Plaintiff and appellee: People of the Philippines Defendants and appellant: Antonio Oanis, Alberto Galanta

FACTS:

Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta were instructed to arrest a notorious criminal and escaped convict, Anselmo
Balagtas, and if overpowered, to get him dead or alive. They went to the suspected house then proceeded to the room
where they saw the supposedly Balagtas sleeping with his back towards the door. Oanis and Galanta simultaneously or
successively fired at him which resulted to the victims death. The supposedly Balagtas turned out to be Serepio Tecson,
an innocent man.

ISSUE:

1. WON Oanis and Galanta incur no liability due to innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of their official
duties.2. WON Oanis and Galanta incur no criminal liability in the performance of their duty.

HELD:1. No. Innocent mistake of fact does not apply to the case at bar. Ignorance facti excusat applies only when the
mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. The fact that the supposedly suspect was sleeping, Oanis and
Galanta could have checked whether it is the real Balagtas.2. No. Oanis and Galanta are criminally liable. A person incurs
no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are 2
requisites to justify this: (1) the offender acted in teh perfomance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office,
(2) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the
lawful exercise of such right or office. In this case, only the first requisite is present.people vs oanis (rule 109)"No
unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and theperson arrested shall not be subject to any
greater restraint than is necessary for his detention."a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent
with the idea of reckless imprudence and where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the
intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support a plea of
mitigated liability.

PEOPLE VS INTOD
Facts: Sulpicio Intod and 3 other men went to Salvador Mandayas house to ask him to go with them to the house of
Bernardina Palangpangan. The group had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he wanted
Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany the 4 men
otherwise he would also be killed. At 10:00 p.m. of that same day, Intod and companions, all armed with firearms arrived
at Palangpangans house. Thereafter, petitioner fired at the said room. It turned out the Palangpangan was in another
city and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired.
No one was hit by the gunfire. The RTC convicted Intod of attempted murder. Petitioner Intod seeks a modification of the
judgment on the ground that he is only liable for an impossible crime {Art. 4(2)}. Petitioner contends that,
Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his companions riddled it with bullets made the crime
inherently impossible. On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not impossible
instead the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder. Respondent likewise
alleged that there was intent. Further, In its Comment to the Petition, respondent pointed out that xxx. The crime of
murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment (Art 4 (2), RPC), but due
to a cause of accident other that petitioners and his co-accuseds own spontaneous desistance (Art. 3) Palangpangan did
not sleep at her house at that time. Had it not been for this fact, the crime is possible, m not impossible.

Issue: Is petitioner is liable only for an impossible crime?

Held: Under Article 4(2) of the RPC, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against person or
property because: 1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or 2) the means
employed is either a) inadequate or b) ineffectual.To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender
must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either 1) legal impossibility, or 2) physical
impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime. Legal impossibility
occurs where the intended act, even if complete would not amount to a crime. Thus: legal impossibility would apply to
those circumstances where 1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; 2) there is
intention to perform the physical act; 3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and 4) the consequence
resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this
category.On the other had, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond
his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One example is the man who puts his hand in the cot pocket
of another with the intention to steal the latters wallet and finds the pocket empty.The case at bar belongs to this
category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present
in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.The factual situation in the case at bar presents a
physical impossibility which render the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of
the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt. This is
not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the
criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility"
that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and
legal impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. We hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible
crime as defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Having in mind
the social danger and degree of criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay the costs.

PEOPLE VS CAMPUHAN
FACTS:
April 25, 1996 4 pm: Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of 4-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went to the ground floor of
their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her 2 children. There she met Primo Campuhan, helper of Conrado Plata
Jr., brother of Corazon, who was then busy filling small plastic bags with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located
at the second floor. Then she heard Crysthel cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" so she went upstairs and saw Primo Campuhan
inside her children's room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed,
while his short pants were down to his knees and his hands holding his penis with his right hand Horrified, she cursed
"P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several times. He evaded her blows and pulled up his pants. He pushed
Corazon aside who she tried to block his path. Corazon then ran out and shouted for help thus prompting Vicente, her
brother, a cousin and an uncle who were living within their compound, to chase the Campuhan who was apprehended.
They called the barangay officials who detained. Physical examination yielded negative results as Crysthel s hymen
was intact Campuhan: Crysthel was in a playing mood and wanted to ride on his back when she suddenly pulled him
down causing both of them to fall down on the floor. RTC: guilty of statutory rape, sentenced him to the extreme
penalty of death Thus, subject to automatic review

