JURISPRUDENCE

TOPICAL OUTLINES
1. Legal Positivism
2. Natural Law
3. Feminist Jurisprudence
4. Marxist Jurisprudence
5. ociological Jurisprudence
Meaning and introduction to Jurisprudence
!"e word jurisprudence derives #rom t"e Latin term jurisprudentia, w"ic" means $t"e stud%& 'nowledge& or
science o# law.$ (n t"e )nited tates *urisprudence commonl% means t"e p"ilosop"% o# law. Legal
p"ilosop"% "as man% aspects& +ut #our o# t"em are t"e most common. !"e #irst and t"e most prevalent #orm
o# *urisprudence see's to anal%,e& explain& classi#%& and critici,e entire +odies o# law. Law sc"ool text+oo's
and legal enc%clopedias represent t"is t%pe o# sc"olars"ip. !"e second t%pe o# *urisprudence compares and
contrasts law wit" ot"er #ields o# 'nowledge suc" as literature& economics& religion& and t"e social sciences.
!"e t"ird t%pe o# *urisprudence see's to reveal t"e "istorical& moral& and cultural +asis o# a particular legal
concept. !"e #ourt" +od% o# *urisprudence #ocuses on #inding t"e answer to suc" a+stract -uestions as ./"at
is law01 and .2ow do *udges 3properl%4 decide cases01
5part #rom di##erent t%pes o# *urisprudence& di##erent sc"ools o# *urisprudence exist. Formalism & or
conceptualism& treats law li'e mat"6s or science. Formalists +elieve t"at a *udge identi#ies t"e relevant legal
principles& applies t"em to t"e #acts o# a case& and logicall% deduces a rule t"at will govern t"e outcome o#
t"e dispute. (n contrast& proponents o# legal realism +elieve t"at most cases +e#ore courts present "ard
-uestions t"at *udges must resolve +% +alancing t"e interests o# t"e parties and ultimatel% drawing an
ar+itrar% line on one side o# t"e dispute. !"is line& realists maintain& is drawn according to t"e political&
economic& and ps%c"ological inclinations o# t"e *udge. ome legal realists even +elieve t"at a *udge is a+le
to s"ape t"e outcome o# t"e case +ased on personal +iases.
5part #rom t"e realist-formalist ic!otom"& t"ere is t"e classic de+ate over t"e appropriate sources o# law
+etween positivist and natural law sc"ools o# t"oug"t. Positi#ists ar$ue t"at t"ere is no connection +etween
la% an moralit" and t"at t"e onl" sources of la% are rules t"at "ave +een expressl% enacted +% a
$o#ernmental entit" or court of la%. Naturalists& or proponents o# natural law& insist t"at t"e rules
enacted +% $o#ernment are not t!e onl" sources of la%. !"e% argue t"at moral p!ilosop!"7 reli$ion&
!uman reason and ini#iual conscience are also integral parts o# t"e law.
!"ere are no +rig"t lines +etween di##erent sc"ools o# *urisprudence. !"e le$al p!ilosop!" o# a particular
legal sc"olar ma% consist o# a com+ination o# strains #rom man% sc"ools o# legal t"oug"t. ome sc"olars
t"in' t"at it is more appropriate to t"in' a+out *urisprudence as a continuum.
LE&AL POSITI'IS(
RESEARC) DONE FRO(* !ttp*++plato,stanfor,eu+entries+le$al-positi#ism+
Legal positivism is t"e t"esis t"at t"e existence and content o# law depends on social #acts and not on its
merits. !"e 8nglis" *urist Jo"n 5ustin 319:;<1=5:4 #ormulated it t"us> .!"e existence o# law is one t"ing7 its
merit and demerit anot"er. /"et"er it +e or +e not is one en-uir%7 w"et"er it +e or +e not con#orma+le to an
assumed standard& is a di##erent en-uir%.1 31=32& p. 1594 !"e positivist t"esis does not sa% t"at law?s merits
are unintelligi+le& unimportant& or perip"eral to t"e p"ilosop"% o# law. (t sa%s t"at t"e% do not determine
w"et"er laws or legal s%stems exist. /"et"er a societ% "as a legal s%stem depends on t"e presence o# certain
structures o# governance& not on t"e extent to w"ic" it satis#ies ideals o# *ustice& democrac%& or t"e rule o#
law. /"at laws are in #orce in t"at s%stem depends on w"at social standards its o##icials recogni,e as
aut"oritative7 #or example& legislative enactments& *udicial decisions& or social customs. !"e #act t"at a
polic% would +e *ust& wise& e##icient& or prudent is never su##icient reason #or t"in'ing t"at it is actuall% t"e
law& and t"e #act t"at it is un*ust& unwise& ine##icient or imprudent is never su##icient reason #or dou+ting it.
5ccording to positivism& law is a matter o# w"at "as +een posited 3ordered& decided& practiced& tolerated&
etc.47 as we mig"t sa% in a more modern idiom& positivism is t"e view t"at law is a social construction.
5ustin t"oug"t t"e t"esis .simple and glaring.1 /"ile it is pro+a+l% t"e dominant view among anal%ticall%
inclined p"ilosop"ers o# law& it is also t"e su+*ect o# competing interpretations toget"er wit" persistent
criticisms and misunderstandings.
-, De#elopment an Influence
Legal positivism "as a long "istor% and a +road in#luence. (t "as antecedents in ancient political p"ilosop"%
and is discussed& and t"e term itsel# introduced& in mediaeval legal and political t"oug"t 3see Finnis 1::@4.
!"e modern doctrine& "owever& owes little to t"ese #or+ears. (ts most important roots lie in t"e
conventionalist political p"ilosop"ies o# 2o++es and 2ume& and its #irst #ull ela+oration is due to Jerem%
Aent"am 3194=<1=324 w"ose account 5ustin adopted& modi#ied& and populari,ed. For muc" o# t"e next
centur% an amalgam o# t"eir views& according to w"ic" law is t"e command o# a sovereign +ac'ed +% #orce&
dominated legal positivism and 8nglis" p"ilosop"ical re#lection a+out law. A% t"e mid<twentiet" centur%&
"owever& t"is account "ad lost its in#luence among wor'ing legal p"ilosop"ers. (ts emp"asis on legislative
institutions was replaced +% a #ocus on law<appl%ing institutions suc" as courts& and its insistence o# t"e role
o# coercive #orce gave wa% to t"eories emp"asi,ing t"e s%stematic and normative c"aracter o# law. !"e most
important arc"itects o# t"is revised positivism are t"e 5ustrian *urist 2ans Belsen 31==1<1:934 and t"e two
dominating #igures in t"e anal%tic p"ilosop"% o# law& 2.L.5. 2art 31:;9<:24 and Josep" Ca, among w"om
t"ere are clear lines o# in#luence& +ut also important contrasts. Legal positivism?s importance& "owever& is
not con#ined to t"e p"ilosop"% o# law. (t can +e seen t"roug"out social t"eor%& particularl% in t"e wor's o#
Marx& /e+er& and Dur'"eim& and also 3t"oug" "ere unwittingl%4 among man% law%ers& including t"e
5merican .legal realists1 and most contemporar% #eminist sc"olars. 5lt"oug" t"e% disagree on man% ot"er
points& t"ese writers all ac'nowledge t"at law is essentiall% a matter o# social #act. ome o# t"em are& it is
true& uncom#orta+le wit" t"e la+el .legal positivism1 and t"ere#ore "ope to escape it. !"eir discom#ort is
sometimes t"e product o# con#usion. Law%ers o#ten use .positivist1 a+usivel%& to condemn a #ormalistic
doctrine according to w"ic" law is alwa%s clear and& "owever pointless or wrong& is to +e rigorousl% applied
+% o##icials and o+e%ed +% su+*ects. (t is dou+t#ul t"at an%one ever "eld t"is view7 +ut it is in an% case #alse&
it "as not"ing to do wit" legal positivism& and it is expressl% re*ected +% all leading positivists. 5mong t"e
p"ilosop"icall% literate anot"er& more intelligi+le& misunderstanding ma% inter#ere. Legal positivism is "ere
sometimes associated wit" t"e "omon%mic +ut independent doctrines o# logical positivism 3t"e meaning o# a
sentence is its mode o# veri#ication4 or sociological positivism 3social p"enomena can +e studied onl%
t"roug" t"e met"ods o# natural science4. /"ile t"ere are "istorical connections& and also commonalities o#
temper& among t"ese ideas& t"e% are essentiall% di##erent. !"e view t"at t"e existence o# law depends on
social #acts does not rest on a particular semantic t"esis& and it is compati+le wit" a range o# t"eories a+out
"ow one investigates social #acts& including non<naturalistic accounts. !o sa% t"at t"e existence o# law
depends on #acts and not on its merits is a t"esis a+out t"e relation among laws& #acts& and merits& and not
ot"erwise a t"esis a+out t"e individual relata. 2ence& most traditional .natural law1 moral doctrines<<
including t"e +elie# in a universal& o+*ective moralit% grounded in "uman nature<<do not contradict legal
positivism. !"e onl% in#luential positivist moral t"eories are t"e views t"at moral norms are valid onl% i#
t"e% "ave a source in divine commands or in social conventions. uc" t"eists and relativists appl% to
moralit% t"e constraints t"at legal positivists t"in' "old #or law.
., T!e E/istence an Sources of La%
8ver% "uman societ% "as some #orm o# social order& some wa% o# mar'ing and encouraging approved
+e"avior& deterring disapproved +e"avior& and resolving disputes. /"at t"en is distinctive o# societies wit"
legal s%stems and& wit"in t"ose societies& o# t"eir law0 Ae#ore exploring some positivist answers& it +ears
emp"asi,ing t"at t"ese are not t"e onl% -uestions wort" as'ing. /"ile an understanding o# t"e nature o# law
re-uires an account o# w"at ma'es law distinctive& it also re-uires an understanding o# w"at it "as in
common wit" ot"er #orms o# social control. ome Marxists are positivists a+out t"e nature o# law w"ile
insisting t"at its distinguis"ing c"aracteristics matter less t"an its role in replicating and #acilitating ot"er
#orms o# domination. 3!"oug" ot"er Marxists disagree> see Pas"u'anis4. !"e% t"in' t"at t"e speci#ic nature
o# law casts little lig"t on t"eir primar% concerns. Aut one can "ardl% 'now t"at in advance7 it depends on
w"at t"e nature o# law actuall% is.
5ccording to Aent"am and 5ustin& law is a p"enomenon o# large societies wit" a sovereign> a determinate
person or group w"o "ave supreme and a+solute de facto power << t"e% are o+e%ed +% all or most ot"ers +ut
do not t"emselves similarl% o+e% an%one else. !"e laws in t"at societ% are a su+set o# t"e sovereign?s
commands> general orders t"at appl% to classes o# actions and people and t"at are +ac'ed up +% t"reat o#
#orce or .sanction.1 !"is imperatival t"eor% is positivist& #or it identi#ies t"e existence o# legal s%stems wit"
patterns o# command and o+edience t"at can +e ascertained wit"out considering w"et"er t"e sovereign "as a
moral rig"t to rule or w"et"er "is commands are meritorious. (t "as two ot"er distinctive #eatures. !"e
t"eor% is monistic> it represents all laws as "aving a single #orm& imposing o+ligations on t"eir su+*ects&
t"oug" not on t"e sovereign "imsel#. !"e imperativalist ac'nowledges t"at ultimate legislative power ma%
+e sel#<limiting& or limited externall% +% w"at pu+lic opinion will tolerate& and also t"at legal s%stems
contain provisions t"at are not imperatives 3#or example& permissions& de#initions& and so on4. Aut t"e%
regard t"ese as part o# t"e non<legal material t"at is necessar% #or& and part o#& ever% legal s%stem. 35ustin is
a +it more li+eral on t"is point4. !"e t"eor% is also reductivist& #or it maintains t"at t"e normative language
used in descri+ing and stating t"e law << tal' o# aut"orit%& rig"ts& o+ligations& and so on << can all +e anal%,ed
wit"out remainder in non<normative terms& ultimatel% as concatenations o# statements a+out power and
o+edience.
(mperatival t"eories are now wit"out in#luence in legal p"ilosop"% 3+ut see Ladenson and Morison4. /"at
survives o# t"eir outloo' is t"e idea t"at legal t"eor% must ultimatel% +e rooted in some account o# t"e
political s%stem& an insig"t t"at came to +e s"ared +% all ma*or positivists save Belsen. !"eir particular
conception o# a societ% under a sovereign commander& "owever& is #riendless 3except among Foucauldians&
w"o strangel% ta'e t"is relic as t"e ideal<t%pe o# w"at t"e% call .*uridical1 power4. (t is clear t"at in complex
societies t"ere ma% +e no one w"o "as all t"e attri+utes o# sovereignt%& #or ultimate aut"orit% ma% +e divided
among organs and ma% itsel# +e limited +% law. Moreover& even w"en .sovereignt%1 is not +eing used in its
legal sense it is nonet"eless a normative concept. 5 legislator is one w"o "as authority to ma'e laws& and
not merel% someone wit" great social power& and it is dou+t#ul t"at ."a+its o# o+edience1 is a candidate
reduction #or explaining aut"orit%. E+edience is a normative concept. !o distinguis" it #rom coincidental
compliance we need somet"ing li'e t"e idea o# su+*ects +eing oriented to& or guided +%& t"e commands.
8xplicating t"is will carr% us #ar #rom t"e power<+ased notions wit" w"ic" classical positivism "oped to
wor'. !"e imperativalists? account o# o+ligation is also su+*ect to decisive o+*ections 32art& 1::4& pp. 2@<9=7
and 2ac'er4. !reating all laws as commands conceals important di##erences in t"eir social #unctions& in t"e
wa%s t"e% operate in practical reasoning& and in t"e sort o# *usti#ications to w"ic" t"e% are lia+le. For
instance& laws con#erring t"e power to marr% command not"ing7 t"e% do not o+ligate people to marr%& or
even to marr% according to t"e prescri+ed #ormalities. Nor is reductivism an% more plausi+le "ere> we spea'
o# legal o+ligations w"en t"ere is no pro+a+ilit% o# sanctions +eing applied and w"en t"ere is no provision
#or sanctions 3as in t"e dut% o# t"e "ig"est courts to appl% t"e law4. Moreover& we ta'e t"e existence o# legal
o+ligations to +e a reason for imposing sanctions& not merel% a conse-uence o# it.
2ans Belsen retains t"e imperativalists? monism +ut a+andons t"eir reductivism. En "is view& law is
c"aracteri,ed +% a basic form and basic norm. !"e #orm o# ever% law is t"at o# a conditional order& directed
at t"e courts& to appl% sanctions i# a certain +e"avior 3t"e .delict14 is per#ormed. En t"is view& law is an
indirect s%stem o# guidance> it does not tell su+*ects w"at to do7 it tells officials w"at to do to its su+*ects
under certain conditions. !"us& w"at we ordinaril% regard as t"e legal dut% not to steal is #or Belsen merel% a
logical correlate o# t"e primar% norm w"ic" stipulates a sanction #or stealing 31:45& p. @14. !"e o+*ections to
imperatival monism appl% also to t"is more sop"isticated version> t"e reduction misses important #acts& suc"
as t"e point o# "aving a pro"i+ition on t"e#t. 3!"e courts are not indi##erent +etween& on t"e one "and&
people not stealing and& on t"e ot"er& stealing and su##ering t"e sanctions.4 Aut in one respect t"e conditional
sanction t"eor% is in worse s"ape t"an is imperativalism& #or it "as no principled wa% to #ix on t"e delict as
t"e dut%<de#ining condition o# t"e sanction << t"at is +ut one o# a large num+er o# relevant antecedent
conditions& including t"e legal capacit% o# t"e o##ender& t"e *urisdiction o# t"e *udge& t"e constitutionalit% o#
t"e o##ense& and so #ort". /"ic" among all t"ese is t"e content o# a legal dut%0
Belsen?s most important contri+ution lies in "is attac' on reductivism and "is doctrine o# t"e .+asic norm.1
2e maintains t"at law is normative and must understood as suc". Mig"t does not ma'e rig"t << not even
legal rig"t << so t"e p"ilosop"% o# law must explain t"e #act t"at law is ta'en to impose o+ligations on its
su+*ects. Moreover& law is a normative system> .Law is not& as it is sometimes said& a rule. (t is a set o# rules
"aving t"e 'ind o# unit% we understand +% a s%stem1 31:45& p. 34. For t"e imperativalists& t"e unit% o# a legal
s%stem consists in t"e #act t"at all its laws are commanded +% one sovereign. For Belsen& it consists in t"e
#act t"at t"e% are all lin's in one c"ain o# aut"orit%. For example& a +%<law is legall% valid +ecause it is
created +% a corporation law#ull% exercising t"e powers con#erred on it +% t"e legislature& w"ic" con#ers
t"ose powers in a manner provided +% t"e constitution& w"ic" was itsel# created in a wa% provided +% an
earlier constitution. Aut w"at a+out t"e ver% #irst constitution& "istoricall% spea'ing0 (ts aut"orit%& sa%s
Belsen& is .presupposed.1 !"e condition #or interpreting an% legal norm as +inding is t"at t"e #irst
constitution is validated +% t"e #ollowing .+asic norm>1 .the original constitution is to be obeyed.1 Now& t"e
+asic norm cannot +e a legal norm << we cannot #ull% explain t"e +indingness o# law +% re#erence to more
law. Nor can it +e a social #act& #or Belsen maintains t"at t"e reason #or t"e validit% o# a norm must alwa%s
+e anot"er norm << no oug"t #rom is. (t #ollows& t"en& t"at a legal s%stem must consist o# norms all t"e wa%
down. (t +ottoms in a "%pot"etical& transcendental norm t"at is t"e condition o# t"e intelligi+ilit% o# an% 3and
all4 ot"er norms as +inding. !o .presuppose1 t"is +asic norm is not to endorse it as good or *ust <<
resupposition is a cognitive stance onl% << +ut it is& Belsen t"in's& t"e necessar% precondition #or a non<
reductivist account o# law as a normative s%stem.
!"ere are man% di##iculties wit" t"is& not least o# w"ic" is t"e #act t"at i# we are willing to tolerate t"e +asic
norm as a solution it is not clear w"% we t"oug"t t"ere was a pro+lem in t"e #irst place. Ene cannot sa% +ot"
t"at t"e +asic norm is t"e norm presupposing w"ic" validates all in#erior norms and also t"at an in#erior
norm is part o# t"e legal s%stem onl% i# it is connected +% a c"ain o# validit% to t"e +asic norm. /e need a
wa% into t"e circle. Moreover& it draws t"e +oundaries o# legal s%stems incorrectl%. !"e Fanadian
Fonstitution o# 1:=2 was law#ull% created +% an 5ct o# t"e ).B. Parliament& and on t"at +asis Fanadian law
and 8nglis" law s"ould +e parts o# a single legal s%stem& rooted in one +asic norm> G!"e 3#irst4 ).B.
constitution is to +e o+e%ed.6 Het no 8nglis" law is +inding in Fanada& and a purported repeal o# t"e
Fonstitution 5ct +% t"e ).B. would +e wit"out legal e##ect in Fanada.
(# law cannot ultimatel% +e grounded in #orce& or in law& or in a presupposed norm& on w"at does its
aut"orit% rest0 !"e most in#luential solution is now 2.L.5. 2art?s. 2is solution resem+les Belsen?s in its
emp"asis on t"e normative #oundations o# legal s%stems& +ut 2art re*ects Belsen?s transcendentalist& Bantian
view o# aut"orit% in #avour o# an empirical& /e+erian one. For 2art& t"e aut"orit% o# law is social. !"e
ultimate criterion o# validit% in a legal s%stem is neit"er a legal norm nor a presupposed norm& +ut a social
rule t"at exists onl% +ecause it is actuall% practiced. Law ultimatel% rests on custom> customs a+out w"o
s"all "ave t"e aut"orit% to decide disputes& w"at t"e% s"all treat as +inding reasons #or decision& i.e. as
sources o# law& and "ow customs ma% +e c"anged. E# t"ese t"ree .secondar% rules&1 as 2art calls t"em& t"e
source<determining rule of recognition is most important& #or it speci#ies t"e ultimate criteria o# validit% in
t"e legal s%stem. (t exists onl% +ecause it is practiced +% o##icials& and it is not onl% t"e recognition rule 3or
rules4 t"at +est explains t"eir practice& it is rule to w"ic" t"e% actuall% appeal in arguments a+out w"at
standards t"e% are +ound to appl%. 2art?s account is t"ere#ore conventionalist 3see Marmor& and Foleman&
2;;14> ultimate legal rules are social norms& alt"oug" t"e% are neit"er t"e product o# express agreement nor
even conventions in t"e c"elling<Lewis sense 3see Ireen 1:::4. !"us #or 2art too t"e legal s%stem is
norms all t"e wa% down& +ut at its root is a social norm t"at "as t"e 'ind o# normative #orce t"at customs
"ave. (t is a regularit% o# +e"avior towards w"ic" o##icials ta'e .t"e internal point o# view>1 t"e% use it as a
standard #or guiding and evaluating t"eir own and ot"ers? +e"avior& and t"is use is displa%ed in t"eir conduct
and speec"& including t"e resort to various #orms o# social pressure to support t"e rule and t"e read%
application o# normative terms suc" as .dut%1 and .o+ligation1 w"en invo'ing it.
(t is an important #eature o# 2art?s account t"at t"e rule o# recognition is an official custom& and not a
standard necessaril% s"ared +% t"e +roader communit%. (# t"e imperativalists? picture o# t"e political s%stem
was p%ramidal power& 2art?s is more li'e /e+er?s rational +ureaucrac%. Law is normall% a tec"nical
enterprise& c"aracteri,ed +% a division o# la+our. Erdinar% su+*ects? contri+ution to t"e existence o# law ma%
t"ere#ore amount to no more t"an passive compliance. !"us& 2art?s necessar% and su##icient conditions #or
t"e existence o# a legal s%stem are t"at .t"ose rules o# +e"avior w"ic" are valid according to t"e s%stem?s
ultimate criteria o# validit% must +e generall% o+e%ed& and ... its rules o# recognition speci#%ing t"e criteria
o# legal validit% and its rules o# c"ange and ad*udication must +e e##ectivel% accepted as common pu+lic
standards o# o##icial +e"avior +% its o##icials1 31::4& p. 11@4. 5nd t"is division o# la+our is not a normativel%
neutral #act a+out law7 it is politicall% c"arged& #or it sets up t"e possi+ilit% o# law +ecoming remote #rom t"e
li#e o# a societ%& a "a,ard to w"ic" 2art is acutel% alert 31::4& p. 1197 c#. /aldron4.
5lt"oug" 2art introduces t"e rule o# recognition t"roug" a speculative ant"ropolog% o# "ow it mig"t emerge
in response to certain de#iciencies in a customar% social order& "e is not committed to t"e view t"at law is a
cultural ac"ievement. !o t"e contrar%& t"e idea t"at legal order is alwa%s a good t"ing& and t"at societies
wit"out it are de#icient& is a #amiliar element o# man% anti<positivist views& +eginning wit" 2enr% Maine?s
criticism o# 5ustin on t"e ground t"at "is t"eor% would not appl% to certain (ndian villages. !"e o+*ection
em+races t"e error it see's to avoid. (t imperialisticall% assumes t"at it is alwa%s a +ad t"ing to lac' law& and
t"en ma'es a da,,ling in#erence #rom oug"t to is> i# it is good to "ave law& t"en eac" societ% must "ave it&
and t"e concept o# law must +e ad*usted to s"ow t"at it does. (# one t"in's t"at law is a man% splendored
t"ing& one will +e tempted +% a ver% wide concept o# law& #or it would seem improper to c"arge ot"ers wit"
missing out. Positivism simpl% releases t"e "arness. Law is a distinctive #orm o# political order& not a moral
ac"ievement& and w"et"er it is necessar% or even use#ul depends entirel% on its content and context.
ocieties wit"out law ma% +e per#ectl% adapted to t"eir environments& missing not"ing.
5 positivist account o# t"e existence and content o# law& along an% o# t"e a+ove lines& o##ers a t"eor% o# t"e
validity o# law in one o# t"e two main senses o# t"at term 3see 2arris& pp. 1;9<1114. Belsen sa%s t"at validit%
is t"e speci#ic mode o# existence o# a norm. 5n invalid marriage is not a special 'ind o# marriage "aving t"e
propert% o# invalidit%7 it is not a marriage at all. (n t"is sense a valid law one t"at is systemically valid in t"e
*urisdiction << it is part o# t"e legal s%stem. !"is is t"e -uestion t"at positivists answer +% re#erence to social
sources. (t is distinct #rom t"e idea o# validit% as moral propriet%& i.e. a sound *usti#ication #or respecting t"e
norm. For t"e positivist& t"is depends on its merits. Ene indication t"at t"ese senses di##er is t"at one ma%
'now t"at a societ% "as a legal s%stem& and 'now w"at its laws are& wit"out "aving an% idea w"et"er t"e%
are morall% *usti#ied. For example& one ma% 'now t"at t"e law o# ancient 5t"ens included t"e punis"ment o#
ostracism wit"out 'nowing w"et"er it was *usti#ied& +ecause one does not 'now enoug" a+out its e##ects&
a+out t"e social context& and so #ort".
No legal positivist argues t"at t"e systemic validity o# law esta+lis"es its moral validity& i.e. t"at it s"ould +e
o+e%ed +% su+*ects or applied +% *udges. 8ven 2o++es& to w"om t"is view is sometimes ascri+ed& re-uired
t"at law actuall% +e a+le to 'eep t"e peace& #ailing w"ic" we owe it not"ing. Aent"am and 5ustin& as
utilitarians& "old t"at suc" -uestions alwa%s turn on t"e conse-uences and +ot" ac'nowledge t"at
diso+edience is t"ere#ore sometimes #ull% *usti#ied. Belsen insists t"at .!"e science o# law does not
prescri+e t"at one oug"t to o+e% t"e commands o# t"e creator o# t"e constitution1 31:@9& p. 2;44. 2art t"in's
t"at t"ere is onl% a prima facie dut% to o+e%& grounded in and t"us limited +% #airness << so t"ere is no
o+ligation to un#air or pointless laws 32art 1:554. Ca, goes #urt"er still& arguing t"at t"ere isn?t even a prima
facie dut% to o+e% t"e law& not even in a *ust state 3Ca, 1:9:& pp. 233<4:4. !"e peculiar accusation t"at
positivists +elieve t"e law is alwa%s to +e o+e%ed is wit"out #oundation. 2art?s own view is t"at an
overweening de#erence to law consorts more easil% wit" t"eories t"at im+ue it wit" moral ideals& permitting
.an enormous overvaluation o# t"e importance o# t"e +are #act t"at a rule ma% +e said to +e a valid rule o#
law& as i# t"is& once declared& was conclusive o# t"e #inal moral -uestion> GEug"t t"is law to +e o+e%ed01
32art 1:5=& p. 954.
0, (oral Principles an t!e 1ounaries of La%
!"e most in#luential criticisms o# legal positivism all #low& in one wa% or anot"er& #rom t"e suspicion t"at it
#ails to give moralit% its due. 5 t"eor% t"at insists on t"e #acticit% o# law seems to contri+ute little to our
understanding t"at law "as important #unctions in ma'ing "uman li#e go well& t"at t"e rule o# law is a pri,ed
ideal& and t"at t"e language and practice o# law is "ig"l% morali,ed. 5ccordingl%& positivism?s critics
maintain t"at t"e most important #eatures o# law are not to +e #ound in its source<+ased c"aracter& +ut in
law?s capacit% to advance t"e common good& to secure "uman rig"ts& or to govern wit" integrit%. 3(t is a
curious #act a+out anti<positivist t"eories t"at& w"ile t"e% all insist on t"e moral nature o# law& wit"out
exception t"e% ta'e its moral nature to +e somet"ing good. !"e idea t"at law mig"t o# its ver% nature +e
morall% pro+lematic does not seem to "ave occurred to t"em.4
(t is +e%ond dou+t t"at moral and political considerations +ear on legal p"ilosop"%. 5s Finnis sa%s& t"e
reasons we "ave #or esta+lis"ing& maintaining or re#orming law include moral reasons& and t"ese reasons
t"ere#ore s"ape our legal concepts 3p. 2;44. Aut which concepts0 Ence one concedes& as Finnis does& t"at t"e
existence and content o# law can +e identi#ied wit"out recourse to moral argument& and t"at ."uman law is
arte#act and arti#ice7 and not a conclusion #rom moral premises&1 3p. 2;54 t"e !"omistic apparatus "e tries to
resuscitate is largel% irrelevant to t"e trut" o# legal positivism. !"is vitiates also Lon Fuller?s criticisms o#
2art 3Fuller& 1:5= and 1:@:4. 5part #rom some con#used claims a+out ad*udication& Fuller "as two main
points. First& "e t"in's t"at it isn?t enoug" #or a legal s%stem to rest on customar% social rules& since law
could not guide +e"avior wit"out also +eing at least minimall% clear& consistent& pu+lic& prospective and so
on << t"at is& wit"out ex"i+iting to some degree t"ose virtues collectivel% called .t"e rule o# law.1 (t su##ices
to note t"at t"is is per#ectl% consistent wit" law +eing source<+ased. 8ven i# moral properties were identical
wit"& or supervened upon& t"ese rule<o#<law properties& t"e% do so in virtue o# t"eir rule<li'e c"aracter& and
not t"eir law<li'e c"aracter. /"atever virtues in"ere in or #ollow #rom clear& consistent& prospective& and
open practices can +e #ound not onl% in law +ut in all ot"er social practices wit" t"ose #eatures& including
custom and positive moralit%. 5nd t"ese virtues are minor> t"ere is little to +e said in #avour o# a clear&
consistent& prospective& pu+lic and impartiall% administered s%stem o# racial segregation& #or example.
