SPECPRO - Rule 73 To 90 - Cases

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 128781. August 6, 2002]

TERESITA N. DE LEON, ZENAIDA C. NICOLAS and the HEIRS OF ANTONIO
NICOLAS, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PABLO P.
INVENTOR and RAMON NICOLAS, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which
prays that the Decision dated February 28, 1997 and the Resolution dated April 3, 1997 issued
by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42958,
[1]
be set aside; and, that another judgment
be entered ordering the Presiding J udge of Branch 123 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City to give due course to petitioners notice of appeal, to approve their record on appeal and to
elevate the records of Sp. Proc. No. C-1679 to respondent appellate court for further
proceedings.
The factual background:
Herein petitioner Teresita N. de Leon was appointed administratrix of the estate of Rafael C.
Nicolas in Sp. Proc. No. C-1679, entitled, In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Rafael C.
Nicolas. Said case was subsequently consolidated with Sp. Proc No. C-1810
[2]
and Civil Case
No. C-17407.
[3]
Deceased spouses Rafael and Salud Nicolas were the parents of petitioner
Teresita N. de Leon, Estrellita N. Vizconde, Antonio Nicolas (deceased husband of petitioner
Zenaida Nicolas and predecessor of the petitioners Heirs of Antonio Nicolas), Ramon Nicolas
and Roberto Nicolas.
On September 19, 1994, private respondent Ramon G. Nicolas, an oppositorapplicant in
the intestate proceedings, filed a Motion for Collation, claiming that deceased Rafael Nicolas,
during his lifetime, had given the following real properties to his children by gratuitous title and
that administratrix-petitioner Teresita failed to include the same in the inventory of the estate of
the decedent:
1. Title No. T-36734 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 14,119 sq. m. distributed as
follows:
1.1 10,110 sq. m. given to daughter Estrellita N. Visconde
1.2 4,009 sq. m. given to son Antonio Nicolas
2. Title No. T-40333 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 1,000 sq. m. given to son Antonio
Nicolas
3. Title No. T-36989 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 4,000 sq. m. given to daughter
Teresita N. de Leon (herein petitioner)
4. Title No. T-36987 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 283 sq. m. given to son Antonio
Nicolas
De Leon vs CA : 128781 : August 6, 2002 : J . Austria-Martinez : First... http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/128781.htm
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5. T-33658 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 6,109 sq. m. given to daughter Teresita N. de
Leon
6. T-68554 located at Caloocan City with an area of 690 sq. m. given to son Ramon (Oppositor-
Applicant herein)
7. T-10907 located at Caloocan City with an area of 310 sq. m. given to son Ramon but was
somehow transferred to Antonio Nicolas, and the property is now titled in the name of the
latters widow, Zenaida Carlos Nicolas.
x x x x x x x x x.
[4]
On September 27, 1994, the RTC issued an Order directing Ramon to submit pertinent
documents relative to the transfer of the properties from the registered owners during their
lifetime for proper determination of the court if such properties should be collated, and set it for
hearing with notice to the present registered owners to show cause why their properties may not
be included in the collation of properties.
[5]
On October 10, 1994, respondent Ramon filed an Amended Motion for Collation specifying
the properties to be collated and attaching to said motion, the documents in support thereof, to
wit:
3. A more complete list of the properties to be collated is as follows:
1. Title No. T-36734 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 14,119 sq. m., xerox copy hereto attached as
Annex A, distributed as follows:
1.1 10,110 sq. m. given to daughter Estrellita N. Visconde, under TCT No. V-554 of Valenzuela Bulacan
(Annex B), and later sold by Estrellita to Amelia Lim Sy for P3,405,612.00 and the Deed of Sale hereto
attached as Annex B-1;
1.2 4,009 sq. m. given to son Antonio Nicolas, xerox copy hereto attached as Annex C;
2. Two lots, covered by TCT No. T-36989 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 4,000 sq. m. and TCT
No. T-33658 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 6,109 sq. m. given to daughter Teresita N. de Leon
by a Deed of Sale, xerox copies are hereto attached as Annex D, D-1 and D-2;
The 4,000 sq. m. lot was sold by Petitioner Teresita for the amount of P1,888,000.00, xerox copy of the
Deed of Sale is hereto attached as Annex D-3;
4. Son Antonio received additional properties under a Deed of Sale, hereto attached as Annex E, which
are those covered by TCT No. T-36987 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 283 sq. m.; TCT No.
T-40333 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 1,000 sq. m. and TCT No. T-10907 located at Caloocan
City with an area of 310 sq. m., xerox copies hereto attached as Annexes E-1, E-2 and E-3;
The lot with an area of 310 sq. m. is supposedly earmarked for Oppositor-applicant Ramon but was
somehow included in the Deed of Sale to son Antonio, and the property is now titled in the name of the
latters widow, Zenaida Carlos Nicolas;
5. TCT No. T-68554 located at Caloocan City with an area of 690 sq. m. where the ancestral home is
presently located;
6. Son Antonio received another property with an area of 1,876 sq. m. and sold for P850,000.00, hereto
attached as Annex F;
2 of 10 1/27/2014 11:55 PM
7. Son Antonio received another property with an area of 1,501 sq. m. and sold for P200,000.00, hereto
attached as Annex G;
x x x x x x x x x.
[6]
A comparison with the original motion for collation reveals that the amended motion refers
to the same real properties enumerated in the original except Nos. 6 and 7 above which are not
found in the original motion.
On November 11, 1994, the RTC issued an Order, to wit:
Acting on the Amended Motion for Collation filed by oppositor-applicant Ramon G. Nicolas and the
comment thereto filed by petitioner-administratrix, the Court finds the following properties to be collated
to the estate properties under present administration, to wit:
(1). 4,009 sq. m. given to son Antonio Nicolas described in paragraph 1.2 of the Amended Motion For
Collation, marked as Annex C; (the xerox copy of the transfer certificate of title in the name of Antonio
Nicolas did not state the number and the technical description of the property. The administratrix should
get hold of a certified copy of the title of Antonio Nicolas about subject property;
(2). Two lots, covered by TCT No. T-36989 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 4,000 sq. m. and
TCT No. T-33658 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 6,109 sq. m. given to daughter Teresita N. de
Leon by a Deed of Sale;
(3). The property covered by TCT No. T-36987 located at Polo, Bulacan, with an area of 283 sq. m.; the
property covered by TCT No. T-40333 located at Polo, Bulacan, with an area of 1,000 sq. m. and another
property covered by TCT No. T-10907 located at Caloocan City with an area of 310 sq. m. xerox copies
of which are attached to the Amended Motion For Collation, marked as Annexes E1, E-2 and E-3;
(4). The lot with an area of 310 sq. m. given to son Antonio Nicolas which property is now titled in the
name of the latters widow, Zenaida Carlos Nicolas.
Accordingly, the Administratrix is hereby ordered to include the foregoing properties which were
received from the decedent for collation in the instant probate proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
[7]
We note that only those lots described under paragraphs 3.1.2, 3.2 and 4 of the Amended
Motion for Collation were ordered included for collation.
On November 18, 1994, petitioner Teresita N. de Leon filed a Motion for Reconsideration
alleging that the properties subject of the Order were already titled in their names years ago
[8]
and that titles may not be collaterally attacked in a motion for collation. On February 23, 1995,
the RTC issued an Order denying said motion, ruling that it is within the jurisdiction of the court
to determine whether titled properties should be collated,
[9]
citing Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules
of Court which provides that the final order of the court concerning questions as to
advancements made shall be binding on the person raising the question and on the heir.
Petitioner Teresita N. de Leon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated
February 23, 1995
[10]
which respondent opposed.
[11]
On J uly 18, 1995, the RTC issued an Order, pertinent portions of which read:
x x x Foremost to be resolved is the issue of collation of the properties of the deceased Rafael Nicolas
which were disposed by the latter long before his death. The oppositor-applicant Ramon Nicolas should
3 of 10 1/27/2014 11:55 PM
prove to the satisfaction of the Court whether the properties disposed of by the late Rafael Nicolas before
the latters death was gratuitous or for valuable consideration. The Court believes that he or she who
asserts should prove whether the disposition of the properties was gratuitously made or for valuable
consideration.
The Court has already set for hearing on J uly 21, 1995, at 8:30 a.m., the reception and/or presentation of
evidence in the issue of collated properties disposed before the death of Rafael Nicolas.
[12]
On November 4, 1996, the RTC removed petitioner from her position as administratrix on
ground of conflict of interest considering her claim that she paid valuable consideration for the
subject properties acquired by her from their deceased father and therefore the same should not
be included in the collation;
[13]
and, ordered the hearing on the collation of properties covered by
TCT No. T-V-1211 and T-V-1210 only.
[14]
On November 28, 1996, acting on the impression that the collation of the real properties
enumerated in the Order dated November 11, 1994 is maintained by the RTC, petitioner
Teresita N. de Leon filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that her appointment as
administratrix be maintained; and that the properties covered by TCT Nos. T-36989, T-33658,
T-36987, T-40333, T-10907 and a portion of TCT No. T-13206 described as Lot 4-A with 4,009
square meters be declared and decreed as the exclusive properties of the registered owners
mentioned therein and not subject to collation.
[15]
The RTC denied said motion in its Order dated December 23, 1996.
[16]
Petitioners Teresita N. de Leon, Zenaida Nicolas (the surviving spouse of Antonio Nicolas)
and the Heirs of Antonio Nicolas filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
injunction claiming that:
" I
RESPONDENT J UDGE HAS ACTED IN EXCESS OF HIS J URISDICTION AND WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN WITHOUT GIVING PETITIONERS OPPORTUNITY TO
VENTILATE THEIR APPEAL HE INSISTED ON HEARING THE MATTERS ON THE
APPOINTMENT OF A REGULAR ADMINISTRATOR AND COLLATION ON DECEMBER 24, 1996
AND RESETTING ITS CONTINUATION TO J ANUARY 21 and 28, 1997 INSPITE OF THE
PENDENCY OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL AND/OR RE-AFFIRMATION OF THE NOTICE OF
APPEAL FROM WHICH ACTS THERE IS NO APPEAL NOR ANY PLAIN, SPEEDY AND
ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW.
II
RESPONDENT J UDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE DID NOT
INCLUDE IN HIS ORDER-ANNEX J THE HEARING ON THE FINAL DETERMINATION OF TCT
NOS. T-36734, T-36989, T-33658, T-36987, T-40333 and T-10907 (WHETHER THEY ARE STILL
PART OF THE ESTATE OR SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE INVENTORY/ESTATE)
THEREBY ASSUMING WITHOUT ANY BASIS THAT THESE PROPERTIES TO BE STILL PART
OF THE ESTATE OF RAFAEL NICOLAS WHEN THEY ARE NOT BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN
SOLD WAY BACK IN 1979 FOR VALUABLE CONSIDERATIONS TO PETITIONER TERESITA N.
DE LEON AND ANTONIO NICOLAS HUSBAND OF PETITIONER ZENAIDA NICOLAS.
[17]
After private respondent Ramon had filed his comment, and petitioners, their reply, and after
hearing the oral arguments of the parties, the Special Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals
found the petition devoid of merit, ruling that the Order dated November 11, 1994 directing the
4 of 10 1/27/2014 11:55 PM
inclusion of the properties therein enumerated in the estate of the deceased Rafael Nicolas had
already become final for failure of petitioners to appeal from the order of collation; that the
appeal of the petitioner from the Orders dated November 4, 1996 and December 3, 1996
removing petitioner as administratrix is timely appealed; and, observing that the notice of
appeal and record on appeal appear to be unacted upon by the RTC, the appellate court
resolved:
WHEREFORE, while finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent J udge, he is hereby
ORDERED to act on petitioners appeal on the matter of the removal of petitioner as administratrix.
SO ORDERED.
[18]
Hence, herein petition anchored on the following assignments of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED IN THE QUESTIONED
DECISION THAT THE ORDER OF THE COURT A QUO DATED NOVEMBER 11, 1994 WAS
FINAL.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED IN THE QUESTIONED
RESOLUTION THAT THERE WAS NO COGENT OR COMPELLING REASON TO DISTURB THE
QUESTIONED DECISION.
[19]
Petitioners claim that: private respondent never presented any document to prove that the
properties transferred by their deceased parents to petitioners are by gratuitous title; private
respondent never notified petitioner of any hearing on said documents to give them opportunity
to show cause why their properties should not be collated; the assailed Order dated November
11, 1994 is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, confiscatory, depriving them of due process; the said
order is interlocutory in nature and therefore non-appealable; the properties acquired by
petitioner Teresita N. de Leon and her deceased brother Antonio Nicolas, married to petitioner
Zenaida C. Nicolas and their children, were sold to them as evidenced by public documents;
and, the properties were already titled in their respective names or sold to third persons.
Private respondent contends that: due process has been afforded the petitioners when the
RTC resolved the issue of collation of the subject properties after hearing; petitioner deliberately
omitted certain material facts in the petition to mislead the Court because petitioners were
actually given at least three (3) times the opportunity to ventilate and oppose the issue of
collation; as stated by the appellate court in the Resolution promulgated on February 10, 1997,
both parties affirmed that the RTC had proceeded to conduct hearings on J anuary 21 and 28,
1997 as originally scheduled; presentation of evidence had been terminated and the twin
issues of the appointment of a new administratrix and the collation of two (2) properties covered
by TCT No. T-V-1210 and T-V-1211 were already submitted for resolution to the court below;
[20]
subject properties are collatable under Articles 1601 and 1071 of the Civil Code and Section 2
of Rule 90 of the Rules of Court and the ruling in Guinguing v. Abuton and Abuton, 48 Phil. 144;
petitioner failed to present evidence that there was valuable consideration for these properties
and failed to rebut the evidence that petitioners do not have the financial capability to pay for
these properties as evidenced by the testimony of credible witnesses who are relatives of
spouses decedents.
We find the petition partly meritorious.
Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals that the Order of November 11, 1994 had
5 of 10 1/27/2014 11:55 PM
become final for failure of petitioners to appeal therefrom in due time, we hold that said Order is
interlocutory in nature. Our pronouncement in Garcia v. Garcia supports this ruling:
The court which acquires jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person through the filing of the
corresponding proceedings, has supervision and control over the said properties, and under the said
power, it is its inherent duty to see that the inventory submitted by the administrator appointed by it
contains all the properties, rights and credits which the law requires the administrator to set out in his
inventory. In compliance with this duty the court has also inherent power to determine what properties,
rights and credits of the deceased should be included in or excluded from the inventory. Should an heir
or person interested in the properties of a deceased person duly call the courts attention to the fact
that certain properties, rights or credits have been left out in the inventory, it is likewise the courts
duty to hear the observations, with power to determine if such observations should be attended to
or not and if the properties referred to therein belong prima facie to the intestate, but no such
determination is final and ultimate in nature as to the ownership of the said properties.
[21]
(Emphasis supplied)
A probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding,
[22]
can only pass upon
questions of title provisionally.
[23]
The rationale therefor and the proper recourse of the aggrieved
party are expounded in Jimenez v. Court of Appeals:
The patent reason is the probate courts limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or
ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in
a separate action.
All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine whether they should or should not
be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a
dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary
action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do
so.
[24]
Further, In Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, we held:
[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside
parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or
should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If
there is no dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing
parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title
because the probate court cannot do so.
[25]
Guided by the above jurisprudence, it is clear that the Court of Appeals committed an error
in considering the assailed Order dated November 11, 1994 as final or binding upon the heirs or
third persons who dispute the inclusion of certain properties in the intestate estate of the
deceased Rafael Nicolas. Under the foregoing rulings of the Court, any aggrieved party, or a
third person for that matter, may bring an ordinary action for a final determination of the
conflicting claims.
Private respondents reliance on Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 2. Questions as to advancement to be determined. Questions as to advancement made, or alleged
to have been made, by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the
person raising the question and on the heir.
6 of 10 1/27/2014 11:55 PM
in support of his claim that the assailed Order is a final order and therefore appealable and that
due to petitioners failure to appeal in due time, they are now bound by said Order, is not
feasible.
What seems to be a conflict between the above-quoted Rule and the aforediscussed
jurisprudence that the Order in question is an interlocutory and not a final order is more
apparent than real. This is because the questioned Order was erroneously referred to as an
order of collation both by the RTC and the appellate court. For all intents and purposes, said
Order is a mere order including the subject properties in the inventory of the estate of the
decedent.
The Court held in Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals
[26]
that the order of
exclusion (or inclusion) is not a final order; that it is interlocutory in the sense that it did not settle
once and for all the title to the subject lots; that the prevailing rule is that for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the
probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by
the parties.
In the Rodriguez case, the Court distinguished between an order of collation and an order of
exclusion from or inclusion in the estates inventory, thus:
We hold further that the dictum of the Court of Appeals and the probate court that the two disputed lots
are not subject to collation was a supererogation and was not necessary to the disposition of the case
which merely involved the issue of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of the testators estate.
The issue of collation was not yet justiciable at that early stage of the testate proceeding. It is not
necessary to mention in the order of exclusion the controversial matter of collation.
Whether collation may exist with respect to the two lots and whether Mrs. Rustias Torrens titles thereto
are indefeasible are matters that may be raised later or may not be raised at all. How those issues should
be resolved, if and when they are raised, need not be touched upon in the adjudication of this appeal.
The intestate and testate proceedings for the settlement of the estates of the deceased Valero spouses
were consolidated, as ordered by the lower court on November 21, 1974, so that the conjugal estate of the
deceased spouses may be properly liquidated, as contemplated in section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court
and Act No. 3176.
We have examined the expedientes of the two cases. We found that the proceedings have not yet reached
the stage when the question of collation or advancement to an heir may be raised and decided. The
numerous debts of the decedents are still being paid. The net remainder (remanente liquido) of their
conjugal estate has not yet been determined. On the other hand, up to this time, no separate action has
been brought by the appellants to nullify Mrs. Rustias Torrens titles to the disputed lots or to show that
the sale was in reality a donation.
In this appeal, it is not proper to pass upon the question of collation and to decide whether Mrs. Rustias
titles to the disputed lots are questionable. The proceedings below have not reached the stage of partition
and distribution when the legitimes of the compulsory heirs have to be determined.
[27]
In the light of the foregoing, Section 2, Rule 90 should be interpreted in the context of
Section 1 of the same Rule, to wit:
Section 1. When order for distribution of residue made. When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses
of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in
accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a
7 of 10 1/27/2014 11:55 PM
person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the
persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and
such person may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any
other person having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the
lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under
the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or
provided for, unless the distributes, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court,
conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.
Based thereon, we find that what the parties and the lower courts have perceived to be as
an Order of Collation is nothing more than an order of inclusion in the inventory of the estate
which, as we have already discussed, is an interlocutory order. The motion for collation was
filed with the probate court at the early stage of the intestate estate proceedings. We have
examined the records of the case and we found no indication that the debts of the decedents
spouses have been paid and the net remainder of the conjugal estate have already been
determined, and the estates of the deceased spouses at the time filing of the motion for collation
were ready for partition and distribution. In other words, the issue on collation is still premature.
And even if we consider, en arguendo, that said assailed Order is a collation order and a
final order, still, the same would have no force and effect upon the parties. It is a hornbook
doctrine that a final order is appealable. As such, the Order should have expressed therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the laws on which it is based as mandated by Section 14,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, which provides:
SEC. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course
or denied without stating the legal basis therefore.
An examination of the subject Order as quoted earlier,
[28]
readily reveals that the presiding
J udge failed to comply with the said constitutional mandate. The assailed Order did not state
the reasons for ordering the collation of the properties enumerated therein. The Order simply
directed the inclusion of certain real properties in the estate of the deceased. It did not declare
that the properties enumerated therein were given to the children of the deceased gratuitously,
despite the title in the childrens names or deeds of sale in their favor. Moreover, in his
Comment, private respondent makes mention of the testimonies of his witnesses but these were
not even mentioned in the Order of November 11, 1994. Petitioner would have been deprived of
due process as they would be divested of the opportunity of being able to point out in a motion
for reconsideration or on appeal, any errors of facts and/or law considering that there were no
facts or laws cited in support of the assailed Order of collation. As a final Order, it is, on its face
patently null and void. It could have never become final. A void judgment is not entitled to the
respect accorded to a valid judgment, but may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative
by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it.
[29]
For it to be considered as a valid
final order, the RTC must then first rule and state in its order whether the properties covered by
TCT Nos. T-36734, T-36989, T-33658, T-36987, T-40333, T-10907 and the 4,009 square meter
lot were acquired by petitioners from the deceased parents of the parties by onerous or
gratuitous title; and must specifically state in its order the reasons why it ordered the subject
properties collated. It is only then that the order of collation may be the subject of a motion for
reconsideration and/or appeal within the 15-day reglementary period. Until and unless the
constitutional mandate is complied with, any appeal from said Order would have been
8 of 10 1/27/2014 11:55 PM
premature.
Either way therefore, whether the Order in question is a final or interlocutory order, it is a
reversible error on the part of the appellate court to rule that the so-called order of collation
dated November 11, 1994 had already attained finality.
As to the prayer of petitioners that the RTC be ordered to give due course to their notice of
appeal from the Orders dated November 4, 1996 and December 23, 1996 removing petitioner
Teresita N. de Leon as administratrix of the estate of private parties deceased parents,
[30]
to
approve their record on appeal
[31]
and to elevate the records of Special Proceeding No. C-1679
to the Court of Appeals It is not disputed by the parties that said Orders are appealable. In
fact, the Court of Appeals had correctly directed the RTC to give due course to petitioners
appeal and this is not assailed by the private respondent.
But, the approval or disapproval of the record on appeal is not a proper subject matter of the
present petition for review on certiorari as it is not even a subject-matter in CA-G.R. SP No.
42958. Whether or not the record on appeal should be approved is a matter that is subject to
the sound discretion of the RTC, provided that Sections 6 to 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court are
observed by appellant.
Finally, the elevation of the records of Special Proceedings No. C-1679 to the Court of
Appeals for the purpose of petitioners appeal from the order removing the administratrix is
unnecessary where a record on appeal is allowed under the Rules of Court. The court a quo
loses jurisdiction over the subject of the appeal upon the approval of the record on appeal and
the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties; but retains jurisdiction over the
remaining subject matter not covered by the appeal.
[32]
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated February 28,
1997 and Resolution dated April 3, 1997 of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED. The Order
dated November 11, 1994 issued by the Regional Trial Court and all other orders of said court
emanating from said Order which involve the properties enumerated therein are considered
merely provisional or interlocutory, without prejudice to any of the heirs, administrator or
approving parties to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims
of title.
The Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Branch 123) is directed to immediately act,
without further delay, on petitioners appeal from the Orders dated November 4, 1996 and
December 23, 1996, subject to Sections 6 to 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Vitug, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., in the result.
[1]
Entitled, Teresita N. de Leon, et al. v. Hon. Pablo P. Inventor, as J udge RTC of Caloocan City Branch 123 and
Ramon Nicolas.
[2]
Entitled, In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Salud G. Nicolas, Teresita N. de Leon, Petitioner.
[3]
Entitled, Teresita N. de Leon as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Rafael C. Nicolas v. United Coconut
Planters Bank and Ramon Nicolas.
[4]
Petition, Annex D, Rollo, p. 36.
[5]
Petition, Annex E, Rollo, p. 38.
9 of 10 1/27/2014 11:55 PM
[6]
Comment, Annex A, Rollo, pp. 120-121.
[7]
Petition, Annex K, Rollo, pp. 39-40.
[8]
Petition, Annex G, Rollo, pp. 41-42.
[9]
Petition, Annex H, Rollo, p. 44.
[10]
Petition, Annex I, Rollo, p. 45.
[11]
Petition, Annex J , Rollo, p. 47.
[12]
Petition, Annex K, Rollo, p. 51.
[13]
Petition, Annex L, Rollo, p. 53.
[14]
Ibid.
[15]
Petition, Annex M, Rollo, p. 67.
[16]
Petition, Annex N, Rollo, p. 73.
[17]
CA Rollo, p. 9.
[18]
CA Rollo, p. 185.
[19]
Petition, Rollo, p. 4.
[20]
CA Rollo, p. 81.
[21]
67 Phil. 353, 356-357 (1939).
[22]
IntestaTe Estate of the Late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 733, 749
(1996).
[23]
J imenez v. Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 367, 371 (1990).
[24]
Id., p. 372.
[25]
279 SCRA 647, 672-673 (1997), citing Ortega v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 96, 102-103, August 14, 1987,
per Paras, J. See also Morales v. CFI of Cavite, Br. V, 146 SCRA 373, 381-383, December 29, 1986.
[26]
91 SCRA 540, 545-546 (1979).
[27]
Id., 546.
[28]
See p. 5.
[29]
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 110 (1999).
[30]
Petition, Annex O, Rollo, p. 75.
[31]
Petition, Annex P, Rollo, p. 76.
[32]
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, Annotated by J ustice J ose T. Feria, p. 169.
10 of 10 1/27/2014 11:55 PM
Today is Monday, J anuary 27, 2014
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 150164 November 26, 2002
GLORIOSA V. VALARAO, petitioner,
vs.
CONRADO C. PASCUAL and MANUEL C. DIAZ,
1
respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FELICIDAD C. PASCUAL died at seventy-one (71) years, femme sole, leaving a substantial inheritance for her
querulous collateral relatives who all appear disagreeable to any sensible partition of their windfall.
To divide the disputed estate are five (5) groups of legal heirs which include respondents Conrado C. Pascual, a
brother of the deceased, and Manuel C. Diaz, a nephew, son of her sister Carmen P. Diaz, and petitioner Gloriosa V.
Valarao who is the decedent's niece. The bloodlines marking the groups of heirs are: (a) the legitimate children of
her late sister Leoncia P. Villanueva, including petitioner Gloriosa V. Valarao; (b) the legitimate children of her late
sister Carmen P. Diaz including respondent Manuel C. Diaz; (c) the legitimate children of her late brother Macario
Pascual; (d) the legitimate children of her late sister Milagros P. de Leon; and, (e) the decedent's surviving sister
Augustia C. Pascual and brothers Leonardo C. Pascual and Conrado C. Pascual, the latter being one of
respondents herein.
On 27 May 1998 petitioner Gloriosa V. Valarao initiated before the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City special
proceedings docketed as SP No. 98-061 for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor over the estate of
Felicidad C. Pascual. On 29 September 1998 respondent Conrado C. Pascual and some of his co-heirs, including
respondent Diaz, filed with the same probate court a petition for probate, docketed as SP No. 98-0124, of an alleged
holographic will of Felicidad C. Pascual. The two (2) special proceedings were consolidated.
On 26 J anuary 1999, by agreement of the parties in the proceedings a quo, petitioner Valarao and respondent Diaz
were appointed joint administrators of the estate of Felicidad C. Pascual. On 8 February 2000, RTC-Br. 260 of
Paraaque City rendered a Decision which dismissed SP No. 98-0124, denying probate of the alleged holographic
will of the decedent and giving due course to the intestate settlement of the estate.
2
On 22 March 2000 respondent
Pascual appealed the Decision to the Court of Appeals by notice of appeal.
On 2 May 2000, in view of the appeal taken from the disallowance of the holographic will, petitioner Valarao moved
in the probate court for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate. On 9 May 2000 respondent Diaz also
asked for his designation as special co-administrator of the estate alongside petitioner. On 10 May 2000 the motions
were heard wherein petitioner opposed the request of respondent Diaz on the ground that he had allegedly
neglected his previous assignment as co-administrator of the estate.
On 7 J une 2000 the probate court issued an Order appointing petitioner Valarao as special administratrix based on
this observation -
Weighing the pros and cons of the situation, considering the unanimity of choice by the heirs, of Mrs. Valarao as
special administratrix, and the vigorous objection to Mr. Diaz as co-administrator, not to mention the fact that the
heirs on the side of Mrs. Valarao represent a numerical majority of the legal heirs of the deceased, the Court
believes that it will be to the best interest of the estate and the heirs themselves if Mrs. Gloriosa Valarao is
appointed special administratrix.
3
On 29 J une 2000 the probate court approved petitioner's bond of P500,000.00, and on 6 J uly 2000 she took her
oath of office as special administratrix.
On 19 J uly 2000 respondent Diaz moved for reconsideration of his rejection as special co-administrator of the
estate. He contested the allegation of petitioner Valarao that he had been remiss in his duties as co-administrator.
He cited as examples of his services the collection of rentals for properties included in the estate, the payment of
estate taxes and the deposit of about P4,000,000.00 in a joint bank account held in trust for the estate by him and
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petitioner as co-administrators. Respondent Diaz further alleged that justice and equity demanded that his group of
heirs be also represented in the management of the estate.
On the other hand, petitioner reiterated the alleged uncooperative conduct of respondent Diaz in discharging his
tasks as co-administrator, and at the same time moved that he and his group of sympathetic heirs be compelled to
surrender to her as special administratrix the books and records of a corporation where the estate owned substantial
interests.
On 11 September 2000 the probate court denied the motion for reconsideration and ordered respondent Diaz and all
the heirs to respect the authority of petitioner Valarao as special administratrix, especially by furnishing her with
copies of documents pertinent to the properties comprising the estate. Anent the charges of nonfeasance in his
tasks as co-administrator, the probate court found -
x x x [respondent] Diaz has not disputed these charges beyond making a mere general denial, stating that he had
been diligent and regular in the performance of his duties when he was still the estates co-administrator.
Considering the allegations of both Manuel Diaz and Gloriosa Valarao and assessing the circumstances surrounding
the case, this Court is of the considered view that the best interest of the estate will be best protected if only one
administrator is appointed for, in that way, conflicting interests which might work to the detriment of the estate may
be avoided.
4
On 25 September 2000 respondents Pascual and Diaz along with other heirs moved for reconsideration of the 11
September 2000 Order on the ground that petitioner Valarao as special administratrix was not authorized to
dispossess the heirs of their rightful custody of properties in the absence of proof that the same properties were
being dissipated by them, and that the possessory right of petitioner as special administratrix had already been
exercised by her "constructively" when the heirs on her side took possession of the estate supposedly in her behalf.
Respondents further alleged that the motion was pending resolution by the probate court.
On 10 October 2000, while the motion for reconsideration was pending resolution, respondents filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 61193, to reverse and set aside the Orders dated 7 J une 2000 and 11 September 2000 insofar as the probate
court appointed only petitioner Valarao as special administratrix, and to order the appointment of respondent Diaz as
special co-administrator of the estate.
On 15 May 2001 the probate court upon motion cited respondents for indirect contempt of court for refusing to turn
over to petitioner Valarao documents covering properties belonging to the estate and ordered them arrested until
compliance with the order to hand over the documents. The warrant of arrest was subsequently lifted by the probate
court after respondents promised to deliver the documents.
On 13 J une 2001 respondents filed their supplemental petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 61193 seeking
permanent injunction against the enforcement of the Orders of 7 J une 2000 and 11 September 2000 also as they
mandated the turn over of documents to petitioner Valarao.
On 28 September 2001 the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision reversing and setting aside the Order of 7
J une 2000 of RTC-Br. 260, Paraaque City, appointing petitioner Valarao as lone special administratrix although the
fallo of the CA Decision was silent on whether the probate court should also appoint respondent Diaz as special
co-administrator of the estate of Felicidad C. Pascual.
5
The appellate court explained that since the heirs were
divided into two (2) scrappy factions, justice and equity demanded that both factions be represented in the
management of the estate of the deceased, citing Matias v. Gonzales,
6
Corona v. Court of Appeals,
7
and Vda. de
Dayrit v. Ramolete.
8
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Valarao claims that the probate court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it rejected the
application of respondent Diaz for appointment as special co-administrator of the estate because of his indubitable
uncooperative attitude towards effective administration of the estate. She also argues that diverse interests among
different groups of heirs do not give each of them the absolute right to secure the appointment of a co-administrator
from within their ranks since it remains the discretion of the probate court to designate the administrators of an
estate. She further asserts that as special administratrix of the estate she possesses the authority to demand the
surrender of documents pertinent to the estate insofar as necessary to fulfill her mandate.
On 26 February 2002 respondents filed their Comment on the petition alleging the absence of special reasons to
justify a review of the assailed Decision and of the partiality of the trial judge in favor of petitioner.
We grant the petition. To begin with, the probate court had ample jurisdiction to appoint petitioner Valarao as special
administratrix and to assist her in the discharge of her functions, even after respondents had filed a notice of appeal
from the Decision disallowing probate of the holographic will of Felicidad C. Pascual. This is because the appeal is
one where multiple appeals are allowed and a record on appeal is required.
9
In this mode of appeal, the probate
court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter of the appeal but retains jurisdiction over the special proceeding
from which the appeal was taken for purposes of further remedies which the parties may avail of, including the
appointment of a special administrator.
10
2 of 6 1/27/2014 11:08 AM
Moreover, there is nothing whimsical nor capricious in the action of the probate court not to appoint respondent Diaz
as special co-administrator since the Orders of 7 J une 2000 and 11 September 2000 clearly stipulate the grounds
for the rejection. The records also manifest that the probate court weighed the evidence of the applicants for special
administrator before concluding not to designate respondent Diaz because the latter was found to have been remiss
in his previous duty as co-administrator of the estate in the early part of his administration. Verily, the process of
decision-making observed by the probate court evinces reason, equity, justice and legal principle unmistakably
opposite the core of abusive discretion correctible by the special civil action of certiorari under which the appellate
court was bound to act. Finally, the extraordinary writ does not operate to reverse factual findings where evidence
was assessed in the ordinary course of the proceedings since perceived errors in the appreciation of evidence do
not embroil jurisdictional issues.
11
Respondents cannot take comfort in the cases of Matias v. Gonzales,
12
Corona v. Court of Appeals
13
and Vda. de
Dayrit v. Ramolete,
14
cited in the assailed Decision. Contrary to their claim, these cases do not establish an
absolute right demandable from the probate court to appoint special co-administrators who would represent the
respective interests of squabbling heirs. Rather, the cases constitute precedents for the authority of the probate
court to designate not just one but also two or more special co-administrators for a single estate. Now whether the
probate court exercises such prerogative when the heirs are fighting among themselves is a matter left entirely to its
sound discretion.
15
Furthermore, the cases of Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit hinge upon factual circumstances other than the
incompatible interests of the heirs which are glaringly absent from the instant case. In Matias this Court ordered the
appointment of a special co-administrator because of the applicant's status as the universal heir and executrix
designated in the will, which we considered to be a "special interest" deserving protection during the pendency of
the appeal. Quite significantly, since the lower court in Matias had already deemed it best to appoint more than one
special administrator, we found grave abuse of discretion in the act of the lower court in ignoring the applicant's
distinctive status in the selection of another special administrator.
In Corona we gave "highest consideration" to the "executrix's choice of Special Administrator, considering her own
inability to serve and the wide latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix in her will,"
16
for this Court to compel
her appointment as special co-administrator. It is also manifest from the decision in Corona that the presence of
conflicting interests among the heirs therein was not per se the key factor in the designation of a second special
administrator as this fact was taken into account only to disregard or, in the words of Corona, to "overshadow" the
objections to the appointment on grounds of "impracticality and lack of kinship."
17
Finally in Vda. de Dayrit we justified the designation of the wife of the decedent as special co-administrator because
it was "our considered opinion that inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal properties and that
she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to deprive her of any hand in the administration of the estate prior to
the probate of the will would be unfair to her proprietary interests."
18
The special status of a surviving spouse in the
special administration of an estate was also emphasized in Fule v. Court of Appeals
19
where we held that the widow
would have more interest than any other next of kin in the proper administration of the entire estate since she
possesses not only the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent but also a share
in the conjugal partnership for which the good or bad administration of the estate may affect not just the fruits but
more critically the naked ownership thereof. And in Gabriel v. Court of Appeals
20
we recognized the distinctive
status of a surviving spouse applying as regular administrator of the deceased spouse's estate when we counseled
the probate court that "there must be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the widow from the
administration."
Clearly, the selection of a special co-administrator in Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit was based upon the
independent proprietary interests and moral circumstances of the appointee that were not necessarily related to the
demand for representation being repeatedly urged by respondents.
We also rule that the probate court in issuing the Order of 11 September 2000 did not err in commanding
respondents to turn over all documents pertinent to the estate under special administration and in enforcing such
order by means of contempt of court. The powers of a special administrator are plainly delineated in Sec. 2, Rule 80
of the Rules of Court, vesting upon him the authority to "take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights,
credits and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed x x
x x"
Contrary to respondents' assertion, there is nothing in Sec. 2 requiring a special administrator to take possession of
the estate only upon a prior finding that the heirs have been wasting properties of the estate which are in their
possession. The law explicitly authorizes him to take possession of the properties in whatever state they are,
provided he does so to preserve them for the regular administrator appointed afterwards. Clearly, the special
administrator enjoys not merely subsidiary possession to be carried out when the heirs dissipate the properties but
the primary and independent discretion of keeping them so they may be preserved for regular administration.
Moreover, respondents cannot deprive the special administratrix of access to and custody of essential documents
by arguing that their possession thereof allegedly in behalf of petitioner is already the equivalent of "constructive
3 of 6 1/27/2014 11:08 AM
possession" which constitutes full compliance with the possessory powers of petitioner as special administratrix
under Sec. 2 of Rule 80. Contrary to what respondents seem to understand by "constructive possession," the right
of possession whether characterized as actual or constructive invariably empowers the special administrator with
the discretion at any time to exercise dominion or control over the properties and documents comprising the
estate.
21
Hence, even if we are to give credence to the theory that petitioner also has "constructive possession" of
the documents alongside respondents' actual possession thereof, respondents would nonetheless be under the
obligation to turn them over whenever the special administratrix requires their actual delivery.
In any event, as we have held in De Guzman v. Guadiz,
22
the partisan possession exercised by litigants over
properties of the estate differs greatly from the neutral possession of a special administrator under the Rules of
Court. Quite obviously, with this distinction, the possession of portions of the estate by respondents as heirs
necessarily excludes the possessory right over the same properties inherent in the mandate of a special
administrator.
The language of Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, also unmistakably gives a special administrator the discretion
to take actual custody of the properties of the estate for the purpose of preserving them for regular administration.
This appreciation of the powers of a special administrator is fairly evident from the combination of the words
"possession" and "charge" in Sec. 2, so much so that even if we have to concede that "possession" means only the
fictitious custody of a thing as respondents suggest, the word "charge," i.e., the commitment of a thing to the care
and custody of another,
23
would emphasize the requirement of actual possession of the properties of the estate
whenever vital according to the discretion of the special administrator. When taken together, the words "possession"
and "charge" serve to highlight the fact that a special administrator must be able to subject the properties of the
estate to his control and management when in his good judgment such action is needed. Indeed, this understanding
of the possessory right of a special administrator is indispensable in fulfilling his mandate to preserve the properties
of the estate until a regular administrator is designated, for fiction and illusion cannot stand in place of the concrete
and tangible exercise of possession if he is to function effectively.
Finally, respondents cannot disobey the reasonable exercise of the authority of a special administrator on the
dubious ground that the order appointing petitioner Valarao as special administratrix had not in the meantime
become final and executory because of a pending motion for reconsideration filed by them. The fallacy of this
reasoning is apparent, for an interlocutory order is not instantly appealable and therefore there is no period nor
action to suspend or interrupt by a motion for reconsideration;
24
it is even well settled that a special civil action for
certiorari does not suspend the immediate enforceability of an interlocutory order absent a temporary restraining
order or an injunction.
25
In the same manner, the appointment of a special administrator being an interlocutory order
is not interrupted by a motion for reconsideration and thus must be obeyed as the proceedings in the probate court
progress.
26
The ruling in PAFLU v. Salvador
27
reiterated in Republic Commodities Corporation v. Oca
28
is
enlightening -
[The] refusal to accord due respect and yield obedience to what a court or administrative tribunal ordains is fraught
with such grave consequences x x x x If such a conduct were not condemned, some other group or groups
emboldened by the absence of any reproof or disapproval may conduct themselves similarly. The injury to the rule
of law may well-nigh be irreparable x x x x When judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals speak, what they decree must be
obeyed; what they ordain must be followed. A party dissatisfied may ask for reconsideration and, if denied, may go
on to higher tribunal. As long as the orders stand unmodified, however, they must, even if susceptible to
well-founded doubts on jurisdictional grounds be faithfully complied with.
