Civpro Cases Under Rules 10-19

Civil Procedure | February 14, 2014
Case Digests for Rules 10-19 | page 1

RULE 10 Amended and Supplemental Pleadings

Siasoco vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 132753, February 15, 1999, 303 SCRA 186

Doctrine: Notwithstanding the filing of a responsive pleading by one defendant, the
complaint may still be amended once, as a matter of right, by the plaintiff in respect to
claims against the non-answering defendant(s). The Court also reiterates that certiorari is
not the proper remedy to contest a lower courts final adjudication, since appeal is available
as a recourse.

Facts: Petitioners were the registered owners of nine parcels of land located in Montalban,
Rizal. In December 1994, they began to offer the subject properties for sale. Subsequently,
Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) negotiated with the petitioners, but the parties failed to agree on the
terms of the purchase. In their letter dated January 8, 1997, petitioners claimed that the
INC had not really accepted the offer, adding that, prior to their receipt of the
aforementioned reply on December 24, 1996, they had already contracted with Carissa
for the sale of the said properties due to the absence of any response to their offer from
INC.
Maintaining that a sale had been consummated, INC demanded that the corresponding
deed be executed in its favor. Petitioners refused. The ensuing events were narrated by
the Court of Appeals, as follows:

On January 14, 1997, private respondent filed a civil suit for [s]pecific [p]erformance and
[d]amages against petitioners and Carissa Homes and Development & Properties, Inc
(Carissa).

Petitioners filed therein a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue and lack of
capacity to sue.
Carissa Homes filed its answer to the complaint on February 24, 1997.

Pending resolution of petitioners Motion to Dismiss, private respondent negotiated with
Carissa Homes which culminated in the purchase of the subject properties of Carissa
Homes by private respondent.

On April 24, 1997, private respondent filed an [A]mended [C]omplaint, dropping Carissa
Homes as one of the defendants and changing the nature of the case to a mere case for
damages.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Strike Out Amended Complaint, contending that the complaint
cannot be amended without leave of court, since a responsive pleading has been filed.

On August 11, 1997, the first assailed order denying petitioners Motion to Strike Out
Amended Complaint was rendered.

On August 31, 1997, petitioners filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceeding pending the
resolution [by] the respondent court of the Motion to Dismiss earlier filed.

On September 11, 1997, the second assailed order denying petitioners Motion to
Suspend Proceeding was rendered[;] the Order reads:

Filed also last September 1, 1997 [was] a Motion for Suspension by the defendant
Siasoco thru their counsel Atty. Clara Dumandang-Singh. Although the court could not
consider the motion filed because it violates the new rules on personal service, in the
interest of justice, the court will resolve the motion. In the resolution of this court dated
August 11, 1997, it state[d] that defendants [were being] given a period of five (5) days
within which to file [an] answer to the Amended Complaint. The defendants here obviously
refer to the defendants Mario Siasoco, et. al. In the Motion for Suspension filed by the
defendants Siasoco, et al., the latter insist on the court resolving the motion to dismiss. As
stated in the resolution, the motion to dismiss is now moot and academic because of the
Amended Complaint from Specific Performance with Damages to just Damages. For this
court to resolve the Motion to Dismiss xxx the first complaint, would be an exercise in futility.
The main complaint now is damages and no longer Specific Performance with damages
which [was] actually what the Resolution dated August 11, 1997 [was] all about. Be that as
it may, the court gives defendants Siasoco, et al. fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order
to file their respective Answers to the Amended Complaint, not from the receipt of the
resolution of the Motion to Dismiss which will not be forthcoming.

RTCs Decision: RTC (1) admitted the Amended Complaint; (2) dropped Defendant
Carissa from the Complaint; and (3) denied the Motion to Declare Defendants Siasoco et al.
(herein petitioners) in Default. The second Order denied the Motion for Suspension filed by
defendants and directed them to file their answer to plaintiffs Amended Complaint.

CAs Decision: The Court of Appeals (CA) ruled that although private respondent could no
longer amend its original Complaint as a matter of right, it was not precluded from doing so
with leave of court. Thus, the CA concluded that the RTC had not acted with grave abuse
of discretion in admitting private respondents Amended Complaint.

Petitioners argued that the trial court where the original Complaint for specific performance
had been filed was not the proper venue. Debunking petitioners argument, the CA
explained that the RTC nevertheless had jurisdiction over the said Complaint. The CA also
held that the Amended Complaint did not substantially alter private respondents cause of
action, since petitioners were not being asked to answer a legal obligation different from
that stated in the original Complaint.

Issue: WON CA erred in affirming the two Orders of the RTC which had allowed the
Amended Complaint?

Held/ SCs Decision: No.
The petition is devoid of merit. We sustain the Court of Appeals, but for reasons different
from those given in the assailed Decision.

Admission of Amended Complaint

Petitioners argue that the lower courts erred in admitting the Amended Complaint. Under
the Rules, a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a
responsive pleading is served xxx. When private respondent filed its Amended Complaint,
Carissa, the other party-defendant in the original Complaint, had already filed its Answer.
Because a responsive pleading had been submitted, petitioners contend that private
respondent should have first obtained leave of court before filing its Amended Complaint.
This it failed to do. In any event, such leave could not have been granted, allegedly
because the amendment had substantially altered the cause of action.

This argument is not persuasive. It is clear that plaintiff (herein private respondent) can
amend its complaint once, as a matter of right, before a responsive pleading is filed.
Contrary to the petitioners contention, the fact that Carissa had already filed its Answer did
not bar private respondent from amending its original Complaint once, as a matter of right,
against herein petitioners. Indeed, where some but not all the defendants have answered,
plaintiffs may amend their Complaint once, as a matter of right, in respect to claims
asserted solely against the non-answering defendants, but not as to claims asserted
against the other defendants.

The rationale for the aforementioned rule is in Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court,
which provides that after a responsive pleading has been filed, an amendment may be
rejected when the defense is substantially altered. Such amendment does not only
prejudice the rights of the defendant; it also delays the action. In the first place, where a
party has not yet filed a responsive pleading, there are no defenses that can be altered.
Furthermore, the Court has held that [a]mendments to pleadings are generally favored and
should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case may so far as
possible be determined on its real facts and in order to speed the trial of cases or prevent
the circuity of action and unnecessary expense, unless there are circumstances such as
inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like, which might
justify a refusal of permission to amend.

In the present case, petitioners failed to prove that they were prejudiced by private
respondents Amended Complaint. True, Carissa had already filed its own Answer.
Petitioners, however, have not yet filed any. Moreover, they do not allege that their
defense is similar to that of Carissa. On the contrary, private respondents claims against
the latter and against petitioners are different. Against petitioners, whose offer to sell the
subject parcels of land had allegedly been accepted by private respondent, the latter is
suing for specific performance and damages for breach of contract. Although private
respondent could no longer amend, as a matter of right, its Complaint against Carissa, it
could do so against petitioners who, at the time, had not yet filed an answer.

The amendment did not prejudice the petitioners or delay the action. On the contrary, it
simplified the case and tended to expedite its disposition. The Amended Complaint
became simply an action for damages, since the claims for specific performance and
declaration of nullity of the sale have been deleted.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioners.

Versoza vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 119511, November 24, 1998, 299 SCRA 100

DOCTRINE: When the amended complaint does not introduce new issues, causes of
action, or demands, the suit is deemed to have commenced on the date the original
complaint was filed, not on the date of the filing of the amended complaint

FACTS:

Fe Giron Uson is the owner of a parcel. She mortgaged the land to Wilfredo Verzosa. Fe
Uson failed to pay her entire obligation to Verzosa, prompting the latter to have the
mortgage foreclosed.
Fe Uson, on August 12, 1988, filed a complaint against Wilfredo Verzosa and the Provincial
Sheriff for annulment of mortgage with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. Verzosa filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The complaint was dismissed
on the ground that it was not personally verified by plaintiff Fe Uson. Fe Uson filed a motion
for reconsideration which was granted by the court. She filed her amended complaint which
bears the proper verification. Meantime, Verzosa wrote the Provincial Sheriff to proceed
with the foreclosure of mortgage.

On July 4, 1989, the foreclosure sale was conducted by the sheriff. The property was sold
to Verzosa being the highest bidder. Verzosa subsequently sold the same land to Martinez
On September 5, 1989, the trial court issued an order admitting the amended complaint of
Fe Uson.
At this point, Verzosa filed with the Court of Appeals CA-G.R. SP No. 18898 for certiorari.
He alleged that the said order, admitting the amended complaint was issued with grave
abuse of discretion. CA denied certiorari.

On May 20, 1991, Fe Uson filed her second amended complaint impleading as additional
defendants the Register of Deeds of Alaminos, Pangasinan and Pilar Martinez and praying,
among others, the annulment of the latters title -- T.C.T. No. 11107.

On November 22, 1991, respondent judge issued an order to the effect that the status quo
being maintained is the possession of plaintiff Fe Uson of the land (grounded on the
time of filing if the original complaint) and that such status quo does not refer to defendant
Pilar Martinez being the registered owner.

TC: Status Quo is in effect at the time of the original complaint

CA: Affirmed TC

ISSUE: WON the suit is deemed to have been filed on the date of the original complaint or
the amended complaint

HELD: When there is no new issues, cause of action or demands made, it is deemed to
have been filed on the date of the original complaint

SC:

According to the SC, The status quo is the last actual peaceful uncontested situation
which precedes a controversy, and its preservation is the office of an injunctive writ.
Although the Complaint was subsequently amended, the controversy began when the first
Complaint was filed. Petitioners contend that the controversy started only when the
Amended Complaint was filed, because the previous Complaints were expunged from the
records. Petitioners invoke Ruymann v. Director of Lands, in which the Court ruled that the
filing of an amended pleading does not retroact to the date of the filing of the original.
However, in Ruymann, the Court held that an amendment to a complaint which introduces
a new or different cause of action, making a new or different demand, is equivalent to a
fresh suit upon a new cause of action, and the statute of limitations continues to run until
the amendment is filed.

It follows that when the amended complaint does not introduce new issues, causes
of action, or demands, the suit is deemed to have commenced on the date the
original complaint was filed, not on the date of the filing of the amended complaint.
In other words, for demands already included in the original complaint, the suit is deemed
to have commenced upon the filing of such original complaint. In short, for purposes of
determining the commencement of a suit, the original complaint is deemed abandoned and
superseded by the amended complaint only if the amended complaint introduces a new or
different cause of action or demand.

Chua vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 109840, January 21, 1999, 301 SCRA 356

DOCTRINE:Any objection to the admissibility of evidence should be made at the time such
evidence is offered or as soon thereafter as the objection to its admissibility becomes
apparent,otherwise the objection will be considered waived and such evidence will form
part of the records of the case as competent and admissible evidence. Rule 10, 5of the
Rules of Civil Procedure allows the amendment of the pleadings in order to make them
conform to the evidence in the record.

FACTS:
! Petitioners were lessees of a commercial unit in Paraaque. The lease was for 5
years, from January 1, 1985 to December 31, 1989.
! The contract expressly provided for the renewal of the lease at the option of the
lessees in accordance with the terms of agreement and conditions set by the
lessor.
! Prior to the expiration of the lease, the parties discussed the possibility of
renewing it. They exchanged proposal and counterproposal, but they failed to
reach agreement. The dispute was referred to the barangay captain for
conciliation but still no settlement was reached by the parties.
! On July 24, 1990, private respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
against petitioners
MTC: Petitioners were granted an extension of (2) years extension of occupancy of the
subject premises starting the date of the filing of the instant complaint
On appeal, RTC: ordered petitioners to vacate the premises turn over possession to private
respondents
CA: affirmed RTCs decision
Arguments and SC Ruling:
1. Petitioners allege that the CA erred in affirming the lower courts finding that
they owe private respondent unpaid rentals because neither the letter of
demand nor the complaint for unlawful detainer alleged a claim for unpaid
rentals.
HELD:
o While it is true that there was no express demand in private
respondents complaint for unlawful detainer against
petitioners for the latters payment of rental arrearages,
private respondent in a pleading filed with the MTC (by way
of comment to petitioners motion to admit amended answer)
it stated That moreover the unpaid rentals from January
1987 to December 31, 1989 amounts to FORTY TWO
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIX PESOS (P42,306.00),
exclusive of rentals from January 1 to December 31, 1990
which would be one hundred eighty thousand pesos
(P180,000.00) or a total of TWO HUNDRED TWENTY TWO
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIX PESOS (222,306.00)
o Then, at the pre-trial of December 17, 1990, among the issues
proposed by counsel for private respondent was W/N
Defendants are in arrears for the rentals from Dec. 31, 1987
to January 1989, in accordance with the contract.
o And since counsel for petitioners did not object to the
statement of issues made by plaintiffs counsel and instead
simply stated as their own main issue whether plaintiff had a
valid cause of action for ejectment against them as he is not
the sole owner of the leased premises, and then averred that
based on this premise, the other issues raised by plaintiff
could be dependent on the resolution of the stated issues .
o Obviously, then, petitioners rental arrearages from 1986 to
1989 was an issue raised at the pre-trial and on which issue
private respondent presented evidence without any objection
from petitioners.
! Indeed, any objection to the admissibility of evidence should be made
at the time such evidence is offered or as soon thereafter as the
objection to its admissibility becomes apparent,otherwise the objection
will be considered waived and such evidence will form part of the
records of the case as competent and admissible evidence. Rule 10,
5of the Rules of Civil Procedure allows the amendment of the
pleadings in order to make them conform to the evidence in the record.
2. Petitioners claim that they are entitled to an extension of time to occupy the
premises in question.
! HELD : Without merit. After the lease terminated on January 1, 1990
and without the parties thereafter reaching any agreement for its
renewal, petitioners became deforciants subject to ejectment from the
premises.
3. The appellate court found petitioners guilty of bad faith in refusing to leave
the premises. But petitioners contend that they acted in good faith under the
belief that they were entitled to an extension of the lease because they had made
repairs and improvements on the premises.
! HELD: Devoid of merit. The fact that petitioners allegedly made
repairs on the premises in question is not a reason for them to retain
the possession of the premises. There is no provision of law which
grants the lessee a right of retention over the leased premises on that
ground.
4. Lastly, Petitioners contend that the CA erredd in affirming the denial of their
counterclaim for damages for their failure to enjoy the peaceful possession of the
premises because private respondent allowed vendors to ply their trade at the
front portion of the leased premises. Petitioners claim that, as a result, they
suffered business losses and moral injuries.
! HELD: There no evidence to support this claim. Petitioners never
complained before about the sidewalk vendors occupying a portion of
the leased property. It was only after negotiations for renewal of the
lease had failed and private respondent had filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer against them did they complain about the vendors.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

Asean Pacific v. City of Urdaneta, G.R. No. 162525, September 23, 2008

DOCTRINE: Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that if evidence is
objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues raised by the pleadings,
the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the
presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved
thereby.

FACTS: This case stemmed from a Complaint for annulment of contracts with prayer for
preliminary prohibitory injunction and temporary restraining order filed by respondent Waldo
C. Del Castillo, in his capacity as taxpayer, against respondents City of Urdaneta and
Ceferino J. Capalad doing business under the name JJEFWA Builders, and petitioners
Asean Pacific Planners (APP) represented by Ronilo G. Goco and Asean Pacific Planners
Construction and Development Corporation (APPCDC) represented by Cesar D. Goco.

Del Castillo alleged that then Urdaneta City Mayor Rodolfo E. Parayno entered into five
contracts for the preliminary design, construction and management of a four-storey twin
cinema commercial center and hotel involving a massive expenditure of public funds
amounting to P250 million, funded by a loan from the Philippine National Bank (PNB). For
minimal work, the contractor was allegedly paid P95 million. Del Castillo also claimed that
all the contracts are void because the object is outside the commerce of men. The object is
a piece of land belonging to the public domain and which remains devoted to a public
purpose as a public elementary school. Additionally, he claimed that the contracts, from the
feasibility study to management and lease of the future building, are also void because they
were all awarded solely to the Goco family.

In their Answer, APP and APPCDC claimed that the contracts are valid. Urdaneta City
Mayor Amadeo R. Perez, Jr., who filed the city's Answer, joined in the defense and
asserted that the contracts were properly executed by then Mayor Parayno with prior
authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Mayor Perez also stated that Del Castillo has
no legal capacity to sue and that the complaint states no cause of action. For respondent
Ceferino J. Capalad, Atty. Oscar C. Sahagun filed an Answer with compulsory counterclaim
and motion to dismiss on the ground that Del Castillo has no legal standing to sue.

After pre-trial, Urdaneta City allegedly wanted to rectify its position and claimed that
inadequate legal representation caused its inability to file the necessary pleadings in
representation of its interests.

TC: In its Order dated September 11, 2002, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta
City, Pangasinan, Branch 45, admitted its complaint for consolidation with Del Castillo's
complaint, and directed the defendants to answer the city's complaint.

In its February 14, 2003 Order,the RTC denied reconsideration of the September 11, 2002
Order. It also granted that the complaint filed by Atty. Jorito C. Peralta be admitted and
consolidated with the complaints of Del Castillo and Urdaneta City.

CA: CA dismissed the petition on the following grounds: (1) defective verification and
certification of non-forum shopping, (2) failure of the petitioners to submit certified true
copies of the RTC's assailed orders as mere photocopies were submitted, and (3) lack of
written explanation why service of the petition to adverse parties was not personal.

CA also
denied APP and APPCDC's motion for reconsideration in its February 4, 2004
Resolution.

ISSUE: WON Urdaneta City is estopped to reverse admissions in its Answer that the
contracts are valid and, in its pre-trial brief, that the execution of the contracts was in good
faith.

