You are on page 1of 5

[EVIDENCE DIGESTED CASES] September 11, 2014

People v. Hodges 46 Phil. 502, 503


FACTS:
At trial, the victim, 20 year old Christine, testified that she had attended
South Bay Christian Academy. At 17 she sought help from appellant Hodges
(president of the school and pastor of the church) by telling him that her
stepfather, a minister in the church, had been molesting her for many years.
Hodges informed her stepfather of the allegations, and told Christine the next
day that her stepfather had confessed to everything, that he would be handling
the situation, and that she should not tell anyone. A few days later, Hodges
told Christine that he had sent her stepfather to a retreat and handed her a
letter of apology from her stepfather. He insisted on having her mother and
stepfather come into the office after she read the letter against her wishes. She
pleaded with Mr. Hodges to not make her go home with her parents because
she was frightened of her stepfather, but he arranged to have her parents pick
her up from school the next day. Instead, she ran away. She
also told others about the situation. She was instructed to return, and on doing
so met with appellants Hodges and Nobbs. Hodges told her unless she returned
home she would not be allowed to return to school and graduate. She returned
home and left immediately after graduation. Mr. Hodges was subsequently
asked during investigation why he did not report the information to police or
child protective services or if he knew he was mandated to report. He told the
officer he knew of the reporting laws, and understood he was a mandated
reporter. He told the officer he wished to take care of the matter within the
church, and that he disciplined the father by having him write the letter of
apology and confess in front of the entire congregation. Additionally, Hodges
took away his ministerial license. Hodges testified that he did not contact the
police because he believed that his role in the matter was a pastoral one, and
that the incidents were sins rather than sexual abuse. Mr. Nob
bs testified he believed he had been acting in a pastoral capacity as assistant
pastor.

ISSUE:

Were appellants properly convicted of violating the Child Abuse and
Neglect Reporting Act, which provides that any child care custodian who has
knowledge of or observes a child in his or her professional capacity or within
the scope of his or her employment whom he or she knows or reasonably
[EVIDENCE DIGESTED CASES] September 11, 2014

suspects has been the victim of child abuse shall report the known or
suspected instance of child abuse to a child protective agency immediately or
as soon as practically possible?
HELD
The jurys decision that appellants were acting within the capacity of a
child care custodian was upheld. The constitutionality of the act as applied to
the appellants was also valid.
Appellants first contend they were not acting as child care custodians
within the meaning of the statute. Mr. Hodges claims he was counseling
Christine as a pastor of the church, with most meetings occurring outside of
school hours. Mr. Nobbs claims he was called only to be informed that
Christines stepfather would be relieved of his ministerial duties, and Mr.
Nobbs would assume them. The definition of child care custodian
means a teacher, administrative officer, or supervisor of child
welfare and attendance of any public or private school. There was
substantial evidence to support the jurys finding that appellants
were child care custodians. The school was attended by the victim
and operated by the church, where religious and academic classes
were taught. Appellants were involved in running the school as
president and principle. Nobbs took care of the day-to-day management,
while Hodges had overall responsibility. Christine testified that she sought
Hodges help because he was in charge of the school.
Appellants next contend the statute violates due process as applied to
them, as it fails to give adequate notice of the obligation to report. The terms
child, child abuse, and child protective agency are all defined. The intent of the
act is to protect children from abuse, and the legislature has been sufficiently
definite to give the constitutionally required degree of notice to those subject to
the acts requirements.
Appellants contend the statute as applied in this case is insufficiently
specific given its impact on activities potentially subject to First Amendment
protection. They argue that they were obligated by their faith to not disclose to
the community the contents of pastoral communications with Christine. The
acts purpose would be severely undermined if appellants failure to report
known child abuse was a protected religious activity under the First
[EVIDENCE DIGESTED CASES] September 11, 2014

Amendment. The protection of all children cannot be achieved in any other way
besides application of the act to religious schools.
Appellants finally allege the act constitutes excessive governmental
entanglement with religion in violation of the First Amendments establishment
clause. They argue the court has effectively barred a pastor from religious
counseling. However, the reporting requirement is designed to ensure the
health and safety of children and therefore fulfills a vital and appropriate
secular purpose. The compelling state interest fulfilled by the act justifies the
interference with appellants religious practices when appellants are acting in
the capacity of child care custodians.
DISCUSSION:
This case discusses the difference between appellants acting in a pastoral role
in the church and a child care custodian role in the school. The Court finds the
jury justified in finding that appellants acted in a child care custodian role, and
that application of the act to appellants was constitutional.














[EVIDENCE DIGESTED CASES] September 11, 2014

People vs. Lliera 82 SCRA 163
FACTS:
At about 11 o'clock on the night of June 7, 1914, the deceased, Teofilo
Gonzales, was asleep in the house of Alberto Hernandez in the county of Los
Angeles. Several members of the Hernandez family were in the house and all
had retired for the night. At this time the defendant, together with Juan Lopez
and Tomas Estrada, came to the house and knocked at the door. These men
were followed in a few minutes by Mrs. Hermana, who lived with Lopez. Shortly
afterward, some controversy having arisen, these visitors and some of the
Hernandez household were talking together near the house. Thereupon Teofilo
Gonzales, roused from sleep by the disturbance, came out and as he came out
he asked, "What is the difficulty"? Juan Lopez replied: "Whatever you want,"
and at the same time struck Gonzales on the left side of the head in the
temporal region with a beer bottle. Gonzales fell backward to the ground, and
immediately thereafter the defendant Liera fired five times with a pistol, putting
five bullets into the body of Gonzales.
Appellant's first contention is that the evidence shows that Gonzales was
killed instantly by the blow received from Lopez and was dead when the shots
were fired by defendant.
The testimony of the coroner's physician who examined the body was
that the immediate cause of death, in his opinion, was probably a fracture of
the skull, and that either one of the injuries would have caused death. All of
the physicians agreed that the blow might have caused instantaneous death,
but none of them insisted that it necessarily produced that effect.
ISSUE:
Whether or not that the appellant's own acts in firing the shots would be held
to have been sufficient to justify his conviction?

HELD:
The court instructed the jury "that in order to render a person an
accomplice, he or she must in some manner knowingly and with criminal
intent aid, abet, assist or participate in the criminal act." Also, "that an
accomplice is one who, knowing that a crime is being committed, willfully and
with criminal intent, intentionally aids, abets and assists another in the
[EVIDENCE DIGESTED CASES] September 11, 2014

commission of such crime or criminal act, and whether or not one is an
accomplice as defined in these instructions, is for the jury to determine from all
the testimony and circumstances in proof in the case." Also, that "for one
person to abet another in the commission of a criminal offense simply means,
to knowingly and with criminal intent, aid, promote, encourage or instigate, by
act or counsel, or by both act and counsel, the commission of such criminal
offense."

You might also like