After delays of more than two years, the UK government decided not to bail out the troubled Libra project. The software application combined office infrastructure and a new casework system. The cost of the project had already increased from PS183m to PS319m.
After delays of more than two years, the UK government decided not to bail out the troubled Libra project. The software application combined office infrastructure and a new casework system. The cost of the project had already increased from PS183m to PS319m.
After delays of more than two years, the UK government decided not to bail out the troubled Libra project. The software application combined office infrastructure and a new casework system. The cost of the project had already increased from PS183m to PS319m.
Cd. Universitaria, San Nicols de los Garza a 16 de Julio de 2014 Case Study 14.1 Project Libra: To Terminate or Not to Terminate
The headline in an issue of ITWeek e-magazine confirmed what many people had known for a long time about the status of a high-profile IT project initiated by the British government: Government Refuses to Bail Out Libra Troubled Project Still Delayed. After significant delays of more than two years, the UK government finally determined that it would spend no more money on the troubled Libra project at the Lord Chancellors department. Libra combined office infrastructure and a new casework system linking magistrates courts, but the software application was not delivered in July 2001 as planned and continued to be delayed. A spokesperson for the Lord Chancellors office claimed that the project was in place at 70% of the magistrates courts. However, he explained that the contract with Fujitsu Services (formerly ICL) was currently under renegotiation and that it is not yet posible to indicate the outcome. The department said that it had so far paid 33m to Fujitsu Services. The cost of the contract had already increased from 183m to 319m due to additional work that the Lord Chancellors department requested. Fujitsu had been under heavy pressure from both the government and opposition parties, but by then it had been recognized that the projects final costs and completion date could not be reasonably determined, suggesting that Project Libra could continue well into the future.
Unfortunately, Libra continues a long tradition of poorly managed government IT projects within the United Kingdom. Recently it was estimated that the cost of canceled or overbudget government IT projects had topped 1.5bn in the past six years. The latest Computing survey into government IT spending showed a 50% increase in the amount of money squandered on mismanaged projects since its previous study nearly two years before that.
Treasury minister Paul Boateng recently admitted that his department does not know how much has been wasted since the Labour government came to power. High-profile disasters taken into account in Computings research include the 698m wasted on the canceled Pathway project to develop smart cards for benefits payments, and the 260m overspent on the magistrates courts Libra system identified by the National Audit Office in 2008.
In business no group of shareholders would stomach the losses, overruns, and even pretty poor software that successive governments have made, said Derek Wyatt,a Member of Parliament. The opportunity cost value is hundreds of small new hospitals and schools. Perhaps civil servants who fail frequently should lose their jobs.26
Questions
1. Do a Google search for UKs Project Libra to see the string of news stories related to Project Libra. Identify some of the sources of the problems the project faced.
Existe una serie de posibles fuentes de los problemas que pueden ser molestados de estas noticias, lo que incluye pobres especificaciones iniciales, la mala comunicacin entre los usuarios, aumento de los costos y la mala gestin de mbitos, y as sucesivamente. En resumen, el caso presenta una lista de las formas en que los proyectos de IT pueden invadir el presupuesto y la calendarizacin
2. If you were the one to decide whether to terminate this project, what would your decision have been? Justify your position.
Terminar el Proyecto, ya que ya se haba duplicado el presupuesto estimado, se haba gastado ya mucho dinero en este proyecto y no se vea para cuando terminara, adems de que exista mucha presin de diferentes partes.
Case Study 14.2 The Project That Wouldnt Die
Ben walked into his bosss office Tuesday morning in a foul mood. Without wasting any time on pleasantries, he confronted Alice. How on earth did I get roped into working on the Regency Project? he asked, holding the memo that announced his immediate transfer. Alice had been expecting such a reaction and sat back a moment to collect her thoughts on how to proceed.
