CHAPTER8

The Logic of Creation

1. Docta ignomntia
To the greatest achievements of science of the last one hundred years
belongs the conclusion Which today one cannot doubt that the World
is not so much static as undergoing evolution. This applies not only to
the evolution of life on our planet as much as the Whole universe to the
greatest magnitude available to us. There are nevertheless three places
in this evolutionWhich remain as discussion points to this day: the genesis
of the World, the birth of life and the aring up of consciousness. It is
hard to doubt that these three places are linked in the plan of the Whole
but, in spite of the remarkable progress in these three elds, we still know
relatively very little. The aimof the notes to this chapter because it is
hard to call them even an outline of a lecture is to express this lack of
knowledge in a more organised, quasi-logical manner.
12 9 Its rst version appeared as: I/ z ' ez ' z ] e/ / eelm T/ oe Logic of Creation, in S ez enee and z / 9 e Fe/ lure
of Z \ / lez / e/ mel, Ponticiae Academiae S cientiarum S cripta Varia 9 9 , Vatican City 2 001,
pp. 501-506.
136 PART IV. Creation and S ense
2 . Fromthe logic of language
The logic of language, now traditionally, is divided into three areas:
syntax, semantics and pragmatics. S yntax is concerned with exploring
the relations between utterances in a given language. It is the oldest
thus it is no surprise that it is the most developed part of the logic of
language. S emantics researches the relations between utterances of the
language and what the utterance refers to. Lastly, pragmatics is inter-
ested in the relation between language and its users. Only recently has
the growth in pragmatics gathered pace. It is important to stress that all
three of these branches of the philosophy of language are purely formal
sciences i.e. they do not appeal to empirical work on language, limiting
themselves to purely deductive research methods. For the next stage
I will continue to be interested in the interaction between semantics
and syntax and thus pragmatics will be put to one side; I will use both
the terms syntax and (especially) semantics in a somewhat broader sense
than is usually done in logic. For example, when talking about the real-
ity to which the language is referred, I will in some cases understand it
not as the formally understood domain of language (or a semantic model
see below) as much as that realm or aspect of the world on which the
given scientific theory (expressed in a certain language) conducts re-
search. S uch a broad treatment of logic is justified to the extent that one
of the most important tasks of logic is the modelling of the reality of
situations and supplying analysis which goes beyond the realm of pure
logic of the schemes of reasoning. I hope that this type of loosening of
rigour will not lead to misunderstandings.
S ome languages exist which are completely devoid of semantic as-
pects. These are formal languages which are reduced to symbol games
whichrefer tonothing? All other languages talk about something, they
have their own semantics, they have something to relate to. Terms like
meaning, designation (denotation) and relation (reference) are ex-
amples of semantic terms or so-called semantic operators: they act on
130 It does not mean, of course, that one does not construct formal models of such lan-
guages but I amnot concerned with this here see below, section 3.
CHAPTER 8. The Logic of Creation 137
language, having their values in the world (model) which the given lan-
guage describes. Thanks to these operators, language may be a language
about something.
It may transpire that some kind of language relates to another lan-
guage (it talks about another language). Therefore, we have two languages
to consider: the language (called a meta-language) which talks about an-
other language (the subject language). It is easy to imagine a whole hierar-
chy of such languages: language (subject), meta-language, meta-meta-lan-
guage. .. The discovery of this hierarchy of languages was a considerable
achievement for the development of logic; it enabled linguists to eliminate
a range of antinomies, that is, ostensibly correct statements which lead to
nonsensical conclusions. Antinomies, springingintoexistence froman un-
controlled jump fromlanguage to meta-language or vice versa, are termed
semantic antinomies (other antinomies exist as well). An example of such
an antinomy would be the famous liar paradox. (Une of its formula-
tions is: that which I now write is false. Is the sentence true or false?)
