CASE FACTS ISSUE PETITIONERS RESPONDENTS RULING RATIO

Monsanto
VS
Factoran
PET Calbayog Asst
Treasurer Salvacion
Mosanto and three other
accused were convicted
by the Sandiganbayan of
the complex crime of
estafa thru falsification of
public documents.
Appealed, but was denied.
While her motion for
reconsideration was
pending, President
Marcos granted her an
absolute pardon which
she accepted.

PET requested that she be
reinstated to her former
position without the
necessity of a new
appointment.
More importantly, when
pardon was issued before
the final verdict of guilt, it
was an acquittal because
there was no offense to
speak of. In effect, the
President has declared
her not guilty of the crime
charged and has
accordingly dismissed the
same.

W/N a public
officer, who
has been
granted an
absolute
pardon by the
Chief
Executive, is
entitled to
reinstatement
to her former
position
without need
of a new
appointment.

The Finance Ministry
granted her request,
but no earlier than
the date she was
extended the absolute
pardon. PET argued
that the full pardon
she received wiped
out the crime which
implies that her
service in the
government was
never interrupter and
therefore the date of
her reinstatement
corresponded to the
date of her
preventive
suspension and that
she is entitled to
backpay.

PET argued that
without that final
judgment of
conviction, the
accessory penalty of
forfeiture of office did
not attach and the
status of her
employment
remained
"suspended."


RES Deputy Executive
Secretary Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., after
receiving PET letter
from the Ministry of
Finance, argued that
acquittal, not absolute
pardon, of a former
public officer is the
only ground for
reinstatement to his
former position and
entitlement to
payment of his
salaries, benefits and
emoluments due to
him during the period
of his suspension
pendente lite.

NO. PET, though pardoned,
cannot be entitled to
receive backpay for lost
earnings and benefits.
Pardon does not ipso
facto restore a convicted
felon to public office
necessarily relinquished
or forfeited by reason of
the conviction, although
such pardon undoubtedly
restores his eligibility for
appointment to that
office. Stated differently,
the pardon granted to
petitioner has resulted in
removing her
disqualification from
holding public
employment but it
cannot go beyond that.
To regain her former post
as assistant city
treasurer, she must re-
apply and undergo the
usual procedure required
for a new appointment.

Garcia
VS
COA
Petitioner Vicente
Garcia was employed as
a lineman in the Region
IV Station of the Bureau
of Telecommunications
in Lucena City.
Petitioner was found
administratively liable
for dishonesty and was
consequently dismissed
from the service.
However, later, he was
accused of stealing
some materials in the
company that gave rise
to a criminal case of
qualified theft being
filed against him.

In the criminal case, the
trial court acquitted
petitioner not on lack of
proof beyond
reasonable doubt but
on the fact that
petitioner did not
commit the offense
imputed to him. Aside
from finding him
innocent of the charge,
the trial court
commended petitioner
for his concern and
dedication as a public
servant.

In this regard, the
President granted him
an executive clemency.
W/N petitioner
is entitled to the
payment of back
wages for
having been
found innocent
and thus
reinstated
pursuant to the
grant of
executive
clemency.

Yes,
petitioner is
entitled to
the payment
of back
wages after
having been
reinstated
pursuant to
the grant of
executive
clemency.


Article VII, Section 19 of
the Constitution
pronounces that the
bestowal of executive
clemency on petitioner in
effect completely
obliterated the adverse
effects of the
administrative decision,
which found him guilty of
dishonest and ordered
his separation from the
service. This can be
inferred from the
executive clemency itself
exculpating petitioner
from the administrative
charge and thereby
directing his
reinstatement, which is
rendered automatic by
the grant of the pardon.

Petitioners automatic
reinstatement to the
government service
entitles him to back
wages. This is meant to
afford relief to petitioner
who is innocent from the
start and to make
reparation for what he
has suffered as a result of
his unjust dismissal from
service. More over, all
rights and privileges,
including the right to
back wages, is afforded
to those who have been
Petitioner was then
reinstated from his
work and he is claiming
before the COA for his
back payment of
salaries from the time
of his dismissal up to
present. Respondent
COA denied petitioners
pleadings and refused
to give due course to
his claim.


illegally dismissed and
were thus ordered
reinstated or to those
otherwise acquitted of
the charges against
them.