Needless to state, the special administratrix appointed by the probate court must be constantly aware that she is not
a representative nor the agent of the parties suggesting the appointment but the administrator in charge of the
estate and in fact an officer of the court. As an officer of the court, she is subject to the supervision and control of the
probate court and is expected to work for the best interests of the entire estate, especially its smooth administration
and earliest settlement.
29
Whatever differences that may exist between the heirs shall be ironed out fairly and
objectively for the attainment of that end. She ought to be sensitive to her position as special administratrix and
neutral possessor which under the Rules of Court is both fiduciary and temporary in character upon which
accountability attaches in favor of the estate as well as the other heirs, especially respondents Pascual and Diaz in
light of her alleged rivalry with them.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28
September 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 61193, "Conrado C. Pascual and Manuel P. Diaz v. The Hon. RTC of
Paraaque City, Branch 260, and Gloriosa V. Valarao," is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated 7 J une
2000 and 11 September 2000 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 260, of Paraaque City, rejecting the application of
respondent Manuel C. Diaz
30
as special co-administrator of the estate of Felicidad C. Pascual and ordering
respondents Conrado C. Pascual and Manuel C. Diaz and all other heirs who may have in their possession or
custody papers, records, certificates of titles over parcels of land, etc., pertaining to properties of the estate of the
late Felicidad C. Pascual to turn over such papers, records and titles to petitioner Gloriosa V. Valarao as special
administratrix thereof, are REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
4 of 6 1/27/2014 11:08 AM
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Respondent Manuel C. Diaz is also referred to as "Manuel P. Diaz" by the courts below.
2
Penned by J udge Helen Bautista-Ricafort.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
Penned by Associate J ustice Andres B. Reyes, J r., concurred in by Associate J ustices B.A. Adefuin-de la
Cruz and Amelita G. Tolentino, Fourteenth Division.
6
101 Phil. 852 (1957).
7
201 Phil. 782 (1982).
8
202 Phil. 937 (1982).
9
Sec. 2 (a), Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; Sec. 39, BP 129; Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases
Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. Nos. 73146-53, 26 August 1986, 143 SCRA 643.
10
I F.D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium (1997), p. 508; see De Guzman v. Guadiz, No. L-48585, 31
March 1980, 96 SCRA 938.
11
Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 110436, 27 J une 1994, 233 SCRA 439; Abig v. Constantino, No. L-1260, 31 May
1961, 2 SCRA 299.
12
See Note 6.
13
See Note 7.
14
See Note 8.
15
Rivera v. Santos, No. L-24563, 29 November 1966, 18 SCRA 871; Fernandez v. Maravilla, No. L-18799,
26 March 1965, 13 SCRA 416; De Gala v. Gonzales, 53 Phil. 104 (1929).
16
See Note 7, p. 787.
17
Ibid.
18
See Note 8, p. 942.
19
No. L-40502, 29 November 1976, 74 SCRA 189.
20
G.R. No. 101512, 7 August 1992, 212 SCRA 413, 421.
21
Blacks Law Dictionary (1990), pp. 314, 1163.
22
See Note 10.
23
See Note 21, p. 233.
24
Rubio v. Municipal Trial Court in Cities, G.R. No. 87110, 24 J anuary 1996, 252 SCRA 172.
25
See Note 10, p. 705.
26
De Borja v. Tan, 97 Phil 872 (1955) where we held that the Rules of Court precludes a party from appealing
from an order appointing a special administrator because such appointment is only for a limited time and for a
specific purpose.
5 of 6 1/27/2014 11:08 AM
27
No. L-29471, 28 September 1968, 25 SCRA 393, 403.
28
No. L-24995, 27 May 1970, 33 SCRA 24, 27-28.
29
Medina v. Court of Appeals, No. L-34760, 28 September 1973, 53 SCRA 206.
30
See Note 1.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
6 of 6 1/27/2014 11:08 AM
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
EDMUND SANTIBAEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAEZ ARIOLA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court which seeks the reversal
of the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals dated May 30, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 48831 affirming the dismissal
2
of
the petitioners complaint in Civil Case No. 18909 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibaez entered into a loan
agreement
3
in the amount of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of the purchase price of one
(1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a
promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations of P43,745.96
due on May 31, 1981 and every May 31st thereafter up to May 31, 1985.
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement,
4
this time in the amount of
P123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of the purchase price of another unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural
All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and
his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note for the said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory
note, they also signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement
5
for the loan dated December 13, 1980.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will.
6
Subsequently in March 1981, testate
proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 7, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 2706. On
April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the special administrator of the estate of the
decedent.
7
During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence
Santibaez Ariola, executed a J oint Agreement
8
dated J uly 22, 1981, wherein they agreed to divide between
themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for
Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor
respectively taken by them.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities
9
was executed by and between FCCC
and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among others, assigned all its assets
and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.
Demand letters
10
for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to
Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a
Complaint
11
for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibaez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 150, docketed as Civil Case No. 18909. Summonses were issued against both, but the one
intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there was no information on his address
or the date of his return to the Philippines.
12
Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to respondent Florence
S. Ariola.
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her Answer
13
and alleged that the loan documents did
not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother
Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to the petitioner
under the joint agreement.
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On J anuary 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and re-raffled to the RTC of Makati City, Branch 63.
14
Consequently,
trial on the merits ensued and a decision was subsequently rendered by the court dismissing the complaint for lack
of merit. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit.
15
The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with the probate court before which the
testate estate of the late Efraim Santibaez was pending, as the sum of money being claimed was an obligation
incurred by the said decedent. The trial court also found that the J oint Agreement apparently executed by his heirs,
Edmund and Florence, on J uly 22, 1981, was, in effect, a partition of the estate of the decedent. However, the said
agreement was void, considering that it had not been approved by the probate court, and that there can be no valid
partition until after the will has been probated. The trial court further declared that petitioner failed to prove that it
was the now defunct Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC had assigned its assets and liabilities.
The court also agreed to the contention of respondent Florence S. Ariola that the list of assets and liabilities of the
FCCC assigned to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank did not clearly refer to the decedents account. Ruling that the
joint agreement executed by the heirs was null and void, the trial court held that the petitioners cause of action
against respondent Florence S. Ariola must necessarily fail.
The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and elevated its case to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the
following as errors of the trial court:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE J OINT AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT A) SHOULD BE
APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID PARTITION AMONG THE
HEIRS UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT TO
HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.
16
The petitioner asserted before the CA that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his legitimate children and
heirs, in this case, Edmund and Florence; the unconditional signing of the joint agreement marked as Exhibit "A"
estopped respondent Florence S. Ariola, and that she cannot deny her liability under the said document; as the
agreement had been signed by both heirs in their personal capacity, it was no longer necessary to present the same
before the probate court for approval; the property partitioned in the agreement was not one of those enumerated in
the holographic will made by the deceased; and the active participation of the heirs, particularly respondent Florence
S. Ariola, in the present ordinary civil action was tantamount to a waiver to re-litigate the claim in the estate
proceedings.
On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintained that the money claim of the petitioner should have
been presented before the probate court.
17
The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious and held that the petitioner should have filed its claim
with the probate court as provided under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. It further held that the
partition made in the agreement was null and void, since no valid partition may be had until after the will has been
probated. According to the CA, page 2, paragraph (e) of the holographic will covered the subject properties
(tractors) in generic terms when the deceased referred to them as "all other properties." Moreover, the active
participation of respondent Florence S. Ariola in the case did not amount to a waiver. Thus, the CA affirmed the RTC
decision, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
18
In the present recourse, the petitioner ascribes the following errors to the CA:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE J OINT AGREEMENT
SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID PARTITION
AMONG THE HEIRS OF THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN
PROBATED.
III.
2 of 6 1/27/2014 11:13 AM
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD WAIVED HER
RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.
IV.
RESPONDENTS CAN, IN FACT, BE HELD J OINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE
PRINCIPAL DEBTOR THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ ON THE STRENGTH OF THE CONTINUING
GUARANTY AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER-APPELLANT UNION BANK.
V.
THE PROMISSORY NOTES DATED MAY 31, 1980 IN THE SUM OF P128,000.00 AND DECEMBER
13, 1980 IN THE AMOUNT OF P123,000.00 CATEGORICALLY ESTABLISHED THE FACT THAT THE
RESPONDENTS BOUND THEMSELVES J OINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE LATE
DEBTOR EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER UNION BANK.
19
The petitioner claims that the obligations of the deceased were transmitted to the heirs as provided in Article 774 of
the Civil Code; there was thus no need for the probate court to approve the joint agreement where the heirs
partitioned the tractors owned by the deceased and assumed the obligations related thereto. Since respondent
Florence S. Ariola signed the joint agreement without any condition, she is now estopped from asserting any
position contrary thereto. The petitioner also points out that the holographic will of the deceased did not include nor
mention any of the tractors subject of the complaint, and, as such was beyond the ambit of the said will. The active
participation and resistance of respondent Florence S. Ariola in the ordinary civil action against the petitioners claim
amounts to a waiver of the right to have the claim presented in the probate proceedings, and to allow any one of the
heirs who executed the joint agreement to escape liability to pay the value of the tractors under consideration would
be equivalent to allowing the said heirs to enrich themselves to the damage and prejudice of the petitioner.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the decisions of both the trial and appellate courts failed to consider the fact that
respondent Florence S. Ariola and her brother Edmund executed loan documents, all establishing the vinculum juris
or the legal bond between the late Efraim Santibaez and his heirs to be in the nature of a solidary obligation.
Furthermore, the Promissory Notes dated May 31, 1980 and December 13, 1980 executed by the late Efraim
Santibaez, together with his heirs, Edmund and respondent Florence, made the obligation solidary as far as the
said heirs are concerned. The petitioner also proffers that, considering the express provisions of the continuing
guaranty agreement and the promissory notes executed by the named respondents, the latter must be held liable
jointly and severally liable thereon. Thus, there was no need for the petitioner to file its money claim before the
probate court. Finally, the petitioner stresses that both surviving heirs are being sued in their respective personal
capacities, not as heirs of the deceased.
In her comment to the petition, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintains that the petitioner is trying to recover a sum
of money from the deceased Efraim Santibaez; thus the claim should have been filed with the probate court. She
points out that at the time of the execution of the joint agreement there was already an existing probate proceedings
of which the petitioner knew about. However, to avoid a claim in the probate court which might delay payment of the
obligation, the petitioner opted to require them to execute the said agreement.1 a\ ^ / phi 1. n et
According to the respondent, the trial court and the CA did not err in declaring that the agreement was null and void.
She asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should still have
been subjected to the approval of the court as it may prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties. Furthermore,
she had not waived any rights, as she even stated in her answer in the court a quo that the claim should be filed
with the probate court. Thus, the petitioner could not invoke or claim that she is in estoppel.
Respondent Florence S. Ariola further asserts that she had not signed any continuing guaranty agreement, nor was
there any document presented as evidence to show that she had caused herself to be bound by the obligation of her
late father.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or not the partition in the Agreement executed by the
heirs is valid; b) whether or not the heirs assumption of the indebtedness of the deceased is valid; and c) whether
the petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the obligation of the deceased.1a wphi 1 . nt
At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the
deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered.
20
The said court is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the
estate.
21
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated:
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated. The law
enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to
3 of 6 1/27/2014 11:13 AM
the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The
authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the
compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will.
22
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties embraced in the will.
23
In
the present case, the deceased, Efraim Santibaez, left a holographic will
24
which contained, inter alia, the
provision which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my demise, shall be
distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence, my
children.
We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all the
properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, and other
properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition
involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement
25
executed by Edmund and Florence,
partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was
already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late fathers holographic will covering the said tractors.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over all the properties of the
deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in any way without the probate courts approval is
tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court cannot allow.
26
Every act intended to put an end to
indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a
sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.
27
Thus, in executing any joint agreement which appears
to be in the nature of an extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and the heirs
cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of the
probate court to determine the identity of the heirs of the decedent.
28
In the instant case, there is no showing that
the signatories in the joint agreement were the only heirs of the decedent. When it was executed, the probate of the
will was still pending before the court and the latter had yet to determine who the heirs of the decedent were. Thus,
for Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto themselves the three (3) tractors was a premature
act, and prejudicial to the other possible heirs and creditors who may have a valid claim against the estate of the
deceased.
The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs assumption of the indebtedness of the decedent is
binding. We rule in the negative. Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the heirs as parties thereto "have
agreed to divide between themselves and take possession and use the above-described chattel and each of them to
assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken as herein after stated which is in favor of First
Countryside Credit Corp."
29
The assumption of liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that
each heir shall take possession and use of their respective share under the agreement. It was made dependent on
the validity of the partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they
were each to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in effect did not receive any such
tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any force and effect.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent.l ^ v vphi 1 . net The petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late
Efraim Santibaez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule
86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed barred; exceptions. All claims for money
against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all
claims for funeral expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent,
must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set
forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an
executor or administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in
his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead of presenting them
independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each other in such action;
and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the true
balance against the estate, as though the claim had been presented directly before the court in the administration
proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their present value.
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is mandatory.
30
As we held in the
vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:
31
This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or
administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a
proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs
of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly requires
the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of
4 of 6 1/27/2014 11:13 AM
the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.
32
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private respondent Florence S. Ariola accountable for
any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and
the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibaez and his son
Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund
as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any
defenses Edmund may have as against the petitioner. As the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of
Edmund, we find it unnecessary to delve into the matter further.
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the petitioner had not sufficiently shown that it is the successor-
in-interest of the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC assigned its assets and liabilities.
33
The
petitioner in its complaint alleged that "by virtue of the Deed of Assignment dated August 20, 1981 executed by and
between First Countryside Credit Corporation and Union Bank of the Philippines"
34
However, the documentary
evidence
35
clearly reflects that the parties in the deed of assignment with assumption of liabilities were the FCCC,
and the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, with the conformity of Bancom Philippine Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can
the petitioners participation therein as a party be found. Furthermore, no documentary or testimonial evidence was
presented during trial to show that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now, in fact, petitioner Union Bank of the
Philippines. As the trial court declared in its decision:
[T]he court also finds merit to the contention of defendant that plaintiff failed to prove or did not present evidence
to prove that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now the Union Bank of the Philippines. J udicial notice does not
apply here. "The power to take judicial notice is to [be] exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken that
the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be promptly resolved in the
negative." (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 107 SCRA 504).
36
This being the case, the petitioners personality to file the complaint is wanting. Consequently, it failed to establish its
cause of action. Thus, the trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint, and the CA in affirming the same.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision is
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, J J ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Penned by Associate J ustice Bienvenido L. Reyes with Associate J ustices Eubulo G. Verzola (deceased),
and Marina L. Buzon, concurring.
2
Penned by Presiding J udge J ulio R. Logarta.
3
Records, pp. 8-12.
4
Id. at 13-18.
5
Id. at 19-20.
6
Exhibit 7.
7
Annex A of the Answer, Records, p. 48.
8
Exhibit A.
9
Exhibit G.
10
Exhibits E and F.
11
Records, p. 1.
12
See Sheriffs Return of Service, Id. at 39.
13
Records, p. 42.
5 of 6 1/27/2014 11:13 AM
14
Id. at 83.
15
Id. at 522.
16
CA Rollo, p. 43.
17
Id. at 76.
18
Rollo, p. 30.
19
Id. at 7-8.
20
See Ortega v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 96 (1987); See also Morales v. CFI of Cavite, Br. V, 146 SCRA
373 (1986).
21
See De la Cruz v. Camon, 16 SCRA 886 (1966).
22
Vda. de Kilayko v. Tengco, 207 SCRA 600 (1992).
23
Ralla v. Untalan, 172 SCRA 858 (1989).
24
Exhibit 7.
25
Exhibit A.
26
See Sandoval v. Santiago, 83 Phil 784 (1949).
27
Article 1082, New Civil Code.
28
See Reyes v. Ysip, 97 Phil 11 (1955).
29
See Exhibit 7.
30
See De Bautista v. De Guzman, 125 SCRA 676 (1983).
31
70 SCRA 130 (1976).
32
Ibid.
33
See Exhibit G.
34
Records, p. 4.
35
Exhibit G.
36
Records, p. 521.
6 of 6 1/27/2014 11:13 AM
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 140929 May 26, 2005
MARGARITO R. JAMERO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ACHILLES L. MELICOR, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Tagbilaran City, Branch 4, ATTY. ALBERTO BAUTISTA, in his capacity as the appointed SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATOR, and ERNESTO R. JAMERO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This refers to the petition for review on certiorari seeking that the Resolution
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA)
promulgated on J une 14, 1999 dismissing the petition for certiorari filed with it by petitioner Margarito R. J amero and
the Resolution promulgated on November 24, 1999 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration be set aside and
declared null and void on the ground that said Resolutions were issued in a way not in accord with law and
jurisprudence.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner filed Special Proceedings No. 1618 for the Administration and Settlement of the Estate of his deceased
mother Consuelo J amero with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, Tagbilaran City. Private respondent Ernesto
R. J amero, a brother of petitioner, opposed the latters petition for appointment as regular administrator of the
estate.
Upon motion of private respondent Ernesto and over the objections of petitioner, the respondent court, in its Order
dated December 4, 1998,
2
appointed Atty. Alberto Bautista as special administrator pending the appointment of a
regular administrator. Petitioner received said Order on December 11, 1998 and filed a motion for reconsideration on
December 28, 1998, the last day of the 15-day reglementary period, that is, December 26, 1998, falling on a
Saturday during which, according to petitioner, the Bureau of Post Office held no office. The court a quo denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration in its Order dated February 26, 1999 which petitioner received on March 4,
1999.
3
On April 21, 1999, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53020, entitled
Margarito R. Jamero, Petitioner vs. Hon. Achilles L. Melicor, as Judge RTC of Tagbilaran City, Branch 4, and Alberto
Bautista.
On J une 14, 1999, the CA issued the herein assailed Resolution, to wit:
A perusal of the petition indicates no statement as to the date when the petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the public respondents decision, in violation of Section 3, paragraph 2, Rule 46 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended by Circular No. 39-98 dated August 18, 1998 of the Supreme
Court, to wit:
In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate the material dates showing when notice
of the judgment or final order or resolution subject hereof was received when a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received.
The attention of the petitioner is likewise called to the amended Section 4, Rule 65 (Ibid.).
SEC. 4. Where and when petition to be filed. The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days
from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it
relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It
may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,
or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-
G.R. No. 140929 http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/may2005/gr_140929_2005.html
1 of 4 1/27/2014 1:03 PM
judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and
cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration in due time after notice of said
judgment, order or resolution the period herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the motion is denied, the
aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five
(5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of such denial. No extension of time to file the petition shall
be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
Hence, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46, the petition may be dismissed outright. In any
case, even if we consider the date of the Motion for Reconsideration (December 26, 1998) as the date of its
filing, the petition would be late by three (3) days.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied due course and accordingly DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
4
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the appellate court denied in its Resolution, promulgated on
November 24, 1999, to wit:
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of our Resolution of dismissal dated J une 14, 1999,
imploring us to use merciful discretion by relaxing the rules on technicality to effect substantial justice, and
citing the importance of the legal issues involved herein.
We find the motion devoid of merit. This Court has no authority to extend the definitive period fixed in Sec. 4,
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
In any case, the appointment of a special administrator is discretionary to the appointing court. Being an
interlocutory order, the same is not appealable nor subject to certiorari.
WHEREORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
5
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner against J udge Achilles L. Melicor, Atty. Bautista
and, this time, including oppositor Ernesto R. J amero, based on the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAD DECIDED IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND ESTABLISHED
J URISPRUDENCE WHEN IT ALLOWED TECHNICALITY TO OVERRIDE, AND TAKE PRECEDENCE
OVER, THE DEMONSTRATED SUBSTANTIVE MERITS OF THE PETITION.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND ESTABLISHED
J URISPRUDENCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR IS
DISCRETIONARY TO THE APPOINTING COURT, AND THAT BEING AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER THE
SAME IS NOT APPEALABLE NOR SUBJ ECT TO CERTIORARI.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAD DECIDED IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND ESTABLISHED
J URISPRUDENCE WHEN IT SUSTAINED THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT APPOINTING ATTY.
ALBERTO Y. BAUTISTA AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE CONSUELO R.
J AMERO, IN THAT:
(A) THE LATE CONSUELO R. J AMERO DIED INTESTATE, LEAVING NO DEBTS. HENCE, THE
APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR IS NOT NECESSARY AS IT WOULD ONLY
UNDULY BURDEN OR OTHERWISE EXPOSE THE ESTATE TO BEING WASTED OR
SQUANDERED.
(B) ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT A SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR IS NECESSARY, THE ORDER OF
PREFERANCE PRESCRIBED BY THE RULES IN THE APPOINTMENT OF REGULAR
ADMINISTRATOR SHOULD HAVE BEEN OBSERVED. THUS, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE
DESIGNATED THE PETITIONER WHO POSSESSES BENEFICIAL INTERESTS AS A CO-OWNER
OF THE ESTATE, RATHER THAN ATTY. ALBERTO Y. BAUTISTA WHO IS ONLY A THIRD PARTY.
(C) ASSUMING, FURTHER, THAT THE DESIGNATION OF ATTY. ALBERTO BAUTISTA WHO IS A
THIRD PARTY IS PROPER, THE AUTHORITY OF A SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR CANNOT BE
EXERCISED IN DEROGATION OF THE RIGHTS OF PETITIONER AS A CO-OWNER OF THE
2 of 4 1/27/2014 1:03 PM
PROPERTIES FORMING PART OF THE ESTATE.
6
Private respondent Ernesto J amero who was not a party in CA-G.R. SP No. 53020 filed his Comment contending
that in the absence of clear, convincing and satisfactory proof that the decision is outrageously wrong,
conspicuously mistaken and whimsically arrived at, the judgment of the CA must be regarded as final, citing
Macapagal vs. CA, et al.
7
and Bustamante, Jr. vs. NLRC.
8
In his Reply, petitioner pointed out that the issue on the timeliness of the filing of the petition for certiorari with the
CA has now become moot and academic in view of A.M. Circular No. 00-2-03-SC which took effect on September 1,
2000, amending Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of
the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such
motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
. . .
Both petitioner and private respondent Ernesto filed their respective memoranda. Private respondent Bautista, the
special administrator designated by the RTC, failed to submit his memorandum despite due notice of the
Resolutions requiring him to do so. Consequently, on October 20, 2004, the Court issued a Resolution directing the
Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to arrest and detain him until he shall have paid the total
amount of P4,000.00 fine and shall have filed his explanation and memorandum.
9
The NBI has not submitted its
return.
The Court is dispensing with the filing of the memorandum by private respondent Bautista in view of the Comments
he filed on October 12, 2000 stating that he has no personal interest in the subject matter of the petition and the
subject matter of Special Proceedings No. 1618, RTC, Bohol; and that he will abide by whatever judgment/order
/resolution that the Court may issue in this case.
10
However, Atty. Bautista is not relieved from paying the amount of
the P4,000.00 fine for his failure to comply with the Resolutions of the Court.
The issues in this case are: (1) whether or not the CA erred in dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 53020 for having been
filed out of time; (2) whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the appointment of special administrator is
discretionary to the appointing court and that being an interlocutory order, the same is not appealable nor subject to
certiorari; and (3) whether or not the appointment of a special administrator is in accordance with law and
jurisprudence.
As to the first issue, the Court finds merit to the claim of petitioner that A.M. Circular No. 00-2-03-SC as herein
quoted earlier, further amending Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, should be given retroactive effect. The
Court held in Republic vs. Court of Appeals:
11
The amendment under A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC quoted above is procedural or remedial in character. It does not
create new or remove vested rights but only operates in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights
already existing. It is settled that procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law,
or the general rule against retroactive operation of statutes. They may be given retroactive effect to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may
feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure.
12
Thus, applying the same to CA-G.R. SP No. 53020, the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner with the CA should
now be considered as having been filed within the reglementary period provided under said circular. Petitioner would
have had sixty days from March 4, 1999 or until May 3, 1999 within which to file his petition in the CA. The petition
for certiorari was filed on April 21, 1999.
However, far from rendering the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 53020 moot and academic, as claimed by petitioner, the
third issue will have to be passed upon by the CA in the petition for certiorari filed with it.
As to the second issue, suffice it to be stated that indeed, the appointment of a special administrator is interlocutory,
discretionary on the part of the RTC and non-appealable. However, it may be subject of certiorari if it can be shown
that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion or lack of or in excess of jurisdiction. As the Court held in
Pefianco vs. Moral,
13
even as the trial courts order may merely be interlocutory and non-appealable, certiorari is the
proper remedy to annul the same when it is rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
14
It is for this reason that the third issue, as already stated, will have to be considered and passed upon by the CA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partially granted. The assailed Resolutions dated J une 14, 1999 and November 24,
1999 are SET ASIDE and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. No pronouncement
as to costs.
The Resolution of this Court dated October 20, 2004 is amended to the effect that the NBI is directed to arrest and
3 of 4 1/27/2014 1:03 PM
detain the person of Atty. Alberto Bautista until full payment of the fine of Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00); and to
submit its return within thirty (30) days from notice hereof.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Acting C.J., (Chairman), Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Tinga, J., out of the country.
Footnotes
1
Penned by J ustice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis, concurred in by Presiding J ustice J esus M. Elbias (retired)
and J ustice Presbitero J . Velasco, J r. (now Court Administrator).
2
CA Rollo, Annex "A," p. 27.
3
Rollo, Petition, p. 15.
4
Rollo, pp. 39-40.
5
Rollo, pp. 41-42.
6
Rollo, pp. 11-12.
7
G.R. No. 110610, April 18, 1997, 271 SCRA 491.
8
G.R. No. 73647, April 8, 1991, 195 SCRA 710.
9
Rollo, p. 190.
10
Rollo, p. 77.
11
G.R. No. 141530, March 18, 2003, 399 SCRA 277.
12
Id., pp. 283-284.
13
G.R. No. 132248, J anuary 19, 2000, 322 SCRA 439, 451.
14
Id., p. 451.
4 of 4 1/27/2014 1:03 PM
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 146006. April 22, 2005]
JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO, in their capacities as President and
Corporate Secretary, respectively, of Philippine International Life
Insurance Company, and FILIPINO LOAN ASSISTANCE GROUP,
petitioners, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH
85 presided by JUDGE PEDRO M. AREOLA, BRANCH CLERK OF
COURT JANICE Y. ANTERO, DEPUTY SHERIFFS ADENAUER G.
RIVERA and PEDRO L. BORJA, all of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City Branch 85, MA. DIVINA ENDERES claiming to be Special
Administratrix, and other persons/public officers acting for and in their
behalf, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
CORONA, J.:
For resolution is private respondent Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes omnibus motion to cite
petitioners in indirect contempt of Court and for the disbarment and/or imposition of disciplinary
sanctions on petitioners counsel
[1]
for their refusal to comply with the final and executory
decision of this Court dated February 23, 2004.
This case began with a petition for letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr.
Juvencio P. Ortaez filed 25 years ago on September 24, 1980. Forming part of the inventory of
the estate were 2,029 shares of stock in Philippine International Life Insurance Company
(Philinterlife). During the pendency of these proceedings, Juliana, Jose and Rafael (all
surnamed Ortaez), the surviving legitimate spouse and legitimate children of the decedent
respectively, executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate, partitioning it (including the
Philinterlife shares of stock) among themselves. Thereafter, Juliana and Jose sold the 2,029
shares to the Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG).
[2]
However, private respondent, one of the illegitimate children of the decedent, was in the
meantime appointed as special administratrix of the 2,029 Philinterlife shares of stock. When
Jose Ortaez filed an omnibus motion seeking the approval of the sale of the shares of stock to
FLAG and the release of private respondent as special administratrix, the trial court in its August
11, 1997 order, denied said motion. On August 29, 1997, the intestate court declared the
extrajudicial settlement made by Juliana, Jose and Rafael partially void ab initio insofar as the
transfer of the Philinterlife shares was concerned. These orders were later upheld by the Court
of Appeals (CA) and this Court.
In its order dated July 6, 2000, the intestate court granted the motion for execution filed by
private respondent:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, let a writ of execution issue as follows:
1. Confirming the nullity of the sale of the 2,029 Philinterlife shares in the name of the Estate of
Dr. Juvencio Ortaez to Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG);
Lee vs RTC of Quezon City : 146006 : April 22, 2005 : J . Corona : Thi... http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/apr2005/146006.htm
1 of 9 1/27/2014 1:14 PM
2. Commanding the President and the Corporate Secretary of Philinterlife to reinstate in the
stock and transfer book of Philinterlife the 2,029 Philinterlife shares of stock in the name of
the Estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez as the owner thereof without prejudice to other claims
for violation of pre-emptive rights pertaining to the said 2,029 Philinterlife shares;
3. Directing the President and the Corporate Secretary of Philinterlife to issue stock certificates
of Philinterlife for 2,029 shares in the name of the Estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez as the
owner thereof without prejudice to other claims for violation of pre-emptive rights pertaining to
the said 2,029 Philinterlife shares; and
4. Confirming that only the Special Administratrix, Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes, has the power
to exercise all the rights appurtenant to the said shares, including the right to vote and to
receive dividends;
5. Directing Philinterlife and/or any other person or persons claiming to represent it or
otherwise, to acknowledge and allow the said Special Administratrix to exercise all the
aforesaid rights on the said shares and to refrain from resorting to any action which may tend
(to) directly or indirectly impede, obstruct or bar the free exercise thereof under pain of
contempt.
6. The President, Corporate Secretary, any responsible officer/s of Philinterlife, or any other
person or persons claiming to represent it or otherwise, are hereby directed to comply with
this Order within three (3) days from receipt hereof under pain of contempt.
7. The Deputy Sheriffs Adenauer Rivera and Pedro Borja are hereby directed to implement the
writ of execution with dispatch to forestall any/or further damage to the Estate.
SO ORDERED.
[3]
Unfortunately, however, the writ of execution was not enforced due to the resistance of
herein petitioners. To block the execution, petitioners filed before the CA a petition for certiorari,
docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 59736, questioning the order of execution, among others. The
petition was dismissed outright on July 26, 2000. Petitioners then elevated the case to us. On
February 23, 2004, a decision was promulgated by the Third Division of this Court:
[4]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P.
No. 59736 dated J uly 26, 2000, dismissing petitioners petition for certiorari and affirming the J uly 6,
2000 order of the trial court which ordered the execution of its (trial courts) August 11 and 29, 1997
orders, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[5]
On April 27, 2004, petitioners filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration and referral of this
case to the en banc allegedly in view of the conflicting rulings of two divisions of the Court. In a
resolution dated May 26, 2004, the Court denied the motion for lack of merit:
The Court deliberated on the petitioners omnibus motion for reconsideration of the decision of February
23, 2004 which denied the petition for review on certiorari. It appears to the Court that the motion merely
reiterates the same arguments earlier raised and does not present any substantial reason not previously
invoked nor any matter not already considered and passed upon by the Court.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. This
denial is FINAL.
[6]
Thus on July 9, 2004, the February 23, 2004 decision became final and executory, and was
recorded in the book of entries of judgments. On October 1, 2004, an alias writ of execution
was issued by the intestate court (the court of origin). In said writ, the deputy sheriffs were
2 of 9 1/27/2014 1:14 PM
ordered to enforce the August 11 and 29, 1997 and July 6, 2000 orders of the intestate court.
Instead of complying with the writ, petitioners filed on October 15, 2004, a motion to
suspend execution/period of compliance by reason of supervening events, raising the following
arguments: (1) the intestate court had already revoked the appointment of private respondent as
special administratrix; (2) there was a need to lay down the legal procedure in the
implementation of the writ and (3) there must be a declaration that the price per share of the
2,029 shares was only P1,000 which was its book value at the time the shares were sold in
1989 and 1991.
[7]
Private respondent went back to this Court and filed this omnibus motion asserting that
petitioners made a travesty of the final and executory decisions of the Lower Courts and this
Honorable Court when they refused to comply with the Alias Writ of Execution issued by the
Lower Court.
[8]
Before we discuss the substance of private respondents motion, we note that attached to it
were mere photocopies of the supporting documents and not certified true copies of documents
or papers involved therein as required by the Rules of Court.
[9]
However, given that the motion
was verified and petitioners, who were given a chance to oppose or comment on it, made no
objection thereto, we brush aside the defect in form and proceed to discuss the merits of the
motion.
Furthermore, as held in Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. CA,
[10]
Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court outlines the procedural requisites before the accused may be punished for indirect
contempt: (1) the filing of a written charge and (2) an opportunity to be heard by himself or
counsel. All that the law requires is that there is a charge in writing duly filed in court and an
opportunity given to the person charged to be heard by himself or counsel. What is important is
that the alleged contemner be granted an opportunity to meet the charges against him and to be
heard in his defense.
[11]
Petitioners were given this opportunity; they in fact filed their
Opposition.
[12]
Petitioners assert that private respondent engaged in forum-shopping because the latter
had previously filed a similar motion in the intestate court. The argument has no merit. The
charge for indirect contempt must be filed before the court against which the indirect contempt
was committed. Section 4, Rule 71 states:
SEC. 5. Where charge to be filed. Where the charge for indirect contempt has been committed against
a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or against an officer appointed by it, the
charge may be filed with such court. xxx
Hence, the charge for indirect contempt for disobedience to our February 23, 2004 decision
was correctly brought to us. As we explained in the case of Igot v. Court of Appeals:
In whatever context it may arise, contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do an
act, in such a manner as to create an affront to the court and the sovereign dignity with which it is clothed.
As a matter of practical judicial administration, jurisdiction has been felt to properly rest in only one
tribunal at a time with respect to a given controversy. Only the court which rendered the order
commanding the doing of a certain act is vested with the right to determine whether or not the order has
been complied with, or whether a sufficient reason has been given for noncompliance, and, therefore,
whether a contempt has been committed. It is a well-established rule that the power to determine the
existence of contempt of court rests exclusively with the court contemned. No court is authorized to
punish a contempt against another.
3 of 9 1/27/2014 1:14 PM
The rationale that is usually advanced for the general rule ... is that, contempt proceedings are sui generis
and are triable only by the court against whose authority the contempts are charged; the power to punish
for contempt exists for the purpose of enabling a court to compel due decorum and respect in its presence
and due obedience to its judgments, orders and processes and in order that a court may compel obedience
to its orders, it must have the right to inquire whether there has been any disobedience thereof, for to
submit the question of disobedience to another tribunal would operate to deprive the proceeding of half its
efficiency.
[13]
We now proceed to the merits of the motion to cite for indirect contempt and for imposition
of disciplinary sanctions.
The private respondent alleges that the following acts of the petitioners constituted indirect
contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court: (1) petitioners failure to comply with
the alias writ of execution served upon them on October 12, 2004 and (2) their act of filing a
patently baseless motion (to suspend execution/period of compliance by reason of supervening
events) which was obviously intended to defeat the implementation of the final and executory
decision of this Court.
On the other hand, petitioners allege that the immediate execution of the subject decision
would be inequitable and should be suspended pending an order of clarification of certain
matters. According to them, the certificates of the shares of stock were turned over to the
intestate court and not to private respondent because her appointment as special administratrix
had already been revoked by the court.
Petitioners obstinate refusal to abide by this Courts February 23, 2004 decision
demonstrates a contumacious attitude which this Court cannot countenance. This contumacy
becomes all the more glaring because of the strongly worded admonition in our decision that
(p)etitioners and all parties claiming rights under them are hereby warned not to further delay
the execution of the Orders of the intestate court dated August 11 and August 29, 1997.
[14]
The
previously quoted July 6, 2000 order of the intestate court, which was affirmed by this Court,
also contained the following directives:
xxx xxx xxx
5. Directing Philinterlife and/or any other person or persons claiming to represent it or
otherwise, to acknowledge and allow the said Special Administratrix to exercise all the
aforesaid rights on the said shares and to refrain from resorting to any action which may
tend (to) directly or indirectly impede, obstruct or bar the free exercise thereof under
pain of contempt.
6. The President, Corporate Secretary, any responsible officer/s of Philinterlife, or any other
person or persons claiming to represent it or otherwise, are hereby directed to comply with
this Order within three (3) days from receipt hereof under pain of contempt.
7. The Deputy Sheriffs Adenauer Rivera and Pedro Borja are hereby directed to implement the
writ of execution with dispatch to forestall any/or further damage to the Estate.
SO ORDERED.

