FACTS: At trial, the victim, 20 year old Christine, testified that she had attended South Bay Christian Academy. At 17 she sought help from appellant Hodges (president of the school and pastor of the church) by telling him that her stepfather, a minister in the church, had been molesting her for many years. Hodges informed her stepfather of the allegations, and told Christine the next day that her stepfather had confessed to everything, that he would be handling the situation, and that she should not tell anyone. A few days later, Hodges told Christine that he had sent her stepfather to a retreat and handed her a letter of apology from her stepfather. He insisted on having her mother and stepfather come into the office after she read the letter against her wishes. She pleaded with Mr. Hodges to not make her go home with her parents because she was frightened of her stepfather, but he arranged to have her parents pick her up from school the next day. Instead, she ran away. She also told others about the situation. She was instructed to return, and on doing so met with appellants Hodges and Nobbs. Hodges told her unless she returned home she would not be allowed to return to school and graduate. She returned home and left immediately after graduation. Mr. Hodges was subsequently asked during investigation why he did not report the information to police or child protective services or if he knew he was mandated to report. He told the officer he knew of the reporting laws, and understood he was a mandated reporter. He told the officer he wished to take care of the matter within the church, and that he disciplined the father by having him write the letter of apology and confess in front of the entire congregation. Additionally, Hodges took away his ministerial license. Hodges testified that he did not contact the police because he believed that his role in the matter was a pastoral one, and that the incidents were sins rather than sexual abuse. Mr. Nob bs testified he believed he had been acting in a pastoral capacity as assistant pastor.
ISSUE:
Were appellants properly convicted of violating the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act, which provides that any child care custodian who has knowledge of or observes a child in his or her professional capacity or within the scope of his or her employment whom he or she knows or reasonably [EVIDENCE DIGESTED CASES] September 11, 2014
suspects has been the victim of child abuse shall report the known or suspected instance of child abuse to a child protective agency immediately or as soon as practically possible? HELD The jurys decision that appellants were acting within the capacity of a child care custodian was upheld. The constitutionality of the act as applied to the appellants was also valid. Appellants first contend they were not acting as child care custodians within the meaning of the statute. Mr. Hodges claims he was counseling Christine as a pastor of the church, with most meetings occurring outside of school hours. Mr. Nobbs claims he was called only to be informed that Christines stepfather would be relieved of his ministerial duties, and Mr. Nobbs would assume them. The definition of child care custodian means a teacher, administrative officer, or supervisor of child welfare and attendance of any public or private school. There was substantial evidence to support the jurys finding that appellants were child care custodians. The school was attended by the victim and operated by the church, where religious and academic classes were taught. Appellants were involved in running the school as president and principle. Nobbs took care of the day-to-day management, while Hodges had overall responsibility. Christine testified that she sought Hodges help because he was in charge of the school. Appellants next contend the statute violates due process as applied to them, as it fails to give adequate notice of the obligation to report. The terms child, child abuse, and child protective agency are all defined. The intent of the act is to protect children from abuse, and the legislature has been sufficiently definite to give the constitutionally required degree of notice to those subject to the acts requirements. Appellants contend the statute as applied in this case is insufficiently specific given its impact on activities potentially subject to First Amendment protection. They argue that they were obligated by their faith to not disclose to the community the contents of pastoral communications with Christine. The acts purpose would be severely undermined if appellants failure to report known child abuse was a protected religious activity under the First [EVIDENCE DIGESTED CASES] September 11, 2014
Amendment. The protection of all children cannot be achieved in any other way besides application of the act to religious schools. Appellants finally allege the act constitutes excessive governmental entanglement with religion in violation of the First Amendments establishment clause. They argue the court has effectively barred a pastor from religious counseling. However, the reporting requirement is designed to ensure the health and safety of children and therefore fulfills a vital and appropriate secular purpose. The compelling state interest fulfilled by the act justifies the interference with appellants religious practices when appellants are acting in the capacity of child care custodians. DISCUSSION: This case discusses the difference between appellants acting in a pastoral role in the church and a child care custodian role in the school. The Court finds the jury justified in finding that appellants acted in a child care custodian role, and that application of the act to appellants was constitutional.
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People vs. Lliera 82 SCRA 163 FACTS: At about 11 o'clock on the night of June 7, 1914, the deceased, Teofilo Gonzales, was asleep in the house of Alberto Hernandez in the county of Los Angeles. Several members of the Hernandez family were in the house and all had retired for the night. At this time the defendant, together with Juan Lopez and Tomas Estrada, came to the house and knocked at the door. These men were followed in a few minutes by Mrs. Hermana, who lived with Lopez. Shortly afterward, some controversy having arisen, these visitors and some of the Hernandez household were talking together near the house. Thereupon Teofilo Gonzales, roused from sleep by the disturbance, came out and as he came out he asked, "What is the difficulty"? Juan Lopez replied: "Whatever you want," and at the same time struck Gonzales on the left side of the head in the temporal region with a beer bottle. Gonzales fell backward to the ground, and immediately thereafter the defendant Liera fired five times with a pistol, putting five bullets into the body of Gonzales. Appellant's first contention is that the evidence shows that Gonzales was killed instantly by the blow received from Lopez and was dead when the shots were fired by defendant. The testimony of the coroner's physician who examined the body was that the immediate cause of death, in his opinion, was probably a fracture of the skull, and that either one of the injuries would have caused death. All of the physicians agreed that the blow might have caused instantaneous death, but none of them insisted that it necessarily produced that effect. ISSUE: Whether or not that the appellant's own acts in firing the shots would be held to have been sufficient to justify his conviction?
HELD: The court instructed the jury "that in order to render a person an accomplice, he or she must in some manner knowingly and with criminal intent aid, abet, assist or participate in the criminal act." Also, "that an accomplice is one who, knowing that a crime is being committed, willfully and with criminal intent, intentionally aids, abets and assists another in the [EVIDENCE DIGESTED CASES] September 11, 2014
commission of such crime or criminal act, and whether or not one is an accomplice as defined in these instructions, is for the jury to determine from all the testimony and circumstances in proof in the case." Also, that "for one person to abet another in the commission of a criminal offense simply means, to knowingly and with criminal intent, aid, promote, encourage or instigate, by act or counsel, or by both act and counsel, the commission of such criminal offense."