ISSUE: W/N it was a consummated statutory rape

HELD: NO. MODIFIED. guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years four
(4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium as minimum, to fourteen (14) years ten (10) months and twenty
(20) days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. Costs de oficio. People v. De la Pea: labia majora must be
entered for rape to be consummated. Primo's kneeling position rendered an unbridled observation impossible Crysthel
made a categorical statement denying penetration but her vocabulary is yet as underdeveloped. Corazon narrated that
Primo had to hold his penis with his right hand, thus showing that he had yet to attain an erection to be able to penetrate
his victim the possibility of Primo's penis having breached Crysthel's vagina is belied by the child's own assertion that she
resisted Primo's advances by putting her legs close together and that she did not feel any intense pain but just felt "not
happy" about what Primo did to her. Thus, she only shouted "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" not "Aray ko, aray ko! no medical basis to
hold that there was sexual contact between the accused and the victim.

PEOPLE VS VILLACORTE
villacortefacts:
Benito Ching, a Chinese merchant, left his sari-sari store in the public market of Caloocan togo home, bringing with him
the proceeds of his sales of the day which were placed in apaper bag. He was accompanied by his two employees, Pedro
Libantino and ModestoGalvez, who acted as his bodyguards. On the way towards his home located at 133 F.Roxas, Grace
Park, Caloocan, Benito Ching and his two companions were accosted by four persons near the corner of an alley at F.
Roxas street. At that time, Libantino was somethree or four meters in front of Ching, while Galvez was walking directly
behind the Chinesemerchant.One of the holduppers pointed a .45 cal. pistol at Ching. Another placed his left arm
aroundthe neck of Galvez, while the third held both his arms. The first who pointed a pistol at Chingsnatched from him
the paper bag containing the money. The fourth got that paper bag fromthe snatcher.Ching shouted for help, crying
aloud "Pedie, Pedie"; his companion Libantino turned aroundto respond to his employer's call; but upon seeing the bag
snatcher pointing a pistol atChing, Libantino fled. When Ching shouted: "Pedie, Pedie," the pistol-holder fired at
him.Galvez, Ching's other companion, was able to free himself from two of the holduppersholding him, and he too ran
away. Ching fell down sprawled on the street and the four holduppers ran away. Benito Ching, notwithstanding his
wound, was able to walk, staggeringtowards his home. His common-law wife immediately called for a taxicab, brought
Ching tothe North General Hospital in Manila where he died the following day.As already above stated, the trial court, in
its decision of May 15, 1963, acquitted Handig,convicted Villacorte who did not appeal, and Yusay who appealed but who
withdrew hisappeal, and Inoferio who pursued his appeal.

Issue:Whether or not the accused-appellant should be convicted of the crime of attemptedhomicide?
Held:the time he testified, Inoferio was 39 years old, single, and a house painter. The flow of events as related by him in
his testimony, a synopsis of which we have already given earlier,is so natural and convincing as to set at ease the mind
and the conscience of the Court thathe was telling the truth. He denied any participation in the robbery holdup in
question.Moreover, that he did not know co-accused Villacorte and Handig at the time the crime wascommitted on August
27, 1959. He came to know them only when these two were alreadyarrested, a fact corroborated by Villacorte and
Handig. Even at the confrontation before police officers and CIS agents, Inoferio, on one hand, and his two co-accused,
on the other,already denied having known each other earlier.The motive of Guerrero in testifying against Inoferio was
explained by the latter, and that is,that Guerrero thought, when Inoferio pointed to him at Camp Crame that Inoferio
wasimplicating Guerrero in the robbery holdup. And Galvez, who never implicated Inoferio wheninvestigated by the
Caloocan police officers in the evening of August 27, 1959 and wheninvestigated by the CIS Camp Crame on September
11, 1959, must have based histestimony in court, where he identified Inoferio, on the erroneous information supplied to
himthat "Sante" (one of the holduppers) was Inoferio.This is good a time as any to emphasize the fact that courts should
not at once look withdisfavor at the defense of alibi. Although inherently weak and easily fabricated, the
evidencepresented by an accused in support of that defense must be scrutinized with the same carethat evidence
supporting other defenses deserves. When an accused puts up the defense of alibi, the court should not at once have a
mental prejudice against him. For, taken in the lightof all the evidence on record, it may be sufficient to acquit him, as in
the case of appellantInoferio.