Fuller?s second worr% is t"at i# law is a matter o# #act& t"en we are wit"out an explanation o# t"e dut% to
o+e%. 2e gloatingl% as's "ow .an amoral datum called law could "ave t"e peculiar -ualit% o# creating an
o+ligation to o+e% it1 3Fuller& 1:5=4. Ene possi+ilit% "e neglects is t"at it doesn?t. !"e #act t"at law claims to
o+ligate is& o# course& a di##erent matter and is suscepti+le to ot"er explanations 3Ireen 2;;14. Aut even i#
Fuller is rig"t in "is unargued assumption& t"e .peculiar -ualit%1 w"ose existence "e dou+ts is a #amiliar
#eature o# man% moral practices. Fompare promises> w"et"er a societ% "as a practice o# promising& and w"at
someone "as promised to do& are matters o# social #act. Het promising creates moral o+ligations o#
per#ormance or compensation. 5n .amoral datum1 ma% indeed #igure& toget"er wit" ot"er premises& in a
sound argument to moral conclusions.
/"ile Finnis and Fuller?s views are t"us compati+le wit" t"e positivist t"esis& t"e same cannot +e said o#
Conald Dwor'in?s important wor's 3Dwor'in 1:9= and 1:=@4. Positivism?s most signi#icant critic re*ects t"e
t"eor% on ever% conceiva+le level. 2e denies t"at t"ere can +e any general t"eor% o# t"e existence and
content o# law7 "e denies t"at local t"eories o# particular legal s%stems can identi#% law wit"out recourse to
its merits& and "e re*ects t"e w"ole institutional #ocus o# positivism. 5 t"eor% o# law is #or Dwor'in a t"eor%
o# "ow cases oug"t to +e decided and it +egins& not wit" an account o# political organi,ation& +ut wit" an
a+stract ideal regulating t"e conditions under w"ic" governments ma% use coercive #orce over t"eir su+*ects.
Force must onl% +e deplo%ed& "e claims& in accordance wit" principles laid down in advance. 5 societ% "as a
legal s%stem onl% w"en& and to t"e extent t"at& it "onors t"is ideal& and its law is t"e set o# all considerations
t"at t"e courts o# suc" a societ% would +e morall% *usti#ied in appl%ing& w"et"er or not t"ose considerations
are determined +% an% source. !o identi#% t"e law o# a given societ% we must engage in moral and political
argument& #or t"e law is w"atever re-uirements are consistent wit" an interpretation o# its legal practices
3su+*ect to a t"res"old condition o# #it4 t"at s"ows t"em to +e +est *usti#ied in lig"t o# t"e animating ideal. (n
addition to t"ose p"ilosop"ical considerations& Dwor'in invo'es two #eatures o# t"e p"enomenolog% o#
*udging& as "e sees it. 2e #inds deep controversy among law%ers and *udges a+out "ow important cases
s"ould +e decided& and "e #inds diversity in t"e considerations t"at t"e% "old relevant to deciding t"em. !"e
controvers% suggests to "im t"at law cannot rest on an o##icial consensus& and t"e diversit% suggests t"at
t"ere is no single social rule t"at validates all relevant reasons& moral and non<moral& #or *udicial decisions.
Dwor'in?s ric" and complex arguments "ave attracted various lines o# repl% #rom positivists. Ene response
denies t"e relevance o# t"e p"enomenological claims. Fontrovers% is a matter o# degree& and a consensus<
de#eating amount o# it is not proved +% t"e existence o# adversarial argument in t"e "ig" courts& or indeed in
an% courts. 5s important is t"e +road range o# settled law t"at gives rise to #ew dou+ts and w"ic" guides
social li#e outside t"e courtroom. 5s #or t"e diversit% argument& so #ar #rom +eing a re#utation o# positivism&
t"is is an entailment o# it. Positivism identi#ies law& not wit" all valid reasons #or decision& +ut onl% wit" t"e
source<+ased su+set o# t"em. (t is no part o# t"e positivist claim t"at t"e rule o# recognition tells us "ow to
decide cases& or even tells us all t"e relevant reasons #or decision. Positivists accept t"at moral& political or
economic considerations are properl% operative in some legal decisions& *ust as linguistic or logical ones are.
Modus ponens "olds in court as muc" as outside& +ut not +ecause it was enacted +% t"e legislature or
decided +% t"e *udges& and t"e #act t"at t"ere is no social rule t"at validates +ot" modus ponens and also t"e
Municipalities 5ct is true +ut irrelevant. !"e aut"orit% o# principles o# logic 3or moralit%4 is not somet"ing
to +e explained +% legal p"ilosop"%7 t"e aut"orit% o# acts o# Parliament must +e7 and accounting #or t"e
di##erence is a central tas' o# t"e p"ilosop"% o# law.
Et"er positivists respond di##erentl% to Dwor'in?s p"enomenological points& accepting t"eir relevance +ut
modi#%ing t"e t"eor% to accommodate t"em. o<called .inclusive positivists1 3e.g.& /aluc"ow 3to w"om t"e
term is due4& Foleman& oper and L%ons4 argue t"at t"e merit<+ased considerations ma% indeed +e part o#
t"e law& i# t"e% are explicitl% or implicitl% made so +% source<+ased considerations. For example& Fanada?s
constitution explicitl% aut"ori,es #or +reac" o# F"arter rig"ts& .suc" remed% as t"e court considers
appropriate and *ust in t"e circumstances.1 (n determining w"ic" remedies mig"t +e legall% valid& *udges are
t"us expressl% told to ta'e into account t"eir moralit%. 5nd *udges ma% develop a settled practice o# doing
t"is w"et"er or not it is re-uired +% an% enactment7 it ma% +ecome customar% practice in certain t%pes o#
cases. Ce#erence to moral principles ma% also +e implicit in t"e we+ o# *udge<made law& #or instance in t"e
common law principle t"at no one s"ould pro#it #rom "is own wrongdoing. uc" moral considerations&
inclusivists claim& are part o# t"e law because the sources make it so& and t"us Dwor'in is rig"t t"at t"e
existence and content o# law turns on its merits& and wrong onl% in "is explanation o# t"is #act. Legal
validit% depends on moralit%& not +ecause o# t"e interpretative conse-uences o# some ideal a+out "ow t"e
government ma% use #orce& +ut +ecause t"at is one o# t"e t"ings t"at ma% +e customaril% recogni,ed as an
ultimate determinant o# legal validit%. (t is t"e sources t"at make t"e merits relevant.
!o understand and assess t"is response& some preliminar% clari#ications are needed. First& it is not plausi+le
to "old t"at t"e merits are relevant to a *udicial decision only w"en t"e sources ma'e it so. (t would +e odd
to t"in' t"at *ustice is a reason #or decision onl% +ecause some source directs an o##icial to decide *ustl%. (t is
o# t"e nature o# *ustice t"at it properl% +ears on certain controversies. (n legal decisions& especiall% important
ones& moral and political considerations are present o# t"eir own aut"orit%7 t"e% do not need sources to
propel t"em into action. En t"e contrar%& we expect to see a sourceJa statute& a decision& or a
conventionJw"en *udges are constrained not to appeal directl% to t"e merits. econd& t"e #act t"at t"ere is
moral language in *udicial decisions does not esta+lis" t"e presence o# moral tests #or law& #or sources come
in various guises. /"at sounds li'e moral reasoning in t"e courts is sometimes reall% source<+ased
reasoning. For example& w"en t"e upreme Fourt o# Fanada sa%s t"at a pu+lication is criminall% .o+scene1
onl% i# it is "arm#ul& it is not appl%ing J.. Mill?s "arm principle& #or w"at t"at court means +% ."arm#ul1 is
t"at it is regarded +% t"e communit% as degrading or intolera+le. !"ose are source<+ased matters& not moral
ones. !"is is *ust one o# man% appeals to positive moralit%& i.e. to t"e moral customs actuall% practiced +% a
given societ%& and no one denies t"at positive moralit% ma% +e a source o# law. Moreover& it is important to
remem+er t"at law is d%namic and t"at even a decision t"at does appl% moralit% itsel# becomes a source o#
law& in t"e #irst instance #or t"e parties and possi+l% #or ot"ers as well. Ever time& +% t"e doctrine o#
precedent w"ere it exists or t"roug" t"e gradual emergence o# an interpretative convention w"ere it does
not& t"is gives a #actual edge to normative terms. !"us& i# a court decides t"at mone% damages are in some
instances not a .*ust remed%1 t"en t"is #act will *oin wit" ot"ers in #ixing w"at .*ustice1 means #or t"ese
purposes. !"is process ma% ultimatel% detac" legal concepts #rom t"eir moral analogs 3t"us& legal .murder1
ma% re-uire no intention to 'ill& legal .#ault1 no moral +lamewort"iness& an .e-uita+le1 remed% ma% +e
mani#estl% un#air& etc.4
Aearing in mind t"ese complications& "owever& t"ere undenia+l% remains a great deal o# moral reasoning in
ad*udication. Fourts are o#ten called on to decide w"at would reasona+le& #air& *ust& cruel& etc. +% explicit or
implicit re-uirement o# statute or common law& or +ecause t"is is t"e onl% proper or intelligi+le wa% to
decide. 2art sees t"is as "appening pre<eminentl% in "ard cases in w"ic"& owing to t"e indeterminac% o#
legal rules or con#licts among t"em& *udges are le#t wit" t"e discretion to ma'e new law. .Discretion&1
"owever& ma% +e a potentiall% misleading term "ere. First& discretionar% *udgments are not ar+itrar%> t"e%
are guided +% merit<+ased considerations& and t"e% ma% also +e guided +% law even t"oug" not #ull%
determined +% it << *udges ma% +e empowered to ma'e certain decisions and %et under a legal dut% to ma'e
t"em in a particular wa%& sa%& in con#ormit% wit" t"e spirit o# preexisting law or wit" certain moral
principles 3Ca, 1::4& pp. 23=<534. econd& 2art?s account mig"t wrongl% +e ta'en to suggest t"at t"ere are
#undamentall% two 'inds o# cases& eas% ones and "ard ones& distinguis"ed +% t"e sorts o# reasoning
appropriate to eac". 5 more perspicuous wa% o# putting it would +e to sa% t"at t"ere are two 'inds o#
reasons t"at are operative in ever% case> source<+ased reasons and non<source<+ased reasons. Law
application and law creation are continuous activities #or& as Belsen correctl% argued& every legal decision is
partl% determined +% law and partl% underdetermined> .!"e "ig"er norm cannot +ind in ever% direction t"e
act +% w"ic" it is applied. !"ere must alwa%s +e more or less room #or discretion& so t"at t"e "ig"er norm in
relation to t"e lower one can onl% "ave t"e c"aracter o# a #rame to +e #illed +% t"is act1 31:@9& p. 34:4. !"is
is a general trut" a+out norms. !"ere are in#initel% man% wa%s o# compl%ing wit" a command to .close t"e
door1 3-uic'l% or slowl%& wit" one?s rig"t "and or le#t& etc.4 !"us& even an .eas% case1 will contain
discretionar% elements. ometimes suc" residual discretion is o# little importance7 sometimes it is central7
and a s"i#t #rom marginal to ma*or can "appen in a #las" wit" c"anges in social or tec"nological
circumstances. !"at is one o# t"e reasons #or re*ecting a strict doctrine o# separation o# powers << 5ustin
called it a .c"ildis" #iction1 << according to w"ic" *udges onl% appl% and never ma'e t"e law& and wit" it an%
literal interpretation o# Dwor'in?s ideal t"at coercion +e deplo%ed onl% according to principles laid down in
advance.
(t "as to +e said& "owever& t"at 2art "imsel# does not consistentl% view legal re#erences to moralit% as
mar'ing a ,one o# discretion. (n a passing remar' in t"e #irst edition o# The Concept of Law& "e writes& .(n
some legal s%stems& as in t"e )nited tates& t"e ultimate criteria o# legal validit% explicitl% incorporate
principles o# *ustice or su+stantive moral values K1 31::4& p. 2;44. !"is t"oug"t sits uneasil% wit" ot"er
doctrines o# importance to "is t"eor%. For 2art also sa%s t"at w"en *udges exercise moral *udgment in t"e
penum+ra o# legal rules to suppose t"at t"eir results were alread% part o# existing law is .in e##ect& an
invitation to revise our concept o# w"at a legal rule is K1 31:5=& p. 924. !"e concept o# a legal rule& t"at is&
does not include all correctl% reasoned ela+orations or determinations o# t"at rule. Later& "owever& 2art
comes to see "is remar' a+out t"e ).. constitution as #ores"adowing inclusive positivism 3.so#t
positivism&1 as "e calls it4. 2art?s reasons #or t"is s"i#t are o+scure 3Ireen 1::@4. 2e remained clear a+out
"ow we s"ould understand ordinar% statutor% interpretation& #or instance& w"ere t"e legislature "as directed
t"at an applicant s"ould "ave a .reasona+le time1 or t"at a regulator ma% permit onl% a .#air price>1 t"ese
grant a +ounded discretion to decide t"e cases on t"eir merits. /"% t"en does 2art << and even more
insistentl%& /aluc"ow and Foleman << come to regard constitutional ad*udication di##erentl%0 (s t"ere an%
reason to t"in' t"at a constitution permitting onl% a .*ust remed%1 re-uires a di##erent anal%sis t"an a statute
permitting onl% a .#air rate01
Ene mig"t "a,ard t"e #ollowing guess. ome o# t"ese p"ilosop"ers t"in' t"at constitutional law expresses
t"e ultimate criteria o# legal validit%> +ecause un*ust remedies are constitutionall% invalid and void ab initio&
legall% spea'ing t"e% never existed 3/aluc"ow4. !"at +eing so& moralit% sometimes determines t"e
existence or content o# law. (# t"is is t"e underl%ing intuition& it is misleading& #or t"e rule o# recognition is
not to +e #ound in constitutions. !"e rule o# recognition is t"e ultimate criterion 3or set o# criteria4 o# legal
validit%. (# one 'nows w"at t"e constitution o# a countr% is& one 'nows some o# its law7 +ut one ma% 'now
w"at t"e rule o# recognition is wit"out 'nowing any o# its laws. Hou ma% 'now t"at acts o# t"e Aundestag
are a source o# law in Ierman% +ut not +e a+le to name or interpret a single one o# t"em. 5nd constitutional
law is itsel# subject to t"e ultimate criteria o# s%stemic validit%. /"et"er a statute& decision or convention is
part o# a countr%?s constitution can onl% +e determined +% appl%ing t"e rule o# recognition. !"e provisions o#
t"e 14
t"
5mendment to t"e ).. constitution& #or example& are not t"e rule o# recognition in t"e )..& #or
t"ere is an intra<s%stemic answer to t"e -uestion w"% t"at 5mendment is valid law. !"e ).. constitution&
li'e t"at o# all ot"er countries& is law onl% +ecause it was created in wa%s provided +% law 3t"roug"
amendment or court decision4 or in wa%s t"at came to +e accepted as creating law 3+% constitutional
convention and custom4. Fonstitutional cases t"us raise no p"ilosop"ical issue not alread% present in
ordinar% statutor% interpretation& w"ere inclusive positivists seem content wit" t"e t"eor% o# *udicial
discretion. (t is& o# course& open to t"em to adopt a uni#ied view and treat every explicit or implicit legal
re#erence to moralit% << in cases& statutes& constitutions& and customs << as esta+lis"ing moral tests #or t"e
existence o# law. 35lt"oug" at t"at point it is unclear "ow t"eir view would di##er #rom Dwor'in?s.4 o we
s"ould consider t"e wider -uestion> w"% not regard as law ever%t"ing re#erred to +% law0
8xclusive positivists o##er t"ree main arguments #or stopping at social sources. !"e #irst and most important
is t"at it captures and s%stemati,es distinctions we regularl% ma'e and t"at we "ave good reason to continue
to ma'e. /e assign +lame and responsi+ilit% di##erentl% w"en we t"in' t"at a +ad decision was mandated +%
t"e sources t"an we do w"en we t"in' t"at it #lowed #rom a *udge?s exercise o# moral or political *udgement.
/"en considering w"o s"ould +e appointed to t"e *udiciar%& we are concerned not onl% wit" t"eir
acumenas*urists& +ut also wit" t"eir moralit% and politics<<and we ta'e di##erent t"ings as evidence o# t"ese
traits. !"ese are deepl% entrenc"ed distinctions& and t"ere is no reason to a+andon t"em.
!"e second reason #or stopping at sources is t"at t"is is demonstra+l% consistent wit" 'e% #eatures o# law?s
role in practical reasoning. !"e most important argument to t"is conclusion is due to Ca, 31::4& pp. 21;<
394. For a related argument see "apiro. For criticism see Perr%& /aluc"ow& Foleman 2;;1& and 2imma.4
5lt"oug" law does not necessaril% "ave legitimate aut"orit%& it la%s claim to it& and can intelligi+l% do so
onl% i# it is t"e 'ind o# t"ing t"at could "ave legitimate aut"orit%. (t ma% #ail& t"ere#ore& in certain wa%s onl%&
#or example& +% +eing un*ust& pointless& or ine##ective. Aut law cannot #ail to +e a candidate aut"orit%& #or it
is constituted in t"at role +% our political practices. 5ccording to Ca,& practical aut"orities mediate +etween
su+*ects and t"e ultimate reasons #or w"ic" t"e% s"ould act. 5ut"orities? directives s"ould +e +ased on suc"
reasons& and t"e% are *usti#ied onl% w"en compliance wit" t"e directives ma'es it more li'el% t"at people
will compl% wit" t"e underl%ing reasons t"at appl% to t"em. Aut t"e% can do that onl% i# is possi+le to 'now
w"at t"e directives re-uire independent o# appeal to t"ose underl%ing reasons. Fonsider an example.
uppose we agree to resolve a dispute +% consensus& +ut t"at a#ter muc" discussion #ind ourselves in
disagreement a+out w"et"er some point is in #act part o# t"e consensus view. (t will do not"ing to sa% t"at
we s"ould adopt it i# it is indeed properl% part o# t"e consensus. En t"e ot"er "and& we could agree to adopt
it i# it were endorsed +% a ma*orit% vote& #or we could determine t"e outcome o# a vote wit"out appeal to our
ideas a+out w"at t"e consensus s"ould +e. ocial sources can pla% t"is mediating role +etween persons and
ultimate reasons& and +ecause t"e nature o# law is partl% determined +% its role in giving practical guidance&
t"ere is a t"eoretical reason #or stopping at source<+ased considerations.
!"e t"ird argument c"allenges an underl%ing idea o# inclusive positivism& w"at we mig"t call t"e Midas
Principle. .Just as ever%t"ing Bing Midas touc"ed turned into gold& ever%t"ing to w"ic" law re#ers +ecomes
law K 1 3Belsen 1:@9& p. 1@14. Belsen t"oug"t t"at it #ollowed #rom t"is principle t"at .(t is K possi+le #or
t"e legal order& +% o+liging t"e law<creating organs to respect or appl% certain moral norms or political
principles or opinions o# experts to trans#orm t"ese norms& principles& or opinions into legal norms& and t"us
into sources o# law1 3Belsen 1:45& p. 1324. 3!"oug" "e regarded t"is trans#ormation as e##ected +% a sort o#
tacit legislation.4 (# sound& t"e Midas Principle "olds in general and not onl% wit" respect to moralit%& as
Belsen ma'es clear. uppose t"en t"at t"e (ncome !ax 5ct penali,es overdue accounts at =L per annum. (n
a relevant case& an o##icial can determine t"e content o# a legal o+ligation onl% +% calculating compound
interest. Does t"is ma'e mat"ematics part o# t"e law0 5 contrar% indication is t"at it is not su+*ect to t"e
rules o# c"ange in a legal s%stem << neit"er courts nor legislators can repeal or amend t"e law o#
commutativit%. !"e same "olds o# ot"er social norms& including t"e norms o# #oreign legal s%stems. 5
con#lict<o#<laws rule ma% direct a Fanadian *udge to appl% Mexican law in a Fanadian case. !"e conflicts
rule is o+viousl% part o# t"e Fanadian legal s%stem. Aut t"e rule o# Mexican law is not& #or alt"oug"
Fanadian o##icials can decide w"et"er or not to appl% it& t"e% can neit"er c"ange it nor repeal it& and +est
explanation #or its existence and content ma'es no re#erence to Fanadian societ% or its political s%stem. (n
li'e manner& moral standards& logic& mat"ematics& principles o# statistical in#erence& or 8nglis" grammar&
t"oug" all properl% applied in cases& are not t"emselves t"e law& #or legal organs "ave applicative +ut not
creative power over t"em. !"e inclusivist t"esis is actuall% groping towards an important& +ut di##erent&
trut". Law is an open normative s%stem 3Ca, 1:95& pp. 152<544> it adopts and en#orces man% ot"er
standards& including moral norms and t"e rules o# social groups. !"ere is no warrant #or adopting t"e Midas
Principle to explain "ow or w"% it does t"is.
2, La% an Its (erits
(t ma% clari#% t"e p"ilosop"ical sta'es in legal positivism +% comparing it to a num+er o# ot"er t"eses wit"
w"ic" it is sometimes wrongl% identi#ied& and not onl% +% its opponents. 3ee also 2art& 1:5=& Fuesser& and
c"auer.4
2,- T!e Falli3ilit" T!esis
Law does not necessaril% satis#% t"e conditions +% w"ic" it is appropriatel% assessed 3L%ons 1:=4& p. @3&
2art 1::4& pp. 1=5<@4. Law s"ould +e *ust& +ut it ma% not +e7 it s"ould promote t"e common good& +ut
sometimes it doesn?t7 it s"ould protect moral rig"ts& +ut it ma% #ail misera+l%. !"is we ma% call t"e moral
#alli+ilit% t"esis. !"e t"esis is correct& +ut it is not t"e exclusive propert% o# positivism. 5-uinas accepts it&
Fuller accepts it& Finnis accepts it& and Dwor'in accepts it. Enl% a crude misunderstanding o# ideas li'e
5-uinas?s claim t"at .an un*ust law seems to +e no law at all1 mig"t suggest t"e contrar%. Law ma% "ave an
essentiall% moral c"aracter and %et +e morall% de#icient. 8ven i# ever% law alwa%s does one 'ind o# *ustice
3#ormal *ustice7 *ustice according to law4& t"is does not entail t"at it does ever% 'ind o# *ustice. 8ven i# ever%
law "as a prima #acie claim to +e applied or o+e%ed& it does not #ollow t"at it "as suc" a claim all t"ings
considered. !"e gap +etween t"ese partial and conclusive *udgments is all a natural law t"eor% needs to
accommodate t"e #alli+ilit% t"esis. (t is sometimes said t"at positivism gives a more secure grasp on t"e
#alli+ilit% o# law& #or once we see t"at it is a social construction we will +e less li'el% to accord it
inappropriate de#erence and +etter prepared to engage in a clear<"eaded moral appraisal o# t"e law. !"is
claim "as appealed to several positivists& including Aent"am and 2art. Aut w"ile t"is mig"t #ollow #rom t"e
trut" o# positivism& it cannot provide an argument #or it. (# law "as an essentiall% moral c"aracter t"en it is
o+#uscating& not clari#%ing& to descri+e it as a source<+ased structure o# governance.
2,. T!e Separa3ilit" T!esis
5t one point& 2art identi#ies legal positivism wit" .t"e simple contention t"at it is no sense a necessar% trut"
t"at laws reproduce or satis#% certain demands o# moralit%& t"oug" in #act t"e% "ave o#ten done so1 31::4&
pp. 1=5<=@4. Man% ot"er p"ilosop"ers& encouraged also +% t"e title o# 2art?s #amous essa%& .Positivism and
t"e eparation o# Law and Morals&1 31:5=4 treat t"e t"eor% as t"e denial t"at t"ere is a necessar% connection
+etween law and moralit% << t"e% must +e in some sense .separa+le1 even i# not in #act separate 3Foleman&
1:=24. !"e separa+ilit% t"esis is generall% construed so as to tolerate an% contingent connection +etween
moralit% and law& provided onl% t"at it is conceivable t"at t"e connection mig"t #ail. !"us& t"e separa+ilit%
t"esis is consistent wit" all o# t"e #ollowing>
3i4 moral principles are part o# t"e law7
3ii4 law is usuall%& or even alwa%s in #act& valua+le7
3iii4 t"e +est explanation #or t"e content o# a societ%?s laws includes re#erence to t"e moral ideals current in
t"at societ%7 and
3iv4 a legal s%stem cannot survive unless it is seen to +e& and t"us in some measure actuall% is& *ust. 5ll #our
claims are counted +% t"e separa+ilit% t"esis as contingent connections onl%7 t"e% do not "old o# all possible
legal s%stems << t"e% pro+a+l% don?t even "old o# all "istorical legal s%stems. 5s merel% contingent trut"s& it
is imagined t"at t"e% do not a##ect t"e concept o# law itsel#. 3!"is is a de#ective view o# concept<#ormation&
+ut we ma% ignore t"at #or t"ese purposes.4 (# we t"in' o# t"e positivist t"esis t"is wa%& we mig"t interpret
t"e di##erence +etween exclusive and inclusive positivism in terms o# t"e scope o# t"e modal operator>
38P4 (t is necessaril% t"e case t"at t"ere is no connection +etween law and moralit%.
3(P4 (t is not necessaril% t"e case t"at t"ere is a connection +etween law and moralit%.
(n realit%& "owever& legal positivism is not to +e identi#ied wit" eit"er t"esis and eac" o# t"em is #alse. !"ere
are man% necessar% .connections&1 trivial and non<trivial& +etween law and moralit%. 5s Jo"n Iardner notes&
legal positivism ta'es a position onl% one o# t"em& it re*ects an% dependence o# t"e existence o# law on its
merits 3Iardner 2;;14. 5nd wit" respect to t"is dependenc% relation& legal positivists are concerned wit"
muc" more t"an t"e relations"ip +etween law and morality& #or in t"e onl% sense in w"ic" t"e% insist on a
separation o# law and morals t"e% must insist also<<and #or t"e same reasons<<on a separation o# law and
economics.
!o exclude t"is dependenc% relation& "owever& is to leave intact man% ot"er interesting possi+ilities. For
instance& it is possi+le t"at moral value derives #rom t"e s"eer existence o# law 3Ca, 1::;& 1@5<9;4 (#
2o++es is rig"t& an% order is +etter t"an c"aos and in some circumstances order ma% +e ac"ieva+le onl%
t"roug" positive law. Er per"aps in a 2egelian wa% ever% existing legal s%stem expresses deli+erate
governance in a world ot"erwise dominated +% c"ance7 law is t"e spirit o# t"e communit% come to sel#<
consciousness. Notice t"at t"ese claims are consistent wit" t"e #alli+ilit% t"esis& #or t"e% do not den% t"at
t"ese supposedl% good t"ings mig"t also +ring evils& suc" as too muc" order or t"e will to power. Per"aps
suc" derivative connections +etween law and moralit% are t"oug"t innocuous on t"e ground t"at t"e% s"ow
more a+out "uman nature t"an t"e% do a+out t"e nature o# law. !"e same cannot +e said o# t"e #ollowing
necessar% connections +etween law and moralit%& eac" o# w"ic" goes rig"t to t"e "eart o# our concept o#
law>
314 Necessaril%& law deals wit" moral matters.
Belsen writes& .Just as natural and positive law govern t"e same su+*ect<matter& and relate& t"ere#ore& to t"e
same norm<o+*ect& namel% t"e mutual relations"ips o# men << so +ot" also "ave in common t"e universal
#orm o# t"is governance& namel% obligation.1 3Belsen 1:2=& p. 344 !"is is a matter o# t"e content o# all legal
s%stems. /"ere t"ere is law t"ere is also moralit%& and t"e% regulate t"e same matters +% analogous
tec"ni-ues. E# course to sa% t"at law deals wit" moralit%?s su+*ect matter is not to sa% t"at it does so well&
and to sa% t"at all legal s%stems create o+ligations is not to endorse t"e duties so created. !"is is +roader
t"an 2art?s .minimum content1 t"esis according to w"ic" t"ere are +asic rules governing violence& propert%&
#idelit%& and 'ins"ip t"at an% legal s%stem must encompass i# it aims at t"e survival o# social creatures li'e
ourselves 32art 1::4& pp. 1:3<2;;4. 2art regards t"is as a matter o# .natural necessit%1 and in t"at measure
is willing to -uali#% "is endorsement o# t"e separa+ilit% t"esis. Aut even a societ% t"at pre#ers national glor%
or t"e wors"ip o# gods to survival will c"arge its legal s%stem wit" t"e same tas's its moralit% pursues& so
t"e necessar% content o# law is not dependent& as 2art t"in's it is& on assuming certain #acts a+out "uman
nature and certain aims o# social existence. 2e #ails to notice t"at i# "uman nature and li#e were di##erent&
t"en moralit% would +e too and i# law "ad an% role in t"at societ%& it would inevita+l% deal wit" moralit%?s
su+*ect matter. )nli'e t"e rules o# a "ealt" clu+& law "as +road scope and reac"es to t"e most important
t"ings in an% societ%& w"atever t"e% ma% +e. (ndeed& our most urgent political worries a+out law and its
claims #low #rom *ust t"is capacit% to regulate our most vital interests& and law?s wide reac" must #igure in
an% argument a+out its legitimac% and its claim to o+edience.
