CURRENCIES INTEREST RATES EQUITIES COMMODITIES To contact FX CONCEPTS New York: 1 (212) 554-6830; London: +44 20 7213 9600; Singapore: (65) 67352898; research@fx-concepts.com
MARKET INSIGHT REPORT Rates Cant Go Up By John R. Taylor, Jr. Chief Investment Officer _____________________________________________________________________________ The interest rate decline over the last thirty years created both the economic growth we all enjoyed and the climb in asset prices that benefited wealthier individuals. We were not smarter than other generations, we were luckier nothing more but now this multi- decade wind at our back must come to an end. Unfortunately, there is no alternative, as rates cant go any or not much lower and asset prices will therefore stall in their decades-long upmove as well. The drop in rates from the teens in most countries allowed everyone to borrow more, for a lower cost, over indulging ourselves in more luxurious housing, personal adornment, and travel. At the same time rates dropped we bid up the prices on assets and services housing booms and equity rallies followed the bond rally in every country. As citizens, we voted for our governments to increase spending on social programs and pension benefits while telling them to cut taxes. We allowed them to fund the difference with increased debt, even with creative off-balance sheet structures, which are only just coming to light. This whole process seemed painless and it felt like a win-win situation, but it never was. The decline of rates from the nosebleed levels of 30 years ago means most of us and most of our governments can still support our interest payments, as we pay no more today than we paid in 1980. Borrow $100 billion today at 2% and the annual interest cost is less than it was to borrow $20 billion at 15% back then. With some adjustments, ratios like this are seen through the entire developed world. For a while it seemed governments could follow this path forever, but interest rates can only go so low. And, the lower rates are, the higher the risk. In our simplistic example above, a doubling in rates from 2% to 4% would explode almost every countrys budget. For individuals who are on average paying a lower percentage of their income on interest payments today than they were in 1980, despite a many-fold inflation-adjusted level of debt, increases in mortgage rates have become more painful as rates go down and house prices go up. In the UK, where the average home costs about 5.1x the median wage, a 1% increase in mortgage rates would cut roughly 7% of after-tax, after-mortgage income. Considering average wages have been stagnant for the past five years, this would have a drastic impact on consumer welfare.
As almost every country and many individuals still run deficits or support their balance sheet with questionable assets (like houses, bonds, and equities), a rise in interest rates is an anathema to governments not only because of the impact on consumer spending and individual finances but also because they are a disaster for asset prices. Equities are famously valued with a dividend-discount model or more simplistically in comparison to the 10-year government bond, so a rough rule of thumb is that any increase in rates will drive asset prices down. The hoped-for loophole to this rule is that the asset could be assumed to generate more revenue if the higher rates (driving value down) coincided with higher growth (pushing future flows higher). The problem with this is mathematical. At very low levels a small increase in rates has a large percentage impact in the discount rate (rates going from 1% to 2% is a 50% increase), while a small increase in growth (implied this increase in rates) will not impact the future actual level of cash flows in that logarithmic fashion. The lower rates go, the worse the comparison, so any hint at higher rates becomes negative. Compare the US and Europe to Japan over the last 20 years and Japan looks better. It started with more assets, was more conservatively funded, and its people less indebted and more liquid. Buying long-dated bonds at low rates paid off in Japan for years. Higher rates cannot be allowed. We cannot afford it! FX CONCEPTS FX CONCEPTS GLOBAL MACRO RESEARCH GLOBAL MACRO RESEARCH CURRENCIES INTEREST RATES EQUITIES COMMODITIES To contact FX CONCEPTS New York: 1 (212) 554-6830; London: +44 20 7213 9600; Singapore: (65) 67352898; research@fx-concepts.com
CURRENCY - Asia Long-Term View
Abe Is Running Out of Time By John R. Taylor, Jr. _____________________________________________________________________________
We do hope the numbers begin to improve in Japan, but there arent many more data points that Abe can ignore before he loses the backing of world economic opinion and his countrys political elite. Wednesdays report on Q2 growth, where it only declined by 6.8%, better than the forecasted average at -7.0%, could not be seen as a positive as first quarter growth declined for an originally reported 6.8% positive to a 6.1% positive. As we see it the net outcome is -0.7% for the half-year rather than the forecasted -0.2%. The expectations for the current quarter are more positive, but we see few signs there will be a significant uptick in capital expenditures or any other key input to growth.
The cycles for the USD/JPY are positive for the next five months with the normal ups and downs in between. This view would normally imply a risk-on attitude in the global economy and an effort from the Abe team to stimulate the economy once again. We hope is the outcome, but we are not optimistic. As the yen is a counter-cyclical currency, it would normally strengthen if the euro were to weaken and the equity markets were to be under pressure. As that is our most likely outlook, we would usually need to see Abe turn on the BOJ printing presses again for our forecast to prove correct. However, the 1997 example shows us something very different. As we discussed last week, during the period between the middle of 1997 and the fall of 1998, the Japanese economy did very poorly because the government did not respond with sufficient stimulus to offset the dramatic slide in economic output that followed the consumption tax hike of April 1997. During that period, the Nikkei equity index made a significant new low, the JGB yield dropped from about 2.8% to the 0.80% area, and the USD/JPY rose over 30% as Japan was in such dramatic trouble. As our cycles very often point the way even when it is hard to construct the fundamental situation that might drive the market in their direction, we will follow the cyclical lead but keep a close eye on the surrounding fundamentals.
Our near-term view has become more positive on the USD/JPY as the low that occurred on August 8 at the 101.50 level could very easily have been aggressive enough to establish the dollar low. The short cycles tend to see dollar weakness into the first half of next week, but if the USD/JPY can hold the brown upchannel lines around 101.70 to 101.90 then the upmove into the week of September 1 is more likely to be aggressive going to the 103.40 level by that time the box is marked with the red #1. This much strength would further mean the dollar will have a more aggressive uptrend into the first half of October as well, reaching over 105.50 by then the #1 again. If the dollar drops down below the August 8 low now the lower probability then the upmove will continue to the flatter green channel, only reaching the 103.80 to 104.20 level in the first half of October.
PAF - Karachi Institute of Economics and Technology Course: Financial Management Faculty: Ali Sajid Class ID: 110217 Total Marks: Examination: Assignment #1 Date