under the proposed article, she and her parents would have such
a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would
vouchsafe ade=uate legal re&edy for that untold nu&ber of &oral wrongs which
it is i&possible for hu&an foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes.
(1
Article $'3% of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus2
Dhoever by act or o&ission causes da&age to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the da&age done. 4uch fault or negligence, if
there is no pree9isting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
is li&ited to negligent acts or o&issions and e9cludes the notion of
willfulness or intent. uasi-delict, known in 4panish legal treatises as
culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an AngloA&erican or
co&&on law concept. !orts is &uch broader than culpa aquiliana because
it includes not only negligence, but international cri&inal acts as well such
as assault and battery, false i&prison&ent and deceit. 7n the general
sche&e of the 0hilippine legal syste& envisioned by the Co&&ission
responsible for drafting the #ew Civil Code, intentional and &alicious acts,
with certain e9ceptions, are to be governed by the Revised 0enal Code
while negligent acts or o&issions are to be covered by Article $'3% of the
Civil Code.
((
7n between these opposite spectru&s are in<urious acts
which, in the absence of Article $', would have been beyond redress.
Thus, Article $' fills that vacuu&. 7t is even postulated that together with
Articles ') and $1 of the Civil Code, Article $' has greatly broadened the
scope of the law on civil wrongs6 it has beco&e &uch &ore supple and
adaptable than the AngloA&erican law on torts.
(3
7n the light of the above laudable purpose of Article $', De are of the opinion,
and so hold, that where a &an:s pro&ise to &arry is in fact the pro9i&ate cause
of the acceptance of his love by a wo&an and his representation to fulfill that
pro&ise thereafter beco&es the pro9i&ate cause of the giving of herself unto hi&
in a se9ual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of &arrying her
and that the pro&ise was only a subtle sche&e or deceptive device to entice or
inveigle her to accept hi& and to obtain her consent to the se9ual act, could
<ustify the award of da&ages pursuant to Article $' not because of such pro&ise
to &arry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful in<ury to her
honor and reputation which followed thereafter. 7t is essential, however, that such
in<ury should have been co&&itted in a &anner contrary to &orals, good
custo&s or public policy.
7n the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner:s Cfraudulent
and deceptive protestations of love for and pro&ise to &arry plaintiff that &ade
her surrender her virtue and wo&anhood to hi& and to live with hi& on the
honest and sincere belief that he would keep said pro&ise, and it was likewise
these fraud and deception on appellant:s part that &ade plaintiff:s parents agree
to their daughter:s livingin with hi& preparatory to their supposed &arriage.C
()
7n
short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession
of every single 5ilipina, not because of lust but because of &oral seduction B the
kind illustrated by the Code Co&&ission in its e9a&ple earlier adverted to. The
petitioner could not be held liable for cri&inal seduction punished under either
Article **3 or Article **, of the Revised 0enal Code because the private
respondent was above eighteen -',/ years of age at the ti&e of the seduction.
0rior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article $' &ay be applied in a
breach of pro&ise to &arry where the wo&an is a victi& of &oral seduction.
Thus, in "er#osisi#a vs. Court of Appeals,
(*
this Court denied recovery of
da&ages to the wo&an because2
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is #orally guilty of seduction,
not only because he is appro9i&ately ten -'1/ years younger than the
co&plainant B who was around thirtysi9 -*%/ years of age, and as highly
enlightened as a for&er high school teacher and a life insurance agent are
supposed to be B when she beca&e inti&ate with petitioner, then a &ere
apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance found that,
co&plainant Csurrendered herselfC to petitioner because, Coverwhel&ed by her
loveC for hi&, she C$anted to bindC %i# by %aving a fruit of t%eir engage#ent
even before t%ey %ad t%e benefit of clergy.