324 Necessaril%& law ma'es moral claims on its su+*ects.
!"e law tells us w"at we must do& not merel% w"at it would +e virtuous or advantageous to do& and it
re-uires us to act wit"out regard to our individual sel#<interest +ut in t"e interests o# ot"er individuals& or in
t"e pu+lic interest more generall% 3except w"en law itsel# permits ot"erwise4. !"at is to sa%& law purports to
o+ligate us. Aut to ma'e categorical demands t"at people s"ould act in t"e interests o# ot"ers is to ma'e
moral demands on t"em. !"ese demands ma% +e misguided or un*usti#ied #or law is #alli+le7 t"e% ma% +e
made in a spirit t"at is c%nical or "al#<"earted7 +ut t"e% must +e t"e 'ind o# t"ing t"at can +e o##ered as& and
possi+l% ta'en as& o+ligation<imposing re-uirements. For t"is reason neit"er a regime o# .star' imperatives1
3see Bramer& pp. =3<:4 nor a price s%stem would +e a s%stem o# law& #or neit"er could even la% claim to
o+ligate its su+*ects. 5s wit" man% ot"er social institutions& w"at law& t"oug" its o##icials& claims determines
its c"aracter independent o# t"e trut" or validit% o# t"ose claims. Popes& #or example& claim apostolic
succession #rom t. Peter. !"e #act t"at t"e% claim t"is partl% determines w"at it is to +e a Pope& even i# it is
a #iction& and even t"e Pope "imsel# dou+ts its trut". !"e nature o# law is similarl% s"aped +% t"e sel#<image
it adopts and pro*ects to its su+*ects. !o ma'e moral demands on t"eir compliance is to sta'e out a certain
territor%& to invite certain 'inds o# support and& possi+l%& opposition. (t is precisel% +ecause law ma'es t"ese
claims t"at doctrines o# legitimac% and political o+ligation ta'e t"e s"ape and importance t"at t"e% do.
334 Necessaril%& law is *ustice<apt.
(n view o# t"e normative #unction o# law in creating and en#orcing o+ligations and rig"ts& it alwa%s ma'es
sense to as' whether law is *ust& and w"ere it is #ound de#icient to demand re#orm. Legal s%stems are
t"ere#ore t"e 'ind o# t"ing t"at is apt for appraisal as *ust or un*ust. !"is is a ver% signi#icant #eature o# law.
Not all "uman practices are *ustice<apt. (t ma'es no sense to as' w"et"er a certain #ugue is *ust or to demand
t"at it +ecome so. !"e musical standards o# #ugal excellence are preeminentl% internal << a good #ugue is a
good example o# its genre7 it s"ould +e melodic& interesting& inventive etc. << and t"e #urt"er we get #rom
t"ese internal standards t"e less secure evaluative *udgments a+out it +ecome. /"ile some #ormalists #lirt
wit" similar ideas a+out law& t"is is in #act inconsistent wit" law?s place amongst "uman practices. 8ven i#
law "as internal standards o# merit << virtues uni-uel% its own t"at in"ere in its law<li'e c"aracter << t"ese
cannot preclude or displace its assessment on independent criteria o# *ustice. 5 #ugue ma% +e at its +est
w"en it "as all t"e virtues o# #ugacit%7 +ut law is not +est w"en it excels in legalit%7 law must also +e *ust. 5
societ% ma% t"ere#ore su##er not onl% #rom too little o# t"e rule o# law& +ut also #rom too muc" o# it. !"is
does not presuppose t"at *ustice is t"e onl%& or even t"e #irst& virtue o# a legal s%stem. (t means t"at our
concern #or its *ustice as one o# its virtues cannot +e sidelined +% an% claim o# t"e sort t"at law?s purpose is
to +e law& to its most excellent degree. Law stands continuousl% exposed to demands #or *usti#ication& and
t"at too s"apes its nature and role in our lives and culture.
!"ese t"ree t"eses esta+lis" connections +etween law and moralit% t"at are +ot" necessar% and "ig"l%
signi#icant. 8ac" o# t"em is consistent wit" t"e positivist t"esis t"at t"e existence and content o# law
depends on social #acts& not on its merits. 8ac" o# t"em contri+utes to an understanding o# t"e nature o# law.
!"e #amiliar idea t"at legal positivism insists on t"e separa+ilit% o# law and moralit% is t"ere#ore
signi#icantl% mista'en.
2,0 T!e Neutralit" T!esis
!"e necessar% content t"esis and t"e *ustice<aptitude t"esis toget"er esta+lis" t"at law is not value<neutral.
5lt"oug" some law%ers regard t"is idea as a revelation 3and ot"ers as provocation4 it is in #act +anal. !"e
t"oug"t t"at law could +e value neutral does not even rise to #alsit% << it is simpl% inco"erent. Law is a
normative s%stem& promoting certain values and repressing ot"ers. Law is not neutral +etween victim and
murderer or +etween owner and t"ie#. /"en people complain o# t"e law?s lac' o# neutralit%& t"e% are in #act
voicing ver% di##erent aspirations& suc" as t"e demand t"at it +e #air& *ust& impartial& and so #ort". 5 condition
o# law?s ac"ieving an% o# t"ese ideals is t"at it is not neutral in eit"er its aims or its e##ects.
Positivism is "owever sometimes more credi+l% associated wit" t"e idea t"at legal philosophy is or s"ould
+e value<neutral. Belsen& #or example& sa%s& .t"e #unction o# t"e science o# law is not t"e evaluation o# its
su+*ect& +ut its value<#ree description1 31:@9& p. @=4 and 2art at one point descri+ed "is wor' as .descriptive
sociolog%1 31::4& p. v4. ince it is well 'nown t"at t"ere are convincing arguments #or t"e inelimina+ilit% o#
values in t"e social sciences& t"ose w"o "ave ta'en on +oard Muinian "olisms& Bu"nian paradigms& or
Foucauldian espistemes& ma% suppose t"at positivism s"ould +e re*ected a priori& as promising somet"ing
t"at no t"eor% can deliver.
!"ere are complex -uestions "ere& +ut some advance ma% +e made +% noticing t"at Belsen?s alternatives are
a #alse dic"otom%. Legal positivism is indeed not an .evaluation o# its su+*ect1& i.e.& an evaluation o# the
law. 5nd to sa% t"at t"e existence o# law depends on social #acts does not commit one to t"in'ing t"at it is a
good t"ing t"at t"is is so. 3Nor does it preclude it> see MacFormic' and Famp+ell4 !"us #ar Belsen is on
secure ground. Aut it does not #ollow t"at legal p"ilosop"% t"ere#ore o##ers a .value<#ree description1 o# its
su+*ect. !"ere can +e no suc" t"ing. /"atever t"e relation +etween #acts and values& t"ere is no dou+t a+out
t"e relations"ip +etween descriptions and values. 8ver% description is value<laden. (t selects and
s%stemati,es onl% a su+set o# t"e in#inite num+er o# #acts a+out its su+*ect. !o descri+e law as resting on
customar% social rules is to omit man% ot"er trut"s a+out it including& #or example& trut"s a+out its
connection to t"e demand #or paper or sil'. Eur warrant #or doing t"is must rest on t"e view t"at t"e #ormer
#acts are more important t"an t"e latter. (n t"is wa%& all descriptions express c"oices a+out w"at is salient or
signi#icant& and t"ese in turn cannot +e understood wit"out re#erence to values. o legal p"ilosop"%& even i#
not directl% an evaluation o# its su+*ect is nonet"eless .indirectl% evaluative1 3Dic'son& 2;;14. Moreover&
.law1 itsel# is an ant"ropocentric su+*ect& dependent not merel% on our sensor% em+odiment +ut also& as its
necessar% connections to moralit% s"ow& on our moral sense and capacities. Legal 'inds suc" as courts&
decisions& and rules will not appear in a purel% p"%sical description o# t"e universe and ma% not even appear
in ever% social description. 3!"is ma% limit t"e prospects #or a .naturali,ed1 *urisprudence7 t"oug" #or a
spirited de#ense o# t"e contrar% view& see Leiter4
(t ma% seem& "owever& t"at legal positivism at least re-uires a stand on t"e so<called .#act<value1 pro+lem.
!"ere is no dou+t t"at certain positivists& especiall% Belsen& +elieve t"is to +e so. (n realit%& positivism ma%
co"a+it wit" a range o# views "ere << value statements ma% +e entailed +% #actual statements7 values ma%
supervene on #acts7 values ma% +e 'ind o# #act. Legal positivism re-uires onl% t"at it +e in virtue o# its
#acticit% rat"er t"an its meritoriousness t"at somet"ing is law& and t"at we can descri+e t"at #acticit% wit"out
assessing its merits. (n t"is regard& it is important to +ear in mind t"at not ever% 'ind o# evaluative statement
would count among t"e merits o# a given rule7 its merits are onl% t"ose values t"at could +ear on its
*usti#ication.
8valuative argument is& o# course& central to t"e p"ilosop"% o# law more generall%. No legal p"ilosop"er can
+e only a legal positivist. 5 complete t"eor% o# law re-uires also an account o# w"at 'inds o# t"ings could
possi+l% count as merits o# law 3must law +e e##icient or elegant as well as *ust047 o# w"at role law s"ould
pla% in ad*udication 3s"ould valid law alwa%s +e applied047 o# w"at claim law "as on our o+edience 3is t"ere
a dut% to o+e%047 and also o# t"e pivotal -uestions o# w"at laws we s"ould "ave and w"et"er we s"ould "ave
law at all. Legal positivism does not aspire to answer t"ese -uestions& t"oug" its claim t"at t"e existence and
content o# law depends onl% on social #acts does give t"em s"ape.
),L,A, )art4 5Le$al Positi#ism5
from Positi#ism an t!e Separation of La% an (orals
6- )AR', L, RE', 7804 782-9:9 ;-87<
SOURCED FRO(> "ttp>NNwww.'entlaw.eduNclassesNrwarnerN*usticeNs%lla+usN"positiv."tml
8ditor?s Note> 2.L.5. 2art was Pro#essor o# Jurisprudence in Ex#ord )niversit% #rom 1:52 until 1:@=. 2e
lectured and taug"t on man% occasions in t"e )nited tates& and "is writings in legal p"ilosop"% "ave +een
extraordinaril% in#luential.O
5t t"e close o# t"e eig"teent" centur% and t"e +eginning o# t"e nineteent" t"e most earnest t"in'ers in
8ngland a+out legal and social pro+lems and t"e arc"itects o# great re#orms were t"e great )tilitarians. !wo
o# t"em& Aent"am and 5ustin& constantl% insisted on t"e need to distinguis"& #irml% and wit" t"e maximum
o# clarit%& law as it is #rom law as it oug"t to +e. !"is t"eme "aunts t"eir wor'& and t"e% condemned t"e
natural<law t"in'ers precisel% +ecause t"e% "ad +lurred t"is apparentl% simple +ut vital distinction. A%
contrast& at t"e present time in t"is countr% and to a lesser extent in 8ngland& t"is separation +etween law
and morals is "eld to +e super#icial and wrong. ome critics "ave t"oug"t t"at it +linds men to t"e true
nature o# law and its roots in social li#e.344 Et"ers "ave t"oug"t it not onl% intellectuall% misleading +ut
corrupting in practice& at its worst apt to wea'en resistance to state t%rann% or a+solutism& and at its +est apt
to +ring law into disrespect. !"e nonpe*orative name $Legal Positivism&$ li'e most terms w"ic" are used as
missiles in intellectual +attles& "as come to stand #or a +a##ling multitude o# di##erent sins. Ene o# t"em is t"e
sin& real or alleged& o# insisting& as 5ustin and Aent"am did& on t"e separation o# law as it is and law as it
oug"t to +e.
2ow t"en "as t"is reversal o# t"e w"eel come a+out0 /"at are t"e t"eoretical errors in t"is distinction0
2ave t"e practical conse-uences o# stressing t"e distinction as Aent"am and 5ustin did +een +ad0 "ould
we now re*ect it or 'eep it0 (n considering t"ese -uestions we s"ould recall t"e social p"ilosop"% w"ic"
went along wit" t"e )tilitarians? insistence on t"is distinction. !"e% stood #irml% +ut on t"eir own utilitarian
ground #or all t"e principles o# li+eralism in law and government. No one "as ever com+ined& wit" suc"
even<minded sanit% as t"e )tilitarians& t"e passion #or re#orm wit" respect #or law toget"er wit" a due
recognition o# t"e need to control t"e a+use o# power even w"en power is in t"e "ands o# re#ormers. Ene +%
one in Aent"am?s wor's %ou can identi#% t"e elements o# t"e Cec"tstaat and all t"e principles #or t"e de#ense
o# w"ic" t"e terminolog% o# natural law "as in our da% +een revived. 2ere are li+ert% o# speec"& and o#
press& t"e rig"t o# association& t"e need t"at laws s"ould +e pu+lis"ed and made widel% 'nown +e#ore t"e%
are en#orced& t"e need to control administrative agencies& t"e insistence t"at t"ere s"ould +e no criminal
lia+ilit% wit"out #ault& and t"e importance o# t"e principle o# legalit%& nulla poena sine lege. ome& ( 'now&
#ind t"e political and moral insig"t o# t"e )tilitarians a ver% simple one& +ut we s"ould not mista'e t"is
simplicit% #or super#icialit% nor #orget "ow #avora+l% t"eir simplicities compare wit" t"e pro#undities o#
ot"er t"in'ers. !a'e onl% one example> Aent"am on slaver%. 2e sa%s t"e -uestion at issue is not w"et"er
t"ose w"o are "eld as slaves can reason& +ut simpl% w"et"er t"e% su##er. Does t"is not compare well wit" t"e
discussion o# t"e -uestion in terms o# w"et"er or not t"ere are some men w"om Nature "as #itted onl% to +e
t"e living instruments o# ot"ers0 /e owe it to Aent"am more t"an an%one else t"at we "ave stopped
discussing t"is and similar -uestions o# social polic% in t"at #orm.
o Aent"am and 5ustin were not dr% anal%sts #iddling wit" ver+al distinctions w"ile cities +urned& +ut were
t"e vanguard o# a movement w"ic" la+oured wit" passionate intensit% and muc" success to +ring a+out a
+etter societ% and +etter laws. /"% t"en did t"e% insist on t"e separation o# law as it is and law as it oug"t to
+e0 /"at did t"e% mean0 Let us #irst see w"at t"e% said. 5ustin #ormulated t"e doctrine>
!"e existence o# law is one t"ing7 its merit or demerit is anot"er. /"et"er it +e or +e not is one en-uir%7
w"et"er it +e or +e not con#orma+le to an assumed standard& is a di##erent en-uir%. 5 law& w"ic" actuall%
exists& is a law& t"oug" we "appen to disli'e it& or t"oug" it var% #rom t"e text& +% w"ic" we regulate our
appro+ation and disappro+ation. !"is trut"& w"en #ormall% announced as an a+stract proposition& is so
simple and glaring t"at it seems idle to insist upon it. Aut simple and glaring as it is& w"en enunciated in
a+stract expressions& t"e enumeration o# t"e instances in w"ic" it "as +een #orgotten would #ill a volume.
ir /illiam Alac'stone& #or example& sa%s in "is $Fommentaries&$ t"at t"e laws o# Iod are superior in
o+ligation to all ot"er laws7 t"at no "uman laws s"ould +e su##ered to contradict t"em7 t"at "uman laws are
o# no validit% i# contrar% to t"em7 and t"at all valid laws derive t"eir #orce #rom t"at Divine original.
Now& "e ma% mean t"at all "uman laws oug"t to con#orm to t"e Divine laws. (# t"is +e "is meaning& ( assent
to it wit"out "esitation....Per"aps& again& "e means t"at "uman lawgivers are t"emselves o+liged +% t"e
Divine laws to #as"ion t"e laws w"ic" t"e% impose +% t"at ultimate standard& +ecause i# t"e% do not& Iod
will punis" t"en.
!o t"is also entirel% assent....
Aut t"e meaning o# t"is passage o# Alac'stone& i# it "as a meaning& seems rat"er to +e t"is> t"at no "uman
law w"ic" con#licts wit" t"e Divine law is o+ligator% or +inding7 in ot"er words& t"at no "uman law w"ic"
con#licts wit" t"e Divine law is a law.
5ustin?s protest against +lurring t"e distinction +etween w"at law is and w"at it oug"t to +e is -uite general>
it is a mista'e& w"atever our standard o# w"at oug"t to +e& w"atever $t"e text +% w"ic" we regulate our
appro+ation or disappro+ation.$ 2is examples& "owever& are alwa%s a con#usion +etween law as it is and law
as moralit% would re-uire it to +e. For "im& it must +e remem+ered& t"e #undamental principles o# moralit%
were Iod?s commands& to w"ic" utilit% was an $index$> +esides t"is t"ere was t"e actual accepted moralit%
o# a social group or $positive$ moralit%.
Aent"am insisted on t"is distinction wit"out c"aracteri,ing moralit% +% re#erence to Iod +ut onl%& o# course&
+% re#erence to t"e principles o# utilit%. Aot" t"in'ers? prime reason #or t"is insistence was to ena+le men to
see steadil% t"e precise issues posed +% t"e existence o# morall% +ad laws& and to understand t"e speci#ic
c"aracter o# t"e aut"orit% o# a legal order. Aent"am?s general recipe #or li#e under t"e government o# laws
was simple> it was $to o+e% punctuall%7 to censure #reel%.$ Aut Aent"am was especiall% aware& as an anxious
spectator o# t"e Frenc" revolution& t"at t"is was not enoug"> t"e time mig"t come in an% societ% w"en t"e
law?s commands were so evil t"at t"e -uestion o# resistance "ad to +e #aced& and it was t"en essential t"at
t"e issues at sta'e at t"is point s"ould neit"er +e oversimpli#ied nor o+scured. Het& t"is was precisel% w"at
t"e con#usion +etween law and morals "ad done and Aent"am #ound t"at t"e con#usion "ad spread
s%mmetricall% in two di##erent directions. En t"e one "and Aent"am "ad in mind t"e anarc"ist w"o argues
t"us> $!"is oug"t not to +e t"e law& t"ere#ore it is not and ( am #ree not merel% to censure +ut to disregard
it.$ En t"e ot"er "and "e t"oug"t o# t"e reactionar% w"o argues> $!"is is t"e law& t"ere#ore it is w"at it oug"t
to +e&$ and t"us sti#les criticism at its +irt". Aot" errors& Aent"am t"oug"t& were to +e #ound in Alac'stone>
t"ere was "is incautious statement t"at "uman laws were invalid i# contrar% to t"e law o# Iod& and $t"at
spirit o# o+se-uious -uietism t"at seems constitutional in our 5ut"or$ w"ic" $will scarce ever let "im
recognise a di##erence$ +etween w"at is and w"at oug"t to +e. !"is indeed was #or Aent"am t"e
occupational disease o# law%ers> $(n t"e e%es o# law%ers not to spea' o# t"eir dupes t"at is to sa%& as %et& t"e
generalit% o# non<law%ers t"e is and oug"t to +e...were one and indivisi+le.$ !"ere are t"ere#ore two dangers
+etween w"ic" insistence on t"is distinction will "elp us to steer> t"e danger t"at law and its aut"orit% ma%
+e dissolved in man?s conceptions o# w"at law oug"t to +e and t"e danger t"at t"e existing law ma% supplant
moralit% as a #inal test o# conduct and so escape criticism.
(n view o# criticisms it is also important to distinguis" several t"ings t"at t"e )tilitarians did not mean +%
insisting on t"eir separation o# law and morals. !"e% certainl% accepted man% o# t"e t"ings t"at mig"t +e
called $t"e intersection o# law and morals.$ First& t"e% never denied t"at& as a matter o# "istorical #act& t"e
development o# legal s%stems "ad +een power#ull% in#luenced +% moral opinion& and& conversel%& t"at moral
standards "ad +een pro#oundl% in#luenced +% law& so t"at t"e content o# man% legal rules mirrored moral
rules or principles. (t is not in #act alwa%s eas% to trace t"is "istorical causal connection& +ut Aent"am was
certainl% read% to admit its existence7 so too 5ustin spo'e o# t"e $#re-uent coincidence$o# positive law and
moralit% and attri+uted t"e con#usion o# w"at law is wit" w"at law oug"t to +e to t"is ver% #act.
econdl%& neit"er Aent"am nor "is #ollowers denied t"at +% explicit legal provisions moral principles mig"t
at di##erent points +e +roug"t into a legal s%stem and #orm part o# its rules& or t"at courts mig"t +e legall%
+ound to decide in accordance wit" w"at t"e% t"oug"t *ust or +est. Aent"am indeed recogni,ed& as 5ustin
did not& t"at even t"e supreme legislative power mig"t +e su+*ected to legal restraints +% a constitution and
would not "ave denied t"at moral principles& li'e t"ose o# t"e #i#t" amendment& mig"t #orm t"e content o#
suc" legal constitutional restraints. 5ustin di##ered in t"in'ing t"at restraints on t"e supreme legislative
power could not "ave t"e #orce o# law& +ut would remain merel% political or moral c"ec's7 +ut o# course "e
would "ave recogni,ed t"at a statute& #or example& mig"t con#er a delegated legislative power and restrict
t"e area o# its exercise +% re#erence to moral principles.
/"at +ot" Aent"am and 5ustin were anxious to assert were t"e #ollowing two simple t"ings> #irst& in t"e
a+sence o# an expressed constitutional or legal provision& it could not #ollow #rom t"e mere #act t"at a rule
violated standards o# moralit% t"at it was not a rule o# law7 and& conversel%& it could not #ollow #rom t"e
mere #act t"at a rule was morall% desira+le t"at it was a rule o# law.
!"e "istor% o# t"is simple doctrine in t"e nineteent" centur% is too long and too intricate to trace "ere. Let
me summari,e it +% sa%ing t"at a#ter it was propounded to t"e world +% 5ustin it dominated 8nglis"
*urisprudence and constitutes part o# t"e #ramewor' o# most o# t"ose curiousl% 8nglis" and per"aps
unsatis#actor% productions t"e omni+us surve%s o# t"e w"ole #ield o# *urisprudence. 5 succession o# t"ese
were pu+lis"ed a#ter a #ull text o# 5ustin?s lectures #inall% appeared in 1=@1. (n eac" o# t"em t"e utilitarian
separation o# law and morals is treated as somet"ing t"at ena+les law%ers to attain a new clarit%. 5ustin was
said +% one o# "is 8nglis" successors& 5mos& $to "ave delivered t"e law #rom t"e dead +od% o# moralit% t"at
still clung to it$7 and even Maine& w"o was critical o# 5ustin at man% points& did not -uestion t"is part o# "is
doctrine. (n t"e )nited tates men li'e N. t. Jo"n Ireen& Ira%& and 2olmes considered t"at insistence on
t"is distinction "ad ena+led t"e understanding o# law as a means o# social control to get o## to a #ruit#ul new
start7 t"e% welcomed it +ot" as sel#<evident and as illuminating as a revealing tautolog%. !"is distinction is&
o# course& one o# t"e main t"emes o# 2olmes? most #amous essa% $!"e Pat" o# t"e Law&$ +ut t"e place it "ad
in t"e estimation o# t"ese 5merican writers is +est seen in w"at Ira% wrote at t"e turn o# t"e centur% in !"e
Nature and ources o# t"e Law. 2e said>
!"e great gain in its #undamental conceptions w"ic" Jurisprudence made during t"e last centur% was t"e
recognition o# t"e trut" t"at t"e Law o# a tate...is not an ideal& +ut somet"ing w"ic" actuall% exists....P(Ot is
not t"at w"ic" oug"t to +e& +ut t"at w"ic" is. !o #ix t"is de#initel% in t"e Jurisprudence o# t"e Fommon Law&
is t"e #eat t"at 5ustin accomplis"ed.
o muc" #or t"e doctrine in t"e "e%da% o# its success. Let us turn now to some o# t"e criticisms. Q Q Q
!"ere is& "owever& one ma*or initial complexit% +% w"ic" criticism "as +een muc" con#used. /e must
remem+er t"at t"e )tilitarians com+ined wit" t"eir insistence on t"e separation o# law and morals two ot"er
e-uall% #amous +ut distinct doctrines. Ene was t"e important trut" t"at a purel% anal%tical stud% o# legal
concepts& a stud% o# t"e meaning o# t"e distinctive voca+ular% o# t"e law& was as vital to our understanding
o# t"e nature o# law as "istorical or sociological studies& t"oug" o# course it could not supplant t"em. !"e
ot"er doctrine was t"e #amous imperative t"eor% o# law t"at law is essentiall% a command.
!"ese t"ree doctrines constitute t"e utilitarian tradition in *urisprudence7 %et t"e% are distinct doctrines. (t is
possi+le to endorse t"e separation +etween law and morals and to value anal%tical in-uiries into t"e meaning
o# legal concepts and %et t"in' it wrong to conceive o# law as essentiall% a command. Ene source o# great
con#usion in t"e criticism o# t"e separation o# law and morals was t"e +elie# t"at t"e #alsit% o# an% one o#
t"ese t"ree doctrines in t"e utilitarian tradition s"owed t"e ot"er two to +e #alse7 w"at was worse was t"e
#ailure to see t"at t"ere were t"ree -uite separate doctrines in t"is tradition. !"e indiscriminate use o# t"e
la+el $positivism$ to designate am+iguousl% eac" o# t"ese t"ree separate doctrines 3toget"er wit" some
ot"ers w"ic" t"e )tilitarians never pro#essed4 "as per"aps con#used t"e issue more t"an an% ot"er single
#actor. ome o# t"e earl% 5merican critics o# t"e 5ustinian doctrine were& "owever& admira+l% clear on *ust
t"is matter. Ira%& #or example& added at t"e end o# t"e tri+ute to 5ustin& w"ic" ( "ave alread% -uoted& t"e
words& $2e ma% "ave +een wrong in treating t"e Law o# t"e tate as +eing t"e command o# t"e sovereign$
and "e touc"ed s"rewdl% on man% points w"ere t"e command t"eor% is de#ective. Aut ot"er critics "ave
+een less clear"eaded and "ave t"oug"t t"at t"e inade-uacies o# t"e command t"eor% w"ic" graduall% came
to lig"t were su##icient to demonstrate t"e #alsit% o# t"e separation o# law and morals.
!"is was a mista'e& +ut a natural one. !o see "ow natural it was we must loo' a little more closel% at t"e
command idea. !"e #amous t"eor% t"at law is a command was a part o# a wider and more am+itious claim.
5ustin said t"at t"e notion o# a command was $t"e 'e% to t"e sciences o# *urisprudence and morals&$ and
contemporar% attempts to elucidate moral *udgments in terms o# $imperative$ or $prescriptive$ utterances
ec"o t"is am+itious claim. Aut t"e command t"eor%& viewed as an e##ort to identi#% even t"e -uintessence o#
law& let alone t"e -uintessence o# morals& seems +reat"ta'ing in its simplicit% and -uite inade-uate. !"ere is
muc"& even in t"e simplest legal s%stem& t"at is distorted i# presented as a command. Het t"e )tilitarians
t"oug"t t"at t"e essence o# a legal s%stem could +e conve%ed i# t"e notion o# a command were supplemented
+% t"at o# a "a+it o# o+edience. !"e simple sc"eme was t"is> /"at is a command0 (t is simpl% an expression
+% one person o# t"e desire t"at anot"er person s"ould do or a+stain #rom some action& accompanied +% a
t"reat o# punis"ment w"ic" is li'el% to #ollow diso+edience. Fommands are laws i# two conditions are
satis#ied> #irst& t"e% must +e general7 second& t"e% must +e commanded +% w"at 3as +ot" Aent"am and
5ustin claimed4 exists in ever% political societ% w"atever its constitutional #orm& namel%& a person or a
group o# persons w"o are in receipt o# "a+itual o+edience #rom most o# t"e societ% +ut pa% no suc"
o+edience to ot"ers. !"ese persons are its sovereign. !"us law is t"e command o# t"e uncommanded
commanders o# societ%t"e creation o# t"e legall% untrammelled will o# t"e sovereign w"o is +% de#inition
outside t"e law.
