Ozean Journal of Social Sciences 1(1), 2008

75


Intergovernmental Relations and Political Opposition in Nigerias Fourth Republic,
1999-2004

Bamgbose, J. Adele

Political Science Department, Lagos State University, Ojo, Nigeria.
E-Mail: bamgboseja@yahoo.com
____________________________________________________________________________________

Abstract: This paper considers the relationship among the three tiers of governments in Nigeria between
1999 and 2004. The paper argues that such relationship has been very much in conflict than friendship (as
shown by the case studies) as one level of government since the fourth democratic dispensation has been
accusing one another. Five case studies are taken into consideration which had led to such bad relations.
These are: the Resource control issue which made the Federal Government to lock horns with the oil
producing states particularly the south-south Nigerian states; the second is the Electoral Act which
brought the state governments into a direct confrontation with the federal Government as a result of the
former (State Governments) challenging the validity of the whole Electoral Act of 2001. The third, being
the confrontation between the Local Government against both the Federal and State Governments as the
latter are in support of scrapping local Government. The fourth has to do with the local government
elections into the newly created local government in some states of the federation (Lagos, Nassarawa,
Kogi, Katsina and Niger) which strained the relations between the federal government and the Lagos State
while the fifth one has to do with the case involving the Lagos state and the federal government over the
validity of the Urban and Regional Planning Decree No. 88 of 1992.
______________________________________________________________________________________


INTRODUCTION

The shape of the Nigerian federation and the constitutions construction regarding the legislative
competence of the two spheres of government have being the origins of intergovernmental friction from
which other frictions emanate in Nigerias political system. The general trend is that, such tension or
political opposition is particularly real in those Third World federations that are characterized by deep
sectional divisions and intense elite competition for political power and its material rewards. (Suberu,
1990) However, the complexity of the dimension of such political opposition in the Third World
Federations can best be understood by making reference to the variants of federations. Thus in the literature
of federal systems, two basic perspectives on the origin of federal systems can be identified, aggregative or
coming coming together and the disaggregative, devolutionary or holding together. (Agbaje, 2000).
Aggregative theories see federalism as arising from a bargain leading to an agreement among previously
sovereign entities to come together while disaggregative or devolutionary theories postulate that certain
federations are created through a process of devolving power from the centre. Of the two, devolutionary
federations have been more conflicting. Suberu and Agbaje (2000) were quick to point this out when they
stated that devolutionary federations:

tend to lack the integrative identities and the values of civic reciprocity and mutual respect
associated with a voluntary compact or bargain to join a federal union. Rather, they tend to
be besieged by the disruptive local loyalties that made the constitutional fragmentation or
disaggregation of the state necessary in the first place

(Agbaje, 2000, p.1.)
Ozean Journal of Social Sciences 1(1), 2008
ISSN 1943-2577
2008 Ozean Publication
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There are many developments in Nigerias political history to buttress Suberu and Agbajes assertion. Thus
at the Resumed Conference on the Nigerian constitution held in Lagos between January and February 1954,
the Action Group (AG) delegation to the conference demanded the recognition in the constitution of the
right of secession. The Action Group (AG) went further that the dream of a United Nigeria would fail
unless the principle of freedom of association, that is, the freedom to dissociate were conceded (Tamuno,
1970). Even though the country succeeded in removing the Action Group (A.G) view as the various
delegates agreed that no secession clause should be written into the amended constitution (Tamuno,
1970), earlier in 1951 constitutional arrangements allocated half of the parliamentary seats to
representatives from the northern region. This set up a contradiction between the constitutional allocation
of power and the real distribution of power. (Sklar, 1965; Bach, 1989 and Ohonbamu, 1965). This
contradiction became the source of agitation and violence that eventually swept the first republic into
oblivion.

The sudden military take-over in 1966 further unexpectedly produced centralization in the distribution of
powers because of the unity of command which had long been recognized as a fundamental pr2inciple of
military organization. (Adekanye, 1981). This military federalism as it should be called opened a new
chapter in Nigerian politics and in the words of Elaigwu (1980) the military were to be the star political
actors or managers (Elaigwu, 1980). The federal military government left the regions with little autonomy
and besides, the government took over power to legislate for the entire country and did not limit itself to the
exclusive and concurrent lists of the civilian constitution. The outbreak of the civil war further
strengthened the powers of the federal military government.

Diverse areas of jurisdiction which fell under the regions especially in the 1960s were transferred to the
federal government after the civil war (Bach, 1989 and Brain, 1981). This brought unequal relations
between the states and the federal government. With the accession to the hierarchy of power by the
military, federal state relations has consistently being on collision, because incessant creation of states by
the federal government and arbitrary use of its power has produced friction between them. Instances of
such friction abound. Thus the federal military government took over some functions and responsibilities
that previously belonged to the domain of the state governments. Such functions included the maintenance
of roads, the building and maintenance of hospitals, the construction of water supplies and the Universal
Education Programme. (Adebayo, 1981 and Brain, 1981). The 1979 constitution which ushered in the
Second Republic, divided functions among the three tiers of governments. This notwithstanding, the
constitution still left certain functions to be shared by both the Federal and State Governments. Obviously
this constitutional provision became a source of unhealthy rivalry between the Federal and State
Governments. The housing scheme embarked upon by the Federal government was considered as an
encroachment into the residual subject belonging to the states. The same was applicable to agricultural
programmes, primary and post primary education. Similar struggle dominated the Second Republic and
thus replaced the co-operation and co-ordination implicit in the federal arrangements as provided in the
1979 Constitution.