7n !an&anco vs. Court of Appeals,
(6
while this Court likewise hinted at possible
recovery if there had been &oral seduction, recovery was eventually denied
because De were not convinced that such seduction e9isted. The following
enlightening dis=uisition and conclusion were &ade in the said case2
The Court of Appeals see& to have overlooked that the e9a&ple set forth in the
Code Co&&ission:s &e&orandu& refers to a tort upon a &inor who had been
seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is &ore than &ere se9ual
intercourse, or a breach of a pro&ise of &arriage6 it connotes essentially the idea
of deceit, entice&ent, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the
seducer to which the wo&an has yielded -F.4. vs. +uenaventura, $3 0hil. '$'6
F.4. vs. Arlante, ) 0hil. 5)5/.
7t has been ruled in the 'uenaventura case -supra/ that B
To constitute seduction there &ust in all cases be so&e sufficient
pro&ise or induce&ent and t%e $o#an #ust yield because of
t%e pro#ise or ot%er induce#ent. 7f she consents &erely fro&
carnal lust and the intercourse is fro& &utual desire, there is no
seduction -4* Cent. Dig. tit. 4eduction, par. 5%/ 4he &ust be
induced to depart fro& the path of virtue by the use of so&e
species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to
have and do have that effect, and which result in her person to
ulti&ately sub&itting her person to the se9ual e&braces of her
seducer -$3 0hil. '$*/.
And in A&erican ?urisprudence we find2
(n the other hand, in an action by the wo&an, the entice&ent,
persuasion or deception is the essence of the in<ury6 and a &ere
proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of
se9ual desire of curiosity of the fe&ale, and the defendant
&erely affords her the needed opportunity for the co&&ission of
the act. 7t has been e&phasi8ed that to allow a recovery in all
such cases would tend to the de&orali8ation of the fe&ale se9,
and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of
adventuresses would be swift to profit. -43 A&. ?ur. %%$/
999 999 999
(ver and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole
year, fro& ')5, to ')5), the plaintiffappellee, a wo&an of adult age, &aintain
inti&ate se9ual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. 4uch
conduct is inco&patible with the idea of seduction. 0lainly there is here
voluntariness and &utual passion6 for had the appellant been deceived, had she
surrendered e9clusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the
defendant, she would not have again yielded to his e&braces, &uch less for one
year, without e9acting early fulfill&ent of the alleged pro&ises of &arriage, and
would have cut short all se9ual relations upon finding that defendant did not
intend to fulfill his defendant did not intend to fulfill his pro&ise. >ence, we
conclude that no case is &ade under article $' of the Civil Code, and no other
cause of action being alleged, no error was co&&itted by the Court of 5irst
7nstance in dis&issing the co&plaint.
(7
7n his annotations on the Civil Code,
(+
Associate ?ustice Adgardo .. 0aras, who
recently retired fro& this Court, opined that in a breach of pro&ise to &arry
where there had been carnal knowledge, &oral da&ages &ay be recovered2
. . . if there be cri#inal or #oral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to
&utual lust. ->er&osisi&a vs. Court of Appeals,
.'4%$,, 4ept. *1, ')%16 Astopa vs. 0iansay, ?r., .'43**, 4ept. *1, ')%16
+atarra vs. @arcos, 3 0hil. 5% -sic/6 +eatri8 !alang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., .
'3$4,, ?an. $), ')%$/. -7n other words, if the CAF4A be the pro&ise to &arry,
and the A55ACT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there was
cri#inal or #oral seduction, hence recovery of &oral da&ages will prosper. 7f it
be the other way around, there can be no recovery of &oral da&ages, because
here &utual lust has intervened/. . . .
together with CACTFA. da&ages, should there be any, such as the
e9penses for the wedding presentations -4ee Do&alagon v. +olifer, **
0hil. 43'/.
4enator Arturo @. Tolentino
(9
is also of the sa&e persuasion2
7t is sub&itted that the rule in 'atarra vs. Marcos(
3,
still subsists, notwithstanding
the incorporation of the present article
31
in the Code. The e9a&ple given by the
Code Co&&ission is correct, if there was seduction, not necessarily in the legal
sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. +ut when the se9ual act is
acco&plished without any deceit or =ualifying circu&stance of abuse of authority
or influence, but the wo&an, already of age, has knowingly given herself to a
&an, it cannot be said that there is an in<ury which can be the basis for inde&nity.