(t is eas% to see t"at t"is account o# a legal s%stem is t"read+are. Ene can also see w"% it mig"t seem t"at its
inade-uac% is due to t"e omission o# some essential connection wit" moralit%. !"e situation w"ic" t"e
simple trilog% o# command& sanction& and sovereign avails to descri+e& i# %ou ta'e t"ese notions at all
precisel%& is li'e t"at o# a gunman sa%ing to "is victim& $Iive me %our mone% or %our li#e.$ !"e onl%
di##erence is t"at in t"e case o# a legal s%stem t"e gunman sa%s it to a large num+er o# people w"o are
accustomed to t"e rac'et and "a+ituall% surrender to it. Law surel% is not t"e gunman situation writ large&
and legal order is surel% not to +e t"us simpl% identi#ied wit" compulsion.
!"is sc"eme& despite t"e points o# o+vious analog% +etween a statute and a command& omits some o# t"e
most c"aracteristic elements o# law. Let me cite a #ew. (t is wrong to t"in' o# a legislature 3and a #ortiori an
electorate4 wit" a c"anging mem+ers"ip& as a group o# persons "a+ituall% o+e%ed> t"is simple idea is suited
onl% to a monarc" su##icientl% long<lived #or a $"a+it$ to grow up. 8ven i# we waive t"is point& not"ing
w"ic" legislators do ma'es law unless t"e% compl% wit" #undamental accepted rules speci#%ing t"e essential
lawma'ing procedures. !"is is true even in a s%stem "aving a simple unitar% constitution li'e t"e Aritis".
!"ese #undamental accepted rules speci#%ing w"at t"e legislature must do to legislate are not commands
"a+ituall% o+e%ed& nor can t"e% +e expressed as "a+its o# o+edience to persons. !"e% lie at t"e root o# a legal
s%stem& and w"at is most missing in t"e utilitarian sc"eme is an anal%sis o# w"at it is #or a social group and
its o##icials to accept suc" rules. !"is notion& not t"at o# a command as 5ustin claimed& is t"e $'e% to t"e
science o# *urisprudence&$ or at least one o# t"e 'e%s.
5gain& 5ustin& in t"e case o# t"e democrac%& loo'ed past t"e legislators to t"e electorate as $t"e sovereign$
3or in 8ngland as part o# it4. 2e t"oug"t t"at in t"e )nited tates t"e mass o# t"e electors to t"e state and
#ederal legislatures were t"e sovereign w"ose commands& given +% t"eir $agent$ in t"e legislatures& were
law. Aut on t"is #ooting t"e w"ole notion o# t"e sovereign outside t"e law +eing $"a+ituall% o+e%ed$ +% t"e
$+ul'$ o# t"e population must go> #or in t"is case t"e $+ul'$ o+e%s t"e +ul'& t"at is& it o+e%s itsel#. Plainl%
t"e general acceptance o# t"e aut"orit% o# a lawma'ing procedure& irrespective o# t"e c"anging individuals
P2:Ow"o operate it #rom time to time& can +e onl% distorted +% an anal%sis in terms o# mass "a+itual
o+edience to certain persons w"o are +% de#inition outside t"e law& *ust as t"e cognate +ut muc" simpler
p"enomenon o# t"e general social acceptance o# a rule& sa% o# ta'ing o## t"e "at w"en entering a c"urc"&
would +e distorted i# represented as "a+itual o+edience +% t"e mass to speci#ic persons.
Et"er critics diml% sensed a #urt"er and more important de#ect in t"e command t"eor%& %et +lurred t"e edge
o# an important criticism +% assuming t"at t"e de#ect was due to t"e #ailure to insist upon some important
connection +etween law and morals. !"is more radical de#ect is as #ollows. !"e picture t"at t"e command
t"eor% draws o# li#e under law is essentiall% a simple relations"ip o# t"e commander to t"e commanded& o#
superior to in#erior& o# top to +ottom7 t"e relations"ip is vertical +etween t"e commanders or aut"ors o# t"e
law conceived o# as essentiall% outside t"e law and t"ose w"o are commanded and su+*ect to t"e law. (n t"is
picture no place& or onl% an accidental or su+ordinate place& is a##orded #or a distinction +etween t%pes o#
legal rules w"ic" are in #act radicall% di##erent. ome laws re-uire men to act in certain wa%s or to a+stain
#rom acting w"et"er t"e% wis" to or not. !"e criminal law consists largel% o# rules o# t"is sort> li'e
commands t"e% are simpl% $o+e%ed$ or $diso+e%ed.$ Aut ot"er legal rules are presented to societ% in -uite
di##erent wa%s and "ave -uite di##erent #unctions. !"e% provide #acilities more or less ela+orate #or
individuals to create structures o# rig"ts and duties #or t"e conduct o# li#e wit"in t"e coercive #ramewor' o#
t"e law. uc" are t"e rules ena+ling individuals to ma'e contracts& wills& and trusts& and generall% to mould
t"eir legal relations wit" ot"ers. uc" rules& unli'e t"e criminal law& are not #actors designed to o+struct
wis"es and c"oices o# an antisocial sort. En t"e contrar%& t"ese rules provide #acilities #or t"e reali,ation o#
wis"es and c"oices. !"e% do not sa% 3li'e commands4 $do t"is w"et"er %ou wis" it or not&$ +ut rat"er $i# %ou
wis" to do t"is& "ere is t"e wa% to do it.$ )nder t"ese rules we exercise powers& ma'e claims& and assert
rig"ts. !"ese p"rases mar' o## c"aracteristic #eatures o# laws t"at con#er rig"ts and powers7 t"e% are laws
w"ic" are& so to spea'& put at t"e disposition o# individuals in a wa% in w"ic" t"e criminal law is not. Muc"
ingenuit% "as gone into t"e tas' o# $reducing$ laws o# t"is second sort to some complex variant o# laws o#
t"e #irst sort. !"e e##ort to s"ow t"at laws con#erring rig"ts are $reall%$ onl% conditional stipulations o#
sanctions to +e exacted #rom t"e person ultimatel% under a legal dut% c"aracteri,es muc" o# Belsen?s wor'.
32=4 Het to urge t"is is reall% *ust to ex"i+it dogmatic determination to suppress one aspect o# t"e legal
s%stem in order to maintain t"e t"eor% t"at stipulation o# a sanction& li'e 5ustin?s command& represents t"e
-uintessence o# law. Ene mig"t as well urge t"at t"e rules o# +ase+all were $reall%$ onl% complex
conditional directions to t"e scorer and t"at t"is s"owed t"eir real or $essential$ nature. Q Q Q
Q Q Q Cules t"at con#er rig"ts& t"oug" distinct #rom commands& need not +e moral rules or coincide wit"
t"em. Cig"ts& a#ter all& exist under t"e rules o# cere<P3;Omonies& games& and in man% ot"er sp"eres regulated
+% rules w"ic" are irrelevant to t"e -uestion o# *ustice or w"at t"e law oug"t to +e. Nor need rules w"ic"
con#er rig"ts +e *ust or morall% good rules. !"e rig"ts o# a master over "is slaves s"ow us t"at. $!"eir merit
or demerit&$ as 5ustin termed it& depends on "ow rig"ts are distri+uted in societ% and over w"om or w"at
t"e% are exercised. !"ese critics indeed revealed t"e inade-uac% o# t"e simple notions o# command and "a+it
#or t"e anal%sis o# law7 at man% points it is apparent t"at t"e social acceptance o# a rule or standard o#
aut"orit% 3even i# it is motivated onl% +% #ear or superstition or rests on inertia4 must +e +roug"t into t"e
anal%sis and cannot itsel# +e reduced to t"e two simple terms. Het not"ing in t"is s"owed t"e utilitarian
insistence on t"e distinction +etween t"e existence o# law and its $merits$ to +e wrong.
Notes
1. 2art?s criti-ue o# t"e command t"eor% o# 5ustin& and t"e related t"eor% o# 2ans Belsen& #ocuses on t"e
#unctional c"aracter o# a command and its relation to t"e notion o# a sovereign& rat"er t"an on t"e coercive
power o# t"e state t"at& according to t"e earlier t"eorists& was a crucial part o# w"at made suc" commands
law and distinguis"ed t"em #rom ot"er non<law directives. /"% mig"t t"e earlier positivists "ave cared so
muc" a+out de#ining law so as to emp"asi,e its coercive c"aracter0 Does t"e use o# state coercion raise
special moral considerations0 Does de#ining t"e law in terms o# state coercion serve to isolate t"ose
considerations0 ee Dale Nance& Legal !"eor% and t"e Pivotal Cole o# t"e Foncept o# Foercion& 59 ).
FELE. L. C8R. 1 31:=54.
2. (# one concedes t"at t"e law as it is ma% diverge #rom law as it oug"t to +e& t"en one needs terminolog%
#or re#erring to eac" idea. /"en we sa%& $!"e law re-uires S&$ we are ordinaril% ma'ing a re#erence to t"e
law $as it is.$ (n t"ese materials& we will generall% "ave t"is re#erence in mind w"en using t"e word $law$
wit"out more. Het it is #re-uentl% use#ul to re#er to t"e ot"er idea& t"e $law as it oug"t to +e.$ !"e ancient
Iree' p"ilosop"er 5ristotle seems to "ave used t"e term $*ustice$ #or t"is idea& meaning t"at aspect o#
moralit% 3or w"at 5ristotle would call virtue4 w"ic" oug"t to +e re#lected in t"e law. Het it is argua+le t"at&
all t"ings considered& t"e law s"ould not alwa%s satis#% or en#orce t"e demands o# *ustice 3Fan %ou t"in' o#
examples04& so t"e identi#ication seems imprecise. !"e eig"teent" centur% Ierman p"ilosop"er (mmanuel
Bant seems to "ave used t"e term $rig"t$ to re#er to t"at part o# moralit% w"ic" s"ould +e re#lected in t"e
law. Aut similar pro+lems arise& since one can imagine moral rig"ts t"at oug"t not to +e made legal rig"ts.
35gain& can %ou t"in' o# examples04 (n order to avoid linguistic disputes& per"aps we s"ould +e content wit"
a term li'e $ideal law$ to re#er to t"e law as it oug"t to +e& recogni,ing t"at w"at is ideal ma% not +e t"e
same #or all societies at all times7 indeed& t"ere ma% +e no uni-ue ideal law #or an% given societ% at an%
given time. (n su+se-uent Parts o# t"ese materials& we will examine some o# w"at can +e said in
c"aracteri,ing ideal law& at least in 5merican societ%.
3. Pro#essor 2art clearl% distinguis"es +etween utilitarianism and legal positivism& even t"oug" t"ese views
were +ot" "eld +% people li'e 5ustin and Aent"am. /"ereas positivism is a t"eor% a+out t"e nature o# law&
t"at is a legal t"eor%& utilitarianism is one #orm o# moral t"eor%. 5s 2art notes& utilitarian arguments can +e
used& and "ave +een used& to critici,e existing law& to indicate in w"at respects extant law di##ers #rom t"e
ideal. Aut utilitarianism is not t"e onl% suc" #orm o# moral t"eor%. (n particular& it "as +een c"allenged as
giving too little weig"t to t"e notion o# individual rig"ts.
!o generali,e& t"ree t%pes o# moral argument can +e identi#ied. First& t"ere are conse-uentialist 3also called
teleological4 modes o# argument& suc" as utilitarianism& in w"ic" moral dut% is derived entirel% #rom t"e
goodness or +adness o# t"e conse-uences o# action. econd& t"ere are nonconse-uentialist 3also called
deontological4 modes& suc" as some arguments #rom $natural rig"ts&$ in w"ic" moral dut% is derived in
some wa% t"at does not depend on t"e appraisal o# t"e material conse-uences o# accepting t"e argument& +ut
rat"er on t"e in"erent rig"tness or wrongness o# t"e conduct in -uestion. 3$Ene oug"t to "onor one?s
promise& even i# t"at doesn?t produce t"e +est possi+le conse-uences.$4 Muc" modern p"ilosop"ical de+ate
"as addressed t"e -uestion o# t"e priorit% o# t"ese two modes o# moral t"oug"t. 8speciall% prominent "ave
+een "%pot"eticals speci#icall% designed to generate a con#lict in t"e prescriptions t"at ma% +e derived #rom
utilitarian and rig"ts<+ased approac"es. !"e% are usuall% some variation on t"e t"eme o# w"at to do w"en
%ou are #aced wit" a situation in w"ic" intentionall% 'illing an innocent person will result in t"e saving o#
man% ot"ers. For example>
uppose %ou are t"e driver o# a trolle%. !"e trolle% rounds a +end& and t"ere come into view a"ead #ive trac'
wor'men& w"o "ave +een repairing t"e trac'. !"e trac' goes t"roug" a +it o# a valle% at t"at point& and t"e
sides are steep& so %ou must stop t"e trolle% i# %ou are to avoid running t"e #ive men down. Hou step on t"e
+ra'es& +ut alas t"e% don?t wor'. Now %ou suddenl% see a spur o# trac' leading o## to t"e rig"t. Hou can turn
t"e trolle% onto it& and t"us save t"e #ive men on t"e straig"t trac' a"ead. )n#ortunatel%&...t"ere is one trac'
wor'man on t"at spur o# trac'. 2e can no more get o## t"e trac' in time t"an t"e #ive can& so %ou will 'ill
"im i# %ou turn t"e trolle% onto "im. (s it morall% permissi+le Por re-uiredO #or %ou to turn t"e trolle%0
Judit" Jarvis !"omson& !"e !rolle% Pro+lem& :4 H5L8 L.J. 13:5 31:=54.
Finall%& t"ere are w"at ma% +e called $mixed$ or $"%+rid$ modes o# argument w"ic" tr% to com+ine t"e
strengt"s o# +ot" conse-uentialist and nonconse-uentialist anal%ses& allowing a place #or eac". For example&
it "as +een suggested t"at t"e di##erent modes o# argument can +e seen as di##erent +ut complementar% wa%s
o# c"ec'ing and testing our moral intuitions against "istoricall% o+served practices and conventions0 ee
Cand% Aarnett& Foreword> E# F"ic'ens and 8ggs!"e Fompati+ilit% o# Moral Cig"ts and Fonse-uentialist
5nal%ses& 12 25CR. J.L. T P)A. PEL?H @11 31:=:4.
/"ic" mode o# argument do %ou #ind most accepta+le& t"e conse-uentialist& t"e nonconse-uentialist& or a
mixture0 (t is all too eas% to opt #or t"e mixed mode7 +ear in mind t"at man% p"ilosop"ers "ave #ound
conse-uentialism and deontolog% to +e #undamentall% incompati+le. Hou will "ave man% occasions to t"in'
a+out t"ese issues in t"e #ollowing materials.
4. /"at does it mean #or a *udge to accept positivism0 2ow mig"t a *udge reason a+out "is or "er
responsi+ilities in deciding a case i# t"e *udge accepts positivism0 2ow does Justice tor%?s opinion in Prigg
illustrate t"e issues0 Did tor% emplo% an% moral t"eor% in deciding t"e case0 (# so& was it utilitarian& or
deontological& or
)ANS =ELSEN
!"e Pure !"eor% o# Law
SOURCED FRO(* !ttp*++plato,stanfor,eu+entries+le$al-positi#ism+
!"e idea o# a Pure !"eor% o# Law was propounded +% t"e #ormida+le 5ustrian *urist and p"ilosop"er 2ans
Belsen 31==1<1:934. 3ee +i+liograp"ical note4 Belsen +egan "is long career as a legal t"eorist at t"e
+eginning o# t"e 2;
t"
centur%. !"e traditional legal p"ilosop"ies at t"e time& were& Belsen claimed&
"opelessl% contaminated wit" political ideolog% and morali,ing on t"e one "and& or wit" attempts to reduce
t"e law to natural or social sciences& on t"e ot"er "and. 2e #ound +ot" o# t"ese reductionist endeavors
seriousl% #lawed. (nstead& Belsen suggested a Gpure6 t"eor% o# law w"ic" would avoid reductionism o# an%
'ind. !"e *urisprudence Belsen propounded .c"aracteri,es itsel# as a Gpure6 t"eor% o# law +ecause it aims at
cognition #ocused on t"e law alone1 and t"is purit% serves as its .+asic met"odological principle.1 PP!1& 9O
Note t"at t"is anti<reductionism is +ot" met"odological and su+stantive. Belsen #irml% +elieved t"at i# t"e
law is to +e considered as a uni-ue normative practice& met"odological reductionism s"ould +e avoided
entirel%. Aut t"is approac" is not onl% a matter o# met"od. Ceductionism s"ould +e avoided +ecause t"e law
is a uni-ue p"enomenon& -uite separate #rom moralit% and nature.
-, T!e 1asic Norm
!"e law& according to Belsen& is a s%stem o# norms. Norms are Goug"t6 statements& prescri+ing certain
modes o# conduct. )nli'e moral norms& "owever& Belsen maintained t"at legal norms are created +% acts o#
will. !"e% are products o# deli+erate "uman action. For instance& some people gat"er in a "all& spea'& raise
t"eir "ands& count t"em& and promulgate a string o# words. !"ese are actions and events ta'ing place at a
speci#ic time and space. !o sa% t"at w"at we "ave descri+ed "ere is t"e enactment of a law& is to interpret
t"ese actions and events +% ascri+ing a normative signi#icance to t"em. Belsen& "owever& #irml% +elieved in
2ume?s distinction +etween Gis6 and Goug"t6& and in t"e impossi+ilit% o# deriving Goug"t6 conclusions #rom
#actual premises alone. !"us Belsen +elieved t"at t"e law& w"ic" is comprised o# norms or Goug"t6
statements& cannot +e reduced to t"ose natural actions and events w"ic" give rise to it. !"e gat"ering&
spea'ing and raising o# "ands& in itsel#& is not t"e law7 legal norms are essentiall% Goug"t6 statements& and as
suc"& t"e% cannot +e deduced #rom #actual premises alone.
2ow is it possi+le& t"en& to ascri+e an Goug"t6 to t"ose actions and events w"ic" purport to create legal
norms0 Belsen?s repl% is enc"antingl% simple> we ascri+e a legal oug"t to suc" norm<creating acts +%&
ultimatel%& presupposing it. ince Goug"t6 cannot +e derived #rom Gis6& and since legal norms are essentiall%
Goug"t6 statements& t"ere must +e some 'ind o# an Goug"t6 presupposition at t"e +ac'ground& rendering t"e
normativit% o# law intelligi+le.
5s opposed to moral norms w"ic"& according to Belsen& are t%picall% deduced #rom ot"er moral norms +%
s%llogism 3e.g.& #rom general principles to more particular ones4& legal norms are alwa%s created +% acts o#
will. uc" an act can onl% create law& "owever& i# it is in accord wit" anot"er G"ig"er6 legal norm t"at
aut"ori,es its creation in t"at wa%. 5nd t"e G"ig"er6 legal norm& in turn& is valid onl% i# it "as +een created in
accordance wit" %et anot"er& even G"ig"er6 legal norm t"at aut"ori,es its enactment. )ltimatel%& Belsen
argued& one must reac" a point w"ere t"e aut"ori,ing norm is no longer t"e product o# an act o# will& +ut is
simpl% presupposed& and t"is is& w"at Belsen called& t"e Aasic Norm. More concretel%& Belsen maintained
t"at in tracing +ac' suc" a Gc"ain o# validit%6 3to use Ca,?s terminolog%4& one would reac" a point w"ere a
G#irst6 "istorical constitution is t"e +asic aut"ori,ing norm o# t"e rest o# t"e legal s%stem& and t"e Aasic Norm
is t"e presupposition o# t"e validit% o# t"at #irst constitution.
Belsen attri+uted two main explanator% #unctions to t"e Aasic Norm> it explains +ot" t"e unit% o# a legal
s%stem and t"e reasons #or t"e legal validit% o# norms. PP!2& 1:3O 5pparentl%& Belsen +elieved t"at t"ese
two ideas are ver% closel% related& since "e seems to "ave maintained t"at t"e legal validit% o# a norm and its
mem+ers"ip in a given legal s%stem are +asicall% t"e same t"ing. Furt"ermore& Belsen argued t"at ever% two
norms w"ic" derive t"eir validit% #rom a single Aasic Norm necessaril% +elong to t"e same legal s%stem
and& vice versa& so t"at all legal norms o# a given legal s%stem derive t"eir validit% #rom one Aasic Norm. (t
is widel% ac'nowledged t"at Belsen erred in t"ese assumptions a+out t"e unit% o# legal s%stems. Ienerall%
spea'ing& in spite o# t"e considera+le interest in Belsen?s t"eor% o# legal s%stems and t"eir unit% t"at derives
#rom a single Aasic Norm& critics "ave s"own t"at t"is aspect o# Belsen?s t"eor% is re#uta+le. 5lt"oug" it is
certainl% true t"at t"e law alwa%s comes in s%stems& t"e unit% o# t"e s%stem and its separation #rom ot"er
s%stems is almost never as neat as Belsen assumed. Psee Ca,& GBelsen?s !"eor% o# t"e Aasic Norm6.O
2owever& t"e role o# t"e Aasic Norm in explaining t"e normativit% o# law is cruciall% important. !"e
presupposition o# t"e Aasic Norm as t"e condition o# validit% o# legal norms mar's Belsen?s t"eor% as
Gpure6& and distinguis"es it #rom ot"er t"eories in t"e Legal Positivist tradition. Fontemporar% legal
positivists "ave traditionall% accounted #or t"e normativit% o# law in terms o# social #acts> people tend to
perceive o# t"e legal norms in t"eir communit% as valid +ecause& ultimatel%& t"ere are certain social
conventions& or Cules o# Cecognition in 2.L.5. 2art?s terminolog%& t"at determine w"o is aut"ori,ed to
ma'e law and "ow law ma'ing is to +e done. Aut t"is is precisel% t"e 'ind o# reductionism t"at t"e Pure
!"eor% strives to den%. Belsen was convinced t"at an% attempt to ground t"e law?s normativit%& namel%& its
Goug"t6 aspect& is doomed to #ailure i# it is onl% +ased on #acts& w"et"er t"ose #acts are natural or social.
Ence again& to account #or an Goug"t6 conclusion& one needs some Goug"t6 in t"e premises. !"ere#ore& Belsen
t"oug"t& t"e normativit% o# law& as a genuine Goug"t6& must& ultimatel%& +e presupposed.
Fommon wisdom "as it t"at in t"is 'ind o# reasoning Belsen sel#<consciousl% emplo%s a Bantian
!ranscendental argument to esta+lis" t"e necessar% presupposition o# t"e Aasic Norm. !"us t"e argument
ta'es t"e #ollowing #orm>
1. .
2. is possi+le onl% i# !.
3. !"ere#ore& !.
(n Belsen?s case& stands #or t"e #act t"at legal norms are Goug"t6 statements& and ! is t"e presupposition o#
t"e Aasic Norm. PP!2& 2;2O. Furt"ermore& commentators "ave pointed out t"at *ust as Bant?s epistemolog%
is an attempt to #ind t"e middle wa% +etween dogmatic Cationalism and s'eptical 8mpiricism& Belsen?s pure
t"eor% o# law is an attempt to #ind a middle wa% +etween Natural Law?s dogmatism& and Positivism?s
reduction o# law to t"e social sciences. Pee Paulson& (ntroductionO Aut it is wort" 'eeping in mind t"at
Belsen?s argument a+out t"e Aasic Norm is an explicitl% shallow #orm o# Bantian epistemolog%. !"e
Bantian categories and modes o# perception are not optional7 t"e% #orm a deep& universal& and necessar%
#eature o# rational cognition. Ene s"ould recall t"at it is 2umean skepticism t"at Bant strove to answer.
Belsen& "owever& remains 2umean t"roug" and t"roug"& Bantian in#luences notwit"standing. First& Belsen
was ver% s'eptical a+out an% o+*ectivist moral t"eor%& Bant?s included. PP!1& 1@7 P!2& @3<@5O econd&
Belsen does not claim t"at t"e presupposition o# t"e Aasic Norm is a necessar% #eature& or categor%& o#
rational cognition. !"e Aasic Norm is an Goug"t6 presumption and& as suc"& optional. (t is not necessar% #or
an%one to accept t"e Aasic Norm. !"e Aasic Norm is necessaril% presupposed onl% +% t"ose w"o accept t"e
Goug"t6& namel%& t"e normativit%& o# t"e law. Li'ewise& t"ose w"o +elieve in t"e normativit% o# a religious
order must presuppose a Aasic Norm t"at Gone oug"t to o+e% Iod?s commands6. Aut in +ot" cases& t"ere is
not"ing in t"e nature o# t"ings w"ic" would compel an% particular person to adopt suc" a normative
perspective. Belsen?s argument does not rule out at"eism or anarc"ism. 2owever& even t"e anarc"ist& Belsen
maintained& must presuppose t"e Aasic Norm i# s"e is to account #or t"e normativit% o# law. Aut again& t"is
presupposition is onl% an intellectual tool& not a normative commitment& and as t"e latter& it is entirel%
optional.
., T!e Normati#it" of La%
!"is analog% +etween law and religion& on w"ic" Belsen o#ten dwells& is more limited t"an it #irst appears&
"owever. !"e normativit% o# religion& li'e t"at o# moralit%& does not depend on t"e actual o+edience o# t"eir
respective su+*ects. For t"ose& #or example& w"o presuppose t"e +asic norm o# F"ristianit%& t"e latter would
+e valid even i# t"ere are no ot"er F"ristians around. Aut t"is& as Belsen explicitl% admits& is not t"e case
wit" law. !"e validit% o# a legal s%stem partl%& +ut cruciall%& depends on its actual practice> .5 legal order is
regarded as valid& i# its norms are by and large e##ective 3t"at is& actuall% applied and o+e%ed4.1 PP!2& 212O
Furt"ermore& t"e actual content o# t"e Aasic Norm depends on its Ge##ectiveness6. 5s Belsen repeatedl%
argued& a success#ul revolution +rings a+out a radical c"ange in t"e content o# t"e Aasic Norm. uppose& #or
example& t"at in a given legal s%stem t"e Aasic Norm is t"at t"e constitution enacted +% Cex Ene is +inding.
5t a certain point& a coup d"etat ta'es place and a repu+lican government is success#ull% installed. 5t t"is
point& Belsen admits& .one presupposes a new +asic norm& no longer t"e +asic norm delegating law ma'ing
aut"orit% to t"e monarc"& +ut a +asic norm delegating aut"orit% to t"e revolutionar% government.1 PP!1& 5:O.
!"is is ver% pro+lematic& "owever& since it raises t"e suspicion t"at Belsen "as violated "is own categorical
in*unction against deriving Goug"t6 #rom Gis6. Belsen was not unaware o# t"e di##icult%. (n t"e #irst edition o#
t"e ure Theory of Law& "e suggests t"e solution to t"is pro+lem +% introducing international law as t"e
source o# validit% #or c"anges in t"e +asic norms o# municipal legal s%stems. (t #ollows #rom t"e +asic norm
o# international law& Belsen maintains& t"at state sovereignt% is determined +% success#ul control over a
given territor%. !"ere#ore& t"e c"anges in t"e +asic norm w"ic" stem #rom success#ul revolutions can +e
accounted #or in legalistic terms& rel%ing on t"e dogmas o# international law. PP!1& @1<@2O !"e price Belsen
"ad to pa% #or t"is solution& "owever& is rat"er "ig"> "e was compelled to claim t"at all municipal legal
s%stems derive t"eir validit% #rom international law& and t"is entails t"at t"ere is onl% one Aasic Norm in t"e
entire world& namel%& t"e Aasic Norm o# pu+lic international law. 5lt"oug" t"is solution is repeated in t"e
second edition o# t"e Pure !"eor% o# Law P214<215O& Belsen presented it t"ere wit" muc" more "esitation&
per"aps *ust as an option w"ic" would ma'e sense. (t is not -uite clear w"et"er Belsen reall% ad"ered to it.
!"e "esitation is understanda+le7 a#ter all& t"e idea t"at municipal legal s%stems derive t"eir legal validit%
#rom international law would stri'e most *urists and legal "istorians as rat"er #anci#ul and anac"ronistic.