[15]
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, petitioners defiant non-compliance with these directives, as proved by the sheriffs
report dated October 13, 2004, constituted indirect contempt. The pertinent portion of this report
stated:
That on October 12, 2004, when Sheriff Borja went to the Philenterlife (sic) Office to check whether there
was already compliance with the Alias Writ of Execution, one of their staff told Sheriff Borja that Mr.
J ose Lee wanted to talk with Sheriff Borja over the Telephone. In their telephone conversation, Mr. J ose
4 of 9 1/27/2014 1:14 PM
Lee told Sheriff Borja that he had already consulted his lawyer regarding the matter.
WHEREFORE, we respectfully submit this report to the Honorable Court with the information that up to
this writing, Philenterlife (sic) has not submitted their compliance to the Sheriff or to the Court.
[16]
Petitioners act of filing their motion to suspend execution/period of compliance by reason of
supervening events also showed their continuing, stubborn resistance to this Courts judgment.
Indeed, one of the exceptions to the principle of immutability of final judgments is the existence
of supervening events. Supervening events refer to facts which transpire after judgment has
become final and executory or to new circumstances which develop after the judgment has
acquired finality.
[17]
The private respondent alleges that the revocation of her appointment as special
administratrix was made by the intestate court in its May 12, 2003 and September 4, 2003
orders.
[18]
This is not disputed by the petitioners. In short, this fact already existed before the
decision of this Court was promulgated on February 23, 2004 and before it became final and
executory on July 9, 2004. Therefore, the revocation of the appointment of private respondent
as special administratrix was evidently not a supervening event.
Furthermore, this issue had already been raised in petitioners motion for reconsideration
[19]
of this Courts February 23, 2004 decision and passed upon by the Court in its resolution dated
May 26, 2004 denying the motion for lack of merit. Likewise, the increase in the value of the
shares from P1,000 to P4,000 was also raised in the same motion for reconsideration.
[20]
The
Court stated that the motion merely reiterate(d) the same arguments earlier raised and (did) not
present any substantial reason not previously invoked nor any matter not already considered
and passed upon by the Court.
[21]
Petitioners insist that there must be an order laying down the legal procedure for the
implementation of the writ, which implementation did not include taking over the management of
Philinterlife and obtaining possession of office premises. We disagree. The execution should
not be suspended for that reason.
Our February 23, 2004 ruling categorically stated that the estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez
was the lawful owner of 2,029 Philinterlife shares. As lawful owner of the Philinterlife shares,
the estate can exercise all the rights of ownership, including the right to vote the shares. If, by
voting the shares, the estate is able to elect its own representatives who succeed in attaining
management control of Philinterlife, then let it be as such would be a legitimate consequence of
our February 23, 2004 decision.
We call particular attention to the fact that in our February 23, 2004 decision, we noted that
petitioners, with the rest of the FLAG-controlled directors and stockholders, increased the
authorized capital stock of Philinterlife, diluting in the process the 2,029 shares of the estate
[22]
representing 50.725% of Philinterlife. We observed that this was obviously calculated to make it
difficult for the estate to reassume its controlling interest in Philinterlife. Thus, we ruled that,
considering the nullity of the sale of the 2,029 shares to FLAG, the increase in Philinterlifes
authorized capital stock was void ab initio.
[23]
Consequently, any approval by the Securities and
Exchange Commission of this increase would likewise be void ab initio.
Moreover, the directives to petitioners Jose C. Lee and Alma Aggabao, as president and
corporate secretary, respectively, of Philinterlife, were sufficiently clear and needed absolutely
no clarification in order to exact their compliance thereto. Since the nullity of the sale of the
2,029 Philinterlife shares to FLAG had been confirmed, they were ordered to:
5 of 9 1/27/2014 1:14 PM
(1) reinstate the shares in the name of the estate in the stock and transfer book;
(2) issue stock certificates in the name of the estate;
(3) acknowledge and allow the special administratrix to exercise all the rights
appurtenant to the shares;
(4) refrain from resorting to any action which may tend to directly or indirectly impede,
obstruct or bar the free exercise of these rights and
(5) comply with the order within three days from receipt.
The first two directives were undoubtedly covered by the duties and functions of the
corporate secretary and president of a corporation. The next two ordered them not to resist the
writ and the last directive provided a period for their compliance. Given the foregoing, there was
never any need to clarify the procedure for the implementation of the writ.
Pertinent portions of Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court read:
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has been
filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed
by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be
punished for indirect contempt:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order or judgment of a court xxx
(c ) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not
constituting direct contempt xxx
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;
xxx xxx xxx
In the recent case of Heirs of Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas v. Court of Appeals, we
explained the concept of contempt of court:
Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to
bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties
litigant or their witnesses during litigation (12 Am. J ur. 389, cited in 14 SCRA 813).
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice
and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the courts orders, but such
conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some
manner to impede the due administration of justice (17 C.J .S. 4).
This Court has thus repeatedly declared that the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and
is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments,
orders and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice (Slade Perkins vs.
Director of Prisons, 58 Phil. 271; In re Kelly, 35 Phil. 944; Commissioner of Immigration vs. Cloribel, 20
SCRA 1241; Montalban vs. Canonoy, 38 SCRA 1).
[24]
Petitioners disobedience to this Courts judgment is an affront to the Court and the dignity
with which it is clothed. Their attempt to raise issues already laid to rest by a final and executory
judgment of no less than the highest tribunal of the land constitutes a disrespectful and insolent
6 of 9 1/27/2014 1:14 PM
defiance of the authority of this Court and impedes the speedy administration of justice.
[25]
As
mentioned in the beginning of this Resolution, this controversy has been pending for 25 long
years already. Apparently, petitioners want to prolong it to eternity.
In Sacdalan v. Court of Appeals, we said:
Well-settled is the principle that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable
and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court
of the land.
The reason for this is that litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential
to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning
party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must guard against any scheme calculated to
bring about that result and must frown upon any attempt to prolong the controversies.
The only exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc
entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire
after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.