SC/HELD: We disagree. The court may allow amendment of pleadings.

Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that if evidence is objected to
at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues raised by the pleadings, the court
may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of
the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby.
Objections need not even arise in this case since the Pre-trial Order dated April 1, 2002
already defined as an issue whether the contracts are valid. Thus, what is needed is
presentation of the parties' evidence on the issue. Any evidence of the city for or against
the validity of the contracts will be relevant and admissible. Note also that under Section 5,
Rule 10, necessary amendments to pleadings may be made to cause them to conform to
the evidence.

In addition, despite Urdaneta City's judicial admissions, the trial court is still given leeway to
consider other evidence to be presented for said admissions may not necessarily prevail
over documentary evidence, e.g., the contracts assailed. A party's testimony in open court
may also override admissions in the Answer.

Tiu v. PBCOM, G.R. No. 151932, August 19, 2009

DOCTRINE: Even if the amendment substantially alters the cause of action or defense,
such amendment could still be allowed when it is sought to serve the higher interest of
substantial justice; prevent delay; and secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
actions and proceedings.

Asian Water Resources, Inc. (AWRI), represented by petitioners, applied and was
approved for real estate loans with the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCOM).

The first loan was secured by a piece of land as collateral. The second, a bigger loan, was
unsecured. Instead, the members of the Board of Directors of AWRI became sureties under
a Surety Agreement; all copies thereof, except two, were kept by PBCOM -- of these two
kept by the notary public, one copy was retained for his notarial file and the other sent to
the Records Management and Archives Office, through the Office of the RTC Clerk of
Court.

AWRI defaulted. It offered PBCOM all its present properties as dacion en pago. PBCOM
denied the request, instead demanding full payment. AWRI failed to respond thus PBCOM
filed a complaint for collection against petitioners.

In their answer, petitioners alleged that the Surety Agreement was falsified. The words "In
his personal capacity" did not yet appear in the document and were merely intercalated
thereon without their consent evidenced by a certified photocopy of the Surety Agreement
issued by the Records Management and Archives Office showing no entry of the words "In
his personal capacity" in the original document. The notarial copy too showed that the
words "In his personal capacity" did not appear on the Surety Agreement.

PBCOM discovered that the insertion was ordered by the bank auditor. They therefore filed
a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim with Motion for Leave of Court to substitute the
subject document on the Complaint with the duplicate original copy retrieved from the file of
the notary public. PBCOM also admitted its mistake in making the insertion and explained
that it was made without the knowledge and consent of the notary public. PBCOM
maintained that the insertion was not a falsification, but was made only to speak the truth of
the parties intentions. PBCOM also contended that petitioners were already primarily liable
on the Surety Agreement whether or not the insertion was made, having admitted in their
pleadings that they voluntarily executed and signed the Surety Agreement in the original
form. PBCOM, invoking a liberal application of the Rules, emphasized that the motion
incorporated in the pleading can be treated as a motion for leave of court to amend and
admit the amended complaint pursuant to Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.

RTC DECISION: the RTC issued an Order allowing the substitution of the altered
document with the original Surety Agreement, the pertinent portion. A motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioners thereafter was also denied.

CA DECISION: Dismissed the case for lack of merit.

ISSUE: WON the substitution of the document is valid.

HELD: Yes. PBCOMs right under Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, to amend its
complaint, including the documents annexed thereto, after petitioners have filed their
answer, specifically allows amendment by leave of court. The said Section states:

SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court. Except as provided in the next preceding
section, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave
may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay.
Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion
filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.

This Court has emphasized the import of Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure in Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals,26 thus:

Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former
rule in such manner that the phrase "or that the cause of action or defense is substantially
altered" was stricken-off and not retained in the new rules. The clear import of such
amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, "the amendment may (now)
substantially alter the cause of action or defense." This should only be true, however, when
despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense, the
amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and
prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a
"just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."

The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court; and that discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations
that the amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory
of the case, or that it was not made to delay the action.Nevertheless, as enunciated in
Valenzuela, even if the amendment substantially alters the cause of action or defense,
such amendment could still be allowed when it is sought to serve the higher interest of
substantial justice; prevent delay; and secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
actions and proceedings.

The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid a multiplicity of
suits and in order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights
determined, and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality
is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the amendment
was made before the trial of the case, thereby giving the petitioners all the time allowed by
law to answer and to prepare for trial.

Furthermore, amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally
allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case, may so far as possible, be
determined on its real facts and in order to speed up the trial of the case or prevent the
circuity of action and unnecessary expense. That is, unless there are circumstances such
as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like, which might
justify a refusal of permission to amend.

In the present case, there was no fraudulent intent on the part of PBCOM in submitting the
altered surety agreement. In fact, the bank admitted that it was a mistake on their part to
have submitted it in the first place instead of the original agreement. It also admitted that,
through inadvertence, the copy that was attached to the complaint was the copy wherein
the words "IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY" were inserted to conform to the banks
standard practice. This alteration was made without the knowledge of the notary public.
PBCOMs counsel had no idea that what it submitted was the altered document, thereby
necessitating the substitution of the surety agreement with the original thereof, in order that
the case would be judiciously resolved.

Verily, it is a cardinal rule of evidence, not just one of technicality but of substance, that the
written document is the best evidence of its own contents. It is also a matter of both
principle and policy that when the written contract is established as the repository of the
parties stipulations, any other evidence is excluded, and the same cannot be used to
substitute for such contract, or even to alter or contradict the latter. The original surety
agreement is the best evidence that could establish the parties respective rights and
obligations. In effect, the RTC merely allowed the amendment of the complaint, which
consequently included the substitution of the altered surety agreement with a copy of the
original.

It is well to remember at this point that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application that would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be
avoided. Applied to the instant case, this not only assures that it would be resolved based
on real facts, but would also aid in the speedy disposition of the case by utilizing the best
evidence possible to determine the rights and obligations of the party- litigants.

Moreover, contrary to petitioners contention, they could not be prejudiced by the
substitution since they can still present the substituted documents as part of the evidence
of their affirmative defenses. The substitution did not prejudice petitioners or delay the
action. On the contrary, it tended to expedite the determination of the controversy. Besides,
the petitioners are not precluded from filing the appropriate criminal action against PBCOM
for attaching the altered copy of the surety agreement to the complaint. The substitution of
the documents would not, in any way, erase the existence of falsification, if any. The case
before the RTC is civil in nature, while the alleged falsification is criminal, which is separate
and distinct from another. Thus, the RTC committed no reversible error when it allowed the
substitution of the altered surety agreement with that of the original.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Orders of the Regional
Trial Court are AFFIRMED.

RULE 12 Bill of Particulars

Tantuico, Jr. vs. Republic G. R. No. 89114, December 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 428

Doctrine: The function or purpose of a bill of particulars to define, clarify, particularize, and
limit or circumscribe the issues in the case, to expedite the trial, and assist the court.

Facts: The Republic of the Philippines, represented by Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) filed a case before Sandiganbayan against Kokoy Romualdez,
Ferdinand Marcos et. al. (including Francisco Tantuico) for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution and damages. Tantuico, being the previous chairman of the
Commission on Audit, was alleged to have acted in conspiracy with the other defendants
for misappropriation, theft of public funds, plunder, and other acts of corruption.

Tantuico filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars asking for clarification on several allegations
against him, arguing that the Complaint filed was couched in too general terms, not
particularly describing acts allegedly committed by him. However, the Sandiganbayan
denied his Motion stating that the Complaint was clear and sufficient for Tantuico to know
the nature and scope of the cause of action against him. Tantuico filed his Motion for
Reconsideration but was also denied.

Thus, he filed this case with the SC.

Issue: W/N the Sandiganbayan acted in grave abuse of discretion in denying Tantuicos
Motion for Bill of Particular.

Held: Yes, the Sandiganbayan should have granted Tantuicos Motion for Bill of
Particulars.

It must be noted that a complaint must state only ultimate facts, not conclusions of law,
constituting the plaintiff's cause or causes of action. This is to inform the defendant clearly
and definitely of the claims made against him so that he may be prepared to meet the
issues at the trial.

The definition of ultimate facts is as follows: important and substantial facts which either
directly form the basis of the primary right and duty, or which directly make up the wrongful
acts or omissions of the defendant. The term does not refer to the details of probative
matter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to be established. It
refers to principal, determinate, constitutive facts, upon the existence of which, the entire
cause of action rests.

A perusal of the complaint shows that the allegations against Tantuico were mere
conclusions of law unsupported by factual premises.[1] In fact, the complaint does not
allege what duties the petitioner failed to perform, or the particular rights he abused. Thus,
it failed to inform Tantuico the claims made against him so that he may be prepared to
meet the issues at the trial

Premises considered, it is correct for Tantuico to file a Bill of Particulars, as the object of
which is to amplify or limit a pleading, specify more minutely and particularly a claim or
defense set up and pleaded in general terms, give information, not contained in the
pleading, to the opposite party and the court as to the precise nature, character, scope, and
extent of the cause of action or defense relied on by the pleader, and apprise the opposite
party of the case which he has to meet, to the end that the proof at the trial may be limited
to the matters specified, and in order that surprise at, and needless preparation for, the trial
may be avoided.

Uy vs. Court of Appeals G. R. No. L-49059, May 9, 1980, 232 SCRA 579

FACTS:
The case started in the municipal court of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya which dismissed the
January 1975 complaint for ejectment filed by Busa against herein petitioners. The
complaint was based on the ground that petitioners were occupying Busa's lot without any
lease contract and without paying any compensation for the use thereof.

Busa appealed to the CFI which found that the petitioners occupied Busa's lot and built a
school building on the basis of a 15-year lease contract which expired on April 1972. After
the lease expired, Busa sent demand letters informing petitioners that he was not renewing
the lease and required them to vacate the lot.

TC:
The CFI held that, as the lease was not renewed and no rentals were paid, Busa was
entitled to recover possession of his lot and that petitioners are liable to pay reasonable
compensation for their use and occupation. Petitioners appealed to the CA.

CA:
The CA dismissed the petition. Petitioners' MR was also denied. Petitioners did not appeal
from the decision; hence, entry of judgment was made on July 1978.

About 3 months later, the petitioners filed the instant petition contending that the municipal
court had no jurisdiction over the case and, therefore, the proceedings there and in the
other courts are void.

The lack of jurisdiction is based on the theory that petitioners (as defendants) pleaded in
the municipal court the defense that the lease was renewed by virtue of the provision in the
contract that it "shall be for a period of 15 years renewable at the option of the Lessee".
Hence, it was necessary for the municipal court to interpret the renewal clause and thus the
action was transformed from an unlawful detainer case into an action that is "incapable of
pecuniary estimation" which falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the CFI.

ISSUE:
W/N the action was beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court being one that is
incapable of pecuniary estimation rather than an unlawful detainer case?

SC:
NO. Original jurisdiction belongs to the Municipal Court; action is a valid unlawful detainer
case. Petition dismissed. Judgment of the CFI should be enforced.

The complaint in the municipal court was for ejectment based on the demands to vacate,
the last of which was a July 1974 letter, wherein Busa required the petitioners to vacate his
lot, remove their improvements and pay P150 a month as the reasonable compensation for
the use of the lot. The filing of the ejectment or unlawful detainer action was within the 1-
year period counted from the last demand.

The inferior court's jurisdiction in an ejectment case is determined by the nature of the
action set forth in the complaint. Even if this case involved the interpretation of the renewal
clause of the lease contract, it was, nevertheless, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the municipal court because the petitioners were ejected not because of the non-renewal of
the lease but because of nonpayment of rentals.

Consequently, we cannot apply to this case the ruling that where the case hinges on the
correct interpretation of the renewal clause of the lease contract, the action is not for
unlawful detainer but one which is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation and is beyond
the competence of the municipal court. As already stated, the CFI ejected the petitioners on
the ground of nonpayment of rental.

Furthermore, the jurisdictional issue as to the case not being susceptible of pecuniary
estimation was never raised by the petitioners in the municipal court and in the CFI nor in
their brief in the CA. They assailed for the first time the municipal court's jurisdiction on that
ground in their MR in the CA.

Therefore, there is some basis for Busa's contention that the CFI decided the case in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction without any objection on the part of the petitioners and
that they are estopped to question the jurisdiction of the municipal court, although ordinarily
jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived and lack of jurisdiction may be raised
anytime.

Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148154, December 17, 2007
Doctrine:
Default judgments are frowned upon, and the SC has been advising the courts
below to be liberal in setting aside default orders to give both parties every chance to
present their case fairly without resort to technicality; Judicial experience shows that resort
to motions for bills of particulars is sometimes intended for delay or, even if not so intended,
actually result in delay since the reglementary period for filing a responsive pleading is
suspended and the subsequent proceedings are likewise set back in the meantime.
The 1991 Virata-Mapa Doctrine prescribes a motion for a bill of particulars, not a
motion to dismiss, as the remedy for perceived ambiguity or vagueness of acomplaint for
the recovery of ill-gotten wealth.

Facts:
! The main issue in this case is the propriety of filing and granting of a motion for a
bill of particulars filed for the estate of a defaulting and deceased defendant (Pres.
F. Marcos).
! Roman Cruz is impleaded as an alleged crony of President Marcos.
" Cruz, then Pres and GM of GSIS, Pres of PAL, Pres and owner of
Hyatt Hotel. Chairman of Commercial Bank of Manila,
! When the PCGG went after the cronies, in hopes of recovering the wealth he and
his family (Marcoses) and cronies amassed during his reign, an alias summons
was served upon him in Hawaii, his place of exile. Since he was not able to file a
responsive pleading, he was then declared in default, upon motion by the
Republic of the Philippines.
! When the order of exile was lifted after the death of the fallen President, his wife,
Mrs. Marcos moved to set aside the order of default, which motion was granted
by the Sandiganbayan.
" Sandiganbayan: found that a myriad of events, such as their exile,
President Marcos ill health and numerous other civil and criminal suits
against the latter was reasonable cause to lift the order of default.
! The Presidents son, Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. (BongBong), as the executor of his
fathers estate, petitioned the court for extension of time to file a responsive
pleading, which the court granted.
" However, instead of filing an answer, Bong-Bong filed a Motion For Bill
of Particulars, praying for clearer statements of the allegations which
he called mere conclusions of law, too vague and general to enable
defendants to intelligently answer.
# Sandiganbayan: upheld respondent, explaining that the
allegations against former President Marcos were vague,
general, and were mere conclusions of law. It pointed out
that the accusations did not specify the ultimate facts of
former President Marcos' participation in Cruz's alleged
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth, effectively preventing
respondent from intelligently preparing an answer. It noted
that this was not the first time the same issue was raised
before it, and stressed that this Court had consistently ruled
in favor of the motions for bills of particulars of the
defendants in the other ill-gotten wealth cases involving the
Marcoses.
# The PCGG opposed the motion, arguing that the requested
particulars were evidentiary matters; that the motion was
dilatory.
! The Republic argued that since Bong-Bong filed a motion for extension of time to
file an answer, the Sandiganbayan should not have accepted the formers motion
for bill of particulars.
" It argued that the charges were clear, and that other parties, such as
Cruz, also linked to the controversy of ill-gotten wealth, have already
filed their own answers, thus proving that the complaint was not in fact
couched in too general terms.

ISSUE:
Did the court commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in granting respondent's motion for a bill of particulars as
executor of former President Marcos' estates considering that the deceased
defendant was then a defaulting defendant when the motion was filed? (found on
SCRA page 444)

HELD
NO. In his motion for a bill of particulars, respondent wanted clarification on the specific
nature, manner and extent of participation of his father in the acquisition of the assets cited
above under Cruz; particularly whether former President Marcos was a beneficial owner of
these properties; and the specific manner in which he acquired such beneficial control.
While the allegations as to the alleged specific acts of Cruz were clear, they were
vague and unclear as to the acts of the Marcos couple who were allegedly "in unlawful
concert with" the former.
There was no factual allegation in the original and expanded complaints on the
collaboration of or on the kind of support extended by former President Marcos to Cruz in
the commission of the alleged unlawful acts constituting the alleged plunder. All the
allegations against the Marcoses, aside from being maladroitly laid, were couched in
general terms. The alleged acts, conditions and circumstances that could show the
conspiracy among the defendants were not particularized and sufficiently set forth by
petitioner.

SC: Resolutions of Sandiganbayan affirmed.

Addl notes:
A motion for bill of particulars becomes moot and academic where, prior to its filing, the
defendant has already filed his answer and several other pleadings.

Estardante v. People, G.R. Nos. 156851-55, February 18, 2008

DOCTRINE: While the Bill of Particulars is not allowed under the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman and therefore should not be the basis for determining what
specific criminal charges should be filed against herein petitioner, it behooves the
Ombudsman to accord the petitioner her basic rights to due process in the conduct of the
preliminary investigation.

FACTS: Petitioner was the school principal of the Ramon Torres National High School
(RTNHS).

On 1998, a group of concerned RTNHS teachers, composed of the Faculty and Personnel
Club Officers and department heads (private complainants), sent an undated letter to the
Schools Division attaching a list of 15 irregularities allegedly committed by the petitioner,
which the private complainants requested to be investigated. Two complaints were
eventually filed by private complainants against petitioner with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas.

The Ombudsman-Visayas forwarded the complaint City Prosecutor for preliminary
investigation. The City Prosecutor served the petitioner with a subpoena on August 28,
2000 and another on August 30, 2000, requiring her to submit her counter-affidavit \

Instead of filing a counter-affidavit, petitioner filed before the City Prosecutor a Motion for
Bill of Particulars with Motion for Extension of Time to File Counter-Affidavit. In the Motion
for Bill of Particulars, petitioner alleged that there were no specific criminal charges that
were stated in the subpoenas. Thus, petitioner insisted that she cannot intelligently
prepare her counter-affidavit unless the criminal charges and the laws she violated are
specified.