The advent of the fourth republic sharpened political opposition among the tiers of governments in Nigeria
than ever before especially as there has been massive transfer of oil wealth from the southern minority
states of Nigeria to other parts of the federation. This has brought many agitations and confrontations
among different levels of government. We shall presently return to this.


EVOLUTION OF INTER GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN NIGERIA
Perhaps, an appropriate premise to commence this discourse is to embark on the clarification of the concept
of inter governmental relations because of the attendant confusion that besmeared the concept. For
instance, there has been an erroneous misconception that inter-governmental relations can be discussed
only meaningfully in a federal arrangement (Ayoade, 1980). For a proper clarification of the concept, three
schools of thought have developed. The first school contends that inter-governmental relations can only
exist in a federal system, the second posits that inter-governmental relations can both exist within a federal
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77

structure and as well as in a unitary system of government, while the third school says that inter-
governmental relations could as well include international relations.

The lesson we can draw from the above is that, inter-governmental relations exists both in the federal and
unitary structures and in fact, the clamour that intergovernmental relations is only associated with the
federal system should be discarded when we remember the Livingston definition of federalism which says
that Federalism is not an absolute but a relative term; there is no identifiable point at which a society
ceases to be unified and becomes diversified All communities fall somewhere in a spectrum which runs
from what we may call a theoretically wholly integrated society at one extreme to a theoretically wholly,
diversified society at the other (Rhodes, 1983, p.72).

Further still, Wright while alluding to the work of Bogdanor pointed out that other features of inter-
governmental relations that set it apart from federalism included:

1. prominence of policy (rather than mainly legal) issues,
2. inclusion of all governmental entities-local units in addition to national-state (federal) relations,
3. importance of officials attitudes and actions,
4. regular, continuous day to day interactions among officials and
5. inclusion of all types of public officials-especially administrators in addition to elected officials.
(Wright, 1995).

From the above exposition, how then can we define the concept of inter governmental relations?. The
concept has been defined as the interactions that take place among the different levels of government
within a state. (Adamolekun, 1983 and Olopade, 1984). Though, strong emphasis has often been placed on
Federal-state relations in a federal system, a comprehensive analysis of such relations show diverse
relations. With respect to a federal state therefore, nine types of relations are discernible. These are:
Federal-state, Federal-local, Federal-Civic groups, state-state, state-local, state-civic groups, local-local,
Local civic groups and inter-civic groups (Olugbemi, 1980). Three types of such interactions can be
perceived in a unitary state which are: national-local relations, inter-local relations and external relations.
The third type of relations that is, external relations belongs to another field of study known as international
relations.

The concept of Inter-governmental relations originated in the 1930s in the United States of America and by
1950s, it gained widespread currency following the creation of the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental relations. But essentially whether we are referring to the evolution of inter-governmental
relations in the United States of America or Canada, such evolution came to the forefront following the
beginning of the significant economic and social development programmes by the existing federal
government in these countries that began to have greater impact on other levels of government. Such spirit
of change in the American federal system did not go unnoticed as Banovetz (1980) cited in Reagan (1972)
asserted that: Federalism-Old is dead. Yet federalism-new style- is alive and well and living in the United
States its name is intergovernmental relations (Banovetz, 1980, p.141).


However, how did intergovernmental relations as an imported idea start in Nigeria? Nigeria no doubt had
her boundaries delimited by the colonial administration (the British Government). Prior to this
development, the pre-colonial societies in Nigeria were made up of empires, a caliphate, kingdoms,
chiefdoms, city states and village republics (Oyovbaire, 1981 and Oyovbaire, 1983). None of these
societies had a ruler or social class that had a mandate or power over all these societies because each of
these societies had separate rulers. The initial penetration of the British Government left Nigeria in three
separate entities, that is, the Colony of Lagos, the Northern Protectorate and Southern Protectorate. These
three areas were followed by distinctive boundaries but issues relating to boundary demarcations and
delimitation often caused friction. The British Government became dissatisfied with the system of
maintaining three separate administrative units with boundaries ( Okafor, 1981). It was as a result of this
that the British Government embarked on the amalgamation of the country so that the different entities
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78

could be united (Anjorin, 1967 and Ballard, 1971). Following the amalgamation move which was first
orchestrated by Sir Ralph Moor in 1896, the actual unification came in 1914 but this failed to create a
unitary system of politics and administration as there existed separate departments for the Northern
government and corresponding separate departments for the South. Clifford constitution of 1922 aimed to
bring a web of relations within the administrative set up was in no means helpful as the Legislative Council
which was established in Lagos did not have Northern representatives. This condition persisted till 1946.
During these years, the North was represented by the Lieutenant Governor and Senior Residents. This
situation resulted into Southern Legislative Council to make laws for the Colony and the Southern
Provinces only while the Governor legislated for the Northern Provinces by proclamation.