Gonzales
VS
Hechanova
Then President
Diosdado Macapagal
entered into two
executive agreements
with Vietnam and
Burma for the
importation of rice
without complying with
the requisite of
securing a certification
from the Natl
Economic Council
showing that there is a
shortage in cereals.
Hence, Hechanova
authorized the
importation of 67000
tons of rice from
abroad to the detriment
of our local planters.
Gonzales, then
president of the Iloilo
Palay and Corn Planters
Association assailed the
executive agreements.
W/N the
executive
agreements may
be validated in
our courts.
Respondents claim
that in cases where an
executive agreement,
in the form of the
contracts entered into
by herein
respondents, fall in
contrast with existing
statutes as that of RA
2207 (which prohibits
the importation of rice
with the exception of
certain conditions)
and RA 3452 (which
expressly prohibits
the importation of
rice) the latter should
prevail since
according to American
Jurisprudence, it
reflects the latest
intentions have no
merits because
although the President
is generally allowed to
NO. The Court is not satisfied
that the status of said
tracts as alleged
executive agreements has
been sufficiently
established. Even
assuming that said
contracts may properly
considered as executive
agreements, the same are
unlawful, as well as null
and void, from a
constitutional viewpoint,
said agreements being
inconsistent with the
provisions of Republic
Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452.
Although the President
may, under the American
constitutional system
enter into executive
agreements without
previous legislative
authority, he may not, by
executive agreement,
Gonzales averred that
Hechanova is without
jurisdiction or in excess
of jurisdiction, because
RA 3452 prohibits the
importation of rice and
corn by the Rice and
Corn Administration or
any other government
agency.
enter into executive
agreements without
previous legislation,
the latter can never
enter into transactions
which are prohibited
by prior enacted
statutes.
enter into a transaction
which is prohibited by
statutes enacted prior
thereto.
Under the Constitution,
the main function of the
Executive is to enforce
laws enacted by
Congress. He may not
interfere in the
performance of the
legislative powers of the
latter, except in the
exercise of his veto
power. He may not defeat
legislative enactments
that have acquired the
status of law, by
indirectly repealing the
same through an
executive agreement
providing for the
performance of the very
act prohibited by said
laws.

USAFFE
VS
Treasurer
President of the United
States Franklin D.
Roosevelt called into
action his Armed
Forces in lieu of the
coming War. Also
included in such call
were the military forces
of the Philippine
Commonwealth. Given
this, the Congress of the
US provided in its
Appropriation Act of
1941, appropriations to
be allotted to the Army
of the Philippines which
shall be expended in
the manner prescribed
by the President of the
US, but shall be
available to the
Government of the
Philippines upon its
written request of for
reimbursement.

Subsequent acts of
similar nature were
made by the U.S
Congress appropriating
money, and the total
amount appropriated to
the Philippine Armed
Forces amounted to
P578,863,000.00. Of
those amounts about
35 million dollars
remained in the
possession of the
WoN the
Romulo-Snyder
Agreement was
valid?

The petitioners
contend that the
money delivered to
the Armed Forces by
the U.S were straight
payments for military
services and
therefore belonged to
the Philippine
Government.
Furthermore they
contend that the
officers who signed
the agreement had no
authority to sign the
same, seeing as it was
without concurrence
of Congress. They
then prayed that the
amounts be paid to
them to serve the
unpaid claims of the
veterans.

The petitioners rest
their arguments on
the fact that the
agreement lacked
ratification by the
Senate of the
Philippines to make it
binding on the
Government.
YES: Trial
Courts
decision is
affirmed and
the Romulo
Snyder
agreement is
deemed
valid.