On March 10, 2000, the City Prosecutor issued an Order attaching the private complainants
Bill of Particulars pertinent portions of which read:

Complaint 23 & 25

The principal Ms. Estandarte accepted cash and in kind donations without being
properly channeled and accounted first by the property custodian and the cash
without first deposited in the Trust Fund.

x x x x

and directing the petitioner to file her counter-affidavit. Petitioner filed her counter-affidavit
limiting herself only to the charges specified in the Bill of Particulars.

Thereafter, the City Prosecutor referred the case back to the Ombudsman The latter found
sufficient grounds to hold petitioner liable for five counts of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and filed before the
RTC the corresponding Informations.

On May 21, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation before the RTC on the
ground that she cannot allegedly be charged with violation of Sections 68 and 69 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445 since she was not a collecting officer. She also asserts
that she cannot be charged under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as the acts which she was
charged with, did not constitute manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable
negligence.

TC: On September 24 2002, RTC denied MR.

Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the September 24,
2002 Order. Petitioner maintains that when the five Informations for the violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 were filed by the Ombudsman, her right to due process was violated;
and that the Ombudsman in effect went beyond the Bill of Particulars filed by the private
complainants.

In the other assailed Order dated December 20, 2002, the RTC denied the Motion for
Reconsideration.

Hence, herein petition.

ISSUES:

1. WON the Ombudsman-Visayas erred in not considering the Bill of Particulars
submitted by the private complainants and should have limited the charges filed
against the petitioner to the crimes mentioned in the Bill of Particulars -- NO
2. WON the Ombudsman violate the petitioners right to due process when it went
beyond the bill of particulars remanded to rtc for determination

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that a bill of particulars is not allowed by
Administrative Order No. 7, entitled Rules of Procedure in the Office of the Ombudsman
(A.O. No. 7); and that therefore the Ombudsman cannot be bound by the Bill of Particulars
submitted by private complainants.

The Court agrees with the OSG. Clearly, the act of the prosecutor in granting the
petitioners Motion for Bill of Particulars is an act contrary to the express mandate of A.O.
No. 7, to wit:

Section 4. Procedure- The preliminary investigation of cases falling under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts shall be conducted
in the manner prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, subject to
the following provisions:
x x x x

d) No motion to dismiss shall be allowed except for lack of jurisdiction. Neither
may a motion for a bill of particulars be entertained. If the respondent
desires any matter in the complainants affidavit to be clarified, the
particularization thereof may be done at the time of clarificatory questioning in the
manner provided in paragraph (f) of this section.

The Court finds the argument of petitioner that when the City Prosecutor was deputized by
the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation, any action taken therein is, in
effect, an action of the Ombudsman, who is bound by the act of the City Prosecutor in
granting the Motion for Bill of Particulars, and is not tenable.

Section 31 of R.A. No. 6770 or The Ombudsman Act of 1989 expressly provides that those
designated or deputized to assist the Ombudsman shall be under his supervision and
control. Indubitably, when the City Prosecutor is deputized by the Office of the
Ombudsman, he comes under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman which
means that he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve,
reverse or modify the prosecutors decision.

Consequently, in the present case, petitioner has no valid basis for insisting that the
Ombudsman-Visayas must be bound by the erroneous act of the City Prosecutor in
granting petitioners Motion for Bill of Particulars. Laws and jurisprudence grant the Office
of the Ombudsman the authority to reverse or nullify the acts of the prosecutor pursuant to
its power of control and supervision over deputized prosecutors. Hence, it was within the
prerogative of the Ombudsman-Visayas not to consider the Bill of Particulars
submitted by the private complainants.

SECOND ISSUE:

Petitioner claims that her right to due process was violated when the Ombudsman-Visayas
filed the Informations charging her with violations of R.A. No. 3019, which went beyond the
charges specified in the Bill of Particulars. Petitioner further argues that since there were no
criminal charges stated in the subpoenas served on her on August 28, 2000 and August 30,
2000, she was not properly informed of the nature of the crime which she was supposed to
answer in her counter-affidavit

While the Bill of Particulars is not allowed under the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman and therefore should not be the basis for determining what specific criminal
charges should be filed against herein petitioner, it behooves the Ombudsman to accord
the petitioner her basic rights to due process in the conduct of the preliminary investigation.

In the pleadings submitted before this Court, petitioner complained that the subpoenas
served on her did not state the law allegedly violated by her.

In the Motion for Bill of Particulars she filed before the City Prosecutor, she declared that
she was served with subpoena together with the documents attached therein.

However, after a thorough examination of the records, the Court does not find the
subpoenas and the alleged documents served on her. Absent the subpoenas and the
documents attached to the subpoenas, how could it be intelligently determined whether she
was fully apprised of the acts complained of and imputed to her; whether she was given the
opportunity to submit an appropriate counter-affidavit to the charges; and whether the
charges in the five Informations filed against petitioner were based on the same acts
complained of and stated in the subpoena and the documents attached thereto?

While there is no rule that the initial complaint filed against an accused with the
prosecutors office should specifically state the particular law under which he is being
charged, it is a basic elementary rule that the complaint should specifically allege the
criminal acts complained of, so as to enable the accused to prepare his answer or counter-
affidavit accurately and intelligently.

The determination of the issue whether the criminal charges were indeed alleged or
specified in the subpoenas and in the documents attached thereto, is a factual issue and
therefore outside the province of this Court. It is a well-settled rule that the Supreme Court
is not the proper venue in which to consider a factual issue, as it is not a trier of facts.

In resolving the question whether petitioner was denied due process, the RTC or this Court
cannot rely on the disputable presumption that official duties have been regularly performed.
The RTC should have required the petitioner to submit the subpoenas and the attached
documents served on her to enable it to examine the same and resolve whether the
petitioners right to be informed was violated. It was only upon ascertaining this fact that
the RTC could have validly determined whether petitioner was denied due process.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated
September 24, 2002 and December 20, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of BagoCity,
Branch 62 are SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court for determination
whether petitioner was denied due process in the conduct of the preliminary investigation.

RULE 13 Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments and Other Papers

Justice Serafin R. Cuevas vs. Juan Antonio Muoz G.R. No. 140520, December 18,
2000

Doctrine:

Request for extradition need not be filed in court, rather only need be received by
the requested state. The request, as well as the accompanying documents, are valid
despite lack of authentication. The pertinent extradition law does not provide for a
requirement of authentication for the provisional arrest. Moreover, the authenticated copies
of the decision or sentence imposed upon Munoz by HK and the warrant of arrest has
already been received by the Phil. Furthermore, the extradition agreement only requires
authentication for the request of extradition and not for the provisional arrest

Facts:

The Hong Kong Magistrates Court issued a warrant for the arrest of Munoz for
accepting bribes in violation of a HK ordinance and for conspiring to defraud. Later, the
Philippines DOJ was requested by the Mutual Legal Assistance Unit of the Hong Kong DOJ
for the provisional arrest of Munoz pursuant to the RP-HK Extradition Agreement. The
request was forwarded to the NBI.

TC:
Subsequently, a warrant for the arrest of Munoz was issued by the RTC.

CA:
Munoz filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
application forpreliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus assailing the
validity of the Order of Arrest, which the CA granted on the ff. grounds: 1) that the request
was unauthenticated and merefacsimile copies which are insufficient to form a basis for its
issuance;
2) that the 20 day period underPD 1069 or the Philippine extradition law was not amended
by the RP-HK extradition agreement whichprovides for a 45 day period for provisional
arrest;
3) the judge issued it without having personallydetermined the existence of probable cause;
and
4) the requirement of dual criminality under thePhilippine extradition law has not been
satisfied as the crimes complained of are not punishable by Philippine laws.

Cuevas, as Sec. of DOJ filed the instant petition. Munoz filed for release
contending that since he has been detained beyond 20 days, the maximum for the
provisional arrest, without a request for extradition being received by the DOJ, he should be
released.Cuevas, on the other hand, avers that:

i) The Philippine DOJ had already received a formal request for extradition.

ii) There was urgency for the provisional arrestiii)The municipal law does not
subordinate an international agreement
iii) The supporting documents for the request need not be authenticated
iv) There was factual and legal bases in determining probable cause
v) The offense of accepting an advantage as an agent is punishable under the
Anti-Graftand Corrupt Practices Act

Issue:

(1) Whether the provisional warrant of arrest issued by the RTC was void NO
(2) Whether the request for extradition need to be filed in court NO

SC:
Sec. 20 of PD 1069 provides that the requesting state may, pursuant to the
relevant treaty or convention and while the same remains in force, request for the
provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition. In urgent
cases, the person sought may, in accordance with the law of the requested Party, be
provisionally arrested on the application of the requesting Party. There was urgency in the
present case as there was a concern of Munoz being a flight risk if he will be informed of
the pending request for extradition especially given the fact that if he will be found guilty of
the charges against him, the penalties are of such gravity as to increase the probability of
Munoz absconding if allowed provisional liberty. Sec. 20 (d) of PD 1069 provides that if
within a period of 20 days after the provisional arrest the Secretary of Foreign Affairs has
not received the request for extradition, the accused shall be released from custody. While
the RP-HK Extradition Agreement provides for 45 days. Cuevas argument that the latter
agreement amended PD 1069 has been rendered moot and academic by the fact that the
Phil. DOJ had already received a request for extradition as early as 12 days after his
provisional arrest.
Contrary to Munozs contention, the request for extradition need not be filed in
court, rather only need be received by the requested state. The request, as well as the
accompanying documents, are valid despite lack of authentication. The pertinent extradition
law does not provide for a requirement of authentication for the provisional arrest. Moreover,
the authenticated copies of the decision or sentence imposed upon Munoz by HK and the
warrant of arrest has already been received by the Phil. Furthermore, the extradition
agreement only requires authentication for the request of extradition and not for the
provisional arrest. Provisional arrest is a solution to the impending risk of flight as the
process of preparing a formal request for extradition and its accompanying documents is
time-consuming and leakage-prone. Thus, it is an accepted practice for the requesting
state to rush its request in the form of a telex or diplomatic cable or facsimile. The
temporary hold on private respondents privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on
his right to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he decide
to resist the request for his extradition to HK. There is no denial of due process as long as
fundamental fairness is assured a party. As to Munoz contention that it should be the
Foreign Diplomat who should send the request for provisional arrest, as required by PD
1069, the invoked provision only provides for the request for extradition and not the
provisional arrest. There is sufficient compliance with the law if the request for provisional
arrest is made by an official who is authorized by the government of the requesting state to
make such a request and the authorization is communicated to the requested state.

AFP Mutual Benefit Association vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 104769, March 2, 2000

Doctrine: Notice of Lis Pendens! there is no such action as one for annotation of lis
pendens. A notice of lis pendens is not ad can not be sought as a principal action for relief
as the notice of lis pendens is ordinarily recorded without the intervention of the court$ In
case the annotation of Lis Pendens is denied by the Register of Deeds, the same could be
appealed en consulta to the commissioner of Land Registration, and the resolution may
then be appealed to the CA...The annotation of notice of Lis Pendens on the titles of the
property is not proper in cases where the action is in personam

Facts: Ivestco Inc. was the owner of (6) parcels of land. Investco then agreed to sell the (6)
parcels of land to Solid Homes. Solid Homes would be given (5) years to pay the balance in
semi-annual installments.

After paying (4) semi annual installments and a portion of the fifth installment, Solid Homes
made no further payment. Likewise, the postdated checks were dishonored.

Investco filed a case with the Court of First Instance a claim to collect from Solid Homes the
remaining balance. Solid Homes, likewise filed with the trial court a complaint alleging that
the purchase pruce under the contract was not yet due. As such, it prayed for dismissal.
Solid Homes then filed with the Register of Deeds a notice of lis pendens. However, the
notice was not annotated on the titles in the name of Investco.

Investco then executed a deed of absolute sale to AFP Mutual Benefit Association Inc (AFP
MBAI). AFP MBAI then verified the records of the Register of Deeds, and Metropolitan Trial
Court and found the absence of any lis pendens. AFP MBAI completed its payments and
the Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificates.

Solid Homes prayed that the Register of Deeds be ordered to annotate the titles registered
in the name of Investco the notice of lis pendens

Issue: Whether Solid Homes is entitled to the annotation of its notice of lis pendens?

Held: NO, Investcos complaint was an action to cellect sums of money, and damages to
recover from Solid Homes unpaid installments on the purchase price of the property. In
such a case, the annotation of notice of lis pendens on the titles of property was not proper
as the action is in personam. The Doctrine of Lis Pendens is inapplicable to this case.

Notice of Lis Pendens is not and can not be sought as a principal action for relief. The
notice is but an incident to an extra-judicial action. Lis Pendens is intended merely as
constructive advice to warn people who deal with such property

Eduardo Fernandez, et al vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 115813, October 16, 2000

Doctrine: The trial court's inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens is exercised only
under exceptional circumstances, such as: where such circumstances are imputable to the
party who caused the annotation; where the litigation was unduly prolonged to the prejudice
of the other party because of several continuances procured by petitioner; where the case
which is the basis for the lis pendens notation was dismissed for non-prosequitur on the
part of the plaintiff; or where judgment was rendered against the party who caused such a
notation.

Facts: Petition involves Lot 435 of the Bacolod cadastre originally titled to petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest, Prudencio Fernandez. After Fernandez acquired ownership of the
lot, he tried to eject private respondent Jesus Ciocon and some other occupants off the
property. Allegedly, Ciocon asked Fernandez that he be given a "last chance" to
repurchase the lot. Fernandez refused. After this rejection Ciocon instituted a civil case
(Civil Case No. 7687) for reconveyance of the land or what remains of it after deducting
portions already sold to others. Ciocon claimed he had paid for the full reconveyance price
to Fernandez on February 7, 1958 for which Fernandez signed a receipt. Fernandez
through his guardian ad litem denied receiving any money from Ciocon and averred that
Ciocon's receipt was a forgery. Fernandez died and is now substituted by his heirs.

Respondents Levita Llera, Hospicio Pedrina, Rufo Calves, and Monserrat Villalba were
intervenors in said suit who claimed that they had purchased portions of Lot 435 from
Ciocon. Another case (Civil Case No. 7723) was filed by was filed by Alfonso Jardenil,
Anunciacion Jover, and Vicente Urbanozo claiming that they had purchased portions of the
lot as well from Ciocon.

RTC: noting that the parties were indifferent about submitting to a decision based on extant
but incomplete records proceeded to render judgment dismissing both complaints and
ordering private respondent Ciocon and the intervenors to deliver immediate possession of
Lot No. 435 to the heirs of Fernandez.

Private respondents and intervenors timely filed their notices of appeal

Judge Jocson (same judge in RTC), issued an Order requiring the parties to state in writing
within fifteen (15) days whether or not they agree to have the records transmitted to the
Court of Appeals with incomplete transcripts of stenographic notes, and if they should fail to
reply after fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order, the court would consider the parties'
silence as conformity and order the transmittal of the extant records to the Court of Appeals.

After a month, Court ordered transmittal of the records to the appellate court.

Court of Appeals noted the incompleteness of the records and ordered the re-taking and
completion of missing testimonies.

Ciocon filed a Motion to have Above-Entitled Cases Decided Anew, which Judge Jocson
granted. Judge Jocson reasoned that since the cases were decided on the basis of the
records taken by his predecessor, and without the testimony of Roberto Tolentino, the
handwriting expert who testified on the alleged forgery of Fernandez' signature, granting
the motion was in the best interest of justice.

2nd judgment of RTC (by Judge Jocson): In the second decision, the judge explained that
the Court of Appeals, after receiving the notices of appeal and the incomplete records,
"remanded" the case and ordered the re-taking of the testimonies of witnesses Ciocon and
Tolentino. The second decision was a complete reversal of the first decision and directed
the return of the disputed lot to Ciocon and intervenors except the portions still being
litigated. It also ordered the cancellation of the new title issued to Fernandez and the
issuance of a new title in the name of Jesus Ciocon and intervenors.

Oct. 25 Petitioners appealed the second decision. % day after: Ciocon moved for execution
pending appeal. % 6 days after: trial court granted the motion ex parte. The TCT in the
name of Fernandez was cancelled and a new TCT was issued in the name of respondent
Ciocon. petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the order was denied.

Ciocon filed a motion asking that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City be directed to
cancel entries in TCT No. T-164785, particularly Entries Nos. 44213, 1063, 5121, 5381 and
13188 upon the plaintiff's filing of additional bond of P300,000.00. % Entry No. 178073, the
notice of lis pendens involved in Civil Case No. 7687 and 7723, was not among the entries
listed in the motion. % only after a month, Entry No. 178073 was annotated. % Judge
Jocson ordered the cancellation of the entries of the notices of lis pendens

Ciocon then sold the subject property to one Eduardo Gargar who was issued with a new
TCT in Gargars name. Gargar immediately mortgaged the property to the Rizal
Commercial and Banking Corporation to secure a loan for P2,000,000.00.

Trial court issued another Order, directing the transmittal of the records to the Court of
Appeals.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for
preliminary injunction under Rule 65 to annul and set aside the Order of the RTC cancelling
the lis pendens notations in the TCT, and its Decision setting aside its original decision for
having been issued without jurisdiction.

The motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition was denied.

Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON the the cancellation of lis pendens was issued without jurisdiction and in
violation of due process and fundamental rules of procedure?