People vs Amadeo Peralta, et al.G.R. No. L-19069October 29, 1968
Facts:On February 16, 1958, in the municipality of Muntinglupa, province of Rizal, two known warring gangs inside the
New Bilibid Prison as Sigue-Sigue and OXO were preparing to attend a mass at 7 a.m. However, a fight between the
two rival gangs caused a big commotion in the plaza where the prisoners were currently assembled. The fight was
quelled and those involved where led away to the investigation while the rest of the prisoners were ordered to return to
their respective quarters.In the investigation, it was found out that the accused, OXO members, Amadeo Peralta,
Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Paramog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna (six among the twenty-two
defendants charged therein with multiple murder), are also convicts confined in the said prisons by virtue of final
judgments.They conspired, confederated and mutually helped and aided each other, with evident premeditation and
treachery, all armed with deadly weapons, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously killed Sigue-Sigue
sympathizers Jose Carriego, Eugenio Barbosa and Santos Cruz, also convicts confined in the same institution, by hitting,
stabbing, and striking them with ice picks, clubs and other improvised weapons, pointed and/or sharpened, thereby
inflicting upon the victims multiple serious injuries which directly caused their deaths.

Issues(a) Whether of not conspiracy attended the commission of the multiple murder?(b) Whether or not an aggravating
circumstance of quasi-recidivism is present in the commission of the crime?
Held:

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime unless when the law specifically provides a penalty thereof as in
treason, rebellion and sedition. However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is committed by two
or more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes a pivotal importance in the determination of the liability of
the perpetrators. Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals
regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in the commission of the crime/s perpetrated
in furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all.The collective criminal
liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted action of the conspirators in consummating
their common purpose is a patent display of their evil partnership, and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise
they must be held solidarity liable. However, in order to hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it
must be established that he performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, either by actively participating in the
actual commission of the crime, or by lending moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the scene of the
crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators as to move them to executing the conspiracy.
Conspiracy alone, without execution of its purpose, is not a crime punishable by law, except in special instances (Article 8,
Revised Penal Code) which, do not include robbery.Reverting now to the case at bar, the trial court correctly ruled that
conspiracy attended the commission of the murders. To wit, although there is no direct evidence of conspiracy, the court
can safely say that there are several circumstances to show that the crime committed by the accused was planned. First,
all the deceased were Tagalogs and members of sympathizers of Sigue-Sigue gang (OXO members were from either
Visayas or Mindanao), singled out and killed thereby, showing that their killing has been planned. Second, the accused
were all armed with improvised weapons showing that they really prepared for the occasion. Third, the accused
accomplished the killing with team work precision going from one brigade to another and attacking the same men whom
they have previously marked for liquidation and lastly, almost the same people took part in the killing of the Carriego,
Barbosa and Cruz.In view of the attendance of the special aggravating circumstances of quasi -recidivism, as all of the six
accused at the time of the commission of the offenses were serving sentences in the New Bilibid Prison by virtue of
convictions by final judgments that penalty for each offense must be imposed in its maximum period, which is the
mandate of the first paragraph of article 160 of the RPC. Hence, severe penalty imposed on a quasi -recidivist is justified
because of the perversity and incorrigibility of the crime. Accordingly, the judgment a quo is hereby modified as follows:
Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Paramog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna are each
pronounced guilty of three separate and distinct crimes of murder, and are each sentenced to three death penalties; all of
them shall, jointly and severally, indemnify the heirs of each of the three deceased victims in the sum of P12,000; each
will pay one-sixth of the costs.