3/e s"ould recall t"at t"e development o# international law is a relativel% recent p"enomenon in t"e "istor%
o# law.4
o we are +ac' to t"e -uestion o# "ow Gpure6 Belsen?s t"eor% reall% is& i# it is conceded t"at t"e content o#
t"e Aasic Norm is +asicall% determined +% social practice. !"e answer depends on "ow we construe t"e
explanator% #unction o# t"e Aasic Norm> Neit"er Belsen nor "is critics seem to "ave +een care#ul to
distinguis" +etween t"e role o# t"e Aasic Norm in answering t"e -uestion o# "ow we identify t"e law as
suc"& and in answering t"e -uestion o# law?s normativity. 5n answer to t"e -uestion o# w"at counts as law or
as law creating acts in a given communit% cannot +e detac"ed #rom practice& namel%& social conventions.
!"e social conventions prevalent in an% given communit% determine& ultimatel%& w"at counts as law in t"at
communit%. 3ee t"e Nature o# Law4 En t"e ot"er "and& Belsen is rig"t to insist t"at social conventions& +%
t"emselves& could not explain t"e Goug"t6 w"ic" is in"erent in law as a normative s%stem. uc" an Goug"t6
cannot +e constituted +% t"e conventions. ocial conventions can onl% determine w"at t"e practice is& and
"ow one would go a+out in engaging in it7 conventions cannot determine t"at one oug"t to engage in t"e
practice. Psee Marmor& ositive Law # $bjective %alues& 25<33O Fonsider& #or example& t"e analog% o# a
structured game& li'e c"ess. /"at c"ess is& and "ow one s"ould pla% t"e game& are determined +% its
constitutive rules or conventions. !"ose rules w"ic" constitute t"e game o# c"ess& "owever& cannot provide
an%one wit" a complete reason to pla% t"e game. !"e normativit% o# t"e game is conditional7 it depends on a
prior reason& or commitment& to pla% t"e game. /e cannot sa%& #or example& t"at one .oug"t to move t"e
+is"op diagonall%1 unless we assume t"at t"e agent wants to pla% c"ess. !"e #act t"at t"e rules o# c"ess
re-uire t"e pla%ers to move t"e +is"op diagonall% is not& in itsel#& a reason #or doing so& unless& again& it is
assumed t"at it is c"ess t"at one wants to pla%. Now& it is precisel% t"is 'ind o# assumption t"at t"e Aasic
Norm is t"ere to capture. Just as t"e normativit% o# c"ess could not +e explained wit"out presupposing& as it
were& t"at t"e pla%ers want to engage in t"at particular game& so t"e normativit% o# law must +e premised on
t"e Aasic Norm.
!"us& it would seem t"at Belsen?s anti<reductionism is onl% partl% success#ul. !"e explanator% role o# t"e
Aasic Norm must +e con#ined to t"e normativit% o# law. Aut in order to explain w"at counts as law and "ow
law is identi#ied and distinguis"ed #rom ot"er normative practices& t"e Aasic Norms is not su##icient7 one
must re#er to t"e social conventions w"ic" prevail in t"e relevant communit%.
None o# t"is means& "owever& t"at Belsen?s account o# t"e normativit% o# law is unpro+lematic. !"ere are
two main pro+lems t"at ma% +e wort" exploring. First& Belsen "as never made it -uite clear w"et"er "e
maintains t"at t"e Goug"t6 w"ic" is presupposed in t"e legal domain is t"e same 'ind o# Goug"t6 w"ic" would
+e c"aracteristic o# moralit% or& indeed& an% ot"er normative domain. Belsen seems to "ave #aced a dilemma
"ere w"ic" would not +e eas% to resolve. En t"e one "and& "e wanted to avoid t"e mista'e w"ic" "e
attri+uted to t"e Natural Law tradition o# reducing t"e normativit% o# law to moral Goug"t6. Belsen "as
repeatedl% argued t"at Natural Law& w"ic" would reduce t"e legal Goug"t6 to moral Goug"t6 #ails +ecause it
can onl% ac"ieve an account o# t"e normativit% o# law at t"e expense o# missing its target> (# t"e onl% notion
o# validit% is a moral one& we are le#t wit" no room #or t"e concept o# legal validit%. Natural Law& as Belsen
understood it& does not ma'e an% allowance #or t"e possi+ilit% t"at a norm is legall% valid +ut morall%
wrong. /ould t"is impl%& t"en& t"at t"e 'ind o# Goug"t6 w"ic" is presupposed +% t"e Aasic Norm is some"ow
di##erent #rom moral Goug"t60 5nd w"at would t"e di##erence consist in0 Ene s"ould +ear in mind t"at
Belsen t"oug"t t"at t"e normativit% o# moralit%& li'e t"at o# religion or an% ot"er normative domain& is also
Gpresupposed6. o "ere is t"e dilemma> eit"er Belsen maintains t"at t"e legal Goug"t6 and moral Goug"t6 are
two di##erent 'inds o# Goug"t6 3w"ic"& ( t"in'& is t"e stance "e adopted in "is earlier writings4& +ut t"en it
would +e ver% di##icult to explain w"at t"e di##erence consists in& given t"at +ot" 'inds o# Goug"t6 are simpl%
presupposed7 or else& Belsen would "ave to maintain t"at t"e moral and legal Goug"t6 are +asicall% t"e same&
in w"ic" case& "e would +e "ard pressed to explain "ow "e avoids t"e same 'ind o# mista'e w"ic" "e
attri+uted to t"e Natural Law tradition.
econdl%& and per"aps t"is is part o# t"e reason #or t"e #ormer con#usion& Belsen?s account o# t"e
normativit% o# law is seriousl% impeded +% "is 2umean s'epticism a+out t"e o+*ectivit% o# moralit%& *ustice&
or an% ot"er evaluative sc"eme. !"e view one gets& especiall% #rom Belsen?s later writings& is t"at t"ere are
countless potential normative s%stems& li'e moralit%& law& religion& etc.& t"at one can eit"er accept or not *ust
+% presupposing t"eir respective Aasic Norms. Aut wit"out an% rational or o+*ective grounding o# suc"
evaluative s%stems& t"e c"oice o# an% Aasic Norm remains rat"er w"imsical& devoid o# an% reason. (t is
di##icult to understand "ow normativit% can reall% +e explained on t"e +asis o# suc" rationall% groundless
c"oices.
1i3lio$rap!"
Note
Belsen?s academic pu+lications span over almost seven decades in w"ic" "e pu+lis"ed do,ens o# +oo's and
"undreds o# articles. Enl% a+out a t"ird o# t"is vast literature "as +een translated to 8nglis". Belsen?s two
most important +oo's on t"e pure t"eor% o# law are t"e #irst edition o# "is &eine &echtslehre& pu+lis"ed in
1:34& and recentl% translated to 8nglis" under t"e title 'ntroduction to the roblems of Legal Theory&
3Paulson and Paulson trans.4 Ex#ord 2;;2& and t"e second edition w"ic" Belsen pu+lis"ed in 1:@;& ure
Theory of Law& 3Bnig"t trans.4& )F Aer'ele% press& 1:@9. !"e second edition is a considera+l% extended
version o# t"e #irst edition. !"ese +oo's are a++reviated in t"e test as P!1 and P!2 respectivel%. (n addition&
most o# t"e t"emes in t"ese two +oo's also appear in Belsen?s (eneral Theory of Law and )tate& 31:454&
3/ed+erg trans.4& Cussell T Cussell& NH 1:@1 and *hat is Justice+& )F Aer'ele% Press& 1:59. Et"er
relevant pu+lications in 8nglis" include G!"e Pure !"eor% o# Law and 5nal%tical Jurisprudence6& 55
,arvard L- &ev. 31:414& 44& GPro#essor tone and t"e Pure !"eor% o# Law> 5 Cepl%6& 31:@54& ./ )tanford L-
&ev. 112=& and GEn t"e Pure !"eor% o# Law6 31:@@4& . 'srael L- &ev. 1.
For a complete list o# Belsen?s pu+lications w"ic" "ave appeared in 8nglis" see t"e 5ppendix to 2. Belsen&
(eneral Theory of 0orms 3M. 2artne% trans.4 Ex#ord& 1::1& pp. 44;<454.
JE2N 5)!(N
SOURCED FOR(* !ttp*++plato,stanfor,eu+entries+austin->o!n+
Jo"n 5ustin is considered +% man% to +e t"e creator o# t"e sc"ool o# anal%tical *urisprudence& as well as&
more speci#icall%& t"e approac" to law 'nown as $legal positivism.$ 5ustin?s particular command t"eor% o#
law "as +een su+*ect to pervasive criticism& +ut its simplicit% gives it an evocative power t"at cannot +e
ignored.
-, Life
Jo"n 5ustin?s li#e 319:;<1=5:4 was #illed wit" disappointment and un#ul#illed expectations. 2is in#luential
#riends 3w"o included Jerem% Aent"am& James Mill& Jo"n tuart Mill and !"omas Farl%le4 were impressed
+% "is intellect and "is conversation& and predicted "e would go #ar. 2owever& in pu+lic dealings& 5ustin?s
nervous disposition& s"a'% "ealt"& tendenc% towards melanc"ol%& and per#ectionism com+ined to end
-uic'l% careers at t"e Aar& in academia& and in government service. 32am+urger 1:=5& 1::24
5ustin was +orn to a u##ol' merc"ant #amil%& and served +rie#l% in t"e militar% +e#ore +eginning "is legal
training. 2e was called to t"e Aar in 1=1=& +ut "e too' on #ew cases& and -uit t"e practice o# law in 1=25.
5ustin s"ortl% t"erea#ter o+tained an appointment to t"e #irst F"air o# Jurisprudence at t"e recentl%
esta+lis"ed )niversit% Follege London. 2e prepared #or "is lectures +% stud% in Aonn& and evidence o# t"e
in#luence o# continental legal and political ideas can +e #ound scattered t"roug"out 5ustin?s writings.
Lectures #rom t"e course "e gave were eventuall% pu+lis"ed in 1=32 as $Province o# Jurisprudence
Determined.$ 35ustin 1::54 2owever& attendance at "is courses was small and getting smaller& and "e gave
"is last lecture in 1=33. 5 s"ort<lived e##ort to give a similar course o# lectures at t"e (nner !emple met t"e
same result. 5ustin resigned "is )niversit% Follege London F"air in 1=35. 2e later +rie#l% served on t"e
Friminal Law Fommission& and as a Co%al Fommissioner to Malta& +ut "e never #ound eit"er success or
contentment. 2e did some occasional writing on political t"emes& +ut "is plans #or longer wor's never came
to an%t"ing during "is li#etime& due apparentl% to some com+ination o# per#ectionism& melanc"ol%& and
writer?s +loc'. 2is c"anging views on moral& political& and legal matters also apparentl% "indered +ot" t"e
pu+lication o# a revised edition o# $Province o# Jurisprudence Determined&$ and t"e completion o# a longer
pro*ect started w"en "is views "ad +een di##erent.
Muc" o# w"atever success 5ustin #ound during "is li#e& and a#ter& must +e attri+uted to "is wi#e ara"& #or
"er tireless support& +ot" moral and economic 3during t"e later %ears o# t"eir marriage& t"e% lived primaril%
o## "er e##orts as a translator and reviewer4& and "er wor' to pu+lici,e "is writings a#ter "is deat" 3including
t"e pu+lication o# a more complete set o# "is Lectures on Jurisprudence4 35ustin 1=934.
/"ile 5ustin?s wor' was in#luential in t"e decades a#ter "is deat"& its impact seemed to su+side su+stantiall%
+% t"e +eginning o# t"e twentiet" centur%. 5 signi#icant portion o# 5ustin?s current reputation derives #rom
2.L.5. 2art?s use 31:5=& 1::44 o# 5ustin?s t"eor% as a #oil #or t"e explanation o# 2art?s own& more nuanced
approac" to legal t"eor%. (n recent decades some t"eorists "ave revisited 5ustin?s wor'& o##ering new
c"aracteri,ations and de#enses o# "is ideas 3e.g.& Morison 1:=2& Cum+le 1:=54.
., Anal"tical Jurispruence an Le$al Positi#ism
8arl% in "is career& 5ustin came under t"e in#luence o# Jerem% Aent"am& and Aent"am?s utilitarianism is
evident 3t"oug" wit" some di##erences4 in t"e wor' #or w"ic" 5ustin is +est 'nown toda%. En 5ustin?s
reading o# utilitarianism& Divine will is e-uated wit" )tilitarian principles> $utilit% is t"e index to t"e law o#
Iod ... . !o ma'e a promise w"ic" general utilit% condemns& is an o##ense against t"e law o# Iod$ 35ustin
1=93> Lecture R(& p. 3;97 see also 5ustin 1::5> Lecture ((& p. 414. !"is particular reading o# utilitarianism&
"owever& "as "ad little long<term in#luence& t"oug" it seems to "ave +een t"e part o# "is wor' t"at received
t"e most attention in "is own da% 3Cum+le 1::5> p. xx4. 5ustin earl% on s"ared man% o# t"e ideas o# t"e
Aent"amite p"ilosop"ical radicals7 "e was $a strong proponent o# modern political econom%& a +eliever in
2artleian metap"%sics& and a most ent"usiastic Malt"usian.$ 3Cum+le 1:=5> pp. 1@<194
5ustin?s importance to legal t"eor% lies elsew"ere << "is t"eori,ing a+out law was novel at t"ree di##erent
levels o# generalit%. First& "e was argua+l% t"e #irst writer to approac" t"e t"eor% o# law anal%ticall% 3as
contrasted wit" approac"es to law more grounded in "istor% or sociolog%& or arguments a+out law w"ic"
were secondar% to more general moral and political t"eories4. 5nal%tical *urisprudence emp"asi,es t"e
anal%sis o# 'e% concepts& including $law&$ $3legal4 rig"t&$ $3legal4 dut%&$ and $legal validit%.$ !"oug"
anal%tical *urisprudence "as +een c"allenged +% some in recent %ears 3e.g.& Leiter 1::=4& it remains t"e
dominant approac" to discussing t"e nature o# law. 5nal%tical *urisprudence& an approac" to t"eori,ing
a+out law& "as sometimes +een con#used wit" w"at t"e 5merican legal realists 3an in#luential group o#
t"eorists prominent in t"e earl% decades o# t"e 2;t" centur%4 called $legal #ormalism$ << a narrow approac"
to "ow *udges s"ould decide cases. !"e 5merican legal realists saw 5ustin in particular& and anal%tical
*urisprudence in general& as t"eir opponents in t"eir critical and re#orm<minded e##orts. (n t"is& t"e realists
were simpl% mista'en7 un#ortunatel%& it is a mista'e t"at can still +e #ound in some contemporar% legal
commentators.
3!"ere is some evidence t"at 5ustin?s views later in "is li#e ma% "ave moved awa% #rom anal%tical
*urisprudence towards somet"ing more approximating t"e "istorical *urisprudence sc"ool. 32am+urger
1:=5> pp. 19=<:144
econd& wit"in anal%tical *urisprudence& 5ustin was t"e #irst s%stematic exponent o# a view o# law 'nown as
$legal positivism.$ Most o# t"e important t"eoretical wor' on law prior to 5ustin "ad treated *urisprudence
as t"oug" it were merel% a +ranc" o# moral t"eor% or political t"eor%> as'ing "ow s"ould t"e state govern0
3and w"en were governments legitimate04& and under w"at circumstances did citi,ens "ave an o+ligation to
o+e% t"e law0 5ustin speci#icall%& and legal positivism generall%& o##ered a -uite di##erent approac" to law>
as an o+*ect o# $scienti#ic$ stud%& dominated neit"er +% prescription nor +% moral evaluation. u+tle
*urisprudential -uestions aside& 5ustin?s e##orts to treat law s%stematicall% gained popularit% in t"e late 1:t"
centur% among 8nglis" law%ers w"o wanted to approac" t"eir pro#ession& and t"eir pro#essional training& in
a more serious and rigorous manner 3Fotterrell 1:=:> pp. 9:<=14.
Legal positivism asserts 3or assumes4 t"at it is +ot" possi+le and valua+le to "ave a morall% neutral
descriptive 3or $conceptual$ << t"oug" t"is is not a term 5ustin used4 t"eor% o# law. 3!"e main competitor to
legal positivism& in 5ustin?s da% as in our own& "as +een natural law t"eor%.4 Legal positivism does not den%
t"at moral and political criticism o# legal s%stems are important& +ut insists t"at a descriptive or conceptual
approac" to law is valua+le& +ot" on its own terms and as a necessar% prelude to criticism.
!"ere were t"eorists prior to 5ustin w"o argua+l% o##ered views similar to legal positivism or w"o at least
#ores"adowed legal positivism in some wa%. 5mong t"ese would +e !"omas 2o++es& wit" "is amoral view
o# laws as t"e product o# Leviat"an 32o++es 1::@47 David 2ume& wit" "is argument #or separating $is$ and
$oug"t$ 3w"ic" wor'ed as a s"arp criticism #or some #orms o# natural law t"eor%& w"ic" purported to derive
moral trut"s #rom statements a+out "uman nature4 32ume 2;;;47 and Jerem% Aent"am& wit" "is attac's on
*udicial lawma'ing and on t"ose& li'e ir /illiam Alac'stone& w"o *usti#ied suc" lawma'ing wit" natural<
law<li'e *usti#ications 3Aent"am 1:9;& 1::@4.
5ustin?s #amous #ormulation o# w"at could +e called t"e $dogma$ o# legal positivism is as #ollows>
!"e existence o# law is one t"ing7 its merit or demerit is anot"er. /"et"er it +e or +e not is one en-uir%7
w"et"er it +e or +e not con#orma+le to an assumed standard& is a di##erent en-uir%. 5 law& w"ic" actuall%
exists& is a law& t"oug" we "appen to disli'e it& or t"oug" it var% #rom t"e text& +% w"ic" we regulate our
appro+ation and disappro+ation. 35ustin 1::5> Lecture R& p. 1594
!"ird& 5ustin?s version o# legal positivism& a $command t"eor% o# law$ 3w"ic" will +e detailed in t"e next
section4 "as also +een in#luential. 5ustin?s t"eor% "ad similarities wit" t"e views developed +% Jerem%
Aent"am& w"ose t"eor% could also +e c"aracteri,ed as a $command t"eor%.$ 2owever& 5usten?s wor' was
more in#luential in t"is area& +ecause Aent"am?s *urisprudential writings did not appear in an even<roug"l%
s%stematic #orm until well a#ter 5ustin?s wor' "ad alread% +een pu+lis"ed. 3Aent"am 1:9;& 1::@7 Fotterrell
1:=:> pp. 52<534
0, Austin?s 'ie%s
5ustin?s +asic approac" was to ascertain w"at can +e said generall%& +ut still wit" interest& a+out all laws.
5ustin?s anal%sis can +e seen as eit"er a paradigm o#& or a caricature o#& anal%tical p"ilosop"%& in t"at "is
discussions are dr%l% #ull o# distinctions& +ut are t"in in argument. !"e modern reader is #orced to #ill in
muc" o# t"e meta<t"eoretical& *usti#icator% wor'& as it cannot +e #ound in t"e text. /"ere 5ustin does
articulate "is met"odolog% and o+*ective& it is a #airl% traditional one> "e $endeavored to resolve a law 3ta'en
wit" t"e largest signi#ication w"ic" can +e given to t"at term properly4 into t"e necessar% and essential
elements o# w"ic" it is composed.$ 35ustin 1::5> Lecture R& p. 1194
5s to w"at is t"e core nature o# law& 5ustin?s answer is t"at laws 3$properl% so called$4 are commands o# a
sovereign. 2e clari#ies t"e concept o# positive law 3t"at is& man<made law4 +% anal%,ing t"e constituent
concepts o# "is de#inition& and +% distinguis"ing law #rom ot"er concepts t"at are similar>
$Fommands$ involve an expressed wis" t"at somet"ing +e done& and $an evil$ to +e imposed i# t"at
wis" is not complied wit".
Cules are general commands 3appl%ing generall% to a class4& as contrasted wit" speci#ic or individual
commands 3$drin' wine toda%$ or $Jo"n Ma*or must drin' wine$4.
Positive law consisted o# t"ose commands laid down +% a sovereign 3or its agents4& to +e contrasted
to ot"er law< givers& li'e Iod?s general commands& and t"e general commands o# an emplo%er.
!"e $sovereign$ was de#ined as a person 3or collection o# persons4 w"o receives "a+itual o+edience
#rom t"e +ul' o# t"e population& +ut w"o does not "a+ituall% o+e% an% ot"er 3eart"l%4 person or
institution. 5ustin t"oug"t t"at all independent political societies& +% t"eir nature& "ave a sovereign.
Positive law s"ould also +e contrasted wit" $laws +% a close analog%$ 3w"ic" includes positive
moralit%& laws o# "onor& international law& customar% law& and constitutional law4 and $laws +%
remote analog%$ 3e.g.& t"e laws o# p"%sics4.
35ustin 1::5> Lecture (4.
5ustin also wanted to include wit"in $t"e province o# *urisprudence$ certain $exceptions&$ items w"ic" did
not #it "is criteria +ut s"ould nonet"eless +e studied wit" ot"er $laws properl% so called$> repealing laws&
declarative laws& and $imper#ect laws$ < laws prescri+ing action +ut wit"out sanctions 3a concept 5ustin
ascri+es to $Coman PlawO *urists$4. 35ustin 1::5> Lecture (& p. 3@4
(n t"e criteria set out a+ove& 5ustin succeeded in delimiting law and legal rules #rom religion& moralit%&
convention& and custom. 2owever& also excluded #rom $t"e province o# *urisprudence$ were customar% law
3except to t"e extent t"at t"e sovereign "ad& directl% or indirectl%& adopted suc" customs as law4& pu+lic
international law& and parts o# constitutional law. 3!"ese exclusions alone would ma'e 5ustin?s t"eor%
pro+lematic #or most modern readers.4
/it"in 5ustin?s approac"& w"et"er somet"ing is or is not $law$ depends on w"ic" people "ave done w"at>
t"e -uestion turns on an empirical investigation& and it is a matter mostl% o# power& not o# moralit%. E#
course& 5ustin is not arguing t"at law s"ould not +e moral& nor is "e impl%ing t"at it rarel% is. 5ustin is not
pla%ing t"e ni"ilist or t"e s'eptic. 2e is merel% pointing out t"at t"ere is muc" t"at is law t"at is not moral&
and w"at ma'es somet"ing law does not"ing to guarantee its moral value. $!"e most pernicious laws& and
t"ere#ore t"ose w"ic" are most opposed to t"e will o# Iod& "ave +een and are continuall% en#orced as laws
+% *udicial tri+unals.$ 35ustin 1::5> Lecture R& p. 15=4.
(n contrast to "is mentor Aent"am& 5ustin "ad no o+*ection to *udicial lawma'ing& w"ic" 5ustin called
$"ig"l% +ene#icial and even a+solutel% necessar%.$ 35ustin& 1::5> Lecture R& p. 1@34 Nor did 5ustin #ind an%
di##icult% incorporating *udicial lawma'ing into "is command t"eor%> "e c"aracteri,ed t"at #orm o#
lawma'ing& along wit" t"e occasional legalN*udicial recognition o# customs +% *udges& as t"e $tacit
commands$ o# t"e sovereign& t"e sovereign?s a##irming t"e $orders$ +% its ac-uiescence. 35ustin 1::5>
Lecture 1& pp. 35<3@4.
2, Criticisms
5s man% readers come to 5ustin?s t"eor% mostl% t"roug" its criticism +% ot"er writers 3prominentl%& t"at o#
2.L.5. 2art4& t"e wea'nesses o# t"e t"eor% are almost +etter 'nown t"an t"e t"eor% itsel#>
(n man% societies& it is "ard to identi#% a $sovereign$ in 5ustin?s sense o# t"e word 3a di##icult%
5ustin "imsel# experienced& w"en "e was #orced to descri+e t"e Aritis" $sovereign$ aw'wardl%
as t"e com+ination o# t"e Bing& t"e 2ouse o# Lords& and all t"e electors o# t"e 2ouse o#
Fommons4. 5dditionall%& a #ocus on a $sovereign$ ma'es it di##icult to explain t"e continuit% o#
legal s%stems> a new ruler will not come in wit" t"e 'ind o# $"a+it o# o+edience$ t"at 5usten sets
as a criterion #or a s%stem?s rule<ma'er. 2owever& one could argue 3see 2arris 1:994 t"at t"e
sovereign is +est understood as a constructive metap"or> t"at law s"ould +e viewed as i# it
re#lected t"e view o# a single will 3a similar view& t"at law s"ould +e interpreted as i# it derived
#rom a single will& can +e #ound in Conald Dwor'in?s wor' 31:=@44.
5 $command$ model seems to #it some aspects o# law poorl% 3e.g.& rules w"ic" grant powers to
o##icials and to private citi,ens < o# t"e latter& t"e rules #or ma'ing wills& trusts& and contracts are
examples4& w"ile excluding ot"er matters 3e.g.& international law4 w"ic" we are not inclined to
exclude in t"e categor% $law.$
More generall%& it seems more distorting t"an enlig"tening to reduce all law to one t%pe. For
example& rules t"at empower people to ma'e wills and contracts per"aps can +e re<c"aracteri,ed
as part o# a long c"ain o# reasoning #or eventuall% imposing a sanction 35ustin spo'e in t"is
context o# t"e sanction o# $nullit%$4 on t"ose w"o #ail to compl% wit" t"e relevant provisions.
2owever& suc" a re<c"aracteri,ation t"is misses t"e +asic purpose o# t"ose sorts o# laws < t"e% are
argua+l% a+out granting power and autonom%& not punis"ing wrongdoing.
5 t"eor% w"ic" portra%s law solel% in terms o# power #ails to distinguis" rules o# terror #rom
#orms o# governance su##icientl% *ust t"at t"e% are accepted as legitimate +% t"eir own citi,ens.
35ustin was aware o# some o# t"ese lines o# attac'& and "ad responses read%7 it is anot"er matter
w"et"er "is responses were ade-uate.4 (t s"ould also +e noted t"at 5ustin?s wor' s"ows a silence
on -uestions o# met"odolog%& t"oug" t"is ma% +e #orgiva+le& given t"e earl% stage o#
*urisprudence. 5s discussed in an earlier section& in man% wa%s& 5ustin was +la,ing a new pat".
/"en 2.L.5. 2art revived legal positivism in t"e middle o# t"e 2;
t"
centur% 32art 1:5=& 1::44& "e did it +%
critici,ing and +uilding on 5ustin?s t"eor%> #or example& 2art?s t"eor% did not tr% to reduce all laws to one
'ind o# rule& +ut emp"asi,ed t"e var%ing t%pes and #unctions o# legal rules7 and 2art?s t"eor%& grounded
partl% on t"e distinction +etween $o+ligation$ and $+eing o+liged&$ was +uilt around t"e #act t"at some
participants wit"in legal s%stems $accepted$ t"e legal rules as reasons #or action& a+ove and +e%ond t"e #ear
o# sanctions.
7, A Re#isionist 'ie%@
ome modern commentators appreciate in 5ustin elements t"at were pro+a+l% not #oremost in "is mind 3or
t"at o# "is contemporar% readers4. For example& one occasionall% sees 5ustin portra%ed as t"e #irst $realist$>
in contrast +ot" to t"e t"eorists t"at came +e#ore 5ustin and to some modern writers on law& 5ustin is seen
as "aving a 'eener sense o# t"e connection o# law and power& and t"e importance o# 'eeping t"at connection
at t"e #ore#ront o# anal%sis. 3c#. Fotterrell 1:=:> pp. 59<9:4 /"en circumstances seem to warrant a more
critical& s'eptical or c%nical approac" to law and government& 5ustin?s e-uation o# law and #orce will +e
attractive < "owever distant suc" a reading ma% +e #rom 5ustin?s own li+eral<utilitarian views at t"e time o#
"is writing& and "is even more conservative political views later in "is li#e. 32am+urger& 1:=54
Natural La%
!"e term ?natural law? is am+iguous. (t re#ers to a t%pe o# moral t"eor%& as well as to a t%pe o# legal t"eor%&
despite t"e #act t"at t"e core claims o# t"e two 'inds o# t"eor% are logicall% independent. 5ccording to
natural law et"ical t"eor%& t"e moral standards t"at govern "uman +e"avior are& in some sense& o+*ectivel%
derived #rom t"e nature o# "uman +eings. 5ccording to natural law legal t"eor%& t"e aut"orit% o# at least
some legal standards necessaril% derives& at least in part& #rom considerations "aving to do wit" t"e moral
merit o# t"ose standards. !"ere are a num+er o# di##erent 'inds o# natural law t"eories o# law& di##ering #rom
eac" ot"er wit" respect to t"e role t"at moralit% pla%s in determining t"e aut"orit% o# legal norms.