Held: YES. The order of cancellation of notation of lis pendens was based on the ex parte
approval of the motion for execution pending appeal of the trial court's second decision.
This order is fatally flawed, for being the result of a hearing ex parte, hence without notice
to the adverse party and thereby violative of due process.

The cancellation order of the notice of lis pendens in this case, Entry No. 178073, should
be set aside for three reasons. First, it was granted ex parte. Petitioners were deprived of
their right to be heard on notice. Second, there was no showing that the annotation of the
notice was for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, nor that it was not necessary to
protect the rights of those who sought the annotation. And third, at the time of the order of
cancellation of the notice, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction.

While the trial court has inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens, such power is
exercised under express provisions of law. A notice of lis pendens is an announcement to
the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation. Such announcement is
founded upon public policy and necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the properties in
litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated and to prevent the
defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. Under Sec. 14 of Rule 13 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of lis pendens may be canceled only after proper
showing that the purpose of its annotation is for molesting the adverse party, or that it is not
necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be annotated.

The trial court's inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens is exercised only under
exceptional circumstances, such as: where such circumstances are imputable to the party
who caused the annotation; where the litigation was unduly prolonged to the prejudice of
the other party because of several continuances procured by petitioner; where the case
which is the basis for the lis pendens notation was dismissed for non-prosequitur on the
part of the plaintiff; or where judgment was rendered against the party who caused such a
notation. In such instances, said notice is deemed ipso facto cancelled. These exceptional
circumstances are not present in this case. It will be noted that although the case took long
to resolve, it was not due to petitioners. Petitioners had in fact been adjudged owners of the
lot in the first decision and it was private respondents who filed a motion that the case be
decided anew, despite a timely notice of appeal from the first decision. Furthermore, it was
the Court of Appeals which ordered the re-taking of the lost testimonies, which the trial
court erroneously took as a "remand" of the case, resulting in a second decision which was
also timely appealed. The records mentioned no such order to ''remand'' by the Court of
Appeals. The cancellation of the lis pendens notations should not have been ordered since
there had been no final judgment yet, the decisions having been timely appealed.

A notice of lis pendens cannot be ordered cancelled on an ex parte motion, much less
without any motion at all. There should be notice to the party who caused the annotation so
that he may be heard to object to the cancellation of his notice and show to the court that
the notice of lis pendens is necessary to protect his rights and is not merely to molest the
other party.

Private respondent Ciocon's motion to cancel certain notices of lis pendens did not include
a request to cancel Entry No. 178073 in particular, and it certainly could not have been
included since the entry was annotated in the TCT only a month after the filing of the
motion. However, Judge Jocson's order of cancellation included Entry No. 178073. % a
notice of lis pendens cannot be ordered cancelled on an ex parte motion, much less without
any motion at all. There should be notice to the party who caused the annotation so that he
may be heard to object to the cancellation of his notice and show to the court that the
notice of lis pendens is necessary to protect his rights and is not merely to molest the other
party.

Neither can a notice of lis pendens be ordered cancelled upon the mere filing of a bond by
the party on whose title the notice is annotated. The ultimate purpose of the annotation
which is to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court and to prevent the
defeat of the judgment by subsequent alienation will be rendered meaningless if private
respondents are allowed to file a bond, regardless of the amount, in substitution of said
notice.

Aberca et al. v. Ver, et al., G.R. No. 166216, March 14, 2012

SUMMARY:
This petition for certiorari presents vital issues not heretofore passed upon by this Court. It
poses the question whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ

of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military
personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the

Constitution. If such action for damages may be maintained, who can be held liable for
such violations: only the military personnel directly involved and/or their

superiors as well.

FACTS:

SUMMARY:
This petition for certiorari presents vital issues not heretofore passed upon by this Court. It
poses the question whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and
other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. If such action for
damages may be maintained, who can be held liable for such violations: only the military
personnel directly involved and/or their superiors as well.

FACTS:

This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the
rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to
conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses
in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila," Plaintiffs
allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided several
places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during
these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal
items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by
the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and
lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel;
that military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of
violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to
punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and
deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs
and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously known to and
sanctioned by defendants.

Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then Solicitor-General
Estelito Mendoza, alleging that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the
circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) assuming that the courts can
entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the
performance of their official duties; and (3) the complaint states no cause of action against
the defendants. Opposition to said motion to dismiss was filed by plaintiffs.

The Regional Trial Court (Judge Fortun Presiding) issued a resolution granting the motion
to dismiss. It found that (1) the plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the
circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) that assuming that the court can
entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the
performance of their official duties; and (3) that the complaint states no cause of action
against defendants, since there is no allegation that the defendants named in the complaint
confiscated plaintiffs' purely personal properties in violation of their constitutional rights, and
with the possible exception of Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Sergeant Bienvenido Balabo
committed acts of torture and maltreatment, or that the defendants had the duty to exercise
direct supervision and control of their subordinates or that they had vicarious liability as
employers under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court stated, "After a careful
study of defendants' arguments, the court finds the same to be meritorious and must,
therefore, be granted. On the other hand, plaintiffs' arguments in their opposition are
lacking in merit."

A motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint and a supplemental motion for
reconsideration was filed by the plaintiffs.

Judge Fortun issued an order voluntarily inhibiting himself from further proceeding in the
case and leaving the resolution of the motion to set aside the order of dismissal to Judge
Lising, "to preclude any suspicion that he (Judge Fortun) cannot resolve [the] aforesaid
pending motion with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge and to put an end to plaintiffs
assertion that the undersigned has no authority or jurisdiction to resolve said pending
motion."

This order prompted plaintiffs to reesolve an amplificatory motion for reconsideration signed
in the name of the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) of Mabini Legal Aid Committee, by
Attys. Joker P. Arroyo, Felicitas Aquino and Arno Sanidad on April 12, 1984. On May
2,1984, the defendants filed a comment on said amplificatory motion for reconsideration.

In an order dated May 11, 1984, the trial court, Judge Esteban Lising, Presiding, without
acting on the motion to set aside order of November 8, 1983, issued an order stating that
as appearing from the records, several plaintiffs failed to file a motion to reconsider the
Order of November 8, 1983, dismissing the complaint, nor interposed an appeal therefrom
within the reglementary period, as prayed for by the defendants, said Order is now final
against said plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on May 28,1984, alleging that it was not true
that several of the plaintiffs failed to file a motion to reconsider the order of November 8,
1983 dismissing the complaint, within the reglementary period. Plaintiffs claimed that the
motion to set aside the order of November 8, 1983 and the amplificatory motion for
reconsideration was filed for all the plaintiffs, although signed by only some of the lawyers.

The RTC denied such motions nevertheless. Hence this petition for certriorari.

ISSUE (relevant to CivPro): W/N The RTC erred in dismissing the complaint with respect to
plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Puente, Marco Palo, Alan Jazminez, Alex Marcelino,
Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin (the "several plaintiffs"
mentioned earlier), on the basis of the alleged failure of said plaintiffs to file a motion for
reconsideration of the court's resolution of November 8, 1983, granting the respondent's
motion to dismiss?

HELD: Yes.

It is undisputed that a timely motion to set aside said order of November 8, 1983 was filed
by 'plaintiffs, through counsel. True, the motion was signed only by Atty. Joker P. Arroyo,
counsel for Benjamin Sesgulido; Atty. Antonio Rosales, counsel for Edwin Lopez and
Manuel Martin Guzman; Atty. Pedro B. Ella, Jr., counsel for Nestor Bodino and Carlos
Palma; Atty. Arno V. Sanidad, counsel for Arturo Tabara; Atty. Felicitas S. Aquino, counsel
for Joseph Olayer; and Atty. Alexander Padilla, counsel for Rodolfo Benosa.

But the body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the motion was filed on behalf of all
the plaintiffs. And this must have been also the understanding of defendants' counsel
himself for when he filed his comment on the motion, he furnished copies thereof, not just
to the lawyers who signed the motion, but to all the lawyers of plaintiffs, to wit: Attys. Jose
Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren Mercado, Augusto Sanchez, Antonio
Rosales, Pedro Efla Jr., Arno Sanidad, Alexander Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene Saguisag,
Ramon Esguerra and Felicitas S. Aquino.

In filing the motion to set aside the resolution of November 8, 1983, the signing attorneys
did so on behalf of all the plaintiff. They needed no specific authority to do that. The
authority of an attorney to appear for and in behalf of a party can be assumed, unless
questioned or challenged by the adverse party or the party concerned, which was never
done in this case. Thus, it was grave abuse on the part of respondent judge to take it upon
himself to rule that the motion to set aside the order of November 8, 1953 dismissing the
complaint was filed only by some of the plaintiffs, when by its very language it was clearly
intended to be filed by and for the benefit of all of them. It is obvious that the respondent
judge took umbrage under a contrived technicality to declare that the dismissal of the
complaint had already become final with respect to some of the plaintiffs whose lawyers did
not sign the motion for reconsideration. Such action tainted with legal infirmity cannot be
sanctioned.

FEU-NRMF v. FEU-NRMF AFW, G.R. No. 168362, October 16, 2006
DOCTRINE: Personal service effectively ensures that the notice desired under the
constitutional requirement of due process is accomplished. If, however, efforts to find the
party concerned personally would make prompt service impossible, service may be
completed by substituted service, that is, by leaving a copy, between the hours of eight in
the morning and six in the evening, at the partys or counsels residence, if known, with a
person of sufficient age and discretion then residing therein.

FACTS: In 1994, petitioner FEU-NRMF (a medical institution organized and existing under
the Philippine laws), and respondent union (a legitimate labor organization and is the duly
recognized representative of the rank and file employees of petitioner), entered into a CBA
that will expire on 30 April 1996. In view of the forthcoming expiry, respondent union sent a
letter-proposal to petitioner FEU-NRMF stating their economic and non-economic
proposals for thenegotiation of the new CBA.

Petitioner FEU-NRMF rejected respondent unions demands and proposed to maintain the
same provisions of the old CBA reasoning that due to financial constraints, it cannot afford
to accede to a number of their demands. In an effort to arrive at a compromise, subsequent
conciliation proceedings were conducted before the NCMB, but the negotiation failed.

Respondent union filed a Notice of Strike before NCMB on the ground of bargaining
deadlock.

Union staged a strike.

Petitioner FEU-NRMF filed a Petition for the Assumption of Jurisdiction or for Certification
of Labor Dispute with the NLRC, underscoring the fact that it is a medical institution
engaged in the business of providing healthcare for its patients. Secretary of Labor granted
the petition and an Order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute was issued, thereby
prohibiting any strike or lockout and enjoining the parties from committing any acts which
may exacerbate the situation.

September 6, 1996, Francisco Escuadra, the NLRC process server, certified that, on
September 5, 1996 at around 4:00 P.M., he attempted to serve a copy of the Assumption of
Jurisdiction Order (AJO) to the union officers but since no one was around at the strike
area, he just posted copies of the said Order at several conspicuous places within the
premises of the hospital.

Striking employees continued holding a strike until 12 September 1996, claiming that they
had no knowledge that the Secretary of Labor already assumed jurisdiction over the
pending labor dispute as they were not able to receive a copy of the AJO.

Secretary of Labor issued another Order directing all the striking employees to return to
work and the petitioner FEU-NRMF to accept them under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike. A Return to Work Agreement was executed by the disputing
parties.

Subsequently, petitioner FEU-NRMF filed a case before the NLRC, contending that
respondent union staged the strike in defiance of the AJO, hence, it was illegal.

LABOR ARBITER: LA declared the strike illegal and allowed dismissal of union officers for
conducting the strike in defiance of the AJO.

NLRC: NLRC affirmed in toto the Decision of the LA.

CA:CA granted the Petition and reversed the Resolutions of NLRC.

ISSUE: W/N the service of the AJO was validly effected by the process server so as to bind
the respondent union and hold them liable for the acts committed subsequent to the
issuance of the said Order.

HELD: The process server resorted to posting the Order when personal service was
rendered impossible since the striking employees were not present at the strike area. This
mode of service, however, is not sanctioned by either the NLRC Revised Rules of
Procedure or the Revised Rules of Court.

The pertinent provisions of the NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure read:
Section 6. Service of Notices and Resolutions.
(a) Notices or summons and copies of orders, shall be served on the
parties to the case personally by the Bailiff or duly authorized public
officer within 3 days from receipt thereof or by registered mail;
Provided that in special circumstances, service of summons may be
effected in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of
Court; Provided further, that in cases of decisions and final awards,
copies thereof shall be served on both parties and their counsel or
representative by registered mail; Provided further, that in cases where
a party to a case or his counsel on record personally seeks service of
the decision upon inquiry thereon, service to said party shall be
deemed effected upon actual receipt thereof; Provided finally, that
where parties are so numerous, service shall be made on counsel and
upon such number of complainants, as may be practicable, which shall
be considered substantial compliance with Article 224(a) of the Labor
Code, as amended.

An Order issued by the Secretary of Labor assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute is
not a final judgment for it does not dispose of the labor dispute with finality. Consequently,
the rule on service of summons and orders, and not the proviso on service of decisions and
final awards, governs the service of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order.

Under the NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure, service of copies of orders should be made
by the process server either personally or through registered mail. However, due to the
urgent nature of the AJO and the public policy underlying the injunction carried by the
issuance of the said Order, service of copies of the same should be made in the most
expeditious and effective manner, without any delay, ensuring its immediate receipt by the
intended parties as may be warranted under the circumstances. Thus, personal service is
the proper mode of serving the AJO.

It is also provided under the same rules that in special circumstances, service of summons
may be effected in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court.

Parenthetically, the manner upon which personal service may be made is prescribed by the
following provisions of the Revised Rules of Court:
Rule 13. Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments And Other Papers.
Section 6. Personal service. Service of the papers may be made by delivering
personally a copy to the party or his counsel, or by leaving it in his office with his
clerk or with a person having charge thereof. if no person is found in his office, or
his office is not known, or he has no office, then by leaving a copy, between the
hours of eight in the morning and six in the evening, at the partys or counsels
residence, if known, with a person of sufficient age and discretion then residing
therein.

Let it be recalled that the process server merely posted copies of the Assumption of
Jurisdiction Order in conspicuous places in the hospital. Such posting is not prescribed by
the rules, nor is it even referred to when the said rules enumerated the different modes of
effecting substituted service, in case personal service is impossible by the absence of the
party concerned.

Clearly, personal service effectively ensures that the notice desired under the constitutional
requirement of due process is accomplished. If, however, efforts to find the party
concerned personally would make prompt service impossible, service may be completed by
substituted service, that is, by leaving a copy, between the hours of eight in the morning
and six in the evening, at the partys or counsels residence, if known, with a person of
sufficient age and discretion then residing therein.

Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service. It is therefore
required that statutory restrictions for effecting substituted service must be strictly, faithfully
and fully observed. Failure to comply with this rule renders absolutely void the substituted
service along with the proceedings taken thereafter. The underlying principle of this rigid
requirement is that the person, to whom the orders, notices or summons are addressed, is
made to answer for the consequences of the suit even though notice of such action is
made, not upon the party concerned, but upon another whom the law could only presume
would notify such party of the pending proceedings.

Applying this principle in the case at bar, presumption of receipt of the copies of the
Assumption of Jurisdiction Order could not be lightly inferred from the circumstances
considering the adverse effect in case the parties failed to heed to the injunction directed by
such Order. Worthy to note that in a number of cases, we have ruled that defiance of the
assumption and return-to-work orders of the Secretary of Labor after he has assumed
jurisdiction is a valid ground for the loss of employment status of any striking union officer
or member. Employment is a property right of which one cannot be deprived of without due
process.Due process here would demand that the respondent union be properly notified of
the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order of the Secretary of Labor enjoining the strike and
requiring its members to return to work. Thus, there must be a clear and unmistakable
proof that the requirements prescribed by the Rules in the manner of effecting personal or
substituted service had been faithfully complied with. Merely posting copies of the
Assumption of Jurisdiction Order does not satisfy the rigid requirement for proper service
outlined by the above stated rules. Needless to say, the manner of service made by the
process server was invalid and irregular. Respondent union could not therefore be
adjudged to have defied the said Order since it was not properly apprised thereof.
Accordingly, the strike conducted by the respondent union was valid under the
circumstances.

SC: DENIED

Atlantic Erectors v. Herbal Cove, G.R. No. 148568, March 20, 2003

DOCTRINE:
Civil Procedure; Actions; Lis Pendens; Generally only instances which a notice of
lis pendens may be availed of; Annotation also applies to suits seeking to establish a right
to, or an equitable estate or interest in a specific real property, to enforce a lien, a charge or
an encumbrance against it. As a general rule, the only instances in which a notice of lis
pendens may be availed of are as follows: (a)an action to recover a possession of real
estate; (b) an action for partition; and (c) any other court proceedings that directly affect the
title to the land of the building thereon or the use or the occupation thereof. Additionally,
this Court has held that resorting to lis pendens is not necessarily confined to cases that
involve title to or possession of real property. This annotation also applies to suits seeking
to establish a right to, or an equitable estate or interest in, a specific real property; or to
enforce a lien, a charge or an encumbrance against it.

Same; Same; Same; The annotation of a notice of lis pendens on titles to
properties is not proper in cases wherein the proceedings instituted are actions in
personam. When a complaint or an action is determined by the courts to be in personam,
the rationale for or purpose of the notice of lis pendens ceases to exist. To be sure, this
Court has expressly and categorically declared that the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens on title to properties is not proper in cases wherein the proceedings instituted are
actions in personam.

