Doctrine

Doctrine (from Latin: doctrina) is a codification of beliefs or a body of teachings or instructions,

taught principles or positions, as the body of teachings in a branch of knowledge or belief
system. The Greek analogue is the etymology of catechism.[1]
Often doctrine specifically connotes a corpus of religious dogma as it is promulgated by a
church, but not necessarily: doctrine is also used to refer to a principle of law, in the common
law traditions, established through a history of past decisions, such as the doctrine of self-
defense, or the principle of fair use, or the more narrowly applicable first-sale doctrine. In some
organizations, doctrine is simply defined as "that which is taught", in other words the basis for
institutional teaching of its personnel internal ways of doing business.
Military usage
The term also applies to the concept of an established procedure to a complex operation in
warfare. The typical example is tactical doctrine in which a standard set of maneuvers, kinds of
troops and weapons are employed as a default approach to a kind of attack.
Almost every military organization has its own doctrine, sometimes written, sometimes
unwritten. Some military doctrines are transmitted through training programs. More recently,
in modern peacekeeping operations, which involve both civilian and military operations, more
comprehensive (not just military) doctrines are now emerging such as the 2008 United Nations
peacekeeping operations' "Capstone Doctrine"[9] which speaks to integrated civilian and
military operations.
Political
By definition, political doctrine is "[a] policy, position or principle advocated, taught or put into
effect concerning the acquisition and exercise of the power to govern or administrate in
society."[10] The term political doctrine is sometimes wrongly identified with political ideology.
However, doctrine lacks the actional aspect of ideology. It is mainly a theoretical discourse,
which "refers to a coherent sum of assertions regarding what a particular topic should be"
(Bernard Crick). Political doctrine is based on a rationally elaborated set of values, which may
precede the formation of a political identity per se. It is concerned with philosophical
orientations on a meta-theoretical level.[11]
Legal usage
A legal doctrine is a body of inter-related rules (usually of common law and built over a long
period of time) associated with a legal concept or principle. For example the doctrine of
frustration of purpose now has many tests and rules applicable with regards to each other and
can be contained within a "bubble" of frustration. In a court session a defendant may refer to
the doctrine of justification.
It can be seen that a branch of law contains various doctrines, which in turn contain various
rules or tests. The test of non-occurrence of crucial event is part of the doctrine of frustration
which is part of contract law. Doctrines can grow into a branch of law; restitution is now
considered a branch of law separate to contract and tort.




Ideology

An ideology is a set of conscious and unconscious ideas that constitute one's goals,
expectations and actions. An ideology is a comprehensive vision, a way of looking at things
(compare worldview) as in several philosophical tendencies (see political ideologies), or a set of
ideas proposed by the dominant class of a society to all members of this society (a "received
consciousness" or product of socialization).

Ideologies are systems of abstract thought applied to public matters and thus make this
concept central to politics. Implicitly every political or economic tendency entails an ideology
whether or not it is propounded as an explicit system of thought.

History

This section contains information of unclear or questionable importance or relevance to the
article's subject matter. Please help improve this article by clarifying or removing superfluous
information. (November 2010)

The term "ideology" was born in the highly controversial philosophical and political debates and
fights of the French Revolution and acquired several other meanings from the early days of the
First French Empire to the present. The word was coined by Destutt de Tracy in 1796,[1][2]
assembling the parts idea (near to the Lockean sense) and -logy. He used it to refer to one
aspect of his "science of ideas" (to the study itself, not the subject of the study). He separated
three aspects, namely: ideology, general grammar, and logic, considering respectively the
subject, the means, and the reason of this science.[3] He argues that among these aspects
ideology is the most generic term, because the science of ideas also contains the study of their
expression and deduction.

According to Karl Mannheim's historical reconstruction of the shifts in the meaning of ideology,
the modern meaning of the word was born when Napoleon Bonaparte (as a politician) used it in
an abusive way against "the ideologues" (a group which included[citation needed] Cabanis,
Condorcet, Constant, Daunou, Say, Madame de Stal, and Tracy), to express the pettiness of his
(liberal republican) political opponents.

Perhaps the most accessible source for the near-original meaning of ideology is Hippolyte
Taine's work on the Ancien Regime (the first volume of "Origins of Contemporary France"). He
describes ideology as rather like teaching philosophy by the Socratic method, but without
extending the vocabulary beyond what the general reader already possessed, and without the
examples from observation that practical science would require. Taine identifies it not just with
Destutt De Tracy, but also with his milieu, and includes Condillac as one of its precursors. (Tracy
read the works of Locke and Condillac while he was imprisoned during the Reign of Terror.)

The word "ideology" was coined long before the Russians coined "intelligentsia", or before the
adjective "intellectual" referred to a sort of person (see substantive), i.e. an intellectual. Thus
these words were not around when Napoleon Bonaparte took the word "ideologues" to ridicule
his intellectual opponents. Gradually, however, the term "ideology" has dropped some of its
pejorative sting, and has become a neutral term in the analysis of differing political opinions
and views of social groups.[4] While Karl Marx situated the term within class struggle and
domination,[5][6] others believed it was a necessary part of institutional functioning and social
integration.[7]

Political ideologies

List of political ideologies

Many political parties base their political action and program on an ideology. In social studies, a
political ideology is a certain ethical set of ideals, principles, doctrines, myths, or symbols of a
social movement, institution, class, or large group that explains how society should work, and
offers some political and cultural blueprint for a certain social order. A political ideology largely
concerns itself with how to allocate power and to what ends it should be used. Some parties
follow a certain ideology very closely, while others may take broad inspiration from a group of
related ideologies without specifically embracing any one of them.

Political ideologies have two dimensions:
1.Goals: how society should work
2.Methods: the most appropriate ways to achieve the ideal arrangement

An ideology is a collection of ideas. Typically, each ideology contains certain ideas on what it
considers to be the best form of government (e.g. democracy, theocracy, caliphate etc.), and
the best economic system (e.g. capitalism, socialism, etc.). Sometimes the same word is used to
identify both an ideology and one of its main ideas. For instance, "socialism" may refer to an
economic system, or it may refer to an ideology which supports that economic system.

Ideologies also identify themselves by their position on the political spectrum (such as the left,
the center or the right), though this is very often controversial. Finally, ideologies can be
distinguished from political strategies (e.g. populism) and from single issues that a party may be
built around (e.g. legalization of marijuana). Philosopher Michael Oakeshott provides a good
definition of ideology as "the formalized abridgment of the supposed sub-stratum of the
rational truth contained in the tradition".

Studies of the concept of ideology itself (rather than specific ideologies) have been carried out
under the name of systematic ideology.

Political ideologies are concerned with many different aspects of a society, some of which are:
the economy, education, health care, labor law, criminal law, the justice system, the provision
of social security and social welfare, trade, the environment, minors, immigration, race, use of
the military, patriotism, and established religion.

There are many proposed methods for the classification of political ideologies, each of these
different methods generate a specific political spectrum.

Today, many commentators claim that we are living in a post-ideological age,[13] in which
redemptive, all-encompassing ideologies have failed, and this is often associated with Francis
Fukuyama's writings on "the end of history".[14]

Government ideology

When a political ideology becomes a dominantly pervasive component within a government, it
can be considered an ideocracy.[15] Different forms of government utilize ideology in various
ways, not always restricted to politics and society. Certain ideas and schools of thought become
favored, or rejected, over others, depending on their compatibility with or use for the reigning
social order. Galileo's discoveries of the nature of the universe were suppressed due to their
threat to the Church and the monarchy.

Epistemological ideologies

Even when the challenging of existing beliefs is encouraged, as in scientific theories, the
dominant paradigm or mindset can prevent certain challenges, theories, or experiments from
being advanced.

A special case of science adopted as ideology is that of ecology, which studies the relationships
among living things on Earth. Perceptual psychologist James J. Gibson believed that human
perception of ecological relationships was the basis of self-awareness and cognition itself.
Linguist George Lakoff has proposed a cognitive science of mathematics wherein even the most
fundamental ideas of arithmetic would be seen as consequences or products of human
perceptionwhich is itself necessarily evolved within an ecology.

Deep ecology and the modern ecology movement (and, to a lesser degree, Green parties)
appear to have adopted ecological sciences as a positive ideology.

Some accuse ecological economics of likewise turning scientific theory into political economy,
although theses in that science can often be tested. The modern practice of green economics
fuses both approaches and seems to be part science, part ideology.

This is far from the only theory of economics to be raised to ideology statussome notable
economically based ideologies include neo-liberalism, monetarism, mercantilism, mixed
economy, social Darwinism, communism, laissez-faire economics, and free trade. There are also
current theories of safe trade and fair trade which can be seen as ideologies.

Principle

A principle is a law or rule that has to be, or usually is to be followed, or can be desirably
followed, or is an inevitable consequence of something, such as the laws observed in nature or
the way that a system is constructed. The principles of such a system are understood by its
users as the essential characteristics of the system, or reflecting system's designed purpose,
and the effective operation or use of which would be impossible if any one of the principles was
to be ignored.[1]

Examples of principles:
A descriptive comprehensive and fundamental law, doctrine, or assumption,
a normative rule or code of conduct,
a law or fact of nature underlying the working of an artificial device.

The principle of any effect is the cause that produces it.

Depending on the way thea cause is understood the basic law governing that cause may acquire
some distinction in its expression.

Principle of causality, as efficient cause[edit]

The efficient cause is the one that produces the necessary effect, as long as the necessary and
sufficient conditions are provided.

The scientific process generally consists of establishing a cause by analyzing its effect upon
objects. In this way, a description can be established to explain what principle brought about
the change-effect. For this reason the principle of cause is considered to be a determining
factor in the production of facts.

The principle of causality states, "every event has a cause"; i.e., everything that begins to exist
must have a cause. It was formulated by Aristotle as "Everything that moves is moved by
another". This principle, in conjunction with the principle that an infinite regress is not possible,
has been used to argue for God's existence. The principle of causality is often associated with
the similar, though distinct, principle of sufficient reason, according to which, there is a reason
why everything is the particular way it is rather than some other way.

Principle as a final cause[edit]

Final cause is the end, or goal, which guides one to take the necessary actions to obtain it.

For that there needs to be an intelligence capable of conceiving the end and realizing that
certain actions must be taken to achieve the goal.

Science does not recognize the finality of the natural causes as a guiding principle of
investigation.

It is also understood therefore that the principle guides the action as a norm or rule of
behavior, which produces two types of principle.

Principle as law

Principle as scientific law

Laws Physics. Laws Statistics. Laws Biological. Laws of nature are those that cannot be (or are
not) proven explicitly, however we can measure and quantify them by observing the results
that they produce.[vague][clarification needed]

Principle as moral law

It represents a set of values that orient and rule the conduct of a concrete society. The law
establishes an obligation in the individual's conscience that belongs to the cultural field in which
such values are accepted. It supposes the liberty of the individual as cause, that acts without
external coercion, through a process of socialization.

Principle as a juridic law

It represents a set of values that inspire the written norms that organize the life of a society
submitting to the powers of an authority, generally the State. The law establishes a legal
obligation, in a coercive way; it therefore acts as principle conditioning of the action that limits
the liberty of the individuals.

Principle as axiom or logical fundament

Principle of sufficient reason

The principle states that every event has a rational explanation. The principle has a variety of
expressions, all of which are perhaps best summarized by the following:

For every entity x, if x exists, then there is a sufficient explanation for why x exists. For every
event e, if e occurs, then there is a sufficient explanation for why e occurs. For every
proposition p, if p is true, then there is a sufficient explanation for why p is true.

but one realizes that in every sentence there is a direct relation between the predicate and the
subject. To say "the earth is round", corresponds to a direct relation between the subject and
the predicate. Taking this to the sentence "the being is the being", we realize the principle of
identity that the being possesses.

Principle of non-contradiction
"One thing can't be and not be at the same time, under the same aspect." Example: It is not
possible that in exactly the same moment it rains and doesn't rain (in the same place). see Law
of noncontradiction

Principle of excluded middle

The principle of the excluding third or "principium tertium exclusum" is a principle of the
traditional logic formulated canonically by Leibniz as: either A is B or A isn't B. It is read the
following way: either P is true, or its denial P is. It is also known as "tertium non datur" ('A
third (thing) is not). Classically it is considered to be one of the most important fundamental
principles or laws of thought (along with the principles of identity, no contradiction and
sufficient reason). see Law of excluded middle.































Element
A material factor; a basic component.
The term is used to mean one of several parts that unite to form a whole, as in elements of a criminal
action or civil action. In the TORT of Assault and Battery, an essential element of the offense would be
unwanted physical contact. An element of the crime of rape is lack of consent on the part of the victim.
element n. 1) an essential requirement to a cause of action (the right to bring a lawsuit to enforce a
particular right). Each cause of action (negligence, breach of contract, trespass, assault, etc.) is made up
of a basic set of elements which must be alleged and proved. Each charge of a criminal offense requires
allegation and proof of its elements. 2) essential requirement of a General Plan. (See: cause of action,
crime, General Plan, zoning)

Cause of Action
The fact or combination of facts that gives a person the right to seek judicial redress or relief against
another. Also, the legal theory forming the basis of a lawsuit.
The cause of action is the heart of the complaint, which is the Pleading that initiates a lawsuit. Without an
adequately stated cause of action the plaintiff's case can be dismissed at the outset. It is not sufficient
merely to state that certain events occurred that entitle the plaintiff to relief. All the elements of each
cause of action must be detailed in the complaint. The claims must be supported by the facts, the law,
and a conclusion that flows from the application of the law to those facts.
The cause of action is often stated in the form of a syllogism, a form of deductive reasoning that begins
with a major premise (the applicable Rule of Law), proceeds to a minor premise (the facts that gave rise
to the claim), and ends with a conclusion. In a cause of action for Battery, the rule of law is that any
intentional, unpermitted act that causes a harmful or offensive touching of another is a battery. This is the
major premise and is stated first. Supporting facts, constituting the minor premise, appear after the rule of
law. For example, a statement of facts for a case of battery might be "The plaintiff, while walking through
ABC Store on the afternoon of March 11, 1998, was tackled by the defendant, a security guard for the
store, who knocked the plaintiff to the floor and held her there by kneeling on her back and holding her
arms behind her, while screaming in her ear to open her shopping bag. These actions caused the plaintiff
to suffer injuries to her head, chest, shoulders, neck, and back." The cause of action concludes with a
statement that the defendant is responsible for the plaintiff's injuries and that the plaintiff is entitled to
compensation from the defendant.
The facts or circumstances that entitle a person to seek judicial relief may create more than one cause of
action. For example, in the preceding example, the plaintiff might assert claims for assault, battery,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of Civil Rights. She might also bring claims for
negligent hiring (if the guard had a history of violent behavior which the store failed to discover) or
negligent supervision. (When damages are caused by an employee it is common to sue both the
employee and the employer.) All these causes of action arise from the same set of facts and
circumstances but are supported by different rules of law and constitute separate claims for relief.
A cause of action can arise from an act, a failure to perform a legal obligation, a breach of duty, or a
violation or invasion of a right. The importance of the act, failure, breach, or violation lies in its legal effect
or characterization and in how the facts and circumstances, considered as a whole, relate to applicable
law. A set of facts may have no legal effect in one situation, whereas the same or similar facts may have
significant legal implications in another situation. For example, tackling a shoplifting suspect who is
brandishing a gun is a legitimate action by a security guard and probably would not support a claim for
relief if the suspect were injured in the fracas. On the other hand, tackling a shopper who merely acts in a
suspicious manner while carrying a shopping bag is a questionable exercise of a guard's duty and may
well give rise to Justiciable causes of action.
crime n. a violation of a law in which there is injury to the public or a member of the public and a term in
jail or prison, and/or a fine as possible penalties. There is some sentiment for excluding from the "crime"
category crimes without victims, such as consensual acts, or violations in which only the perpetrator is
hurt or involved such as personal use of illegal drugs. (See: felony, misdemeanor)
general plan n. a plan of a city, county or area which establishes zones for different types of
development, uses, traffic patterns, and future development. (See: zoning)
Zoning
The separation or division of a municipality into districts, the regulation of buildings and structures in such
districts in accordance with their construction and the nature and extent of their use, and the dedication of
such districts to particular uses designed to serve the General Welfare.
Zoning, the regulation of the use of real property by local government, restricts a particular territory to
residential, commercial, industrial, or other uses. The local governing body considers the character of the
property as well as its fitness for particular uses. It must enact the regulations in accordance with a well-
considered and comprehensive plan intended to avoid Arbitrary exercise of government power. A
comprehensive plan is a general design to control the use of properties in the entire municipality, or at
least in a large portion of it. Individual pieces of property should not be singled out for special treatment.
For example, one or two lots may not be placed in a separate zone and subjected to restrictions that do
not apply to similar adjoining lands.
Zoning ordinances divide a town, city, village, or county into separate residential, commercial, and
industrial districts, thereby preserving the desirable characteristics of each type of setting. These laws
generally limit dimensions in each zone. Many regulations require certain building features and limit the
number and location of parking and loading areas and the use of signs. Other regulations provide space
for schools, parks, or other public facilities.
Zoning helps city planners bring about orderly growth and change. It controls population density and
helps create attractive, healthful residential areas. In addition, zoning helps assure property owners and
residents that the characteristics of nearby areas will remain stable.
In some states a municipality has the right to be heard on proposed zoning in an adjoining community.
Courts have upheld this so-called extraterritorial zoning as an exercise of the Police Power of the state,
with the goal of serving the general welfare of both communities and creating harmony among the uses of
a given area, without regard to political boundaries.
Following the lead of New York City, which passed the first major zoning ordinance in 1916, most urban
communities throughout the country have enacted zoning regulations.
Zoning is not merely the division of a city into districts and the regulation of the structural and architectural
designs of buildings within each district. It also requires consideration of future growth and development,
adequacy of drainage and storm sewers, public streets, pedestrian walkways, density of population, and
many other factors that are within legislative competence.
Building Codes, which govern the safety and structure of buildings, do not contradict zoning ordinances,
but exist side by side with them. Both rest on the police power: zoning stabilizes the use of property, and
building codes ensure the safety and structure of buildings. Zoning is intended to have a relative
permanency, whereas building codes are much more flexible because they must keep abreast of new
materials and other technological advances.
Municipalities have power to zone property only if a state grants it by statute or it is derived from
constitutional provisions. Zoning ordinances must be reasonable because by their nature they restrain the
use of property that the owners could otherwise use as they chose. The landowner cannot complain as
long as the power to zone is used in the public interest and for the general welfare of the community
impartially and without compensation.
The regulations must meet the demands of the constitutional prohibition against taking private property
for public use without just compensation as mandated by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution as well as by the constitutions of the states. The U.S. Supreme Court decided three
cases that have had considerable impact in this area: Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798 (1992), Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 110
S. Ct. 3177, 111 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1990), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 129 L.
Ed. 2d 304 (1994). The decisions made it more difficult for municipalities to require that land developers
give up part of their property for public purposes, such as access to lake shores, sidewalks, access roads,
and parks. If the government needs the land, it must compensate the owner by exercising its power of
Eminent Domain and condemning the property.
Courts have held that a zoning regulation is legal or valid if it is reasonable and not arbitrary and bears a
reasonable and substantial relation to the public health, safety, comfort, morals, and general welfare and
if the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of its purpose. An ordinance is
invalid if its enforcement will preclude use of the property for any purpose to which it is reasonably
adapted. In determining whether a regulation is reasonable, no single factor is controlling. Those factors
normally considered are need for the adoption, the purpose, location, size, and physical characteristics of
the land, and the character of the neighborhood. Also considered are the effect on the value of property,
the amount by which property values are decreased, the notion of the general welfare (that is, what is
best for the community at large), and the density, population, and aesthetics of the area. Traffic, use of
nearby land, and length of time the property has been vacant are also relevant.
An ordinance that is reasonable when enacted may prove to be unreasonable, and hence may be set
aside by a court, if circumstances have changed. Zoning regulations must promote the good of all the
people in the community rather than further the desires of a particular group, and the power cannot be
invoked to further private interests that conflict with the rights of the public. Restrictions based solely on
race or occupancy of property within certain districts are invalid. A classification that discriminates against
a racial or religious group can only be upheld if the state demonstrates an overwhelming interest that can
be served no other way. The regulation must be clear and specific. It must describe districts with
certainty, and if maps are necessary, it should include references to them. The standards governing
conduct of the administrator must be clear. The fact that regulations have not been enforced does not
prevent their enforcement. Only persons whose rights are injured by regulations may attack them. An
invalid enactment is without effect and confers no rights and imposes no duties.
Regulations must be in accordance with a comprehensive plan, which may be separate or part of the
zoning regulation. Spot zoning of individual parcels of property in a manner different from that of
surrounding property, primarily for the private interests of the owner of the property so zoned, may be
improper but not illegal in all cases. Spot zoning disregards the requirement that zoning be in accordance
with a comprehensive plan. It may be valid if there is a reasonable basis for distinguishing the parcel from
surrounding parcels.
Zoning regulations may validly prescribe a type of building, location of utility lines, restrictions on
accessory buildings or structures, and preservation of historical areas and buildings. General rules of
construction apply to restrictions affecting architectural and structural design of buildings and open
spaces. Such rules apply to building setbacks from the streets and other boundaries, size and height of
buildings, number of rooms, floor space or area and cubic feet, and minimum cost of buildings. They also
apply to frontage of lots, minimum lot area, front, rear, and side yards, off-street parking, the number of
buildings on a lot, and the number of dwelling units in a certain area. Regulations may restrict areas to
single-family homes or to multifamily dwellings or townhouses. An ordinance may permit the construction
of a building intended for nonresidential use, such as a school, church, hospital, or charitable institution,
in a residential district.
Municipalities have gained some flexibility in their regulations by authorizing special use permits in certain
districts. This gives them the power to impose restrictions and requirements that might not otherwise be
possible under the strict classification of the district.
It is also possible to create a unit development in an entire district or a large part of one, with plans and
restrictions governing the entire project. This arrangement may mix some commercial and residential
uses and "clustering" of certain properties, leaving room for green spaces and parkways.
A municipality may use broad discretion to fix the location and boundaries of business, commercial, and
industrial districts and has the power to review and periodically update zoning regulations. This should be
done whenever growth and progress require. Failure or refusal to make a change in regulations when
they are clearly appropriate in view of development may be regarded as unreasonable, arbitrary conduct.
Only the legislative body empowered to enact zoning regulations has the power to amend them. This
must be done with the same formality, including required notices and hearings, as the original enactment.
Neither the courts nor boards of zoning appeals should undertake such amendment, regardless of how
archaic the regulations may be.
Zoning ordinances may permit or prohibit certain uses and may create whole districts devoted only to
residence, commerce, or industry. When a structure's use does not conform to a zoning ordinance but the
structure existed before the adoption or amendment of the ordinance, the structure has nonconforming
use status, sometimes called legal nonconforming use. A vested legal nonconforming use is safeguarded
by the Constitution unless it is abandoned or terminated. It is a property right that cannot be taken away
without just compensation. However, the nonconforming use structure may not be expanded, its use may
not be changed, and, under many laws, if it is destroyed by fire or other cause, it may not be rebuilt.
Zoning regulations are subject to interpretation by the courts where their meaning is unclear. Because
such laws are in derogation of the Common Law, they are to be construed strictly, but they should receive
a reasonable and fair construction in the light of the public good they propose to serve.
Boards of zoning appeals are created by statutes. They are Quasi-Judicial bodies because they conduct
hearings with sworn testimony by witnesses and a transcript is made, which courts may review.
Municipalities generally require permits for building or remodeling and certificates of occupancy after
inspection discloses conformity with applicable codes. An owner without legal training who contests a
zoning requirement would be ill-advised to try to argue his case alone because the members of the board,
the municipal attorney, and the planning official have long experience, knowledge of the law, and a built-
in tendency to favor their interpretations of the ordinances.
Where full compliance with the strict letter of the ordinance works a hardship on the owner, the board of
appeals or governing body may grant a variance, which is toleration of a slight violation of the ordinance.
The owner, however, may not create her own hardship by willfully violating the law.
Zoning regulations may be enforced by Mandamus, an action that results in a judgment of a court
compelling the appropriate public officers to carry out their duty; by Injunction, which results in a court
order forbidding the use or structure that is in violation; and by civil Forfeiture actions or criminal
prosecutions. Adjoining owners or citizens at large may have standing to enforce the ordinances where
the municipal officers fail to do so. Some ordinances provide for a certain sum to be paid to the
municipality for each day of violation. Some courts enforce these penalties strictly, whereas others are
more lenient, as long as compliance with the ordinances is achieved in a reasonable time.
Levels
1. level - a position on a scale of intensity or amount or quality; "a moderate grade of
intelligence"; "a high level of care is required"; "it is all a matter of degree"