People v. De Vera y Garcia
G.R. No. 128966. August 18, 1999
Facts: Edwin de Vera y Garcia, together with Roderick Garcia, Kenneth Florendo and Elmer Castro, was charged with
Murder before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in connection with the killing of one Frederick Capulong. De Vera
and Garcia pleaded not guilty during arraignment. The other two accused, Florendo and Castro, were at large. During
trial, the prosecution presented as witness one Bernardino Cacao who testified that he saw De Vera in the car, where an
altercation later occurred. Thereafter, he saw Florendo drag out of the vehicle an apparently disabled Capulong and shot
him in the head moments later. Aside from Cacaos testimony, the prosecution also presented De Veras extrajudicial
statement which established that he knew that Florendo intended to kill the victim and that the three co-accused were
carrying weapons and that he acted as a lookout to watch for passersby. Thereafter, the trial court convicted De Vera and
his co-accused Garcia of the crime charged and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered
to indemnify the heirs of the victim. In ruling that the crime committed was murder, the trial court found that the killing
was attended by treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. One of these was enough to qualify the
crime as murder; the two others constituted generic aggravating circumstances. The trial court explained that the
evidence established evident premeditation, for Florendos group acted with deliberate forethought and tenacious
persistence in the accomplishment of the criminal design. Treachery was also proven, because the attack was planned
and performed in such a way as to guarantee the execution of the criminal design without risk to the group. There was
also abuse of superior strength, because the attackers took advantage of their superiority in numbers and
weapons.Furthermore, the trial court found that it was indeed Florendo who actually shot the victim. However, it
convicted De Vera as a principal because the scientific and forensic findings on the criminal incident directly and
substantially confirmed the existence of conspiracy among the four accused. Aggrieved, de Vera appealed his conviction
before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting De Vera as principal?
Held: Yes. The testimony of the prosecution eyewitness contained nothing that could inculpate De Vera. Aside from the
fact that he was inside the car, no other act was imputed to him. Mere presence does not amount to conspiracy. Indeed,
the trial court based its finding of conspiracy on mere presumptions, and not on solid facts indubitably indicating a
common design to commit murder. Such suppositions do not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. The fact that De
Vera was at the locus criminis in order to aid and abet the commission of the crime did not make him a conspirator; at
most, he was only an accomplice. Moreover, the prosecution evidence has not established that De Vera was part of the
conspiracy to kill Capulong. De Veras participation, as culled from his own statement, was made after the decision to kill
was already a fait accompli.The trial court erred in appreciating two generic aggravating circumstances, because
treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength. Hence, there is only one generic aggravating circumstance, not two.
Notwithstanding the presence of a generic aggravating circumstance, we cannot impose the death penalty, because the
crime was committed before the effectivity of the Death Penalty Law.When an extrajudicial statement satisfies the
requirements of the Constitution, it constitutes evidence of a high order. The defense has the burden of proving that it
was extracted by means of force, duress or promise of reward. De Vera failed to overcome the overwhelming prosecution
evidence to the contrary. In the present case, De Vera knew that Kenneth Florendo had intended to kill Capulong at the
time, and he cooperated with the latter. But he himself did not participate in the decision to kill Capulong; that decision
was made by Florendo and the others. He joined them that afternoon after the decision to kill had already been agreed
upon; he was there because nagkahiyaan na. Consequently, he is convicted as an accomplice, not as a principal, in the
crime of murder.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby partially GRANTED
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. REGIE LABIAGA, Appellant.

Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision1 dated 18 October 2011 of the Court of Appeals-Cebu (CA-Cebu) in
CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 01000. The CA-Cebu affirmed with modification the Joint Decision2 dated 10 March 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo, Branch 66 (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 2001-155) convicting Regie Labiaga
alias "Banok" (appellant) of murder and Criminal Case No. 2002-1777 convicting appellant of frustrated murder.

The Facts

In Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, appellant, together with a certain Alias Balatong Barcenas and Cristy Demapanag
(Demapanag), was charged with Murder with the Use of Unlicensed Firearm under an Information3 which reads:That on
or about December 23, 2000 in the Municipality of Ajuy, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, armed with unlicensed
firearm, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, by means of treachery and with evident premeditation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot JUDY CONDE alias JOJO with said
unlicensed firearm, hitting her and inflicting gunshot wounds on the different parts of her breast which caused her death
thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.The same individuals were charged with Frustrated Murder with the Use of Unlicensed Firearm in
Criminal Case No. 2002-1777, under an Information4 which states:That on or about December 23, 2000 in the
Municipality of Ajuy, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, armed with unlicensed firearm, with deliberate intent and
decided purpose to kill, by means of treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot Gregorio Conde with said unlicensed firearm, hitting him on the posterior aspect,
middle third right forearm 1 cm. In diameter; thereby performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime
of Murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
accused; that is by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Gregorio Conde which prevented his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.Alias Balatong Barcenas remained at large. Both appellant and Demapanag pled not guilty in both
cases and joint trial ensued thereafter. The prosecution presented four witnesses: Gregorio Conde, the victim in Criminal
Case No. 2002-1777; Glenelyn Conde, his daughter; and Dr. Jeremiah Obaana and Dr. Edwin Jose Figura, the physicians
at the Sara District Hospital where the victims were admitted. The defense, on the other hand, presented appellant,
Demapanag, and the latters brother, Frederick.