FACTS:
On June 20, 1996, Herbal Cove Realty Corp. (respondent) and Atlantic Erectors, Inc.
(petitioner) entered into a Construction Contract whereby the former agreed to construct
four (4) units of townhouses and one (1) single detached unit for an original contract price
of P15,726,745.19 which was later adjusted to P16,726,745.19 as a result of additional
works. The contract period is 180 days commencing on July 7, 1996 and to terminate on
January 7, 1997. AEI claimed that the said period was not followed due to reasons
attributable to respondent, namely: suspension orders, additional works, force majeure, and
unjustifiable acts of omission or delay on the part of said respondent. Respondent, however,
denied such claim and instead pointed to AEI as having exceeded the 180 day contract
period aggravated by defective workmanship and utilization of materials which are not in
compliance with specifications.

x x x x x x x x x

On November 21, 1997, Atlantic Erectors, Inc. filed a complaint for sum of money with
damages with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. In said initiatory pleading, AEI asked for
the following reliefs:

'AFTER DUE NOTICE AND HEARING, to order x x x defendant to:

1. Pay plaintiff the sum of P4,854,229.94 for the unpaid construction services already
rendered;
2. To x x x pay plaintiff the sum of P1,595,551.00 for the construction materials, equipment
and tools of plaintiff held by defendant;
3. To x x x pay plaintiff the sum of P2,250,000.00 for the [loss] x x x of expected income
from the construction project;
4. [T]o x x x pay plaintiff the sum of P800,000.00 for the cost of income by way of rental
from the equipment of plaintiff held by defendants;
5. To x x x pay plaintiff the sum of P5,000,000.00 for moral damages;
6. To x x x pay plaintiff the sum of P5,000,000.00 for exemplary damages;
7. To x x x pay plaintiff the sum equivalent of 25% of the total money claim plus
P200,000.00 acceptance fee and P2,500.00 per court appearance;
8. To x x x pay the cost of suit.'

On the same day of November 21, 1997, AEI filed a notice of lis pendens for annotation of
the pendency of the civil case on titles TCTs nos. T-30228, 30229, 30230, 30231 and
30232. When the lots covered by said titles were subsequently subdivided into 50 lots, the
notices of lis pendens were carried over to the titles of the subdivided lots, i.e., Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. T-36179 to T-36226 and T-36245 to T-36246 of the Register of
Deeds of Tagaytay City.

On January 30, 1998, Herbal Cove Realty Corp. and x x x Ernest L. Escaler, filed a Motion
to Dismiss petitioner's Complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a cause of
action. They claimed that the Makati RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case because the parties' Construction Contract contained a clause requiring them to
submit their dispute to arbitration.

x x x x x x x x x

On March 17, 1998, Makati RTC Judge dismissed the Complaint as against Herbal Cove
for AEIs failure to comply with a condition precedent to the filing of a court action which is
the prior resort to arbitration and as against x x x Escaler for failure of the Complaint to
state a cause of action x x x.
AEI filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the March 17, 1998 dismissal order. Herbal Cove
filed its Opposition thereto.

On April 24, 1998, Herbal Cove filed a Motion to Cancel Notice of Lis Pendens. It argued
that the notices of lis pendens are without basis because petitioner's action is a purely
personal action to collect a sum of money and recover damages and x x x does not directly
affect title to, use or possession of real property.

RTC Judge granted respondent's Motion to Cancel Notice of Lis Pendens x x x:

AEI filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid July 30, 1998 Order to which Herbal
Cove filed an Opposition.

In a November 4, 1998 Order of RTC Makati while finding no merit in the grounds raised by
AEI in its Motion for Reconsideration, reversed his July 30, 1998 Order and reinstated the
notices of lis pendens

CA reinstated the RTC Order granting Herbal Coves Motion to Cancel the Notice of Lis
Pendens. According to the appellate court, the re-annotation of those notices was improper
for want of any legal basis. It specifically cited Section 76 of Presidential Decree No. 1529
(the Property Registration Decree). The decree provides that the registration of such
notices is allowed only when court proceedings directly affect the title to, or the use or the
occupation of, the land or any building thereon.

The CA opined that the Complaint filed by petitioner in Civil Case No. 97-2707 was
intended purely to collect a sum of money and to recover damages. The appellate court
ruled that the Complaint did not aver any ownership claim to the subject land or any right of
possession over the buildings constructed thereon. It further declared that absent any claim
on the title to the buildings or on the possession thereof, the notices of lis pendens had no
leg to stand on.

The appellate court further explained that the re-annotation of the Notice of Lis Pendens
was no longer warranted after the court a quo had ruled that the latter had no jurisdiction
over the case. The former held that the rationale behind the principle of lis pendens -- to
keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of final
judgment -- was no longer applicable. The reason for such inapplicability was that the
Makati RTC already declared that it had no jurisdiction or power over the subject matter of
the case.

Finally, the CA opined that petitioner's Complaint had not alleged or claimed, as basis for
the continued annotation of the Notice of Lis Pendens, the lien of contractors and laborers
under Article 2242 of the New Civil Code. Moreover, petitioner had not even referred to any
lien of whatever nature. Verily, the CA ruled that the failure to allege and claim the
contractor's lien did not warrant the continued annotation on the property titles of
Respondent Herbal Cove.

ISSUE:
Whether or not money claims representing cost of materials for and labor on the houses
constructed on a property [are] a proper lien for annotation of lis pendens on the property
title.

HELD: (Petition has no merit)
As a general rule, the only instances in which a notice of lis pendens may be availed of are
as follows: (a) an action to recover possession of real estate; (b) an action for partition; and
(c) any other court proceedings that directly affect the title to the land or the building
thereon or the use or the occupation thereof. Additionally, this Court has held that resorting
to lis pendens is not necessarily confined to cases that involve title to or possession of real
property. This annotation also applies to suits seeking to establish a right to, or an equitable
estate or interest in, a specific real property; or to enforce a lien, a charge or an
encumbrance against it.

Apparently, petitioner proceeds on the premise that its money claim involves the
enforcement of a lien. Since the money claim is for the nonpayment of materials and labor
used in the construction of townhouses, the lien referred to would have to be that provided
under Article 2242 of the Civil Code. This provision describes a contractor's lien over an
immovable property as follows:

"Art. 2242. With reference to specific immovable property and real rights of the debtor, the
following claims, mortgages and liens shall be preferred, and shall constitute an
encumbrance on the immovable or real right:

x x x x x x x x x

"(3) Claims of laborers, masons, mechanics and other workmen, as well as of architects,
engineers and contractors, engaged in the construction, reconstruction or repair of
buildings, canals or other works, upon said buildings, canals or other works;

"(4) Claims of furnishers of materials used in the construction, reconstruction, or repair of
buildings, canals or other works, upon said buildings, canals or other works."

However, a careful examination of petitioner's Complaint, as well as the reliefs it seeks,
reveals that no such lien or interest over the property was ever alleged. The Complaint
merely asked for the payment of construction services and materials plus damages, without
mentioning -- much less asserting -- a lien or an encumbrance over the property. Verily, it
was a purely personal action and a simple collection case. It did not contain any material
averment of any enforceable right, interest or lien in connection with the subject property.

As it is, petitioner's money claim cannot be characterized as an action that involves the
enforcement of a lien or an encumbrance, one that would thus warrant the annotation of the
Notice of Lis Pendens. Indeed, the nature of an action is determined by the allegations of
the complaint.

Even assuming that petitioner had sufficiently alleged such lien or encumbrance in its
Complaint, the annotation of the Notice of Lis Pendens would still be unjustified, because a
complaint for collection and damages is not the proper mode for the enforcement of a
contractor's lien.

In J.L. Bernardo Construction v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained the concept of a
contractor's lien under Article 2242 of the Civil Code and the proper mode for its
enforcement as follows:

"Articles 2241 and 2242 of the Civil Code enumerate certain credits which enjoy preference
with respect to specific personal or real property of the debtor. Specifically, the contractor's
lien claimed by the petitioners is granted under the third paragraph of Article 2242 which
provides that the claims of contractors engaged in the construction, reconstruction or repair
of buildings or other works shall be preferred with respect to the specific building or other
immovable property constructed.

"However, Article 2242 finds application when there is a concurrence of credits, i.e., when
the same specific property of the debtor is subjected to the claims of several creditors and
the value of such property of the debtor is insufficient to pay in full all the creditors. In such
a situation, the question of preference will arise, that is, there will be a need to determine
which of the creditors will be paid ahead of the others. Fundamental tenets of due process
will dictate that this statutory lien should then only be enforced in the context of some kind
of a proceeding where the claims of all the preferred creditors may be bindingly adjudicated,
such as insolvency proceedings."

Clearly then, neither Article 2242 of the Civil Code nor the enforcement of the lien
thereunder is applicable here, because petitioner's Complaint failed to satisfy the foregoing
requirements. Nowhere does it show that respondent's property was subject to the claims
of other creditors or was insufficient to pay for all concurring debts. Moreover, the
Complaint did not pertain to insolvency proceedings or to any other action in which the
adjudication of claims of preferred creditors could be ascertained.

Another factor negates the argument of petitioner that its money claim involves the
enforcement of a lien or the assertion of title to or possession of the subject property: the
fact that it filed its action with the RTC of Makati, which is undisputedly bereft of any
jurisdiction over respondent's property in Tagaytay City. Certainly, actions affecting title to
or possession of real property or the assertion of any interest therein should be
commenced and tried in the proper court that has jurisdiction over the area, where the real
property involved or a portion thereof is situated. If petitioner really intended to assert its
claim or enforce its supposed lien, interest or right over respondent's subject properties, it
would have instituted the proper proceedings or filed a real action with the RTC of Tagaytay
City, which clearly had jurisdiction over those properties.

Narciso Pea, a leading authority on the subject of land titles and registration, gives an
explicit exposition on the inapplicability of the doctrine of lis pendens to certain actions and
proceedings that specifically include money claims. He explains in this wise:

"By express provision of law, the doctrine of lis pendens does not apply to attachments,
levies of execution, or to proceedings for the probate of wills, or for administration of the
estate of deceased persons in the Court of First Instance. Also, it is held generally that the
doctrine of lis pendens has no application to a proceeding in which the only object sought is
the recovery of a money judgment, though the title or right of possession to property be
incidentally affected. It is essential that the property be directly affected, as where the relief
sought in the action or suit includes the recovery of possession, or the enforcement of a
lien, or an adjudication between conflicting claims of title, possession, or the right of
possession to specific property, or requiring its transfer or sale"

Pea adds that even if a party initially avails itself of a notice of lis pendens upon the filing
of a case in court, such notice is rendered nugatory if the case turns out to be a purely
personal action. We quote him as follows:

"It may be possible also that the case when commenced may justify a resort to lis pendens,
but during the progress thereof, it develops to be purely a personal action for damages or
otherwise. In such event, the notice of lis pendens has become functus officio."
18

(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, when a complaint or an action is determined by the courts to be in personam, the
rationale for or purpose of the notice of lis pendens ceases to exist. To be sure, this Court
has expressly and categorically declared that the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on
titles to properties is not proper in cases wherein the proceedings instituted are actions in
personam.

Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed CA Decision AFFIRMED

RULE 14 Summons

Sps. Mariano Madrigal and Julieta Madrigal vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 129955,
November 26, 1999

Doctrine:
& Sec 6 requires that summons must be served personally on the defendant. However,
should personal service be unattainable, substituted service may be availed of under
Section 7
& Sec. 7. Substituted Service.- If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be
served within a reasonable time$, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the
summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion
residing therein$
& The impossibility of personal service justifying availment of substituted service should
be explained in the proof of service; why efforts exerted towards personal service failed.
The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated
in the proof of service or Officers Return; otherwise, the substituted service cannot be
upheld

Facts:
& Joseph Aquino and Josefina Aquino (SPS AQUINO) brought a Complaint for
recovery of possession with damages against Mariano F. Madrigal (MARIANO) and
Intercity Properties, Inc., (INTERCITY) before the Makati RTC
& The summons and complaint were duly served on INTERCITY but not on MARIANO,
as reported in the Return of the Process Server.
& Alias summons were issued upon motion of the Sps Aquino.
& Since MARIANO was not in his residence despite several attempts to look for him,
substituted service of summons was resorted to by leaving a copy of the summons
together with the complaint and its annexes to his wife, Julieta S. Madrigal, a person of
suitable age and discretion and who acknowledged receipt thereof xxx. The return of
service bore her signature
& During pre-trial, INTERCITY and its counsel failed to appear, despite due notice. So,
INTERCITY was declared in default
& For failure to file an answer, MARIANO was also declared in default and Sps Aquino
adduced their evidence ex-parte
& Judgment by Default[i] was rendered. Copy of such decision was duly received by
Mariano.
& Thereafter, Mariano presented a Motion to Lift Order of Default, contending that the
trial court never acquired jurisdiction over his person as he was not personally served with
summons together with the complaint, and that the complaint was defective because his
wife who, according to movant, is an indispensable party, was not impleaded as a party.
& On December 29, 1995, the same motion was amended to pray for the setting aside
of the said decision.
& RTC: Both motions were denied. Motion for Reconsideration was also denied.
& CA: Sps Mariano filed original action for Certiorari before the CA, to annul the
aforesaid orders allegedly issued with grave abuse of discretion. CA dismissed the petition

Issues:
(1) WON service of summons to petitioner MARIANO was valid
(2) WON the Order denying the motion to lift order of default, after rendition of the decision
by the trial court, was proper
(3) WON JULIETA is an indispensable party in the action for recovery of possession of
property with damages against MARIANO - NO

Held:
(1) On the first issue, petitioners theorize that there was no valid service of summons
because the substituted service of summons effected on JULIETA was improper, absent
any proof of impossibility of personal service as required under Section 6, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court.
The CA however opined that the averments in the Officers Return coupled with the finding
by the lower Court that there had been earlier attempts to serve summons upon the
petitioner, are sufficient compliance with the requirements for substituted service.
Sec 6 requires that summons must be served personally on the defendant. However,
should personal service be unattainable, substituted service may be availed of under
Section 7 of the same rule:
Sec. 7. Substituted Service.- If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served
within a reasonable time!, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons
at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion residing
therein!
In a long line of cases,[ii] this Court held that the impossibility of personal service justifying
availment of substituted service should be explained in the proof of service; why efforts
exerted towards personal service failed. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant
to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officers Return;
otherwise, the substituted service cannot be upheld. It bears stressing that since service of
summons, especially for actions in personam, is essential for the acquisition of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant,[iii] the resort to a substituted service must be duly
justified. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional
grounds.
To determine whether there was such an observance and substituted service was
warranted under the premises, it is necessary for the Court to carefully peruse and evaluate
the Sheriffs Return which reported: (1) That on several occasions, at reasonable hours of
the day, the Deputized Process Server, tried to serve upon MARIANO the summons
together with the complaint; (2) That diligent efforts were exerted by the said Deputized
Process Server; (3) That service of summons was then made on MARIANOs wife,
JULIETA, a person of suitable age and discretion who acknowledged receipt thereof.[iv]
The Sheriffs certificate of service of summons is prima facie evidence of the facts therein
set out. To overcome the presumption of regularity of performance of official functions in
favor of such Sheriffs Return, the evidence against it must be clear and convincing.
Petitioner having been unable to come forward with the requisite quantum of proof to the
contrary, the presumption of regularity of performance on the part of the Sheriff in the case
stands.
MARIANO theorized that he was completely unaware of subject action brought against him
and he only learned about it when his sister-in-law handed to him a brown envelope
containing a copy of the Decision because he was separated from his wife, JULIETA, at the
time of service of summons, and was then a stay-in employee of Via Marine Corporation.
As between the Sheriffs Return, which carries with it a presumption of regularity, and
MARIANOs self-serving assertion that he did not know of the case, the Sheriffs Return is
undoubtedly more deserving of faith and credit.
On MARIANOs argument that the Sheriffs or Process Servers Return is couched in broad
and general terms, and does not state the material dates, the court held that while the
Sheriffs Return is silent on the facts and circumstances engendering the impossibility of
personal service of summons upon MARIANO, within a reasonable time, it can be deduced
therefrom that alias summons had to be issued. Under the Rules of Court, alias summons
is issued when the summons is returned without being served on any of the defendants.
These alias summons were issued in compliance with the law.

(2) The court also held that MARIANOs cause could not since the remedy he opted to avail
of is not the proper recourse under the attendant circumstances. He could have interposed
a motion for reconsideration or for new trial and should such a motion be denied or not
ruled upon with dispatch by the trial court, petitioners could have appealed the judgment by
default within the reglementary period.

(3) The Court is bound by the factual finding a quo that SPOUSES AQUINO are the
registered owners of subject lot which they purchased from INTERCITY.
As a general rule, in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, questions of fact are not to be
delved into and passed upon by this Court, which is bound by the factual findings by the
trial court. Verily, the Court is not a trier of facts.

Petition is DENIED and the decision of the CA is AFFIRMED

Eduardo Fernandez, et. al vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 115813, October 16, 2000
DOCTRINE: 1he Lrlal courL's lnherenL power Lo cancel a noLlce of lls pendens ls exerclsed only
under excepLlonal clrcumsLances, such as: where such clrcumsLances are lmpuLable Lo Lhe parLy
who caused Lhe annoLaLlon, where Lhe llLlgaLlon was unduly prolonged Lo Lhe pre[udlce of Lhe
oLher parLy because of several conLlnuances procured by peLlLloner, where Lhe case whlch ls Lhe
basls of Lhe lls pendens noLaLlon was dlsmlssed for non-prosequlLur on Lhe parL of Lhe plalnLlff or
where [udgmenL was rendered agalnsL Lhe parLy who caused such noLaLlon. 1hese excepLlonal
clrcumsLances are noL presenL ln Lhls case.