2. level - a relative position or degree of value in a graded group; "lumber of the highest grade"


3. level - a specific identifiable position in a continuum or series or especially in a
process; "a remarkable degree of frankness"; "at what stage are the social sciences?"

4. level - height above ground; "the water reached ankle level"; "the pictures were at the same
level"

5. level - indicator that establishes the horizontal when a bubble is centered in a tube of liquid

6. level - a flat surface at right angles to a plumb line; "park the car on the level"

7. level - an abstract place usually conceived as having depth; "a good actor communicates on
several levels"; "a simile has at least two layers of meaning"; "the mind functions on many
strata simultaneously"

1. amount: the amount or concentration of something
2. aspect: a quality or aspect of something
3. rank or scale: a particular position in a range of relative scales or values










Degree
1. (Mathematics & Measurements / Units) a stage in a scale of relative amount or intensity a high degree
of competence
2. (Social Science / Education) an academic award conferred by a university or college on successful
completion of a course or as an honorary distinction (honorary degree)
3. (Medicine) any of three categories of seriousness of a burn See burn1 [22]
4. (Law) (in the US) any of the categories into which a crime is divided according to its seriousness first-
degree murder
5. (Sociology) Genealogy a step in a line of descent, used as a measure of the closeness of a blood
relationship
6. (Linguistics / Grammar) Grammar any of the forms of an adjective used to indicate relative amount or
intensity: in English they are positive, comparative, and superlative
7. (Music, other) Music any note of a diatonic scale relative to the other notes in that scale D is the
second degree of the scale of C major
8. (Mathematics & Measurements / Units) a unit of temperature on a specified scale the normal body
temperature of man is 36.8 degrees Celsius Symbol See also Celsius scale, Fahrenheit scale
9. (Mathematics & Measurements / Units) a measure of angle equal to one three-hundred-and-sixtieth of
the angle traced by one complete revolution of a line about one of its ends. Symbol See also minute1 [2]
second2 [2] Compare radian
10. (Mathematics & Measurements / Units)
a. a unit of latitude or longitude, divided into 60 minutes, used to define points on the earth's surface or
on the celestial sphere
b. a point or line defined by units of latitude and/or longitude. Symbol
11. (Mathematics & Measurements / Units) a unit on any of several scales of measurement, as for alcohol
content or specific gravity. Symbol
12. (Mathematics) Maths
a. the highest power or the sum of the powers of any term in a polynomial or by itself x4 + x + 3 and xyz2
are of the fourth degree
b. the greatest power of the highest order derivative in a differential equation
13. Obsolete a step; rung
14. (Sociology) Archaic a stage in social status or rank



Characteristics of Democracy
No consensus exists on how to define democracy, but equality, freedom and rule of law have
been identified as important characteristics since ancient times.[6][7] These principles are
reflected in all eligible citizens being equal before the law and having equal access to legislative
processes. For example, in a representative democracy, every vote has equal weight, no
unreasonable restrictions can apply to anyone seeking to become a representative, and the
freedom of its eligible citizens is secured by legitimized rights and liberties which are typically
protected by a constitution.[8][9]
One theory holds that democracy requires three fundamental principles: 1) upward control, i.e.
sovereignty residing at the lowest levels of authority, 2) political equality, and 3) social norms by
which individuals and institutions only consider acceptable acts that reflect the first two
principles of upward control and political equality.[10]
The term "democracy" is sometimes used as shorthand for liberal democracy, which is a variant
of representative democracy that may include elements such as political pluralism; equality
before the law; the right to petition elected officials for redress of grievances; due process; civil
liberties; human rights; and elements of civil society outside the government.[citation needed]
Roger Scruton argues that democracy alone can't provide personal and political freedom unless
the institutions of civil society are also present.[11]
In many countries, notably the United Kingdom which originated the Westminster system, the
dominant principle is that of parliamentary sovereignty, while maintaining judicial
independence.[12] In the United States, separation of powers is often cited as a central
attribute. In India, the world's largest democracy, parliamentary supremacy is subject to a
constitution which includes judicial review.[13] Other uses of "democracy" include that of direct
democracy. Though the term "democracy" is typically used in the context of a political state, the
principles also are applicable to private organizations.
Majority rule is often listed as a characteristic of democracy. Hence, democracy allows for
political minorities to be oppressed by the "tyranny of the majority" in the absence of legal
protections of individual or group rights. An essential part of an "ideal" representative
democracy is competitive elections that are fair both substantively[14] and procedurally.[15]
Furthermore, freedom of political expression, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press are
considered to be essential rights that allow eligible citizens to be adequately informed and able
to vote according to their own interests.[16][17]
It has also been suggested that a basic feature of democracy is the capacity of all voters to
participate freely and fully in the life of their society.[18] With its emphasis on notions of social
contract and the collective will of the all voters, democracy can also be characterized as a form
of political collectivism because it is defined as a form of government in which all eligible citizens
have an equal say in the decisions that affect their lives.[19]
While democracy is often equated with the republican form of government, the term "republic"
classically has encompassed both democracies and aristocracies.[20][21] Some democracies
are constitutional monarchies, such as the United Kingdom and Japan.

Some Basic Characteristics of American Democracy
Several unique characteristics of our political system are listed below.
Popular consent is the idea that governments draw their powers from the governed.
Popular sovereignty is the right of the majority to govern themselves.
Majority rule holds that only those policies that collectively garner the consent of a majority of
citizens will become law.
Individualism is the value and focus placed on individuals in our democracy and culture.
Individualism holds that the primary function of government is to enable the individual to achieve
his or her highest level of development. This makes the interests of the individual as important
as or more important than those of the state.
Equality is the idea that everyone is equal under the law.
Personal Liberty usually refers to individual freedoms. It initially referred to freedom from
government interference; today it includes demands for freedom to engage in a variety of
practices free from governmental discrimination.
Federalism refers to a political system in which power is shared among the various levels of
government in the case of the United States, the federal government and the states. Local
governments are created by their states.
Separation of Powers refers to the splitting of power between the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches of government. This creates an intricate system of checks and balances.
Pluralism is a political model in which political power and resources are scattered so widely in
our diverse democracy that no single group or individual can dominate or monopolize any
substantial area of policy. Interest groups are a critical component of pluralism. An interest
group is a collection of individuals organized to express attitudes or positions held in common in
a effort to influence public policy.




World and International Government and Politics
"Global state" redirects here. For the computing concept, see Global state (computing).
"United States of Earth" redirects here. For the government in the television show Futurama,
see Politics in Futurama.
"World empire" and "World State" redirect here. For the video game, see World Empire. For the
World State in Brave New World, see The World State.
This article is about the political concept. For conspiracy theories about world government, see
New World Order (conspiracy theory). For other uses, see World government (disambiguation).
World government is the notion of a single common political authority for all of humanity.
As of 2013, there is no functioning worldwide military, executive, legislature, judiciary, or
constitution with jurisdiction over the entire planet. The United Nations is limited to a mostly
advisory role, and its stated purpose is to foster cooperation between existing national
governments rather than exert authority over them.
Main article: Francisco de Vitoria
Early father of international law, Francisco de Vitoria is considered the "founder of global
political philosophy." De Vitoria conceived of the res publica totius orbis, or the "republic of the
whole world." This came at a time when the University of Salamanca was engaged in
unprecedented thought concerning human rights, international law, an early economics based
on the experiences of the Spanish Empire.
Hugo Grotius
Main article: Hugo Grotius
Title page of the 1631 second edition of De jure belli ac pacis.
De jure belli ac pacis (On the Law of War and Peace) is a 1625 book in Latin, written by Hugo
Grotius and published in Paris, on the legal status of war. It is now regarded as a foundational
work in international law.[1] Grotius was born April 10, 1583. He was a philosopher, theologian,
playwright, and poet. Grotius is known for coming up with the idea of having an international
law, and is still acknowledged today by the American society of International Law. Hugo was the
first child of Jan de Groot and Alida van Overschie. He was exiled from many countries, though
many people had great respect for him.
Immanuel Kant
Immanuel Kant wrote the essay "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (Zum ewigen
Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf.) (1795)". In his essay, Kant describes three basic
requirements for organizing human affairs to permanently abolish the threat of present and
future war, and, thereby, help establish a new era of lasting peace throughout the world.
Specifically, Kant described his proposed peace program as containing two steps.

The "Preliminary Articles" described the steps that should be taken immediately, or with all
deliberate speed:
1."No Secret Treaty of Peace Shall Be Held Valid in Which There Is Tacitly Reserved Matter for
a Future War"
2."No Independent States, Large or Small, Shall Come under the Dominion of Another State by
Inheritance, Exchange, Purchase, or Donation"
3."Standing Armies Shall in Time Be Totally Abolished"
4."National Debts Shall Not Be Contracted with a View to the External Friction of States"
5."No State Shall by Force Interfere with the Constitution or Government of Another State,
6."No State Shall, during War, Permit Such Acts of Hostility Which Would Make Mutual
Confidence in the Subsequent Peace Impossible: Such Are the Employment of Assassins
(percussores), Poisoners (venefici), Breach of Capitulation, and Incitement to Treason
(perduellio) in the Opposing State"

Three Definitive Articles would provide not merely a cessation of hostilities, but a foundation on
which to build a peace.
1."The Civil Constitution of Every State Should Be Republican"
2."The Law of Nations Shall be Founded on a Federation of Free States"
3."The Law of World Citizenship Shall Be Limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality"
Joseph Smith
Main article: Theodemocracy
In early 19th century Mormon theology, Joseph Smith taught that a theodemocracy would guide
and direct the Kingdom of God (Zion) on the earth during the end times. On March 11, 1844,
Smith organized a Council of Fifty, who were to work under the direction of the Priesthood
authorities of his church, along with a Council of Friends. This group of three organizations was
expected to rule as a world government just prior to the Millennium.[2][3][4]
Karl Krause
[icon] This section requires expansion. (October 2009)
In 1811, German philosopher Karl Krause, suggested, in an essay titled "The Archetype of
Humanity", the formation of five regional federations: Europe, Asia, Africa, America and
Australia, aggregated under a world republic.


Alfred Tennyson

In 1842, the English poet Lord Alfred Tennyson, published the oft-quoted lines "Locksley Hall":
For I dipt into the future, far as human eye could see / Saw a Vision of the world, and all the
wonder that would be /... / Till the war-drum throbb'd no longer / and the battle-flags were furled
/ In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world. / There the common sense of most shall
hold / a fretful realm in awe / And the kindly earth shall slumber / lapt in universal law.
Bah'u'llh
In the second half of the 19th century, Bah'u'llh founded the Bah' Faith, a religion which
identified the establishment of world unity and a global commonwealth of nations as a key
principle.[5] He envisioned a set of new social structures based on participation and consultation
among the world's peoples, including a world legislature, an international court, and an
international executive empowered to carry out the decisions of these legislative and judicial
bodies. Connected principles of the Bah' religion include universal systems of weights and
measures, currency unification, and the adoption of a global auxiliary language.[6] In his many
scriptures and messages addressed to the most prominent state leaders of his time, Bah'u'llh
called for world reconciliation, reunification and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Many of the
most fundamental Bah' writings address the central issue of world unity, such as the following:
"The earth is but one country and mankind its citizens".[7] The Bah' faith is considered [8] to
be the newest world religion and counts in excess of 5 million followers spread across 200
States and territories.
Ulysses S. Grant
This section requires expansion. (October 2009)
Ulysses S. Grant commented, "I believe at some future day, the nations of the earth will agree
on some sort of congress which will take cognizance of international questions of difficulty and
whose decisions will be as binding as the decisions of the Supreme Court are upon us".[9]
During Second World war, Wendell Wilkie expanded on this notion in his book One World.
Harry Truman
U.S. President Harry S. Truman commented: "We must make the United Nations continue to
work, and to be a going concern, to see that difficulties between nations may be settled just as
we settle difficulties between States here in the United States. When Kansas and Colorado fall
out over the waters in the Arkansas River, they don't go to war over it; they go to the Supreme
Court of the United States, and the matter is settled in a just and honorable way. There is not a
difficulty in the whole world that cannot be settled in exactly the same way in a world court". --
President Truman's remarks in Omaha, Nebraska on June 5, 1948, at the dedication of the War
Memorial.[10]




International Peace Congress
Starting in 1843, International Peace Congresses were held in Europe every two years, but lost
their momentum after 1853 due to the renewed outbreak of wars in Europe (Crimea) and North
America (American Civil War).
International organizations
Main article: International organizations
Emblem of the International Committee of the Red Cross.
International organizations started forming in the late 19th century the International Committee
of the Red Cross in 1863, the Telegraphic Union in 1865 and the Universal Postal Union in
1874. The increase in international trade at the turn of the 20th century accelerated the
formation of international organizations, and, by the start of World War I in 1914, there were
approximately 450 of them. Support for the idea of establishing international law grew during
that period as well. The Institute of International Law was formed in 1873 by the Belgian Jurist
Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns, leading to the creation of concrete legal drafts, for example by the
Swiss Johaan Bluntschli in 1866.[citation needed] In 1883, James Lorimer published "The
Institutes of the Law of Nations" in which he explored the idea of a world government
establishing the global rule of law. The first embryonic world parliament, called the Inter-
Parliamentary Union, was organized in 1886 by Cremer and Passy, composed of legislators
from many countries. In 1904 the Union formally proposed "an international congress which
should meet periodically to discuss international questions".
League of Nations
See also: Fourteen Points
The League of Nations (LoN) was an inter-governmental organization founded as a result of the
Treaty of Versailles in 19191920. At its largest size from 28 September 1934 to 23 February
1935, it had 58 members. The League's goals included upholding the Rights of Man, such as
the rights of non-whites, women, and soldiers; disarmament, preventing war through collective
security, settling disputes between countries through negotiation, diplomacy, and improving
global quality of life. The diplomatic philosophy behind the League represented a fundamental
shift in thought from the preceding hundred years. The League lacked its own armed force and
so depended on the Great Powers to enforce its resolutions and economic sanctions and
provide an army, when needed. However, these powers proved reluctant to do so. Lacking
many of the key elements necessary to maintain world peace, the League failed to prevent
World War II. Hitler withdrew Germany from the League of Nations once he planned to take
over Europe. The rest of the Axis powers soon followed him. Having failed its primary goal, the
League of Nations fell apart and eventually was transformed into the United Nations. The
League of Nations consisted of the Assembly, the Council, and the Permanent Secretariat.
Below these were many agencies. The Assembly was where delegates from all member states
conferred. Each country was allowed three representatives and one vote.
Nazi Germany
Further information: New Order (Nazism) and Lebensraum
The ruling Nazi Party of 1933-1945 Germany envisaged the ultimate establishment of a world
government under the complete hegemony of the Third Reich.[11] In its move to overthrow the
post-World War I Treaty of Versailles Germany had already withdrawn itself from the League of
Nations, and it did not intend to join a similar internationalist organization ever again.[12] In his
desire and stated political aim of expanding the "living space" (Lebensraum) of the German
people by destroying or driving out "lesser-deserving races" in and from other territories dictator
Adolf Hitler may have devised an ideological system of self-perpetuating expansionism, in which
the expansion of a state's population would require the conquest of more territory which would
in turn lead to a further growth in population which would then require even more conquests.[11]
In 1927 Rudolf Hess relayed to Walter Hewel Hitler's belief that world peace could only be
acquired "when one power, the racially best one, has attained uncontested supremacy". When
this control would be achieved, this power could then set up for itself a world police and assure
itself "the necessary living space.... The lower races will have to restrict themselves
accordingly".[11]
Atlantic Charter
Winston Churchill's edited copy of the final draft of the Atlantic Charter.
The Atlantic Charter was a published statement agreed between the United Kingdom and the
United States. It was intended as the blueprint for the postwar world after World War II, and
turned out to be the foundation for many of the international agreements that currently shape
the world. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the post-war independence of
British and French possessions, and much more are derived from the Atlantic Charter. The
Atlantic charter was made to show the goals of the allied powers during World War II. It first
started with the United States and Great Britain, and later all the allies would follow the charter.
Some goals include access to raw materials, reduction of trade restrictions, and freedom from
fear and wants. The name, The Atlantic Charter, came from a newspaper that coined the title.
However, Winston Churchill would use it, and from then on the Atlantic Charter was the official
name. In retaliation, the Axis powers would raise their morale and try to work their way into
Great Britain. The Atlantic Charter was a stepping stone into the creation of the United Nations.
This section requires expansion. (October 2009)
United Nations
Emblem of the United Nations.
World War II (19391945) resulted in an unprecedented scale of destruction of lives (over 60
million dead, most of them civilians), and the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Some of the
acts committed against civilians during the war were on such a massive scale of savagery, they
came to be widely considered as crimes against humanity itself. As the war's conclusion drew
near, many shocked voices called for the establishment of institutions able to permanently
prevent deadly international conflicts. This led to the founding of the United Nations in 1945,
which adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. Many, however, felt that the
UN, essentially a forum for discussion and coordination between sovereign governments, was
insufficiently empowered for the task. A number of prominent persons, such as Albert Einstein,
Winston Churchill, Bertrand Russell and Mohandas K. Gandhi, called on governments to
proceed further by taking gradual steps towards forming an effectual federal world government.
The United Nations main goal is to work on international law, international security, economic
development, human rights, social progress, and eventually world peace. The United Nations
replaced the League of Nations in 1945, after World War II. Almost every internationally
recognized country is in the U.N.; as it contains 193 member states out of the 196 total nations
of the world. The United Nations gather regularly in order to solve big problems throughout the
world. There are six official languages: Arabic, English, Spanish, Russian, French, and Chinese.
The United Nations is also financed by some of the wealthiest nations. The flag shows the Earth
from a map that shows all of the occupied continents.


