MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS GSIS

G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997, 267 SCRA 408

FACTS:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the
government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51 % of the issued and outstanding
shares of respondent Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding, only two bidders participated.
Petitioner Manila Prince, a Filipino Corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at
P41.58 per share and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian Firm, which bid for the same number of
shares at P44.00 per share.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder, petitioner matches the bid
price of P44.00 per share by Renong Berhad. Subsequently, petitioner sent a manager's check as
bid security to match the bid of Renong Berhad which respondent GSIS refuse to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be
consummated which Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner should be preferred after it has match the bid offered of Malaysian firm
under Section 10, second paragraph of Article 12 of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING:
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation.
It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it
emanates. Since the constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it
is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Article 12, Section 10, paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "in the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos." It means just that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. When
the Constitution speaks of "national patrimony", it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark- a living testimonial of Philippine Heritage. While it was
restrictively an American Hotel when it first opened, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. Respondents
further argue that the Constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to GSIS which by
itself possesses a separate and distinct personality.
In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of a person distinct from the government are considered
"state action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages is a public function;
(2) when the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the
government responsible for his action; and (3) when the government has approved or authorized
the action. Without doubt, the transaction entered into by the GSIS is in fact a transaction of the
State and therefore subject to the constitutional command. Therefore, the GSIS is directed to
accept the matching bid of petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.

NITAFAN vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 78780, July 23, 1987, 152 SCRA 284

FACTS:
Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in
Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner ofInternal
Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of
withholding taxes from their salaries.

They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers
constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that during their continuance in office, their
salary shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary
envisioned in and by said Constitution."

It may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt with the matter administratively in
response to representations that the Court shall direct its Finance Officer to discontinue the
withholding of taxes from salaries of members of the Bench. Thus, on June 4, 1987, it was
reaffirmed by the Court en banc.

ISSUE:
Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes

HELD:
No. The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regardingthe constitutional provision in
question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the
Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to
ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in
the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying
the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.

The ruling that "the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof,
and so violates the Constitution", in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David must
be declared discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have
expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of
the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted

Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and
deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of
the cost of maintaining the government and should share the burden of general income taxation
equitably. Therefore, the petition for Prohibition is hereby dismissed.

FRANCISCO VS. HRET
FACT:
The case at bar is a petition questioning the constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings
being held by the House of Representatives against Chief Justice Davide.
The first impeachment proceeding brought against the Chief Justice, together with other
associate justices, is by Joseph Estrada, for the alleged culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of public trust, and other high crimes. It proceeded due to good form but was later on
dismissed due to lack of substance.
Another impeachment proceeding was being brought against the Chief Justice, in a period less
than the one-year bar provided by the Constitution and the rules of the House of Representatives.
This was initiated by 2 representatives and was endorsed by many other representatives.
This resulted to many petitions by many individuals as well as associations questioning the
constitutionality of such move by Congress. The petitions were consolidated having raised
similar issues. The petitions contend that the second impeachment proceeding was in culpable
violation of the Constitution wherein there is a one-year bar before one can initiate impeachment
proceedings against the same individual. The first proceeding was less than a year away from the
filing of the second proceeding.
Congress mainly contended that the Supreme Court had no power to inquire about the
impeachment proceedings as it is the former which has the power to facilitate or administer
impeachment proceedings, as provided by the Constitution. If the Supreme Court interrupts and
inquires about the proceedings, it will disturb the doctrine of separation of powers as well as the
doctrine of checks and balances. The impeachment proceeding is in itself under the power of the
Congress and is a political question.
ISSUE:
1. w/n the second impeachment proceeding against Davide is constitutional?
2. w/n the impeachment proceeding was a political question wherein the SC cannot disturb it?
RULING:
1. It is prevalent that the second impeachment proceeding against the Chief Justice is
unconstitutional. Under Article XI of our present Constitution, it is provided that with regard to
the impeachment of public officials such as the Chief Justice, there is a one-year bar provided.
No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official within a period of one
year. The term initiate refers to the filing of the case against the official. It starts when a
complaint is filed with the Committee of Justice of the House of Representatives. It is not
initiated during the time when it is verified by the other members of the House or when it is
given to Senate for hearing.
2. It is said that the SC cannot question or inquire about the impeachment proceedings since it
will disturb the separation of power, check and balance between the branches of government, and
that the SC has vested interest in the issue.
The Constitution was equivocal in granting the judiciary, moreover the SC, the duty to settle
controversies that are legally demandable and enforceable. It has been vested the duty to check if
there is any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or office of government. In this
petition wherein the constitutionality of the impeachment proceeding is questioned, no one has
the power to interpret the fundamental law of the land and answer the issue of constitutionality
other than the SC. Given such, even if the legislative that commences and administers
impeachment proceedings, it is not a bar for the SC to inquire about their actions especially if
constitutionality is involved.

Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary (194 SCRA 317)

FACTS:
The petitioner are assailing the Executive Order No. 284 issued by the President allowing cabinet
members, undersecretary or asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of the executive
department to hold 2 positions in the government and government corporations and to receive
additional compensation. They find it unconstitutional against the provision provided by Section
13, Article VII prohibiting the President, Cabinet members and their deputies to hold any other
office or employment. Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B further states that Unless otherwise
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any
other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries." In the
opinion of the DOJ as affirmed by the Solicitor General, the said Executive Order is valid and
constitutional as Section 7 of Article IX-B stated unless otherwise allowed by law which is
construed to be an exemption from that stipulated on Article VII, section 13, such as in the case
of the Vice President who is constitutionally allowed to become a cabinet member and the
Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.

ISSUE:

Whether Section 7 of Article IX-B provides an exemption to Article VII, section 13 of the
constitution.