Facts

! 1hls peLlLlon lnvolves LoL 433 of Lhe 8acolod cadasLre orlglnally LlLled Lo peLlLloners'
predecessor-ln-lnLeresL, rudenclo lernandez. AfLer lernandez acqulred ownershlp of
Lhe loL, he Lrled Lo e[ecL prlvaLe respondenL !esus Clocon and some oLher occupanLs off
Lhe properLy. Allegedly, Clocon asked lernandez LhaL he be glven a lasL chance" Lo
repurchase Lhe loL. lernandez refused. AfLer Lhls re[ecLlon, on SepLember 21, 1983,
Clocon lnsLlLuLed agalnsL lernandez Clvll Case no. 7687 before 8ranch 47 of Lhe 81C of
negros CccldenLal for reconveyance of Lhe land or whaL remalns of lL afLer deducLlng
porLlons already sold Lo oLhers
Clocon clalmed LhaL he had already pald for Lhe full reconveyance prlce, and LhaL
lernandez had already slgned Lhls. lernandez on Lhe oLher hand denled Lhls
lernandez dled on !anuary 23, 1966. Pe was subsLlLuLed ln Lhe clvll sulL by hls helrs
namely: uomlnadora,4 and Lhelr chlldren Lduardo, 1ereslLa, LeLlcla, Adolfo, Clorla,
Zenalda and Lsmerna.
rlvaLe respondenLs Llera, edrlna, Calves, and vlllalba were lnLervenors ln sald sulL who
clalmed LhaL Lhey had purchased porLlons of LoL 433 from Clocon
1C: Slded wlLh peLlLloner, buL laLer on slded wlLh respondenL. lL cancelled noLlce of Lls endens ln
Lhe 1C1 perLalnlng Lo Lhe Clvll Cases flled by respondenL
CA: Affirmed decision of the TC

Issue: Was the cancellation of the Lis Pendens proper?

Held: No, Costs against Private Respondents.Whlle Lhe Lrlal courL has lnherenL power Lo
cancel a noLlce of lls pendens, such power ls exerclsed under express provlslons of law. A noLlce of
lls pendens ls an announcemenL Lo Lhe whole world LhaL a parLlcular real properLy ls ln llLlgaLlon.
Such announcemenL ls founded upon publlc pollcy and necesslLy, Lhe purpose of whlch ls Lo keep
Lhe properLles ln llLlgaLlon wlLhln Lhe power of Lhe courL unLll Lhe llLlgaLlon. Llon ls LermlnaLed and
Lo prevenL Lhe defeaL of Lhe [udgmenL or decree by subsequenL allenaLlon. under Sec. 24, 8ule 14
of Lhe 8ules of CourL, now Sec. 14 of 8ule 13 of Lhe 1997 8ules of Clvll rocedure, a noLlce of lls
pendens may be cancelled only afLer proper showlng LhaL Lhe purpose of lLs annoLaLlon ls for
molesLlng Lhe adverse parLy, or LhaL lL ls noL necessary Lo proLecL Lhe rlghLs of Lhe parLy who
caused lL Lo be annoLaLed. We have scruLlnlzed Lhe records buL found no showlng LhaL Lhe
annoLaLlon was caused by peLlLloners merely Lo molesL prlvaLe respondenLs, nor LhaL lL was noL
needed Lo proLecL peLlLloners' rlghLs. 1he pecullar and excepLlonal clrcumsLances of Lhe case, as ln
Lhe renderlng of Lwo confllcLlng declslons by Lhe same [udge, lndublLably manlfesL LhaL Lhe
annoLaLlon was noL merely Lo molesL Lhe oLher parLy buL was needed Lo proLecL peLlLloners'
lnLeresL from any hasLy Lransfer of Lhe properLy Lo anoLher, maklng recovery of Lhe properLy
exLremely compllcaLed. 1hls ls exacLly whaL happened ln Lhls case when Lhe noLlce of lls pendens
was cancelled.

Moreover, An order of cancellaLlon of noLaLlon of lls pendens whlch ls a resulL of a hearlng ex parLe
ls faLally flawed because lL ls lssued wlLhouL noLlce Lo Lhe adverse parLy and Lhereby vlolaLlve of
due process.

E.B. Villarosa & Partner co. Ltd. vs. Hon. Benito G.R. No. 136426, August 4, 1999

Facts:
Petitioner is a limited partnership with principal office address at Davao City and branch
offices at Praaque City and Cagayan de Oro City. Petitioner and private respondent
exevuted a Deed of Sale with Development Agreement wherein the former agreed to
develop certain parcels of land located at Barrio Carmen, Cagayan de Oro into a housing
subdivision for low cost housing units. They further agreed that in case of litigation, the
venue shall be in the proper courts of Makati.

Private respondent filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against
petitioner, before the RTC of Makati for failure to comply with its contractual obligation in
that, other than a few unfinished low cost houses, there were no substantial development.
Summons, together with the complaint, were served upon the defendant, through its
Branch Manager at Cagayan de Oro.
Petitioner filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper
service of summons and for lack of jurisdiction over their person. Private respondent,
meanwhile, filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default, alleging that no Answer has
been filed despite its receipt of the summons. Further, in its opposition to the Motion to
Dismiss, private respondent alleged that, the summons and the complaint was actually
received by petitioner through its branch manager, and that the purpose of the rule is to
bring home the corporation notice of the filing of the action.

The trail court dismissed the Motion to Dismiss, as well as declaring petitioner in default,
stating that, since the summons and the copy of the complaint were in fact received by the
corporation, there was substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons and
consequently, it validly acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner.

A Motion for Reconsideration was filed, wherein petitioner alleged that, the new Rules did
not liberalize but, restricted the service of summons on persons enumerated therein.

Issue:
WON the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner?

Held:
We agree with the petitioner. The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to
accept summons for a domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly
specified in Sec. 11, Rule 14, of the 1007 Rule of Civil Procedure. The rule now states
general manager instead of only manager; corporate secretary instead of secretary;
and treasurer instead of cashier. The phrase agent, or any of its directors is
conspicuously deleted in the new rule.

The aforesaid terms were obviously ambiguous and susceptible of broad and sometimes
illogical interpretations, especially the word agent of the corporation. The rule must be
strictly observed. Service must be made to one named in the statute. Even prior to the
effectivity of the 1997 Rules, a strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to
confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. The officer upon whom service is made
must be one who is named in the statute; otherwise the service is insufficient.

The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and
proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a
representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with
legal papers served on him. Liberal construction rule cannot be invoked and utilized as a
substitute for the plain legal requirements as to the manner in which summons should be
served on a domestic corporation.

Accordingly, the service of summons upon the branch manager at its branch office at
Cagayan de Oro, instead of upon the general manager of its principal office at Davao City
is improper. Consequently, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner.

NOTE:
Court also held that, the filing of a motion to dismiss, whether or not belatedly filed by the
petitioner, his authorized agent or attorney, precisely objecting to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person of the petitioner can by no means be deemed a submission to the
jurisdiction of the court.

Millenium Industrial Corporation vs. Tan G.R. No. 131724, February 28, 2000
Subject guide: Service upon domestic private juridical entity (Note: Relate this with Rule
14, Sec 11)

DOCTRINES:
1. Service of summons upon a defendant corporation must be on a representative
so integrated with the corporation sued as to make it a priori presumable that he
will realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers
received by him.

2. Doctrine of substantial compliance. (See Held. "In Porac Trucking Inc. ...")

3. It is not allowable to merely infer actual receipt of summons by the corporation
through the person on whom the summons was served - for there to be
substantial compliance, actual receipt of summons by the corporation through the
person served must be shown.

4. Receipt by a defendant corporation of the summons and complaint cannot be
inferred from the fact that it filed a Motion to Dismiss the case.

FACTS:
Herein petitioner executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of respondent Tan. The former
defaulted. Respondent Tan filed against petitioner a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage
in the Cebu RTC. Summons and a copy of the complaint were served upon petitioner
through a certain Lynverd Cinches, described in the sheriff's return as "a Draftsman, a
person of sufficient age and (discretion) working therein, he is the highest ranking officer or
Officer-in-Charge of defendant's Corporation, to receive processes of the Court."
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that there was no valid
service of summons upon it, as a result of which the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over it. Petitioner invoked Rule 14, 13 of the 1964 Rules of Court and contended that
service on Lynverd Cinches, as alleged in the sheriff's return, was invalid as he is not one
of the authorized persons on whom summons may be served and that, in fact, he was not
even its employee.

TC: denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. MR DENIED.

CA: dismissed the petition. The appellate court ruled that although petitioner denied
Lynverd Cinches' authority to receive summons for it, its actual receipt of the summons
could be inferred from its filing of a motion to dismiss, hence, the purpose for issuing
summons had been substantially achieved. Moreover, it was held, by including the
affirmative defense that it had already paid its obligation and praying for other reliefs in its
Motion to Dismiss, petitioner voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.

ISSUE: Whether or not service of summons upon a mere draftsman who is not one of
those upon whom summons may be served in case of a defendant corporation as
mentioned in the rules is valid.

HELD: NO
Summons is the means by which the defendant in a case is notified of the existence of an
action against him and, thereby, the court is conferred jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. If the defendant is corporation, Rule 14, 13 requires that service of summons
be made upon the corporations president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its
directors. The rationale of the rule is that service must be made on a representative so
integrated with the corporation sued as to make it a priori presumable that he will realize his
responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers received by him.

Petitioner contends that the enumeration in Rule 14, 13 is exclusive and that service of
summons upon one who is not enumerated therein is invalid. This is the general rule.
However, it is settled that substantial compliance by serving summons on persons other
than those mentioned in the above rule may be justified. In G & G Trading Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, we ruled that although the service of summons was made on a person
not enumerated in Rule 14, 13, if it appears that the summons and complaint were in fact
received by the corporation, there is substantial compliance with the rule as its purpose has
been attained.

In Porac Trucking, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court enumerated the requisites for the
application of the doctrine of substantial compliance, to wit: (a) there must be actual
receipt of the summons by the person served, i.e., transferring possession of the
copy of the summons from the Sheriff to the person served; (b) the person served
must sign a receipt or the sheriff's return; and (c) there must be actual receipt of the
summons by the corporation through the person on whom the summons was
actually served. The third requisite is the most important for it is through such receipt that
the purpose of the rule on service of summons is attained.

In this case, there is no dispute that the first and second requisites were fulfilled. With
respect to the third, the appellate court held that petitioner's filing of a motion to dismiss the
foreclosure suit is proof that it received the copy of the summons and the complaint. There
is, however, no direct proof of this or that Lynverd Cinches actually turned over the
summons to any of the officers of the corporation. In contrast, in our cases applying the
substantial compliance rule, there was direct evidence, such as the admission of the
corporation's officers, of receipt of summons by the corporation through the person upon
whom it was actually served. The question is whether it is allowable to merely infer actual
receipt of summons by the corporation through the person on whom summons was served.
We hold that it cannot be allowed. For there to be substantial compliance, actual receipt of
summons by the corporation through the person served must be shown. Where a
corporation only learns of the service of summons and the filing of the complaint against it
through some person or means other than the person actually served, the service of
summons becomes meaningless. This is particularly true in the present case where there is
serious doubt if Lynverd Cinches, the person on whom service of summons was effected, is
in fact an employee of the corporation. Except for the sheriff's return, there is nothing to
show that Lynverd Cinches was really a draftsman employed by the corporation.

SC Ruling: the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and the complaint against
petitioner is DISMISSED.

Asiavest Limited vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 128803, September 15, 1998

DOCTRINE: In actions in personam, the Court must acquire jurisdiction by the service of
summons, otherwise the judgment is unenforceable.

FACTS:
- Antonio Heras was sued on the basis of his personal guarantee of the obligations of
Compania Hermanos de Navegacion S.A.
- Asiavest filed a complaint in 1987 against Heras to pay the amount awarded by a
court in Hong Kong in 1984 and 1987 related to his guarantee. This is equivalent to more
than 1.8M US dollars plus interests, fixed costs and attorneys fees.
- Heras filed a Motion to Dismiss. Before this was decided, a fire razed the records of
the QC Court, plaintiff filed a motion for reconstitution of case records this was granted.
Eventually, motion to dismiss was denied.
- Note that during this time, Heras was living in HK but returned to the Philippines when
the judgment was already being enforced.
- He claimed that he never received a copy of the foreign judgment, but Asiavest claims
that the service of summons was given to Heras when the SSHG Law Firm messenger
gave a copy to Heras son-in-law, Dionisio Lopez.

TC: In favor of Asiavest. Ruled that the Hong Kong court judgment had been duly proved, it
is a presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties; hence, the party impugning it
had the burden to prove want of jurisdiction over his person. HERAS failed to discharge
that burden. Therefore, judgment enforceable.

Asiavest filed a MR to increase award, Heras appealed with the CA.

CA: MR was granted BUT CA reversed TCs decision, dismissing the case. It underscored
the fact that a foreign judgment does not of itself have any extraterritorial application. For it
to be given effect, the foreign tribunal should have acquired jurisdiction over the person and
the subject matter. If such tribunal has not acquired jurisdiction, its judgment is void.

ISSUES: Whether or not the foreign judgment (in HK) can be enforced against Heras in
the Philippines? NO

Is there want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party (JURISDICTION and NOTICE -
RELEVANT ISSUE IN THIS CASE), collusion, fraud or clear mistake of law or fact that
allows for non-enforcement of foreign judgements? YES

HELD: NO, cant be enforced. Although the foreign judgment was duly authenticated
(Asiavest was able to adduce evidence in support thereto) and Heras was never able to
overcome the validity of it, it cannot be enforced against Heras here in the Philippines
because Heras was not properly served summons. Hence, as far as Philippine law is
concerned, the Hong Kong court has never acquired jurisdiction over Heras. This means
then that Philippine courts cannot act to enforce the said foreign judgment.

The action against Heras is an action in personam and as far as Hong Kong is concerned,
Heras is a non resident. He is a non resident because prior to the judgment, he already
abandoned Hong Kong. The Hong Kong law on service of summons in in personam cases
against non residents was never presented in court hence processual presumption is
applied where it is now presumed that Hong Kong law in as far as this case is concerned is
the same as Philippine laws. And under our laws, in an action in personam wherein the
defendant is a non-resident who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the
court, personal service of summons within the state is essential to the acquisition of
jurisdiction over her person. This method of service is possible if such defendant is
physically present in the country. If he is not found therein, the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against him.
Without a personal service of summons, the Hong Kong court never acquired jurisdiction.
Needless to say, the summons tendered to Lopez was an invalid service because the same
does not satisfy the requirement of personal service.

SC: Affirmed CA decision.

Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130974, August 16, 2006

DOCTRINE
Requirement of Material Data in Servicing Summons There should be a clear valid
reason cited in the Return why efforts to locate proved inadequate, to reach the conclusion
that personal service has become impossible or unattainable.

Requirement of Extraordinary Efforts to Effect Summons Before resorting to substituted
service, a plaintiff must demonstrate an effort in good faith to locate the defendant through
more direct means.

Requirements of Recipient for Substituted Service there are two (2) requirements under
the Rules: (1) recipient must be a person of suitable age and discretion; and (2) recipient
must reside in the house or residence of defendant.

FACTS
Respondent Trajano seeks the enforcement of a foreign courts judgment rendered by the
United States District Court of Honolulu, Hawaii, USA, for wrongful death of deceased
Archimedes Trajano committed by military intelligence officials of the Philippines allegedly
under the command, direction, authority, supervision, tolerance, sufferance and/or
influence of defendant Manotoc, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 39 of the then Revised
Rules of Court.

The trial court issued a Summons addressed to petitioner at her place in Alexandra Homes,
Pasig City.

The Summons and a copy of the Complaint were allegedly served upon (Mr.) Macky de la
Cruz, an alleged caretaker. When petitioner failed to file her Answer, the trial court declared
her in default.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over
her person due to an invalid substituted service of summons. The grounds to support the
motion were: (1) the address of defendant indicated in the Complaint (Alexandra Homes)
was not her dwelling, residence, or regular place of business as provided in Section 8, Rule
14 of the Rules of Court; (2) the party (de la Cruz), who was found in the unit, was neither a
representative, employee, nor a resident of the place; (3) the procedure prescribed by the
Rules on personal and substituted service of summons was ignored; (4) defendant was a
resident of Singapore; and (5) whatever judgment rendered in this case would be
ineffective and futile.

RTC Decision
The trial court rejected Manotocs Motion to Dismiss, basing their judgment on the strength
of documentary evidence presented by respondent.

It held that petitioner was a resident of Alexandra Homes, which was also the residence of
her husband. The Disembarkation/Embarkation Card and Certification issued by the
Assitant Property Administrator of Alexandra Homes were just hearsay. The Certification
did not even refer to the date when the substituted service was effected. Her Passport as
proof of her residence in SG was rejected as it merely show the dates of her departure and
arrival in the Philippines.

Manotoc filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the CA.

CA Decision
CA upheld the lower court. It held that the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over petitioner
as there was a valid substituted service pursuant to Section 8, Rule 14 of the old Revised
Rules of Court.

ISSUE
WON there was a valid substituted service of summons on petitioner for the trial court to
acquire jurisdiction.