World Federalist Movement

This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding
citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (March
2013)
The years between the conclusion of World War II and 1950, when the Korean War started and
the Cold War mindset became dominant in international politics, were the "golden age" of the
world federalist movement. Wendell Wilkie's book One World, first published in 1943, sold over
2 million copies. In another, Emery Reves' book The Anatomy of Peace(1945) laid out the
arguments for replacing the UN with a federal world government and quickly became the "bible"
of world federalists. The grassroots world federalist movement in the US, led by people such as
Grenville Clark, Norman Cousins, Alan Cranston and Robert Hutchins, organized itself into
increasingly larger structures, finally forming, in 1947, the United World Federalists (later
renamed to World Federalist Association, then Citizens for Global Solutions), claiming
membership of 47,000 in 1949.
Similar movements concurrently formed in many other countries, leading to the formation, at a
1947 meeting in Montreux, Switzerland, of a global coalition, now called World Federalist
Movement. By 1950, the movement claimed 56 member groups in 22 countries, with some
156,000 members.
Garry Davis
In France, 1948, Garry Davis began an unauthorized speech calling for a world government
from the balcony of the UN General Assembly, until he was dragged away by the guards. Mr.
Davis renounced his American citizenship and started a Registry of World Citizens, which
claimed to have registered over 750,000 people in less than two years. Opinion polls carried out
by UNESCO in 1948-1949 found world government favored by a majority of respondents in six
European countries and rejected in three other countries (Australia, Mexico and the United
States).[citation needed] On September 4, 1953, Davis announced from the city hall of
Ellsworth, Maine the formation of the "World Government of World Citizens" based on 3 "World
Laws" One God (or Absolute Value), One World, and One Humanity.[13] Following this
declaration, mandated, he claimed, by Article twenty one, Section three of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, he formed the United World Service Authority in New York City as
the administrative agency of the new government. Its first task was to design and issue a "World
Passport" based on Article 13, Section 2 of the UDHR. To date, over 800,000 of these
documents have been issued to individuals worldwide. They have been recognized de facto by
over 180 countries.[14]
World Passport
The World Passport is a 45-page document issued by the World Service Authority, a non-profit
organization,[15] citing Article 13, Section 2, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
World Passports have reportedly been accepted on a de facto case-by-case basis by over 174
countries and, at one time or another, on an explicit, legal or de jure basis by Burkina Faso,
Ecuador, Mauritania, Tanzania, Togo and Zambia. The latest edition of the World Passport,
issued January 2007, is an MRD (machine readable document) with an alphanumeric code bar
enabling computer input plus an embedded "ghost" photo for security, printing overcovered with
a plastic film. The passport is in 7 languages: English, French, Spanish, Russian, Arabic,
Chinese and Esperanto. Two covers are available: "World Passport", and "World Government
Passport" (for registered World Citizens), ("passport" is in 7 languages on both covers).
Duration is 8 years, 5 years or 3 years. Other documents issued by WSA are a World Birth
Certificate (Art. 1, UDHR), a World Political Asylum Card (Art. 14, UDHR), a World Marriage
Certificate, (Art. 16, UDHR) and a World Identity Card, (Art 21,3, UDHR). Each passport is
numbered and each page has the World Citizen logo in the background. There are two pages
for affiliation with companies, organizations, and firms. There are nineteen visa pages in the
passport. In the back cover there are spaces for personal information such as a persons home
address.[16]

Legal Realism (1954)
Legal anthropologist E. Adamson Hoebel concluded his treatise on broadening the legal realist
tradition to include non-Western nations:[17] Whatever the idealist may desire, force and the
threat of force are the ultimate power in the determination of international behavior, as in the law
within the nation or tribe. But until force and the threat of force in international relations are
brought under social control by the world community, by and for the world society, they remain
the instruments of social anarchy and not the sanctions of world law. The creation in clear-cut
terms of the corpus of world law cries for the doing. If world law, however, is to be realized at all,
there will have to be minimum of general agreement as to the nature of the physical and
ideational world and the relation of men in society to it. An important and valuable next step will
be found in deep-cutting analysis of the major law systems of the contemporary world in order to
lay bare their basic postulates postulates that are too generally hidden; postulates felt,
perhaps, by those who live by them, but so much taken for granted that they are rarely
expressed or exposed for examination. When this is done and it will take the efforts of many
keen intellects steeped in the law of at least a dozen lands and also aware of the social nexus of
the law then mankind will be able to see clearly for the first time and clearly where the
common consensus of the great living social and law systems lies. Here will be found the
common postulates and values upon which the world community can build. At the same time
the truly basic points of conflict that will have to be worked upon for resolution will be revealed.
Law is inherently purposive".
End of the Cold War (1991)
While enthusiasm for multinational federalism in Europe incrementally led, over the following
decades, to the formation of the European Union, the onset of the Cold War (19461991)
eliminated the prospects of any progress towards federation with a more global scope. The
movement quickly shrank in size to a much smaller core of activists, and the world government
idea all but disappeared from wide public discourse.
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, interest in a federal world government
and, more generally, in the global protection of human rights, was renewed. The most visible
achievement of the world federalism movement during the 1990s is the Rome Statute of 1998,
which led to the establishment of the International Criminal Court in 2002. In Europe, progress
towards forming a federal union of European states gained much momentum, starting in 1952
as a trade deal between the German and French people lead, in 1992, to the Maastricht Treaty
that established the name and enlarged the agreement that the European Union (EU) is based
upon. The EU expanded (1995, 2004, 2007) to encompass, in 2007, nearly half a billion people
in 27 member states. Following the EU's example, the African Union was founded in 2002 and
the Union of South American Nations in 2008.
Caliphate
Historically, the Caliphate was established by the followers of the Prophet Muhammad in
Medina after his death in 632. Abu Bakr who was the closest[citation needed] associate[citation
needed] of the prophet was selected as the first Caliph or Deputy[citation needed][who?]; hence
the term Caliphate. Abu Bakr called himself the prophet's deputy and the leader of Muslims. He
and the three Caliphs selected after him shunned any pretensions to royalty but later on ruling
dynasties came into existence and ruled until the end of the Ottoman Caliphate that came after
its defeat in the First World War along with Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire by, inter
alia, Britain, France and Russia in 1918. During the intervening centuries, the Islamic
Caliphate's authority expanded to encompass regions in Europe, Middle East, South Asia,
Central Asia and northern Africa. These territories were ruled under Islamic law. The Caliphate
was abolished by the Turkish National Assembly under Mustafa Kemal Atatrk in 1924.[citation
needed]
Existing regional unions of nations
The only union generally recognized as having achieved the status of a supranational union is
the European Union.[18]
There are a number of other regional organisations that, while not supranational unions, have
adopted or intend to adopt policies that may lead to a similar sort of integration in some
respects.
African Union (AU)
Arab League
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
Central American Integration System (SICA)
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
Commonwealth of Nations
Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (CCASG)
Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC)
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
Turkic Council (TurkKon)
Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)
Union State

Other organisations that have also discussed greater integration include:
Arab League into an "Arab Union"
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) into a "Caribbean Federation"
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) into a "North American Union"
Pacific Islands Forum into a "Pacific Union"
Eurasian Union

NATO[
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an intergovernmental military alliance based on the
North Atlantic Treaty which was signed on 4 April 1949. The organization constitutes a system
of collective defence whereby its member states agree to mutual defense in response to an
attack by any external party. NATO's headquarters are in Brussels, Belgium, one of the 28
member states across North America and Europe, the newest of which, Albania and Croatia,
joined in April 2009. An additional 22 countries participate in NATO's "Partnership for Peace",
with 15 other countries involved in institutionalized dialogue programs. The combined military
spending of all NATO members constitutes over 70% of the world's defence spending.[19]
European Union
The most relevant model for the incremental establishment of a global federation may be the
European Union (EU), which politically unites a large group of widely diverse (and some
formerly hostile) nations spread over a large geographical area and encompassing over 500
million people. Though the EU is still evolving, it already has many attributes of a federal
government, such as open internal borders, a directly elected parliament, a court system, an
official currency (Euro) and a centralized economic policy.
The EU's example is being followed by the African Union, the Union of South American Nations,
the Organization of Central American States, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. A
multitude of regional associations, aggregating most nations of the world, are at different stages
of development towards a growing extent of economic, and sometimes political, integration. The
European Union consists of twenty-eight European states. It has developed a single market
which allows people of different countries to travel from state to state without a passport. This
also includes the same policies when it comes to trading. The European Union is said to have
26% of the world's money. Not all EU member states use the Euro; the United Kingdom, for
example, retains the pound sterling. Where the Euro is in place, it allows easy access for the
free circulation of trade goods. Tariffs are also the same for each country allowing no unfair
practices within the union. With the free movement from country to country, this allows people to
travel easily and freely.
CARICOM
The Caribbean Community (CARICOM), is an organization of 15 Caribbean nations and
dependencies. CARICOM's main purpose is to promote economic integration and cooperation
among its members, to ensure that the benefits of integration are equitably shared and to
coordinate foreign policy.[1] Its major activities involve coordinating economic policies and
development planning; devising and instituting special projects for the less-developed countries
within its jurisdiction; operating as a regional single market for many of its members CARICOM
Single Market and Economy (CSME); and handling regional trade disputes.
Since the establishment of CARICOM by the mainly English Creole-speaking parts of the
Caribbean region CARICOM has become multilingual in practice with the addition of Dutch
speaking Suriname on 4 July 1995 (although the lingua franca in Suriname is Sranan Tongo,
which is an English-based Creole like the languages spoken in much of the rest of CARICOM)
and Haiti, where French and Haitian Creole are spoken, on 2 July 2002. In 2001, the heads of
government signed a Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas in Trinidad and Tobago, clearing the way
for the transformation of the idea for a Common Market aspect of CARICOM into instead a
Caribbean Single Market and Economy. Part of the revised treaty among member states
includes the establishment and implementation of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ).


African Union
The African Union (AU) is an organisation consisting of fifty-four African states. Established on
July 9, 2002, the AU was formed as a successor to the amalgamated African Economic
Community (AEC) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Eventually, the AU aims to have
a single currency and a single integrated defence force, as well as other institutions of state,
including a cabinet for the AU Head of State. The purpose of the union is to help secure Africa's
democracy, human rights, and a sustainable economy, especially by bringing an end to intra-
African conflict and creating an effective common market.
Projects for improved economic and political cooperation are also happening at a regional level
with the Arab Maghreb Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the Economic
Community of Central African States the Southern African Development Community and the
East African Community.
ASEAN

ASEAN (/sin/ AH-see-ahn), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, is a geo-political
and economic organization of 10 countries located in Southeast Asia, which was formed on
August 8, 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand[20] as a
display of solidarity against communist expansion in Vietnam and insurgency within their own
borders. Its claimed aims include the acceleration of economic growth, social progress, cultural
development among its members, and the promotion of regional peace.[21] All members later
founded the Asia Cooperation Dialogue, which aims to unite the entire continent.
Shanghai Cooperation Organization
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an intergovernmental organization which was
founded on June 14, 2001 by the leaders of the People's Republic of China, Russia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Except for Uzbekistan, these countries had
been members of the Shanghai Five; after the inclusion of Uzbekistan in 2001, the members
renamed the organization.
Commonwealth of Independent States
The Commonwealth of Independent States is comparable to a confederation similar to the
original European Community. Although the CIS has few supranational powers, it is more than a
purely symbolic organization, possessing coordinating powers in the realm of trade, finance,
lawmaking, and security. It has also promoted cooperation on democratization and cross-border
crime prevention. As a regional organization, CIS participates in UN peacekeeping forces.[22]
Some of the members of the CIS have established the Eurasian Economic Community with the
aim of creating a full-fledged common market.
Arab League
The Arab League is a regional organization of Arab states in Southwest Asia, and North and
Northeast Africa. It was formed in Cairo on March 22, 1945 with six members: Egypt, Iraq,
Transjordan (renamed Jordan after 1946), Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Yemen joined as
a member on May 5, 1945. The Arab League currently has 22 members, which also include,
Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Kuwait, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine,
Qatar, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia and UAE. It has also been proposed to reform the Arab League
into an Arab Union. the Arab League currently is the most important organization in the region.


Union of South American Nations

The Union of South American Nations, modeled on the European Union, was founded between
2006 and 2008. It incorporates all the independent states of South America. These states are
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname,
Uruguay, and Venezuela.
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is an economic and political
organization of eight countries in Southern Asia. In terms of population, its sphere of influence is
the largest of any regional organization: almost 1.5 billion people, the combined population of its
member states. It was established on December 8, 1985 by India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri
Lanka, Nepal, Maldives and Bhutan. In April 2007, at the Association's 14th summit,
Afghanistan became its eighth member.
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
(Arabic)
Organisation de la Coopration Islamique (French)
Headquarters Saudi Arabia Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
Official languages
Arabic
English
French
Membership 57 member states
Leaders
- Secretary-General Turkey Ekmeleddin hsanolu
Establishment
September 25, 1969
The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is an international organisation with a permanent
delegation to the United Nations. It groups 57 member states, from the Middle East, Africa,
Central Asia, Caucasus, Balkans, Southeast Asia and South Asia. The organization claims it
represents the Global Islamic World (ummah).[23] The official languages of the organisation are
Arabic, English and French.

Since the 19th century, many Muslims have aspired to uniting the Muslim ummah to serve their
common political, economic and social interests. Despite the presence of secularist, nationalist
and socialist ideologies in modern Muslim states, they have cooperated to form the
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. The formation of the OIC happened in the backdrop of the
loss of Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem. The final cause sufficiently compelled leaders of Muslim
nations to meet in Rabat to establish the OIC on September 25, 1969.[24][neutrality is disputed]
According to its charter, the OIC aims to preserve Islamic social and economic values; promote
solidarity amongst member states; increase cooperation in social, economic, cultural, scientific,
and political areas; uphold international peace and security; and advance education, particularly
in the fields of science and technology.[24]
The former flag of the OIC (shown on the right) has an overall green background (symbolic of
Islam). In the centre, there is an upward-facing red crescent enveloped in a white disc. On the
disc the words "Allahu Akbar" (Arabic for "God is great") are written in Arabic calligraphy.
On August 5, 1990, 45 foreign ministers of the OIC adopted the Cairo Declaration on Human
Rights in Islam to serve as a guidance for the member states in the matters of human rights in
as much as they are compatible with the Sharia, or Quranic Law.[25]
Turkic Council
Official members
Prospective future members
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
(only recognized by Turkey)
The Turkic Council is an international organization comprising Turkic countries. Since 1992, the
Turkic Language Speaking Countries Summit has been organizing amongst the Turkic
countries. On October 3, 2009, four of these countries signed the Nahcivan Agreement. The
organizational center is stanbul. Additionally, the Joint Administration of Turkic Arts and Culture
was founded in Almaty in 1992 and the Turkic Countries Parliamentarian Assembly was
founded in Baku in 1998. All of these organizations were coopted into the Turkic Council. The
Turkic Council has an operational style similar to organization like the Arab League. The
member countries are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey. The remaining two
Turkic states, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are not currently official members of the council.
However, due to their neutral stance, they participate in international relations and are strongly
predicted to be future members of the council. The idea of setting up this cooperative council
was first put forward by Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev back in 2006.
United Nations Parliamentary Assembly
A United Nations Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA) is a proposed addition to the United Nations
System that would allow for participation of member nations' legislators and, eventually, direct
election of United Nations (UN) parliament members by citizens worldwide. The idea was raised
at the founding of the League of Nations in the 1920s and again following the end of World War
II in 1945, but remained dormant throughout the Cold War. In the 1990s and 2000s, the rise of
global trade and the power of world organizations that govern it led to calls for a parliamentary
assembly to scrutinize their activity.[26] The Campaign for the Establishment of a United
Nations Parliamentary Assembly was formed in 2007 to coordinate pro-UNPA efforts, which as
of July 2013 has received the support of over 850 Members of Parliament from over 90
countries worldwide, in addition to over 350 non-governmental organizations and 21 Nobel and
Right Livelihood laureates and 16 Heads or former heads of state or government and foreign
ministers.[27][28]
Current global governance system
As of 2013, there is no functioning global international military, executive, legislature, judiciary,
or constitution, with jurisdiction over the entire planet.
The Earth is divided geographically and demographically into mutually exclusive territories and
political structures called states which are independent and sovereign in most cases. There are
numerous bodies, institutions, unions, coalitions, agreements and contracts between these units
of authority, but, except in cases where a nation is under military occupation by another, all such
arrangements depend on the continued consent of the participant nations. Thus the use of
violence is unprohibited throughout the realm and is only checked by the threat of retaliatory
actions. Where no such threat exists a nation may freely use violence against another.
Among the voluntary organizations and international arrangements are:
United Nations (UN) The primary formal organization coordinating activities between states on a
global scale and the only inter-governmental organization with a truly universal membership
(193 governments). In addition to the main organs and various humanitarian programs and
commissions of the UN itself, there are about 20 functional organizations affiliated with the UN's
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), such as the World Health Organization, the
International Labour Organization, and International Telecommunications Union.[29] Of
particular interest politically are the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World
Trade Organization.
Militarily, the UN deploys peacekeeping forces, usually to build and maintain post-conflict
peace and stability. When a more aggressive international military action is undertaken, either
ad hoc coalitions (for example, the multinational force in Iraq) or regional military alliances (for
example, NATO) are used.World Bank / International Monetary Fund (IMF) Formed together in
July 1944 at the Mount Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, United States to
foster global monetary cooperation and to fight poverty by financially assisting states in
need.World Trade Organization (WTO) Sets the rules of international trade. It has a semi-
legislative body (the General Council, reaching decisions by consensus) and a judicial body (the
Dispute Settlement Body). Another influential economical international organization is the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), with membership of 30
democratic members.G8 An association of those eight nations with the world's highest Gross
domestic products. The leaders of the G8 countries meet annually in person to coordinate their
policies in confronting global issues, such as poverty, terrorism, infectious diseases, and climate
change.G20 An association of twenty developing and established nations and entities, including
the European Union.International law Encompassing international treaties, customs and globally
accepted legal principles. With the exceptions of cases brought before the ICC and ICJ (see
below), the laws are interpreted by national courts. Many violations of treaty or customary law
obligations are overlooked.International Court of Justice (ICJ) Also known as the World Court,
the ICJ is the United Nations' judiciary organ. It settles disputes volunteered to it by (member)
states and gives advisory opinions on legal questions submitted to it by other organs of the UN,
such as the General Assembly or Security Council.International Criminal Court (ICC) A relatively
recent development in international law, the ICC (or ICCt) is the first permanent international
criminal court established to ensure that the gravest international crimes (war crimes, genocide,
other crimes against humanity, etc.) do not go unpunished. The ICC treaty was signed by 139
national governments, of which 100 ratified it by October 2005.
In addition to the formal, or semi-formal, international organizations and laws mentioned above,
many other mechanisms act to regulate human activities across national borders. In particular,
international trade in goods, services and currencies (the "global market") has a tremendous
impact on the lives of people in almost all parts of the world, creating deep interdependency
amongst nations (see globalization). Trans-national (or multi-national) corporations, some with
resources exceeding those available to most governments, govern activities of people on a
global scale. The rapid increase in the volume of trans-border digital communications and mass-
media distribution (e.g., Internet, satellite television) has allowed information, ideas, and
opinions to rapidly spread across the world, creating a complex web of international
coordination and influence, mostly outside the control of any formal organizations or laws.