This position of Nigeria which permitted amalgamation albeit different administration was as a result
of the firm belief of British Political Officers such as Sir Hugh Clifford and Richmond Palmer that
Nigeria could never be a suitable union. Coleman (1986) reiterated what Clifford said when he pointed
out that if it were possible to cement the various ethnic communities

... into a single homogeneous nation-a deadly blow would thereby be struck at the
very root of national self-government in Nigeria, which secures to each separate
people the right to maintain its identity, its individuality and its nationality, its own
chosen form of government, and the peculiar political and social institutions which
have been evolved for it by the wisdom and by the:. accumulated experience of
generation of its forebears (Coleman, 1986, p.194)


By 1939, the amalgamation syndrome of 1914 suffered a major set back as Sir Bernard Bourdillon
who became the Governor of Nigeria between 1935 to 1943 further divided southern Nigeria into two,
but the task of writing this into the Nigerian constitution of 1946 was done by Sir Arthur Richards.
Though the country was in three parts (Regions), there was no substantial progress in the level of
inter-governmental relations as there were no functional regional legislatures as the regional
legislatures had no legislative powers.

They were mainly advisory in nature. Constitutionally, there was no National -State relations, being
provided for yet, the Regional Legislatures acted as bridge between the central Legislative council and the
Native Authorities (Ayoade, 1980). The 1951 constitution differed significantly from the 1946 constitution
because it united the country the more by granting more autonomy to the three regions. The Regional
Legislatures acted as the electoral colleges for the central House of Representatives. The Regional
Legislatures then had some Legislative powers and each Region had an Executive Council. This
arrangement brought a constitutional basis for relations between the two levels of government. Thus, all
central Bills in respect of a Region must first be laid before that Region's legislature for consideration as
well as for advice.

The Regional Legislatures had powers to legislate on prescribed subject such as education, public health,
local government and agriculture. (Ojo, 1973).

The competence of the central legislature was greater than
this because, it had full powers of legislation on all subjects including those within the legislative
competence of the regions. Where conflict arises between the two laws, the one enacted later prevailed over
the one enacted earlier. By this, it was possible for a Regional law to supercede a central law on the same
subject-matter if the Regional law was enacted later. But this does not mean that the Region was superior to
the centre. The 1951 Constitution also empowered the state government to establish the local governments
and to regulate their activities. However between 1951 and 1954 that the constitution operated, there was
no direct relations between the Central Government and Local Government.

The Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 further strengthened intergovernmental relations. There was the division
of powers between the Federal and Regional governments. The powers of government were grouped under
three headings which were: the Enumerated list or Exclusively Federal list, the Concurrent list and the
Residual (Ojo, 1973) The Enumerated list contained such subjects like foreign relations, currency, defence,
immigration, citizenship and census, aviation,, banks and so on upon which the Federal government had the
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79

sole authority to legislate on. The Concurrent List includes such matters like higher Education and
Industrial Development, Insurance, Water Power, Scientific Research and so on upon which both the
Federal and Regional governments could legislate. In the case of conflict between a Regional and a Federal
law on the same concurrent subject, the Federal law prevailed. This arrangement removed the anomalous
position of the 1951 where the regional law superceded a central law on the same subject matter if the
Regional law was enacted later. Other subjects not included neither in the Enumerated list nor concurrent
list were Regional affairs. With this arrangement, Regional governments were not interfered by the Federal
government. Besides the Central Regional relations at the time, there was also central-local relations.
Another level of intergovernmental relations surfaced following the creation of Lagos City Council in
1917 under the Township Ordinance of 1917 (Orewa and Adewumi, 1983).

The 1954 Constitution was a further improvement from other earlier constitutions because of the
pronounced inter-governmental relations it brought about. In addition to the foregoing network of
relations brought about by the constitution, it was in the same year that the marketing boards which
were centralized before became decentralized so that both the central and the regional levels were
having marketing boards. The relation between the two levels as marketing board was concerned was
that, the Central Marketing Board served the regions in a consultative capacity (Nnoli, 1978).

Each of
the four regions in existence then had its own civil service and shared equal powers with the central
government while the local governments were created, nurtured and financed solely by the regional
government (Olopade, 1984).

Shortly after the military government took over the helm of affairs in 1966, the then Head of State,
Aguiyi Ironsi discovered that the Federal-Region relations had almost broken down as the regions
were powerful than the central. This had resulted into threats of secession which had pestered the
country in 1914, 1950, 1953 and 1964 (Elaigwu, 1985). It was this situation that besmeared the country
that resulted into the promulgation of Decree No 34 of 1966 which reverted the country back to the
unitary government. With this, Nigeria ceased to be a federal state but was christened the National
Military Government, the regions were abolished and were referred to as group of provinces'. The same
decree unified all the Civil Services. The resultant effect of this position as it affected the
intergovernmental relations limited the degree of relations among the governmental structures in the
country as the degree of relations in a federal system is more than that of a unitary government. But such
relations were ephemeral as the administration of Aguiyi Ironsi was swept into oblivion through the July
1966 coup.