HELD

Acquisition of Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the
defendants voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily
submit to the courts jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons, any
judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and
void. In an action strictly in personam, personal service on the defendant is the preferred
mode of service, that is, by handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person. If
defendant, for excusable reasons, cannot be served with the summons within a reasonable
period, then substituted service can be resorted to. While substituted service of summons
is permitted, it is extraordinary in character and in derogation of the usual method of
service. Hence, it must faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and
circumstances authorized by the rules. Indeed, compliance with the rules regarding the
service of summons is as much important as the issue of due process as of jurisdiction.

Invalid Substituted Service
The Return readily reveals the absence of material data on the serious efforts to serve the
Summons on petitioner Manotoc in person. There is no clear valid reason cited in the
Return why those efforts proved inadequate, to reach the conclusion that personal service
has become impossible or unattainable. It cannot be determined how many times, on what
specific dates, and at what hours of the day the attempts were made.

It has not been shown that respondent Trajano or Sheriff Caelas, who served such
summons, exerted extraordinary efforts to locate petitioner. Before resorting to substituted
service, a plaintiff must demonstrate an effort in good faith to locate the defendant through
more direct means.

Granting that such a general description be considered adequate, there is still a serious
nonconformity from the requirement that the summons must be left with a person of
suitable age and discretion residing in defendants house or residence. Thus, there are
two (2) requirements under the Rules: (1) recipient must be a person of suitable age and
discretion; and (2) recipient must reside in the house or residence of defendant. Both
requirements were not met. In this case, the Sheriffs Return lacks information as to
residence, age, and discretion of Mr. Macky de la Cruz, aside from the sheriffs general
assertion that de la Cruz is the resident caretaker of petitioner as pointed out by a certain
Ms. Lyn Jacinto, alleged receptionist and telephone operator of Alexandra Homes. With
the petitioners allegation that Macky de la Cruz is not her employee, servant, or
representative, it is necessary to have additional information in the Return of Summons.
Besides, Mr. Macky de la Cruzs refusal to sign the Receipt for the summons is a strong
indication that he did not have the necessary relation of confidence with petitioner. To
protect petitioners right to due process by being accorded proper notice of a case against
her, the substituted service of summons must be shown to clearly comply with the rules.

Due to non-compliance with the prerequisites for valid substituted service, the proceedings
held before the trial court perforce must be annulled.

On the issue whether petitioner Manotoc is a resident of Alexandra Homes, our findings
that the substituted service is void has rendered the matter moot and academic. Even
assuming that Alexandra Homes Room 104 is her actual residence, such fact would not
make an irregular and void substituted service valid and effective.

Sansio v. Mogol, G.R. No. 177007, July 14, 2009

Doctrines:
! Section 6, Rule 14 of the ROC does not require that the service of summons on
the defendant in person must be effected only at the latters residence as stated
in the summons.
! Summons upon a respondent or a defendant must be served by handing a copy
thereof to him in person or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. The
essence of personal service is the handing or tendering of a copy of the
summons to the defendant himself, wherever he may be found; that is, wherever
he may be, provided he is in the Philippines.
! Service of summons in the persons of the defendants is generally preferred over
substituted service.

FACTS: Petitioner Sansio Philippines, Inc. is a domestic corporation that is engaged in the
business of manufacturing and selling appliances and other related products.

Petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages against respondent spouses
Mogol before the MeTC of Manila. At the request of herein petitioner, the process server of
the MeTC of Manila served the summons and the copy of the complaint on respondent
spouses Mogol at the courtroom of the MeTC. Respondent spouses were in the said
premises, as they were waiting for the scheduled hearing of the criminal cases filed by
petitioner against respondent Alicia for violations of BP 22. Upon being so informed of the
summons and the complaint, respondent spouses Mogol referred the same to their counsel,
who was also present in the courtroom. The counsel of respondent spouses Mogol took
hold of the summons and the copy of the complaint and read the same. Thereafter, he
pointed out to the process server that the summons and the copy of the complaint should
be served only at the address that was stated in both documents, i.e., at Lucena City, and
not anywhere else. The counsel of respondent spouses Mogol apparently gave back the
summons and the copy of the complaint to the process server and advised his clients not to
obtain a copy and sign for the same. As the process server could not convince the
respondent spouses Mogol to sign for the aforementioned documents, he proceeded to
leave the premises of the courtroom.

The process server of the MeTC of Manila issued a Return on Service of Summons,
declaring that the original and duplicate copies of the Summons were returned unserved.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Declare [Respondents] in Default. Petitioner averred that the
summons and the copy of the complaint were already validly served upon the respondent
spouses Mogol at the courtroom of the MeTC. From the date of said service up to the time
of the filing of the above-stated motion, respondent spouses Mogol had yet to file any
responsive pleading.

Through a special appearance of their counsel, respondent spouses Mogol filed an
Opposition to the Motion to Declare [Respondents] in Default. Respondent spouses Mogol
averred the service should have been effected at the respondent spouses residential
address, as stated in the summons and the copy of the complaint.

MeTC: The MeTC of Manila ruled that Section 6, Rule 14 of the ROC does not specify
where service is to be effected.. Respondent spouses Mogol were, thus, validly served with
summons and a copy of the complaint. For failing to file any responsive pleading before the
lapse of the reglementary period therefor, the Motion to Declare [Respondents] in Default
filed by petitioner was declared to be meritorious. Respondent spouses Mogol filed an MR
on the above Order, but the same was denied by the MeTC of Manila.

Respondent spouses filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and/or Injunction before the
RTC of Manila against Judge de Castro, Jr. of the MeTC of Manila, and herein petitioner.
Respondent spouses insisted there was no valid service of summons per return of the
process server, which was binding on the MeTC judge, who did not acquire jurisdiction over
the persons of respondent spouses. They contended that the MeTC of Manila acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring them in
default.

RTC: The RTC of Manila issued an Order dismissing the petition. It held that Section 6,
Rule 14 of the ROC does not mandate that summons be served strictly at the address
provided by the plaintiff in the complaint. Contrarily, said provision states that the service of
summons may be made wherever such is possible and practicable. Therefore, it did not
matter much that the summons and the copy of the complaint in this case were served
inside the courtroom of the MeTC of Manila, Branch 24, instead of the address at Lucena
City. The primordial consideration was that the service of summons was made in the
person of the respondent spouses Mogol.

CA: Reversed the decision of the RTC and held that there was no valid service of
summons.

ISSUE: WON there was a valid service of summons to the respondent spouses.

HELD:
YES; A summon is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against
him or her. In a civil action, jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid
service of summons or the defendants voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant
does not voluntarily submit to the courts jurisdiction, or when there is no valid service of
summons, any judgment of the court, which has no jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, is null and void. Where the action is in personam, i.e., one that seeks to impose
some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant through the
judgment of a court, and the defendant is in the Philippines, the service of summons may
be made through personal or substituted service in the manner provided for in Sections 6
and 7, Rule 14 of the ROC, which read:

SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. Whenever practicable, the summons shall be
served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive
and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served
within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a)
by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein; or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants
office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

It is well-established that summons upon a respondent or a defendant must be served by
handing a copy thereof to him in person or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him.
The essence of personal service is the handing or tendering of a copy of the summons to
the defendant himself, wherever he may be found; that is, wherever he may be, provided
he is in the Philippines.

In the instant case, the Court finds that there was already a valid service of summons in the
persons of respondent spouses Mogol. The act of the counsel of respondent spouses
Mogol of receiving the summons and the copy of the complaint already constituted receipt
on the part of his clients, for the same was done with the latters behest and consent.
Already accomplished was the operative act of handing a copy of the summons to
respondent spouses in person. Thus, jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent
spouses Mogol was already acquired by the MeTC of Manila. That being said, the
subsequent act of the counsel of respondent spouses of returning the summons and the
copy of the complaint to the process server was no longer material.

Section 6, Rule 14 of the ROC does not require that the service of summons on the
defendant in person must be effected only at the latters residence as stated in the
summons. On the contrary, said provision is crystal clear that, whenever practicable,
summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant; or if he refuses to
receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. Nothing more is required.

Much more important than considerations of practicality, however, is the fact that
respondent spouses Mogol based their case on a wrong appreciation of the above-stated
provisions of the ROC. Respondent spouses principally argue that Section 6 of Rule 14
cannot be singled out without construing the same with Section 7. Axiomatically, Sections 6
and 7 of Rule 14 of the ROC cannot be construed to apply simultaneously. Said provisions
do not provide for alternative modes of service of summons, which can either be resorted to
on the mere basis of convenience to the parties. Under our procedural rules, service of
summons in the persons of the defendants is generally preferred over substituted service.

As to the reliance of the CA on the second paragraph of the Return on Service of
Summons stating that the original and duplicate copies of the Summons were returned
UNSERVED, the Court finds the same utterly misplaced. A simple reading of the first
paragraph of the Return on Service of Summons, which contains the circumstances
surrounding the service of the summons on the persons of the respondent spouses Mogol,
manifestly reveals that the summons and the copy of the complaint were already validly
served on the said respondents. They merely refused to receive or obtain a copy of the
same.

Although We find lamentable the apparently erroneous statement made by the process
server in the aforesaid second paragraph an error that undoubtedly added to the
confusion of the parties to this case the same was, nonetheless, a mere conclusion of law,
which does not bind the independent judgment of the courts. Indeed, it cannot be said that
because of such a statement, respondent spouses Mogol had the right to rely on said
return informing them that the summons had been unserved, thus justifying their non-filing
of any responsive pleading.

In fine, we rule that jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent spouses Mogol was
validly acquired by the MeTC in this case. For their failure to file any responsive pleading to
the Complaint filed against them, in violation of the order of the said court as stated in the
summons, respondent spouses Mogol were correctly declared in default.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is
GRANTED

Palma v. Galvez, G.R.No. 165273, March 10, 2010

DOCTRINE: Because Section 16 of Rule 14 on summons uses the words may and
also, it is therefore not mandatory.

FACTS:

On July 28, 2003, petitioner Leah Palma filed with the RTC an action for damages against
the Philippine Heart Center (PHC), Dr. Danilo Giron and Dr. Bernadette O. Cruz, alleging
that the defendants committed professional fault, negligence and omission for having
removed her right ovary against her will, and losing the same (Quite morbid but might be
asked). She amended the complaint and included herein private respondent Agudo. Thus,
summons were subsequently issued to them.

The summon for Agudo was served thru her husband Alfredo Agudo, who received
and signed the same as private respondent was out of the country.

On March 30, 2004, private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over her as she was not properly served with summons,
since she was temporarily out of the country; that service of summons on her should
conform to Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner filed her Opposition to the
motion to dismiss, arguing that a substituted service of summons on private respondent's
husband was valid and binding on her; that service of summons under Section 16, Rule 14
was not exclusive and may be effected by other modes of service, i.e., by personal or
substituted service.

On May 7, 2004, the RTC issued its assailed Order granting private respondent's motion to
dismiss. It found that while the summons was served at private respondent's house and
received by respondent's husband, such service did not qualify as a valid service of
summons on her as she was out of the country at the time the summons was served, thus,
she was not personally served a summons; and even granting that she knew that a
complaint was filed against her, nevertheless, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over her
person as she was not validly served with summons; that substituted service could not be
resorted to since it was established that private respondent was out of the country, thus,
Section 16, Rule 14 provides for the service of summons on her by publication.

Petitioner claims that the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in ruling that Section
16, Rule 14, limits the service of summons upon the defendant-resident who is temporarily
out of the country exclusively by means of extraterritorial service,i.e., by personal service or
by publication

TC: No proper service of summon as respondent is outside the country and therefore,
publication is necessary

CA: Certiorari case straight to SC

ISSUE: WON proper summons were made to private respondent Aguda

HELD: YES.

SC:

According to the SC, in civil cases, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant either by the service of summons or by the latters voluntary appearance and
submission to the authority of the former. Private respondent was a Filipino resident who
was temporarily out of the Philippines at the time of the service of summons; thus, service
of summons on her is governed by Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:

Sec. 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. When an action is
commenced against a defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but
who is temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of court, be also effected out of
the Philippines, as under the preceding section. (Emphasis supplied)

The RTC found that since private respondent was abroad at the time of the service of
summons, she was a resident who was temporarily out of the country; thus, service of
summons may be made only by publication. However, the SC do not agree.

In Montefalcon v. Vasquez, the SC has already ruled that because Section 16 of
Rule 14 uses the words may and also, it is not mandatory. Other methods of
service of summons allowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the serving
officer on a defendant-resident who is temporarily out of the Philippines. Thus, if a
resident defendant is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service
may be resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth in section 7 ( formerly Section 8), Rule
14; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication,
also with leave of court; or (4) in any other manner the court may deem sufficient.

In Montalban v. Maximo, the SC held that substituted service of summons under the
present Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court in a suit in personam against residents of
the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom is the normal method of service of summons
that will confer jurisdiction on the court over such defendant

RULE 15 Motions

Gan vs. Reyes ,G.R. No. 145527 May 28, 2002
Doctrine: Petitioner argued that the writ of execution is void on the ground that he was not
notified of its issuance.
o SC said such a plea in unacceptable for enough has been done by
petitioner to delay the execution of the writ. It also said that
technicality should be an aid to justice and not its great hindrance and
chief enemy. Hence, if the writ of execution would be voided on this
ground alone, then procedural rules which were primarily drafted to
protect parties in the realm of constitutional guarantees would acquire
a new sanctity at the expense of equity and justice.
Facts:
& Bernadette S. Pondevida wrote petitioner (GAN) a letter demanding support for
their "love child." Petitioner, in his reply, denied paternity of the child.
& Bernadette thereafter instituted in behalf of her daughter a complaint against
petitioner for support with prayer for support pendente lite.
& Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action. He argued that since Francheska's certificate of birth indicated
her father as "UNKNOWN," there was no legal or factual basis for the claim of
support.
& His motion, however, was denied by the trial court.
& Despite denial of his motion, petitioner failed to file his answer within the
reglementary period.
& Private respondent moved that petitioner be declared in default, which motion
was granted.
& In its Order declaring petitioner in default the TRIAL COURT noted that
petitioner's Motion to Admit Answer was filed more than 90 days after the
expiration of the reglementary period, and only after private respondent moved
that petitioner be declared in default.
& Hence, the court received the evidence of private respondent ex parte.
& After finding that the claim of filiation and support was adequately
proved, the trial court rendered its decision ordering petitioner to recognize
private respondent Francheska Joy S. Pondevida as his illegitimate child and
support her with P20,000.00 every month and was also ordered to pay the
accumulated arrears of P20,000.00 per month from the day she was born
& Private respondent moved for execution of the judgment of support, which the
trial court granted by issuing a writ of execution.
& Petitioner appealed the Judgment to the CA alleging that the writ was issued
without notice to him hence it was invalid and seeks the setting aside of the
default order and the judgment rendered thereafter for the reason that should he
be allowed to prove his defense of adultery, the claim of support would be most
likely denied.
& CA dismissed the petition on the ratiocination that under Sec. 4, Rule 39 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure judgments for support are immediately executory
and cannot be stayed by an appeal
Issue: W/N the writ of execution is valid?
Ruling: There is no evidence indeed to justify the setting aside of the writ on the
ground that it was issued beyond the legitimate bounds of judicial discretion.
& Section 4, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court clearly states that, unless ordered by
the trial court, judgments in actions for support are immediately executory and
cannot be stayed by an appeal. This is an exception to the general rule which
provides that the taking of an appeal stays the execution of the judgment and
that advance executions will only be allowed if there are urgent reasons therefor.
o To consider then petitioner's argument that there should be good
reasons for the advance execution of a judgment would violate the
clear and explicit language of the rule mandating immediate execution.
& As to petitioners contention to annul the writ of execution on the ground that he
was not notified of its issuance.
o SC said such a plea in unacceptable for enough has been done by
petitioner to delay the execution of the writ.
! Records show that in partial fulfillment of the writ of
execution petitioner surrendered a sedan which apparently
was not his as it was later ordered released to a third party
who laid claim over the levied vehicle. Also, petitioner filed
before the Court of Appeals a Motion for Leave to Deposit in
Court Support Pendente Lite promising to deposit the
amount due as support every 15th of the month, but to date
has not deposited any amount in complete disavowal of his
undertaking.
o It also said that technicality should be an aid to justice and not its great
hindrance and chief enemy. Hence, if the writ of execution would be
voided on this ground alone, then procedural rules which were
primarily drafted to protect parties in the realm of constitutional
guarantees would acquire a new sanctity at the expense of equity and
justice.
& Lastly, the court ruled that the money and property adjudged for support and
education should and must be given presently and without delay because if it had
to wait the final judgment, the children may in the meantime have suffered
because of lack of food or have missed and lost years in school because of lack
of funds.

Mutilan vs. Adiong Adm. Matter No. RTJ-00-1581, July 2, 2002
(take note of the dates)

DOCTRINE: Rule 15, Sections 4 and 6, of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly provides
that every motion required to be heard shall include a notice of hearing, which should be
sent to the other party at least three days before the date of hearing, unless the court sets
the hearing on shorter notice.

FACTS: An administrative complaint charging Judge Santos Adiong of the Regional Trial
Court of Marawi City, Branch 8, with gross ignorance of the law, incompetence, and
violation of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, has been filed by Governor Mahid
Mutilan of the Province of Lanao del Sur before the Office of the Court Administrator which
involves unpaid salaries of the petitioners from the provincial government. Complainant
claims that Judge Adiong has assumed jurisdiction over the petition immediately upon its
filing without conducting any raffle, and that the judge has issued an order requiring the
provincial government to answer within ten (10) days from receipt of the petition without it
having first been served on complainant.