Version of the prosecutionThe prosecutions version of the facts is as follows: At around 7:00 p.m. on 23 December 2000,
Gregorio Conde, and his two daughters, Judy and Glenelyn Conde, were in their home at Barangay Malayu-an, Ajuy,
Iloilo. Thereafter, Gregorio stepped outside. Glenelyn was in their store, which was part of their house.Shortly thereafter,
appellant, who was approximately five meters away from Gregorio, shot the latter. Gregorio called Judy for help. When
Judy and Glenelyn rushed to Gregorios aid, appellant shot Judy in the abdomen. The two other accused were standing
behind the appellant. Appellant said, "she is already dead," and the three fled the crime scene.Gregorio and Judy were
rushed to the Sara District Hospital. Judy was pronounced dead on arrival while Gregorio made a full recovery after
treatment of his gunshot wound.Dr. Jeremiah Obaana conducted the autopsy of Judy. His report stated that her death
was caused by "cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to Cardiac Tamponade due to gunshot wound."5Dr. Jose Edwin Figura,
on the other hand, examined Gregorio after the incident. He found that Gregorio sustained a gunshot wound measuring
one centimeter in diameter in his right forearm and "abrasion wounds hematoma formation" in his right shoulder.6

Version of the defense .Appellant admitted that he was present during the shooting incident on 23 December 2000. He
claimed, however, that he acted in self-defense. Gregorio, armed with a shotgun, challenged him to a fight. He attempted
to shoot appellant, but the shotgun jammed. Appellant tried to wrest the shotgun from Gregorio, and during the struggle,
the shotgun fired. He claimed that he did not know if anyone was hit by that gunshot.Demapanag claimed that at the
time of the shooting, he was in D&D Ricemill, which is approximately 14 kilometers away from the crime scene. This was
corroborated by Frederick, Demapanags brother.

The Ruling of the RTC

In its Joint Decision, the RTC acquitted Demapanag due to insufficiency of evidence. Appellant, however, was convicted
of murder and frustrated murder. The dispositive portion of the Joint Decision reads:WHEREFORE, in light of the
foregoing, the court hereby finds the accused Regie Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the Crime of
Murder in Crim. Case No. 2001-1555 and hereby sentences the said accused to reclusion perpetua together with
accessory penalty provided by law, to pay the heirs of Judy Conde P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.In Crim. Case No. 2002-1777, the court finds accused Regie
Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder and hereby sentences the said
accused to a prison term ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to ten (10) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, together with the necessary penalty provided by law and without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.Accuseds entire period of detention shall be deducted
from the penalty herein imposed when the accused serves his sentence.For lack of sufficient evidence, accused Cristy
Demapanag is acquitted of the crimes charged in both cases. The Provincial Warden, Iloilo Rehabilitation Center, Pototan,
Iloilo is hereby directed to release accused Cristy Demapanag from custody unless he is being held for some other valid
or lawful cause.SO ORDERED.7