The Gowon administration that came shortly after the Ironsi's administration reverted the country back to
a federal system. The former regions retained their names and their separate civil services. It was under
this new regime that intergovernmental relations received greater impetus as more states were created
and closer cooperation and interactions between the Federal Government and the states developed. To
crown it all, the federal military government through the 1976 local government reforms established a
more developed relationship between the federal Government and local Government. Okoro (1998) has
put this properly when he said that such relationship hings more prominently on the degree of local
government financial independence (Okoro, 1998)


Areas of conflict from 1999-2004.
Tamuno (1970) has forcefully argued in his article entitled Separatist Agitations in Nigeria since 1914
that Historically, it was easier to establish the Nigerian state than to nourish the Nigerian nation.
Though the former was to a large extent achieved through the 1914 Amalgamation, the latter eluded both
British officials and Nigerians for several decades thereafter (Tamuno, 1970, p. 564). Similarly, Taiwo
(2000) once remarked that: It is not an exaggeration to say that from 1914 when the Colony of Lagos,
the Southern Protectorate, and the Northern protectorate were amalgamated to form the country now
known as Nigeria, the relationship among its diverse units, have been marked by tensions of different
degrees of severity (Taiwo, 2000, p. 34). The above two references rightly summed up the relationships
among the three tiers of government in Nigeria between 1999 and 2004. But Nigerian federation seems
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80

not to be an exception even the oldest federation of the world, the United States does experience conflict
especially when the layers of government: federal, state and local are on the verge of determining their
jurisdictional power. Little does one wonder when Jinadu (1998) pointed out such conflictual nature in
federal state when he remarked that:

... the dynamics of federal-state relations within the federalist constitutional framework is
one of a see-saw between interdependence and cooperation on one hand and conflict on the
other hand, between the centre and the units and between the units themselves (Jinadu,
1998, p. 11).

We shall from this premise consider these areas of conflict one after the other.


a. The Resource Control
The Resource Control controversy was between the Federal Government of Nigeria and the eight littoral
States (Oil Producing States) which are: Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo and
Rivers which have boundaries with the sea (Sanyaolu, 2002 and Dunmoye, 2002). The remaining 28 states
later joined the eight littoral states in the struggle. But what was the struggle about?. The eight littoral states
were asking from the federal government the application of the derivation principle to revenues generated
from natural resources located offshore from their coast (Ojameruaye, 2002). These states in essence were
asking for a larger share than non-littoral states. They agreed that the revenue from offshore resources
should be paid into the Federation Account but 13 per cent of it should be set aside for them while 87 per
cent should go to all the states and Local Governments as well as the Federal Government.
The clamour for resource control has been due to many reasons which include:
a. the injustice and inequity that characterise the distribution of national resources, particularly
oil revenue,
b. the jettisoning of derivation as a fundamental principle of revenue allocation which reduced
the amount of funds going to the pauperised oil producing areas as of right;
c. the lack of infrastructural development in Nigeria at large, but in the oil producing areas in
particular;
d. the new democratic dispensation which allows for overt airing of grievances which were
violently suppressed under military rule,
e. the introduction of Sharia judicial system by a few Northern states which was seen by the
southern states as a major test for the Federal Constitution. Demand for resource control is,
therefore, an indirect constitutional cum economic response to the introduction of Sharia,
f. the systematic destruction of the ecosystem in the oil producing areas which led to
environmental degradation, pollution, acid rain and the attendant unemployment and mass
poverty,
g. failure of the multinational oil companies to contribute to the social and economic
development of the oil producing states,
h. the activities of ethnic militants made up of unemployed youths in the oil producing
communities who are exerting pressure on their political and traditional leaders, thus
necessitating political actions,
i. the Ogoni Bill of Rights which demanded for political autonomy that will guarantee political
control of Ogoni affairs by Ogoni indigenes; the right to the control and use of a fair
proportion of Ogoni economic resources for Ogoni development (Edemodu and Nwokoh,
2002 and Dunmoye, 2002)

Caught up in this demand from the eight littoral states, the Federal Government in February 2001 filed
a suit at the Supreme Court against the 36 states of the Federation in which it sought an interpretation
to know whether the state's boundary extends to continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone
and to know whether money derived from such zones as a result of mineral exploration should be
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shared to the littoral states or not. When the suit was filed at the Supreme Court, 11 of the 36 states
raised preliminary objections in their statements of Defence challenging the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to hear the suit. These eleven states were: Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Anambra, Bayelsa, Cross
River, Delta, Ebonyi, Edo, Ogun, Ondo and Rivers. The grounds of the preliminary objections varied.
They included the following

1. That the suit is academic, frivolous, vexatious and speculative,
2. That the non-littoral states are not parties to the suit and ought to be struck out,
3. That the original jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court does not extend to the realm of
International law,
4. That the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiffs claim or grant the relief
sought as the constitution vests the power upon the National Assembly only to determine the
formula for revenue allocation including allocation on the basis of principle of derivation,
5. That the plaintiff's claim for the Supreme Court to determine the boundary of the littoral states is
not justiceable since the court has no jurisdiction to determine state boundaries,
6. That the plaintiffs claim does not disclose a reasonable cause of action,
7. That the plaintiffs claim does not establish the existence of a valid dispute whether of law or fact,
nor disclose the existence or extent of a legal right,
8. That the plaintiff lacks the locus standi to bring the action,
9. That the suit raises political question and is an abuse of judicial process,
10. That the action is not properly constituted and is incurably defective on grounds of misjoinder of
non-littoral states in the suit,
11. That the Supreme Court lacks the jurisdiction to grant the relief sought and to interpret section
162(2) of the Constitution including the proviso thereof;
12. That the action is premature as the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria has not yet tabled
any proposal for revenue allocation before the National Assembly in accordance with section 162
subsection 2 of the constitution,
13. That delimitation, demarcation or adjustment of boundaries between states is the responsibility of
the Executive or the legislature;
14. That it is not proper for the plaintiff to start the action by filling a statement of claim instead of
issuing an originating summons,
15. That there is no legislation on interpretation which will enable the Supreme Court determine the
seaward boundary of littoral states, and
16. That any determination of the seaward boundary of a littoral state is tantamount to the Supreme
Court delimiting the international maritime boundary of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which is
beyond the juridical competence of the Court (Nwankwo, 2001).