It is not the case, however, that proceeding froma language to a meta-
language always produces antinomies. On the contrary, if we are able to
use them competently then they can serve as a powerful method of
provingtheorems. For example, Kurt Godel proved his famous theorem
of the incompleteness of the system of arithmetic, which shook the
foundations of the philosophy of mathematics, by cleverly utilising the
strategy of moving from a meta-language to the language of arithme-
tic and back again. He first translated certain sentences on arithmetic
(that is, belonging to the meta-language of arithmetic) into statements
on numbers (which belong to the language of arithmetic). The language
of arithmetic is very functional since it allows one to conduct calcula-
tions. Havingcompleted the required calculations, Godel then translated
the conclusions acquired into meta-language. He attained in this manner
sentences which expressed his statement of the incomplete nature of
the system of arithmetic. This type of method of proceeding fromme-
ta-language to language is termed the ref-1" efe1" e1eee method and is particu-
larly effective. However, it is necessary to emphasise once again that in
applying this method the slightest inattention may result in, instead of
binding conclusions, the production of antinomies.
138 PART IV. Creation and S ense
3. Language and interpretation
S trictly speaking, rigorous control of reasoning is only possible in
formal languages which as we know are completely without seman-
tics, that is, the reference to somethingother than the language itself. We
may, however, add such a reference to formal languages articially. If
we want to place this on a logical footing then this relation must also
be purely formal. We obtain this reference by creating a purely formal
substitute to reality and establishing the semantic relations between
language (theory) and this substitute which we term a se/ eeez mee model (or,
in short, a model) of the given language (or theory). When such a model
is constructed then we can say that the given language (or theory) has
attained an z ' m e1" ] > 1" ez ez z z ' 01e, that is it has been z ' m e1" p1" ez ee' . Having at our dis-
posal the deductive theory and its interpretation (semantic model) we
may exactly codify the rules of transition from the theory (language) to
the model and vice versa. Here it is, of course, essential to abide by the
principles of both language and meta-language.
This strategy has very important applications. One is the famous defi-
nition of truth by Tarski. It states that a certain statement which belongs
to a given formal language is true if and only if it asserts something in the
semantic model of the language and this then really occurs in the model. Tar-
skis definition only applies in relation to formal languages but the inspiration
whichflowed fromit had a considerable effect ongeneral philosophical views
in the 2 0 century Nevertheless, the moment when we step beyond the safe
realm of deductive language theory, moving from syntax to semantics and
vice versa, we begin to experience difficulties; the ground becomes increas-
ingly awkward but aboundinginimportant problems.
In scholastic philosophy there existed a distinction strongly reminis-
cent of that between syntax and semantics. It spoke of logical order and
ontological order. Logical order related, however, not to language but
rather to what is in the intellect and ontological order not to a deductive
model (because they were still unknown) as much as to what is inreality.
This distinction was made, for example, by S t Thomas Aquinas when he
argued against the so-called ontological proof of the existence of God
proposed by Anselm of Canterbury. According to S t Anselm, God is
something of which nothing greater can be thought (Dem esz ez / z ' qez z ' e' gem
CHAPTER 8. The Logic of Creation 139
m' / 9 z ' / / eeez ie/ J e0gz ' fez 1" z ' pom?) but the God that exists according to Anselm
is greater than the God which does not exist and, thus, God exists.131 S t
Thomas riposted by drawingattention to the fact that the first premise of
proof (God is something of which nothing greater can be thought)
belongs to the logical order while the conclusion (God exists) is
part of the ontological order. The error thus stems from as we would
say today an illicit jump from syntax to semantics.
Our sense of logic compels us to sympathisewithS t Thomas. Indeed,
Anselmgets caught in the trap created by the interweavingof language and
meta-language.132 In any case, we touch on here an extremely important
issue the relation between language and that which it relates to. This is
not only an internal ntatter of logic (which can be seen fromthe example
of S t Anselms reasoning). In the functioning of the world we encounter
a range of situations in which language (or somethingvery reminiscent of
language) seems to be an efficient cause of something which exists in
reality. Atypical situation of this type is computer programming (and thus
a certain language) and its implementation, that is, what our computer does
in reality, but there also exist analogical situations of significantly more im-
portant philosophical meaning. Utilisingcertain technical sources fromlogic
may lead to a deeper discernment of their problematic.
4. Genetic code
The term code in the sense of genetic code is in reality a syno-
nym for the term language. As we know, the alphabet of this language
is made up of four bases (represented by their symbols, A, C, G and T)
which, in a linear sequence, create DNAmolecules which contain all of
the information indispensible for the creation of a four leaved clover or
Albert Einstein. Today we are able to a considerable degree to derive the
131 It is worthremembering, however, that even Anselmhimself did not regard this view
as a strict proof. He placed it in an ascetic sermon to monks whichhad as its objective an
exhortation to live a perfect life.