The Ruling of the CA-Cebu;Appellant impugned the RTCs Joint Decision, claiming that "the RTC gravely erred in
convicting the appellant of the crime charged despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt."8 The CA-Cebu, however, upheld the conviction for murder and frustrated murder.The CA-Cebu also modified the
Joint Decision by imposing the payment of moral and exemplary damages in both criminal cases. The CA-Cebu made a
distinction between the civil indemnity awarded by the RTC in Criminal Case No. 2001-1555 and the moral damages. The
CA-Cebu pointed out that:The trial court granted the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity in Criminal Case No. 2001-
1555. It did not award moral damages. Nonetheless, the trial court should have awarded both, considering that they are
two different kinds of damages. For death indemnity, the amount of P50,000.00 is fixed "pursuant to the current judicial
policy on the matter, without need of any evidence or proof of damages. Likewise, the mental anguish of the surviving
family should be assuaged by the award of appropriate and reasonable moral damages."9The dispositive portion of the
Decision of the CA-Cebu reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Joint Decision dated March
10, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, in Barotac Viejo, Iloilo is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The
dispositive portion of the said Joint Decision should now read as follows:WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the court
hereby finds the accused Regie Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder in Crim.
Case No. 2001-1555 and hereby sentences the said accused to reclusion perpetua together with the accessory penalty
provided by law, to pay the heirs of Judy Conde P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.In Crim.
Case No. 2002-1777 the court finds accused Regie Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Frustrated Murder and hereby sentences the said accused to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
together with the accessory penalty provided by law, to pay Gregorio Conde P25,000.00 as moral damages and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs
Accused(s) entire period of detention shall be deducted from the penalty herein imposed when the accused serves his
sentence.For lack of sufficient evidence, accused Cristy Demapanag is acquitted of the crime(s) charged in both cases.
The Provincial Warden, Iloilo Rehabilitation Center, Pototan, Iloilo is hereby directed to release accused Cristy Demapanag
from custody unless he is being held for some other valid or lawful cause.SO ORDERED
Hence, this appeal.

The Ruling of the Court

Our review of the records of Criminal Case No. 2002-1777 convinces us that appellant is guilty of attempted murder and
not frustrated murder. We uphold appellants conviction in Criminal Case No. 2001-1555 for murder, but modify the civil
indemnity awarded in Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, as well as the award of moral and exemplary damages in both cases.
Justifying circumstance of self-defense

Appellants feeble attempt to invoke self-defense in both cases was correctly rejected by the RTC and the CA-Cebu. This
Court, in People v. Damitan,11 explained that:When the accused admits killing a person but pleads self-defense, the
burden of evidence shifts to him to prove by clear and convincing evidence the elements of his defense. However,
appellants version of the incident was uncorroborated. His bare and self-serving assertions cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the two (2) principal witnesses of the prosecution.12Appellants failure to present any other
eyewitness to corroborate his testimony and his unconvincing demonstration of the struggle between him and Gregorio
before the RTC lead us to reject his claim of self-defense. Also, as correctly pointed out by the CA-Cebu, appellants
theory of self-defense is belied by the fact that:

x x x The appellant did not even bother to report to the police Gregorios alleged unlawful aggression and that it was
Gregorio who owned the gun, as appellant claimed. And, when appellant was arrested the following morning, he did not
also inform the police that what happened to Gregorio was merely accidental.13

Appellants claim that he did not know whether Gregorio was hit when the shotgun accidentally fired is also implausible.In
contrast, we find that the Condes account of the incident is persuasive. Both the CA-Cebu and the RTC found that the
testimonies of the Condes were credible and presented in a clear and convincing manner. This Court has consistently put
much weight on the trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses, especially when affirmed by the appellate
court.14 In People v. Mangune,15 we stated that:It is well settled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses
first hand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. These are important in
determining the truthfulness of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies.
For, indeed, the emphasis, gesture, and inflection of the voice are potent aids in ascertaining the witness credibility, and
the trial court has the opportunity to take advantage of these aids.16Since the conclusions made by the RTC regarding
the credibility of the witnesses were not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight or misapprehension of relevant facts, the
same must be sustained by this Court.

Attempted and Frustrated Murder

Treachery was correctly appreciated by the RTC and CA-Cebu. A treacherous attack is one in which the victim was not
afforded any opportunity to defend himself or resist the attack.17 The existence of treachery is not solely determined by
the type of weapon used. If it appears that the weapon was deliberately chosen to insure the execution of the crime, and
to render the victim defenseless, then treachery may be properly appreciated against the accused.18In the instant case,
the Condes were unarmed when they were shot by appellant. The use of a 12-gauge shotgun against two unarmed
victims is undoubtedly treacherous, as it denies the victims the chance to fend off the offender.
We note, however, that appellant should be convicted of attempted murder, and not frustrated murder in Criminal Case
No. 2002-1777.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines the stages in the commission of felonies:

Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. Consummated felonies as well as those which are frustrated
and attempted, are punishable.A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the
will of the perpetrator.There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance.