World and International Dynamics and Political Theory, Ideologies
and Principles
Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama clearly possessed major differences in their
approaches to international affairs. One area, however, in which their views and policies in
important ways overlapped was how political ideologies were likely to shape U.S. security,
particularly in the Middle East. Although both Bush and Obama early in their presidencies
indicated that ideologies would play relatively unimportant roles in their Middle Eastern policies,
developments soon pushed both administrations to reverse course. Bush attributed the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks perpetrated by al Qaeda to this group's profound
ideological differences with the United States, and the president made similar assessments
about the root sources of America's enmity with Iraq, Iran, and Syria. These judgments led Bush
to make regime change in these states a central component of his foreign policies. The most
important-and costly-dimension of this objective was the 2003 decision to invade Iraq and the
subsequent efforts to democratize it. To Bush, increased liberalization in the Middle East would
significantly improve America's security. The result, as the president explained in his Second
Inaugural Address, was that "America's vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one. So it
is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and
institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world."
Although Obama's pragmatic foreign policy inclinations ran even deeper than Bush's, he, too,
was pulled in a more ideological direction by Middle Eastern developments. Massive popular
protests that swept across much of the Arab world in 2011 resulted in the ouster of three
authoritarian leaders, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, and Muammar
Qaddafi in Libya and in increased political repression in many others, including Bahrain, Iran,
Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen (Qaddafi's overthrow, like Hussein's, was largely due to the use
of American military force). Obama called for liberalizing reforms-even in America's authoritarian
allies-as the best way of quelling the protests and ultimately building more stable relations with
the United States. Obama, just as with Bush, claimed a synergy between America's ideological
and security interests when he laid out his administration's vision for U.S.-Middle Eastern
relations in light of the 2011 "Arab Spring": " We must acknowledge that a strategy based solely
upon the narrow pursuit of [material] interests.will only feed the suspicion [among the peoples of
the Middle East] that has festered for years that the United States pursues our interests at their
expense.[Thus] it will be the policy of the United States to promote reform across the region,
and to support transitions to democracy.The United States of America was founded on the belief
that people should govern themselves. And now we cannot hesitate to stand squarely on the
side of those who are reaching for their rights, knowing that their success will bring about a
world that is more peaceful, more stable, and more just."
Were these U.S. leaders correct in their assessments of the importance of ideologies in
international relations? Are, for example, large ideological differences between states a key
source of hostilities? Are attempts to export particular ideological values effective strategies of
conflict resolution?
Despite the overwhelming importance of these issues, little consensus exists in either
policymaking or academic circles about how or to what extent ideologies affect international
relations. Most notably, proponents of the theoretical tradition known as realism, which is the
dominant approach to the study of international politics, argue that the effects of ideologies in
international relations pale in comparison to the effects of power. Thus leaders should neither
believe that others' core security policies are a product of their ideological principles, nor
dedicate significant resources to attempting to spread particular ideological beliefs and
institutions abroad.
My research in two books has attempted to add clarity to these critical, and highly controversial,
issues and debates. My primary purpose is to provide a detailed framework for understanding to
what extent ideologies matter in international relations, how they do so, and which foreign
policies decision makers should implement to make best use of this information to advance
their state's security interests. After examining the diplomatic history of key cases of the great
powers' foreign policies from the French Revolution to the end of the Cold War, as well as the
international relations of various Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East since the Cold
War's end, I find that ideologies consistently had major effects on leaders' core international
perceptions and policies. Most importantly, ideologies went a long way toward determining
leaders' understandings of which states were likely to threaten and which states were likely to
support their core domestic and international interests. Ideologies, in short, to a great extent
determined leaders' perceptions of likely enemies and allies.
I define an ideology as leaders' preferences for ordering the political world. Ideologies, in other
words, are the specific, often idiosyncratic, political principles and goals that leaders both value
most highly and use to legitimate their claim to rule. Any number of different social values and
institutional objectives can comprise leaders' core ideological beliefs. Do politicians, for
example, advocate for their country the creation or continuation of representative or
authoritarian political institutions? Capitalist or socialist economies? Theocratic or secular
values? The advancement of particular ethnicities against rival ethnic groups? Prominent
ideologies include communism, fascism, liberalism, monarchism, and religious fundamentalism.
Leaders' ideological beliefs not only have major implications for domestic politics, but
international relations as well. Significant ideological differences dividing states' leaders
frequently affect their foreign policies by shaping their understandings of the threats that they
pose to one another's interests. Ideologies shape leaders' threat perceptions and consequent
foreign policies by two main pathways. First, these variables play a key role in affecting how
leaders' assess one another's international intentions. The greater the ideological differences
dividing decision makers, the more likely they are to assume the worst about one another's
objectives. Ideological enemies believe that conflict between them is in the long run inevitable.
Even if ideological rivals in the present exhibit no hostility toward one another-or are even
currently cooperating with each other-leaders will often assume that such amicability is
temporary, and is bound to be replaced eventually with overt animosity.
Important historical examples of ideological rivals' beliefs that conflict with one another is
inevitable and the consequent adoption of policies that ensure this outcome are numerous.
These views, for example, were central to the origins of the Second World War. Adolf Hitler of
Nazi Germany repeatedly told the Wehrmacht leaders that the origins, objectives, and means of
fighting the unavoidable war with the Soviet Union were rooted in the huge ideological
differences between the two powers. Three months before Germany's attack on the Soviet
Union, he told his generals that the "struggle [with the USSR] is one of ideologies and racial
differences and will have to be conducted with unprecedented, unmerciful, and unrelenting
harshness. . . . The commissars are the bearers of ideologies directly opposed to National
Socialism. Therefore the commissars will be liquidated." In fact, the "main theme" of Hitler's
reasoning for attacking the Soviet Union, according to the Chief of the Armed Forces High
Command, Wilhelm Keitel, was to engage "the decisive battle between two ideologies."
Intense suspicions of ideological rivals were also a defining attribute of the Cold War. Former
Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov stated in an interview in 1946 that the "root cause" of
Soviet-American confrontation was "the ideological conception prevailing [in the Soviet Union]
that conflict between the Communist and capitalist worlds is inevitable." Dwight Eisenhower
similarly asserted early in his presidency that "anyone who doesn't recognize that the great
struggle of our time is an ideological one.[is] not looking this question squarely in the face." "The
central core of the great world problem is the aggressive intent of international communism."
This was still the view of America's president over thirty years later. According to Ronald
Reagan: "All of us need to be better informed about the unchanging realities of the Soviet
system. We are in a long-term twilight struggle with an implacable foe of freedom." "We cannot
assume that their ideology and purpose will change; this implies enduring competition."
A second prominent way in which large ideological differences are likely to shape leaders' threat
perceptions is by affecting their understandings of the dangers to their most important domestic
interests, namely the preservation of their political power and the regime type they support. The
greater the ideological differences dividing decision makers in different states, the greater their
fears of domestic subversion are likely to be. Leaders will tend to worry that the success of
ideological enemies abroad will be contagious, ultimately boosting the political fortunes of like-
minded individuals at home, even to the point of revolution. Politicians will also tend to assume
that international ideological rivals will provide aid to the latter's ideological allies throughout the
system in an attempt to promote political change in targeted states. In these ways, international
ideological competitions tend to be translated into domestic struggles for power and legitimacy.
Fears of domestic subversion often have critical effects on leaders' international relations.
British and French conservative leaders' fears of the spread of communism, for example,
virtually precluded an alliance with the Soviet Union against Germany in the 1930s, despite the
latter's massive rearmament policies and geopolitical expansion. French Prime Minister Leon
Blum in a letter to the French ambassador to the Soviet Union, Robert Coulondre, explicitly
referred to the ideological barriers to an alliance with the Soviet Union that blocked cooperation
despite significant incentives to forge such a coalition: "A psychosis is being created according
to which the Soviet entente leads to Communism; this fear tends to neutralize that which is
inspired by the German threat and to paralyze cooperation among the pacific powers at the very
time when this current ought to intensify." British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain similarly
explained in a private letter to his sister Ida in March 1939 why he continued to oppose an
alliance with the USSR even at this late date: "I must confess to the most profound distrust of
Russia.I distrust her motives which seem to me to have little connection with ideas of liberty and
to be concerned only with getting every one else by the ears." Chamberlain in the spring of
1939 even threatened to resign "rather than sign [an] alliance with the Soviet."
This is not to say that ideological differences create an absolute barrier to alliances. There are
numerous historical examples of security cooperation among fierce ideological rivals.
Nevertheless, it is fair to state that substantial ideological differences among states create
powerful barriers to alignment that require particularly strong incentives to overcome. Ideological
differences often create important delays in alliance formation, or lead to their premature
dissolution due to ideologies' centrifugal effects. In my research, I have found that ideological
differences and their perceived effects on states' international and domestic interests have been
a central cause of conflict in a number of key cases, including in the aftermath of the French
Revolution, the 1930s in Europe, the Cold War, and various conflicts between Western and
Islamist groups.
The opposite threat relationships often hold for states' leaders who are dedicated to similar
ideological beliefs. Policymakers who share core ideological principles are likely both to interpret
one another's international intentions in a mostly favorable light, and to view their domestic
interests as interconnected. These dynamics have often resulted in significant cooperation
among multiple ideological groups, including liberals, monarchists, fascists, religious
fundamentalists, and even communists. For example, although the Sino-Soviet alliance of the
1950s was eventually replaced with enmity, it should not be forgotten the depth of the
cooperation between the two communist powers that existed throughout the 1950s. Soviet
economic and military aid to China was massive, and in important ways surpassed analogous
support from America to its allies. Internal documents reveal that ideological affinity was a key
motivating force for this impressive, in some ways unprecedented, aid. Soviet leader Josef
Stalin, for example, told one of his associates that "if socialism is victorious in China and other
countries follow the same road, we can consider the victory of socialism throughout the world to
be guaranteed...Because of that, we must not spare any effort or resources in assisting the
Chinese communists."
Trust and as a result cooperation among liberal states has been the most impressive and
enduring of any ideological group. No established liberal democracy has ever warred with
another. This phenomenon is known in the international relations literature as the "democratic
peace." Numerous liberal leaders have expressed high levels of trust about one another's
international objectives. In a speech expressing his support for the European Union (EU),
President Bill Clinton, for example, claimed that Americans "should develop ourselves to
become a part of the group that shares our common [liberal] values.Of course, one day the EU
will surpass the United States economically. But if we belong to the same group with our
common values, who cares!" Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair reciprocated these sentiments
when he indicated that despite America's overwhelming power superiority in the post-Cold War
world, liberal states need not fear American primacy. Hence his assertion in a July 2003 speech
that "there is no more dangerous theory in international politics today than that we need to
balance the power of America with other competitor powers." Every president of the United
States in the post-Cold War period (Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George
W. Bush, and Barack Obama) has expressed confidence in the accuracy of the predictions of
democratic peace theory.
One of the most important, and enduring, effects of ideologies on leaders' foreign policies is that
these variables create powerful incentives for politicians to try to convert ideological rivals to
their own legitimating principles. Because leaders tend to believe that hostilities with ideological
enemies is in the long run unavoidable and cooperation with ideological allies likely, politicians
will view regime exportation as a way of reducing the number of enemies in the system and
increasing the number of allies. Fears of subversion to the principles of international ideological
enemies add domestic incentives to work for the spread of one's principles abroad. Taken
together, these beliefs explain why politicians of virtually all ideological beliefs-monarchical,
liberal, fascist, communist, and religious fundamentalist-have attempted to export, including by
force, their defining ideological principles and institutions. As Stalin explained to a Yugoslav
communist leader, Milovan Djilas, in April 1945: "This war is not as in the past; whoever
occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own
system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise." Stalin, though, was partly wrong in
his assessment. Regime exportation was not new to the Second World War, but typical among
ideological enemies both before and after this conflict.
During the Wars of the French Revolution, for example, British leaders, in the words of Prime
Minister William Pitt, had "no idea of any peace being secure, unless France returned to the
monarchical system." Regime change thus remained a high priority for Britain throughout the
1790s. Within weeks of the outbreak of the First World War, British leaders in both private and
public statements made the destruction of "Prussian militarism" in Germany a central war-
fighting objective. As Prime Minister H. H. Asquith declared in a November 1914 speech: "We
shall never sheathe the sword.until the military domination of Prussia [in German politics] is
wholly and finally destroyed." Prominent Soviet officials at various points in the interwar period
declared that international peace could "only be guaranteed by the victorious proletarian
revolution in all capitalist countries," and that the end of war could result "only when the Soviet
system has been adopted by all the countries of the world." Given these views, it is not
surprising that efforts to help spread the communist revolution remained a priority to Soviet
leaders in these years.
In a 1962 report entitled the "Basic National Security Policy" of the United States, the Chairman
of the Policy Planning Council at the State Department and a close advisor to President John F.
Kennedy, Walt Rostow, asserted that because it was difficult "to envisage the survival of
democratic American society as a beleaguered island in a totalitarian sea," it was a preeminent
American interest to see rival regimes, including the USSR, "develop along lines broadly
consistent with our own concepts of individual liberty and government based on consent." Two
decades later in the 1983 top-secret National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)-75, Reagan
officials stated that a critical objective of U.S. foreign policy was "to promote . . . the process of
change in the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic political and economic system in which the
power of the privileged ruling elite is gradually reduced. The U.S. recognizes that Soviet
aggressiveness has deep roots in the internal system." President George W. Bush made related
augments in his Second Inaugural address: "For as long as whole regions of the world simmer
in resentment and tyranny-prone to ideologies that feed hatred and excuse murder-violence will
gather .and raise a mortal threat.We are led.to one conclusion: The survival of liberty in our land
increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our
world is the expansion of freedom in all the world." Exporting liberalism, the president
concluded, "is the urgent requirement of our nation's security."
In all these cases, states' key policymakers believed that ideological differences with other
countries were the root cause of the dangers to both their international and domestic interests.
A logical, almost inevitable, conclusion resulting from these beliefs was that the promotion of
leaders' ideologies abroad became a central strategy of international conflict resolution and
domestic stability. According to the political scientist John Owen, since 1500 states have used
force on over 200 separate occasions to alter or preserve the ideological principles and
institutions of another country.
Recognizing that ideological enemies confront powerful incentives to export their legitimating
principles says nothing, however, about the means by which leaders hope to accomplish this
goal. One of the major problems with the Bush administration's efforts to promote liberalism in
the Middle East is that this presidency's highly aggressive policies caused numerous people in
the Muslim world - including liberals and reformers - to doubt America's commitment to
liberalism. These actions included largely one-sided support of Israel in its conflict with the
Palestinian people, sending suspected or confirmed terrorists to illiberal states (such as Syria)
to be tortured to acquire information as part of America's controversial rendition program, and
the indefinite detention and sometimes torture of accused combatants and terrorists at the
Guantanamo Bay detainment camp in Cuba. Most damaging to America's reputation was the
Iraq war. Using force to spread liberty seemed to many a contradiction that was difficult to
resolve. America's inadvertent killing of civilians during the war - especially when accompanied
by some deliberate barbarities, such as the much-publicized inhumane treatment of prisoners
by U.S. forces at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq - was particularly damaging to America's liberal
reputation. Invading and occupying a Muslim country also fueled many ordinary Muslims'
nationalistic sentiments against the United States.
The Bush administration's major mistakes in executing some of its core policies does not mean,
however, that leaders should discount the importance of ideologies in international relations.
History has repeatedly demonstrated the great significance of ideologies to leaders' threat
perceptions and core international-security policies. Failure to incorporate ideological variables
into states' security strategies is to ignore key dimensions of how the world works.
One of the most important of my findings is that different ideological groups (i.e., different
political parties or governing factions) from the same country at the same time frequently have
vastly different international perceptions and policies. The more similar a group's ideological
beliefs to foreigners, the less threatening their policies tend to be. Significantly, this tendency
applies to Muslim-majority countries today. Liberalizers and reformers in Muslim-majority states
are often much less hostile to the United States and its allies than other ideological groups in
the same countries at the same time, despite often intense opposition to some of America's
more provocative policies. Western leaders, as a result, have a security interest in trying to
boost these groups' political power. In other words, although U.S. policymakers have made
major mistakes in the past in attempting to spread liberalism in the Middle East, the logic
underpinning this objective remains sound. The goal should be to correct past errors in this area
without abandoning an emphasis on the importance of ideologies in international relations.












Legal maxim
A legal maxim is an established principle or proposition. The Latin term, apparently a
variant on maxima, is not to be found in Roman law with any meaning exactly
analogous to that of a legal maxim in the Medieval or modern sense of the word, but the
treatises of many of the Roman jurists on Regular definitiones, and Sententiae juris are,
in some measure, collections of maxims. Most of the Latin maxims developed in the
Medieval era in European countries that used Latin as their language for law and courts.

The attitude of early English commentators towards the maxims of the law was one of
unmingled adulation. In Thomas Hobbes, Doctor and Student (p. 26), they are
described as of the same strength and effect in the law as statutes. Not only, observes
Francis Bacon in the Preface to his Collection of Maxims, will the use of maxims be in
deciding doubt and helping soundness of judgment, but, further, in gracing argument, in
correcting unprofitable subtlety, and reducing the same to a more sound and substantial
sense of law, in reclaiming vulgar errors, and, generally, in the amendment in some
measure of the very nature and complexion of the whole law.[1]
A similar note was sounded in Scotland; and it has been well observed that a glance at
the pages of Morrisons Dictionary or at other early reports will show how frequently in
the older Scots law questions respecting the rights, remedies and liabilities of
individuals were determined by an immediate reference to legal maxims.
In later times, less value has been attached to the maxims of the law, as the
development of civilization and the increasing complexity of business relations have
shown the necessity of qualifying the propositions which they enunciate. But both
historically and practically, they must always possess interest and value.









Right Of First Refusal
The "Right Of First Refusal" is a provision frequently written into custody
orders and parenting plans. The intent of a Right Of First Refusal provision
is to maximize the time child spends with both parents. Many times it is
written to protect the non-custodial parent whose time is limited already.