!a+le o# Fontents
(. !wo Binds o# Natural Law !"eor%
((. Fonceptual Naturalism
o ((.1 !"e Pro*ect o# Fonceptual Jurisprudence
o ((.2 Flassical Natural Law !"eor%
(((. !"e u+stantive Neo<Naturalism o# Jo"n Finnis
(R. !"e Procedural Naturalism o# Lon L. Fuller
Conald Dwor'in?s $!"ird !"eor%$
)ources
I, T%o =ins of Natural La% T!eor"
5t t"e outset& it is important to distinguis" two 'inds o# t"eor% t"at go +% t"e name o# natural law. !"e #irst
is a t"eor% o# moralit% t"at is roug"l% c"aracteri,ed +% t"e #ollowing t"eses. First& moral propositions "ave
w"at is sometimes called o+*ective standing in t"e sense t"at suc" propositions are t"e +earers o# o+*ective
trut"<value7 t"at is& moral propositions can +e o+*ectivel% true or #alse. !"oug" moral o+*ectivism is
sometimes e-uated wit" moral realism 3see& e.g.& Moore 1::2& 1:;> $t"e trut" o# an% moral proposition lies
in its correspondence wit" a mind< and convention<independent moral realit%$4& t"e relations"ip +etween t"e
two t"eories is controversial. Ieo##re% a%re<McFord 31:==4& #or example& views moral o+*ectivism as one
species o# moral realism& +ut not t"e onl% #orm7 on a%re<McFord?s view& moral su+*ectivism and moral
intersu+*ectivism are also #orms o# moral realism. trictl% spea'ing& t"en& natural law moral t"eor% is
committed onl% to t"e o+*ectivit% o# moral norms.
!"e second t"esis constituting t"e core o# natural law moral t"eor% is t"e claim t"at standards o# moralit%
are in some sense derived #rom& or entailed +%& t"e nature o# t"e world and t"e nature o# "uman +eings. t.
!"omas 5-uinas& #or example& identi#ies t"e rational nature o# "uman +eings as t"at w"ic" de#ines moral
law> $t"e rule and measure o# "uman acts is t"e reason& w"ic" is t"e #irst principle o# "uman acts$ 35-uinas&
! (<((& M.:;& 5.(4. En t"is common view& since "uman +eings are +% nature rational +eings& it is morall%
appropriate t"at t"e% s"ould +e"ave in a wa% t"at con#orms to t"eir rational nature. !"us& 5-uinas derives
t"e moral law #rom t"e nature o# "uman +eings 3t"us& $natural law$4.
Aut t"ere is anot"er 'ind o# natural law t"eor% "aving to do wit" t"e relations"ip o# moralit% to law.
5ccording to natural law t"eor% o# law& t"ere is no clean division +etween t"e notion o# law and t"e notion
o# moralit%. !"oug" t"ere are di##erent versions o# natural law t"eor%& all su+scri+e to t"e t"esis t"at t"ere
are at least some laws t"at depend #or t"eir $aut"orit%$ not on some pre<existing "uman convention& +ut on
t"e logical relations"ip in w"ic" t"e% stand to moral standards. Et"erwise put& some norms are aut"oritative
in virtue o# t"eir moral content& even w"en t"ere is no convention t"at ma'es moral merit a criterion o# legal
validit%. !"e idea t"at t"e concepts o# law and moralit% intersect in some wa% is called t"e Everlap !"esis.
5s an empirical matter& man% natural law moral t"eorists are also natural law legal t"eorists& +ut t"e two
t"eories& strictl% spea'ing& are logicall% independent. Ene can den% natural law t"eor% o# law +ut "old a
natural law t"eor% o# moralit%. Jo"n 5ustin& t"e most in#luential o# t"e earl% legal positivists& #or example&
denied t"e Everlap !"esis +ut "eld somet"ing t"at resem+les a natural law et"ical t"eor%.
(ndeed& 5ustin explicitl% endorsed t"e view t"at it is not necessaril% true t"at t"e legal validit% o# a norm
depends on w"et"er its content con#orms to moralit%. Aut w"ile 5ustin t"us denied t"e Everlap !"esis& "e
accepted an o+*ectivist moral t"eor%7 indeed& 5ustin in"erited "is utilitarianism almost w"olesale #rom J..
Mill and Jerem% Aent"am. 2ere it is wort" noting t"at utilitarians sometimes seem to suggest t"at t"e%
derive t"eir utilitarianism #rom certain #acts a+out "uman nature7 as Aent"am once wrote& $nature "as placed
man'ind under t"e governance o# two sovereign masters& pain and pleasure. (t is #or t"em alone to point out
w"at we oug"t to do& as well as to determine w"at we s"all do. En t"e one "and t"e standard o# rig"t and
wrong& on t"e ot"er t"e c"ain o# causes and e##ects& are #astened to t"eir t"rone$ 3Aent"am 1:4=& 14. !"us& a
commitment to natural law t"eor% o# moralit% is consistent wit" t"e denial o# natural law t"eor% o# law.
Fonversel%& one could& t"oug" t"is would +e unusual& accept a natural law t"eor% o# law wit"out "olding a
natural law t"eor% o# moralit%. Ene could& #or example& "old t"at t"e conceptual point o# law is& in part& to
reproduce t"e demands o# moralit%& +ut also "old a #orm o# et"ical su+*ectivism 3or relativism4. En t"is
peculiar view& t"e conceptual point o# law would +e to en#orce t"ose standards t"at are morall% valid in
virtue o# cultural consensus. For t"is reason& natural law t"eor% o# law is logicall% independent o# natural
law t"eor% o# moralit%. !"e remainder o# t"is essa% will +e exclusivel% concerned wit" natural law t"eories
o# law.
II, Conceptual Naturalism
((.1 !"e Pro*ect o# Fonceptual Jurisprudence
!"e principal o+*ective o# conceptual 3or anal%tic4 *urisprudence "as traditionall% +een to provide an
account o# w"at distinguis"es law as a s%stem o# norms #rom ot"er s%stems o# norms& suc" as et"ical norms.
5s Jo"n 5ustin descri+es t"e pro*ect& conceptual *urisprudence see's $t"e essence or nature w"ic" is
common to all laws t"at are properl% so called$ 35ustin 1::5& 114. 5ccordingl%& t"e tas' o# conceptual
*urisprudence is to provide a set o# necessar% and su##icient conditions #or t"e existence o# law t"at
distinguis"es law #rom non<law in ever% possi+le world.
/"ile t"is tas' is usuall% interpreted as an attempt to anal%,e t"e concepts o# law and legal s%stem& t"ere is
some con#usion as to +ot" t"e value and c"aracter o# conceptual anal%sis in p"ilosop"% o# law. 5s Arian
Leiter 31::=4 points out& p"ilosop"% o# law is one o# t"e #ew p"ilosop"ical disciplines t"at ta'es conceptual
anal%sis as its principal concern7 most ot"er areas in p"ilosop"% "ave ta'en a naturalistic turn& incorporating
t"e tools and met"ods o# t"e sciences. !o clari#% t"e role o# conceptual anal%sis in law& Arian Aix 31::54
distinguis"es a num+er o# di##erent purposes t"at can +e served +% conceptual claims> 314 to trac' linguistic
usage7 324 to stipulate meanings7 334 to explain w"at is important or essential a+out a class o# o+*ects7 and
344 to esta+lis" an evaluative test #or t"e concept<word. Aix ta'es conceptual anal%sis in law to +e primaril%
concerned wit" 334 and 344.
(n an% event& conceptual anal%sis o# law remains an important& i# controversial& pro*ect in contemporar%
legal t"eor%. Fonceptual t"eories o# law "ave traditionall% +een c"aracteri,ed in terms o# t"eir posture
towards t"e Everlap !"esis. !"us& conceptual t"eories o# law "ave traditionall% +een divided into two main
categories> t"ose li'e natural law legal t"eor% t"at a##irm t"ere is a conceptual relation +etween law and
moralit% and t"ose li'e legal positivism t"at den% suc" a relation.
((.2 Flassical Natural Law !"eor%
5ll #orms o# natural law t"eor% su+scri+e to t"e Everlap !"esis& w"ic" asserts t"at t"ere is some 'ind o#
non<conventional relation +etween law and moralit%. 5ccording to t"is view& t"en& t"e notion o# law cannot
+e #ull% articulated wit"out some re#erence to moral notions. !"oug" t"e Everlap !"esis ma% seem
unam+iguous& t"ere are a num+er o# di##erent wa%s in w"ic" it can +e interpreted.
!"e strongest construction o# t"e Everlap !"esis #orms t"e #oundation #or t"e classical naturalism o#
5-uinas and Alac'stone. 5-uinas distinguis"es #our 'inds o# law> 314 eternal law7 324 natural law7 334
"uman law7 and 344 divine law. 8ternal law is comprised o# t"ose laws t"at govern t"e nature o# an eternal
universe7 as usan Dimoc' 31:::& 224 puts it& one can $t"in' o# eternal law as comprising all t"ose scienti#ic
3p"%sical& c"emical& +iological& ps%c"ological& etc.4 ?laws? +% w"ic" t"e universe is ordered.$ Divine law is
concerned wit" t"ose standards t"at must +e satis#ied +% a "uman +eing to ac"ieve eternal salvation. Ene
cannot discover divine law +% natural reason alone7 t"e precepts o# divine law are disclosed onl% t"roug"
divine revelation.
!"e natural law is comprised o# t"ose precepts o# t"e eternal law t"at govern t"e +e"avior o# +eings
possessing reason and #ree will. !"e #irst precept o# t"e natural law& according to 5-uinas& is t"e somew"at
vacuous imperative to do good and avoid evil. 2ere it is wort" noting t"at 5-uinas "olds a natural law
t"eor% o# moralit%> w"at is good and evil& according to 5-uinas& is derived #rom t"e rational nature o#
"uman +eings. Iood and evil are t"us +ot" o+*ective and universal.
Aut 5-uinas is also a natural law legal t"eorist. En "is view& a "uman law 3i.e.& t"at w"ic" is promulgated +%
"uman +eings4 is valid onl% inso#ar as its content con#orms to t"e content o# t"e natural law7 as 5-uinas puts
t"e point> $P8Over% "uman law "as *ust so muc" o# t"e nature o# law as is derived #rom t"e law o# nature.
Aut i# in an% point it de#lects #rom t"e law o# nature& it is no longer a law +ut a perversion o# law$ 3! (<((&
M.:5& 5.((4. !o parap"rase 5ugustine?s #amous remar'& an un*ust law is reall% no law at all.
!"e idea t"at a norm t"at does not con#orm to t"e natural law cannot +e legall% valid is t"e de#ining t"esis o#
conceptual naturalism. 5s /illiam Alac'stone descri+es t"e t"esis& $!"is law o# nature& +eing co<eval wit"
man'ind and dictated +% Iod "imsel#& is o# course superior in o+ligation to an% ot"er. (t is +inding over all
t"e glo+e& in all countries& and at all times> no "uman laws are o# an% validit%& i# contrar% to t"is7 and suc" o#
t"em as are valid derive all t"eir #orce& and all t"eir aut"orit%& mediatel% or immediatel%& #rom t"is original$
31:9:& 414. (n t"is passage& Alac'stone articulates t"e two claims t"at constitute t"e t"eoretical core o#
conceptual naturalism> 14 t"ere can +e no legall% valid standards t"at con#lict wit" t"e natural law7 and 24 all
valid laws derive w"at #orce and aut"orit% t"e% "ave #rom t"e natural law.
(t s"ould +e noted t"at classical naturalism is consistent wit" allowing a su+stantial role to "uman +eings in
t"e manu#acture o# law. /"ile t"e classical naturalist seems committed to t"e claim t"at t"e law necessaril%
incorporates all moral principles& t"is claim does not impl% t"at t"e law is ex"austed +% t"e set o# moral
principles. !"ere will still +e coordination pro+lems 3e.g.& w"ic" side o# t"e road to drive on4 t"at can +e
resolved in an% num+er o# wa%s consistent wit" t"e set o# moral principles. !"us& t"e classical naturalist
does not den% t"at "uman +eings "ave considera+le discretion in creating natural law. Cat"er s"e claims
onl% t"at suc" discretion is necessaril% limited +% moral norms> legal norms t"at are promulgated +% "uman
+eings are valid onl% i# t"e% are consistent wit" moralit%.
Fritics o# conceptual naturalism "ave raised a num+er o# o+*ections to t"is view. First& it "as o#ten +een
pointed out t"at& contra 5ugustine& un*ust laws are all<too< #re-uentl% en#orced against persons. 5s 5ustin
petulantl% put t"e point>
Now& to sa% t"at "uman laws w"ic" con#lict wit" t"e Divine law are not +inding& t"at is to sa%& are not laws&
is to tal' star' nonsense. !"e most pernicious laws& and t"ere#ore t"ose w"ic" are most opposed to t"e will
o# Iod& "ave +een and are continuall% en#orced as laws +% *udicial tri+unals. uppose an act innocuous& or
positivel% +ene#icial& +e pro"i+ited +% t"e sovereign under t"e penalt% o# deat"7 i# ( commit t"is act& ( s"all
+e tried and condemned& and i# ( o+*ect to t"e sentence& t"at it is contrar% to t"e law o# Iod& w"o "as
commanded t"at "uman lawgivers s"all not pro"i+it acts w"ic" "ave no evil conse-uences& t"e Fourt o#
Justice will demonstrate t"e inconclusiveness o# m% reasoning +% "anging me up& in pursuance o# t"e law o#
w"ic" ( "ave impugned t"e validit% 35ustin 1::5& 15=4.
E# course& as Arian Aix 31:::4 points out& t"e argument does little wor' #or 5ustin +ecause it is alwa%s
possi+le #or a court to en#orce a law against a person t"at does not satis#% 5ustin?s own t"eor% o# legal
validit%.
5not"er #re-uentl% expressed worr% is t"at conceptual naturalism undermines t"e possi+ilit% o# moral
criticism o# t"e law7 inasmuc" as con#ormit% wit" natural law is a necessar% condition #or legal validit%& all
valid law is& +% de#inition& morall% *ust. !"us& on t"is line o# reasoning& t"e legal validit% o# a norm
necessaril% entails its moral *ustice. 5s Jules Foleman and Je##re% Murp"% 31::;& 1=4 put t"e point>
!"e important t"ings Pconceptual naturalismO supposedl% allows us to do 3e.g.& morall% evaluate t"e law and
determine our moral o+ligations wit" respect to t"e law4 are actuall% rendered more di##icult +% its collapse
o# t"e distinction +etween moralit% and law. (# we reall% want to t"in' a+out t"e law #rom t"e moral point o#
view& it ma% o+scure t"e tas' i# we see law and moralit% as essentiall% lin'ed in some wa%. Moral criticism
and re#orm o# law ma% +e aided +% an initial moral s'epticism a+out t"e law.
!"ere are a couple o# pro+lems wit" t"is line o# o+*ection. First& conceptual naturalism does not #oreclose
criticism o# t"ose norms t"at are +eing en#orced +% a societ% as law. (nso#ar as it can plausi+l% +e claimed
t"at t"e content o# a norm +eing en#orced +% societ% as law does not con#orm to t"e natural law& t"is is a
legitimate ground o# moral criticism> given t"at t"e norm +eing en#orced +% law is un*ust& it #ollows&
according to conceptual naturalism& t"at it is not legall% valid. !"us& t"e state commits wrong +% en#orcing
t"at norm against private citi,ens.
econd& and more importantl%& t"is line o# o+*ection see's to critici,e a conceptual t"eor% o# law +% pointing
to its practical implications U a strateg% t"at seems to commit a categor% mista'e. Fonceptual *urisprudence
assumes t"e existence o# a core o# social practices 3constituting law4 t"at re-uires a conceptual explanation.
!"e pro*ect motivating conceptual *urisprudence& t"en& is to articulate t"e concept o# law in a wa% t"at
accounts #or t"ese pre<existing social practices. 5 conceptual t"eor% o# law can legitimatel% +e critici,ed #or
its #ailure to ade-uatel% account #or t"e pre<existing data& as it were7 +ut it cannot legitimatel% +e critici,ed
#or eit"er its normative -ualit% or its practical implications.
5 more interesting line o# argument "as recentl% +een ta'en up +% Arian Aix 31::@4. Following Jo"n Finnis
31:=;4& Aix re*ects t"e interpretation o# 5-uinas and Alac'stone as conceptual naturalists& arguing instead
t"at t"e claim t"at an un*ust law is not a law s"ould not +e ta'en literall%>
5 more reasona+le interpretation o# statements li'e $an un*ust law is no law at all$ is t"at un*ust laws are not
laws $in t"e #ullest sense.$ 5s we mig"t sa% o# some pro#essional& w"o "ad t"e necessar% degrees and
credentials& +ut seemed nonet"eless to lac' t"e necessar% a+ilit% or *udgment> $s"e?s no law%er$ or $"e?s no
doctor.$ !"is onl% indicates t"at we do not t"in' t"at t"e title in t"is case carries wit" it all t"e implications it
usuall% does. imilarl%& to sa% t"at an un*ust law is $not reall% law$ ma% onl% +e to point out t"at it does not
carr% t"e same moral #orce or o##er t"e same reasons #or action as laws consistent wit" $"ig"er law$ 3Aix
1::@& 22@4.
!"us& Aix construes 5-uinas and Alac'stone as "aving views more similar to t"e neo< naturalism o# Jo"n
Finnis discussed +elow in ection (((. Nevert"eless& w"ile a plausi+le case can +e made in #avor o# Aix?s
view& t"e long "istor% o# construing 5-uinas and Alac'stone as conceptual naturalists& along wit" its
pedagogical value in developing ot"er t"eories o# law& ensures t"at t"is practice is li'el%& #or +etter or worse&
to continue inde#initel%.
III, T!e Su3stanti#e Neo-Naturalism of Jo!n Finnis
Jo"n Finnis ta'es "imsel# to +e explicating and developing t"e views o# 5-uinas and Alac'stone. Li'e Aix&
Finnis +elieves t"at t"e naturalism o# 5-uinas and Alac'stone s"ould not +e construed as a conceptual
account o# t"e existence conditions #or law. 5ccording to Finnis& t"e classical naturalists were not concerned
wit" giving a conceptual account o# legal validit%7 rat"er t"e% were concerned wit" explaining t"e moral
#orce o# law> $t"e principles o# natural law explain t"e o+ligator% #orce 3in t"e #ullest sense o# ?o+ligation?4 o#
positive laws& even w"en t"ose laws cannot +e deduced #rom t"ose principles$ 3Finnis 1:=;& 23<244. En
Finnis?s view o# t"e Everlap !"esis& t"e essential #unction o# law is to provide a *usti#ication #or state
coercion 3a view "e s"ares wit" Conald Dwor'in4. 5ccordingl%& an un*ust law can +e legall% valid& +ut it
cannot provide an ade-uate *usti#ication #or use o# t"e state coercive power and is "ence not o+ligator% in
t"e #ullest sense7 t"us& an un*ust law #ails to reali,e t"e moral ideals implicit in t"e concept o# law. 5n un*ust
law& on t"is view& is legall% +inding& +ut is not #ull% law.
Li'e classical naturalism& Finnis?s naturalism is +ot" an et"ical t"eor% and a t"eor% o# law. Finnis
distinguis"es a num+er o# e-uall% valua+le +asic goods> li#e& "ealt"& 'nowledge& pla%& #riends"ip& religion&
and aest"etic experience. 8ac" o# t"ese goods& according to Finnis& "as intrinsic value in t"e sense t"at it
s"ould& given "uman nature& +e valued #or its own sa'e and not merel% #or t"e sa'e o# some ot"er good it
can assist in +ringing a+out. Moreover& eac" o# t"ese goods is universal in t"e sense t"at it governs all
"uman cultures at all times. !"e point o# moral principles& on t"is view& is to give et"ical structure to t"e
pursuit o# t"ese +asic goods7 moral principles ena+le us to select among competing goods and to de#ine w"at
a "uman +eing can permissi+l% do in pursuit o# a +asic good.
En Finnis?s view& t"e conceptual point o# law is to #acilitate t"e common good +% providing aut"oritative
rules t"at solve coordination pro+lems t"at arise in connection wit" t"e common pursuit o# t"ese +asic
goods. !"us& Finnis sums up "is t"eor% o# law as #ollows>
!"e term ?law? ... re#erPsO primaril% to rules made& in accordance wit" regulative legal rules& +% a determinate
and e##ective aut"orit% 3itsel# identi#ied and& standardl%& constituted as an institution +% legal rules4 #or a
?complete? communit%& and +uttressed +% sanctions in accordance wit" t"e rule<guided stipulations o#
ad*udicative institutions& t"is ensem+le o# rules and institutions +eing directed to reasona+l% resolving an%
o# t"e communit%?s co<ordination pro+lems 3and to rati#%ing& tolerating& regulating& or overriding co<
ordination solutions #rom an% ot"er institutions or sources o# norms4 #or t"e common good o# t"at
communit% 3Finnis 1:=;& 29@4.
5gain& it +ears emp"asi,ing t"at Finnis ta'es care to den% t"at t"ere is an% necessar% moral test #or legal
validit%> $one would simpl% +e misunderstanding m% conception o# t"e nature and purpose o# explanator%
de#initions o# t"eoretical concepts i# one supposed t"at m% de#inition ?ruled out as non<laws? laws w"ic"
#ailed to meet& or meet #ull%& one or ot"er o# t"e elements o# t"e de#inition$ 3Finnis 1:=;& 29=4.
Nevert"eless& Finnis +elieves t"at to t"e extent t"at a norm #ails to satis#% t"ese conditions& it li'ewise #ails
to #ull% mani#est t"e nature o# law and t"ere+% #ails to #ull% o+ligate t"e citi,en<su+*ect o# t"e law. )n*ust
laws ma% o+ligate in a tec"nical legal sense& on Finnis?s view& +ut t"e% ma% #ail to provide moral reasons #or
action o# t"e sort t"at it is t"e point o# legal aut"orit% to provide. !"us& Finnis argues t"at $a ruler?s use o#
aut"orit% is radicall% de#ective i# "e exploits "is opportunities +% ma'ing stipulations intended +% "im not
#or t"e common good +ut #or "is own or "is #riends? or part%?s or #action?s advantage& or out o# malice
against some person or group$ 3Finnis 1:=;& 3524. For t"e ultimate +asis o# a ruler?s moral aut"orit%& on t"is
view& $is t"e #act t"at "e "as t"e opportunit%& and t"us t"e responsi+ilit%& o# #urt"ering t"e common good +%
stipulating solutions to a communit%?s co< ordination pro+lems$ 3Finnis 1:=;& 3514.
Finnis?s t"eor% is certainl% more plausi+le as a t"eor% o# law t"an t"e traditional interpretation o# classical
naturalism& +ut suc" plausi+ilit% comes& #or +etter or worse& at t"e expense o# naturalism?s identit% as a
distinct t"eor% o# law. (ndeed& it appears t"at Finnis?s natural law t"eor% is compati+le wit" naturalism?s
"istorical adversar%& legal positivism& inasmuc" as Finnis?s view is compati+le wit" a source<+ased t"eor% o#
legal validit%7 laws t"at are tec"nicall% valid in virtue o# source +ut un*ust do not& according to Finnis& #ull%
o+ligate t"e citi,en. (ndeed& Finnis 31::@4 +elieves t"at 5-uinas?s classical naturalism #ull% a##irms t"e
notion t"at "uman laws are $posited.$
Aac' to !a+le o# Fontents
I', T!e Proceural Naturalism of Lon L, Fuller
Li'e Finnis& Lon Fuller 31:@44 re*ects t"e conceptual naturalist idea t"at t"ere are necessar% substantive
moral constraints on t"e content o# law. Aut Fuller& unli'e Finnis& +elieves t"at law is necessaril% su+*ect to a
procedural moralit%. En Fuller?s view& "uman activit% is necessaril% goal<oriented or purposive in t"e sense
t"at people engage in a particular activit% +ecause it "elps t"em to ac"ieve some end. (nso#ar as "uman
activit% is essentiall% purposive& according to Fuller& particular "uman activities can +e understood onl% in
terms t"at ma'e re#erence to t"eir purposes and ends. !"us& since lawma'ing is essentiall% purposive
activit%& it can +e understood onl% in terms t"at explicitl% ac'nowledge its essential values and purposes>
!"e onl% #ormula t"at mig"t +e called a de#inition o# law o##ered in t"ese writings is +% now t"oroug"l%
#amiliar> law is t"e enterprise o# su+*ecting "uman conduct to t"e governance o# rules. )nli'e most modern
t"eories o# law& t"is view treats law as an activit% and regards a legal s%stem as t"e product o# a sustained
purposive e##ort 3Fuller 1:@4& 1;@4.
!o t"e extent t"at a de#inition o# law can +e given& t"en& it must include t"e idea t"at law?s essential #unction
is to $ac"ieve social order t"roug" su+*ecting people?s conduct to t"e guidance o# general rules +% w"ic"
t"e% ma% t"emselves orient t"eir +e"avior$ 3Fuller 1:@5& @594.
Fuller?s #unctionalist conception o# law implies t"at not"ing can count as law unless it is capa+le o#
per#orming law?s essential #unction o# guiding +e"avior. 5nd to +e capa+le o# per#orming t"is #unction& a
s%stem o# rules must satis#% t"e #ollowing principles>
;P-A t!e rules must 3e e/presse in $eneral termsB
;P.A t!e rules must 3e pu3licl" promul$ateB
;P0A t!e rules must 3e prospecti#e in effectB
;P2A t!e rules must 3e e/presse in unerstana3le termsB
;P7A t!e rules must 3e consistent %it! one anot!erB
;P9A t!e rules must not reCuire conuct 3e"on t!e po%ers of t!e affecte partiesB
;P6A t!e rules must not 3e c!an$e so freCuentl" t!at t!e su3>ect cannot rel" on t!emB an
;P<A t!e rules must 3e aministere in a manner consistent %it! t!eir %orin$.
En Fuller?s view& no s%stem o# rules t"at #ails minimall% to satis#% t"ese principles o# legalit% can ac"ieve
law?s essential purpose o# ac"ieving social order t"roug" t"e use o# rules t"at guide +e"avior. 5 s%stem o#
rules t"at #ails to satis#% 3P24 or 3P44& #or example& cannot guide +e"avior +ecause people will not +e a+le to
determine w"at t"e rules re-uire. 5ccordingl%& Fuller concludes t"at "is eig"t principles are $internal$ to law
in t"e sense t"at t"e% are +uilt into t"e existence conditions #or law.
!"ese internal principles constitute a moralit%& according to Fuller& +ecause law necessaril% "as positive
moral value in two respects> 314 law conduces to a state o# social order and 324 does so +% respecting "uman
autonom% +ecause rules guide +e"avior. ince no s%stem o# rules can ac"ieve t"ese morall% valua+le
o+*ectives wit"out minimall% compl%ing wit" t"e principles o# legalit%& it #ollows& on Fuller?s view& t"at t"e%
constitute a moralit%. ince t"ese moral principles are +uilt into t"e existence conditions #or law& t"e% are
internal and "ence represent a conceptual connection +etween law and moralit%. !"us& li'e t"e classical
naturalists and unli'e Finnis& Fuller su+scri+es to t"e strongest #orm o# t"e Everlap !"esis& w"ic" ma'es
"im a conceptual naturalist.
Nevert"eless& Fuller?s conceptual naturalism is #undamentall% di##erent #rom t"at o# classical naturalism.
First& Fuller re*ects t"e classical naturalist view t"at t"ere are necessar% moral constraints on t"e content o#
law& "olding instead t"at t"ere are necessar% moral constraints on t"e procedural mec"anisms +% w"ic" law
is made and administered> $/"at ( "ave called t"e internal moralit% o# law is ... a procedural version o#
natural law ... Pin t"e sense t"at it isO concerned& not wit" t"e su+stantive aims o# legal rules& +ut wit" t"e
wa%s in w"ic" a s%stem o# rules #or governing "uman conduct must +e constructed and administered i# it is
to +e e##icacious and at t"e same time remain w"at it purports to +e$ 3Fuller 1:@4& :@< :94.
econd& Fuller identi#ies t"e conceptual connection +etween law and moralit% at a "ig"er level o# a+straction
t"an t"e classical naturalists. !"e classical naturalists view moralit% as providing su+stantive constraints on
t"e content o# individual laws7 an un*ust norm& on t"is view& is conceptuall% dis-uali#ied #rom +eing legall%
valid. (n contrast& Fuller views moralit% as providing a constraint on t"e existence o# a legal s%stem> $5 total
#ailure in an% one o# t"ese eig"t directions does not simpl% result in a +ad s%stem o# law7 it results in
somet"ing t"at is not properl% called a legal s%stem at all$ 3Fuller 1:@4& 3:4.