[26]
This case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions. Moreover, the immutability
of the February 23, 2004 decision is all the more emphasized in this case since it is this Court,
the highest Court of the land and final arbiter of all legal controversies, that promulgated it.
Thus, petitioners are bound by the finality of our decision and cannot, under the guise of a
phony motion to suspend execution/period of compliance by reason of supervening events,
reopen a case already decided with finality. Nor should they be permitted to litigate anew
questions or issues already laid to rest.
The fact is that virtually the same issues have been elevated to this Court no less than
three times: in G.R. Nos. 128525, 135177 and 146006. Private respondent obtained a writ of
execution in 2000 but her attempt to enforce the writ was unsuccessful. After our February 23,
2004 decision became final and executory, she obtained an alias writ of execution on October 1,
2004 but the petitioners again managed to frustrate her efforts to execute the decision and
torpedo its enforcement.
As we ruled in Beautifont, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:
Considerable time has already elapsed and, to serve the ends of justice, it is time that [the] controversy
is finally laid to rest. Sound practice seeks to accommodate the theory which avoids waste of time, effort
and expense, both to the parties and the government, not to speak of delay in the disposal of the case. A
marked characteristic of our judicial set-up is that where the dictates of justice so demand ... the Supreme
Court should act, and act with finality. In this case, the dictates of justice do demand that this Court act,
and act with finality.
[27]
This Court is becoming impatient with the devious tricks and maneuvers of petitioners.
Section 7, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court penalizes indirect contempt as follows:
Sec. 7. Punishment for indirect contempt. If the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect contempt
committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, he may be punished by a
fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months or both. xxx
Petitioners Jose C. Lee and Alma Aggabao, for their defiance and resistance to the October
1, 2004 alias writ of execution enforcing this Courts February 23, 2004 decision resulting in
7 of 9 1/27/2014 1:14 PM
the frustration of its execution are hereby adjudged guilty of indirect contempt.
Finally, with regard to the administrative charge against petitioners counsel, Atty. Teodorico
Fernandez, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, this Court
resolves to refer it to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for investigation, report and recommendation.
WHEREFORE, petitioners Jose C. Lee and Alma Aggabao, president and corporate
secretary, respectively, of petitioner Philippine International Life Insurance Company, are hereby
found GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT for which the maximum FINE of P30,000 is hereby
imposed on each of them, payable in full within five days from receipt of this resolution. They
are furthermore given a final non-extendible period of five days from receipt of this resolution
within which to comply within our decision and orders as aforementioned. Petitioners are
hereby warned not to file any more pleadings in connection herewith. Failure to comply with our
decision, orders and P30,000 fine within the five-day period will subject them to imprisonment till
full compliance.
In view hereof, petitioners counsel, Atty. Teodorico Fernandez, is likewise strongly warned
to refrain from any further attempts to make a mockery of our judicial processes.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Carpio-Morales and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., no part.
[1]
Rollo, p. 830.
[2]
FLAG, together with Jose C. Lee and Alma Aggabao, its president and corporate secretary respectively, are the
petitioners herein.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 47-48.
[4]
Penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Corona and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C. Vitug (retired)
and Conchita Carpio Morales. Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez took no part.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 777-778.
[6]
Id., p. 816.
[7]
Id., pp. 855-856.
[8]
Id., p. 836.
[9]
Rule 71, Sec. 4.
[10]
335 Phil. 1150 (1997).
[11]
Id., p. 1159, citing Castaos v. Judge Escao, Jr., 321 Phil. 527, 553-554 (1995); Gavieres v. Falcis, G.R. No.
62380, 7 February 1991, 193 SCRA 649, , in turn citing People v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211 (1956);
Santos v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch VI, G.R. Nos. 57190-91, 18 May 1990, 185 SCRA 472,.
[12]
Rollo, pp. 919-928.
[13]
G.R. No. 150794, 17 August 2004, citing San Luis v. CA, et al., 417 Phil. 599 (2001).
[14]
Rollo, p. 777.
8 of 9 1/27/2014 1:14 PM
[15]
Supra at note 3.
[16]
Rollo, p. 853.
[17]
Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126462, 12 November 2002, 391 SCRA 370, 387, citing
Clavano v. Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 143781, 27 February 2002, 378 SCRA 172.
[18]
Rollo, p. 836.
[19]
Id., p. 810.
[20]
Id. p. 811-812. Specifically, petitioners alleged that in 1980, the fair market value of each share of stock was
only P1,791.91. In 2003, this increased to P3,914.21; Rollo, p. 811.
[21]
Supra at note 6.
[22]
Rollo, p. 753.
[23]
Id., p. 771.
[24]
G.R. No. 138660, 5 February 2004, 422 SCRA 101, 114-115, citing Halili, et al. v. CIR, et al., 220 Phil. 507
(1985).
[25]
Id., citing People v. Godoy, 312 Phil. 977 (1995) and Pacquing v. Court of Appeals, 200 Phil. 516 (1982).
[26]
G.R. No. 128967, 20 May 2004, 428 SCRA 586, 599, citing Philippine Veterans Bank v. Estrella, G.R. No.
138993, 27 June 2003, 405 SCRA 168 and Salva v. Court of Appeals, 364 Phil. 284 (1999).
[27]
G.R. No. 50141, 29 January 1988, 157 SCRA 481, 494, citations omitted.
9 of 9 1/27/2014 1:14 PM
[G.R. No. 146006. August 22, 2005]
LEE vs. QUEZON CITY RTC
THIRD DIVISION
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated AUG 22 2005.
G.R. No. 146006 (JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO, in their capacities as President
and corporate Secretary, respectively, of the Philippine International Life Insurance Company,
and FILIPINO LOAN ASSISTANCE GROUP, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON
CITY, BRANCH 85 presided by JUDGE PEDRO M. AREOLA, BRANCH CLERK OF COURT
JANICE Y. ANTERO, DEPUTY SHERIFFS ADENAUER G. RIVERA and PEDRO L. BORJA, all
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 85, MA. DIVINA ENDERES claiming to be
Special Administratrix, and other persons/public officers acting for and in their behalf.)
This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners J ose C. Lee and Alma
Aggabao of our resolution dated April 22, 2005
[1]
finding the petitioners guilty of indirect
contempt.
Petitioners were cited for contempt for their refusal to comply with the final and executory
decision of this Court dated February 23, 2004. Petitioners non-compliance, as president and
corporate secretary, respectively, of Philippine International Life Insurance Company
(Philinterlife), with the directives stated in the orders we affirmed in our February 23, 2004
decision was evident from the sheriffs report
[2]
and the dilatory motion to suspend
execution/period of compliance by reason of alleged supervening events which they filed
[3]
with the probate court.
Petitioners now come to us again, raising arguments which have already been passed
upon. Therefore, this motion for reconsideration must be denied with finality.
At the outset, we must emphasize that petitioners have already paid the fine imposed on
them.
[4]
They are bound by such payment which was made unconditionally.
Petitioners dispute the following statement in our April 22, 2005 resolution:
We call particular attention to the fact that in our February 23, 2004 decision, we noted that petitioners,
with the rest of the FLAG-controlled directors and stockholders, increased the authorized capital stock of
Philinterlife, diluting in the process the 2,029 shares of the estate representing 50.725% of Philinterlife.
We observed that this was obviously calculated to make it difficult for the estate to reassume its
controlling interest in Philinterlife. Thus, we ruled that, considering the nullity of the sale of the 2,029
shares to FLAG, the increase in Philinterlifes authorized capital stock was void ab initio. Consequently,
any approval by the Securities and Exchange Commission of this increase would likewise be void ab
initio.
[5]
Petitioners take issue with the 50.725%
[6]
figure and claim that this is an additional
declaration which still has to be proved. This claim is incorrect. This figure
[7]
is not an
additional declaration as it was mentioned in our February 23, 2004 decision.
[8]
It was never
challenged nor disputed.
Next, they assail our ruling that the increase in Philinterlifes authorized capital stock was
void ab initio. Again, this is not the first time this matter was taken up. As stated in our April 22,
2005 resolution, our February 23, 2004 decision held that:
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It goes without saying that the increase in Philinterlifes authorized capital stock, approved on the vote of
petitioners non-existent shareholdings and obviously calculated to make it difficult for Dr. Ortaezs
estate to reassume its controlling interest in Philinterlife, was likewise void ab initio.
[9]
In fact, petitioners questioned this when they sought a reconsideration
[10]
of our February
23, 2004 decision. We denied their motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in a resolution
dated May 26, 2004.
[11]
Petitioners argue that the nullification of the increase in authorized capital stock of
Philinterlife will adversely affect the interests of stockholders who were not parties to this case
and are independent of petitioner Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG).
[12]
To nullify the
increase will deprive them of their property without due process.
[13]
In addition, they assert that
the increases in authorized capital stock in 1987 and 2001 were done in compliance with
governmental requirements for insurance companies.
[14]
By petitioners own allegation, the so-called independent stockholders
[15]
acquired their
shares in 1983.
[16]
Petitioners named the following as stockholders independent and separate
from FLAG: J ose C. Lee, Rodrigo Gatchalian (predecessor of Carmelita Tan), Benjamin Lee,
Angel Ong, Amparo Sarmiento, J ose Gachalian, Antonio Gatchalian, Luis Gatchalia, Brenda
Ortaez, Manuel Hizon and Ma. Paz Lee.
Obviously, J ose C. Lee is a party to this case and cannot escaped its effects.
[17]
The others,
although not parties to this case, cannot claim to be unaware of the probate proceedings which
commenced in 1980 and which involved a big chunk of Philinterlifes shares. Petitioners
themselves admit that in 1983, the estates 2,029 shares represented 40.58% interest in the
company.
[18]
Moreover, these stockholders participated in the management of the company: in
1983, Rodrigo Gatchalian was Philinerlifes president and chairman of the board of directors
while Amparo Sarmiento was its corporate secretary and Benjamin Lee, J ose Gatchalian and
Brenda Ortaez were members of the board
[19]
; in 1989, Angel Ong and Ma. Paz Lee were also
members of the board.
[20]
It is incredible that they now claim to have no knowledge of this case.
Even if they were not part of Philinterlifes management, it is difficult to believe that they, as
stockholders, never bothered to inquire from their board and corporate officers, who were all
embroiled in the controversy (nor were they apprised by these officers) of the circumstances
surrounding the 2,029 shares under litigation. In any case, the information could have been
easily obtained by them since these facts appeared in public judicial records. They were
charged with knowledge and could not feign ignorance of these facts so as to escape the legal
effects of the eventual outcome of the controversy.
Besides, the time-honored legal maxim of caveat emptor
[21]
should have placed these
stockholders on guard. They bought their shares, which could be affected by the litigation
embroiling Philinterlife, at their own risk. It is safe to presume that, as prudent business
investors, they bought into the company only after a due diligence audit and therefore should
have been aware of the legal consequences that could normally come with the purchase of
shares in a corporation entangled in a bitter suit. Since they claim to be stockholders since
1983, they cannot now belatedly protest after the case, which they had knowledge of, has been
finally resolved.
The declaration that the increase in authorized capital stock was void ab initio flows
2 of 4 1/27/2014 1:25 PM
naturally from our ruling that the ownership of the 2,029 shares never left the estate. Throughout
the pendency of these proceedings which commenced in 1980, the estate of Dr. Ortaez,
including the 2,029 shares of stock in Philinterlife, was in custodia legis or under the custody
and jurisdiction of the court.
[22]
Where the estate of the deceased person is already the subject
of a testate or in testate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction
involving it without prior approval of the probate court.
[23]
Clearly, the intention is to protect the
interests of the estate while the respective rights of the parties are being litigated.
As shown by the figures provided by the petitioners, the increases in authorized capital
stock in 1987 and 2001, both carried out without the approval of the probate court, diluted the
interest of the estate in Philinterlife. For still unexplained reasons, the shares of the estate of Dr.
Ortaez in Philinterlife went down from 50.725%
[24]
in 1980 to 40.58% in 1983.
[25]
Philinterlifes
authorized capital stock was increased from P5 million to P10 million in 1987. Consequently, in
1989, the estates interest went down to 20.29%.
[26]
In 2001, the authorized capital stock was
again increased to P50 million. As a result, the estate now owns a miniscule 4.05%.
[27]
The law provides a mechanism by which the estate could have preserved its proportionate
interest in the company.
[28]
For unexplained reasons, the estates interest was wittingly or
unwittingly allowed to shrink. To tolerate this situation will not only negate the control of the
probate court over assets brought into custodia legis but will also frustrate the protection given
them.
We need not discuss the other issues raised for they have already been exhaustively
discussed in our April 22, 2005 resolution.
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY. No
further pleadings shall be entertained.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court
[1]
Rollo, pp. 930-950.
[2]
Dated October 13, 2004; Id., p. 853.
[3]
Dated October 15, 2004; Id., pp. 854-856.
[4]
These payments were noted in our J une 29, 2005 resolution; Id., p. 953.
[5]
Supra at note 1, p. 943.
[6]
This is the percentage of interest of the estate in Philinterlife in 1980, upon the death of Dr. Ortaez; Rollo, p.
287.
[7]
This appears in the documents submitted to this Court; Id., pp. 92, 173, 709.
[8]
G.R. No. 146006, 423 SCRA 497, 500, 503.
[9]
Id., p. 516.
[10]
Filed on April 27, 2004; Rollo, p. 811.
[11]
Id., p. 816.
[12]
Id., p. 962.
3 of 4 1/27/2014 1:25 PM
[13]
Id., pp. 962-963.
[14]
They allege that in 1987, Philinterlifes authorized capital stock was increased from P5 million to 10 million in
compliance with Ministry Order No. 2-84 issued by the Ministry of Finance. In 2001, this was further increased to
P50 million as ordered by the Department of Finance in Department Order No. 31-01; Rollo, pp. 960-961, 978-979.
[15]
Rollo, p. 962.
[16]
Id., p. 959.
[17]
Specifically, J ose C. Lee represented FLAG as its president in the nullified deeds of sale of shares; supra at
note 8, pp. 500-501.
[18]
Rollo, pp. 960, 976.
[19]
Philinterlifes General Information Sheets as of March 31, 1983; Rollo, p. 992.
[20]
Philinterlifes General Information Sheets as of April 15, 1989; Id., p. 993.
[21]
Literally meaning let the purchaser beware or look for himself. See Lee, J r., Handbook of Legal Maxims, p.28
(1998).
[22]
Domingo v. Hon. Garlitos, et al., 118 Phil. 456, 459 (1963); Sandoval v. Santiago, 83 Phil. 784 (1949).
[23]
Estate of Amadeo Matute Olave, et al. v. Hon. Reyes, et al., 208 Phil. 678, 683 (1983); Manotok Realty, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-35367, 9 April 1987, 149 SCRA 174, 180; Dollena v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
L-77660, 28 J uly 1988, 163 SCRA 630, 636.
[24]
Supra at note 7.
[25]
Rollo, p. 960.
[26]
Id., pp. 960, 975.
[27]
Id., p. 974.
[28]
Under section 39 of the Corporation Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 68), (a)ll stockholders of a stock corporation
shall enjoy pre-emptive right to subscribe to all issues or disposition of shares of any class, in proportion to their
respective shareholdings, unless such right is denied by the articles of incorporation or an amendment thereto:.
4 of 4 1/27/2014 1:25 PM
[Synopsis/Syllabi]
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118671. January 29, 1996]
THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, Executor, petitioner, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Special Sixth Division), MARIA
PILAR RUIZ-MONTES, MARIA CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE ALBERTINE
RUIZ, MARIA ANGELINE RUIZ and THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, BRANCH 156, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision dated
November 10, 1994 and the resolution dated J anuary 5, 1995 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 33045.
The facts show that on J une 27, 1987, Hilario M. Ruiz
1
executed a holographic will naming
as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar
Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice
Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to his heirs
substantial cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate.
2
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his
estate was distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with the
decedents will. For unbeknown reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action
for the probate of his fathers holographic will.
On J une 29, 1992, four years after the testators death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar
Ruiz Montes who filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the
probate and approval of Hilario Ruizs will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to
Edmond Ruiz.
3
Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will was
executed under undue influence.
On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of the estate - the house and lot at No. 2 Oliva
Street, Valle Verde IV, Pasig which the testator bequeathed to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine
and Maria Angeline
4
- was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third persons.
On J anuary 19, 1993, the probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of
Court the rental deposit and payments totalling P540,000.00 representing the one-year lease of
the Valle Verde property. In compliance, on J anuary 25, 1993, Edmond turned over the amount
of P348,583.56, representing the balance of the rent after deducting P191,416.14 for repair and
maintenance expenses on the estate.
5
In March 1993, Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay the real estate taxes
on the real properties of the estate. The probate court approved the release of P7,722.00
6
On May 14, 1993, Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will. Consequently,
the probate court, on May 18, 1993, admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of
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letters testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the amount of
P50,000.00. The letters testamentary were issued on J une 23, 1993.
On J uly 28, 1993, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz as executor, filed an Ex-Parte
Motion for Release of Funds. It prayed for the release of the rent payments deposited with the
Branch Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed a
Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs and Motion for Issuance of Certificate of
Allowance of Probate Will. Montes prayed for the release of the said rent payments to Maria
Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline and for the distribution of the testators
properties, specifically the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance
with the provisions of the holographic will.
On August 26, 1993, the probate court denied petitioners motion for release of funds but
granted respondent Montes motion in view of petitioners lack of opposition. It thus ordered the
release of the rent payments to the decedents three granddaughters. It further ordered the
delivery of the titleds to and possession of the properties bequeathed to the three
granddaughters and respondent Montes upon the filing of a bond of P50,000.00.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that he actually filed his opposition to
respondent Montes motion for release of rent payments which opposition the court failed to
consider. Petitioner likewise reiterated his previous motion for release of funds.
On November 23, 1993, petitioner, through counsel, manifested that he was withdrawing his
motion for release of funds in view of the fact that the lease contract over Valle Verde property
had been renewed for another year.
7
Despite petitioners manifestation, the probate court, on December 22, 1993, ordered the
release of the funds to Edmond but only such amount as may be necessary to cover the
espenses of administration and allowanceas for support of the testators three granddaughters
subject to collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance. The court, however, held
in abeyance the release of the titles to respondent Montes and the three granddaughters until
the lapse of six months from the date of firast publication of the notice to creditors.
8
The Court
stated thus:
xxx xxx xxx
After consideration of the arguments set forth thereon by the parties, the court resolves to allow
Administrator Edmond M. Ruiz to take possession of the rental payments deposited with the Clerk of
Court, Pasig Regional Trial Court, but only such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of
administration and allowances for support of Maria Cathryn Veronique, Candice Albertine and Maria
Angeli, which are subject to collation and deductible from the share in the inheritance of said heirs and
insofar as they exceed the fruits or rents pertaining to them.
As to the release of the titles bequeathed to petitioner Maria Pilar Ruiz-Montes and the above-named
heirs, the same is hereby reconsidered and held in abeyance until the lapse of six (6) months from the
date of first publication of Notice to Creditors.
WHEREFORE, Administrator Edmond M. Ruiz is hereby ordered to submit an accounting of the
expenses necessary for administration including provisions for the support Of Maria Cathryn Veronique
Ruiz, Candice Albertine Ruiz and Maria Angeli Ruiz before the amount required can be withdrawn and
cause the publication of the notice to creditors with reasonable dispatch.
9
Petitioner assailed this order before the Court of Appeals. Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of respondent judge, the appellate court dismissed the petition and sustained the probate courts order in a
decision dated November 10, 1994
10
and a resolution dated J anuary 5, 1995.
11
2 of 7 1/27/2014 1:28 PM
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that:
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF J URISDICTION IN AFFIRMING AND
CONFIRMING THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, BRANCH
156, DATED DECEMBER 22, 1993, WHICH WHEN GIVEN DUE COURSE AND IS EFFECTED
WOULD: (1) DISALLOW THE EXECUTOR/ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE
HILARIO M. RUIZ TO TAKE POSSESSION OF ALL THE REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTIES
OF THE ESTATE; (2) GRANT SUPPORT, DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE SETTLEMENT OF
AN ESTATE, TO CERTAIN PERSONS NOT ENTITLED THERETO; AND (3) PREMATURELY
PARTITION AND DISTRIBUTE THE ESTATE PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL EVEN BEFORE ITS INTRINSIC VALIDITY HAS BEEN DETERMINED,
AND DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF UNPAID DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE ESTATE.
12
The issue for resolution is whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but
before payment of the estates debts and obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an
allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the testators grandchildren; (2) to
order the release of the titles to certain heirs; and (3) to grant possession of all properties of the
estate to the executor of the will.
On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. - The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a deceased
person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the direction of the court, such
allowance as are provided by law.
Petitioner alleges that this provision only gives the widow and the minor or incapacitated
children of the deceased the right to receive allowances for support during the settlement of
estate proceedings. He contends that the testators three granddaughters do not qualify for an
allowance because they are not incapacitated and are no longer minors but of legal age,
married and gainfully employed. In addition, the provision expressly states children of the
deceased which excludes the latters grandchildren.
It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should not be limited to
the minor or incapacitated children of the deceased. Article 188
13
of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the substantive law in force at the time of the testators death, provides that during
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the deceaseds legitimate spouse and children,
regardless of their age, civil status or gainful employment, are entitled to provisional support
from the funds of the estate.
14
The law is rooted on the fact that the right and duty to support,
especially the right to education, subsist even beyond the age of majority.
15
Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the
decedents estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to widow and children and does not
extend it to the deceaseds grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.
16
It was
error, therefore, for the appellate court to sustain the probate courts order granting an allowance
to the grandchildren of the testator pending settlement of his estate.
Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the release of the titles of the bequeathed
properties to private respondents six months after the date of first publication of notice to
creditors. An order releasing titles to properties of the estate amounts to an advance distribution
of the estate which is allowed only under the following conditions:
3 of 7 1/27/2014 1:28 PM
Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. - Nothwithstanding a pending controversy or appeal
in proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon such terms as it
may deem proper and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be affected by the controversy or
appeal be distributed among the heirs or legatees, upon compliance with the conditions set forth in Rule
90 of these Rules.
17
And Rule 90 provides that:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. - When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of
administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in
accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a
person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the
persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and
such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any
other person having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the
lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under
the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above-mentioned has been
made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by
the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.
18
In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made:
(1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and
estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or
any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those
obligations.
19
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde
property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six months
from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors. The questioned order speaks of
notice to creditors, not payment of debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts
when he died but the taxes on his estate had not hitherto been paid, much less ascertained.
The estate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of the estate. If
not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to
meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the inheritance.
20
Notably,
at the time the order was issued the properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried and
appraised.
It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order the release of the titles six
months after admitting the will to probate. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due
execution and extrinsic validity
21
and settles only the question of whether the testator, being of
sound mind, freely executed it in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.
22
Questions
as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or
legacy may be raised even after the will has been authenticated.
23
The intrinsic validity of Hilarios holographic will was controverted by petitioner before the
probate court in his Reply to Montes Opposition to his motion for release of funds
24
and his
motion for reconsideration of the August 26, 1993 order of the said court.
25
Therein, petitioner
assailed the distributive shares of the devisees and legatees inasmuch as his fathers will
included the estate of his mother and allegedly impaired his legitime as an intestate heir of his
4 of 7 1/27/2014 1:28 PM
mother. The Rules provide that if there is a controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of the
decedent and their distributive shares in his estate, the probate court shall proceed to hear and
decide the same as in ordinary cases.
26
Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed order deprived him of his right
to take possession of all the real and personal properties of the estate. The right of an executor
or administrator to the possession and management of the real and personal properties of the
deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised so long as it is necessary for the payment
of the debts and expenses of administration,
27
Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of
Court explicitly provides:
Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and to administer estate not willed.
- An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of the real as well as
the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses
for administration.
28
When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited with the clerk of court, he had
been previously granted by the probate court certain amounts for repair and maintenance
expenses on the properties of the estate, and payment of the real estate taxes thereon. But
petitioner moved again for the release of additional funds for the same reasons he previously
cited. It was correct for the probate court to require him to submit an accounting of the
necessary expenses for administration before releasing any further money in his favor.
It was relevantly noted by the probate court that petitioner had deposited with it only a
portion of the one-year rental income from the Valle Verde property. Petitioner did not deposit its
succeeding rents after renewal of the lease.
29
Neither did he render an accounting of such
funds.
Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of his father is
merely inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned.
30
As executor,
he is a mere trustee of his fathers estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds
and he is held to the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order.
31
He cannot
unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his parents properties and the fruits thereof
without first submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of the
deceased, rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses of administration, the
amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by the court
as to their veracity, propriety and justness.
32
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
33045 affirming the order dated December 22, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156,
Pasig in SP Proc. No. 10259 are affirmed with the modification that those portions of the order
granting an allowance to the testators grandchildren and ordering the release of the titles to the
private respondents upon notice to creditors are annulled and set aside.
Respondent judge is ordered to proceed with dispatch in the proceedings below.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Romero, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
1
Predeceased by his wife who died on August 4, 1986
2
Annex D to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 46-60.
5 of 7 1/27/2014 1:28 PM
3
SP Proc. No. 10259.
4
Holographic Will, p. 10; RoIlo, p. 55.
5
Comment to the Petition, pp. 8-9; rollo, pp. 97-98
6
Reply to Comment, p.2; rollo, p. 114.
7
Comment, Annex 1; Rollo, p. 110.
8
Petition, Annex C; Rollo, p. 45.
9
Id.; Emphasis as copied.
10
CA-G.R. SP No. 33045, Annex A to the Petition; Rollo, pp. 36-42.
11
Id., Annex B to the Petition; Rollo, p. 44.
12
Petition, p. 8; Rollo, p. 17.
13
Art. 188. From the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the children
during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be
deducted that amount received for support which exceeds fruits or rents pertaining to them.
Article 188 is now Article 133 of the Family Code.
14
Santero v. Court of First Instance of Cavite, 153 SCRA 728 [1987].
15
Id., pp. 733-734; Article 290, Civil Code of the Philippines.
16
Babao v. Villavicencio, 44 Phil. 921 [1922].
17
Revised Rules of Court, Rule 109, Section 2.
18
Emphasis supplied.
19
Castillo v. Castillo, 124 Phil. 485 [1966]; Edmands v. Philippine Trust Co., 87 Phil. 405 [1952].
20
Prieto v. Valdez, 95 Phil. 46 [1954].
21
Rule 75, Section 1.
22
Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 100 [1987]; Pastor v. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 885 [1983];
Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982].
23
Maninang v. Court of Appeals, supra; Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369 [1967]; Cacho v. Udan, 13 SCRA
693 [1965]; Montanano v. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676, 679-680 [1909].
24
Reply to Opposition of Funds and Opposition to Omnibus Motion, pp. 1-3; Rollo, pp. 69-71.
25
Motion for Reconsideration, p. 14; Rollo, p. 66.
26
Rule 90, Section 1, paragraph 1; Pimentel v. Palanca, 5 Phil. 436 [1905]; II Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium 88 [1989].
27
Mananquil v. Villegas, 189 SCRA 335 [1990].
28
Emphasis supplied.
29
Comment to the Petition, p. 9; Rollo, p. 98.
30
Salvador v. Sta. Maria, 20 SCRA 603 [1967].
31
Noel v. Court qf Appeals, 240 SCRA 78,89 [1995]; 3 Martin, Rules of Court of the Philippines 545-546 [1986]
6 of 7 1/27/2014 1:28 PM
citing 21 Am. J ur. 370-371.
32
Rule 81, Section 1; Rule 85, Sections ito 9.
7 of 7 1/27/2014 1:28 PM
[Decision]
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE; ALLOWANCE
FOR SUPPORT; SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED TO MINOR OR INCAPACITATED
CHILD-REN. - It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should
not be limited to the minor or incapacitated children of the deceased. Article 188 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, the substantive law in force at the time of the testators death,
provides that during the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the deceaseds legitimate
spouse and children, regardless of their age, civil status or gainful employment, are entitled
to provisional support from the funds of the estate. The law is rooted on the fact that the
right and duty to support, especially the right to education, subsist even beyond the age of
majority.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DOES NOT EXTEND TO DECEASEDS GRANDCHILDREN. - The law
clearly limits the allowance to widow and children and does not extend it to the deceaseds
grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE PROPERTIES CAN BE MADE. In
settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made:
(1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow,
and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the
distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the
payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made
to meet those obligations.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF ESTATE TAX; AN OBLIGATION THAT MUST BE PAID
BEFORE THE DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE. The estate tax is one of those obligations
that must be paid before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the
distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in
proportion to their respective shares in the inheritance.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE OF PROBATE. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due
execution and extrinsic validity and settles only the question of whether the testator, being of
sound mind, freely executed it in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.
Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of
any devise or legacy may be raised even after the will has been authenticated.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF AN EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR OVER PROPERTIES OF
THE DECEASED. - The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and
management of the real and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can
only be exercised so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of
administration.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Hemedino M. Brondial for petitioner.
De Jesus & Associates for private respondents.
118671 : Synopsis/Syllabi http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/syllabus/jan/118671_syl.htm
1 of 1 1/27/2014 1:28 PM