Now in its most basic form, Right Of First Refusal means that before either
parent can use the services of a baby-sitter or other third-party caregiver,
the other parent must be given the opportunity to care for the child during
that time. The kind of situations where Right Of First Refusal typically apply
are both "spur of the moment" occurrences (your car breaks down and
you're unable to pick up the child at school, your in a car accident, etc), as
well as situations that are planned in advance (for example, job interviews,
doctors' appointments, or night classes, night out with friends). Got the
idea.

Now in some, not all, the Right Of First Refusal is considered to be implicit
in the custody decree, even though it may not be explicitly written out. IT
has been my experience that most Family Court judges acknowledge the
concept and worth of Right Of First Refusal clauses and rarely, if ever,
object to such a provision being included in the parenting plan because it
affords the potential for parents to work together in raising the children. The
second reason is that 'it is in the best interest of the child' to spend as much
time with each parent as possible. However, on the other hand judges will
rarely enforce violations of Right Of First Refusal, leaving it up to the
custodial parent's discretion. Many judges consider Right Of First Refusal
issues to be too minor in importance to warrant a hearing in court.

Now for most exercising the Right Of First Refusal is only practical when
the parents live in close geographic proximity to one another. However, in
the case of substantial long distances exercising the Right Of First Refusal
is impractical (if not impossible) are involved because of issues related to
timing and notification. If parents live more than about an hour of travel-
time away from each other, exercising Right Of First Refusal starts to
become difficult to implement in a practical sense. Remember 'What is in
the best interest of the child'.

It is my understanding that the court system really wants BOTH parents to
work together on this issue but doing so depends strongly upon
collaboration between the parents. I have personally seen that when
exercised properly, Right Of First Refusal can increase cooperation and
trust between divorced or separated parents, allowing them to depend
upon one another in the same way as they would if they were still in a
cooperative marriage. This cooperation is also extremely beneficial to the
child because it allows the child to see the parents working together in a
positive way, as well as increasing the overall time the child spends with
each parent.

Now in the most basic form of "Right Of First Refusal", means that before
either parent can use the services of a baby-sitter or other third-party
caregiver or relative, the other parent must be given the opportunity to care
for the child during that time. The kind of situations where Right Of First
Refusal typically apply are both "spur of the moment" occurrences (your car
breaks down and you're unable to pick up the child at school), as well as
situations that are planned in advance (for example, job interviews, doctors'
appointments, or night classes). Remember the other parent must have the
first right to care for said child before any other type baby sitting service or
other relative has the opportunity.






RIGHT TO REVOLT
The constitution in any democratic state enshrines the rule of law. Any action that
operates beyond the framework of the rule of law is considered illegal. It sometimes
happens, that the people rise in revolt against the existing administration and through
force or threats succeed in altering the constituted organs of government. (Sinco, 1962).
The revolution, being an elemental right, is attributed to the state if it succeeds. It
becomes legal since any action attributed to the state is legal. This is the legal and
political basis of the doctrine of revolution.
In some other nations, the right to revolt is not included in their organic laws because it
implies political instability of the state. From their points of view, to constitutionalize the
right to revolt might encourage mob rule and set-off a chain of revolutions for capricious
reasons.
The Philippines, provides otherwise. Section 1, Article II of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution recognizes that the people, as the ultimate judges of their destiny, can
resort to revolution as a matter of right. (De Leon, 1991). It recognizes the inherent right
of the people to revolt if sufficiently provoked by oppression or abuses. From the time
that the present Constitution took effect, twice that the people of the Philippines have
exercised this basic right, but in the in more prudent and peaceful ways. In a span of 15
years, the Filipinos were able to overthrow two administrations haunted by graft and
corruption and human rights violations. Those direct state actions were written in history
as People Power 1 and People Power 2 respectively.











Individual Rights

Freedom is not a product of historical destiny, divine intervention or happy accidentit
is an intellectual achievement that depends on the vital concept of individual rights.
Rights are moral principles that define mans freedom of action within society. Ayn Rand
showed that individual rights are not gifts from a deity or permissions from
governmentbut are necessitated by mans nature as a rational being. As she wrote in
Atlas Shrugged, If man is to live on earth, it is right for him to use his mind, it is right to
act on his own free judgment, it is right to work for his values and to keep the product of
his work. If life on earth is his purpose, he has a right to live as a rational being: nature
forbids him the irrational.
The right to life is the only fundamental right. It is the moral entitlement to engage in
every type of action objectively necessary to sustain a human life. All other rights
including property rights, without which no other rights can existare implications of this
bedrock right.
A society is free when it secures mans moral rights to life, liberty, property and the
pursuit of happiness.













Ignorance of the law

The Civil Code provides that: "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith."[1] This principle is of Spanish origin, adopted in the Philippines to govern
and limit legal conduct in this jurisdiction.[2] If mistake of law were ever excusable, the
law would be unenforceable.[3] Ignorance in this regard encompasses not only
substantive but also procedural laws.[4]

The purpose of the publication requirement of laws is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application
of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish
or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.[5]














Right of entry
Right of entry refers to one's right to take or resume possession of
land, or the right of a person to go onto another's real property
without committing trespass. It also refers to a grantor's power to
retake real estate from a grantee in the case of a fee simple
subject to condition subsequent.



















Violation of the Rights of Others
Human rights are "commonly understood as inalienable fundamental rights to which a person is inherently
entitled simply because she or he is a human being."[1] Human rights are thus conceived as universal
(applicable everywhere) and egalitarian (the same for everyone). These rights may exist as natural rights
or as legal rights, in local, regional, national, and international law.[2] The doctrine of human rights in
international practice, within international law, global and regional institutions, in the policies of states and
in the activities of non-governmental organizations, has been a cornerstone of public policy around the
world. The idea of human rights[3] states, "if the public discourse of peacetime global society can be said
to have a common moral language, it is that of human rights." Despite this, the strong claims made by the
doctrine of human rights continue to provoke considerable skepticism and debates about the content,
nature and justifications of human rights to this day. Indeed, the question of what is meant by a "right" is
itself controversial and the subject of continued philosophical debate.[4]
Many of the basic ideas that animated the human rights movement developed in the aftermath of the
Second World War and the atrocities of The Holocaust, culminating in the adoption of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in Paris by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948. The ancient world
did not possess the concept of universal human rights.[5] The true forerunner of human rights discourse
was the concept of natural rights which appeared as part of the medieval Natural law tradition that
became prominent during the Enlightenment with such philosophers as John Locke, Francis Hutcheson,
and Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, and featured prominently in the political discourse of the American
Revolution and the French Revolution.
From this foundation, the modern human rights arguments emerged over the latter half of the twentieth
century.[6]
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world...
1st sentence of the Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.
Article 1 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)[










Distributive justice


Distributive justice concerns the nature of a socially just allocation of goods in a society. A
society in which incidental inequalities in outcome do not arise would be considered a society
guided by the principles of distributive justice. The concept includes the available quantities of
goods, the process by which goods are to be distributed, and the resulting allocation of the
goods to the members of the society.

Often contrasted with just process, which is concerned with the administration of law,
distributive justice concentrates on outcomes. This subject has been given considerable
attention in philosophy and the social sciences.

In Social Psychology, Distributive Justice is defined as perceived fairness of how rewards and
costs are shared by (distributed across) group members.[1] For example, when workers of the
same job are paid different salaries, group members may feel that distributive justice has not
occurred.

To determine whether distributive justice has taken place, individuals often turn to the
distributive norms of their group.[2] A norm is the standard of behaviour that is required,
desired, or designated as normal within a particular group.[3] If rewards and costs are allocated
according to the designated distributive norms of the group, distributive justice has
occurred.[4]


1) Equity: Members outcomes should be based upon their inputs. Therefore, an individual who
has invested a large amount of input (e.g. time, money, energy) should receive more from the
group than someone who has contributed very little. Members of large groups prefer to base
allocations of rewards and costs on equity.

2) Equality: Regardless of their inputs, all group members should be given an equal share of the
rewards/costs. Equality supports that someone who contributes 20% of the groups resources
should receive as much as someone who contributes 60%.

3) Power: Those with more authority, status, or control over the group should receive more
than those in lower level positions.

4) Need: Those in greatest needs should be provided with resources needed to meet those
needs. These individuals should be given more resources than those who already possess them,
regardless of their input.

5) Responsibility: Group members who have the most should share their resources with those
who have less.
Commutative Justice


Commutative Justice is about honest and just economic transactions. It is a major
theme in both Testaments of the Bible. From the Old Testament:

Lev 19:11 NRSV

You shall not steal; you shall not deal falsely; and you shall not lie to one another.

Lev 19:13 NRSV

You shall not defraud your neighbor; you shall not steal; and you shall not keep
for yourself the wages of a laborer until morning.

Lev 19:35-36 NRSV

You shall not cheat in measuring length, weight, or quantity. You shall have
honest balances, honest weights, an honest ephah, and an honest hin: I am the
LORD your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt.

Deut 25:13-16 NRSV

13 You shall not have in your bag two kinds of weights, large and small. 14 You
shall not have in your house two kinds of measures, large and small. 15 You shall
have only a full and honest weight; you shall have only a full and honest measure,
so that your days may be long in the land that the LORD your God is giving you. 16
For all who do such things, all who act dishonestly, are abhorrent to the LORD
your God.

Economic transactions of the time often involved grain, ointments, food, and
precious metals. A scale consisting of a beam balanced on a stem, with trays of
equal weight on each side, was used to determine weight and price. Weights
were placed on one side and the substance to be weighed was placed on the
other side. Standardized weights were removed one by one until the two trays
were in balance. Then a price was rendered. A dishonest merchant would use
weights that would misrepresent quantities to his advantage.

Proverbs frequently warns against dishonest behavior and use of false scales and
measures. The prophet Micah wrote:

Micah 6:11-12 NRSV

Can I tolerate wicked scales and a bag of dishonest weights? Your wealthy are full
of violence; your inhabitants speak lies, with tongues of deceit in their mouths.

In the New Testament, Jesus said, Let your word be 'Yes, Yes' or 'No, No';
anything more than this comes from the evil one. (Matthew 5:37) Upon meeting
Jesus, Zacchaeus decided to refund anything he had overcharged people. (Luke
19:8) Paul, referring to the Old Testament, instructs, for the scripture says, You
shall not muzzle an ox while it is treading out the grain, and, "The laborer
deserves to be paid." (1 Tim 5:18) James warns the rich, 4 Listen! The wages of
the laborers who mowed your fields, which you kept back by fraud, cry out, and
the cries of the harvesters have reached the ears of the Lord of hosts. (James
5:4-5)

Our culture operates in a much more complex economic environment and many
of the issues we face were not addressed specifically in scripture. For instance,
discrimination in hiring and promotion would clearly fall under commutative
justice. Nevertheless, honest and just economic transactions were a central
concern of biblical ethics and must be a central part of any Christian economic
ethic.















Legal Justice

The proper administration of the law; the fair and equitable treatment of all individuals
under the law. A title given to certain judges, such as federal and state supreme court
judges.

justice n. 1) fairness. 2) moral rightness. 3) a scheme or system of law in which every
person receives his/her/its due from the system, including all rights, both natural and
legal. One problem is that attorneys, judges, and legislatures often get caught up more
in procedure than in achieving justice for all. Example: the adage "justice delayed is
justice denied," applies to the burdensome procedures, lack of sufficient courts,
clogging the system with meritless cases, and the use of the courts to settle matters
which could be resolved by negotiation. The imbalance between court privileges
obtained by attorneys for the wealthy and for the person of modest means, the use of
delay and "blizzards" of unnecessary paper by large law firms, and judges who fail to cut
through the underbrush of procedure all erode justice. 4) an appellate judge, the Chief
Justice and Associate Justices of the U. S. Supreme Court, a member of a Federal Court
of Appeal, and judges of any of the various state appellate courts.

justice noun aequitas, equitableness, equity, fair play, fair treatment, fairness, freedom
from bias, impartiality, iustitia, justness, objectivity, probity, reason, reasonableness,
rectitude, reparation, right, righteousness, rightfulness, uprighteousness
Associated concepts: due administration of justice, ends of justice, equity, fleeing from
justice, fugitive from justice, in furtherance of justice, in the interests of justice,
miscarriage of justice, obstructing justice, preventive justice, speedy justice, substantial
justice
Foreign phrases: Melior est justitia vere praeveniens quam severe puniens.Truly
preventive justice is better than severe punishment. Justitia non est neganda non
differenda. Justice is neither to be denied nor delayed. In re propria iniquum admodum
est alicui licentiam tribuere sententiae. It is unjust for anyone to assign to himself the
privilege of deciding his own case. Sacramentum habet in se tres comites,-veritatem,
justiiiam, et judicium; veritus habenda est in jurato; justitia et justicium in judice. An
oath has in it three compooents-truth, justice, and judgment; truth in the party
swearing; justice and judgment in the judge administering the oath. Justitia est constans
et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi. Justice is the constant and perretual
means to render to each one his rights. Lex dilaaiones semper exhorret. The law always
abhors delays. Boni judicis est ampliare justitiam. It is the duty of a good judge to make
precedents which amplify justice. Discretio est scire per legem quid sit justum.
Discretion consists in knowing through the law what is just. Justitia est duplex, viz.,
severe puniens et vere praeveniens. Justice is double, that is to say punishing severely,
and truly preventing. Nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus, aut differemus rectum vel
justitian. We will sell to none, we will deny to none, we will delay to none, either equity
or justice. Justitia non novit patrem nec matrem; solum verrtatem spectat justitia.
Justice knows neither father nor mother; justice looks to the truth alone. Quod ad jus
nattrale attinet omnes homines aequales sunt. All men are equal as far as the natural
law is concerned. Accipere quid ut justitiam facias, non est tam accipere quam
extorruere. The acceptance of a reward for doing justice is not so much an acceptance
as an extortion. Justitia nemini neganda est. Justice is to be denied to no one. Plena et
celeris justitia fiat partibus. Let full and speedy justice be done to the parties. Jure
naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem.
According to the laws of nature, it is just that no one should be enriched by the
detriment and injury of another. Fiat justitia, ruat coelum. Let right be done, though the
heavens fall. Nihil magis justum est quam quod necessarium est. Nothing is more just
than what is necessary. Lex non deficit in justitia exhibenda. The law does not fail in
dispensing justice. Bonus judex secundum aequum et bonum judicat, et aequitatem
stricto juri praefert. Good judges decide according to what is just and right, and prefer
equity to strict law. Lex plus laudatur quando ratione probatur. The law is most
praiseworthy when it is consistent with reason. Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura
subveniunt. The laws aid the vigilant and not those who slumber. Judex bonus nihil ex
arbitrio suo faciat, nec propositione domesticae voluntatis, sed juxta leges et jura
pronunciet. A good judge should do nothing of his own arbitrary will, nor on the dictate
of his personal wishes, but should decide according to law and justice. Qui aliquid
statterit, parte inaudita altera, aequum licet dixerit, haud aeeuum fecerit. He who
decides anything without hearing both sides, although he may decide correctly, has by
no means acted justly. Fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant. Fraud and justice never dwell
together. Festinatio justitiae est noverca infortunii. The hastening of justice is the
stepmother of misfortune. Commodum ex injuria sua non habere debet. No person
ought to derive any advantage by his own wrong. Veritas habenda est in juratore;
justitia et judicium in judice. Truth should be possessed by a juror; justice and judgment
by a judge. Jus est ars boni et aequi. Law is the science of what is good and just. Lex est
dictamen rationis. Law is the dictate of reason. Lex est ratio summa, quae jubet quae
sunt utilia et necessaria et contraria prohibet. That which is law is the consummation of
reason, which commands those things useful and necessary, while prohibiting the
contrary. Sequi debet potentia justitiam, non praeeedere. Power ought to follow justice,
not precede it. Summa caritas est facere justitiam singulis, et omni temmore quando
necesse fuerit. The greatest charity is to do justice to everyone, and at all times when it
is necessary.




Freedom of choice


In law

In the abortion debate, for example, the term "freedom of choice", is sometimes
used to refer to a woman's right to determine whether she will proceed with or
terminate a pregnancy.[3][4][5] Similarly, other topics such as euthanasia,[6]
contraception[7] and same-sex marriage[8] are sometimes discussed in terms of
an individual right of "freedom of choice." Some social issues, for example the
New York "Soda Ban" have been both defended[9] and opposed[10] with
reference to "freedom of choice."

In economics

The freedom to choose which brand and flavor of soda to buy is related to
market competition.
In microeconomics, freedom of choice is the freedom of economic agents to
allocate their resources as they see fit, among the options (such as goods,
services, or assets) that are available to them.[11][12] It includes the freedom to
engage in employment available to them.[13]

Ratner et al., in 2008, cited the literature on libertarian paternalism which states
that consumers do not always act in their own best interests. They attribute this
phenomenon to factors such as emotion, cognitive limitations and biases, and
incomplete information which they state may be remedied by various proposed
interventions. They discuss providing consumers with information and decision
tools, organizing and restricting their market options, and tapping emotions and
managing expectations. Each of these, they state, could improve consumers'
ability to choose.[14]

However, economic freedom to choose ultimately depends upon market
competition, since buyers' available options are usually the result of various
factors controlled by sellers, such as overall quality of a product or a service and
advertisement. In the event that a monopoly exists, the consumer no longer has
the freedom to choose to buy from a different producer. As Friedrich Hayek
pointed out:


Our freedom of choice in a competitive society rests on the fact that, if one
person refuses to satisfy our wishes, we can turn to another. But if we face a
monopolist we are at his absolute mercy.

Friedrich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom - "Can planning free us from care?"[15]

Many libertarian thinkers are strong advocates for increasing freedom of choice,
as evidenced by the previous quote and Milton Friedman's Free to Choose book
and TV series.[further explanation needed][improper synthesis?]

There is no consensus as to whether an increase in economic freedom of choice
leads to an increase in happiness.[16] In one study, the Heritage Foundation's
2011 Index of Economic Freedom report showed a strong correlation between its
Index of Economic Freedom and happiness in a country.[17]





















Voluntariness

Voluntariness is a legal and philosophical concept referring to a choice being
made of a person's free will, as opposed to being made as the result of coercion
or duress. Philosophies such as libertarianism and voluntaryism, as well as many
legal systems, hold that a contract must be voluntarily agreed to by a party in
order to be binding on that party. The social contract rests on the concept of the
voluntary consent of the governed.

The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that "Before accepting a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address the defendant personally in
open court and determine that the plea is voluntary and did not result from force,
threats, or promises (other than promises in a plea agreement)."[1] The actual
voluntariness is suspect, in that it is common for prosecutors to threaten to seek
more prison time unless the defendant agrees to plead guilty. For this reason,
common law courts historically took a negative view of guilty pleas.[2]





















Accountability


In ethics and governance, accountability is answerability, blameworthiness,
liability, and the expectation of account-giving.[1] As an aspect of governance, it
has been central to discussions related to problems in the public sector, nonprofit
and private (corporate) worlds. In leadership roles,[2] accountability is the
acknowledgment and assumption of responsibility for actions, products,
decisions, and policies including the administration, governance, and
implementation within the scope of the role or employment position and
encompassing the obligation to report, explain and be answerable for resulting
consequences.

In governance, accountability has expanded beyond the basic definition of "being
called to account for one's actions".[3][4] It is frequently described as an account-
giving relationship between individuals, e.g. "A is accountable to B when A is
obliged to inform B about As (past or future) actions and decisions, to justify
them, and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual misconduct".[5]
Accountability cannot exist without proper accounting practices; in other words,
an absence of accounting means an absence of accountability.

Types

Bruce Stone, O.P. Dwivedi, and Joseph G. Jabbra list 8 types of accountability,
namely: moral, administrative, political, managerial, market, legal/judicial,
constituency relation, and professional.[14] Leadership accountability cross cuts
many of these distinctions.