The Regency Project was a minor legend around the office. Begun as an internal audit of business practices 20 months earlier, the project never seemed to get anything accomplished, was not taken seriously within the company, and had yet to make one concrete proposal for improving working practices. In fact, as far as Ben and many other members of the company were concerned, it appeared to be a complete waste of time. And now here Ben was, assigned to join the project!
Ben continued, Alice, you know this assignment is misusing my abilities. Nothing has come from Regency; in fact, Id love to know how top management, who are usually so cost conscious, have allowed this project to continue. I mean, the thing just wont die!
Alice laughed. Ben, the answer to your question can be easily found. Have you bothered taking a look at any of the early work coming out of Regency during its first three months? When Ben shook his head, she continued, The early Statement of Work and other scope development was overseen by Harry Shapiro. He was the original project manager for Regency..
All of a sudden, light dawned on Ben. Harry Shapiro? You mean Vice President Harry Shapiro? Thats right. Harry was promoted to the VP job just over a year ago. Prior to that, he was responsible for getting Regency off the ground. Think about itdo you really expect Harry to kill his brainchild? Useless or not, Regency will be around longer than any of us.
Ben groaned, Great, so Im getting roped into serving on Harrys pet project! What am I supposed to do?
Alice offered him a sympathetic look. Look, my best advice is to go into it with good intentions and try to do your best. Ive seen the budget for Regency, and top management has been trimming their support for it. That means they must recognize the project isnt going well. They just dont want to kill it outright..
Remember, Alice continued, the project may not die because Harrys so committed to it, but that also means it has high visibility for him. Do a good job and you may get noticed. Then your next assignment is bound to be better. Alice laughed. Heck, it cant be much worse!
Questions
1. What termination method does it appear the Company is using with the Regency Project?
Parece ser que estn usando la terminacin por Starvation.
2. What are the problems with motivation when Project team members perceive that a project is earmarked for termination?
Es bastante difcil conseguir personal motivado a servir en un proyecto que se rumora va a terminar o que se ha ido terminando poco a poco, como en el caso del Proyecto Regency. La motivacin en esta instancia es bastante difcil de conseguir debido a los sentimientos naturales de conservacin.
3. Why would you suspect Harry Shapiro has a role in keeping the project alive?
La razn que se nos hara ms obvia sera por el ego. Harry era el autor del proyecto y sirvi como su primer jefe de proyecto antes de ser promovido; as, el proyecto siempre tendr gran visibilidad para l y tendr gran enlace emocional.
Case Study 14.3 The Navy Scraps Development of Its Showpiece Warship
In midsummer 2008, the U.S. Navy announced its decision to cancel the DDG 1000 Zumwalt destroyer, after the first two were completed at shipyards in Maine and Mississippi. This decision, originally stated as due to the ships high construction cost, points to a highly controversial and, it could be argued, poor scope management process since the beginning.
The Zumwalt class of destroyers was conceived for a unique role. They were to operate close offshore (in what is referred to as the littoral environment) and provide close-in bombardment support against enemy targets, using their 155-millimeter guns and cruise missiles. With a displacement of 14,500 tons and a length of 600 feet, the ships have a crew of only 142 people due to advanced automated systems used throughout. Additional features of the Zumwalt class include advanced dual-band radar systems for accurate targeting and fire support, as well as threat identification and tracking. The sonar is also considered superior for tracking submarines in shallow, coastal waterways. However, the most noticeable characteristic of the Zumwalt class was the decision to employ stealth technology in its design, in order to make the destroyer difficult for enemy radar to track. This technology included the use of composite, radar-absorbing materials and a unique, wave-piercing hull design. Thus, the Zumwalt, in development since the late 1990s, was poised to become the newest and most impressive addition to the Navys fleet.