132 Yet the logician of Godels class was convinced that S t Anselms proof could be saved
by adding an additional premise that states that the Perfect Being may exist.
140 PART IV. Creation and S ense
deductive rules which govern these letters of life. It is undoubtedly
a syntactical aspect of the language of genetics.
The real problem, however, stems from the fact that the syntactic ge-
netic code must create its semantics. The information contained within
must translate itself to certain processes in reality that ultimately produce
the four leaved clover or Albert Einstein. To use more traditional lan-
guage, it is necessary to make a jump fromlogical order to ontological
order. The living organismis not, after all, a purely linguistic creation as
much as a real object. Genetic code does not simply describe certain ways
of action, it also makes themreal.
jaques Monod, in his famous book Le haz ard ez ae' eessz ' z e133, in the fol-
lowing manner introduces this semantic antinomy: Genetic code would
be completely useless if there did not exist a decoding mechanism which
could be applied to the information which, in turn, would be applied to
biochemical processes. Without this kind of decoding tool, the information
contained in genetic code would never be able to leave the syntax of this
code. However, the information concerning the decoding structural tool is
not present anywhere except within genetic code itself. We thus have a clas-
sic antinomy: without a decoding tool, the code may not function but it
may not be produced anywhere other than within the encoded information
contained within the code. It is a new version of an old dilemma which
came first : the chicken or the egg? The situation is reminiscent of a vicious
circle. How is it connected with the theory of evolution?13 1 I am not using
this understanding as an argument against the theory of evolution; I only
wish to call attention to the fact that what may seem as illicit jumps in tlte
theory of language from syntax to semantics, do not only occur in reality
in the strategy of evolutionary processes, but manifest themselves at key
points. Can one not make here a certain analogy withthe method employed
by Godel in proving his statement? The method of self-reference is effec-
tive under the condition that it is used in a rened manner.
133 Monod, Le haz ard ez 1eeeerrz ' z e, Du S euil, Paris 19 70, p. 182 .
131 On the attempts to resolve this dilemma and the linguistic aspect of genetic infor-
mation, john Maynard S mith writes in an interesting manner in his article Ere/ aired and
Iafer/ aaaea, in I/ Wager qf the War/ d S ez eaee, I-Ia/ aaaz els; / lrz , ed. A. Koj, P. S z tompka, Uni-
wersytet jagiellonski, Krakow 2 001, pp. 13-17.
CHAPTER 8. The Logic of Creation 141
5. The language of the brain
Another eld in which one may discern the syntactic-semantic con-
juring trick is the functioning of the human brain. In this case, language
is created by electrical signals which travel along the nerve cells and the
illicit jump hereis even more radical: it is not based on the transition from
the linguistic level to somethingwhich that language speaks of, as much as
on the transition from language to something which previously did not
exist at all (or existed only rudimentarily) intoconsciousness. Theproblem
which we must assess here is thus even harder and our knowledge of the
eld is yet more insufcient. One of the main methods of the workingof
consciousness is that of the self-referencingmethod. It gives birthto self-
awareness and alongwithit all of the problems whichwe grapple with.
6. Illicit jump
The third area in which the linguistic approach may be utilised is
the universe or, more strictly speaking, the laws of nature which govern
it. It is often said that the laws of nature are expressed in the language
of mathematics. Physics handbooks are full of mathematical formulae
which are nothing other than elements of a certain purely formal lan-
guage (even though the language of physical theory is rarely recon-
structed as an axiomatic system) suitably interpreted. On the strength
of this interpretation, mathematical language gains a semantic refer-
ence to a physical reality and certain formulae of this language be-
come interpreted as laws of nature. In reference to the idea put forward
in section 3, one may say that the universe (or some of its realms) is
a semantic model of a given mathematical language. However, the
expression semantic model should be put here in quotation marks
since the universe (or some of its realms) is not a collection of sentences
or symbolical sequences, as is the case in a technical understanding of
a semantic model. Indeed, logicians and philosophers of science often
try to construct semantic models (in their technical sense) of theories
of physics but physicists, inwritingtheir equations, normally relate them
directly to what they term physical reality.