Political accountability[edit]

Political accountability is the accountability of the government, civil servants and
politicians to the public and to legislative bodies such as a congress or a
parliament.

In a few cases, recall elections can be used to revoke the office of an elected
official. Generally, however, voters do not have any direct way of holding elected
representatives to account during the term for which they have been elected.
Additionally, some officials and legislators may be appointed rather than elected.
Constitution, or statute, can empower a legislative body to hold their own
members, the government, and government bodies to account. This can be
through holding an internal or independent inquiry. Inquiries are usually held in
response to an allegation of misconduct or corruption. The powers, procedures
and sanctions vary from country to country. The legislature may have the power
to impeach the individual, remove them, or suspend them from office for a period
of time. The accused person might also decide to resign before trial.
Impeachment in the United States has been used both for elected representatives
and other civil offices, such as district court judges.

In parliamentary systems, the government relies on the support or parliament,
which gives parliament power to hold the government to account. For example,
some parliaments can pass a vote of no confidence in the government.

Researchers at the Overseas Development Institute found that empowering
citizens in developing countries to be able to hold their domestic government's to
account was incredibly complex in practice. However, by developing explicit
processes that generate change from individuals, groups or communities
(Theories of Change), and by fusing political economy analysis and outcome
mapping tools, the complex state-citizen dynamics can be better understood. As
such, more effective ways to achieve outcomes can hence be generated.[15]

Ethical accountability

See also: Social accounting and Environmental accounting

Within an organization, the principles and practices of ethical accountability aim
to improve both the internal standard of individual and group conduct as well as
external factors, such as sustainable economic and ecologic strategies. Also,
ethical accountability plays a progressively important role in academic fields, such
as laboratory experiments and field research. Debates around the practice of
ethical accountability on the part of researchers in the social field - whether
professional or others - have been thoroughly explored by Norma R.A. Romm in
her work on Accountability in Social Research,[16] including her book on New
Racism: Revisiting Researcher Accountabilities, reviewed by Carole Truman in the
journal Sociological Research Online.[17] Here it is suggested that researcher
accountability implies that researchers are cognisant of, and take some
responsibility for, the potential impact of their ways of doing research and of
writing it up on the social fields of which the research is part. That is,
accountability is linked to considering carefully, and being open to challenge in
relation to, one's choices concerning how research agendas are framed and the
styles in which write-ups of research "results" are created.

Administrative accountability

Internal rules and norms as well as some independent commission are
mechanisms to hold civil servants within the administration of government
accountable. Within department or ministry, firstly, behavior is bound by rules
and regulations; secondly, civil servants are subordinates in a hierarchy and
accountable to superiors. Nonetheless, there are independent watchdog units
to scrutinize and hold departments accountable; legitimacy of these commissions
is built upon their independence, as it avoids any conflicts of interests.





















Responsibility

We evaluate people and groups as responsible or not, depending on how
seriously they take their responsibilities. Often we do this informally, via moral
judgment. Sometimes we do this formally, for instance in legal judgment. This
article considers mainly moral responsibility, and focuses largely upon individuals.
Later sections also comment on the relation between legal and moral
responsibility, and on the responsibility of collectives.

The article discusses four different areas of individual moral responsibility: (1)
Responsible agency, whereby a person is regarded as a normal moral agent; (2)
Retrospective responsibility, when a person is judged for her actions, for instance,
in being blamed or punished; (3) Prospective responsibility, for instance, the
responsibilities attaching to a particular role; and (4) Responsibility as a virtue,
when we praise a person as being responsible. Philosophical discussion of
responsibility has focused largely on (1) and (2). The article points out that a wider
view of responsibility helps explore some connections between moral and legal
responsibility, and between individual and collective responsibility. It also enables
us to relate responsibility to its original philosophical use, which was in political
thought.

1. Introduction

The word responsibility is surprisingly modern. It is also, as Paul Ricoeur has
observed, not really well-established within the philosophical tradition (2000:
11). This is reflected in the fact that we can locate two rather different
philosophical approaches to responsibility.

The original philosophical usage of responsibility was political (see McKeon,
1957). This reflected the origin of the word. In all modern European languages,
responsibility only finds a home toward the end of the eighteenth century. This
is within debates about representative government, that is, government which is
responsible to the people. In the etymology of responsibility, the Oxford English
Dictionary cites the debates on the U.S. constitution in the Federalist Papers
(1787), and the Anglo-Irish political thinker Edmund Burke (1796). When John
Stuart Mill writes of responsibility, in the middle of the nineteenth century, again
his concern is not with free will, but with the principles of representative
government. At the end of the nineteenth century, the most notable thinker to
speak of responsibility is Max Weber, who propounds an ethics of responsibility
(Verantwortungsethik) for the politician. For Weber, the vocation of politics
demands a calm attention to the facts of the situation and the consequences of
actions and not to lofty or abstract principles.

So far as responsibility has a place in eighteenth and nineteenth century thought,
then, this is in political contexts, where the concern is with responsible action and
the principles of representative government. In twentieth century philosophy, on
the other hand, the emphasis has been on questions of free will and determinism:
Is a person responsible for her actions or character? Would the truth of
determinism eliminate such responsibility? Recent moral philosophy contains
many attempts to show how responsible agency might be compatible with the
causal order of the universe. These debates obviously center on the individual
agent. As such, they pose difficulties for understanding the topic of collective
responsibility an issue that twentieth century politics has raised with a new
urgency. Nor does a concern with free will correspond to many everyday issues
about responsibility for example, questions of mutual accountability, defining a
persons sphere of responsibility, or judging a person as sufficiently responsible
for a particular role.

This Encyclopedia article will mainly deal with the responsibility of individual
persons; another article considers collective moral responsibility. In fact, there are
several important uses of responsibility as it relates to individuals, which this
article will tackle in turn. There are also important questions about the distinction
between moral and legal responsibility. The article will then consider what
relations there may be between the concepts individual and collective uses. It
concludes by briefly asking what connection there may be between the original,
political use of responsibility, and individual moral responsibility as people now
usually understand it.

2. Individual Responsibility

There is no philosophically well-settled way of dividing or analyzing the various
components of responsibility, and some components are often ignored by
philosophers. To take a more comprehensive approach, this article divides the
responsibility of individuals into four areas of enquiry. Recent analytic moral
philosophy has tended to ask two deceptively simple questions about
responsibility:
i.What is it to be responsible? and
ii.What is a person responsible for?

The first question is usually taken as a question about moral agency, the second
as a question about holding people accountable for past actions. As noted,
however, this does not capture the variety of uses that we make of the concept.
We can see this by observing that both questions might mean something quite
different, leading us to four distinct topics, as follows:

What is it to be responsible? is most often asked by philosophers as a question
about the foundations of moral agency. What sort of creature can properly be
held responsible for its actions? The simple answer is: a normal human adult. To
explain and justify this reply, philosophers tend to turn to psychological and
metaphysical features of normal adults, such as free will. We might also approach
the same issue with a somewhat different emphasis: What features of (normal,
adult) human interaction are involved in our holding one another responsible?

However, in asking What is it to be responsible? we might also have a second
question in mind. We often praise some people as responsible, and criticize
others as irresponsible. Here responsibility names a virtue a morally valuable
character trait. We may also praise an institution as responsible. One of the
words original uses was to call for responsible government. We can compare
this with the more recent demand that corporations be socially responsible.
This aspect of responsibility has received very little philosophical attention.

What is a person responsible for? is a question most often asked by
philosophers in connection with causation and accountability. This retrospective,
or backward-looking, use is closely connected with praise and blame, punishment,
and desert. When something has gone wrong, we invariably want to know who
was at fault; and when something has gone right, we occasionally stop to ask who
acted well. This is the topic of retrospective responsibility.

Again, however, we might use the same words to ask an entirely different
question: What is a person responsible for? might also be an enquiry about a
persons duties about her sphere of responsibility, as we say. A parent is
responsible for caring for his child, an employee for doing her job, a citizen for
obeying the law. It is a basic fact of human cooperation that responsibilities are
often divided up between people: for example, the doctor is responsible for
prescribing the right drugs, and the patient responsible for taking them correctly.
As against questions of retrospective responsibility, this topic is sometimes
termed prospective responsibility, that is, what responsibilities we are duty-
bound to undertake.

These two apparently simple questions (What is it to be responsible? and
What is a person responsible for?) about individual responsibility thus point to
four different topics:
1.moral agency
2.responsibility as a virtue
3.retrospective responsibility
4.prospective responsibility

Each of these topics poses a host of important philosophical questions. Both the
retrospective and prospective uses also raise the relation between legal and
moral responsibility. Many important theories of responsibility relate to legal
concerns, which will be discussed in a later section. As we pursue these topics,
there is also the difficulty of seeing how they interrelate, so that it makes sense
that we use the same word to raise each issue.

The discussion begins with the topics which philosophers have most often
discussed: the nature of moral agency and retrospective responsibility.

a. Moral Agency

Normal human adults represent our paradigm case of responsible agents. What is
distinctive about them, that we accord them this status? Thinking of retrospective
responsibility in particular, why can be held accountable for their actions justly
praised or blamed, deservedly punished or rewarded? The philosophical literature
has explored three broad approaches to moral agency:
Human beings have free will, that is, distinctive causal powers or a special
metaphysical status, that separate them from everything else in the universe;
Human beings can act on the basis of reason(s);
Human beings have a certain set of moral or proto-moral feelings.

The first approach, although historically important, has largely been discredited
by the success of modern science. Science provides, or promises, naturalistic
explanations of such phenomena as the evolution of the human species and the
workings of the brain. Almost all modern philosophers approach responsibility as
compatibilists that is, they assume that moral responsibility must be compatible
with causal or naturalistic explanation of human thought and action, and
therefore reject the metaphysical idea of free will. (An important note: There can
be terminological confusion here. Some contemporary philosophers will use the
term free will to describe our everyday freedom of choice, claiming that free
will, properly understood, is compatible with the worlds causal order.)

Among modern compatibilists, a contest remains, however, between the second
and third approaches positions that are essentially Kantian and Humean in
inspiration. Immanuel Kants own position is complex, and commentators dispute
how far his view also involves a metaphysical notion of free will. It is indisputable,
however, that our rationality is at the centre of his picture of moral agency. Kant
himself does not speak of responsibility the word was only just coming into the
language of his day but he does have much to say about imputation
(Zurechnung), that is, the basis on which actions are imputed to a person. Kant
was principally concerned with evaluation of the self. Although he occasionally
mentions blame (mutual accountability), his moral theory is really about the basis
on which a person treats herself as responsible. The core of his answer is that a
rational agent chooses to act in the light of principles that is, we deliberate
among reasons. Therefore standards of rationality apply to us, and when we fail
to act rationally this is, simply and crudely, a Bad Thing. It is important to be
aware that Kant sees reason as having moral content, so that there is a failure of
rationality involved when we do something immoral for instance, by pursuing
our self-interest at the expense of others. Even if we sometimes feel no
inclination to take account of others, reason still tells us that we should, and can
motivate us to do so. Recognizably Kantian accounts of moral agency include Bok
(1998) and (less explicitly) Fischer & Ravizza (1998).

The issue of reasons moral content separates Kantians from Humeans. David
Hume denied that reason can provide us with moral guidance, or the motivation
to act morally. He is famous for his claim that Reason is wholly inactive, and can
never be the source of so active a principle as conscience, or a sense of morals (A
Treatise of Human Nature, book 3, part 1, sect. 1). If we are moral agents, this is
because we are equipped with certain tendencies to feel or desire, dispositions
that make it seem rational to us to act and think morally. Hume himself stressed
our tendency to feel sympathy for others and our tendency to approve of actions
that lead to social benefits (and to disapprove of those contrary to the social
good). Another important class of feelings concern our tendencies to feel shame
or guilt, or more broadly, to be concerned with how others see our actions and
character. A Humean analysis of responsibility will investigate how these
emotions lead us to be responsive to one another, in ways that support moral
conduct and provide social penalties for immoral conduct. That is, its emphasis is
less on peoples evaluation of themselves and more on how people judge and
influence one another. Russell (1995) carefully develops Humes own account. In
twentieth century philosophy, broadly Humean approaches were given a new
lease of life by Peter Strawsons Freedom and Resentment (1962). This classic
essay underlined the role of reactive sentiments or reactive attitudes that
is, emotional responses such as resentment or shame in practices of
responsibility.

The basic criticisms that each position makes of the other are simple. Kantians are
vulnerable to the charge that they do not give a proper account of the role of
feeling and emotion in the moral life. They can also be accused of reifying our
capacity for reason in a way that makes mysterious how human beings capacities
for reason and morality might have evolved. Humeans are vulnerable to the
charge that they cannot give any account of the validity of reasoning beyond the
boundaries of what we might feel inclined to endorse or reject: Can the Humean
really hold that moral reasoning has any validity for people who do not feel
concern for others? Contemporary philosophers have developed both positions
so as to take account of such criticisms, which has led to rather technical debates
about the nature of reason (for instance, Bernard Williams (1981) well-known
distinction between internal and external reasons) and normativity (what it is for
something to provide a reason to act or think in a certain way, for example,
Korsgaard, 1996). So far as responsibility is concerned, Wallace (1994) is a well-
regarded attempt to mediate between the two approaches. Rather differently,
Pettit (2001) uses our susceptibility to reasons as the basis for an essentially
interactive account of moral agency.

For our purposes, perhaps the most important point is that both positions
highlight a series of factors important to responsibility and mutual accountability.
These factors include: general responsiveness to others (for instance, via moral
reasoning or feelings such as sympathy); a sense of responsibility for our actions
(for instance, so that we may offer reasons for our actions or feel emotions of
shame or guilt); and tendencies to regard others as responsible (for instance, to
respect persons as the authors of their deeds and to feel resentful or grateful to
them). In each case, note that the first example in brackets has a typically Kantian
(reason-based) cast, the second a Humean (feeling/emotion-related) cast.

Two further thoughts should be added which apply regardless of which side of
this debate one inclines toward. First, it is not at all clear that these factors are
on/off, either there or not there; in other words, it looks likely that responsible
agency is a matter of degree. One possible implication of this is that some other
animals might have a degree of moral agency; another implication is that human
beings may vary in the extent of their agency. (This seems clearly true of children
as opposed to adults. We may be more reluctant to believe that the extent of
adults moral agency can vary, but such a claim is not obviously false.) Second,
none of these factors has an obvious connection to free will, in the metaphysical
sense that opposes free will to determinism. As we shall see, however, whether
we emphasize the rational or the affective basis for responsible agency tends to
generate characteristically different accounts of retrospective responsibility,
where the issue of free will tends to recur.

b. Retrospective Responsibility

In assigning responsibility for an outcome or event, we may simply be telling a
causal story. This might or might not involve human actions. For example: the
faulty gasket was responsible for the car breaking down; his epileptic fit was
responsible for the accident. Such usages do not imply any assignment of blame
or desert, and philosophers often distinguish them by referring to causal
responsibility. More commonly, however, responsibility attribution is concerned
with the morality of somebodys action(s). Among the many different causes that
led to an outcome, that action is identified as the morally salient one. If we say
the captain was responsible for the shipwreck, we do not deny that all sorts of
other causes were in play. But we do single out the person who we think ought to
be held responsible for the outcome. Philosophers sometimes distinguish this
usage, by speaking of liability responsibility. Retrospective responsibility usually
involves, then, a moral (or perhaps legal) judgment of the person responsible.
This judgment typically pictures the person as liable to various consequences: to
feeling remorse (or pride), to being blamed (or praised), to making amends (or
receiving gratitude), and so forth.

This topic is an old concern of philosophers, predating the term responsibility by
at least two millennia. The classic analysis of the issues goes back to Aristotle in
the Nicomachean Ethics, where he investigates the conditions that exculpate us
from blame and the circumstances where blame is appropriate. Among conditions
that excuse the actor, he mentions intoxication, force of circumstances, and
coercion: we cannot be held responsible where our capacity to choose was
grossly impaired or where there was no effective choice open to us (though
perhaps we can be blamed for getting into that condition or those circumstances).
We can be blamed for what we do when threatened by others, but not as we
would be if coercion were absent. In each case, the issue seems to be whether or
not we are able to control what we do: if something lies beyond our control, it
also lies beyond the scope of our responsibility.

However, although Aristotle thinks that our capacities for deliberation and choice
are important to responsible agency, he lacks the Kantian emphasis on rational
control discussed in the last section. Aristotle grants considerable importance to
habituation and stable character traits the virtues and vices. Hence another way
of interpreting what he says about responsibility is to argue that Aristotles
excusing conditions represent cases where an action does not reveal a persons
character: everybody would act like that if circumstances provided no other
choice; no one makes responsible choices when drunk. On the other hand, how
we respond to coercion does reveal much about our virtues and vices; the point is
that the meaning of such acts is very different from the meaning they would have
in the absence of coercion.

In its emphasis on character, Aristotles account is much closer to Humes than to
Kants, since character is about tendencies to feel and behave in various ways, as
well as to think and choose. Given that Kants moral psychology is usually thought
to be less plausible than Aristotle or Humes, it is interesting that Kantian
approaches have, nonetheless, dominated modern approaches to retrospective
responsibility. Why should this be so?

Kants underlying thought is that the person who acts well deserves to be happy
(he continually refers to goodness as worthiness to be happy). The person who
acts badly does not: she deserves to be reproached, ought to feel remorse, and
may even deserve punishment. Since blame, guilt and punishment are of great
practical importance, it is clearly desirable that our account of responsibility
justify them. Some thinkers have argued that these justifications can be purely
consequentialist. For instance, Smart (1961) argues that blame, guilt and
punishment are only merited insofar as they can encourage people to do better in
the future. However, most philosophers have been dissatisfied with such
accounts. Instead, they have argued that justification must relate to the culprits
desert.

For most people, the intuitive justification for the sort of desert involved in
retrospective responsibility lies in individual choice or control. You chose to act
selfishly: you deserve blame. You chose not to take precautions: you deserve to
bear the consequences. You chose to break the law: you deserve punishment.
(The question of legal responsibility is considered separately, below.) This way of
putting matters clearly gives pride of place to our capacity to control our conduct
in the light of reasons, moral and otherwise. It will also emphasize the intentions
underlying an action rather than its actual outcomes. This is because intentions
are subject to rational choice in a way that outcomes often are not. Kants
thought that the rational agent can choose whether or not to act on the basis of
reasons is sometimes expressed in the idea that we should each be respected as
the authors of our thoughts and intentions. This thought has the less positive
consequence that when somebody chooses immorally and irrationally, he fails in
a distinctive way, so that he is not (in Kants terms) worthy to be happy. Note,
however, that this line of thought is open to a very obvious objection. It can be
argued that our intentions and choices are conditioned by our characters, and our
characters by the circumstances of our upbringing. Clearly these are not matters
of choice. This is why a concern with retrospective responsibility raises the family
of issues around moral luck and continues to lead back to the issue of free will:
the idea that we are, really and ultimately, the authors of our own choices
despite scientific and common-sense appearances.

The article on praise and blame discusses this issue in more depth, contrasting
Kants approach with that of Aristotle and utilitarianism. Humeans, favoring
naturalistic explanation of thought and action, are likely to be drawn to elements
of the last two namely Aristotles emphasis on actions as revealing virtues and
vices, and the consequentialist emphasis on social benefits of practices of
accountability. In particular, Humeans are much more likely to see retrospective
responsibility in terms of the feelings that are appropriate for instance, our
resentment at someones bad conduct, or our susceptibility to shame at others
responses. Clearly, such feelings and the resulting actions are about our exercising
mutual influence on one anothers conduct for the sake of more beneficial social
interaction. In other words, although the Humean analysis can be understood in
terms of individual psychology, it also points to the question: What is it about
human interaction that leads us to hold one another responsible? Kantians, on
the other hand, tend to think of retrospective responsibility, not as a matter of
influencing others, but rather as our respecting individual capacities for rational
choice. This respect may still have harsh consequences, as it involves granting
people their just deserts, including blame and punishment.

c. Prospective Responsibility

A different use of responsibility is as a synonym for duty. When we ask about
a persons responsibilities, we are concerned with what she ought to be doing or
attending to. Sometimes we use the term to describe duties that everyone has
for example, Everyone is responsible for looking after his own health. More
typically, we use the term to describe a particular persons duties. He is
responsible for sorting the garbage; she is responsible for looking after her baby;
the Environmental Protection Agency is responsible for monitoring air pollution;
and so on. In these cases, the term singles out the duties, or area of
responsibility, that somebody has by virtue of their role.