Unfortunately, the ship was hampered from the beginning by several fundamental flaws. First, its price tag, which was originally expected to be nearly $2.5 billion per vessel, ballooned to an estimated $5 billion for each ship. In contrast, the Navys current state-of-the-art Arleigh Burke class of destroyers cost $1.3 billion per ship. Cost overruns became so great that the original 32 ships of the Zumwalt class the Navy intended to build were first reduced to 12 and then to seven. Finally, after another congressional review, the third destroyer in the class, to be built at Maines Bath Iron Works, was funded with the proviso that this would be the last built, effectively killing the program after three destroyers were completed.
In addition to the high cost, of significantly more concern were the design and conceptual flaws in the Zumwalt destroyers, a topic the Navy has been keen to avoid until recently. For example, the ship is not fitted with an effective antiship missile system. In other words, the Zumwalt cannot defend itself against ballistic antiship missiles. Considering that the mission of the Zumwalt is close-in support and shore bombardment, the inability to effectively defend itself against antiship missiles is a critical flaw. Critics have contended that the Navy knew all along that the Zumwalt could not employ a reasonable antiship missile defense. The Navy argues that the ship can carry such missiles of its own but acknowledges that it cannot guide those missiles toward a target. This raises the question: If these ships need nonstealth vessels around them for protection against incoming threats, what is the point of creating a stealth ship in the first place?
Another problem has emerged from a closer examination of the role the Navy envisioned for the Zumwalt. If its main purpose was truly to serve as an offshore bombardment platform, why use it at all?
Couldnt carrier- based aircraft hit these targets just as easily? How about GPS-guided cruise missiles? The deputy chief of naval operations, Vice Admiral Barry McCullough, conceded this critical point in acknowledging, With the accelerated advancement of precision munitions and targeting, excess fire capacity already exists from tactical aviation. In other words, why take the chance of exposing nearly defenseless ships near enemy shorelines to destroy the same targets that air power can eliminate at much lower risk?
In short, despite initially protesting that the Zumwalt was a crucial new weapon platform to support the Navys role, critics and the Navys own analysis have confirmed that the DDG 1000 destroyer class represents an investment in risky technology based on a questionable need. It is too expensive, cannot adequately defend itself, and is intended to do a job for which other options are better suited. The cancellation of the Zumwalt destroyer project was ultimately the correct decision, albeit a tardy one, in that it has cost the American taxpayers an estimated $13 billion in R&D and budget funding to build three ships that are likely to have no immediate or useful role in the near future.27
Questions
1. The U.S. Department of Defense has a long history of sponsoring projects that have questionable usefulness. If you were assigned as a member of a project review team for a defense project, what criteria would you insist such a project has in order to be supported? In other words, what are the bare essentials needed to support such a project?
Uno de los elementos a considerar es su utilidad, ya que de nada nos servira invertir en un proyecto que no es necesario. Otro elemento sera la autodefensa, que tan propenso es a los ataques, soportara un ataque militar?. Su ataque, Qu tanto afectaran los ataques al enemigo?. Y por ltimo, los costos; habiendo considerando estos tres factos tendramos que analizar el costo de la maquinara para as tomar la decisin de si el proyecto es viable.
2. Why, in your opinion, is there such a long history of defense projects overshooting their budgets or failing some critical performance metrics? (Consider other project cases in this text, including the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle discussed in Chapter 5.)
Porque muchas veces uno no puede predecir como se van a comportar las diferentes variables que determinan cuanto va a costar un Proyecto, lo normal es que se estime una cantidad y que sta no sea correcta, si no que se necesite mas dinero. Se necesita mucha experiencia para poder determinar un presupuesto acertado para un proyecto.
3. The mystery is not that the Zumwalt was canceled. The mystery is why it took so long for it to be canceled. Do you agree with this assessment? Why or why not?
Estamos de acuerdo en con esta aseveracin, ya que es muy extrao que no hayan hecho un anlisis completo en cuanto a utilidad o verificar si era necesario el proyecto antes de comenzarlo y comenzar a invertir en un proyecto que a final de cuentas fue cancelado.