Fuller?s procedural naturalism is vulnera+le to a num+er o# o+*ections. 2.L.5. 2art& #or example& denies
Fuller?s claim t"at t"e principles o# legalit% constitute an internal moralit%7 according to 2art& Fuller
con#uses t"e notions o# moralit% and e##icac%>
!"e aut"or?s insistence on classi#%ing t"ese principles o# legalit% as a $moralit%$ is a source o# con#usion
+ot" #or "im and "is readers. !"e crucial o+*ection to t"e designation o# t"ese principles o# good legal
cra#tsmans"ip as moralit%& in spite o# t"e -uali#ication $inner&$ is t"at it perpetrates a con#usion +etween two
notions t"at it is vital to "old apart> t"e notions o# purposive activit% and moralit%. Poisoning is no dou+t a
purposive activit%& and re#lections on its purpose ma% s"ow t"at it "as its internal principles. 3$5void
poisons "owever let"al i# t"e% cause t"e victim to vomit$....4 Aut to call t"ese principles o# t"e poisoner?s art
$t"e moralit% o# poisoning$ would simpl% +lur t"e distinction +etween t"e notion o# e##icienc% #or a purpose
and t"ose #inal *udgments a+out activities and purposes wit" w"ic" moralit% in its various #orms is
concerned 32art 1:@5& 12=5<=@4.
En 2art?s view& all actions& including virtuous acts li'e lawma'ing and impermissi+le acts li'e poisoning&
"ave t"eir own internal standards o# e##icac%. Aut inso#ar as suc" standards o# e##icac% con#lict wit"
moralit%& as t"e% do in t"e case o# poisoning& it #ollows t"at t"e% are distinct #rom moral standards. !"us&
w"ile 2art concedes t"at somet"ing li'e Fuller?s eig"t principles are +uilt into t"e existence conditions #or
law& "e concludes t"e% do not constitute a conceptual connection +etween law and moralit%.
)n#ortunatel%& 2art overloo's t"e #act t"at most o# Fuller?s eig"t principles dou+le as moral ideals o#
#airness. For example& pu+lic promulgation in understanda+le terms ma% +e a necessar% condition #or
e##icac%& +ut it is also a moral ideal7 it is morall% o+*ectiona+le #or a state to en#orce rules t"at "ave not +een
pu+licl% promulgated in terms reasona+l% calculated to give notice o# w"at is re-uired. imilarl%& we ta'e it
#or granted t"at it is wrong #or a state to enact retroactive rules& inconsistent rules& and rules t"at re-uire
w"at is impossi+le. Poisoning ma% "ave its internal standards o# e##icac%& +ut suc" standards are
distinguis"a+le #rom t"e principles o# legalit% in t"at t"e% con#lict wit" moral ideals.
Nevert"eless& Fuller?s principles operate internall%& not as moral ideals& +ut merel% as principles o# e##icac%.
5s Fuller would li'el% ac'nowledge& t"e existence o# a legal s%stem is consistent wit" considera+le
divergence #rom t"e principles o# legalit%. Legal standards& #or example& are necessaril% promulgated in
general terms t"at inevita+l% give rise to pro+lems o# vagueness. 5nd o##icials all too o#ten #ail to administer
t"e laws in a #air and even<"anded manner even in t"e +est o# legal s%stems. !"ese divergences ma% alwa%s
+e prima facie o+*ectiona+le& +ut t"e% are inconsistent wit" a legal s%stem onl% w"en t"e% render a legal
s%stem incapa+le o# per#orming its essential #unction o# guiding +e"avior. (nso#ar as t"ese principles are
+uilt into t"e existence conditions #or law& it is +ecause t"e% operate as e##icac% conditionsVand not +ecause
t"e% #unction as moral ideals.
Aac' to !a+le o# Fontents
Ronal D%orDin?s 5T!ir T!eor"5
Conald Dwor'in?s so<called t"ird t"eor% o# law is +est understood as a response to legal positivism& w"ic" is
essentiall% constituted +% t"ree t"eoretical commitments> t"e ocial Fact !"esis& t"e Fonventionalit% !"esis&
and t"e epara+ilit% !"esis. !"e ocial Fact !"esis asserts it is a necessar% trut" t"at legal validit% is
ultimatel% a #unction o# certain 'inds o# social #acts7 t"e idea "ere is t"at w"at ultimatel% explains t"e
validit% o# a law is t"e presence o# certain social #acts& especiall% #ormal promulgation +% a legislature.
!"e Fonventionalit% !"esis emp"asi,es law?s conventional nature& claiming t"at t"e social #acts giving rise
to legal validit% are aut"oritative in virtue o# a social convention. En t"is view& t"e criteria t"at determine
w"et"er or not an% given norm counts as a legal norm are +inding +ecause o# an implicit or explicit
agreement among o##icials. !"us& #or example& t"e ).. Fonstitution is aut"oritative in virtue o# t"e
conventional #act t"at it was #ormall% rati#ied +% all #i#t% states.
!"e epara+ilit% !"esis& at t"e most general level& simpl% denies naturalism?s Everlap !"esis7 according to
t"e epara+ilit% !"esis& t"ere is no conceptual overlap +etween t"e notions o# law and moralit%. 5s 2art
more narrowl% construes it& t"e epara+ilit% !"esis is $*ust t"e simple contention t"at it is in no sense a
necessar% trut" t"at laws reproduce or satis#% certain demands o# moralit%& t"oug" in #act t"e% "ave o#ten
done so$ 32art 1::4& 1=5<1=@4.
Dwor'in re*ects positivism?s ocial Fact !"esis on t"e ground t"at t"ere are some legal standards t"e
aut"orit% o# w"ic" cannot +e explained in terms o# social #acts. (n deciding "ard cases& #or example& *udges
o#ten invo'e moral principles t"at Dwor'in +elieves do not derive t"eir legal aut"orit% #rom t"e social
criteria o# legalit% contained in a rule o# recognition 3Dwor'in 1:99& p. 4;4.
(n &iggs v- almer& #or example& t"e court considered t"e -uestion o# w"et"er a murderer could ta'e under
t"e will o# "is victim. 5t t"e time t"e case was decided& neit"er t"e statutes nor t"e case law governing wills
expressl% pro"i+ited a murderer #rom ta'ing under "is victim?s will. Despite t"is& t"e court declined to award
t"e de#endant "is gi#t under t"e will on t"e ground t"at it would +e wrong to allow "im to pro#it #rom suc" a
grievous wrong. En Dwor'in?s view& t"e court decided t"e case +% citing $t"e principle t"at no man ma%
pro#it #rom "is own wrong as a +ac'ground standard against w"ic" to read t"e statute o# wills and in t"is
wa% *usti#ied a new interpretation o# t"at statute$ 3Dwor'in 1:99& 2:4.
En Dwor'in?s view& t"e &iggs court was not *ust reac"ing +e%ond t"e law to extralegal standards w"en it
considered t"is principle. For t"e &iggs *udges would $rig"t#ull%$ "ave +een critici,ed "ad t"e% #ailed to
consider t"is principle7 i# it were merel% an extralegal standard& t"ere would +e no rig"t#ul grounds to
critici,e a #ailure to consider it 3Dwor'in 1:99& 354. 5ccordingl%& Dwor'in concludes t"at t"e +est
explanation #or t"e propriet% o# suc" criticism is t"at principles are part o# t"e law.
Furt"er& Dwor'in maintains t"at t"e legal aut"orit% o# standards li'e t"e &iggs principle cannot derive #rom
promulgation in accordance wit" purel% #ormal re-uirements> $PeOven t"oug" principles draw support #rom
t"e o##icial acts o# legal institutions& t"e% do not "ave a simple or direct enoug" connection wit" t"ese acts to
#rame t"at connection in terms o# criteria speci#ied +% some ultimate master rule o# recognition$ 3Dwor'in
1:99& 414.
En Dwor'in?s view& t"e legal aut"orit% o# t"e &iggs principle can +e explained w"oll% in terms o# its
content. !"e &iggs principle was +inding& in part& +ecause it is a re-uirement o# #undamental #airness t"at
#igures into t"e +est moral *usti#ication #or a societ%?s legal practices considered as a w"ole. 5 moral
principle is legall% aut"oritative& according to Dwor'in& inso#ar as it maximall% conduces to t"e +est moral
*usti#ication #or a societ%?s legal practices considered as a w"ole.
Dwor'in +elieves t"at a legal principle maximall% contri+utes to suc" a *usti#ication i# and onl% i# it satis#ies
two conditions> 314 t"e principle co"eres wit" existing legal materials7 and 324 t"e principle is t"e most
morall% attractive standard t"at satis#ies 314. !"e correct legal principle is t"e one t"at ma'es t"e law t"e
moral +est it can +e. 5ccordingl%& on Dwor'in?s view& ad*udication is and s"ould +e interpretive>
PJOudges s"ould decide "ard cases +% interpreting t"e political structure o# t"eir communit% in t"e #ollowing&
per"aps special wa%> +% tr%ing to #ind t"e +est *usti#ication t"e% can #ind& in principles o# political moralit%&
#or t"e structure as a w"ole& #rom t"e most pro#ound constitutional rules and arrangements to t"e details o#&
#or example& t"e private law o# tort or contract 3Dwor'in 1:=2& 1@54.
!"ere are& t"us& two elements o# a success#ul interpretation. First& since an interpretation is success#ul
inso#ar as it *usti#ies t"e particular practices o# a particular societ%& t"e interpretation must fit wit" t"ose
practices in t"e sense t"at it co"eres wit" existing legal materials de#ining t"e practices. econd& since an
interpretation provides a moral justification #or t"ose practices& it must present t"em in t"e +est possi+le
moral lig"t.
For t"is reason& Dwor'in argues t"at a *udge s"ould strive to interpret a case in roug"l% t"e #ollowing wa%>
5 t"oug"t#ul *udge mig"t esta+lis" #or "imsel#& #or example& a roug" $t"res"old$ o# #it w"ic" an%
interpretation o# data must meet in order to +e $accepta+le$ on t"e dimension o# #it& and t"en suppose t"at i#
more t"an one interpretation o# some part o# t"e law meets t"is t"res"old& t"e c"oice among t"ese s"ould +e
made& not t"roug" #urt"er and more precise comparisons +etween t"e two along t"at dimension& +ut +%
c"oosing t"e interpretation w"ic" is $su+stantivel%$ +etter& t"at is& w"ic" +etter promotes t"e political ideals
"e t"in's correct 3Dwor'in 1:=2& 1914.
5s Dwor'in conceives it& t"en& t"e *udge must approac" *udicial decision<ma'ing as somet"ing t"at
resem+les an exercise in moral p"ilosop"%. !"us& #or example& t"e *udge must decide cases on t"e +asis o#
t"ose moral principles t"at $#igurePO in t"e soundest t"eor% o# law t"at can +e provided as a *usti#ication #or
t"e explicit su+stantive and institutional rules o# t"e *urisdiction in -uestion$ 3Dwor'in 1:99& @@4.
5nd t"is is a process& according to Dwor'in& t"at $must carr% t"e law%er ver% deep into political and moral
t"eor%.$ (ndeed& in later writings& Dwor'in goes so #ar as to claim& somew"at implausi+l%& t"at $an% *udge?s
opinion is itsel# a piece o# legal p"ilosop"%& even w"en t"e p"ilosop"% is "idden and t"e visi+le argument is
dominated +% citation and lists o# #acts$ 3Dwor'in 1:=@& :;4.
Dwor'in +elieves "is t"eor% o# *udicial o+ligation is a conse-uence o# w"at "e calls t"e Cig"ts !"esis&
according to w"ic" *udicial decisions alwa%s en#orce pre<existing rig"ts> $even w"en no settled rule
disposes o# t"e case& one part% ma% nevert"eless "ave a rig"t to win. (t remains t"e *udge?s dut%& even in
"ard cases& to discover w"at t"e rig"ts o# t"e parties are& not to invent new rig"ts retrospectivel%$ 3Dwor'in
1:99& =14.
(n $2ard Fases&$ Dwor'in distinguis"es +etween two 'inds o# legal argument. 5rguments o# polic% $*usti#%
a political decision +% s"owing t"at t"e decision advances or protects some collective goal o# t"e communit%
as a w"ole$ 3Dwor'in 1:99& =24. (n contrast& arguments o# principle $*usti#% a political decision +% s"owing
t"at t"e decision respects or secures some individual or group rig"t$ 3Dwor'in 1:99& =24.
En Dwor'in?s view& w"ile t"e legislature ma% legitimatel% enact laws t"at are *usti#ied +% arguments o#
polic%& courts ma% not pursue suc" arguments in deciding cases. For a conse-uentialist argument o# polic%
can never provide an ade-uate *usti#ication #or deciding in #avor o# one part%?s claim o# rig"t and against
anot"er part%?s claim o# rig"t. 5n appeal to a pre<existing rig"t& according to Dwor'in& can ultimatel% +e
*usti#ied onl% +% an argument o# principle. !"us& inso#ar as *udicial decisions necessaril% ad*udicate claims
o# rig"t& t"e% must ultimatel% +e +ased on t"e moral principles t"at #igure into t"e +est *usti#ication o# t"e
legal practices considered as a w"ole.
Notice t"at Dwor'in?s views on legal principles and *udicial o+ligation are inconsistent wit" all t"ree o#
legal positivism?s core commitments. 8ac" contradicts t"e Fonventionalit% !"esis inso#ar as *udges are
+ound to interpret posited law in lig"t o# unposited moral principles. 8ac" contradicts t"e ocial Fact !"esis
+ecause t"ese moral principles count as part o# a communit%?s law regardless o# w"et"er t"e% "ave +een
#ormall% promulgated. Most importantl%& Dwor'in?s view contradicts t"e epara+ilit% !"esis in t"at it seems
to impl% t"at some norms are necessaril% valid in virtue o# t"eir moral content. (t is "is denial o# t"e
epara+ilit% !"esis t"at places Dwor'in in t"e naturalist camp.
An O#er#ie% of Natural La% T!eor"
3" Jonat!an Dol!ent"4 P!,D,
Natural law t"eor% is one o# t"e most important t"eories in t"e p"ilosop"% o# Flassical Cealism. (t is also
widel% misunderstood +% man% w"o "ave eit"er not ta'en t"e time to stud% it or "ave "eard o# it and
dismissed it as a $medieval$ relic. /"at ( want to do "ere is merel% s'etc" out a general presentation o#
natural law t"eor%& wit" t"e "ope t"at t"e reader will +ecome interested enoug" to pursue #urt"er stud% o# it.
( will provide a lin' to more in<dept" resources at t"e end o# t"is essa%.
Ae#ore we get into an overview o# t"e nature o# natural law t"eor% itsel#& let?s ta'e a +rie# loo' at some
"istor%.
!"e concept o# natural law "as ta'en several #orms. !"e idea +egan wit" t"e ancient Iree's? conception o# a
universe governed in ever% particular +% an eternal& immuta+le law and in t"eir distinction +etween w"at is
*ust +% nature and *ust +% convention. toicism provided t"e most complete classical #ormulation o# natural
law. !"e toics argued t"at t"e universe is governed +% reason& or rational principle7 t"e% #urt"er argued t"at
all "umans "ave reason wit"in t"em and can t"ere#ore 'now and o+e% its law. Aecause "uman +eings "ave
t"e #acult% o# c"oice 3a #ree will4& t"e% will not necessaril% o+e% t"e law7 i# t"e% act in accordance wit"
reason& "owever& t"e% will +e $#ollowing nature.$
F"ristian p"ilosop"ers readil% adapted toic natural law t"eor%& identi#%ing natural law wit" t"e law o# Iod.
For !"omas 5-uinas& natural law is t"at part o# t"e eternal law o# Iod 3$t"e reason o# divine wisdom$4
w"ic" is 'nowa+le +% "uman +eings +% means o# t"eir powers o# reason. 2uman& or positive& law is t"e
application o# natural law to particular social circumstances. Li'e t"e toics& 5-uinas +elieved t"at a
positive law t"at violates natural law is not true law.
/it" t"e seculari,ation o# societ% resulting #rom t"e Cenaissance and Ce#ormation& natural law t"eor% #ound
a new +asis in "uman reason. !"e 19t"<centur% Dutc" *urist 2ugo Irotius +elieved t"at "umans +% nature
are not onl% reasona+le +ut social. !"us t"e rules t"at are $natural$ to t"em << t"ose dictated +% reason alone
are t"ose w"ic" ena+le t"em to live in "armon% wit" one anot"er. From t"is argument& +% t"e wa%& Irotius
developed t"e #irst compre"ensive t"eor% o# international law.
Natural law t"eor% eventuall% gave rise to a concept o# $natural rig"ts.$ Jo"n Loc'e argued t"at "uman
+eings in t"e state o# nature are #ree and e-ual& %et insecure in t"eir #reedom. /"en t"e% enter societ% t"e%
surrender onl% suc" rig"ts as are necessar% #or t"eir securit% and #or t"e common good. 8ac" individual
retains #undamental prerogatives drawn #rom natural law relating to t"e integrit% o# person and propert%
3natural rig"ts4. !"is natural rig"ts t"eor% provided a p"ilosop"ical +asis #or +ot" t"e 5merican and Frenc"
revolutions. !"omas Je##erson used t"e natural law t"eor% to *usti#% "is trinit% o# $inaliena+le rig"ts$ w"ic"
were stated in t"e )nited tates Declaration o# (ndependence.
During t"e 1:t" centur% natural law t"eor% lost in#luence as utilitarianism and Aent"amism& positivism&
materialism& and t"e "istorical sc"ool o# *urisprudence +ecame dominant. (n t"e 2;t" centur%& "owever&
natural law t"eor% "as received new attention& partl% in reaction to t"e rise o# totalitarianism and an
increased interest in "uman rig"ts t"roug"out t"e world. /it" t"is contemporar% interest in mind& let?s now
turn to our attention to t"e natural law t"eor% as understood +% t"e tradition o# Flassical Cealism.
/"at do we mean +% $natural law$0 (n its simplest de#inition& natural law is t"at $unwritten law$ t"at is
more or less t"e same #or ever%one ever%w"ere. !o +e more exact& natural law is t"e concept o# a +od% o#
moral principles t"at is common to all "uman'ind and& as generall% posited& is recogni,a+le +% "uman
reason alone. Natural law is t"ere#ore distinguis"ed #rom << and provides a standard #or << positive law& t"e
#ormal legal enactments o# a particular societ%.
ince law must alwa%s +e some dictate o# reason& natural law also will +e some dictate o# reason. (n #act& it
is law discovered +% "uman reason. Eur normal and natural grasp o# t"e natural law is e##ected +% reason&
t"at is& +% t"e t"in'ing mind& and in t"is service reason is sometimes called $conscience.$ /e& in all our
"uman acts& inevita+l% see t"em in t"eir relation to t"e natural law& and we mentall% pronounce upon t"eir
agreement or disagreement wit" t"e natural law. uc" a pronouncement ma% +e called a $*udgment o#
conscience.$ !"e $norm$ o# moralit% is t"e natural law as applied +% conscience. Lastl%& we can sa% t"at t"e
natural law is t"e disposition o# t"ings as 'nown +% our "uman reason and to w"ic" we must con#orm
ourselves i# we are to reali,e our proper end or $good$ as "uman +eings.
To sum it up4 t!en4 %e can sa" t!at t!e natural la%*
is not made +% "uman +eings7
is +ased on t"e structure o# realit% itsel#7
is t"e same #or all "uman +eings and at all times7
is an unc"anging rule or pattern w"ic" is t"ere #or "uman +eings to discover7
is t"e naturall% 'nowa+le moral law7
is a means +% w"ic" "uman +eings can rationall% guide t"emselves to t"eir good.
(t is interesting to note t"at virtuall% ever%one seems to "ave some 'nowledge o# natural law even +e#ore
suc" 'nowledge is codi#ied and #ormali,ed. 8ven %oung c"ildren ma'e an appeal to $#air pla%&$ demand t"at
t"ings +e $#air and s-uare&$ and older c"ildren and adults o#ten appl% t"e $golden rule.$ /"en doing so& t"e%
are spontaneousl% invo'ing t"e natural law. !"is is w"% man% proponents o# t"e natural law t"eor% sa% it is
t"e law w"ic" is $written upon t"e "earts o# men.$ !"ese are examples o# w"at is called $connatural
'nowledge&$ t"at is& a 'nowledge w"ic">
#ollows on t"e $lived experience$ o# t"e trut"7
is t"e living contact o# t"e intellect wit" realit% itsel#7
is not alwa%s given expression in concepts7
ma% +e o+scure to t"e 'nower7
is overlaid wit" elements #rom t"e a##ective or #eeling side o# man?s nature.
Now& our re#lection on our own conduct gives rise to t"e explicit #ormulation o# t"e precepts o# t"e natural
law. /e as "uman +eings put our $commonsense$ notions o# natural law under $critical examination.$ (n
ot"er words& our natural impulses toward $#air pla%&$ *ustice& and so on are su+*ect to a rigorous
investigation and rationali,ation. 5nd our understanding o# natural law +ecomes more precise as we
consider and codi#% t"e principles or precepts o# natural law. !"e primar% precept o# natural law will +e t"e
most +asic principle a+out "uman action t"at can +e #ormulated.
!"ose readers #amiliar wit" Flassical Cealism will recall t"at t"ere is an a+solutel% #irst and indemonstra+le
principle in t"e speculative order o# t"ings. !"at is& t"ere is an a+solutel% +asic& sel#<evident trut" o# realit%
upon w"ic" we +uild our entire metap"%sics w"ic" serves as t"e #oundation #or our view o# t"e ultimate
structure o# realit%. !"is is t"e Principle o# Fontradiction& #rom w"ic" we derive ot"er +asic principles suc"
as (dentit% and 8xcluded Middle. trictl% spea'ing& t"e Principle o# Fontradiction cannot +e $proved.$ (t
must +e accepted as an a+solute $intuitive$ or sel#<evident trut"& t"e trut" o# w"ic" is s"own +% an anal%sis
o# t"e terms o# t"e Principle and t"e impossi+ilit% o# t"in'ing t"e opposite.
Natural law t"eor% is o# t"e $practical order$ o# t"ings and t"e #irst principle o# t"e practical order is a
principle t"at directs "uman acts in all t"eir operations& and it will +e concerned wit" t"e $good&$ since we
act in terms o# w"at a least seems good to us. !"ere#ore& t"e primar% principle o# t"e practical order << t"e
#irst precept o# natural law << is a #ormulation +ased upon t"e notion o# t"e good and is stated in t"e
#ollowing wa%> !"e $good$ 3according to reason4 must +e done& and evil 3w"at is contrar% to reason4 must
+e avoided. !"e simplest statement o# t"is precept is& o# course& $Do good and avoid evil.$
5lt"oug" we rarel% express t"e precept o# $Do good and avoid evil$ explicitl% 3*ust as we rarel% state t"e
Principle o# Fontradiction explicitl% in dail% li#e4& nevert"eless we alwa%s act in terms o# suc" a precept.
!"is #act points to t"e #undamental trut" o# suc" a precept& and indicates "ow it expresses somet"ing
$natural$ to "uman +eings. 5 "uman +eing naturall% inclines to see' w"at appears good to reason& and
naturall% s"rin's #rom w"at appears to +e evil. 2ence& t"e *usti#ication o# spea'ing o# t"is +asic moral law as
$natural$ law.
)pon #urt"er re#lection& we can distinguis"& wit"in natural law& primar% and secondar% precepts. !"e
primar% precepts will correspond to t"e order o# natural inclinations in "uman +eings. !"e most #undamental
inclination o# all& $Do good and avoid evil&$ will give rise to ot"er primar% precepts suc" as t"e natural
inclination to sel#<preservation& to live in societ%& to avoid "arm to ot"ers& and to 'now trut"s a+out t"e
realit% we live in and our own "uman nature. !"ese primar% precepts are unc"angea+le to t"e extent t"e%
concern t"e primar% ends o# t"e natural inclinations in"erent in all "uman +eings.
!"e primar% precepts are ver% general in t"eir #ormulation. !"e secondar% precepts& on t"e ot"er "and& are
more particular or speci#ic and are concerned wit" t"ings to w"ic" we are not inclined so immediatel%.
5mong t"ese are suc" precepts as t"ose regarding t"e education o# c"ildren& and t"e sta+ilit% o# #amil% li#e&
and t"e demands o# "ospitalit%. En t"e negative side& we also "ave secondar% precepts regarding t"e neglect
o# c"ildren& deli+erate in*ur% to ot"ers& and so on.
Do we 'now ever%t"ing a+out t"e natural law0 !"is is a common -uestion as'ed and a good one. !"e
answer is a simple $No.$ !"e discover% o# t"e natural law is a continuousl% un#olding enterprise. Just as it
too' "uman +eings a long time to separate out and clari#% t"e laws o# p"%sical nature& so too #or t"e laws o#
moral nature. !"e passage o# time and additional p"ilosop"ical re#lection alwa%s raises new issues in natural
law t"eor%. For instance& slaver% was once accepted as normal and natural even +% man% w"o su+scri+ed to
natural law t"eor%. /e now 'now t"at slaver% violates t"e natural law. ociet% once accepted *udicial torture
as +eing normal and natural. /e now 'now t"at *udicial slaver% violates t"e natural law. 5nd& personall%& (
am convinced t"at one da% our societ% will $discover$ t"at capital punis"ment violates natural law and we
will a+olis" it.
!"e o+vious conclusion "ere is t"at our 'nowledge o# natural law& particularl% regarding its secondar%
precepts& is incomplete& and pro+a+l% will alwa%s +e incomplete. /e& as civili,ed and rational "uman
+eings& will alwa%s +e involved in a $critical examination$ o# our actions in t"e practical order. Eut o# t"is
re#lection will come new and re#ined $trut"s$ regarding et"ics and moral p"ilosop"%. (n #act& ( suspect t"at
we are now in a time w"en t"e most important decisions we ma'e as a societ% will +e t"ose in et"ics and
moral p"ilosop"% 3t"in' $+ioet"ics$ and $weapons o# mass destruction$4. !"is is one reason w"% ( "ave no
reservations a+out suggesting t"at all students in our institutions o# "ig"er education need a good dose o#
p"ilosop"ical studies& especiall%& o# course& in t"e tradition o# Flassical Cealism.
( "ope %ou "ave some general 'nowledge o# natural law t"eor% as a result o# t"is +rie# overview. Moreover&
( "ope ( "ave interested %ou to see' more 'nowledge a+out t"is #ascinating t"eor%.
(# %ou want to learn more& ( "ave suggested some resources w"ic" s"ould "elp %ou in %our investigation.
ee> Dr. Dol"ent%?s Cecommended Aoo's"el# For Natural Law !"eor%.
NATURAL LAE
(n *urisprudence and political p"ilosop"%& a s%stem o# rig"t or *ustice common to all "uman'ind and derived
#rom nature rat"er t"an #rom t"e rules o# societ%& or positive law.
!"e concept can +e traced to 5ristotle& w"o "eld t"at w"at was .*ust +% nature1 was not alwa%s t"e same as
w"at was .*ust +% law.1 (n one #orm or anot"er& t"e existence o# natural law was asserted +% t"e Stoics 3see
toicism4& Ficero& t"e Coman *urists& t. Paul& t. 5ugustine& Iratian& t. !"omas 5-uinas& Jo"n Duns
cotus& /illiam o# Ec'"am& and Francisco uWre,. (n t"e modern period& 2ugo Irotius insisted on t"e
validit% o# natural law even on t"e assumption t"at Iod does not exist& and !"omas 2o++es de#ined a law o#
nature as .a precept o# general rule #ound out +% reason& +% w"ic" a man is #or+idden to do t"at w"ic" is
destructive o# "is li#e.1 2o++es attempted to construct an edi#ice o# law +% rational deduction #rom a
"%pot"etical .state o# nature1 and a social contract o# consent +etween rulers and su+*ects. Jo"n Loc'e
departed #rom 2o++es in descri+ing t"e state o# nature as an earl% societ% in w"ic" #ree and e-ual men
o+serve t"e natural law. Jean<Jac-ues Cousseau postulated a savage w"o was virtuous in isolation and
actuated +% two principles .prior to reason1> sel#<preservation and compassion. !"e aut"ors o# t"e )..
Declaration o# (ndependence re#er onl% +rie#l% to .t"e Laws o# Nature1 +e#ore citing e-ualit% and ot"er
.unaliena+le1 rig"ts as .sel#<evident.1 !"e Frenc" Declaration o# t"e Cig"ts o# Man and o# t"e Fiti,en
asserts li+ert%& propert%& securit%& and resistance to oppression as .imprescripti+le natural rig"ts.1 (nterest in
t"e concept o# natural law declined dramaticall% in t"e 1:t" centur%& partl% as a result o# s'eptical attac's +%
Jerem% Aent"am and ot"er proponents o# utilitarianism7 it was revived in t"e mid<2;t" centur% in lig"t o#
t"e crimes committed +% t"e Na,i regime during /orld /ar ((. 'epticism o# natural law and natural rig"ts
remained strong& "owever& and later writers almost invaria+l% tal'ed o# "uman rig"ts rat"er t"an natural
rig"ts.