This usage bears at least one straightforward relation to the question of
retrospective responsibility. We will tend to hold someone responsible when she
fails to perform her duties. A captain is responsible for the safety of the ship;
hence he will be held responsible if there is a shipwreck. The usual justification for
this lies in the thought that if he had taken his responsibility more seriously, then
his actions might have averted the shipwreck. In some cases, though, when we
are entrusted with responsibility for something, we will be held responsible if
harm occurs, regardless of whether we might have averted it. This might be true if
one hires (that is, rents) a car, for instance: even if an accident is not your fault,
the contract may stipulate that you will be responsible for part of the repair costs.
In order to hire (rent) the car in the first place, one must accept take
responsibility for certain risks.

Legal thinkers, in particular, have pointed out that this suggests one way in which
Kantian approaches that is, approaches to responsibility which focus on acts and
outcomes that were under a persons control may be inadequate. We may think
that everybody has a duty (that is, a prospective responsibility) to make
recompense when certain sorts of risks materialize from their actions. Consider a
standard example: suppose John accidentally slips and breaks a vase in Janes
shop. This is probably not something John had control over, and to avoid the risk
of damaging any of Janes possessions, John would have to avoid entering her
shop altogether. Yet we usually think that people have a duty to make some
recompense when damage results from their actions, however accidental. From
the point of view of our interacting with one another, the issue is not really
whether a person could have avoided a particular, unfortunate outcome, so much
as the fact that all our actions create risks; and when those risks materialize,
someone suffers. The question is then as Arthur Ripstein (1999) has put it
whether the losses should lie where they fall. To say that they should is basically
to shrug our shoulders about the damage; in that case, the only person who
suffers is the shop-owner. But we often think that losses should be redistributed.
For that to happen, someone else has to make some sort of amends in this case,
the person who caused the accident will have to accept responsibility.

In terms of prospective responsibility, then, we may think that everyone has a
duty to make certain amends when certain risks of action actually materialize
just because all our actions impose risks on others as well as ourselves. In this
case, retrospective responsibility is justified, not by whether the person
controlled the outcome or could have chosen to do otherwise, but by reference
to these prospective responsibilities. Notice, however, that we might want to
distinguish the duty to make amends from the issue of blameworthiness. One
might accept the above account as to why the customer should compensate the
owner of the broken vase, but add that in such a case she is not to blame for the
breakage. There is clearly some merit to this response. It suggests that
retrospective responsibility is more complicated than is often thought:
blameworthiness and liability to compensate are different things, and may need
to be justified in different ways. However, this question has not really been
systematically pursued by moral philosophers, although the distinction between
moral culpability and liability to punishment has attracted much attention among
legal philosophers.

The connection between prospective and retrospective responsibility raises
another complication. This stems from the fact that people often disagree about
what they ought to do that is, about what peoples prospective responsibilities
are. This question of moral disagreement is not often mentioned in debates about
responsibility, but may be rather important. To take an example: people have
very different beliefs about the ethics of voluntary euthanasia some call it
mercy killing, others outright murder. Depending on our view, we will tend to
blame or to condone the person who kills to end grave suffering. In other words,
different views of somebodys prospective responsibilities will lead to very
different views of how retrospective responsibility ought to be assigned. One
might even argue that many of our moral disagreements are actually brought to
light, and fought out, when actors and on-lookers dispute what responses are
appropriate. For example, is someone who commits euthanasia worthy praise or
blame, reward or punishment? These disagreements, often very vocal, are
important for the whole topic of responsibility, because they relate to how moral
agents come to be aware of what morality demands of them.

Kantian ethics typically describes moral agency in terms of the co-authorship of
moral norms: the rational agent imposes norms upon herself, and so can regard
herself as an author of morality. (This element of Kantian ethics can be difficult
to appreciate, because Kant is so clear that everyone should impose the same
objective morality on themselves.) Whether or not one accepts the Kantian
emphasis upon rationality or a universalist morality, it is clear that an important
element of responsible agency consists in judging ones own responsibilities.
Hence, we do not tend to describe a dutiful child as responsible. This is because
he obeys, rather than exercising his own judgment about what he ought to do.
This issue is not just about how we judge our own duties, however: its also about
how others judge us, and our right to judge others. So far as others regard us as
responsible, they will recognize that we also have a right to judge what peoples
prospective responsibilities are, and how retrospective responsibility ought to be
assigned. Importantly, people can recognize one another as responsible in this
way, even in the face of quite deep moral disagreements. By the same token, we
know how disrespectful it is of someone, not to take her moral judgments
seriously.

The question of how far we are entitled to judge prospective responsibilities our
own and other peoples and how far we are entitled to judge retrospective
responsibilities our own and others raises yet another complication for how
we think about responsibility. As the example of childhood suggests, there can be
degrees of responsibility. Ascribing different degrees of responsibility may be
necessary or appropriate with regard to different sorts of decision-making. Hence
we sometimes say, Hes not ready for that sort of responsibility or She couldnt
be expected to understand the implications of that sort of choice. In the first
place, such statements highlight the close connection between prospective and
retrospective responsibility: it will not be appropriate to hold someone (fully)
responsible for his actions if he was faced with responsibilities that were
unrealistic and over-demanding. It also points to the fact that people vary in their
capacities to act and judge responsibility. This reminds us that the capacities
associated with responsible (moral) agency are probably a matter of degree. It
might also remind us of a fourth use of responsibility: to name a virtue of
character.

d. Responsibility as a Virtue

While theories of moral agency tend to regard an agent as either responsible or
not, with no half-measures, our everyday language usually deploys the term
responsible in a more nuanced way. As just indicated, one way we do this is by
weighing degrees of responsibility, both with regard to the sort of prospective
responsibilities a person should bear and a persons liability to blame or penalties.
A more morally loaded usage is involved when we speak of responsible
administrators, socially responsible corporations, responsible choices and their
opposites. In these cases, we use the term responsible as a term of praise:
responsibility represents a virtue that people (and organizations) may exhibit in
one area of their conduct, or perhaps exemplify in their entire lives.

In such cases, our meaning is usually quite clear. The responsible person can be
relied on to judge and to act in certain morally desirable ways; in the case of more
demanding (more responsible) roles, the person can be trusted to exercise
initiative and to demonstrate commitment; and when things go wrong, such a
person will be prepared to take responsibility for dealing with things. One way of
putting this might be to say that the responsible person can be counted on take
her responsibilities seriously. We will not need to hold her responsible, because
we can depend on her holding herself responsible. Another way of putting the
matter would be much more contentious, and harkens back to the question of
whether we should think of moral agency as a matter of degree. One might claim
that the responsible person possesses the elements pertaining to moral agency
(such as capacities to judge moral norms or to respond to others) to a greater
degree than the irresponsible person. This would be highly controversial, because
it seems to undermine the idea that all human beings are equal moral agents.
However, it would help us to see why a term we sometimes use to describe all
moral agents can also be used to praise some people rather than others.

However this may be, it is fair to say that this usage of responsible has received
the least attention from philosophers. This is interesting given that this is clearly a
virtue of considerable importance in modern societies. At any rate, it is possible
to see some important connections between the virtue and the areas that
philosophers have emphasized.

The irresponsible person is not one who lacks prospective responsibilities, nor is
she one who may not be held responsible retrospectively. It is only that she does
not take her responsibilities seriously. Note, however, that the more responsible
someone is, the more we will be inclined to entrust her with demanding roles and
responsibilities. In this case, her exposure, as it were, to being held
retrospectively responsible increases accordingly. And the same is true in the
opposite direction, when someone consistently behaves less responsibly. An
illuminating essay by Herbert Fingarette (1967) considers the limit case of the
psychopath, someone who shows absolutely no moral concern for others, nor any
sensitivity to moral reproach. Perhaps our first response will be to say that such a
person is irresponsible, even evil. Fingarette argues we must finally conclude that
he is in fact not a candidate for moral responsibility that he is not a moral agent,
not to be assigned prospective responsibilities, not to be held retrospectively
responsible for his actions. In other words, it only makes sense to grade someone
as responsible or irresponsible, so long as holding her responsible has any
prospect of making her act more responsibly. The psychopath will never be
responsive to blame, nor ever feel guilt. In fact, as someone who will never take
any responsibility seriously, he does not qualify as a moral agent at all as being
responsible in its most basic sense. This might sound like writing the person a
blank check to behave utterly immorally, but two points should be remembered:
First, society protects itself against such people, often by incarcerating them as
insane (psychopathy names a mental disorder). Second, the Kantian account
reminds us that not to treat someone as responsible for her actions is to fail to
respect her as the author of her deeds. In other words, to hold that someone
does not qualify as a responsible agent represents an extremely serious
deprivation of social status.

Looking at the matter positively, we can also say that a person who exhibits the
virtue of responsibility lives up to the three other aspects of responsibility in an
exemplary way. First, she exercises the capacities of responsible moral agency to
a model degree. Second, she approaches her previous actions and omissions with
all due concern, being prepared to take responsibility for any failings she may
have shown. And third, she takes her prospective responsibilities seriously, being
both a capable judge of what she should do, and willing to act accordingly.

3. Moral versus Legal Responsibility

As some of the examples of retrospective and prospective responsibility indicate,
law has an especial connection with questions of responsibility. Legal institutions
often assign responsibilities to people, and hold them responsible for failing to
fulfill these responsibilities either via the criminal law and policing, or by
allowing other parties to bring them to court via the civil law, for example when a
contract is breached. Accordingly, the justification of punishment represents a
major concern of philosophy of law. Likewise, legal philosophers, including figures
such as H.L.A. Hart, Herbert Morris and Joel Feinberg, have written a great deal
about the philosophy of responsibility. Their discussions have had considerable
influence on moral and political philosophers.

The most obvious point, that all writers will endorse, is that legal and moral
responsibility often overlap, but will diverge on some occasions. In the liberal
state we can hope that there will be systematic convergence, inasmuch as the law
will uphold important moral precepts, especially concerning the protection of
rights. (In a corrupt or tyrannical state, on the other hand, it is obviously very
common that legal and moral responsibility have no relation at all. Tyrants often
demand that their subjects be complicit in immorality, such as harming the
innocent.) An example where law and morality clearly overlap is murder: it is both
a legal crime and an egregious moral wrong. Few would dispute, then, that
murder ought to be punished, both legally and morally speaking.

However, the law does not punish attempted murder in the same way as an
actual murder that is, it does not prioritize intentions over outcomes in the
same way that many believe that moral judgment should. The difference between
murder and grievous bodily harm may not lie in the intention or even in the actual
wounds inflicted: everything depends on the outcome, that is, whether death
results. Thus the crimes attract different punishments, though our moral
judgment of someone may be no lighter in the case of a particularly vicious
assault. One way of putting this is to say that the law is concerned with definite
outcomes, and only secondarily with intentions. Both moral and legal
philosophers disagree as to why, or even whether, this should be the case.

A distinguished line of thought, exemplified by H.L.A. Hart in his essay Legal
Responsibility and Excuses (in Hart, 1968), holds that legal responsibility should
be understood in different terms to moral judgment. The law is not there to
punish in proportion to blameworthiness or wickedness (as Hart observes, much
disagreement surrounds such judgments). Instead, the law provides people who
are competent to choose with reasons to act in socially responsible ways. Hart
focuses on excuses under the law, such as insanity or coercion. Law admits such
excuses in spite of their possible consequentialist disutility (excuses may well
decrease the deterrent force of law, because some people might hope to misuse
these excuses to wriggle out of legal accountability). For Hart, excuses are an
important part of a system that does not just seek to prevent crime, but also to
protect choice; as a result, law does not punish those who were not able to
choose their actions. Under such a choosing system, individuals can find out, in
general terms at least, the costs they have to pay if they act in certain ways
(1968: 44). In this way, law can foster the prime social virtue of self-restraint
(1968: 182). Law can also respect what Peter Strawson stressed in Freedom and
Resentment (1962): that our social relations depend on our emotional responses
to peoples voluntary actions. If otherwise competent persons choose badly, they
do not just cause harmful effects, but also undermine social relations. Harts
justification of punishment, then, holds that attributions of (legal) responsibility
help uphold social order while respecting individual choice. His account therefore
combines a consequentialist emphasis on external actions and outcomes with an
important mental element: punishment is only appropriate in case of competent
choice, that is, where excusing conditions do not apply. However, Hart
emphasizes that his account does not apply to moral judgment, about which his
views seem to be more or less Kantian.

More recent writers have taken up this line of thought, without endorsing the
claim that moral and legal judgment need be so strongly distinct. Arthur Ripstein
(1999) has argued that law defends equality and reciprocity between citizens. It
therefore has to protect peoples interests in freedom of action as well their
interests in security of person and property. Law has to be concerned with
fairness to victims as well as fairness to culprits. To do this, it defines a system of
prospective responsibilities that protect the interests of all, and holds people
retrospectively responsible for breaches. For instance, the coercive measure of
punishment is called for where a person disregards anothers liberty or security
interests. Threats or attempts also disregard those interests and may be
punishable, but they do not undermine equality in social relations as severely as
successful violations of rights. (As Ripstein notes, his approach actually descends
from Kants account of punishment, which works in a different way to Kants
account of moral imputation. On this, see Hill, 2002.) Ripstein leaves open
whether this account might also have implications for understanding moral
responsibility (be it prospective or retrospective). However, his underlying idea
concerning fairness to both wrong-doer and victim does suggest problems for
accounts of retrospective moral responsibility that focus (in more or less Kantian
fashion) only on the culprits choice and intentions.

A quite different school of thought, recently exemplified in the work of Michael
Moore (1998), endorses a recognizably Kantian view of moral responsibility, and
argues that the law ought to share this approach. Apart from the theoretical
difficulties that face the Kantian approach to moral responsibility, however, this
school of thought has to claim that large parts of legal practice are misconceived.
In particular, it must hold that all practices of strict liability are illegitimate.
Strict liability is the practice of holding a person accountable if certain harms
materialize, even where she could not have done anything to prevent those
harms coming about. (Contrast Ripsteins account just given, or the above
example of the customer who accidentally breaks a vase in a shop.) Similarly,
Moores approach faces severe difficulties in explaining why the law should
punish on the basis of outcomes and not only intentions even though every
legal system shares this feature.

Legal responsibility has another interesting relation to the question of responsible
agency. In addition to admitting excusing conditions such as insanity, systems of
law stipulate various age conditions as to who counts as responsible. For example,
all jurisdictions have an age of criminal responsibility: a person under the age of,
say, twelve cannot be punished for murder. Likewise, law permits only people
above certain ages to engage in various activities: drinking alcohol, voting,
standing as an elected representative, entering into contracts, consenting to
medical treatment, and so forth. Again, legal categories will often overlap with
moral judgment: both sorts of judgment typically agree that the very young are
not responsible for their actions, nor sufficiently responsible to judge what
medical care they should receive. That said, our non-legal judgments about when
a person becomes sufficiently mature to be responsible invariably depend on the
person, as well as on the difficult question of what degree of maturity is necessary
to responsible conduct in different spheres of life.

4. Collective Responsibility

In recent decades increasing attention has been given to the question of
collective responsibility. This question can arise wherever the actions of a group
of people combine to generate a particular result whether a corporation, or the
citizens of a state, or even individuals who have no particular connection to one
another. (A well-known example of the last is the tragedy of the commons,
when lots of people use a shared resource for instance, everyone using the
commons as grazing land for their cattle resulting in the degradation of that
resource. Our increasing awareness of damage to environment has given this case
particular contemporary importance.) There are questions about the
responsibilities of the collective, and of the individual as a member of that body.
Recall that one of the original uses of the word responsible was to describe a
desirable quality of government, and that we still use the word in this way to
praise some institutions, just as we may criticize a corporation or group as
irresponsible.

Many perplexities about shared responsibility arise from the thought that
individuals are responsible agents, in a way that groups cannot be. A well-known
formulation captures this problem neatly: No soul to damn, no body to kick
(Coffee, 1981). As pointed out above, it is usually thought that a person can be
blamed or deserve punishment by virtue of certain psychological capacities
(soul), as well as by virtue of being the same person (body) today as she was
yesterday. On this account, there is a serious puzzle as to how a collective can be
responsible, since a collective lacks the psychological capacities of an individual
person (but see the Encyclopedia article on collective intentionality) and its
membership tends to alter over time. Note, however, that if we think of
responsibility in terms of capacities to interact in the light of shared norms as
the Humean account of moral agency might suggest rather than as a matter of
particular psychological capacities, then we need not be so concerned with those
capacities nor, perhaps, with changes in membership.

A separate article, collective moral responsibility, discusses the issues that arise
here. It may be useful, however, to indicate briefly how the four aspects of
individual responsibility discussed above might apply to the collective case.

a. The Agency of Groups

In the first place, it is clear that collective bodies can function as agents, at least in
some circumstances. Groups and organizations can pursue particular policies,
respect legal requirements, reach decisions about how to respond to situations,
and create important benefits and costs for other agents. They can also offer an
account of their previous actions and policies, setting out how and why these
were decided upon. However, these abilities clearly depend upon the collectives
being appropriately organized, which is a matter of internal communication,
deliberative mechanisms, and allocation of responsibilities to individuals. Clearly,
organizations may function better or worse in all these regards as may the other
organizations with which they interact and which may, in turn, hold them
responsible.

b. Retrospective Responsibility of Collectives

By the same token, collective bodies can be held responsible. In fact, law does this
all the time, at least for formally established collectives that are not states, for
example, corporations, charities and statutory bodies such as government
agencies. Responsible officers may be called to account to answer for their
organizations actions, to be dismissed or even punished if that account is
unsatisfactory. As a body, the collective owns property and acts in systematic
ways: legal measures can therefore make it provide compensation, or exact fines
simply as a punishment; a court can order the body to act differently or to remedy
a particular case or situation.

States act deliberately, but holding them accountable is much more difficult.
States can commit the most serious wrongs, waging war or inflicting grave
injustice upon their own peoples. International law attempts to codify some
duties of states, and the duties of individuals who govern them. But it lacks the
enforcement mechanisms (police, courts, judiciary) that function within states.
Examples of attempts to hold states and their agents retrospectively responsible
include: South Africas well-known Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which
addressed the brutalities of the old apartheid regime; the trial of individuals, such
as the 1961 Jerusalem trial of Nazi functionary Adolf Eichmann; and the exacting
of reparations following the defeat of a state, for instance the notorious Versailles
agreement that penalized Germany for its role in the First World War.