All the above preliminary objections were rejected by the Supreme Court, the court therefore
maintained that it could adjudicate on the dispute. The Supreme Court however waded into the case and
after several days, the Supreme Court ruled that:

1. The seaward boundary of littoral states for the purpose of calculating the amount of revenue
accruing to the Federation Account directly from any natural resources derived from that state
is the low-water mark of its land surface or the seaward limits of inland waters within the
state as in the Cross Rivers State with an archipelago of islands,
2. Contentions of the littoral states that their boundaries extend to the exclusive economic zone
or the continental shelf of Nigeria is rejected,
3. There is no provision anywhere in the 1999 Constitution which made it possible for revenue
derived from the continental shelf contiguous to a region to be payable to that region,
4. The federal capital territory is not a state or a Local government in a state. It therefore cannot
qualify for distribution of the Federation Account,
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5. Exclusion by the Federal Government of natural gas as constituent of derivation is
unconstitutional (Ishiekwene, 2002 and Sanyaolu, 2002).

The verdict of the Supreme Court obviously showed that the eight littoral states lost in the legal tussle.
Though, it did not go down well with the littoral states, there was nothing they could do to change the
decision of the Supreme Court.

As a way of reducing the effect of the Supreme Court verdict, the president acting on the recommendations
of the committee set up to study the implication of the Supreme Court judgement sent a bill to the National
Assembly seeking to abolish the dichotomy between onshore and offshore in the application of the
principle of derivation (Ogbodo, 2004). However, by November 2002, the harmonised position reached by
the Joint Conference of the National Assembly was that the continental shelf and the exclusive economic
zone contiguous to a state of the federation shall be deemed to be part of that state for the purposes of
computing the revenue accruing to the federation account from that state pursuant to the provisions of
constitution of the republic of Nigeria 1999 or any other enactment. The president did not however concede
to this but by January 2004 he suggested 24 nautical miles as areas onshore that the littoral states could
benefit from.

Making further clarification, the president made it clear that there was not much production of crude oil
beyond 24 nautical miles and he therefore suggested in the new bill 200m water depth and he further
claimed that all existing producing oil areas found in the country are located within the 200 meter water
depth isobath. This was eventually signed into law and it had resulted in much jubilation to the littoral
states. But hardly had this been done by the Federal government than the 22 governors filed a suit at the
Supreme Court against the littoral states. The 22 governors were seeking a declaration that the Onshore/
Offshore Abrogation Act enacted by the National Assembly was unconstitutional and equally that there
should be a stoppage to further payments to the littoral states of the derivation benefits from offshore oil
exploitations. Meanwhile, the Guardian opinion was sympathetic with the littoral states and enjoined the
22 governors to withdraw the suit from the Supreme Court (Anikulapo, 2004).



b. The Electoral Act of 2001
The Electoral Act of 2001 had been very controversial from the time that the Independent National
Electoral Commission (INEC) had presented it as a bill to the National Assembly for debate. It received its
loudest criticism following the signing of the bill into law with some controversial clauses. But those
that set the states of the federation against the federal government were the signing into law of the
extension of the tenure of local government councilors, chairman and vice-chairman from three as
stipulated by the Councils (Basic Constitutional and Transitional Provisions) Decree 36 of 1998 (Sanyaolu,
2002) to four years; the reordering of elections beginning with the presidential and then National
Assembly, Governorship and State Assemblies, followed by Local Government and the interpretation of
constitutional provisions on functions of National Assembly against those of state houses . The legal tussle
was first championed by the Speakers of the House of Assemblies of the 36 states of the Federation ' who
headed for the Federal High Court at Abuja (Ojewuji, 2002). As a result of much delay there was no
solution to the matter and because the speakers were not constitutionally empowered to initiate legal
actions at the Supreme Court nothing was heard on the matter, but the 34 state governments of the 36
states of the federation took the matter to the Supreme Court. The 34 states were: Abia, Adamawa, Akwa
Ibom, Anambra, Bauchi, Bayelsa, Benue, Borno, Cross River, Delta, Ebonyi, Edo, Ekiti, Enugu, Gombe,
Imo, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Kastina, Lagos, Nasarawa, Niger, Ogun, Osun, Oyo, Rivers, Sokoto,
Taraba, Yobe and Zamfara, Kebbi, Kogi and Kwara (Nwankwo, 2002). The remaining two states (Ondo
and Plateau) joined in the suit later (Odiaka, 2002).