It is concluded by the
court that the agreement
is not a treaty per se, and
the fact that it was not
submitted to Senate for
its concurrence is
conceded. However
treaties are not the only
international agreements
that are binding, in fact
this agreement may be
considered as an
Executive Agreement
that requires no
concurrence from Senate
but is equally binding.

Executive Agreements
fall into two classes: (1)
agreements made purely
as executive acts
affecting external
relations and
independent of or
without legislative
authorization, which may
be termed as presidential
agreements and (2)
agreements entered into
in pursuants of acts of
Congress, which have
been designated as
Congressional-Executive
Agreements.

The Romulo-Snyder
Agreement may fall
under any of these two
classes, for precisely on
Philippine Armed
Forces. However
needing funds in a
dying financial situation
then President Quirino
requested that the
Philippine Government
retain the fund to be
paid in ten annual
installments later on.

These installments
were to be the subject
of the assailed
agreement in this case
which is the Romulo-
Snyder Agreement
signed on Washington
in November 6, 1950.
The agreement
provided that the
Philippine Government
shall pay back the 35
million by paying
around $3.5 million in
ten years.

September 18, 1946,
Congress of the
Philippines specifically
authorized the President
of the Philippines to
obtain such loans or
incur such indebtedness
with the Government of
the United States, its
agencies or
instrumentalities.

Tanada
VS
Angara

Doctrine: A final
act, sometimes
called protocol de
clture, is an
instrument which
records the
winding up of the
proceedings of a
diplomatic
conference and
usually includes a
reproduction of
the texts of
treaties,
conventions,
recommendations
and other acts
agreed upon and
signed by the
plenipotentiaries
attending the
conference. It is
not the treaty
itself. It is rather
a summary of the
proceedings of a
protracted
conference which
may have taken
place over several
years.
In April 15, 1994
Secretary Navarro
(respondent) signed
the Final Act
Embodying the
Results of the
Uruguay Round of
Multilateral
Negotiations in
Morroco. The Senate
received a letter for
its concurrence in
August and on
December, the
Philippine Senate
adopted a resolution
to concur the
Agreement
Establishing the
World Trade
Organization.
However, the Final
Act signed by
Secretary Navarro not
only contains the
WTO Agreement but
also the Ministerial
Declarations and
Decisions and the
Understanding on
Commitments and
Financial Services. On
December 29, 1994, a
petition was filed.

W/N RES
members of the
Senate acted in
grave abuse of
discretion
amounting to
lack or excess of
jurisdiction
when they
concurred only
in the
ratification of
the Agreement
Establishing the
World Trade
Organization,
and not with
the Presidential
submission
PET Sen. Wilberto E.
Tanada, et al.
contends both the
wisdom and legality
of WTO. PET argued,
inter alia,
concurrence only in
the WTO Agreement
and not in other
documents
contained in the
Final Act is defective
and insufficient and
thus constitutes
abuse of authority.
PET submit that
such concurrence in
the WTO Agreement
alone is flawed
because it is in effect
a rejection of the
Final Act, which in
turn was the
document signed by
Secretary Navarro,
in representation of
the Republic upon
authority of the
President. They
contend that the
second letter of the
President to the
Senate which
enumerated what
constitutes the Final
Act should have
been the subject of
concurrence of the
Senate.
RES Sen. Egardo
Angara et al. are
members of the
Senate who
concurred in the
ratification who
concurred in the
ratification by the
President of the
Agreement
establishing the
World Trade
Organization.
NO. The
Court cannot
find any
cogent
reason to
impute grave
abuse of
discretion to
the Senates
exercise of its
power of
concurrence
in the WTO
Agreement
granted it by
Sec. 21 of
Article VII of
the
Constitution.
Senate records show
that the Senate
deliberated on what
exactly was the subject
of their concurrence.
An excerpt reveals:
SEN TOLENTINO: Mr.
Chairman, I have not
seen the new
submission actually
transmitted to us but I
saw the draft of his
earlier, and I think it
now complies with the
provisions of the
Constitution, and with
the Final Act itself. The
Constitution does not
require us to ratify the
Final Act. It requires us
to ratify the Agreement
which is now being
submitted. The Final
Act itself specifies what
is going to be
submitted to with the
governments of the
participants.
Bayan
VS
Zamora
After the expiration of
the RP-US Military
Bases Agreement, the
RP-US negotiated for a
possible extension of
the RP-US Military
Bases Agreement.
Negotiations led to
the Visiting Forces
Agreement. The draft
was approved by the
then President Fidel
V. Ramos and the US
Ambassador Thomas
Hubbard. Then,
President Estrada
ratified the VFA and
submitted through
Exec. Secretary
Zamora, the VFA for
concurrence of the
Senate in pursuant of
Section 21 Article 7 of
the Constitution. The
proposed resolution
was then approved by
2/3 of the Senate as
Senate Resolution No.
18.
Is VFA
governed by the
provision of
Section 21,
Article 7 or of
Section 25,
Article 18?