STOICIS(
c"ool o# p"ilosop"% in Ireco<Coman anti-uit%.
(nspired +% t"e teac"ing o# ocrates and Diogenes o# inope& toicism was #ounded at 5t"ens +% Xeno o#
Fitium c- 3;; AF and was in#luential t"roug"out t"e Ireco<Coman world until at least 5D 2;;. (t stressed
dut% and "eld t"at& t"roug" reason& man'ind can come to regard t"e universe as governed +% #ate and&
despite appearances& as #undamentall% rational& and t"at& in regulating one?s li#e& one can emulate t"e
grandeur o# t"e calm and order o# t"e universe +% learning to accept events wit" a stern and tran-uil mind
and to ac"ieve a lo#t% moral wort". (ts teac"ings "ave +een transmitted to later generations largel% t"roug"
t"e surviving +oo's o# Ficero and t"e Coman toics eneca& 8pictetus& and Marcus 5urelius.
Jurisprudence ma% +e divided into t"ree +ranc"es> anal%tical& sociological& and t"eoretical. !"e anal%tical
+ranc" articulates axioms& de#ines terms& and prescri+es t"e met"ods t"at +est ena+le one to view t"e legal
order as an internall% consistent& logical s%stem. !"e sociological +ranc" examines t"e actual e##ects o# t"e
law wit"in societ% and t"e in#luence o# social p"enomena on t"e su+stantive and procedural aspects o# law.
!"e t"eoretical +ranc" evaluates and critici,es law in terms o# t"e ideals or goals postulated #or it.
T!omas )o33es
1orn April 74 -7<<4 Eestport4 Eilts!ire4 En$,
ie Dec, 24 -9684 )ar%icD )all4 Der3"s!ire
8nglis" p"ilosop"er and political t"eorist.
!"e son o# a vicar w"o a+andoned "is #amil%& 2o++es was raised +% "is uncle. 5#ter graduating #rom t"e
)niversit% o# Ex#ord "e +ecame a tutor and traveled wit" "is pupil in 8urope& w"ere "e engaged Ialileo in
p"ilosop"ical discussions on t"e nature o# motion. 2e later turned to political t"eor%& +ut "is support #or
a+solutism put "im
SOCIAL CONTRACT
5ctual or "%pot"etical compact +etween t"e ruled and t"eir rulers.
!"e original inspiration #or t"e notion ma% derive #rom t"e +i+lical covenant +etween Iod and 5+ra"am&
+ut it is most closel% associated wit" t"e writings o# !"omas 2o++es& Jo"n Loc'e& and Jean<Jac-ues
Cousseau. 2o++es argued t"at t"e a+solute power o# t"e sovereign is *usti#ied +% a "%pot"etical social
contract in w"ic" t"e people agree to o+e% "im in all matters in return #or a guarantee o# peace and securit%&
w"ic" t"e% lac' in t"e warli'e .state o# nature1 posited to exist +e#ore t"e contract is made. Loc'e +elieved
t"at rulers also were o+liged to protect private propert% and t"e rig"t to #reedom o# t"oug"t& speec"& and
wors"ip. Cousseau "eld t"at in t"e state o# nature people are unwarli'e +ut also undeveloped in reasoning
and moralit%7 in surrendering t"eir individual #reedom& t"e% ac-uire political li+ert% and civil rig"ts wit"in a
s%stem o# laws +ased on t"e .general will1 o# t"e governed. !"e idea o# t"e social contract in#luenced t"e
s"apers o# t"e 5merican Cevolution and t"e Frenc" Cevolution and t"e constitutions t"at #ollowed t"em.
T!omas )o33es an Jo!n LocDe
T!omas )o33es an Jo!n LocDe4 %!ere t!e" a$ree an isa$ree concernin$ nature4 natural la%4
an t!e nature of man in a state of %ar,
!"omas 2o++es and Jo"n Loc'e were two main political p"ilosop"ers during t"e seventeent" centur%.
2o++es is t"e well 'nown aut"or o# Leviat"an& and Loc'e is t"e aut"or o# 5n 8ssa% Foncerning 2uman
)nderstanding. (n t"eir essa%s& +ot" men address t"e c"aracteristics o# man& natural law& and t"e purpose
and structure o# government. !"e two men "ave ver% di##erent opinions o# t"e c"aracteristics o# man.
2o++es sees man as +eing evil& w"ereas Loc'e views man in a muc" more optimistic lig"t. !"e% +ot" agree
t"at all men are e-ual according to natural law. 2owever& t"eir ideas o# natural law di##er greatl%. 2o++es
sees natural law as a state o# war in w"ic" ever% man is a enem% to ever% man. Loc'e on t"e ot"er "and&
sees natural law as a state o# e-ualit% and #reedom. Loc'e t"ere#ore +elieves t"at government is necessar% in
order to preserve natural law& and on t"e contrar%& 2o++es sees government as necessar% in order to control
natural law.
2o++es and Loc'e see man'inds natural c"aracteristics in two ver% di##erent wa%s. 2o++es descri+es t"e
li#e o# man as solitar%& poor& nast%& +rutis"& and s"ort. 2e o+viousl% does not t"in' ver% "ig"l% man. 2e also
sa%s t"at it is "ard #or men to +elieve t"ere +e man% so wise as t"emselves& expressing "is discontent wit"
"ow sel#is" men are. Fonversel%& Loc'e views man'inds natural c"aracteristics muc" more optimisticall%.
Loc'e sees men as +eing governed according to reason. 2e perceives men to +e t"in'ing& capa+le
individuals t"at can coexist peace#ull%. 2o++es and Loc'e disagree on man'inds natural c"aracteristics& +ut
t"e degree o# t"eir disagreement grows muc" larger wit" respect to natural law.
!"e main t"ing t"at 2o++es and Loc'e can seem to agree on& wit" respect to natural law& is t"at all men
are e-ual in nature. For 2o++es& t"is e-ualit% exists in a state o# war& in w"ic" ever% man "as a rig"t to ever%
t"ing. 2e terms t"is state o# war& a state o# e-ualit%& +ecause even t"e wea'est "as strengt" enoug" to 'ill t"e
strongest. (n 2o++ess opinion& no one is superior& +ecause t"e% are all e-ual in t"eir level o# rottenness.
Loc'e agrees t"at in natural law& no one is superior. 2owever "e writes& t"e state all men are naturall% inis a
state o# per#ect #reedom e-ualit% and li+ert%& displa%ing "is +elie# t"at men are sensi+le +% nature& and can
exist "appil% according to natural law& wit"out t"e need #or constant war. Loc'e does admit t"at war is
sometimes necessar%& +ut t"at one ma% onl% destro% a man w"o ma'es war upon "im. (n general& "e
+elieves t"at it is +ene#icial #or "umans to #ollow natural law.
ince natural law is good& and not evil #or Loc'e& it is t"ere#ore t"e role o# government to preserve natural
law. For 2o++es on t"e ot"er "and& government must exist in order to control natural law. 2o++es reasons
t"at people will a+ide +% t"e laws t"e government sets& #or #ear o# some evil conse-uence. 2o++es points out
t"e sel#is" reasons #or w"% man will #ollow government in order to explain "ow government is a+le to wor'&
wit" men +eing so naturall% evil. Loc'e sees government& as merel% a preservation o# t"at w"ic" is alread%
good. Loc'e +elieves t"at people are willing to unite under a #orm o# government so as to preserve t"eir
lives& li+erties and estates& or in ot"er words& t"eir propert%. ince natural law is alread% good& government
not onl% preserves natural law& +ut also wor's to en"ance it.
!"e ideas presented +% 2o++es and Loc'e are o#ten in opposition. 2o++es tends to ta'e a muc" more
pessimistic stance7 viewing men as evil& natural law as a state o# war& and government as somet"ing t"at can
wipe out natural law. Loc'e ta'es a muc" more optimistic stance7 viewing men as #ree and e-ual and seeing
government as onl% a preservation o# t"e state t"e% are naturall% in. Despite t"e di##erence in t"eir
arguments& t"eir ideas were revolutionar% #or t"eir time. !"e interest t"e% too' in mans natural
c"aracteristics& natural law& and t"e role o# government& provided inspiration #or& and was t"e #ocus o# man%
literar% wor's t"roug"out t"e 8nlig"tenment.
(ARFIST JURISPRUDENCE
TUTOR* C)RIS 1E)RENS
STUDENT* DA'ID RISSTRO(* 8-:9-:7
'n the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are
independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of
their material forces of production- The totality of these relations constitute the economic structure of
society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond
definite forms of social consciousness-
Barl Marx& reface to 1 Contribution to the Criti2ue of olitical 3conomy& 521.
1
Marxist *urisprudence posits t"at legal relations are determined +% t"e economic +ase o# particular 'inds o#
societ% and modes o# production.
2
Marxist t"oug"t6s primar% #ocus rests on political econom% and t"e
corresponding power relations wit"in societ%& providing t"e most extensive criti-ue to date o# li+eral
tradition on w"ic" man% o# our legal presuppositions are #ounded. !o t"is end& t"is essa% examines law& its
structure& motivation and conse-uences #or *ustice and rig"ts #rom a Marxian *urisprudential perspective.
M5CS(M 5ND L5/
4our ideas are but the outgrowth of the conditions of your bourgeois production and bourgeois property,
just as your jurisprudence is but the will of your class made into a law for all, a will, whose essential
character and direction are determined by the economical conditions of existence in your class-
Barl Marx& The Communist Manifesto& 24.
Law is not o# central concern to Marxists *urisprudentialists& as law in t"e capitalist mode o# production is
seen as an instrument o# class oppression perpetuated as a conse-uence o# its particular "istorical& social and
economic structures. (ndeed& wis"ing to avoid li+eral predisposition towards legal #etis"ism& Marxists den%
t"e degree o# importance *urisprudence t%picall% a##ords law in anal%ses o# t"e composition and
determination o# social #ormations.
3

/25! ( M5CS(M0
Marxist t"eories o# political econom%& expounded upon t"e notions o# Barl Marx 31=1=<=34 and Friedric"
8ngels 31=2;<:54& consider law an instrument o# class oppression t"at +ene#its t"e ruling class t"roug"
oppression o# t"e proletariat. !"e common law s%stem o# criminal and civil law& w"ic" protects personal
and private propert% rig"ts& as well as #acilitating predica+ilit% in social li#e& is regarded as .no more t"an a
s%stem o# coercion designed to protect +ourgeois owners"ip o# t"e means o# production1.
4

Het& despite Marx and 8ngels6 #ailure to develop a s%stematic approac" to law
5
& and claims o# #ailure in
8astern 8urope and t"e oviet )nion& Marxism6s materialist emp"asis& particularl% concerning t"e notion o#
alienation and its conse-uences as outlined +% Ellman
@
& assists its contemporar% paucit%.
9

2(!EC(F5L M5!8C(5L(M
Men have history because they must produce their life, and because they must produce it moreover in a
certain way5 this is determined by their physical organisation6 their consciousness is determined in just the
same way-
Marx& The (erman 'deology& 4:.
1
Marx, K., Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy in
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels Selected Works, Moscow: Proress Press,
!"#" $%!.
2
&albus, '., Commo(ity )orm an( *eal )orm in +easons, C., The Sociology
of Law, ,oronto: &utterworths, !"-# #..
3
Collins, /., Marxism and Law, 0xfor(: 0xfor( 1ni2ersity Press, !"#- "#.
4
&arry, 3., An Introduction to Modern olitical Theory, *on(on: Macmillan,
!"#" $..
5
Cain, M., an( /unt, A., !"-", Marx and Engels on Law, *on(on: Aca(emic
Press.
6
0llman, &.,!"-4, Alienation! Marx"s #once$tion of Man in #a$italist Society,
Cambri(e: Cambri(e 1ni2ersity Press.
7
Collins, /., o5 cit., !6.
!"e determinist relations"ip +etween t"e economic +ase and social superstructure& 'nown as 2istorical
Materialism& is #irst descri+ed in The (erman 'deology.
=
2istoric materialism contends t"at t"e catal%st
+e"ind societal evolution is materiall% determined& +eing predicated on contradictions +etween t"e #orces
and means o# production. 5s .it is not consciousness t"at determines li#e& +ut li#e t"at determines
consciousness1
:
& law is a re#lection o# t"e economic +ase& rat"er t"an t"e reserve as li+erals suc" as Dwor'in
would propose.
)nder increasing industrialisation Marx #oresaw cr%stallisation o# societ% into two classes7 +ourgeoisie and
proletariat. !"ese relations o# production developed due to particular #orces o# production under t"e
capitalist mode o# production t"at coerced t"e +ourgeoisie to extract surplus value as pro#it #rom t"e
proletariat. Laws& as Marx detailed in Capital& as one element o# t"e social superstructure& assisted in
#orcing down wages.
1;

Follins c"aracterises two Marxist approac"es7 crude materialism& in w"ic" law is simpl% a re#lection o# t"e
economic +ase7 and secondl%& class instrumentalism7 in w"ic" rules emerge +ecause t"e ruling class want
t"em to.
11
!"is distinction continues as an area o# de+ate& as demonstrated +% E?Malle%6s attac's o#
Muinne% and F"am+liss6 crude materialist claim t"at law is a direct tool o# power#ul classes or groups&
#avouring t"e more interactionist& and less con#lict premised t"eor% o# legislative c"ange.
12
!"e Celative
5utonom% !"esis is suc" a t"eor%. Fontemporar% Marxists suc" as Marcuse& suggest mec"anisms
analogous to t"e 7actory 1cts and %agrancy 1cts remain instruments o# t"e ruling class perpetuating
conditions rein#orcing t"is arrangement& especiall% in relation to t"e alienating nature o# modern
tec"nological rationalit%.
13
A58 5ND )P8C!C)F!)C8 (N !28 F5P(!5L(! MED8 EF PCED)F!(EN
Muc" o# our law& suc" as Fontract& Propert% and Fommercial Law& is predicated on t"e existence o# t"e
capitalist mode o# production. 5s Marx6s ma*or pro*ect was t"e criti-ue o# capitalism& irrespective o# a
+elie# in revolution& Marxism "as a great deal to noti#% us o# in our contemporar% *urisprudence. Marxism
postulates t"at in t"e social production o# t"eir existence& people& independent o# t"eir will& enter into
de#inite relations o# production appropriate to a given stage in t"e development o# t"e materials #orces o#
production.
14
Fonse-uentl% t"e societal superstructure& including +ut not dominated +% law& amongst ot"er
"egemonic devices& is determined +% t"e economic +ase and t"e organisation o# power in societ%.
15
Marxist
*urisprudence concentrates on t"e relations"ip +etween law and particular "istorical& social and economic
structures& seeing law& unli'e li+eral t"eor%& as "aving no legitimate primac%. Fre-uentl% encountered legal
rules and doctrine& argue Iramsci
1@
and 5lt"usser
19
& esta+lis" modern li+eral *urisprudential "egemon%.
1=

8
Marx, K., an( Enels, )., !"-4, The %erman Ideology, Moscow: Proress
Press.
9
Marx, K., The %erman Ideology, Moscow: Proress Publishers, !"-4 7%.
10
Marx, K., &loo(y *eislation aainst the Ex5ro5riate(, from the en( of the
!$th. century: )orcin 8own 9aes by Acts of Parliament in #a$ital& '()*
4#4.
11
Collins, /., Marxism and Law, 0xfor(: 0xfor( 1ni2ersity Press, !"#- %7.
12
0Malley, P., ,heories on :tructure ;ersus Causal 8etermination in
,omasic <e(.= Legislation and Society in Australia, Allen an( 1nwin, !"#6
!76.
13
Marcuse, /., +ne,-imensional Man, &oston: &eacon Press, !"4# x2.
14
Marx. K., Preface ,o A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy in
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels Selected Works, !"#" $%!.
15
Collins, /., o5 cit., ".
16
>ramsci, A., Selections from the rison .ote/ooks, *on(on: *awrence an(
9ishart. !"-! !"$.
17
Althusser, *., For Marx, *on(on: 3ew *eft &oo?s, !"-- !!7.
18
Collins, /., Marxism and Law, 0xfor( 1ni2ersity Press, !"#% $6.
F(8N!(F(F EF(5L(M
Marxist epistemolog%& wit" dialectic materialism as t"e centrepiece o# Marxism6s scienti#ic claim& proclaims
in real li#e& w"ere speculation ends& positive science7 t"e representation o# t"e practical activit%& o# t"e
practical progress o# development o# men& +egins.
1:
/"ilst Marx6s materialism does not re#er to t"e
assumption o# a logicall% argued ontological position& Marx adopts an undou+tedl% Cealist position& in
w"ic" ideas are t"e product o# t"e "uman +rain in sensor% transaction wit" a 'nowa+le material world.
2;

!"ese claims contrast wit" t"ose o# natural law%ers suc" as 5-uinas w"o +elieve religion s"ould
normativel% guide law7 t"ose desiring utilitarian tendencies suc" as 5ustin and Aent"am7 or o+*ective
consistenc% as some positivists suc" as 2art& or per"aps integrit%& as per"aps onl% Dwor'in can #ull%
endorse. Nevert"eless& w"ilst de+ate as to t"e scienti#ic credentials o# Marxism continue& Follins claims
Marxism6s desire #or class reductionism to explain t"e d%namic interaction +etween man and nature ris's
misconstruing t"e diversit% o# social p"enomena in order to con#irm t"e Grigid s%stemic #ramewor' o#
"istorical materialism6.
21
L5/ 5ND !28 D(F!5!EC2(P EF !28 PCEL8!5C(5!
Law, morality, religion, are to him so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush as many
bourgeois interests-
Barl Marx& The Communist Manifesto& 1=
Marxism saw development o# t"e relations o# production dialecticall%& as +ot" inevita+le& and creating
"ostilit%. 5ccelerated +% increased class consciousness& as t"e contradictions o# capitalism per#orate t"e
+ourgeois "egemon%& inevita+le revolution and a dictators"ip o# t"e proletariat would #acilitate .socialised
production upon a predetermined plan.1
22
Iiven t"e scienti#ic nature o# 2istoric Materialism& and upon
recognising t"e role t"e state and its laws suppl%& t"e proletariat will sei,e political power and turn t"e
means o# production into state propert%
23
& t"en according to Marxist *urisprudence& .5s soon as t"ere is no
longer an% class to +e "eld in su+*ection7 as soon as class rule and t"e individual struggle #or existence K
are removed& not"ing more remains to +e repressed.1
24

FEMM)N(M 5ND !28 8ND EF L5/
!"e meaning o# "istor%& t"at man6s destin% lies in creation o# a Fommunist societ% w"ere .law will wit"er
awa%1
25
& as men experience a "ig"er stage o# +eing amounting to t"e realisation o# true #reedom& will a#ter
transition t"roug" ocialism& +e ac"ieved.
J)!(F8 5ND C(I2!
Communism abolishes eternal truths, it abolishes all religion, and all morality, instead of constituting them
on a new basis-
Barl Marx& The Communist Manifesto& 24
Marxism argues t"ere is no a+solute concept o# *ustice& *ustice +eing dependent on t"e re-uirements o# a
given mode o# production.
2@
Lu'es claims Marx +elieves *ustice& .Does not provide a set o# independent
19
Marx, K., The %erman Ideology, Moscow: Proress Publishers, !"-4 .#.
20
>i((ens, A., #a$italism and Modern Social Theory0 An Analysis of the
writings of Marx& -urkheim and We/er, Cambri(e: Cambri(e 1ni2ersity
Press, !"-! %!.
21
Collins, /., o5 cit., 7$.
22
Enels, )., Socialism0 1to$ian and Scienti2c, Moscow: Proress Publishers:
!"$7 -".
23
'bi(., -..
24
'bi(., -..
25
Marx, K., The %erman Ideology, Moscow Proress Press, !"-4 $!.
26
9ac?s, +., 3uris$rudence, *on(on: &lac?stone Press, !"#- !-$.
rational standards +% w"ic" to measure social relations& +ut must itsel# alwa%s in turn +e explained as arising
#rom and controlling t"ose relations1.
29
Marxism +elieves t"at rig"ts are simpl% a +ourgeois creation& and t"at *ustice is somet"ing onl% t"e ric" can
ac"ieve in capitalist modes o# production. 5natole France 31=:44 encapsulated t"is distinction +etween
#ormal and su+stantive *ustice as entitlement& drawing attention to .t"e ma*estic egalitarianism o# t"e law&
w"ic" #or+ids ric" and poor ali'e to sleep under +ridges& to +eg in t"e streets and to steal +read.1
2=
Formal
*ustice as entitlement t"ere#ore allows e-ual opportunit% to t"e individual wit"out an% re#erence to t"e
une-ual a+ilit% to use it& wit" rig"ts onl% +eing anti<socialist i# individuals are ta'en to +e .in"erentl% and
irredeema+l% sel#<interested.1
2:

Marxist dispute over "ow rig"ts and *ustice will operate in practice are answered +% t"e materialist
proposition t"at t"e .distri+ution o# +urdens and +ene#its s"ould not +e ta'en in accordance wit" a +oo' o#
rules& +ut in t"e lig"t o# t"e o+*ectives o# social polic%.1
3;
Famp+ell distinguis"es +etween ocialist and
Aourgeois Cig"ts& arguing t"at an interest +ased t"eor% o# rig"ts& rat"er t"an t"e contract +ased notions suc"
as Pas"u'anis6 incorporated in "is commodit% exc"ange t"eor% o# law
31
& allow protection o# t"e individual
32
&
t"ere+% negating t"e logical connection +etween rig"ts and *ustice.
33
(N )MM5CH
Marxist *urisprudence and Marxist criti-ues o# law provide invalua+le c"allenges to our t"in'ing as people
under law in a li+eral democratic societ%. !"is essa% is onl% t"e +rie#est o# introductions in a #ield ric" wit"
re#lections concerning t"e assumptions we construct into our law. /"et"er %ou accept t"e claims o# its
doctrine& its in#luence on s"aping t"e societ% we live in is more signi#icant t"an most o# us realise.
..,9 Ri$!ts Eit!out Duties
2o"#eld& a legal p"ilosop"er& emp"asised t"e relations"ip +etween rig"ts and duties and also t"e di##erence
+etween rig"t and privilege. 2o"#eld emp"asised t"at t"ere cannot +e a rig"t wit"out a dut%. Cig"t in one
person presupposes a dut% in anot"er. !"e concept o# a rig"t wit"out a dut% is meaningless. Li'ewise "e also
distinguis"ed +etween rig"ts and privileges. 5 privilege is availa+le on su##erance. (t is a discretion vested in
t"e person granting it. 5 rig"t is an entitlement. En t"is anal%sis w"at are commonl% called rig"ts to
emplo%ment& wel#are& etc& are not rig"ts. 5 rig"t to emplo%ment is meaningless +ecause t"ere is no person
w"o is under a dut% to emplo%. /el#are is not a rig"t. (t is a privilege w"ic" is given to certain persons.
/"et"er one agrees wit" t"is anal%sis or not& it is undenia+le t"at at t"e commonsense level a rig"t involves
a dut% in anot"er person or institution. 5s an essential commonsense corollar%& it must also involve an
acceptance o# t"at dut% +% t"e person w"o is su+*ect to it. (t is ironic in societ% toda% t"at w"ile more and
more people are demanding rig"ts& #ewer and #ewer people are concerned a+out duties& least o# all t"ose
w"o are most vocal in t"e assertion o# rig"ts. Iovernments& t"e 2uman Cig"ts Fommission and man% ot"er
government agencies provide dou+t#ul leaders"ip in t"is regard. !"e% are educating people a+out t"eir rig"ts
and are attempting to ma'e more and more rig"ts availa+le wit" no re#erence to logic and commonsense.
27
*u?es, :., Marxism, Morality an( @ustice in Par?inson, >., Marx and
Marxisms, Cambri(e: Cambri(e 1ni2ersity Press, !"#% !"-.
28
>amble, A., An Introduction to Modern olitical and Social Thought,
/am5shire: Macmillan, !"#- !6!.
29
Cam5bell, ,., 3ustice, *on(on: Macmillan, !"## !#".
30
Cam5bell, ,., The Left and 4ights, *on(on: +outle(e an( Kean Paul, !"#.
...
31
9arrinton, +., Pashu?anis an( the commo(ity form theory in :uarman,
8., Legality& Ideology and the State, *on(on: Aca(emic Press, !"#. 7..
32
Campbell, T. 1983, op cit., 123.
33
Ibid., 124.
Aut t"e% seem unconcerned a+out t"e need to educate people a+out duties and t"e importance o# a sense o#
responsi+ilit%.
5 dangerous +%product o# t"e wel#are state and t"e growt" o# government is a pro#ound attitudinal c"ange
in societ% w"ic" ma'es people demand more and more and contri+ute less and less. !"is trans#ormation o#
t"e social ps%c"e "as ta'en place impercepti+l% to t"e point t"at it unconsciousl% pervades t"e entire societ%.
!"e preoccupation wit" rig"ts 3particularl% state created social and economic rig"ts4 "as +ecome an
o+session. 5lt"oug" t"is is not an intrinsic evil& t"e pursuit o# rig"ts +ecomes sel# de#eating w"en it is
unaccompanied +% t"e commitment to duties. !"e pressures exercised +% interest groups "ave +ecome t"e
dominant #eature o# t"e modern era. !"ese demands come not onl% #rom t"e poor and t"e underprivileged&
+ut also #rom privileged academic& +ureaucratic& social and +usiness groups. 5t t"e same time t"ere is a
dea#ening silence on t"e -uestion o# individual responsi+ilit%.
!"e interventionist wel#are state "as +ecome a super patriarc"al entit% #rom w"ic" individual mem+ers "ave
come to expect solutions to all pro+lems. Cig"ts are +eing demanded and duties #orgotten.
!"e Ai+le emp"asises duties and responsi+ilities 3not rig"ts4. !"e !en Fommandments are duties. Duties
"ave +een more important t"an rig"ts in t"e 5ustralian 5c"ievement. !"e emp"asis on rig"ts to t"e near
exclusion o# duties and responsi+ilities in modern societ% is a c"allenge. !"ere is a grave danger in t"e pus"
towards legislative recognition o# su+*ective 3so<called4 rig"ts in response to t"e demands o# politicall%
in#luential pressure groups.
5 dut%<centred societ% is pre#era+le to a rig"t<centred societ%. (# individuals are concerned a+out t"eir
duties& responsi+ilities and o+ligations& t"e% cannot +ut +e concerned a+out t"e rig"ts and #reedoms o#
ot"ers. 5 rig"t<centred societ% is one in w"ic" individuals assert t"eir rig"ts. !"e% are encouraged +% t"e
2uman Cig"ts Fommission and li'e Fommonwealt" and tate +odies& to demand rig"ts& wit" no
consideration #or t"e e##ect o# t"ose demands on ot"er people& eg t"e rig"t to protest and demonstrate
con#licts wit" t"e rig"t o# pedestrians and motorists to use t"e pu+lic roads #or t"e purpose #or w"ic" roads
are +uilt.
Iovernments and pressure groups w"ic" #ocus on rig"ts& give no t"oug"t to "ow rig"ts can operate in t"e
a+sence o# a climate in w"ic" t"e importance o# duties is emp"asised.
!"ere is no end to t"e so<called rig"ts w"ic" can +e demanded. 5 rig"t<conscious societ%& in e##ect&
recognises a #ew rig"ts and neglects man% ot"ers. !"e rig"ts t"at are recognised are t"ose w"ic" are
demanded +% t"e power#ul& t"e aggressive and t"e nast%.
!"ere cannot +e a rig"t wit"out a dut%. 5n endless cacop"on% o# demands +% interest groups #or rig"ts "as
+ecome a dominant #eature o# t"e modern 5ustralian tate 3#ed +% legislation w"ic" encourages t"ese
demands4. 5t t"e same time t"ere is a dea#ening silence on t"e -uestion o# individual responsi+ilit%. !"e
time "as come to realise and to emp"asise t"at rig"ts& w"et"er material or political& depend on t"e disc"arge
o# duties. /ealt" and prosperit% are created +% e##ort. Enl% continuing e##ort can sustain t"em. /estern
societies t"roug" e##ort "ave ac"ieved a level o# prosperit% unparalleled in "istor%.
2istor% "as continuall% demonstrated t"at t"e greatest o# civilisations decline and #all w"en t"e% succum+ to
indulgence at t"e expense o# discipline and endeavour. !"e #ate o# 8g%ptian and Coman civilisations are
prime examples. (t is not too earl% #or /estern Fivili,ation.