In a 13 page paragraph statement the plaintiff that is, the 34 states sort among other relieves that:
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83

1. A declaration that by the combined effect of the Local Government (Basic Interpretation Act
Cap 192 Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1990), the tenure of elected officers in Local
Government Councils throughout the Federation is three years,
2. A declaration that no law enacted by the National Assembly can validly increase or otherwise
alter the tenure of elected officers or as Councillors of Local Government Councils in Nigeria
except in relation to the Federal Capital Territory alone.
3. A declaration that the National Assembly has no power in relation to the Federal Capital Territory
alone to make any law with respect to:
a. The conduct of elections into the office of Chairman, Vice Chairman or Councillors of
Local Government Councils,
b. Division of Local Government Areas into wards for purposes of election into Local
Government Councils.
c. The qualification or disqualification of persons as candidates for election as Chairman,
Vice Chairman, or Councillors of a Local Government Council,
d. The date of election into Local Government Council.
e. Prescribing of the event upon the happening of which a local Government Council
stands dissolved.
4. A declaration that the National Assembly has no power to make any law with respect to the
disqualification of candidates for elections held pursuant to the provisions of the 1999
Constitution.
5. A declaration that the provisions contained in sections 15 to 73 and 110 to 122 of the Electoral
Act, 2001 are from the date of the commencement of the said Act inconsistent with the provision
of the Constitution of the federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.
6. A declaration that the National Assembly cannot legitimately impose separate responsibilities on
political parties unless such responsibilities are on political associations duly registered as political
parties irrespective of date of registration (Nwankwo, 2002).


In addition, the plaintiffs enjoined the Federal Government (the defendant) to produce:

1. Copy of the Electoral Bill 2001 passed by the National Assembly and sent to the President for
assent and,
2. Copy of the Electoral Bill 2001, assented to by the president.

On the other hand, the defendant (the federal government) claimed that:

1. The Electoral Bill 2001 assented to by the president has not contravened the 1999 constitution
with regard to qualifications and disqualifications to all elective offices,
2. The Electoral Bill has not altered or frozen the powers specifically assigned to the plaintiff under
the 1999 constitution,
3. Decree No 36 of 1998 had been expressly repeated by decree No 62 of 1999,
4. Election of Local Government Offices took place before the commencement of the 1999
Constitution and was therefore not done pursuant to the provisions of the 1999 Constitution,
5. The National Assembly has inherent Constitutional powers to determine the tenure of elected
officers of Local Government Councils.

The Defendant therefore urged the Supreme Court to hold that:

a. The Electoral Bill 2001 is not inconsistent with the 1999 constitution,
b. That proper and necessary parties to the action are not before the court,
c. That the plaintiffs action lacks merit and is accordingly vexatious and an abuse of the court
process.
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84

The legal tussle which started on January 9, 2002 ended on March 28, 2002 with the Supreme

Court judgment. In its historic ruling, the Supreme Court held that most of the provisions of the Electoral
Act were inconsistent with the 1999 Constitution and are therefore to that extent, null and void and
inoperative. It declared that no law by the National Assembly could validly increase or alter the tenure of
elected officers of local governments, only the House of Assembly could make laws on elections for the
posts of Chairman, Vice- Chairman or Councillors of local governments. In addition, the Supreme Court
declared that the National Assembly has no power except in relation to the Federal Capital Territory to
make any law or division of council for election purposes, date of election and so on. The court
further declared that provisions of the Electoral Act in Sections 15 to 73 and Sections 110 to 122 were null
and void and should therefore be expunged from the law (Electoral Act). This was how the Supreme Court
resolved the controversy that besmeared the three levels of government.

c. Removal and suspension of Chairmen from office
The State's government action towards the Local Governments under the period of consideration had
resulted into uncordial relations between the states and Local Governments. Thus under the period,
about 10 Local Government Chairmen were both removed and suspended from office. For instance,
the governor of Kaduna State suspended several numbers of Local Government Chairmen, the
governors of Zamfara and some other state governors were not left out in this act. It was this that
infuriated the Local Government Chairmen which made them to sue the thirty-six governors and
their state assemblies (Fadeyi, 2001). In the suit filed by these local government chairmen, they sought
the following reliefs:

a. a declaration that it is unconstitutional and ultra vices, the powers of the state governors to
remove or suspend a democratically elected Chairman of a local government council
before the end of his tenure of office,
b. a declaration that it is not part of the function of the State Houses of Assembly to make laws
to remove or suspend the chairman of a democratically elected local government council
before the end of his tenure of office,
c. a declaration that there exists a lacuna with regard to the procedure or conditions before a
democratically elected chairman of a local government council in Nigeria can be removed or
suspended from office in the provisions of the 1999 constitution of Nigeria;
d. a declaration that the removal or suspension from office of some democratically elected local
government council chairmen by the defendants is ultra vices, their powers and functions
therefore, null and void ab initio,
e. a declaration that by the combined effect of sections 4(2), 3 and 5 of the 1999 Constitution, only
the National Assembly is empowered to make laws regulating the procedure for the removal
or suspension from office of an elected chairman of a local government council and,
f. an order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from removing or suspending a
democratically elected local government council chairman or dissolving any local government
councils or in any way whatsoever from interfering with the exercise of the functions of their
offices as democratically elected chairmen of the respective local government councils,
The Chairmen were also seeking the determination of the following questions:
1. Whether or not the defendants are under sections 5,7,8 and 176(2) and or any other section of the
1999 Constitution empowered to remove or suspend from office any local government Chairman,
2. Whether the State Houses of Assembly in exercise of the powers conferred on them under section
4(6) or any other section of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria are empowered to make laws to
remove or suspend from office any local government chairman,
3. Whether the system of local government by democratically elected local government councils is
not guaranteed under section 7 of the 1999 constitution of Nigeria,
4. Whether there exists a lacuna with regard to the procedure, and conditions obtainable before an
elected chairman of a local government council is removed or suspended from office before the
end of his tenure of office in the Nigerian Constitution of 1999,
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85