RULING:

The court held it is not an exemption since the legislative intent of both Constitutional provisions
is to prevent government officials from holding multiple positions in the government for self
enrichment which a betrayal of public trust. Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the
general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while
Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-
President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. Thus the phrase unless
otherwise provided by the Constitution in Section 13, Article VII cannot be construed as a
broad exception from Section 7 of Article IX-B that is contrary to the legislative intent of both
constitutional provisions. Such phrase is only limited to and strictly applies only to particular
instances of allowing the VP to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as ex-
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. The court thereby declared E.O 284 as null and
void.

MACALINTAL VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 157013, July 10 2003

FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a
member of the Philippine Bar, seeking adeclaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No.
9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional
infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case
in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed
the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 9189 violates the residency requirement
in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution.
(2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of the same law violates the constitutional mandate
under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and the
Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress.
(3) Whether or not Congress may, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created
in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve
the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections, promulgate without
violating the independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution.
RULING:
(1) No. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 enumerates those who are disqualified voting under this Act. It
disqualifies an immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country.
However, an exception is provided i.e. unless he/she executes, upon registration, an
affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual
physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years from approval of
registration. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another
country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or
permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia.

Petitioner claims that this is violative of the residency requirement inSection 1 Article V of
the Constitution which requires the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one yr,
and a resident in the place where he proposes to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding
an election.

However, OSG held that ruling in said case does not hold water at present, and that the Court
may have to discard that particular ruling. Panacea of the controversy: Affidavit for without it,
the presumption of abandonment of Phil domicile shall remain. The qualified Filipino abroad
who executed an affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines and
presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. Section 5 of
RA No. 9189 does not only require the promise to resume actual physical permanent residence in
the Philippines not later than 3 years after approval of registration but it also requires the Filipino
abroad, WON he is a green card holder, a temporary visitor or even on business trip, must
declare that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, he/she must return to
the Philippines otherwise consequences will be met according to RA No. 9189.

Although there is a possibility that the Filipino will not return after he has exercised his right to
vote, the Court is not in a position to rule on the wisdom of the law or to repeal or modify it if
such law is found to be impractical. However, it can be said that the Congressitself was
conscious of this probability and provided for deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails to
return as promised stands to lose his right of suffrage. Accordingly, the votes he cast shall not be
invalidated because he was qualified to vote on the date of the elections.

Expressum facit cessare tacitum: where a law sets down plainly its whole meaning, the Court is
prevented from making it mean what the Court pleases. In fine, considering that underlying
intent of theConstitution, as is evident in its statutory construction and intent of the framers,
which is to grant Filipino immigrants and permanent residents abroad the unquestionable right to
exercise the right of suffrage (Section 1 Article V) the Court finds that Section 5 of RA No. 9189
is not constitutionally defective.

(2) Yes. Congress should not have allowed COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally
belongs to it. The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for
President and Vice President for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congressas its
duty and power under Section 4 of Article VII of theConstitution. COMELEC has the authority
to proclaim the winningcandidates only for Senators and Party-list Reps.

(3) No. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend and revise the Implementing
Rules & Regulations for RA No. 9189,Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional
authority.Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the
COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its
usual silence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.


CHONGBIAN VS DE LEON
FACTS:
In 1925, Victoriano Chiongbian, a Chinese citizen and father of the herein petitioner William
Chiongbian, was elected to and held the office of municipal councilor of the town of Plaridel,
Occidental Misamis. This fact is sufficiently established by the evidence submitted to this Court;
by the findings of the National Bureau of Investigation cited in Opinion No. 27, s. 1948, of the
Secretary of Justice; and as admitted by respondents in their pleadings. It is also shown and
admitted that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, petitioner William Chiongbian was
still a minor.
it is conclusive that upon the adoption of the Constitution, Victoriano Chiongbian, father of
herein petitioner, having been elected to a public office in the Philippines before the adoption of
the Constitution, became a Filipino citizen by virtue of Article IV, section 1, subsection 2 of the
Constitution. William Chiongbian, the herein petitioner, who was then a minor, also became a
Filipino citizen by reason of subsection 3 (Article IV) of the Constitution, his father having
become a Filipino citizen upon the adoption of said Constitution. This is also in conformity with
the settled rule of our jurisprudence that a legitimate minor child follows the citizenship of his
father.
It is argued by respondent that this privilege of citizenship granted by subsection 2 (Article IV,
Constitution) is strictly personal and does not extend to the children of the grantee. In support of
this contention they offer two principal arguments. Firstly, that this subsection was adopted by
the Constitutional Convention merely to grant Filipino citizenship to Delegate Caram and thus
obviate the possibility of a non-Filipino signing the Constitution as one of its framers. Secondly,
it is argued that the original draft of said subsection 2 contained the phrase "and their
descendants," which was deleted from the final draft, thus showing that this privilege of
citizenship was intended to be strictly personal to the one who had been elected to public office
and did not extend to his descendants.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is a Filipino citizen
RULING:
It may be said that the members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a
provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it
could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said
provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but
in conjunction with all other provisions of that great document. They adopted said provision
fully cognizant of the transmissive essence of citizenship as provided in subsection 3. Had it
been their intention to curtail the transmission of citizenship in such a particular case, they would
have so clearly stated.
The mere deletion of the phrase "and their descendants," is not determinative of any
conclusion. It could have been done because the learned framers of our Constitution considered
it superfluous, knowing full well that the meaning of such a phrase was adequately covered by
subsection 3. Deletion in the preliminary drafts of the Convention are, at best, negative guides,
which cannot prevail over the positive provisions of the finally adopted Constitution.