+ut so long as there is fraud, which is characteri8ed by willfulness -sic/, the
action lies. The court, however, &ust weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to
deceive the wo&an under the circu&stances, because an act which would
deceive a girl si9teen years of age &ay not constitute deceit as to an
e9perienced wo&an thirty years of age. +ut so long as there is a wrongful act
and a resulting in<ury, there should be civil liability, even if the act is not
punishable under the cri&inal law and there should have been an ac=uittal or
dis&issal of the cri&inal case for that reason.
De are unable to agree with the petitioner:s alternative proposition to the effect
that granting, for argu&ent:s sake, that he did pro&ise to &arry the private
respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to hi&, both parties
are in pari delicto6 hence, pursuant to Article '4'$-'/ of the Civil Code and the
doctrine laid down in 'atarra vs. Marcos,
3(
the private respondent cannot recover
da&ages fro& the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as stating that if the
private respondent had Csustained any in<ury or da&age in their relationship, it is
pri&arily because of her own doing,
33
for2
. . . 4he is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will beco&e a doctor
sooner or later. Take notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a &ere
e&ployee . . . -Anne9 CCC/ or a waitress -T4#, p. 5', ?anuary $5, '),,/ in a
luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a &an who can give her econo&ic
security. >er fa&ily is in dire need of financial assistance. -T4#, pp. 5'5*, @ay
',, '),,/. And this predica&ent pro&pted her to accept a proposition that &ay
have been offered by the petitioner.
3)
These state&ents reveal the true character and &otive of the petitioner. 7t is clear
that he harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private
respondent on account of the latter:s ignoble birth, inferior educational
background, poverty and, as perceived by hi&, dishonorable e&ploy&ent.
(bviously then, fro& the very beginning, he was not at all &oved by good faith
and an honest &otive. @arrying with a wo&an so circu&stances could not have
even re&otely occurred to hi&. Thus, his profession of love and pro&ise to &arry
were e&pty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the
poor wo&an into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his
life:s partner. >is was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a
5ilipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal
of &arriage, she would be able to en<oy a life of ease and security. 0etitioner
clearly violated the 5ilipino:s concept of &orality and bra8enly defied the
traditional respect 5ilipinos have for their wo&en. 7t can even be said that the
petitioner co&&itted such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article ') of the
Civil Code which directs every person to act with <ustice, give everyone his due
and observe honesty and good faith in the e9ercise of his rights and in the
perfor&ance of his obligations.
#o foreigner &ust be allowed to &ake a &ockery of our laws, custo&s and
traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private
respondent &ay not have been i&pelled by the purest of intentions, she
eventually sub&itted to the petitioner in se9ual congress not out of lust, but
because of &oral seduction. 7n fact, it is apparent that she had =ual&s of
conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the
petitioner was not going to &arry her after all, she left hi&. 4he is not, therefore,
in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto &eans Cin e=ual fault6 in a si&ilar
offense or cri&e6 e=ual in guilt or in legal fault.C
3*
At &ost, it could be conceded
that she is &erely in delicto.
A=uity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his
transgression has been brought about by the i&position of undue influence of the
party on who& the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or where his
consent to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud.
36
7n Mangayao vs. )asud,
37
De declared2
Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no
action by one against the other -Art. '4'$, #ew Civil Code/. This rule, however,
has been interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both sides is, &ore or
less, e=uivalent. 7t does not apply where one party is literate or intelligent and the
other one is not. -c.f. +ough vs. Cantiveros, 41 0hil. $1)/.
De should stress, however, that while De find for the private respondent, let it
not be said that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in
letting her and the petitioner stay together in the sa&e roo& in their house after
giving approval to their &arriage. 7t is the sole&n duty of parents to protect the
honor of their daughters and infuse upon the& the higher values of &orality and
dignity.