142 PART IV. Creation and S ense
It doesnt matter which manner of describingthe method we use: just
as logicians and philosophers with their deductive models, as physicists,
appealingto the research experience what is surprisingis that this model
functions so well. With its help, for example, we are able to foresee with
remarkable precision (surpassing by many orders of magnitude the pre-
cision which our senses allow) the events of the quantum world and el-
ementary particles of which we would know nothingwere it not for this
method. It is hard to oppose the impression that here we are also dealing
with an illicit jump fromthe syntax of mathematical language to its se-
mantics, which combines an unusual explanatory effectiveness and ability
to predict phenomena stemming fromthe real world.
It seems to me that the problem which we must assess here is of even
deeper nature than that of genetic code or neurological code. Boththe struc-
ture of DNAand the structure of electric signals between neurons are lan-
guages of nature and, if we wish to understand the shift fromthe syntax of
these languages to their semantics, we may appeal to the as yet unresearched
secrets of nature. In the case of mathematical language of the laws of na-
ture, the situation is all the more complicated since mathematical language is
our own creation; it has been created by people as part of a longprocess of
the development of human culture. It may transpire that the questions stem-
mingfromthe shift fromthe syntax of this language to its semantics may be
no more complex than in other human languages but everything indicates,
however, that it touches on the deepest secrets of existence.
If our empirical-mathematical method of researchingtheworldis effec-
tive, and to date its successes seemto conrmthis, then all of theproperties
of the world are able to be deduced fromthe appropriate collection of the
laws of nature, namely theappropriate set of correctly interpreted mathemati-
cal formulae. All of the properties of the world with one exception its ex-
istence. It is true that todays theoretical physicists are in a position, with the
help of the laws of quantumphysics, to create a model of the origin of the
universe fromnothingness but in doing so, they must assume that the laws
of quantum physics exist aprz ' 0rz ' in relation to the world which they want
to reproduce (a] > rz ' erz ' in a logical sense, not necessarily as a temporal con-
sequence). Not accepting that from the start we have at our disposition
the laws of physics means that we would not be able to make any steps in
CHAPTER 8. The Logic of Creation 143
the construction of our model.135 Nevertheless, the universe denitely ex-
ists. The illicit jump fromnon-existence to existence must have somehow
been made. This is exactly the Mystery of Creation.
7. New logic
I feel compelled at this point to caution the Reader against the all too
easy temptation of treating these illicit jumps, as I have described above,
as a place which should be lled by the God hypothesis. If science does
not wish to betray its calling, it may never become entangled in a chain of
questions and utilise a strategy of examinationwhichdoes not appeal to sci-
entic method. I think that what we now regard as illicit jumps (e.g. from
non-life to life or unconsciousness to consciousness) is something only re-
garded as illicit fromthe perspective of our contemporary logic but actually
serves as a fundamental strategy of nature in solving its hardest problems.
The limits of our logic today are too well known for us to keep needing to
remind ourselves of them (see the above mentioned theoremof Godel and
other limiting theorems). Everythingindicates that our current post-Aris-
totelian logic is too simplistic to be able to address the most fundamental
problems uncovered by the development of science. I would be inclined to
believe that we need a radical new perspective onlogic a perspectivewhich
would not be concerned with questioning or rejecting this or that rule, one
or another axiombut rather perceivinglogicinan entirely new light. I donot
think that this may be conducted via experimentations with purely deduc-
tive operations, which may subsequently be applied to a concrete scientic
problem (e.g. to the problemof the creation of life or consciousness). This
new logic must rather be developed in the course of resolving scientic
problems as a fully bindingpartner of other elements of scientic method.
Would the new logic throw a brighter shaft of light on the most im-
portant question of why there exists something rather than nothing? We
should hope so but I think that the question will always remain a source
of metaphysical fascination. For, after all, we exist and it would be much
easier if nothing existed at all.
135 I write on this subject in more detail in chapter 14 of my book: Crgy igj/ / ajesz aaa/ ea
/ ea/ reaaz lrgyeq/ ea.9 , 0,1). ea .