EDGAR SAN LUIS, G.R. No. 133743
Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS,
Respondent.

x ---------------------------------------------------- x

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, G.R. No. 134029
Petitioner,

- versus -
Promulgated:
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS
alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS,
Respondent. February 6, 2007

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998
Decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside
the September 12, 1995
[2]
and J anuary 31, 1996
[3]
Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution
[4]
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis
G.R. No. 133743 http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/feb2007/133743_134029.htm
1 of 18 1/27/2014 1:30 PM
(Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime,
Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March
17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita
and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom
he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a
Complaint for Divorce
[5]
before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii,
United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and
Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973.
[6]

On J une 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed
Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire
Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
[7]
He had no children with respondent but lived
with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.

Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and
the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration
[8]
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No.
M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.

Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death,
the decedent was residing at 100 San J uanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro
Manila; that the decedents surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by
his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both
conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not
have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated
and that letters of administration be issued to her.

On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by
his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss
[9]
on the grounds of improper venue and failure
to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration
should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of
residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to
2 of 18 1/27/2014 1:30 PM
file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of
his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.

On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother
Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal
[10]
of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court
issued an Order
[11]
denying the two motions to dismiss.

Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994
her opposition
[12]
thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while
Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to
their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in
1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the
First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had
already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her
by virtue of paragraph 2,
[13]
Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
[14]

Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed
motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss.
[15]
They
asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to
validate respondents bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested
rights in derogation of Article 256
[16]
of the Family Code.

On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a
motion to disqualify Acting Presiding J udge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.

On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order
[17]
denying the motions for
reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal
standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for
disqualification was deemed moot and academic
[18]
because then Acting Presiding J udge
Santos was substituted by J udge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.

3 of 18 1/27/2014 1:30 PM
Mila filed a motion for inhibition
[19]
against J udge Tensuan on November 16, 1994.
On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration
[20]
from the Order denying their
motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it was
based.

On November 25, 1994, J udge Tensuan issued an Order
[21]
granting the motion for
inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by J udge Paul T. Arcangel.

On April 24, 1995,
[22]
the trial court required the parties to submit their respective
position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the
petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested
[23]
that he is adopting the arguments and
evidence set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper.
Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on J une 14,
[24]
and J une 20,
[25]
1995,
respectively.

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor
and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity
to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was
bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving
Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind
Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family
Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of
Felicisimos legitimate children.

Respondent moved for reconsideration
[26]
and for the disqualification
[27]
of J udge
Arcangel but said motions were denied.
[28]

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders
of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of
which states:
4 of 18 1/27/2014 1:30 PM

WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and J anuary 31, 1996 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are
REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.
[29]

The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term
place of residence of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his
estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of
abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although
Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang,
Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.

The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent
by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.
[30]
and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.
[31]
It found that the marriage between
Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce
issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph
2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent.
Thus

With the well-known rule express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family
Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy
behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, there is no justiciable reason to sustain the
individual view sweeping statement of J udge Arc[h]angel, that Article 26, par. 2 of the
Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any form
whatsoever. Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should do is
to give force and effect to the express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having been
obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992,
[32]
the Filipino divorcee, shall x x x have
capacity to remarry under Philippine laws. For this reason, the marriage between the
deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as a bigamous marriage.

Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving
spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x
x
[33]

Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration
[34]
which were
denied by the Court of Appeals.

On J uly 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on
5 of 18 1/27/2014 1:30 PM
certiorari.
[35]
Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition
which was granted.
[36]

In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the
subject petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of his
death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our
rulings in Nuval v. Guray
[37]
and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City,
[38]
residence is
synonymous with domicile which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when
absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any
given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.

Petitioners also contend that respondents marriage to Felicisimo was void and
bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of the latters marriage to Merry
Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it
would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent
cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file
the petition for letters of administration.

The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether
respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.

The petition lacks merit.

Under Section 1,
[39]
Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the
province in which he resides at the time of his death. In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of
Appeals,
[40]
we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence as
contradistinguished from domicile of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate:

[T]he term resides connotes ex vi termini actual residence as distinguished from legal
residence or domicile. This term resides, like the terms residing and residence, is
elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of
the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the
6 of 18 1/27/2014 1:30 PM
significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word domicile still it is construed as
meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction
between the terms residence and domicile but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term inhabitant. In other
words, resides should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal,
actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence
simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No particular
length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary.
[41]
(Emphasis supplied)

It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that residence, for purposes of fixing the venue
of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with domicile. The rulings in
Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election
cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between residence for purposes of election
laws and residence for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases,
residence and domicile are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning.
[42]
However, for
purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the residence of a person is his
personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not
necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.
[43]
Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and
domicile in another.

In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa
from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of
Absolute Sale
[44]
dated J anuary 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid
property. She also presented billing statements
[45]
from the Philippine Heart Center and
Chinese General Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of
Felicisimo at 100 San J uanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa. Respondent also presented
proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association
[46]
and Ayala
Country Club, Inc.,
[47]
letter-envelopes
[48]
from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceaseds
children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceaseds calling cards
[49]
stating that his
7 of 18 1/27/2014 1:30 PM
home/city address is at 100 San J uanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa while his
office/provincial address is in Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna.

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject
petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court
[50]
which
has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on
December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital J udicial Region which had territorial
jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 3.
[51]
Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file the petition for letters
of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his
alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidads
marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on J une 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took
effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the
provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is
sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.

The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
[52]
involved a marriage between a foreigner and
his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained
abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien
spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be
protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien
spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:

In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the
Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of
matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or
domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond.
The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A
husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law.
When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not
marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the
8 of 18 1/27/2014 1:30 PM
bond of the former marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own
countrys Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does
not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property.
[53]

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no
longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to
perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to
be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations
under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged
to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent.
The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to
be served.
[54]
(Emphasis added)

This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera
[55]
where the Court
recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the
alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The
Court stated that the severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former
spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the
other.
[56]

Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals,
[57]
the Court stated that where a Filipino is
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies.
[58]
Although
decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the
Civil Code provisions were still in effect.

The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of
divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing
marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to
remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by
the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that if the
9 of 18 1/27/2014 1:30 PM
foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.
[59]
In Garcia v. Recio,
[60]
the Court likewise cited the
aforementioned case in relation to Article 26.
[61]

In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III,
[62]
the historical background and
legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:

Brief Historical Background

On J uly 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No.
209, otherwise known as the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26
thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.

On J uly 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive
Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family
Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis
supplied)

x x x x

Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to J udge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code
Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the
alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
[63]
(Emphasis added)
10 of 18 1/27/2014 1:30 PM

As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce
is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and
paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through
judicial precedent.

Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance
intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief
in some way should be obtainable.
[64]
Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment
between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is
considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the
state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino
spouse, as in this case.

Petitioners cite Articles 15
[65]
and 17
[66]
of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce
is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this
Courts rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated
against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
[67]
In Alonzo v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,
[68]
the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may
add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first
concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this
is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we
presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some
laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because
of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature
and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do
instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the
law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law
as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law, so we are
warned, by J ustice Holmes again, where these words import a policy that goes beyond
them.

11 of 18 1/27/2014 1:30 PM
x x x x

More than twenty centuries ago, J ustinian defined justice as the constant and
perpetual wish to render every one his due. That wish continues to motivate this Court when
it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. J ustice is always an
essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a
way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin
with, that the law be dispensed with justice.
[69]

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained
by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad
with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse.
However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the
divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under
the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio,
[70]
the Court laid down the specific guidelines for
pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of
the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be
presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept
in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
[71]

With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California,
U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text
[72]
of
the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in
accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
[73]

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of
evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for
letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the
12 of 18 1/27/2014 1:30 PM
properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.

Section 6,
[74]
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be
granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also
provides in part:

SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the
petitioner: x x x.

An interested person has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate,
such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must
be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.
[75]

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct
interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was
not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity
to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the
laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144
[76]
of the
Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the
beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their
work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor,
efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have
been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners
shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.
[77]

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the
marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled
the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of
couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry.
[78]
In Saguid v.
Court of Appeals,
[79]
we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property
occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.
[80]
The Court described
13 of 18 1/27/2014 1:30 PM
the property regime under this provision as follows:

The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who
are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband
and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their
respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual
contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their
contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.

x x x x

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue
of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an
adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential. x x x

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by
the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be
proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponents defense. x x x
[81]

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal capacity to file the subject
petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of
Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the
Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which
denied petitioners motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed
petitioners motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to
the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate J ustice

WE CONCUR:

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate J ustice Associate J ustice
14 of 18 1/27/2014 1:30 PM

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate J ustice

I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

Associate J ustice
Chairperson, Third Division

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief J ustice
[1]
Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, pp. 45-66. Penned by Associate J ustice Artemon D. Luna and concurred in by Associate J ustices
Godardo A. J acinto and Roberto A. Barrios.
[2]
Records, pp. 335-338. Penned by J udge Paul T. Arcangel.
[3]
Id. at 391-393.
[4]
Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 68. Penned by Associate J ustice Artemon D. Luna and concurred in by Associate J ustices
Demetrio G. Demetria and Roberto A. Barrios.
[5]
Records, p. 125.
[6]
Id. at 137.
[7]
Id. at 116.
[8]
Id. at 1-5.
[9]
Id. at 10-24.
15 of 18 1/27/2014 1:30 PM
[10]
Id. at 30-35.
[11]
Id. at 38.
[12]
Id. at 39-138.
[13]
When a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.
[14]
G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139.
[15]
See Records, pp. 155-158, 160-170 and 181-192.
[16]
This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested rights or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws.
[17]
Records, p. 259.
[18]
Id. at 260.
[19]
Id. at 262-267.
[20]
Id. at 270-272.
[21]
Id. at 288.
[22]
Id. at 301.
[23]
Id. at 302-303.
[24]
Id. at 306-311.
[25]
Id. at 318-320.
[26]
Id. at 339-349.
[27]
Id. at 350-354.
[28]
Id. at 391-393.
[29]
Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 66.
[30]
Supra note 14.
[31]
G.R. No. 80116, J une 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.
[32]
Parenthetically, it appears that the Court of Appeals proceeded from a mistaken finding of fact because the records clearly
show that the divorce was obtained on December 14, 1973 (not December 14, 1992) and that the marriage of Gov. San Luis with
respondent was celebrated on J une 20, 1974. These events both occurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988.
[33]
Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 65.
[34]
See CA rollo, pp. 309-322, 335-340, and 362-369.
[35]
Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, pp. 8-42.
[36]
Id. at 75.
[37]
52 Phil. 645 (1928).
[38]
G.R. No. 104960, September 14, 1993, 226 SCRA 408.
[39]
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons be settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of
his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, x x x. (Underscoring supplied)
[40]
G.R. Nos. L-40502 & L-42670, November 29, 1976, 74 SCRA 189.
[41]
Id. at 199-200.
[42]
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, supra note 38 at 415.
16 of 18 1/27/2014 1:30 PM
[43]
See Boleyley v. Villanueva, 373 Phil. 141, 146 (1999); Dangwa Transportation Co. Inc. v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. L-22795,
J anuary 31, 1977, 75 SCRA 124, 128-129.
[44]
Records, pp. 76-78.
[45]
Id. at 60-75.
[46]
Id. at 79.
[47]
Id. at 80.
[48]
Id. at 81-83.
[49]
Id. at 84.
[50]
The Regional Trial Court and not the Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction over this case because the value of Gov. San
Luis estate exceeded P200,000.00 as provided for under B.P. Blg 129, Section 19(4).
[51]
SC Administrative Order No. 3 dated J anuary 19, 1983 states in part:
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, and Section 4 of the Executive Order issued
by the President of the Philippines on J anuary 17, 1983, declaring the reorganization of the J udiciary, the
territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts in the National Capital J udicial Region are hereby defined as
follows:
x x x x
5. Branches CXXXII to CL, inclusive, with seats at Makati over the municipalities of
Las Pinas, Makati, Muntinlupa and Paraaque. x x x
[52]
Supra note 14.
[53]
Id. at 139, 143-144.
[54]
Id. at 144.
[55]
Supra note 31.
[56]
Id. at 664.
[57]
G.R. No. 124862, December 22, 1998, 300 SCRA 406.
[58]
Id. at 414; See also Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114, 121.
[59]
Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. I, 1990 ed., p. 263.
[60]
G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437.
[61]
Id. at 447.
[62]
Supra note 58.
[63]
Id. at 119-121.
[64]
Goitia v. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil. 252, 254-255 (1916).
[65]
ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
[66]
Art. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order,
public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
[67]
Supra note 14 at 144.
[68]
G.R. No. L-72873, May 28, 1987, 150 SCRA 259.
[69]
Id. at 264-265, 268.
[70]
Supra note 60.
[71]
Id. at 448-449.
[72]
Records, pp. 118-124.
17 of 18 1/27/2014 1:30 PM
[73]
[74]
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If x x x a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to
such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; x x x.
[75]
Saguinsin v. Lindayag,116 Phil. 1193, 1195 (1962).
[76]
Article 144 of the Civil Code reads in full:
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the
beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
[77]
Valdes v. RTC, Br. 102, Quezon City, 328 Phil. 1289, 1297 (1996).
[78]
Francisco v. Master Iron Works & Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 151967, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 494, 506.
[79]
G.R. No. 150611, J une 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678.
[80]
Id. at 686.
[81]
Id. at 679, 686-687.
18 of 18 1/27/2014 1:30 PM

THIRD DIVISION

ERLINDA PILAPIL and HEIRS
OF DONATA ORTIZ BRIONES,
namely: ESTELA, ERIBERTO
AND VIRGILIO SANTOS, ANA
SANTOS CULTURA, ELVIRA
SANTOS INOCENTES,
ERNESTO MENDOZA,
RIZALINA SANTOS, ADOLFO
MENDOZA and PACITA
MENDOZA,
Petitioners,

- versus-

HEIRS OF MAXIMINO R.
BRIONES, namely: SILVERIO S.
BRIONES, PETRA BRIONES,
BONIFACIO CABAHUG, JR.,
ANITA TRASMONTE, CIRILITA
FORTUNA, CRESENCIA
BRIONES, FUGURACION
MEDALLE and MERCEDES
LAGBAS,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 150175

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
*
CALLEJ O, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

Promulgated:

February 5, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

R E S O L U T I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

On 10 March 2006, this Court promulgated its Decision
[1]
in the above-entitled case,
ruling in favor of the petitioners. The dispositive portion
[2]
reads as follows:

G.R. No. 150175 http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/feb2007/150175.htm
1 of 19 1/27/2014 1:33 PM
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 55194, dated 31 August 2001, affirming the Decision of
the Cebu City RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-5794, dated 28 September 1986, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and the Complaint for partition, annulment, and
recovery of possession filed by the heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 is
hereby DISMISSED.