In Serrano v. People,19 we distinguished a frustrated felony from an attempted felony in this manner:

1.) In a frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as a
consequence; whereas in an attempted felony, the offender merely commences the commissi on of a felony directly by
overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution.2.) In a frustrated felony, the reason for the non-
accomplishment of the crime is some cause independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in an
attempted felony, the reason for the non-fulfillment of the crime is a cause or accident other than the offenders own
spontaneous desistance.20In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound would have been fatal
were it not for timely medical intervention.21 If the evidence fails to convince the court that the wound sustained would
have caused the victims death without timely medical attention, the accused should be convicted of attempted murder
and not frustrated murder.In the instant case, it does not appear that the wound sustained by Gregorio Conde was
mortal. This was admitted by Dr. Edwin Figura, who examined Gregorio after the shooting incident:

Prosecutor Con-El:

Q: When you examined the person of Gregorio Conde, can you tell the court what was the situation of the patient when
you examined him?

A: He has a gunshot wound, but the patient was actually ambulatory and not in distress.

x x x x

Court (to the witness)

Q: The nature of these injuries, not serious?

A: Yes, Your Honor, not serious. He has also abrasion wounds hematoma formation at the anterior aspect right
shoulder.22Since Gregorios gunshot wound was not mortal, we hold that appellant should be convicted of attempted
murder and not frustrated murder. Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the corresponding penalty for attempted
murder shall be two degrees lower than that prescribed for consummated murder under Article 248, that is, prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
provides:x x x the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code,
and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense.1wphi1Thus, appellant should serve an indeterminate sentence ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional in its medium period to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium
period.

Award of damages.In light of recent jurisprudence, we deem it proper to increase the amount of damages imposed by
the lower court in both cases. In Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, this Court hereby awards P75,000.00 as civil indemnity23
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.24 The award of P50,000.00 as moral damages in the foregoing case is sustained.
Appellant is also liable to pay P40,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, in relation to
Criminal Case No. 2002-1777.WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 18 October 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals-Cebu in
CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 01000 with MODIFICATIONS. In Criminal Case No. 2002-1777, we find that appellant Regie
Labiaga is GUILTY of Attempted Murder and shall suffer an indeterminate sentence ranging from two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum, and pay P40,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. In Criminal Case No. 2001-
1555, appellant shall pay P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.SO ORDERED.

One evening, a man stepped out of his home and was shot by the accused. As his two daughters rushed to his aid, the
accused shot one of the girls in the abdomen. The man and his daughter were rushed to the hospital. The man fully
recovered after the treatment of his gunshot wound on his right forearm. His daughter however was proclaimed dead on
arrival at the hospital.The accused was charged with murder and frustrated murder, both with the use of an unlicensed
firearm. In his defense, the accused claimed that the shooting incident occurred because he had acted in self-defense. He
alleged that the man, who was then armed with a gun, challenged him to a fight. The man attempted to shoot him but
the shotgun jammed. The accused then tried to wrestle the gun away but during the struggle, the shotgun fired. The
accused claimed he did not know if anyone was shot.Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals convicted the
accused of murder and frustrated murder. On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of murder but found the
accused guilty not of frustrated murder, but attempted murder. Under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, the stages in
the commission of felonies or crimes are as follows:Consummated felonies as well as those which are frustrated and
attempted are punishable.A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the
will of the perpetrator.There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance.In a frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution,
which should have produced the felony as a consequence, but did not for some reason independent of the offenders will.
In an attempted felony, the offender merely begins the commission of the crime by some overt acts but does not perform
all acts of execution due to some cause or accident other than the offenders own spontaneous desistance.

In classifying the crime as attempted murder rather than frustrated murder, the High Court held:
In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound would have been fatal were it not for timely
medical interventions. If the evidence fails to convince the court that the wound sustained would have caused the victims
death without timely medical attention, the accused should be convicted of attempted murder and not frustrated murder.
In the instant case, it does not appear that the wound sustained by [the man] was mortal (People of the Philippines v.
Labiaga, G.R. No. 202867, 15 July 2013, J. Carpio).