5. What procedure and or conditions are obtainable before an elected chairman of local government
council can be removed and from office before the expiration of his term of office and
6. Whether a state governor or House of Assembly has the powers to dissolve a local government
council under the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (Fadeyi, 2001).

Though this case was not pursued further in the court, the probability of misusing such constitutional power
by the State Houses of Assembly in the affairs of local government Councils in Nigeria made people to
suggest that such power be reviewed at the National Political Reform Conference with a view to checking
such power.


d. Controversy over the Local Government elections into the newly created Local
Governments in some states of the Federation.
Prior to this time, controversy had been surrounding the institution of Local Government in Nigeria as
there had been a vehement agitation to scrap this institution in the time past. However, as the nation
was awaiting the 2003 Local Government elections, the governors of Lagos, Nassarawa, Kogi, Katsina
and Niger went ahead to create new local governments in addition to those ones recognised by the
1999 Constitution (Ishiekwene, 2004). But shortly after this, the National Council of State (NCS) took
the decision
.
of recognising only 774 local councils. These were the Local Councils existing in the
country before the newly created ones. The decision to abide by the old local councils was again
reiterated by the People's Democratic Party (PDP) at its first meeting of the National Working
Committee (NWC) for the year 2004.

Concerned with

this issue, Senator Olorunimbe Mamora (Lagos East) Chairman, Senate Committee on
Ethics and Petitions introduced a motion, though, the motion did not sail through in which he prayed
the Senate that:

a. the Senate takes legislative notice of the creation of the new local government areas in some
states in the country,
b. the senate is not opposed to such exercise where same has been carried out in accordance with
the due process as stipulated in section 8 of the 1999 Constitution;
c. consequently, without prejudice to any judicial pronouncement to the contrary, the senate is
not opposed to the conduct of election in such newly created local councils to bring them into
conformity with section 7(1) of the 1999 constitution and,
d. the Senate puts in place appropriate machinery to make consequential provisions in
compliance with section 8(5) of the 1999 Constitution in respect of states that have made
returns to the National Assembly following the creation of the new local government
(Ogbodo, Ndujihe and Saduwa, 2004).

The ruling party, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) further stated that the local government council
elections would not be conducted in the new councils created by the governors. But in spite of this
threat, Lagos state government and other state governments went ahead to conduct elections into the
newly created local governments. Infuriated by this action, the President (President Olusegun
Obasanjo) in a letter to the Minister of Finance, Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala ordered the stoppage of the
monthly revenue allocations to the states that conducted elections into newly-created local
governments. This resulted in the inability of all local governments across the states to pay the
primary school teachers.

In a swift reaction to the federal government action, the affected states took the federal government to
Supreme Court challenging President Olusegun Obasanjo's stoppage of revenue allocation to their
Local councils. Lagos State government in particular rushed to the apex court (Supreme Court) on
April 19th 2004 to seek the following determination.
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86

a. A determination of the question of whether or not there is power vested in the president of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria (by executive or administrative action) to suspend or withhold
for any period whatsoever the statutory allocation due and payable to Lagos state government
pursuant to the provisions of section 162 (5) of the 1999 Constitution,
b. A consequential order of the court compelling the defendant to pay immediately all an
outstanding arrears of statutory allocation due and payable to Lagos state government
pursuant to the provision of section 165(5) of the 1999 constitution and,
c. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria,
or any functionaries or agencies of executive branch of the Federal Government from doing
anything whatsoever to suspend, withhold, for any period whatsoever or calculated to suspend
or so to withhold any monies due and payable to the Lagos State government pursuant to the
provisions of section 165 (5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
(Onwubiko, 2004).

Sensing the impending danger that their action might bring, other states with the exception of Lagos
state dropped their suit over the council fund (Onwubiko, 2004). Thus the Federal Government countered
the Lagos State claims by filling a suit at the Supreme Court asking among others for the following:

a. A declaration that the plaintiff/ defendant to the counter claim has no power or right under the
1999 constitution to create new local governments without recourse to the National Assembly as
provided for under the constitution,
b. A declaration that the alteration of the names of local governments, the alteration of the
boundaries of the local governments and the creation of new local governments done by the Lagos
State government and the operation of the new local Governments before and or without an act of
National Assembly to that effect, is illegal, unconstitutional, null and void,
c. A declaration that the following local governments are the only local governments established
under the 1999 constitution in Lagos State, Agege, Ajeromi-Ifelodun, Alimosho, Amuwo- Odofin,
Apapa, Badagry, Epe, Eti-Osa, Ibeju/ Lekki, Ifako-Ijaye, Ikeja, Ikorodu, Kosofe, Lagos Island,
Lagos Mainland, Mushin, Ojo, Oshodi-Isolo, Shomolu and Surulere,