Whether there
is a grave abuse
of discretion by
the President
and the Senate
in ratifying the
agreement

The petitioners
submit that there is
grave abuse of
discretion and that
Article 18 Section
25, not Article 7
Section 21 should be
applied. On the
grounds of the third
requirement of
Art.18 Section 25
recognized as a
treaty, the
petitioners further
assail the validity of
the VFA agreement
being a mere
executive agreement
by the United States,
and do not possess
the advice and
consent of the
United States Senate
pursuant to its own
constitutional
process. Thus, the
petitions assail the
validity of the VFA
agreement.
DISMISSED. Sec. 21, Art. VII
pertains to treaties and
international
agreements in general
while Sec. 25, Art. XVIII
applies to treaties
which involve the
presence of military
bases, troops or
facilities in the
Philippines.

The former only
requires the
concurrence of the
members of the Senate.
On the other hand, the
latter requires the
concurrence of the
Senate, ratification by a
majority of votes cast
in a national
referendum and
recognition by the
other contracting State.
Therefore, both
provisions are
applicable.
Abaya
VS
Ebdane
The government of
Japan and the
Philippines conducted
Exchange of Notes
concerning the
understanding of
Japanese loans to be
extended to the
Philippine
Government for the
countrys economic
stabilization and
development. Japan
Bank for International
Cooperation (JBIC)
agreed to lend RP an
amount not exceeding
Y15.4Billion as
principal for the
implementation of the
Arterial Road Links
Development Project.
Subsequently, DPWH
who was tasked to
implement the project
issued a published
invitation to bid,
eventually out of the
23 foreign and local
contractors that
joined the bidding,
only seven remained
and China Road and
Bridge Corporation
won the bidding
despite its bid amount
of P950Billion that is
apparently above the
Approved Budget for
W/N DPWH
erred in
upholding the
grant of the
aforementioned
project to China
Road and
Bridge
Corporation
Petition
DISMISSED.
RA 9184, which
petitioners heavily
bank on, cannot be
applied because the
advertisements of the
invitation for bids was
already issued prior to
the effectivity of the
said act, and since laws
cannot be given
retroactive effect
unless expressly
provided, it should be
EO 40, PD 1594, RA
7160 and their IRR
which should govern.

It should be noted that
the assailed Loan
Agreement, taken in
conjunction with the
Exchange of Notes is an
Executive Agreement
since it was executed
pursuant to the
agreement and is an
integral part of the
same.



Loan Agreement, taken
in conjunction with the
Exchange of Notes is an
Executive Agreement
since it was executed
pursuant to the
the Contract which
was only at
P730Billion; hence
the current petition
assailing DPWHs
resolution PJHL-A-04-
012 which awarded
China Road & Bridge
Corporation with the
project.
agreement and is an
integral part of the
same