On 10 May 2006, a Motion for Reconsideration
[3]
of the foregoing Decision was filed
by Atty. Celso C. Reales of the Reales Law Office on behalf of the respondents, heirs of
Maximino R. Briones. On 19 May 2006, petitioners Erlinda Pilapil and the other co-heirs of
Donata Ortiz Vda. de Briones, through counsel, filed an Opposition to Respondents Motion
for Reconsideration,
[4]
to which the respondents filed a Rejoinder
[5]
on 23 May 2006.
Thereafter, Atty. Amador F. Brioso, J r. of the Canto Brioso Arnedo Law Office entered his
appearance as collaborating counsel for the respondents.
[6]
Atty. Brioso then filed on 11
J une 2006 and 16 J une 2006, respectively, a Reply
[7]
and Supplemental Reply
[8]
to the
petitioners Opposition to respondents Motion for Reconsideration. Finally, petitioners filed
a Rejoinder
[9]
to the respondents Reply and Supplemental Reply on 5 J uly 2006.

The facts of the case, as recounted in the Decision,
[10]
are as follows

Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-Briones (Donata), consisting of
her surviving sister, Rizalina Ortiz-Aguila (Rizalina); Rizalinas daughter, Erlinda
Pilapil (Erlinda); and the other nephews and nieces of Donata, in representation of her
two other sisters who had also passed away. Respondents, on the other hand, are the
heirs of the late Maximino Briones (Maximino), composed of his nephews and nieces,
and grandnephews and grandnieces, in representation of the deceased siblings of
Maximino.

x x x x

Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any children.
When Maximino died on 1 May 1952, Donata instituted intestate proceedings to settle
her husbands estate with the Cebu City Court of First Instance (CFI), 14
th
J udicial
District, designated as Special Proceedings No. 928-R. On 8 J uly 1952, the CFI issued
Letters of Administration appointing Donata as the administratrix of Maximinos
estate. She submitted an Inventory of Maximinos properties, which included, among
other things, the following parcels of land x x x.

x x x x
2 of 19 1/27/2014 1:33 PM

The CFI would subsequently issue an Order, dated 2 October 1952, awarding
ownership of the aforementioned real properties to Donata. On 27 J une 1960, Donata
had the said CFI Order recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds,
and by virtue thereof, received new TCTs, covering the said properties, now in her
name.

Donata died on 1 November 1977. Erlinda, one of Donatas nieces, instituted
with the RTC a petition for the administration of the intestate estate of Donata. Erlinda
and her husband, Gregorio, were appointed by the RTC as administrators of Donatas
intestate estate. Controversy arose among Donatas heirs when Erlinda claimed
exclusive ownership of three parcels of land, covered by TCTs No. 21542, 21545, and
58684, based on two Deeds of Donation, both dated 15 September 1977, allegedly
executed in her favor by her aunt Donata. The other heirs of Donata opposed Erlindas
claim. This Court, however, was no longer informed of the subsequent development in
the intestate proceedings of the estate of Donata; and as far as this Petition is
concerned, all the heirs of Donata, including Erlinda, appear to be on the same side.

On 21 J anuary 1985, Silverio Briones (Silverio), a nephew of Maximino, filed a
Petition with the RTC for Letters of Administration for the intestate estate of
Maximino, which was initially granted by the RTC. The RTC also issued an Order,
dated 5 December 1985, allowing Silverio to collect rentals from Maximinos
properties. But then, Gregorio filed with the RTC a Motion to Set Aside the Order,
dated 5 December 1985, claiming that the said properties were already under his and
his wifes administration as part of the intestate estate of Donata. Silverios Letters of
Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino was subsequently set aside by the
RTC.

On 3 March 1987, the heirs of Maximino filed a Complaint with the RTC
against the heirs of Donata for the partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of
real property, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-5794. They later filed an Amended
Complaint, on 11 December 1992. They alleged that Donata, as administratrix of the
estate of Maximino, through fraud and misrepresentation, in breach of trust, and
without the knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded in registering in her name the real
properties belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino.

x x x x

After trial in due course, the RTC rendered its Decision, dated 8 April 1986, in
favor of the heirs of Maximino x x x.

x x x x

x x x[T]he RTC declared that the heirs of Maximino were entitled to of the
real properties covered by TCTs No. 21542, 21543, 21544, 21545, 21546, and 58684.
It also ordered Erlinda to reconvey to the heirs of Maximino the said properties and to
render an accounting of the fruits thereof.

3 of 19 1/27/2014 1:33 PM
The heirs of Donata appealed the RTC Decision, dated 8 April 1986, to the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, promulgated on 31 August
2001, affirmed the RTC Decision, x x x.

x x x x

Unsatisfied with the afore-quoted Decision of the Court of Appeals, the heirs of
Donata filed the present Petition, x x x.

In its Decision, dated 10 March 2006, this Court found the Petition meritorious and,
reversing the Decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
dismissed the Complaint for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of real property
filed by the heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794. This Court summed up its
findings,
[11]
thus

In summary, the heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that Donata managed, through fraud, to have the real properties, belonging to
the intestate estate of Maximino, registered in her name. In the absence of fraud, no
implied trust was established between Donata and the heirs of Maximino under Article
1456 of the New Civil Code. Donata was able to register the real properties in her
name, not through fraud or mistake, but pursuant to an Order, dated 2 October 1952,
issued by the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R. The CFI Order, presumed to be
fairly and regularly issued, declared Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of
Maximino; hence, making Donata the singular owner of the entire estate of Maximino,
including the real properties, and not merely a co-owner with the other heirs of her
deceased husband. There being no basis for the Complaint of the heirs of Maximino in
Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the same should have been dismissed.

Respondents move for the reconsideration of the Decision of this Court raising still the
arguments that Donata committed fraud in securing the Court of First Instance Order, dated 2
October 1952, which declared her as the sole heir of her deceased husband Maximino and
authorized her to have Maximinos properties registered exclusively in her name; that
respondents right to succession to the disputed properties was transmitted or vested from the
moment of Maximinos death and which they could no longer be deprived of; that Donata
merely possessed and held the properties in trust for her co-heirs/owners; and that, by virtue
of this Courts ruling in Quion v. Claridad
[12]
and Sevilla, et al. v. De Los Angeles,
[13]
respondents action to recover title to and possession of their shares in Maximinos estate,
held in trust for their benefit by Donata, and eventually, by petitioners as the latters
successors-in-interest, is imprescriptible. Respondents also advance a fresh contention that
the CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952, being based on the fraudulent misrepresentation of
4 of 19 1/27/2014 1:33 PM
Donata that she was Maximinos sole heir, was a void order, which produced no legal effect.
Lastly, respondents asseverate that, by relying on certain procedural presumptions in its
Decision, dated 10 March 2006, this Court has sacrificed their substantive right to succession,
thus, making justice subservient to the dictates of mere procedural fiats.
[14]

While this Court is persuaded to reexamine and clarify some points in its previous
Decision in this case, it does not find any new evidence or argument that would adequately
justify a change in its previous position.

On the finding of fraud

As this Court declared in its Decision, the existence of any trust relations between
petitioners and respondents shall be examined in the light of Article 1456 of the New Civil
Code, which provides that, [i]f property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person
obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the
person from whom the property comes. Hence, the foremost question to be answered is still
whether an implied trust under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code had been sufficiently
established in the present case.

In the Decision, this Court ruled in the negative, since there was insufficient evidence
to establish that Donata committed fraud. It should be remembered that Donata was able to
secure certificates of title to the disputed properties by virtue of the CFI Order in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R (the proceedings she instituted to settle Maximinos intestate estate),
which declared her as Maximinos sole heir. In the absence of proof to the contrary, the
Court accorded to Special Proceedings No. 928-R the presumptions of regularity and
validity. Reproduced below are the relevant portions
[15]
of the Decision

At the onset, it should be emphasized that Donata was able to secure the TCTs
covering the real properties belonging to the estate of Maximino by virtue of a CFI
Order, dated 2 October 1952. It is undisputed that the said CFI Order was issued by
the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, instituted by Donata herself, to settle the
intestate estate of Maximino. The petitioners, heirs of Donata, were unable to present
a copy of the CFI Order, but this is not surprising considering that it was issued 35
years prior to the filing by the heirs of Maximino of their Complaint in Civil Case No.
CEB-5794 on 3 March 1987. The existence of such CFI Order, nonetheless, cannot be
denied. It was recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds on 27
J une 1960, at 1:10 p.m., as Entry No. 1714. It was annotated on the TCTs covering the
real properties as having declared Donata the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of
Maximino. The non-presentation of the actual CFI Order was not fatal to the cause of
5 of 19 1/27/2014 1:33 PM
the heirs of Donata considering that its authenticity and contents were never
questioned. The allegation of fraud by the heirs of Maximino did not pertain to the CFI
Order, but to the manner or procedure by which it was issued in favor of Donata.
Moreover, the non-presentation of the CFI Order, contrary to the declaration by the
RTC, does not amount to a willful suppression of evidence that would give rise to the
presumption that it would be adverse to the heirs of Donata if produced. x x x.

x x x x

The CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued in Special Proceedings No. 928-R,
effectively settled the intestate estate of Maximino by declaring Donata as the sole,
absolute, and exclusive heir of her deceased husband. The issuance by the CFI of the
said Order, as well as its conduct of the entire Special Proceedings No. 928-R, enjoy
the presumption of validity pursuant to the Section 3(m) and (n) of Rule 131 of the
Revised Rules of Court, reproduced below

SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence:

x x x x

(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;

(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines
or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction.

By reason of the foregoing provisions, this Court must presume, in the absence
of any clear and convincing proof to the contrary, that the CFI in Special Proceedings
No. 928-R had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties, and to have rendered a
judgment valid in every respect; and it could not give credence to the following
statements made by the Court of Appeals in its Decision.

x x x x

There was totally no evidentiary basis for the foregoing pronouncements. First
of all, the Petition filed by Donata for Letters of Administration in Special Proceedings
No. 928-R before the CFI was not even referred to nor presented during the course of
the trial of Civil Case No. CEB-5794 before the RTC. How then could the Court of
Appeals make a finding that Donata willfully excluded from the said Petition the
names, ages, and residences of the other heirs of Maximino? Second, there was also
no evidence showing that the CFI actually failed to send notices of Special
Proceedings No. 928-R to the heirs of Maximino or that it did not require presentation
of proof of service of such notices. It should be remembered that there stands a
presumption that the CFI J udge had regularly performed his duties in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R, which included sending out of notices and requiring the
presentation of proof of service of such notices; and, the heirs of Maximino did not
propound sufficient evidence to debunk such presumption. They only made a general
denial of knowledge of Special Proceedings No. 928-R, at least until 1985. There was
6 of 19 1/27/2014 1:33 PM
no testimony or document presented in which the heirs of Maximino categorically
denied receipt of notice from the CFI of the pendency of Special Proceedings No.
928-R. The only evidence on record in reference to the absence of notice of such
proceedings was the testimony of Aurelia Briones (Aurelia), one of the heirs of
Maximino, x x x.

x x x x

Aurelias testimony deserves scant credit considering that she was not
testifying on matters within her personal knowledge. The phrase I dont think is a
clear indication that she is merely voicing out her opinion on how she believed her
uncles and aunts would have acted had they received notice of Special Proceedings
No. 928-R.

It is worth noting that, in its foregoing ratiocination, the Court was proceeding from an
evaluation of the evidence on record, which did not include an actual copy of the CFI Order
in Special Proceedings No. 928-R. Respondents only submitted a certified true copy thereof
on 15 J une 2006, annexed to their Supplemental Reply to petitioners opposition to their
motion for reconsideration of this Courts Decision. Respondents did not offer any
explanation as to why they belatedly produced a copy of the said Order, but merely claimed
to have been fortunate enough to obtain a copy thereof from the Register of Deeds of
Cebu.
[16]

Respondents should be taken to task for springing new evidence so late into the
proceedings of this case. Parties should present all their available evidence at the courts
below so as to give the opposing party the opportunity to scrutinize and challenge such
evidence during the course of the trial. However, given that the existence of the CFI Order in
Special Proceedings No. 928-R was never in issue and was, in fact, admitted by the
petitioners; that the copy submitted is a certified true copy of the said Order; and that the said
Order may provide new information vital to a just resolution of the present case, this Court is
compelled to consider the same as part of the evidence on record.

The CFI Order
[17]
in question reads in full as

O R D E R

This is with reference to the Motion of the Administratrix, dated J anuary 5, 1960, that
she be declared the sole heir of her deceased husband, Maximino Suico Briones, the latter
having died without any legitimate ascendant nor descendant, nor any legitimate brother or
sister, nephews or nieces.

7 of 19 1/27/2014 1:33 PM
At the hearing of this incident today, nobody appeared to resist the motion, and based
on the uncontradicted testimony of Donata G. Ortiz that she was the nearest surviving relative
of the deceased Maximino Suico Briones at the time of the latters death, and pursuant to the
pertinent provisions of the new Civil Code of the Philippines, the Court hereby declares the
aforesaid Donata G. Ortiz the sole, absolute and exclusive heir of the estate of the deceased
Maximino Suico Briones, and she is hereby entitled to inherit all the residue of this estate
after paying all the obligations thereof, which properties are those contained in the Inventory,
dated October 2, 1952.

Cebu City, J anuary 15, 1960.

From the contents of the afore-quoted Order, this Court is able to deduce that the CFI
Order was in fact issued on 15 J anuary 1960 and not 2 October 1952, as earlier stated in the
Decision. It was the inventory of properties, submitted by Donata as administratrix of
Maximinos intestate estate, which was dated 2 October 1952.
[18]
Other than such
observation, this Court finds nothing in the CFI Order which could change its original
position in the Decision under consideration.

While it is true that since the CFI was not informed that Maximino still had surviving
siblings and so the court was not able to order that these siblings be given personal notices of
the intestate proceedings, it should be borne in mind that the settlement of estate, whether
testate or intestate, is a proceeding in rem,
[19]
and that the publication in the newspapers of
the filing of the application and of the date set for the hearing of the same, in the manner
prescribed by law, is a notice to the whole world of the existence of the proceedings and of
the hearing on the date and time indicated in the publication. The publication requirement of
the notice in newspapers is precisely for the purpose of informing all interested parties in the
estate of the deceased of the existence of the settlement proceedings, most especially those
who were not named as heirs or creditors in the petition, regardless of whether such omission
was voluntarily or involuntarily made.

This Court cannot stress enough that the CFI Order was the result of the intestate
proceedings instituted by Donata before the trial court. As this Court pointed out in its earlier
Decision, the manner by which the CFI judge conducted the proceedings enjoys the
presumption of regularity, and encompassed in such presumption is the order of publication
of the notice of the intestate proceedings. A review of the records fails to show any
allegation or concrete proof that the CFI also failed to order the publication in newspapers of
the notice of the intestate proceedings and to require proof from Donata of compliance
therewith. Neither can this Court find any reason or explanation as to why Maximinos
8 of 19 1/27/2014 1:33 PM
siblings could have missed the published notice of the intestate proceedings of their
brother.

In relying on the presumptions of the regular performance of official duty and lawful
exercise of jurisdiction by the CFI in rendering the questioned Order, dated 15 J anuary 1960,
this Court is not, as counsel for respondents allege, sacrificing the substantive right of
respondents to their share in the inheritance in favor of mere procedural fiats. There is a
rationale for the establishment of rules of procedure, as amply explained by this Court in De
Dios v. Court of Appeals
[20]

Procedural rules are designed to insure the orderly and expeditious
administration of justice by providing for a practical system by which the parties to a
litigation may be accorded a full and fair opportunity to present their respective
positions and refute each other's submissions under the prescribed requirements,
conditions and limitations. Adjective law is not the counterfoil of substantive law. In
fact, there is a symbiotic relationship between them. By complying faithfully with the
Rules of Court, the bench and the bar are better able to discuss, analyze and
understand substantive rights and duties and consequently to more effectively protect
and enforce them. The other alternative is judicial anarchy.

Thus, compliance with the procedural rules is the general rule, and abandonment thereof
should only be done in the most exceptional circumstances. The presumptions relied upon by
this Court in the instant case are disputable presumptions, which are satisfactory, unless
contradicted or overcome by evidence. This Court finds that the evidence presented by
respondents failed to overcome the given presumptions.

Although Donata may have alleged before the CFI that she was her husbands sole
heir, it was not established that she did so knowingly, maliciously and in bad faith, so as for
this Court to conclude that she indeed committed fraud. This Court again brings to the fore
the delay by which respondents filed the present case, when the principal actors involved,
particularly, Donata and Maximinos siblings, have already passed away and their lips forever
sealed as to what truly transpired between them. On the other hand, Special Proceedings No.
928-R took place when all these principal actors were still alive and each would have been
capable to act to protect his or her own right to Maximinos estate. Letters of Administration
of Maximinos estate were issued in favor of Donata as early as 8 J uly 1952, and the CFI
Order in question was issued only on 15 J anuary 1960. The intestate proceedings for the
settlement of Maximinos estate were thus pending for almost eight years, and it is the burden
of the respondents to establish that their parents or grandparents, Maximinos surviving
siblings, had absolutely no knowledge of the said proceedings all these years. As established
9 of 19 1/27/2014 1:33 PM
in Ramos v. Ramos,
[21]
the degree of proof to establish fraud in a case where the principal
actors to the transaction have already passed away is proof beyond reasonable doubt, to wit

"x x x But length of time necessarily obscures all human evidence; and as it
thus removes from the parties all the immediate means to verify the nature of the
original transactions, it operates by way of presumption, in favor of innocence, and
against imputation of fraud. It would be unreasonable, after a great length of time, to
require exact proof of all the minute circumstances of any transaction, or to expect a
satisfactory explanation of every difficulty, real or apparent, with which it may be
encumbered. The most that can fairly be expected, in such cases, if the parties are
living, from the frailty of memory, and human infirmity, is, that the material facts can
be given with certainty to a common intent; and, if the parties are dead, and the cases
rest in confidence, and in parol agreements, the most that we can hope is to arrive at
probable conjectures, and to substitute general presumptions of law, for exact
knowledge. Fraud, or breach of trust, ought not lightly to be imputed to the living;
for, the legal presumption is the other way; as to the dead, who are not here to
answer for themselves, it would be the height of injustice and cruelty, to disturb their
ashes, and violate the sanctity of the grave, unless the evidence of fraud be clear,
beyond a reasonable doubt (Prevost vs. Gratz, 6 Wheat. [U.S.], 481, 498).

Moreover, even if Donatas allegation that she was Maximinos sole heir does
constitute fraud, it is insufficient to justify abandonment of the CFI Order, dated 15 J anuary
1960,
[22]
considering the nature of intestate proceedings as being in rem and the disputable
presumptions of the regular performance of official duty and lawful exercise of jurisdiction
by the CFI in rendering the questioned Order, dated 15 J anuary 1960, in Special Proceedings
No. 928-R.

On prescription of the right to recover based on implied trust

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Donatas misrepresentation constitutes fraud
that would impose upon her the implied trust provided in Article 1456 of the Civil Code, this
Court still cannot sustain respondents contention that their right to recover their shares in
Maximinos estate is imprescriptible. It is already settled in jurisprudence that an implied
trust, as opposed to an express trust, is subject to prescription and laches.

The case of Ramos v. Ramos
[23]
already provides an elucidating discourse on the
matter, to wit

"Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are created by the intention
of the trustor or of the parties. Implied trusts come into being by operation of law"
10 of 19 1/27/2014 1:33 PM
(Art. 1441, Civil Code). "No express trusts concerning an immovable or any interest
therein may be proven by oral evidence. An implied trust may be proven by oral
evidence" (Ibid; Arts. 1443 and 1457).

"No particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being
sufficient that a trust is clearly intended" (Ibid; Art. 1444; Tuason de Perez vs. Caluag,
96 Phil. 981; Julio vs. Dalandan, L-19012, October 30, 1967, 21 SCRA 543, 546).
"Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and positive acts of the
parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words either expressly or impliedly
evincing an intention to create a trust" (89 C.J . S. 122).

"Implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from
the nature of the transaction as matters of intent, or which are superinduced on the
transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the particular
intention of the parties" (89 C.J .S. 724). They are ordinarily subdivided into resulting
and constructive trusts (89 C.J .S. 722).

"A resulting trust is broadly defined as a trust which is raised or created by the
act or construction of law, but in its more restricted sense it is a trust raised by
implication of law and presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties, the
intention as to which is to be found in the nature of their transaction, but not expressed
in the deed or instrument of conveyance" (89 C.J .S. 725). Examples of resulting trusts
are found in Article 1448 to 1455 of the Civil Code. See Padilla vs. Court of Appeals,
L-31569, September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 168, 179).

On the other hand, a constructive trust is a trust "raised by construction of law,
or arising by operation of law." In a more restricted sense and as contradistinguished
from a resulting trust, a constructive trust is "a trust not created by any words, either
expressly or impliedly evincing a direct intention to create a trust, but by the
construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice. It does not arise by
agreement or intention but by operation of law." (89 C.J .S. 726-727). "If a person
obtains legal title to property by fraud or concealment, courts of equity will impress
upon the title a so-called constructive trust in favor of the defrauded party." A
constructive trust is not a trust in the technical sense (Gayondato vs. Treasurer of the
P.I., 49 Phil. 244; See Art. 1456, Civil Code).