d. A declaration that sections 1, 2 and 3 of the local government areas law No. 5 of 2002 of Lagos
State are in contravention of section 3(6) and part 1 of the first schedule to the constitution of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 and therefore are unconstitutional, null and void in so far as
said section 3(6) and part 1 of the First schedule to the 1999 Constitution, with respect to
Lagos state of Nigeria,
e. A declaration that the elections conducted by the Lagos State government on Saturday March
27th 2004 into the 57 local government areas created by the local government areas Law
No.5 of 2002 of Lagos State are inchoate and cannot take effect as presently established in
that 57 local government areas are not known to the constitution,
f. An order nullifying and setting aside the elections conducted by the Lagos State Government
on Saturday March 27 2004 into the 57 local government councils established by the local
government areas law No. 5 of 2002 of Lagos State.
g. An order of injunction restraining the Lagos State governor, the Lagos State House of
Assembly or any functionaries or agencies of the Lagos State Government from maintaining,
financing and recognising any local government in Lagos State apart from the ones created
under schedule 1 of the 1999 Constitution.

On December 10, 2004 the Supreme Court granted the reliefs sought by the Lagos State Government
in its action against the Federal Government on the decision of the latter to withhold and suspend the
statutory allocation due to the state for its local government councils. The Supreme Court gave its
verdict but the Federal government did not comply with this verdict.

In actual fact, the Federal Government was not satisfied with the verdict of the Supreme court which
centred on the release of the money to Lagos State government. It was on the basis of this that the
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87

federal government filed a suit in the Supreme Court seeking clarification on the Supreme Court
judgement as it related to the status of the newly created local governments and whether they were
constitutionally created to be part of those to receive funds from the Federation Account. The case was
however struck out bringing another victory to Lagos state government but the federal government
refused to release the money to the Lagos State government claiming that there were no 20 chairmen
of the recognised councils again and that it was not possible for any of the 57 chairmen of the local
governments in Lagos State to parade himself as one of the 20 (Adewole and Akinmade, 2005).
It was after much pleading which took several months that the Federal Government started to
release the fund piece meal to Lagos State Government.


e. Federal/ State planning dispute.
There had been a dispute between the Federal Government and Lagos State in particular over
which of the town planning authority should exercise town planning powers over the 45.72
metres land which runs parallel to both sides of the federal highways, under the loops formed by
bridges as well as under the bridges. In Lagos State, such highways are Kingsway Road in Ikoyi,
Western Avenue in Surulere, Old Agege Motor Road among others.
Since the land in question had at one time or the other been acquired by the Federal Government, the
Federal Government's town planning authority that is, the Urban and Regional Development Division
(URDD) of the Federal Ministry of Works and Housing (FMW&H) thought that it is under its
jurisdiction to exercise relevant town planning powers which should include approving building plans
for all forms of development within such land. The Lagos State Urban and Regional Planning Board
(LASURPB) also asserted itself as the appropriate town planning authority on such land. LASURPB
argued among other things that under the 1999 constitution, town planning was a residual matter
within the exclusive Legislative and Executive competence of the state. Consequently, the issuance of
development permits on land along set backs to federal highways should be the responsibility of the
state.

It was in determination of which of the two planning authorities that has jurisdiction over such land
that made the Lagos State to sue the Federal Government to the Supreme Court of Nigeria on
Wednesday March 20, 2002. Fifteen months later, judgement was delivered in favour of Lagos State.
Delivering the judgement, the Supreme Court declared that:

Town planning and the regulation of physical development of land was the
exclusive responsibility of the state government in whose territory the land lay.
Henceforth, the Federal Government should not engage itself in giving building
permits, licenses or approval over federal land in any state territory except
within the Federal Capital territory (FCT) (Abiodun, 2003, p.43).


CONCLUSION

This study has considered intergovernmental relations in Nigeria between 1999 and 2004. With the
operation of a federal system of government in Nigeria, such relations have been so much complex and
problematic. The complexity and the problematic nature of such relations began to increase in Nigerias
polity following the gradual increase of the federating units and the local governments at one level and the
varieties of interests that cut across the various units.
Though, the adoption of a federal polity is a political design to absorb conflicting issues in every polity, the
advent of May 29 1999 which gave birth to Nigerias Fourth Republic witnessed the most conflicting
political opposition ever experienced in Nigerias polity as the various tiers of governments engaged in
competitive rather than co-operative relations thereby endangering the cordial relations expected among
these governments. Afterwards the importance of intergovernmental relations in a federal polity is to enable
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88

unity and cooperation to prevail. This absolutely eluded Nigerias democracy under the period under
consideration and even beyond.

Unhealthy rivalry it should be pointed out disrupts the proper functioning of any polity. Besides, no group
of governing elite is interested seeing the political system where they operate to degenerate into a state of
anarchy. Looking back at Nigerias political system, conflicting issues especially among the different levels
of government swept both the First and Second Republics into oblivion. The military stifled the Third
Republic. The Fourth Republic should be allowed to be different from the previous republics. This can only
be done through the elimination of competitive politics and ensuring consensus politics.


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