As the article on collective moral responsibility discusses, imposing liabilities,
punishments or duties onto collective bodies will finally involve costs or duties for
individuals. This poses many difficult questions about how the supposed
responsibilities of the group might be traced back to particular individuals.
Perhaps the people who were most to blame have died or moved jobs or are
otherwise out of reach. Should the citizens of a country make amends for the
wrong-doing of their forefathers, for instance? Ought a corporation that has fired
its top managers still be liable to pay fines for the misdeeds that those former
managers led the corporation into? For many, such questions highlight the most
puzzling aspect of collective responsibility, namely that individuals might justly be
required to make amends for others actions and policies.

c. Prospective Responsibilities of Groups

For formally organized collectives, prospective responsibilities are often codified
by law, or (in the case of a charity, for instance) specified in a groups constitution.
As in the individual case, of course, our moral judgment may differ from codified
responsibilities: not only moral but also political arguments often surround these
allocations of responsibility. Proponents of corporate social responsibility, for
example, generally hold that companies responsibilities extend much beyond
their legal duties, including wider obligations to the communities amongst which
they operate and to the natural environment. Just as in the case of individuals,
attempts to hold groups and organizations retrospectively accountable often,
therefore, reveal serious moral disagreements, and invariably have a political
dimension, too.

d. Responsibility as a Virtue

Groups, companies, and states can all be more or less responsible. Originally,
responsible government described government responsive to the wants and
needs of its citizens; in the same way, we now speak of corporate social
responsibility. As in the individual case, for collectives to exhibit the virtue of
responsibility depends on the other three aspects of responsibility discussed in
this article. With regard to moral agency, it will require good internal
organization, so that the body is aware of its situation, capacities, actions and
impacts. With regard to retrospective responsibility, it involves a willingness and
ability to deal with failings and omissions, and to learn from these. In terms of
prospective responsibility, the collectives activities and policies must be aptly
chosen, conformable to wider moral norms, and properly put into effect. As with
individuals, how far a body is likely to do these things also depends on how far
those around it (that is, both individuals and other collectives) act responsibly. For
instance, others will need to form appropriate expectations of the collective, and
be prepared to enforce these expectations fairly and reasonably.

5. Conclusion

This article has pointed to four dimensions of responsibility, reflecting the various
ways in which the word is used. Moral agency can also be termed responsible
agency, meaning that a person is open to moral evaluation. This sort of moral
status points in two directions. It means that a persons actions can be judged
morally, so that various responses such as praise or punishment may be
appropriate this is the stuff of retrospective responsibility. In the other
direction, a moral agent has particular duties or concerns the stuff of
prospective responsibility. Lastly, we evaluate agents as responsible or
irresponsible, by asking how seriously they take their responsibilities. This
involves evaluating them in terms of how far they exercise (or possess) the
capacities pertaining to moral agency, how they approach their past actions and
failings, and how they approach their duties and areas of responsibility. As we
have seen, writers differ concerning the connections between moral and legal
responsibility, but it is also true that these four dimensions all find echo in legal
uses of responsibility.

Philosophical discussion often considers these aspects of responsibility only with
regard to individuals, so that the term collective responsibility appears puzzling,
despite its frequent usage in everyday life. The final part of this article briefly
considered how each of these dimensions can be applied to groups, although it
has left aside some difficult questions that arise for example, how a groups
retrospective responsibilities can be fairly apportioned to individuals, or how
collectives can be organized so as to be more or less responsible.

This article began by observing that the word responsibility is surprisingly
modern, and that two quite different philosophical stories have been told about
it. Very little was said concerning the first story, concerning responsibility in
political thought. However, it has pointed out that the concept extends more
widely than modern philosophical debates tend to acknowledge. Prospective
responsibility relates to the fine-grained division of responsibilities involved in the
different roles which people adopt in modern societies above all, the different
spheres of responsibility which we are given in the workplace. By the same token,
responsibility has clearly become a very important virtue in modern societies.

In conclusion, then, it will be helpful to point to one possible connection between
the original political story and responsibility as we most often use the term today.
(See also Pettit, 2001, for another account.) Uncertainty and disagreement about
how we should live together is one of the most marked features of modern life.
We live in an age when both individuals and organizations are asked to be
endlessly flexible. Our roles and responsibilities are continually changing and
continually challenged. Uncertainty and disagreement about prospective
responsibilities are always passing over into disputes about retrospective
responsibility, as we hold one another accountable. We all face the test, then, of
how to conduct ourselves amid this uncertainty and disagreement. It is surely one
hallmark of the person who exhibits the virtue of responsibility that she
contributes to cooperation in the face of this difficult situation. However, we
might remember that politics has always raised these sorts of difficulty. In
modern societies, negotiation, compromise and judgment are required, not just
of those who take on formal political office, but of all of us. It is surely no wonder,
then, that we no longer think of responsibility as only a question for the political
sphere.


























Fundamental rights

Fundamental rights are a generally regarded set of legal protections in the
context of a legal system, wherein such system is itself based upon this same set
of basic, fundamental, or inalienable rights. Such rights thus belong without
presumption or cost of privilege to all human beings under such jurisdiction. The
concept of human rights has been promoted as a legal concept in large part owing
to the idea that human beings have such "fundamental" rights, such that
transcend all jurisdiction, but are typically reinforced in different ways and with
different emphasis within different legal systems.

Some universally recognized rights as fundamental, i.e., contained in the United
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the U.N. International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, or the U.N. Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, include the following:
Right to self-determination
Right to liberty
Right to due process of law
Right to freedom of movement
Right to freedom of thought
Right to freedom of religion
Right to freedom of expression
Right to peaceably assemble
Right to freedom of association
Right to marry

Legal meaning

Though many fundamental rights are also widely considered human rights, the
classification of a right as fundamental invokes specific legal tests courts use to
determine the constrained conditions under which the United States government
and various state governments may limit these rights. In such legal contexts,
courts determine whether rights are fundamental by examining the historical
foundations of those rights, and determining whether their protection is part of a
longstanding tradition. Individual states may guarantee other rights as
fundamental.

Coercion

Coercion /korn/ is the practice of forcing another party to act in an
involuntary manner (whether through action or inaction) by use of intimidation or
threats or some other form of pressure or force, and describes a set of various
different similar types of forceful actions that violate the free will of an individual
to induce a desired response. These actions can include, but are not limited to,
extortion, blackmail, torture, and threats to induce favors. In law, coercion is
codified as a duress crime. Such actions are used as leverage, to force the victim
to act in a way contrary to their own interests. Coercion may involve the actual
infliction of physical pain/injury or psychological harm in order to enhance the
credibility of a threat. The threat of further harm may lead to the cooperation or
obedience of the person being coerced.[citation needed]

Overview

The purpose of coercion is to substitute ones aims to those of the victim. For this
reason, many social philosophers have considered coercion as the polar opposite
to freedom.[citation needed]

Various forms of coercion are distinguished: first on the basis of the kind of injury
threatened, second according to its aims and scope, and finally according to its
effects, from which its legal, social, and ethical implications mostly depend.

Physical

Physical coercion is the most commonly considered form of coercion, where the
content of the conditional threat is the use of force against a victim, their dear
ones or property. An often used example is "putting a gun to someone's head" (at
gunpoint) or putting a "knife under the throat" (at knifepoint or cut-throat) to
compel action. These are so common that they are also used as metaphors for
other forms of coercion.

Armed forces in many countries use firing squads to maintain discipline and
intimidate the masses, or opposition, into submission or silent compliance.
However, there also are nonphysical forms of coercion, where the threatened
injury does not immediately imply the use of force. Byman and Waxman (2000)
define coercion as "the use of threatened force, including the limited use of actual
force to back up the threat, to induce an adversary to behave differently than it
otherwise would."[1] Coercion does not in many cases amount to destruction of
property or life since compliance is the goal.

Psychological

In psychological coercion, the threatened injury regards the victims relationships
with other people. The most obvious example is blackmail, where the threat
consists of the dissemination of damaging information. However, many other
types are possible e.g. so-called "emotional blackmail", which typically involves
threats of rejection from or disapproval by a peer-group, or creating feelings of
guilt/obligation via a display of anger or hurt by someone whom the victim loves
or respects. Another example is coercive persuasion.

Psychological coercion along with the other varieties - was extensively and
systematically used by the government of the Peoples Republic of China during
the Thought Reform campaign of 1951-1952. The process carried out partly at
revolutionary universities and partly within prisons was investigated and
reported upon by Robert Jay Lifton, then Research Professor of Psychiatry at Yale
University: see Lifton (1961). The techniques used by the Chinese authorities
included a technique derived from standard group psychotherapy, which was
aimed at forcing the victims (who were generally intellectuals) to produce
detailed and sincere ideological confessions. For instance, a professor of formal
logic called Chin Yueh-lin who was then regarded as Chinas leading authority on
his subject was induced to write: The new philosophy *of Marxism-Leninism],
being scientific, is the supreme truth. *Lifton (1961) p. 545+.

Legal

Government agencies may use highly intimidating methods during investigations
e.g. the threat of harsh legal penalties; such coercion is typically legal. The usual
incentive to cooperate is some form of plea bargain i.e. an offer to drop or reduce
criminal charges against a suspect in return for full cooperation.



Social

Some people[who?] speak of cultural coercion when the fear of falling out with
the group may force people into wearing a certain style of dress, publicly reciting
a creed or a pledge of allegiance which they find ethically reprehensible or
starting to smoke when they would have preferred not to etc. Within the
definitional framework adopted here, all such things amount to (psychological)
coercion if and only if the fear of falling out with the group is the result of
purposeful threats by someone. See Peer pressure, Sociology of religion, Pledge
of Allegiance.



























Concupiscence

Concupiscence (from the Latin: con-, with + cupi, cupid - desire + -escere - suffix
denoting beginning of a process or state) is often defined as an ardent, usually
sensual, longing.[1] The concept is most commonly encountered in Christian
theology, where it also receives the name "Fomes peccati", as the selfish human
desire for an object, person, or experience.[2] For Christians, concupiscence refers
to what they understand as the orientation, inclination or innate tendency of
human beings to long for fleshly appetites, often associated with a desire to do
things which are proscribed.

There are nine occurrences of concupiscence in the Douay-Rheims Bible[3] and
three occurrences in the King James Bible.[4] It is also one of the English
translations of the Koine Greek epithumia (),*5+ which occurs 38 times in
the New Testament.[6]

Concupiscence

In its widest acceptation, concupiscence is any yearning of the soul for good; in its
strict and specific acceptation, a desire of the lower appetite contrary to reason.
To understand how the sensuous and the rational appetite can be opposed, it
should be borne in mind that their natural objects are altogether different. The
object of the former is the gratification of the senses; the object of the latter is
the good of the entire human nature and consists in the subordination of reason
to God, its supreme good and ultimate end. But the lower appetite is of itself
unrestrained, so as to pursue sensuous gratifications independently of the
understanding and without regard to the good of the higher faculties. Hence
desires contrary to the real good and order of reason may, and often do, rise in it,
previous to the attention of the mind, and once risen, dispose the bodily organs
to the pursuit and solicit the will to consent, while they more or less hinder
reason from considering their lawfulness or unlawfulness. This is concupiscence in
its strict and specific sense. As long, however, as deliberation is not completely
impeded, the rational will is able to resist such desires and withhold consent,
though it be not capable of crushing the effects they produce in the body, and
though its freedom and dominion be to some extent diminished. If, in fact, the
will resists, a struggle ensues, the sensuous appetite rebelliously demanding its
gratification, reason, on the contrary, clinging to its own spiritual interests and
asserting it control. "The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the
flesh."

From the explanation given, it is plain that the opposition between appetite and
reason is natural in man, and that, though it be an imperfection, it is not a
corruption of human nature. Nor have the inordinate desires (actual
concupiscence) or the proneness to them (habitual concupiscence) the nature of
sin ; for sin, being the free and deliberate transgression of the law of God, can be
only in the rational will; though it be true that they are temptations to sin,
becoming the stronger and the more frequent the oftener they have been
indulged. As thus far considered they are only sinful objects and antecedent
causes of sinful transgressions; they contract the malice of sin only when consent
is given by the will; not as though their nature were changed, but because they
are adopted and completed by the will and so share its malice. Hence the
distinction of concupiscence antecedent and concupiscence consequent to the
consent of the will; the latter is sinful, the former is not. The first parents were
free from concupiscence, so that their sensuous appetite was perfectly subject to
reason ; and this freedom they were to transmit to posterity provided they
observed the commandment of God. A short but important statement of the
Catholic doctrine on this point may be quoted from Peter the Deacon, a Greek,
who was sent to Rome to bear witness to the Faith of the East: "Our belief is that
Adam came from the hands of his Creator good and free from the assaults of the
flesh" (Lib. de Incarn., c. vi). In our first parents, however, this complete dominion
of reason over appetite was no natural perfection or acquirement, but a
preternatural gift of God, that is, a gift not due to human nature ; no was it, on
the other hand, the essence of their original justice, which consisted in sanctifying
grace ; it was but a complement added to the latter by the Divine bounty. By the
sin of Adam freedom from concupiscence was forfeited not only for himself, but
also for all his posterity with the exception of the Blessed Virgin by special
privilege. Human nature was deprived of both its preternatural and supernatural
gifts and graces, the lower appetite began to lust against the spirit, and evil
habits, contracted by personal sins, wrought disorder in the body, obscured the
mind, and weakened the power of the will, without, however, destroying its
freedom. Hence that lamentable condition of which St. Paul complains when he
writes:
I find then a law, that when I have a will to do good, evil is present with me. For I
am delighted with the law of God, according to the inwardman : but I see
anotherlaw in my members, fighting against the law of mymind, and captivating
me in the law of sin, that is in my members. Unhappyman that I am, who shall
deliver me from the body of this death? (Romans 7:21-25 )
Christ by His death redeemed mankind from sin and its bondage. In baptism the
guilt of original sin is wiped out and the soul is cleansed and justified again by the
infusion of sanctifying grace. But freedom from concupiscence is not restored to
man, any more than immortality ; abundant grace, however, is given him, by
which he may obtain the victory over rebellious sense and deserve life
everlasting.

The Reformers of the sixteenth century, especially Luther, proposed new views
respecting concupiscence. They adopted as fundamental to their theology the
following propositions:
Original justice with all its gifts and graces was due to man as an integral part of
his nature ;
concupiscence is of itself sinful, and being the sinful corruption of human nature
caused by Adam's transgression and inherited by all his descendants, is the very
essence of original sin ;
baptism, since it does not extinguish concupiscence, does not really remit the
guilt of original sin, but only effects that it is no longer imputed to man and no
longer draws down condemnation on him. This position is held also by the
Anglican Church in its Thirty-nine Articles and its Book of Common Prayer.
The Catholic Church condemns these doctrines as erroneous or heretical. The
Council of Trent (Sess. V, e.v.) defines that by the grace of baptism the guilt of
original sin is completely remitted and does not merely cease to be imputed to
man. As to concupiscence the council declares that it remains in those that are
baptized in order that they may struggle for the victory, but does no harm to
those who resist it by the grace of God, and that it is called sin by St. Paul, not
because it is sin formally and in the proper sense, but because it sprang from sin
and incites to sin. Later on Pius V, by the Bull "Ex omnibus affictionibus" (1 Oct.,
1567), Gregory XIII, by the Bull "Provisions Nostrae" (29 Jan., 15798), Urban VIII,
by the Bull "In eminenti" (6 March, 1641), condemned the propositions of Bajus
(21, 23, 24, 26), Clement XI, by the Constitution "Unigenitus", those of Quesnel
(34, 35); and finally Pius VI, by the Bull "Auctorem fidei" (28 Aug., 1794), those of
the Synod of Pistoja (16), which maintained that the gifts and graces bestowed on
Adam and constituting his original justice were not supernatural but due to
human nature. (See GRACE, JUSTIFICATION, SIN.)
Antecedent Concupiscence and Consequent Concupiscence

It was being considered that the responsibility of an individual depends upon
how voluntary his/her action is. There are certain factors that affect how
voluntary is the action of an individual which could effect the individuals
accountability for a certain act. These factors are the Ignorance, Concupiscence
and the Fear and Violence.

Ignorance can be defined as the absence of intellectual knowledge for a certain
thing. There is what we call vincible ignorance and there is what we call invincible
ignorance.

A Vincible ignorance is committed by an individual who actually has knowledge
about the certain mistake that was being committed.

An Invincible ignorance is committed by an individual who actually has no
knowledge or completely not knowledgeable about a certain thing that was being
done.

In the case of the vincible ignorance, the responsibility and voluntariness is not
destroyed or removed making the individual guilty for committing the act. In the
case of the invincible ignorance, the responsibility and voluntariness are being
excuse since an individual has no total consent. The individual does not have the
intellectual knowledge to be able to act accurately hence his/her accountability
for the act is lessened.

The accountability of an individual with regards to the act being committed can
also be lessened according to concupiscence. Concupiscence is a technical term
for passion, passion or concupiscence can also affect the voluntariness of an
action. It was being considered that an individual that is proven to be under the
influence of concupiscence is not acting normally or perfectly as long as the
individuals free will is concern. Such thing like anger could trigger an act without
the consent of an individuals accurate sense.

There are considered two kinds of concupiscence namely; the antecedent
concupiscence and the consequent concupiscence. The antecedent
concupiscence usually occurs spontaneously without having to stimulate it, while
the consequent concupiscence arises at the command or continues having the
consent of the individuals will.

In other words, the antecedent concupiscence could lessen the voluntariness and
responsibility of an act done but it cannot totally remove them.

On the other hand, consequent concupiscence is considered to neither lessens
nor destroy voluntariness and responsibility of an act.

The Fear and Violence are also other factors that could affect the accountability of
a certain act. An individual who suffers from fear and violence might not be
accountable for the act that was being committed. It is being considered since the
individual is under the influence of fear and violence which eventually could
greatly affect his/her will and consent.























Legal Counseling

Counsel 1) The lawyer or lawyers representing a client. For example, on
the advice of counsel, the defendant did not take the stand. 2) Used as
a verb, to give legal advice.
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Counsel
1. A lawyer or attorney who gives legal advice and represents one in the
court in legal proceedings. 2. To give an advice and guide as to what is
right and what is not right. 3.

To counsel another to do an unlawful act is to become accessory to it if
it be a felony, or principal if it be treason, or a misdemeanor.

Counsel: Legal advice; a term used to refer to lawyers in a case.
Court: Government entity authorized to resolve legal disputes.
Court reporter: A person who makes a record of what is said in court.

Counsel: Legal adviser; a term used to refer to lawyers in a case.
Counterclaim: Claim brought by a defendant in a lawsuit against the
plaintiff.


Legal Forms

Legal forms includes last will and testament forms, Power of Attorney, prenuptial
Agreement, LLC Business Agreement, Bill of Sale forms, Guardianship forms and
more.



Practicum


A practicum is a graduate level course, often in a specialized field of study, that is
designed to give students supervised practical application of a previously or
concurrently studied theory. Practicums (student teaching) are common for
education and social work majors. In some cases, the practicum may be a part-
time student teaching placement that occurs the semester before a student's full-
time student teaching placement.



Ethics
Ethics, also known as moral philosophy, is a branch of philosophy that involves
systematizing, defending and recommending concepts of right and wrong
conduct.[1] The term comes from the Greek word ethos, which means
"character". Ethics is a complement to Aesthetics in the philosophy field of
Axiology. In philosophy, ethics studies the moral behavior in humans and how one
should act. Ethics may be divided into four major areas of study:[1]
Meta-ethics, about the theoretical meaning and reference of moral propositions
and how their truth values (if any) may be determined;
Normative ethics, about the practical means of determining a moral course of
action;
Applied ethics, about how moral outcomes can be achieved in specific situations;
Descriptive ethics, also known as comparative ethics, is the study of people's
beliefs about morality;

Ethics seeks to resolve questions dealing with human moralityconcepts such as
good and evil, right and wrong, virtue and vice, justice and crime.

Defining ethics

According to Dr. Richard Paul and Dr. Linda Elder of the Foundation for Critical
Thinking, "most people confuse ethics with behaving in accordance with social
conventions, religious beliefs and the law", and don't treat ethics as a stand-alone
concept.[2] Paul and Elder define ethics as "a set of concepts and principles that
guide us in determining what behavior helps or harms sentient creatures".[2] The
Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy states that the word ethics is "commonly
used interchangeably with 'morality' ... and sometimes it is used more narrowly to
mean the moral principles of a particular tradition, group or individual."[3]

The general meaning of ethics: rational, optimal (regarded as the best solution of
the given options) and appropriate decision brought on the basis of common
sense. This does not exclude the possibility of destruction if it is necessary and if it
does not take place as the result of intentional malice. If, for example, there is the
threat of physical conflict and one has no other solution, it is acceptable to cause
the necessary extent of injury, out of self-defence. Thus ethics does not provide
rules like morals but it can be used as a means to determine moral values
(attitudes or behaviours giving priority to social values, e.g. ethics or morals