There is a rule that a trustee cannot acquire by prescription the ownership of
property entrusted to him (Palma vs. Cristobal, 77 Phil. 712), or that an action to
compel a trustee to convey property registered in his name in trust for the benefit of
the cestui qui trust does not prescribe (Manalang vs. Canlas, 94 Phil. 776; Cristobal
vs. Gomez, 50 Phil. 810), or that the defense of prescription cannot be set up in an
action to recover property held by a person in trust for the benefit of another (Sevilla
vs. De los Angeles, 97 Phil. 875), or that property held in trust can be recovered by the
beneficiary regardless of the lapse of time (Marabilles vs. Quito, 100 Phil. 64;
Bancairen vs. Diones, 98 Phil. 122, 126; Juan vs. Zuiga, 62 O.G. 1351; 4 SCRA
1221; Jacinto vs. Jacinto, L-17957, May 31, 1962. See Tamayo vs. Callejo, 147 Phil.
31, 37).

That rule applies squarely to express trusts. The basis of the rule is that the
11 of 19 1/27/2014 1:33 PM
possession of a trustee is not adverse. Not being adverse, he does not acquire by
prescription the property held in trust. Thus, Section 38 of Act 190 provides that the
law of prescription does not apply "in the case of a continuing and subsisting trust"
(Diaz vs. Gorricho and Aguado, 103 Phil. 261, 266; Laguna vs. Levantino, 71 Phil.
566; Sumira vs. Vistan, 74 Phil. 138; Golfeo vs. Court of Appeals, 63 O.G. 4895, 12
SCRA 199; Caladiao vs. Santos, 63 O.G. 1956, 10 SCRA 691).

The rule of imprescriptibility of the action to recover property held in trust may
possibly apply to resulting trusts as long as the trustee has not repudiated the trust
(Heirs of Candelaria vs. Romero, 109 Phil. 500, 502-3; Martinez vs. Grao, 42 Phil.
35; Buencamino vs. Matias, 63 O. G. 11033, 16 SCRA 849).

The rule of imprescriptibility was misapplied to constructive trusts (Geronimo
and Isidoro vs. Nava and Aquino, 105 Phil. 145, 153. Compare with Cuison vs.
Fernandez and Bengzon, 105 Phil. 135, 139; De Pasion vs. De Pasion, 112 Phil. 403,
407).

Acquisitive prescription may bar the action of the beneficiary against the trustee
in an express trust for the recovery of the property held in trust where (a) the trustee
has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui qui
trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui qui
trust and (c) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive (Laguna vs. Levantino,
supra; Salinas vs. Tuason, 55 Phil. 729. Compare with the rule regarding co-owners
found in the last paragraph of Article 494, Civil Code; Casaas vs. Rosello, 50 Phil.
97; Gerona vs. De Guzman, L-19060, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 153, 157).

With respect to constructive trusts, the rule is different. The prescriptibility of
an action for reconveyance based on constructive trust is now settled (Alzona vs.
Capunitan, L-10228, February 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 450; Gerona vs. De Guzman, supra;
Claridad vs. Henares, 97 Phil. 973; Gonzales vs. Jimenez, L-19073, J anuary 30, 1965,
13 SCRA 80; Boaga vs. Soler, 112 Phil. 651; J. M. Tuason & Co., vs. Magdangal,
L-15539, J anuary 30, 1962, 4 SCRA 84). Prescription may supervene in an implied
trust (Bueno vs. Reyes, L-22587, April 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 1179; Fabian vs. Fabian,
L-20449, J anuary 29, 1968; Jacinto vs. Jacinto, L-17957, May 31, 1962, 5 SCRA
371).

And whether the trust is resulting or constructive, its enforcement may be
barred by laches (90 C.J .S. 887-889; 54 Am J ur. 449-450; Diaz vs. Gorricho and
Aguado, supra; Compare with Mejia vs. Gampona, 100 Phil. 277). [Emphases
supplied.]

A present reading of the Quion
[24]
and Sevilla
[25]
cases, invoked by respondents,
must be made in conjunction with and guided accordingly by the principles established in the
afore-quoted case. Thus, while respondents right to inheritance was transferred or vested
upon them at the time of Maximinos death, their enforcement of said right by appropriate
legal action may be barred by the prescription of the action.
12 of 19 1/27/2014 1:33 PM

Prescription of the action for reconveyance of the disputed properties based on implied
trust is governed by Article 1144 of the New Civil Code, which reads

ART. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the
time the right of action accrues:

(1) Upon a written contract;

(2) Upon an obligation created by law;

(3) Upon a judgment.

Since an implied trust is an obligation created by law (specifically, in this case, by Article
1456 of the New Civil Code), then respondents had 10 years within which to bring an action
for reconveyance of their shares in Maximinos properties. The next question now is when
should the ten-year prescriptive period be reckoned from. The general rule is that an action
for reconveyance of real property based on implied trust prescribes ten years from
registration and/or issuance of the title to the property,
[26]
not only because registration
under the Torrens system is a constructive notice of title,
[27]
but also because by registering
the disputed properties exclusively in her name, Donata had already unequivocally repudiated
any other claim to the same.

By virtue of the CFI Order, dated 15 J anuary 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R,
Donata was able to register and secure certificates of title over the disputed properties in her
name on 27 J une 1960. The respondents filed with the RTC their Complaint for partition,
annulment, and recovery of possession of the disputed real properties, docketed as Civil Case
No. CEB-5794, only on 3 March 1987, almost 27 years after the registration of the said
properties in the name of Donata. Therefore, respondents action for recovery of possession
of the disputed properties had clearly prescribed.

Moreover, even though respondents Complaint before the RTC in Civil Case No.
CEB-5794 also prays for partition of the disputed properties, it does not make their action to
enforce their right to the said properties imprescriptible. While as a general rule, the action
for partition among co-owners does not prescribe so long as the co-ownership is expressly or
impliedly recognized, as provided for in Article 494, of the New Civil Code, it bears to
emphasize that Donata had never recognized respondents as co-owners or co-heirs, either
expressly or impliedly.
[28]
Her assertion before the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R
13 of 19 1/27/2014 1:33 PM
that she was Maximinos sole heir necessarily excludes recognition of some other co-owner
or co-heir to the inherited properties; Consequently, the rule on non-prescription of action for
partition of property owned in common does not apply to the case at bar.

On laches as bar to recovery

Other than prescription of action, respondents right to recover possession of the
disputed properties, based on implied trust, is also barred by laches. The defense of laches,
which is a question of inequity in permitting a claim to be enforced, applies independently of
prescription, which is a question of time. Prescription is statutory; laches is equitable.
[29]

Laches is defined as the failure to assert a right for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either
abandoned or declined to assert it. This equitable defense is based upon grounds of public
policy, which requires the discouragement of stale claims for the peace of society.
[30]

This Court has already thoroughly discussed in its Decision the basis for barring
respondents action for recovery of the disputed properties because of laches. This Court
pointed out therein
[31]
that

In further support of their contention of fraud by Donata, the heirs of Maximino
even emphasized that Donata lived along the same street as some of the siblings of
Maximino and, yet, she failed to inform them of the CFI Order, dated [15 J anuary
1960], in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, and the issuance in her name of new TCTs
covering the real properties which belonged to the estate of Maximino. This Court,
however, appreciates such information differently. It actually works against the heirs
of Maximino. Since they only lived nearby, Maximinos siblings had ample
opportunity to inquire or discuss with Donata the status of the estate of their deceased
brother. Some of the real properties, which belonged to the estate of Maximino, were
also located within the same area as their residences in Cebu City, and Maximinos
siblings could have regularly observed the actions and behavior of Donata with regard
to the said real properties. It is uncontested that from the time of Maximinos death on
1 May 1952, Donata had possession of the real properties. She managed the real
properties and even collected rental fees on some of them until her own death on 1
November 1977. After Donatas death, Erlinda took possession of the real properties,
and continued to manage the same and collect the rental fees thereon. Donata and,
subsequently, Erlinda, were so obviously exercising rights of ownership over the real
properties, in exclusion of all others, which must have already put the heirs of
Maximino on guard if they truly believed that they still had rights thereto.

The heirs of Maximino knew he died on 1 May 1952. They even attended his
14 of 19 1/27/2014 1:33 PM
wake. They did not offer any explanation as to why they had waited 33 years from
Maximinos death before one of them, Silverio, filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino on 21 J anuary 1985. After
learning that the intestate estate of Maximino was already settled in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R, they waited another two years, before instituting, on 3 March
1987, Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the Complaint for partition, annulment and recovery
of the real property belonging to the estate of Maximino. x x x

Considering the circumstances in the afore-quoted paragraphs, as well as respondents
conduct before this Court, particularly the belated submission of evidence and argument of
new issues, respondents are consistently displaying a penchant for delayed action, without
any proffered reason or justification for such delay.

It is well established that the law serves those who are vigilant and diligent and not
those who sleep when the law requires them to act. The law does not encourage laches,
indifference, negligence or ignorance. On the contrary, for a party to deserve the
considerations of the courts, he must show that he is not guilty of any of the aforesaid
failings.
[32]

On void judgment or order

Respondents presented only in their Reply and Supplemental Reply to the petitioners
Opposition to their Motion for Reconsideration the argument that the CFI Order, dated 15
J anuary 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R is void and, thus, it cannot have any legal
effect. Consequently, the registration of the disputed properties in the name of Donata
pursuant to such Order was likewise void.

This Court is unconvinced.

In the jurisprudence referred to by the respondents,
[33]
an order or judgment is
considered void when rendered by the court without or in excess of its jurisdiction or in
violation of a mandatory duty, circumstances which are not present in the case at bar.

Distinction must be made between a void judgment and a voidable one, thus

"* * * A voidable judgment is one which, though not a mere nullity, is liable to
be made void when a person who has a right to proceed in the matter takes the proper
steps to have its invalidity declared. It always contains some defect which may become
15 of 19 1/27/2014 1:33 PM
fatal. It carries within it the means of its own overthrow. But unless and until it is duly
annulled, it is attended with all the ordinary consequences of a legal judgment. The
party against whom it is given may escape its effect as a bar or an obligation, but only
by a proper application to have it vacated or reversed. Until that is done, it will be
efficacious as a claim, an estoppel, or a source of title. If no proceedings are ever taken
against it, it will continue throughout its life to all intents a valid sentence. If
emanating from a court of general jurisdiction, it will be sustained by the ordinary
presumptions of regularity, and it is not open to impeachment in any collateral action.
* * *"

But it is otherwise when the judgment is void. "A void judgment is in legal
effect no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained.
Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It
neither binds nor bars any one. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out
of it are void. The parties attempting to enforce it may be responsible as trespassers.
The purchaser at a sale by virtue of its authority finds himself without title and without
redress." (Freeman on J udgments, sec. 117, citing Campbell vs. McCahan, 41 Ill., 45;
Roberts vs. Stowers, 7 Bush, 295, Huls vs. Buntin, 47 Ill., 396; Sherrell vs. Goodrum,
3 Humph., 418; Andrews vs. State, 2 Sneed, 549; Hollingsworth vs. Bagley, 35 Tex.,
345; Morton vs. Root, 2 Dill., 312; Commercial Bank of Manchester vs. Martin, 9
Smedes & M., 613; Hargis vs. Morse, 7 Kan., 259. See also Cornell vs. Barnes, 7 Hill,
35; Dawson and Another vs. Wells, 3 Ind., 399; Meyer vs. Mintonye, 106 Ill., 414;
Olson vs. Nunnally, 47 Kan., 391; White vs. Foote L. & M. Co., 29 W. Va., 385.)

It is not always easy to draw the line of demarcation between a void judgment
and a voidable one, but all authorities agree that jurisdiction over the subject-matter is
essential to the validity of a judgment and that want of such jurisdiction renders it void
and a mere nullity. In the eye of the law it is non-existent. (Fisher vs. Harnden, 1 Paine,
55; Towns vs. Springer, 9 Ga., 130; Mobley vs. Mobley, 9 Ga., 247; Beverly and
McBride vs. Burke, 9 Ga., 440; Central Bank of Georgia vs. Gibson, 11 Ga., 453;
J ohnson vs. J ohnson, 30 Ill., 215; St. Louis and Sandoval Coal and Mining Co. vs.
Sandoval Coal and Mining Co., 111 Ill., 32; Swiggart vs. Harber, 4 Scam., 364; Miller
vs. Snyder, 6 Ind., 1; Seely vs. Reid, 3 Greene [Iowa], 374.)
[34]

The fraud and misrepresentation fostered by Donata on the CFI in Special Proceedings
No. 928-R did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the case,
namely, the intestate estate of Maximino. Donatas fraud and misrepresentation may have
rendered the CFI Order, dated 15 J anuary 1960, voidable, but not void on its face. Hence, the
said Order, which already became final and executory, can only be set aside by direct action
to annul and enjoin its enforcement.
[35]
It cannot be the subject of a collateral attack as is
being done in this case. Note that respondents Complaint before the RTC in Civil Case No.
CEB-5794 was one for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of the disputed
properties. The annulment sought in the Complaint was not that of the CFI Order, dated 15
16 of 19 1/27/2014 1:33 PM
J anuary 1960, but of the certificates of title over the properties issued in Donatas name. So
until and unless respondents bring a direct action to nullify the CFI Order, dated 15 J anuary
1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, and attain a favorable judgment therein, the assailed
Order remains valid and binding.

Nonetheless, this Court also points out that an action to annul an order or judgment
based on fraud must be brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud.
[36]
If it is
conceded that the respondents came to know of Donatas fraudulent acts only in 1985, during
the course of the RTC proceedings which they instituted for the settlement of Maximinos
estate, then their right to file an action to annul the CFI Order, dated 15 J anuary 1960, in
Special Proceedings No. 928-R (earlier instituted by Donata for the settlement of Maximinos
estate), has likewise prescribed by present time.

In view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate J ustice

WE CONCUR:

Chairperson

No Part
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate J ustice Associate J ustice

17 of 19 1/27/2014 1:33 PM

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

Associate J ustice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief J ustice

*
No part.
[1]
Penned by Associate J ustice Minita V. Chico-Nazario with Chief J ustice Artemio V. Panganiban, Associate J ustices
Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, and Romeo J . Callejo, concurring; Rollo, pp. 286-305.
[2]
Id. at 304-305.
[3]
Id. at 306-315.
[4]
Id. at 320-336.
[5]
Id. at 338-343.
[6]
Id. at 345-346.
[7]
Id. at 348-363.
[8]
Id. at 364-378.
[9]
Id. at 342-356.
[10]
Id. at 287-293.
[11]
Id. at 304.
[12]
74 Phil. 100 (1943).
[13]
97 Phil. 875 (1955).
18 of 19 1/27/2014 1:33 PM
[14]
Rollo, p. 359.
[15]
Id. at 296-300.
[16]
Id. at 369.
[17]
Id. at 379.
[18]
When the Decision was promulgated on 10 March 2006, in the absence of an actual copy of the CFI Order in question,
this Court relied on the date of issuance of the said Order as recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds.
[19]
Bautista, v. de Guzman, 211 Phil. 26, 35 (1983); Varela v. Villanueva, 95 Phil. 248, 266-267 (1954); McMaster v.
Reissman & Co., 68 Phil. 142, 144 (1939).
[20]
G.R. No. 80491, 12 August 1992, 212 SCRA 519, 521.
[21]
G.R. No. L-19872, 3 December 1974, 61 SCRA 284, 305.
[22]
See Solivio v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 83484, 12 February 1990, 182 SCRA 119, 131), wherein this Court quoted
that, "Failure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters which would defeat one's own, claim or defense is not
such extrinsic fraud as will justify or require vacation of the judgment." (49 C.J .S. 489, citing Young v. Young, 2 SE 2d
622; First National Bank & Trust Co. of King City v. Bowman, 15 SW 2d 842; Price v. Smith, 109 SW 2d 1144, 1149.)
[23]
158 Phil. 935, 950-952 (1974).
[24]
Supra note 12.
[25]
Supra note 13.
[26]
Marquez v. Court of Appeals, 360 Phil. 843, 849-850 (1998).
[27]
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, Section 31.
[28]
Vda. de Alberto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 29759, 18 May 1989, 173 SCRA 436, 446-447.
[29]
Vda. de Rigonan v. Derecho, G.R. No. 159571, 15 J uly 2005, 463 SCRA 627, 647.
[30]
Id. at 648.
[31]
Rollo, pp. 300-301.
[32]
Vda. de Alberto v. Court of Appeals, supra note 28 at 450.
[33]
Republic v. Atlas Farms, Inc., 398 Phil. 1135 (2000); Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz, 385 Phil. 208 (2000); Ramos v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 42108, 29 December 1989, 180 SCRA 635; Estoesta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 74817, 8
November 1989, 179 SCRA 203; Caro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-31426, 29 February 1988, 158 SCRA 270; Gomez
v. Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717 (1925).
[34]
Gomez v. Concepcion, id. at 722-723.
[35]
Balangcad v. Justices of the Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84888, 12 Fcbruary 1992, 206 SCRA 169, 171.
[36]
Gallanosa v. Arcangel, G.R. No. L-29300, 21 J une 1978, 83 SCRA 676, 686.
19 of 19 1/27/2014 1:33 PM
l\epubhr of tlJe f)IJihpplnes
<!Court
;.ffianila
SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION
EMILIO A.M. SIJNTA Y Ill,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. 183053
- versus -
Present:
SERENO,*
Chief Justice,
CARPIO, J.,
Clzuirperson,,
PERAl,TA,
ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ
Promulgated:
COJUANGCO-SUNTA Y, ffi .l
Respondent. __ 1 0
<S"
RESOLUTION
PEREZ,.!.:
The now overly prolonged, all-too familiar and too-much-stretched
imbroglio over the estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay has continued. We
issued a Decision in the dispute as in Inter Caetera.
1
We now find a need to
replace the decision.
l'cr rartlc Jatcd --l July 20 II.
!"he Papal Bull mentioned in our Dcci,iun of 16 June 20 I 0 (,'-;'ulllU\' Ill ,._ ( 'oiiJllilllgco-S'un!ur.
(;RNu.I83053,16Junc2010,621 SCRA 142,144).
Resolution G.R. No. 183053

2
Before us is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay (respondent Isabel) of our Decision
2
in G.R. No. 183053
dated 16 J une 2010, directing the issuance of joint letters of administration
to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent. The
dispositive portion thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III
and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond
to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in
Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch
78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to make a determination and to
declare the heirs of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the
actual factual milieu as proven by the parties, and all other persons with
legal interest in the subject estate. It is further directed to settle the estate
of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.
3

We are moved to trace to its roots the controversy between the
parties.

The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4
J une 1990. Cristina was survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay
(Federico) and five grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, including
herein respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren, including
petitioner Emilio III, all by Federicos and Cristinas only child, Emilio A.
Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents.

The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita, were both
reared from infancy by the spouses Federico and Cristina. Their legitimate

2
Penned by Associate J ustice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura (now retired) with Associate J ustices
Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson), Diosdado M. Peralta, Roberto A. Abad and J ose Portugal Perez
of the Second Division, concurring. Rollo, pp. 231-246.
3
Id. at 244-245.

3
grandchildren, Isabel and her siblings, Margarita and Emilio II, lived with
their mother Isabel Cojuangco, following the separation of Isabels parents,
Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco. Isabels parents, along with her paternal
grandparents, were involved in domestic relations cases, including a case for
parricide filed by Isabel Cojuangco against Emilio I. Emilio I was
eventually acquitted.

In retaliation, Emilio I filed a complaint for legal separation against
his wife, charging her among others with infidelity. The trial court declared
as null and void and of no effect the marriage of Emilio I and Isabel
Cojuangco on the finding that:

From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in
the Veterans memorial Hospital. Although at the time of the trial of
parricide case (September 8, 1967) the patient was already out of the
hospital[,] he continued to be under observation and treatment.

It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs
mental aberration classified as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves
manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease worsened with time, until
1965 when he was actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrist (sic)
treatment; that even if the subject has shown marked progress, the remains
bereft of adequate understanding of right and wrong.

There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was
effected on J uly 9, 1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in.
This fact would justify a declaration of nullity of the marriage under
Article 85 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the
following causes after (sic) existing at the time of the marriage:

x x x x

(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such
party, after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the
other as husband or wife.

There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant
knew about the mental condition of plaintiff; and there is proof that
plaintiff continues to be without sound reason. The charges in this very


4
complaint add emphasis to the findings of the neuro-psychiatrist handling
the patient, that plaintiff really lives more in fancy than in reality, a strong
indication of schizophernia (sic).
4

Intent on maintaining a relationship with their grandchildren, Federico
and Isabel filed a complaint for visitation rights to spend time with
Margarita, Emilio II, and Isabel in the same special lower court. The
J uvenile Domestic Relations Court in Quezon City (J DRC-QC) granted their
prayer for one hour a month of visitation rights which was subsequently
reduced to thirty minutes, and ultimately stopped, because of respondent
Isabels testimony in court that her grandparents visits caused her and her
siblings stress and anxiety.
5

On 27 September 1993, more than three years after Cristinas death,
Federico adopted his illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.

On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration over Cristinas estate docketed as Special Proceeding Case
No. 117-M-95. Federico, opposed the petition, pointing out that: (1) as the
surviving spouse of the decedent, he should be appointed administrator of
the decedents estate; (2) as part owner of the mass of conjugal properties
left by the decedent, he must be accorded preference in the administration
thereof; (3) Isabel and her siblings had been alienated from their
grandparents for more than thirty (30) years; (4) the enumeration of heirs in
the petition was incomplete as it did not mention the other children of his
son, Emilio III and Nenita; (5) even before the death of his wife, Federico
had administered their conjugal properties, and thus, is better situated to
protect the integrity of the decedents estate; (6) the probable value of the

4
Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, 360 Phil. 932, 936-937 (1998).
5
Rollo, pp. 43-44.

5
estate as stated in the petition was grossly overstated; and (7) Isabels
allegation that some of the properties are in the hands of usurpers is untrue.

Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabels petition for letters of
administration on the ground that Isabel had no right of representation to the
estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result
of Isabels parents marriage being declared null and void. However, in
Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, we categorically declared that Isabel and her
siblings, having been born of a voidable marriage as opposed to a void
marriage based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the Civil Code, were legitimate
children of Emilio I, who can all represent him in the estate of their
legitimate grandmother, the decedent, Cristina.

Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to
administer the decedents estate on his behalf in the event letters of
administration issues to Federico. Consequently, Emilio III filed an
Opposition-In-Intervention, echoing the allegations in his grandfathers
opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better
equipped than respondent to administer and manage the estate of the
decedent, Cristina.

On 13 November 2000, Federico died.

Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November 2001, the trial court
rendered a decision appointing Emilio III as administrator of decedent
Cristinas intestate estate:

WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is
DENIED and the Opposition[-]in[-]Intervention is GRANTED.


6
Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III (sic) is
hereby appointed administrator of the estate of the decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo Suntay, who shall enter upon the execution of his trust upon
the filing of a bond in the amount of P200,000.00, conditioned as follows:

(1) To make and return within three (3) months, a true and
complete inventory;

(2) To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all debts,
legatees, and charge on the same, or dividends thereon;

(3) To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and
at any other time when required by the court, and

(4) To perform all orders of the Court.

Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of Administration
be issued in his favor.
6

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of
the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and
appointed respondent as administratrix of the subject estate:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision
dated November 9, 2001 of Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan in SPC No. 117-M-95 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
letters of administration issued by the said court to Emilio A.M. Suntay
III, if any, are consequently revoked. Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay
is hereby appointed administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina
Aguinaldo Suntay. Let letters of administration be issued in her favor
upon her filing of a bond in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand
(P200,000.00) Pesos.
7

As previously adverted to, on appeal by certiorari, we reversed and
set aside the ruling of the appellate court. We decided to include Emilio III
as co-administrator of Cristinas estate, giving weight to his interest in
Federicos estate. In ruling for co-administration between Emilio III and
Isabel, we considered that:

6
Id. at 60.
7
Id. at 31.

7
1. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina,
and her husband, Federico, who both acknowledged him as their grandchild;

2. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of
the decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their conjugal partnership of gains
during the subsistence of their marriage;

3. Cristinas properties, forming part of her estate, are still
commingled with those of her husband, Federico, because her share in the
conjugal partnership remains undetermined and unliquidated; and

4. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to
share in the distribution of the latters estate as a direct heir, one degree from
Federico, and not simply in representation of his deceased illegitimate father,
Emilio I.

In this motion, Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the Court of
Appeals Decision in favor of her sole administratorship based on her status
as a legitimate grandchild of Cristina, whose estate she seeks to administer.

Isabel contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court on the order of preference for the issuance of letters of
administration cannot be ignored and that Article 992 of the Civil Code must
be followed. Isabel further asserts that Emilio III had demonstrated adverse
interests and disloyalty to the estate, thus, he does not deserve to become a
co-administrator thereof.

Specifically, Isabel bewails that: (1) Emilio III is an illegitimate
grandchild and therefore, not an heir of the decedent; (2) corollary thereto,


8
Emilio III, not being a next of kin of the decedent, has no interest in the
estate to justify his appointment as administrator thereof; (3) Emilio IIIs
actuations since his appointment as administrator by the RTC on 9
November 2001 emphatically demonstrate the validity and wisdom of the
order of preference in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court; and (4) there
is no basis for joint administration as there are no opposing parties or
factions to be represented.