D>ARA5(RA, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant
petition is hereby DA#7AD, with costs against the petitioner.
4( (RDARAD.
*eliciano( 'idin( Ro#ero and Melo( JJ.( concur.
+utierre,( Jr.( J.( is on leave.

- Foo.!o.e/
' Anne9 C!C of 0etition6 Rollo, 5*%$. 0er Associate ?ustice Alicia ". 4e&pioDiy,
concurred in by Associate ?ustices ?ose C. Ca&pos, ?r. and ?ai&e @. .antin.
$ Anne9 CAC of 0etition6 Rollo, $1$$.
* Anne9 C+C of 0etition6 Rollo, $*$4.
4 Anne9 CCC, Id.6 Id., $5.
5 Anne9 CDC of 0etition6 Rollo, $%**. 0er ?udge Antonio @. +elen.
% Id., **.
3 Rollo, *'**.
, Rollo, 5455.
) A9hibit CAC of 0etition6 Rollo, *451.
'1 Anne9 C!C, Id.6 Id.6 5*%$.
'' Rollo, 5,5).
'$ Rollo, %'.
'* Id., ''.
'4 7n support thereof, he cites Despi vs. Aliosco, GCAH %4 (.!.6 Dass&er vs.
"ele8, '$ 4CRA %4, G')%4H6 >er&osisi&a vs. Court of Appeals, '1) 0hil. %$)
G')%1H6 and Astopa vs. 0iansay, '1) 0hil. %41 G')%1H.
'5 0eople vs. !arcia, ,) 4CRA 441 G')3)H6 0eople vs. +autista, )$ 4CRA 4%5
G')3)H6 0eople vs. Abe<uela, )$ 4CRA 51* G')3)H6 0eople vs. Arciaga, ), 4CRA
' G'),1H6 0eople vs. @ar8an, '$, 4CRA $1* G'),4H6 0eople vs. Alcid, '*5 4CRA
$,1 G'),5H6 0eople vs. 4anche8, ')) 4CRA 4'4 G'))'H6 and 0eople vs. Atilano,
$14 4CRA $3, G'))'H.
'% ')' 4CRA $', G'))1H, footnote o&itted6 see also, Re&alante vs. Tibe, '5,
4CRA '*, G'),,H.
'3 >er&osisi&a vs. Court of Appeals, '1) 0hil. %$) G')%1H6 Astopa vs. 0iansay,
'1) 0hil. %41 G')%1H.
', 5, 0hil. ,%% G')**H.
') Congressional Record, vol. 7", #o. 3), Thursday, '4 @ay ')4), $*5$.
$1 0hilippine #ational +ank vs. Court of Appeals, ,* 4CRA $*3 G')3,H.
$' Report of the Code Co&&ission, *)41. This passage is =uoted, e9cept for
the last paragraph, in Tan<anco vs. Court of Appeals, ', 4CRA ))4, ))%))3
G')%%H6 the Article $* referred to is now Article $'.
$$ Report of the Code Co&&ission, '%''%$.
$* T(.A#T7#(, A.@., Co##entaries and Jurisprudence on t%e Civil Code of t%e
P%ilippines, vol. ', '),5 ed., 3$.
$4. Rollo, %'.
$5. -upra.
$%. -upra.
$3 At pages ))3))).
$, Civil Code of t%e P%ilippines Annotated, vol. 7, Aleventh ed., -'),4/, )')$.
$) Co##entaries and Jurisprudence on t%e Civil Code of t%e P%ilippines, vol. ',
'),5 ed., 3%33, o&itting footnotes.
*1 3 0hil. '5% G')1%H.
*' Article $'.
*$ -upra.
** Rollo, '%.
*4 Id., '%'3.
*5 +lack:s .aw Dictionary, 5ifth ed., '114.
*% *3 A& ?ur $d, 41', o&itting citations.
*3 '' 4CRA '5, G')%4H6 see also, .igue8 vs. Court of Appeals '1$ 0hil. 533
G')35H.

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