Pharmaceutical
VS
DOH
This tackles the
constitutionality of
the RIRR
implemented by the
DOH vis a vis the
provisions of the Milk
Code or EO 51, a Code
that adopted the
ICMBS. The ICMBS has
been adopted as a
domestic law through
local legislation in
1981 (by doctrine of
transformation),
hence it is the Milk
Code that is in effect
and not really the
ICMBS. Moreover, it
must be noted that
while the Milk Code
almost verbatim
adopts the ICMBS, it
did not adopt the
provision in the
ICMBS prohibiting
prohibiting
advertising or other
forms of promotion to
the general public of
Whether
pertinent
international
agreements
entered into by
the Philippines
are part of the
law of the land
and
may be
implemented
by the DOH
through the
RIRR; If in the
affirmative,
whether the
RIRR is in
accord with the
international
agreements
The RIRR goes
beyond the
provisions of the
Milk Code thereby
amending and
expanding the said
law
YES. Court considers the
WHA Resolutions as
soft law (already
discussed before as
recommendations that
have political weight,
and are not binding).
Respondents failed to
establish that such law
is customary
international law such
that it can be deemed
part of the law of the
land (by virtue of
incorporation). Those
provisions containing
prohibitions on the
advertising and
promoting of
breastmilk substitutes
cannot be adopted as
contained in the WHA
Resolutions as it is
wanting of a local
legislation in pursuant
to Article VII, Section
21 of the Constitution
(doctrine of
transformation). Only
products within the
scope of the ICMBS.
Instead, the Milk Code
expressly provides
that advertising,
promotion, or other
marketing materials
may be allowed if
such materials are
duly authorized and
approved by the
Inter-Agency
Committee (IAC).
those contained in the
Milk Code, as it is the
law that has already
gone through local
legislation, can be
implemented by the
DOH through the RIRR.
Vinuya
VS
Romulo
"PET Isabelita Vinuya,
et al. were all
members of the
Malaya Lolas
Organization,
established for the
purpose of providing
aid to the victims of
rape by Japanese
military forces in the
Philippines during
WWII.

PET argue that (1) the
general waiver of
claims made by the
Philippine
government in the
Treaty of Peace with
Japan is void. (2) They
claim that the comfort
women system
established by Japan,
and the brutal rape
and enslavement of
petitioners
constituted a crime
against humanity,
sexual slavery, and
torture.
(1) W/N RES
ultra vires in
refusing to
espouse the
claims of the
PET for the
crimes against
humanity and
war crimes
committed
against them;
and,

(2) W/N the
Court can
compel RES to
espouse PET
claims for
official apology
and other forms
of reparations
against Japan
before the
International
Court of Justice
(ICJ) and other
international
tribunals.

They also allege that
the prohibition
against these
international crimes
is jus cogens norms
from which no
derogation is
possible; as such, in
waiving the claims
of Filipina comfort
women and failing
to espouse their
complaints against
Japan, the Philippine
government is in
breach of its legal
obligation not to
afford impunity for
crimes against
humanity.

Finally, PET assert
that the Philippine
govts acceptance of
the apologies
made by Japan as
well as funds from
the Asian Womens
Fund (AWF) were
contrary to
international law.

RES Executive
Secretary Alberto
Romulo, et al.
maintain that (1)all
claims of the
Philippines and its
nationals relative to
the war were dealt
with in the San
Francisco Peace
Treaty of 1951 and
the bilateral
Reparations
Agreement of 1956.
(2) In addition, RES
argue that the
apologies made by
Japan have been
satisfactory, and (3)
that Japan had
addressed the
individual claims of
the women through
the atonement
money paid by the
AWF."
NO. The issue is political in
nature. It is not within
SC power to order the
Executive Department
to take up the PET
cause. SC only power
in this regard is to urge
and exhort the
Executive Department
to take up PET cause.
Jurisdiction over such
issues of international
scope lies with the
Executive Department,
particularly the Chief
Executive. As a general
principle and
particularly here,
where such an
extraordinary length of
time has lapsed
between the treatys
conclusion and our
consideration the
Executive must be
given ample discretion
to assess the foreign
policy considerations
of espousing a claim
against Japan, from the
standpoint of both the
interests of the
petitioners and those
of the Republic, and
decide on that basis if
apologies are sufficient,
and whether further
steps are appropriate
or necessary.