To begin with, the case at bar reached us on the issue of who, as
between Emilio III and Isabel, is better qualified to act as administrator of
the decedents estate. We did not choose. Considering merely his
demonstrable interest in the subject estate, we ruled that Emilio III should
likewise administer the estate of his illegitimate grandmother, Cristina, as a
co-administrator. In the context of this case, we have to make a choice and
therefore, reconsider our decision of 16 J une 2010.

The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a
decedent is laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If
no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be,
or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such
person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests
to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be,
or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for
thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to some
other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal
creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

9
(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to
serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may
select.

Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of
preference, in the appointment of an administrator. This order of preference,
which categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the
creditors in the appointment of an administrator, has been reinforced in
jurisprudence.
8

The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator
over the estate of a decedent is the prospective administrators interest in the
estate.
9
This is the same consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into
account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of
administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is that those who
will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the
estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence
or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to
administer the estate correctly.
10
In all, given that the rule speaks of an order
of preference, the person to be appointed administrator of a decedents estate
must demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but an interest therein
greater than any other candidate.

To illustrate, the preference bestowed by law to the surviving spouse
in the administration of a decedents estate presupposes the surviving
spouses interest in the conjugal partnership or community property forming

8
Uy v. Court of Appeals, 519 Phil. 673 (2006); Angeles v. Angeles-Maglaya, 506 Phil. 347 (2005);
Valarao v. Pascual, 441 Phil. 226 (2002); Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 364 Phil. 188 (1999).
9
Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-59935, 30 September 1982, 117 SCRA 608, 612; Corona
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-59821, 30 August 1982, 116 SCRA 316, 320; Matias v.
Gonzales, 101 Phil. 852, 858 (1957).
10
Gonzales v. Aguinaldo, G.R. No. 74769, 28 September 1990, 190 SCRA 112, 117-118.

10
part of the decedents estate.
11
Likewise, a surviving spouse is a compulsory
heir of a decedent
12
which evinces as much, if not more, interest in
administering the entire estate of a decedent, aside from her share in the
conjugal partnership or absolute community property.

It is to this requirement of observation of the order of preference in
the appointment of administrator of a decedents estate, that the appointment
of co-administrators has been allowed, but as an exception. We again refer
to Section 6(a) of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court which specifically states that
letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving spouse and the
next of kin. In addition and impliedly, we can refer to Section 2 of Rule 82
of the Rules of Court which say that x x x [w]hen an executor or
administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining executor or
administrator may administer the trust alone, x x x.

In a number of cases, we have sanctioned the appointment of more
than one administrator for the benefit of the estate and those interested
therein.
13
We recognized that the appointment of administrator of the estate
of a decedent or the determination of a persons suitability for the office of
judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the
court exercising the power of appointment.
14

Under certain circumstances and for various reasons well-settled in
Philippine and American jurisprudence, we have upheld the appointment of
co-administrators: (1) to have the benefits of their judgment and perhaps at

11
See Articles 91 and 106 of the Family Code.
12
See Article 887, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code.
13
Matias v. Gonzales; Corona v. Court of Appeals; Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, supranote 9.
14
Uy v. Court of Appeals, supra note 8 at 680; Angeles v. Angeles-Maglaya, supra note 8 at 365;
Valarao v. Pascual, supra note 8 at 234; Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, supranote 8 at 210-211.

11
all times to have different interests represented;
15
(2) where justice and
equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the
management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or,
from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle;
16
(4) to have all
interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for
the best interests of the estate;
17
and when a person entitled to the
administration of an estate desires to have another competent person
associated with him in the office.
18

In the frequently cited Matias v. Gonzales, we dwelt on the
appointment of special co-administrators during the pendency of the appeal
for the probate of the decedents will. Pending the probate thereof, we
recognized Matias special interest in the decedents estate as universal heir
and executrix designated in the instrument who should not be excluded in
the administration thereof. Thus, we held that justice and equity demands
that the two (2) factions among the non-compulsory heirs of the decedent,
consisting of an instituted heir (Matias) and intestate heirs (respondents
thereat), should be represented in the management of the decedents estate.
19

Another oft-cited case is Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, where we held
that inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal properties
and that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to deprive her of any
hand in the administration of the estate prior to the probate of the will would
be unfair to her proprietary interests.
20

15
Gonzales v. Aguinaldo, supranote 10 at 118-119.
16
Uy v. Court of Appeals, supra note 8 at 681; Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101512, 7
August 1992, 212 SCRA 413, 423 citing Copeland v. Shapley, 100 NE. 1080.
17
Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, id.
18
In re Fichters Estate, 279 N.Y.S. 597.
19
Supra note 9.
20

12
Hewing closely to the aforementioned cases is our ruling in Ventura v.
Ventura
21
where we allowed the appointment of the surviving spouse and
legitimate children of the decedent as co-administrators. However, we drew
a distinction between the heirs categorized as next of kin, the nearest of kin
in the category being preferred, thus:

In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio
Ventura is J uana Cardona while the next of kin are: Mercedes and
Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The next of kin has
been defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of
distribution to the decedents property [citations omitted]. It is
generally said that the nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is
more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator.
Among members of a class the strongest ground for preference is the
amount or preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the
nearest of kin is to be preferred. [citations omitted]

As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme
Court, Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of
Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as
the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura, they are entitled to preference over
the illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel
Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of
Rule 78, the person or persons to be appointed administrator are J uana
Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as
nearest of kin, or J uana Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in
the discretion of the Court, in order to represent both interests.
22

(Emphasis supplied)

In Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,
23
we maintained that the order of
preference in the appointment of an administrator depends on the attendant
facts and circumstances. In that case, we affirmed the legitimate childs
appointment as special administrator, and eventually as regular
administrator, of the decedents estate as against the surviving spouse who
the lower court found unsuitable. Reiterating Sioca v. Garcia
24
as good law,
we pointed out that unsuitableness for appointment as administrator may

21
243 Phil. 952 (1988).
22
Id. at 962-963.
23
Supra note 8.
24
44 Phil. 711 (1923).

13
consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately
interested in the estate.

In Valarao v. Pascual,
25
we see another story with a running theme of
heirs squabbling over the estate of a decedent. We found no reason to set
aside the probate courts refusal to appoint as special co-administrator Diaz,
even if he had a demonstrable interest in the estate of the decedent and
represented one of the factions of heirs, because the evidence weighed by the
probate court pointed to Diazs being remiss in his previous duty as co-
administrator of the estate in the early part of his administration. Surveying
the previously discussed cases of Matias, Corona, and Vda. de Dayrit, we
clarified, thus:

Respondents cannot take comfort in the cases of Matias v.
Gonzales, Corona v. Court of Appeals, and Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete,
cited in the assailed Decision. Contrary to their claim, these cases do
not establish an absolute right demandable from the probate court to
appoint special co-administrators who would represent the respective
interests of squabbling heirs. Rather, the cases constitute precedents
for the authority of the probate court to designate not just one but
also two or more special co-administrators for a single estate. Now
whether the probate court exercises such prerogative when the heirs
are fighting among themselves is a matter left entirely to its sound
discretion.

Furthermore, the cases of Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit
hinge upon factual circumstances other than the incompatible interests of
the heirs which are glaringly absent from the instant case. In Matias this
Court ordered the appointment of a special co-administrator because of the
applicant's status as the universal heir and executrix designated in the will,
which we considered to be a "special interest" deserving protection during
the pendency of the appeal. Quite significantly, since the lower court in
Matias had already deemed it best to appoint more than one special
administrator, we found grave abuse of discretion in the act of the lower
court in ignoring the applicant's distinctive status in the selection of
another special administrator.

25
Supra note 8.

14
In Corona we gave "highest consideration" to the "executrix's
choice of Special Administrator, considering her own inability to serve
and the wide latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix in her will,"

for this Court to compel her appointment as special co-administrator. It is
also manifest from the decision in Corona that the presence of conflicting
interests among the heirs therein was not per se the key factor in the
designation of a second special administrator as this fact was taken into
account only to disregard or, in the words of Corona, to "overshadow" the
objections to the appointment on grounds of "impracticality and lack of
kinship."

Finally in Vda. de Dayrit we justified the designation of the wife of
the decedent as special co-administrator because it was "our considered
opinion that inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal
properties and that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to
deprive her of any hand in the administration of the estate prior to the
probate of the will would be unfair to her proprietary interests." The
special status of a surviving spouse in the special administration of an
estate was also emphasized in Fule v. Court of Appeals where we held that
the widow would have more interest than any other next of kin in the
proper administration of the entire estate since she possesses not only the
right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent
but also a share in the conjugal partnership for which the good or bad
administration of the estate may affect not just the fruits but more
critically the naked ownership thereof. And in Gabriel v. Court of Appeals
we recognized the distinctive status of a surviving spouse applying as
regular administrator of the deceased spouse's estate when we counseled
the probate court that "there must be a very strong case to justify the
exclusion of the widow from the administration."

Clearly, the selection of a special co-administrator in Matias,
Corona and Vda. de Dayrit was based upon the independent
proprietary interests and moral circumstances of the appointee that
were not necessarily related to the demand for representation being
repeatedly urged by respondents.
26
(Emphasis supplied)

In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, we unequivocally declared the
mandatory character of the rule on the order of preference for the issuance of
letters of administration:

Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the
order of preference in the issuance of letters of administration, it
categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the
creditors, and requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an

26
Id. at 233-235.

15
administrator. It would be a grave abuse of discretion for the probate court
to imperiously set aside and insouciantly ignore that directive without any
valid and sufficient reason therefor.
27

Subsequently, in Angeles v. Angeles-Maglaya,
28
we expounded on the
legal contemplation of a next of kin, thus:

Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of
administrator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is
preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When the law speaks of
"next of kin," the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute of
distribution, to the decedent's property; one whose relationship is such that
he is entitled to share in the estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir. In
resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters of
administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court
perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate
action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration,
the trial court acted within bounds when it looked into and pass[ed] upon
the claimed relationship of respondent to the late Francisco Angeles.
29

Finally, in Uy v. Court of Appeals,
30
we took into consideration the
size of, and benefits to, the estate should respondent therein be appointed as
co-administrator. We emphasized that where the estate is large or, from any
cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle, the appointment of co-
administrators may be sanctioned by law.

In our Decision under consideration, we zeroed in on Emilio IIIs
demonstrable interest in the estate and glossed over the order of preference
set forth in the Rules. We gave weight to Emilio IIIs demonstrable interest
in Cristinas estate and without a closer scrutiny of the attendant facts and
circumstances, directed co-administration thereof. We are led to a review of
such position by the foregoing survey of cases.

27
28
Supra note 8.
29
Id. at 365.
30
Supra note 8.

16
The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the
estate to be settled does not ipso facto entitle an interested person to co-
administration thereof. Neither does squabbling among the heirs nor adverse
interests necessitate the discounting of the order of preference set forth in
Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of the estate
of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the
interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator.
31
Given
Isabels unassailable interest in the estate as one of the decedents legitimate
grandchildren and undoubted nearest next of kin, the appointment of
Emilio III as co-administrator of the same estate, cannot be a demandable
right. It is a matter left entirely to the sound discretion of the Court
32
and
depends on the facts and the attendant circumstances of the case.
33

Thus, we proceed to scrutinize the attendant facts and circumstances
of this case even as we reiterate Isabels and her siblings apparent greater
interest in the estate of Cristina.

These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of the order of
preference mapped out in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. They
compel that a choice be made of one over the other.

1. The bitter estrangement and long-standing animosity between
Isabel, on the one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, traced back from the
time their paternal grandparents were alive, which can be characterized as
adverse interest of some kind by, or hostility of, Emilio III to Isabel who is
immediately interested in the estate;

31
Gonzales v. Aguinaldo, supra note 10 at 117.
32
Fernandez v. Maravilla, G.R. No. L-18799, 26 March 1965, 13 SCRA 416, 419-420.
33
Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 8 at 211.

17
2. Corollary thereto, the seeming impossibility of Isabel and Emilio
III working harmoniously as co-administrators may result in prejudice to the
decedents estate, ultimately delaying settlement thereof; and

3. Emilio III, for all his claims of knowledge in the management of
Cristinas estate, has not looked after the estates welfare and has acted to
the damage and prejudice thereof.

Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio IIIs
demonstrable interest in the estate makes him a suitable co-administrator
thereof, the evidence reveals that Emilio III has turned out to be an
unsuitable administrator of the estate. Respondent Isabel points out that
after Emilio IIIs appointment as administrator of the subject estate in 2001,
he has not looked after the welfare of the subject estate and has actually
acted to the damage and prejudice thereof as evidenced by the following:

1. Emilio III, despite several orders from the probate court for a
complete inventory, omitted in the partial inventories
34
he filed therewith
properties of the estate
35
including several parcels of land, cash, bank
deposits, jewelry, shares of stock, motor vehicles, and other personal
properties, contrary to Section 1,
36
paragraph a, Rule 81 of the Rules of
Court.

2. Emilio III did not take action on both occasions against Federicos
settlement of the decedents estate which adjudicated to himself a number of

34
Annexes 3, 5, and 6, of respondents Motion for Reconsideration. Rollo, pp. 318-331.
35
Annex 4, of respondents Motion for Reconsideration. Id. at 326.
36
Section 1. Bond to be given issuance of letters. Amount. Conditions. Before an
executor or administrator enters upon the execution of his trust, and letters testamentary or of
administration issue, he shall give a bond, in such sum as the court directs, conditioned as follows:
(a) To make and return to the court, within three (3) months, a true and complete inventory of all
goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which shall come to his possession or
knowledge or to the possession of any other person for him;

18
properties properly belonging to said estate (whether wholly or partially),
and which contained a declaration that the decedent did not leave any
descendants or heirs, except for Federico, entitled to succeed to her estate.
37

In compliance to our Resolution dated 18 April 2012 requiring Emilio
III to respond to the following imputations of Isabel that:

1. [Emilio III] did not file an inventory of the assets until November
14, 2002;
2. [T]he inventory [Emilio III] submitted did not include several
properties of the decedent;
3. [T]hat properties belonging to the decedent have found their way
to different individuals or persons; several properties to Federico
Suntay himself; and
4. [W]hile some properties have found their way to [Emilio III], by
reason of falsified documents;
38

Emilio III refutes Isabels imputations that he was lackadaisical in assuming
and performing the functions of administrator of Cristinas estate:

1. From the time of the RTCs Order appointing Emilio III as
administrator, Isabel, in her pleadings before the RTC, had vigorously
opposed Emilio IIIs assumption of that office, arguing that [t]he decision
of the [RTC] dated 9 November 2001 is not among the judgments authorized
by the Rules of Court which may be immediately implemented or executed;

37
Annexes 1, and 2, of respondents Motion for Reconsideration. Rollo, pp. 318-321.
38
Id. at 407.

19
2. The delay in Emilio IIIs filing of an inventory was due to
Isabels vociferous objections to Emilio IIIs attempts to act as administrator
while the RTC decision was under appeal to the Court of Appeals;

3. The complained partial inventory is only initiatory, inherent in
the nature thereof, and one of the first steps in the lengthy process of
settlement of a decedents estate, such that it cannot constitute a complete
and total listing of the decedents properties; and

4. The criminal cases adverted to are trumped-up charges where
Isabel, as private complainant, has been unwilling to appear and testify,
leading the J udge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44 of Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro, to warn the prosecutor of a possible motu propio
dismissal of the cases.

While we can subscribe to Emilio IIIs counsels explanation for the
blamed delay in the filing of an inventory and his exposition on the nature
thereof, partial as opposed to complete, in the course of the settlement of a
decedents estate, we do not find any clarification on Isabels accusation that
Emilio III had deliberately omitted properties in the inventory, which
properties of Cristina he knew existed and which he claims to be
knowledgeable about.

The general denial made by Emilio III does not erase his unsuitability
as administrator rooted in his failure to make and return x x x a true and
complete inventory which became proven fact when he actually filed
partial inventories before the probate court and by his inaction on two
occasions of Federicos exclusion of Cristinas other compulsory heirs,
herein Isabel and her siblings, from the list of heirs.

20
As administrator, Emilio III enters into the office, posts a bond and
executes an oath to faithfully discharge the duties of settling the decedents
estate with the end in view of distribution to the heirs, if any. This he failed
to do. The foregoing circumstances of Emilio IIIs omission and inaction
become even more significant and speak volume of his unsuitability as
administrator as it demonstrates his interest adverse to those immediately
interested in the estate of the decedent, Cristina.

In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and
the protracted litigation, is the inescapable fact that Emilio III and
respondent Isabel have a deep aversion for each other. To our mind, it
becomes highly impractical, nay, improbable, for the two to work as co-
administrators of their grandmothers estate. The allegations of Emilio III,
the testimony of Federico and the other witnesses for Federico and Emilio
III that Isabel and her siblings were estranged from their grandparents
further drive home the point that Emilio III bears hostility towards Isabel.
More importantly, it appears detrimental to the decedents estate to appoint a
co-administrator (Emilio III) who has shown an adverse interest of some
kind or hostility to those, such as herein respondent Isabel, immediately
interested in the said estate.

Bearing in mind that the issuance of letters of administration is simply
a preliminary order to facilitate the settlement of a decedents estate, we here
point out that Emilio III is not without remedies to protect his interests in the
estate of the decedent. In Hilado v. Court of Appeals,
39
we mapped out as
among the allowable participation of any interested persons or any
persons interested in the estate in either testate or intestate proceedings:


21
x x x x

4. Section 6
40
of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the
estate of the deceased to complain to the court of the concealment,
embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of evidence
of the decedents title or interest therein;

5. Section 10
41
of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of
the examination and allowance of the Administrators account to persons
interested;

6. Section 7(b)
42
of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice to the
persons interested before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the
disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the estate; and

7. Section 1,
43
Rule 90, which allows any person interested in the estate
to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of
the decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or provided for.
44

39
G.R. No. 164108, 8 May 2009, 587 SCRA 464.
40
Section 6. Proceedings when property concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed.
If an executor or administrator, heir, legatee, creditor, or other individual interested in the estate
of the deceased, complains to the court having jurisdiction of the estate that a person is suspected
of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away any of the money, goods, or chattels of the
deceased, or that such person has in his possession or has knowledge of any deed, conveyance,
bond, contract, or other writing which contains evidence of or tends to disclose the right, title,
interest, or claim of the deceased to real or personal estate, or the last will and testament of the
deceased, the court may cite such suspected person to appear before it and may examine him on
oath on the matter of such complaint; and if the person so cited refuses to appear, or to answer on
such examination or such interrogatories as are put to him, the court may punish him for
contempt, and may commit him to prison until he submits to the order of the court. The
interrogatories put to any such person, and his answers thereto, shall be in writing and shall be
filed in the clerks office.
41
Section 10. Account to be settled on notice. Before the account of an executor or
administrator is allowed, notice shall be given to persons interested of the time and place of
examining and allowing the same; and such notice may be given personally to such persons
interested or by advertisement in a newspaper or newspapers, or both, as the court directs.
42
Section 7. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber
estate. x x x.
(a) x x x
(b) The court shall thereupon fix a time and place for hearing such petition, and cause notice
stating the nature of the petition, the reason for the same, and the time and place of hearing, to
be given personally or by mail to the persons interested, and may cause such further notice to
be given, by publication or otherwise, as it shall deem proper.
43
Section 1. When order for distribution of residue made. When the debts, funeral
charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any,
chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of
the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice,
shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the
proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their
respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his
possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to he distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above-mentioned
has been made or provided for, unless the distributes, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be
fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court
directs.

22
In addition to the foregoing, Emilio III may likewise avail of the
remedy found in Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or
administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation, or removal. If an
executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the
estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or
a duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane,
or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may
remove him, or, in its discretion, may permit him to resign. When an
executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining
executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, unless the court
grants letters to someone to act with him. If there is no remaining executor
or administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable person.

Once again, as we have done in the Decision, we exercise judicial
restraint: we uphold that the question of who are the heirs of the decedent
Cristina is not yet upon us. Article 992 of the Civil Code or the curtain bar
rule is inapplicable in resolving the issue of who is better qualified to
administer the estate of the decedent.

Thus, our disquisition in the assailed Decision:

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us
to refrain from making a final declaration of heirship and distributing the
presumptive shares of the parties in the estates of Cristina and Federico,
considering that the question on who will administer the properties of the
long deceased couple has yet to be settled.

Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata on the same issue remains
good law:

[T]he declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature,
although the evidence sufficiently shows who are entitled to
succeed the deceased. The estate had hardly been judicially
opened, and the proceeding has not as yet reached the stage of
distribution of the estate which must come after the inheritance is
liquidated.

44
Hilado v. Court of Appeals, supra note 37 at 472-473.

23

Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the
foregoing admonition:

Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. - x
x x. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the
lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares
to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy
shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the
obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for,
unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be
fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations
within such time as the court directs.
45

Lastly, we dispose of a peripheral issue raised in the Supplemental
Comment
46
of Emilio III questioning the Special Second Division which
issued the 18 April 2012 Resolution. Emilio III asseverates that the
operation of the Special Second Division in Baguio is unconstitutional and
void as the Second Division in Manila had already promulgated its
Decision on 16 J une 2010 on the petition filed by him:

7. The question is: who created the Special Second Division in
Baguio, acting separately from the Second Division of the Supreme Court
in Manila? There will then be two Second Divisions of the Supreme
Court: one acting with the Supreme Court in Manila, and another Special
Second Division acting independently of the Second Division of the
Supreme Court in Manila.
47

For Emilio IIIs counsels edification, the Special Second Division in
Baguio is not a different division created by the Supreme Court.

The Second Division which promulgated its Decision on this case on
16 J une 2010, penned by J ustice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, now has a
different composition, with the advent of J ustice Nachuras retirement on 13

45
Rollo, pp. 243-244.
46
Id. at 442-445.
47
Id. at 443.

24
J une 2011. Section 7, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court
provides:
Sec. 7. Resolutions of motions for reconsideration or clarification
of decisions or signed resolutions and all other motions and incidents
subsequently filed; creation of a Special Division. Motions for
reconsideration or clarification of a decision or of a signed resolution and
all other motions and incidents subsequently filed in the case shall be
acted upon by the ponente and the other Members of the Division who
participated in the rendition of the decision or signed resolution.

If the ponente has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is
disqualified, or has inhibited himself or herself from acting on the motion
for reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall be replaced through
raffle by a new ponente who shall be chosen among the new Members
of the Division who participated in the rendition of the decision or
signed resolution and who concurred therein. If only one Member of
the Court who participated and concurred in the rendition of the
decision or signed resolution remains, he or she shall be designated as
the new ponente.

If a Member (not the ponente) of the Division which rendered the
decision or signed resolution has retired, is no longer a Member of the
Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited himself or herself from acting on
the motion for reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall be replaced
through raffle by a replacement Member who shall be chosen from the
other Divisions until a new J ustice is appointed as replacement for the
retired J ustice. Upon the appointment of a new J ustice, he or she shall
replace the designated J ustice as replacement Member of the Special
Division.

Any vacancy or vacancies in the Special Division shall be filled by
raffle from among the other Members of the Court to constitute a Special
Division of five (5) Members.

If the ponente and all the Members of the Division that rendered
the Decision or signed Resolution are no longer Members of the Court, the
case shall be raffled to any Member of the Court and the motion shall be
acted upon by him or her with the participation of the other Members of
the Division to which he or she belongs.

If there are pleadings, motions or incidents subsequent to the
denial of the motion for reconsideration or clarification, the case shall be
acted upon by the ponente on record with the participation of the other
Members of the Division to which he or she belongs at the time said
pleading, motion or incident is to be taken up by the Court. (Emphasis
supplied)

Resolution 25 U.R. No. I S3053
As regards the operation thereof in Baguio City, such is simply a
change in venue for the Supreme Court's summer session held last April.'
18
WIIERKFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY
G Our Decision in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010 is
Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay shall solely issue to respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
upon payment of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78,
Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional
Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to settle the
estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
.lOS
CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
l{esulutiun dated <J February 2012, A.M. No. 12-:2-7-SC Re: 2012 Summer Session i11 Baguiu
City
Resolution 26 G.R. No. 183053
JVIAH.IA P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

A. ABAD
Associate Justice
ATTESTATI()N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court's Division.
Associate J usticc
Chairperson, Special Second Division
C E I{ T I F I C A T I () N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
LOlJRDES J>. A. SERENO
Chief .Justice

SPECPRO - Rule 73 To 90 - Cases

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SPECPRO - Rule 73 To 90 - Cases

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FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 128781. August 6, 2002]

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