It would appear that in an order, dated 24 September 1998, Judge Adiong granted the
motion of the petitioners to declare the respondents in default. Upon learning of the order
of default, the provincial government, through its counsel Attorney Johnny Marohombsar,
filed a motion to set aside the order of default and scheduled its hearing on 14 October
1998. Judge Adiong, nevertheless, rendered on 5 October 1998, promulgated the following
day, a judgment ordering the provincial government of Lanao del Sur to process, sign and
approve the claim vouchers of the petitioners and to pay their just and valid claims in the
total amount of P562,966.93; to pay jointly and severally in their official capacities as such
respondents to the petitioners the sum of P500,000.00 for moral damages; to pay or
indemnify jointly and severally the petitioners the sum of P30,000.00 plus 10% of
petitioners total claims as attorneys fees and to pay the costs. A copy of the decision was
served on and received by the Provincial Government of Lanao del Sur on 6 October 1998.
On the same day, the petitioners filed a joint motion for garnishment on any account or
accounts of the Province of Lanao del Sur, Governor Mahid Mutilan, and the Provincial
Treasurer with the Philippine National Bank (PNB), Marawi City, for payment of the
adjudged claims which was forthwith granted by Judge Adiong. On 8 October 1998, the
petitioners filed a motion for contempt and asking that the PNB immediately release the
funds to satisfy the judgment. In an order, dated 09 October 1998, Judge Adiong, acting on
the motion, ordered the PNB to immediately release the funds and the bank manager to
explain within 72 hours why she should not be cited for contempt. In a memorandum,
dated 9 October 1998, Sandra M. Ambor, Senior Assistant Manager of the PNB, ordered
the release of the amount of P1,154,263.62 to the court in SPC Civil Case No. 507-98.
Subsequently, Judge Adiong issued an order, dated 9 October 1998, directing Sheriff
Rimbang Paniambaan to encash the check and disposed of it in accordance with the
decision of 5 October 1998.

Juge Adiong maintained that the complaint was a form of harassment against him due to
the adverse rulings suffered by complainant. He denied the charge that no raffle was
conducted. He averred that he had issued an order requiring complainant to answer the
petition for mandamus which order was duly served. For failing to file an answer within the
reglementary period, the respondents were, upon motion filed by the petitioners, declared
in default. Subsequently, a judgment by default was served on the provincial government.
Respondent judge maintained that Attorney Johnny Marohombsar, counsel for the
provincial government, only filed his entry of appearance when he submitted the motion to
lift the order of default on 05 October 1998.

OCA: OCA found respondent judge to have ignored established rules and legal principles,
and it recommended that respondent judge be ordered to pay a fine of one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00), with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt
with severely.

SC/HELD: SC affirmed OCAs findings with modification (fine raised to 5k)

The Court agrees with the Investigating Justice. A perusal of the motion to declare the
respondent in SPC Civil Case No. 507-98 in default, as well as the joint motion for
garnishment filed by the petitioners, shows non-compliance with the proof of service and
notice of hearing requirements. Rule 15, Sections 4 and 6, of the Revised Rules of Court
explicitly provides that every motion required to be heard shall include a notice of hearing,
which should be sent to the other party at least three days before the date of hearing,
unless the court sets the hearing on shorter notice. Proof of service is mandatory. The
Court has invariably held that a motion without a notice of hearing is a mere scrap of
paper.Respondent judge has acted too swiftly; he has granted petitioners motion to
declare the respondents in default, as well as the joint motion for garnishment, without
giving the provincial government the opportunity to be heard. Clearly, respondent judge
has ignored a fundamental rule.

Bacelonia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143440, February 11, 2004

FACTS: Private respondents Victorino and Olivia Bolos filed a complaint for damages
against herein petitioners including Simeon Roxas-Cu and Daniel Cario before the RTC.
The case stemmed from a vehicular accident, involving a tamaraw-type school shuttle
service vehicle and a 6 x 6 Isuzu cargo truck,resulting in the untimely demise of private
respondents daughter, Jemelee Bolos. Jemelee was on board the school shuttle service
vehicle.

Petitioners-spouses Graciano, Sr. and Serena Bacelonia were named defendants in the
said complaint for damages as owners/operators of the school shuttle service that figured
in the accident. Graciano Bacelonia, Jr. was the driver thereof. The other defendants
therein, Simeon Roxas-Cu and Daniel Cario were the owner and the driver of the cargo
truck, respectively.

The petitioners filed their answer with special and affirmative defenses and counterclaim
while their co-defendants, Simeon Roxas-Cu and Daniel Cario, filed their answer with
affirmative defenses and cross-claim.

Meanwhile, it appears that, prior to the filing of the complaint by the private respondents,
petitioners filed a complaint for damages arising from the said accident against their co-
defendants, from which they entered into a compromise agreement leading to the dismissal
of said case.

Petitioners filed a motion to be dropped as defendants on the ground that a compromise
agreement had already been entered into by the parties. The petitioners opined in essence
that their co-defendants, Simeon Roxas-Cu and Daniel Cario, had explicitly admitted sole
responsibility for the vehicular accident by entering into the compromise agreement. Thus,
they (the Bacelonias) should be excluded as defendants. However, their co-defendants,
Simeon Roxas-Cu and Daniel Cario, filed an opposition substantially contending that res-
judicata does not obtain insofar as the present case is concerned, and that, on the contrary,
they never admitted any responsibility for the accident.

The trial court resolved to deny the motion of the petitioners to be dropped as defendants
from the case for lack of merit.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. On the same day, Petitioners also filed a
separate motion to cancel the hearing for the presentation of evidence for the defense
earlier scheduled so that their motion for reconsideration may not be rendered moot and
academic. Private respondents opposed the twin motions of the petitioners for lack of merit.

RTC DECISION: The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration.

CA DECISION: The petitioners maintained that they were not accorded their right to due
process when their motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court. However, the
petition was dismissed for being premature and for lack of merit. The appellate court
explained that the questioned order of the trial court was interlocutory and could not be
assailed in a petition for certiorari and that, moreover, res judicata did not apply insofar as
the claim was concerned. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied.

ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals exceeded its jurisdiction when it dismissed the MR.

HELD: No. The motion for reconsideration of the trial courts resolution on January 10,
2000 was filed by the petitioners on January 31, 2000. The date and time of hearing thereof
was set by the petitioners on February 15, 2000 at 8:30 oclock in the morning. In this
connection, Rule 15, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court on motions provides:

Section 5. Notice of hearing.- The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties
concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than
ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.

It is clear then that the scheduled hearing of the said motion for reconsideration was
beyond the period specified by the Revised Rules of Court which was not later than ten
(10) days after the filing of the motion, or no later than February 10, 2000. Significantly, the
above provision of Rule 15, Section 5 uses the mandatory term "must" in fixing the period
within which the motion shall be scheduled for hearing. A motion that fails to religiously
comply with the mandatory provision of Rule 15, Section 5 is pro forma and presents no
question which merits the attention and consideration of the court.

The mandatory character of Rule 15, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court becomes
specially significant in this case, considering the claim of the private respondents that the
petitioners have been engaging in dilatory tactics, an imputation not without factual basis.
As borne by the records, herein petitioners and their co-defendants, Simeon Roxas-Cu and
Daniel Cario, entered into a compromise agreement on April 27, 1995 that led to the
dismissal by the trial court of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-95-23169 on April 28, 1995.

This compromise agreement was already interposed by the petitioners as one of the
special and affirmative defenses in their answer to the complaint for damages in Civil Case
No. Q-98-33149. Thus it was no longer legally possible for the petitioners to file the Motion
to Exclude on September 24, 1999 in Civil Case No. Q-98-33149 (actually a motion to
dismiss the case against them), based on a compromise agreement that did not even bind
the complainants (herein private respondents) who were not parties thereto. At such stage,
the private respondents were already winding up the presentation of their evidence in Civil
Case No. Q-98-33149.

Upon the denial of their Motion to Exclude on January 10, 2000, the petitioners filed the
subject motion for reconsideration on January 31, 2000. In addition, they moved to cancel
the scheduled hearing for the initial presentation of their evidence already scheduled on
February 3, 2000 ostensibly to give way to oral arguments in support of their motion for
reconsideration which, as above discussed, was pro forma. By their actuations, it can be
conclusively presumed that the petitioners had no other intention but to delay the
proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-98-33149.

It should be pointed out that the motion to cancel the scheduled hearing on February 3,
2000 filed on January 31, 2000 by the petitioners was itself scheduled to be heard on
February 3, 2000 which latter date, incidentally, was previously set by the trial court for
reception of defendants evidence. Admittedly, the petitioners were present during the
hearing on said date to argue on the merits of their motion to cancel. On the same occasion,
the private respondents objected to the motion to cancel the hearing on February 3, 2000,
arguing that no compelling reason existed to grant the said pending motion; they proposed
instead that petitioners avail of the said setting to argue their motion for reconsideration.

Despite the denial by the trial court of their motion to cancel, and a subsequent directive for
them to argue their motion for reconsideration on February 3, 2000, the petitioners chose to
ignore the same. The petitioners thus had only themselves to blame for not having been
heard on their motion for reconsideration.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED.

Republic v. Peralta, G.R. No. 150327, June 18, 2003

Doctrine: The requirements entombed in Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court
are mandatory and non-compliance therewith is fatal and renders the motion pro forma; a
worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and which the court
has no authority to act upon.

Facts: The Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) utilized a property covered in Davao City,
covered by TCT No. T-134231. However, Peralta et. al., claimed ownership over TCT No.
T-134231 and demanded BFD to vacate the premises. Thus, a case was filed in RTC.

RTC: The RTC ruled in favor of Peralta et. al., acknowledging their right over the subject
property.

The BFD, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (MR). However, the MR was expunged due to the lack of notice of hearing
as required by the Rules of Court.

In turn, BFD filed its Notice of Appeal to the RTC. However, the RTC ruled that it failed to
file its Notice of Appeal within the reglementary period, dismissing their appeal. Thus, BFD
filed appealed the case to the CA

CA: Upon filing a Petition for Certiorari by the BFD, the CA ruled in favor of Peralta et. al.,
affirming that the Motion for Reconsideration was defective due to the lack of notice of
hearing as required by the Rules of Court. Consequently, BFDs period to appeal expired,
making the Decision of the RTC final and executory.

Issue: W/N RTC acted in grave abuse of discretion in not accepting BFDs Motion for
Reconsideration due to lack of notice of hearing as required by the Rules of Court.

Held: No, the RTC is correct in not acknowledging BFDs Motion for Reconsideration..

Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion for reconsideration or a
motion for a new trial shall be made in writing stating the ground or grounds therefor, a
written notice of which shall be served by the movant on the adverse party. Such written
notice is that prescribed in Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Under Section
4, paragraph 2 of said rule, a notice of hearing on a motion shall be served by the movant
to all the parties concerned at least three days before the date of hearing. Section 5 of the
same rule requires that the notice of hearing shall be directed to the parties concerned and
shall state the time and place of the hearing of the motion.

The requirements entombed in Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court are
mandatory and non-compliance therewith is fatal and renders the motion pro forma; a
worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and which the court
has no authority to act upon. In cases of motions for a new trial or for the reconsideration of
a judgment, the running of the period for appeal is not tolled by the mere filing or pendency
of said motion.

Although the petitioners filed the motion for reconsideration dated May 30, 1997 within the
reglementary period, said motion failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15.
Furthermore, the OSG offered no valid justification for its failure to comply with Sections 4
and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court except the self-serving claim of Solicitor Evaristo M.
Padilla that his omission was sheer inadvertence, caused by heavy pressure of work in
preparing numerous pleadings and in the almost daily attendance in court for naturalization
cases and those for nullity of marriage, among others.

N.B. However, prescinding from all the foregoing, this Court grants not only petitioners
plea that it suspend its own rule on the perfection of appeals but also directs the reopening
of the trial of the case for the parties to adduce their respective evidence. The Court
excepts this case from the said rule in the interest of justice, to avert a grave miscarriage of
justice to the State through the negligence of the OSG.

SC: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 53440 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City, Branch 13, dated February 5, 1999 and May 5, 1999 in Civil Case No. 23,168-
94 are SET ASIDE. The said Regional Trial Court is DIRECTED to reopen the trial to
enable the parties to adduce their respective evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General
is hereby directed to represent the petitioners during the trial. No costs.

RULE 16 Motion to Dismiss

Province of Zamboanga Del Norte vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 109853, October 11,
2000
DOCTRINE:
The premature invocation of the jurisdiction of the trial court warrants the dismissal of the
case.

FACTS:
Petitioner Province of Zamboanga del Norte (represented by Gov. Isagani S. Amatong)
filed with the RTC, a complaint against Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative
(ZANECO) for "Illegal Collection Of Power Bills And Preliminary Injunction With Restraining
Order."

Petitioner alleged that as per electric bills issued by ZANECO, respondent increased the
Fuel Compensating Charge (FCC) and Interim Adjustment charges. As a result, the electric
bills of the consumers almost doubled in amount. Petitioner claimed that the increase was
arbitrary and illegal, and that the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) did not sanction the
collections.

Petitioner further alleged that ZANECO cannot increase the bills since the power rate
increase from the National Power Corporation (NPC) was not implemented yet due to a
restraining order issued by the Supreme Court.

ZANECO in its answer, assailed the jurisdiction of the trial court over the case.

The RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent to desist from imposing,
charging, billing and collecting the FCC and other additional charges upon its end-users in
Zamboanga del Norte and the cities of Dipolog and Dapitan and to refrain from cutting off
the electric lines of those who refused to pay the questioned charges, pending
determination of the litigation.

ZANECO filed with the RTC a motion requesting the court to set for hearing the affirmative
defenses set in its answer, asking for the dismissal of the case. (Motion to Dismiss)

RTC:
RTC denied ZANECOs motion to dismiss. The court ruled that (1) the nullity of the charges
imposed are matters not capable of pecuniary estimation and thus fall within the jurisdiction
of the regional trial court; and (2) it is futile to file a complaint with the National
Electrification Administration (NEA) or the NPC considering that charges imposed by
respondent emanated from these agencies.

ZANECO filed an MR. The RTC denied ZANECOs MR. Respondent appealed to the CA.

CA:
CA reversed the RTC decision. The RTC was ordered to dismiss the complaint. Hence, this
petition.

Petitioner assails the imposition of the FCC and Incremental Costs Charge (ICC) as void,
illegal, and unconstitutional for lack of notice, hearing and consultation of the parties
affected, and without prior authority from the ERB. Petitioner rationalized that the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB) has jurisdiction by virtue of EO 172, Section 3 (a) in that ERB is
empowered to fix and regulate the prices of petroleum products. Since the FCC was
imposed to compensate the cost of diesel fuel, a petroleum product, then such imposition
must be approved by the ERB.

Petitioner also maintains that the case qualifies as an exception to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies, basing its argument on the unconstitutionality and arbitrariness of
the imposition of the charges.

ISSUE: (These issues are interrelated to the M2D topic)
1. Whether jurisdiction is vested in the ERB, the trial court, or the NEA.
2. W/N the case qualifies as an exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies which would make the grant of a motion to dismiss improper.

SC:
The decision of the CA in setting aside the trial courts orders and ordering the trial court to
dismiss the complaint is AFFIRMED in toto.

HELD:
1. The real issue is not the compensation of the cost of diesel fuel used to feed the
generating set in Mindanao. The complaint was for "Illegal Collection of Power Bills."
Since the complaint is one questioning the increase in the power rates, the proper
body to investigate the case is the National Electrification Administration (NEA).

The regulation and fixing of power rates to be charged by electric cooperatives
remain within the jurisdiction of the NEA, despite the enactment of EO 172, creating
the Energy Regulatory Board. The issue raised in the complaint is the legality of the
imposition of the FCC or ICC. Despite the fact that diesel fuel was used to run its
machinery, the fact is that ZANECO charged its consumers to compensate for the
increase in the price of fuel. Petitioner did not question the price of diesel fuel. Rather,
it questioned the charges passed on to its end users as a result of increase in the
price of fuel. And the body with the technical expertise to determine whether or not
the charges are legal is the NEA.

Thus, a party questioning the rates imposed by an electric cooperative may file a
complaint with the NEA as it is empowered to conduct hearings and investigations
and issue such orders on the rates that may be charged. In case a party feels
aggrieved by any order, ruling or decision of the NEA, he may file a petition for
review before the CA.

2. Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that
he avail himself of all administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy
within the administrative machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative
officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then
such remedy must be exhausted first before the courts power of judicial review can
be sought. The premature resort to the court is fatal to ones cause of action.
Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case may be dismissed for
lack of cause of action.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not without its practical and
legal reasons. Indeed, resort to administrative remedies entails lesser expenses and
provides for speedier disposition of controversies. Our courts of justice for reason of
comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the
administrative agency every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the
case.

The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies has certain exceptions as
embodied in various cases. This doctrine is a relative one and is flexible depending
on the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case.
It is disregarded: (1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue
involved is purely a legal question; (3) when the administrative action is patently
illegal and amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the
part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury; (6)
when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the
President, bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require
exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would
amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private land in
land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention; and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the
complainant; (12) when no administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the
rule of qualified political agency applies; and (14) when the issue of non-exhaustion
of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.

Petitioner fails to show that the instant case falls under any of the exceptions. Mere
allegation of arbitrariness will not suffice to vest in the trial court the power that has
been specifically granted by law to special government agencies.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with
an administrative body of special competence. It is a basic rule that the court will not
interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special
technical knowledge and training of such agencies.

In fact, a party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed
administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate
conclusion before seeking judicial intervention. The underlying principle of the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the presumption that when the
administrative body, or grievance machinery, is afforded a chance to pass upon the
matter, it will decide the same correctly.

The premature invocation of the jurisdiction of the trial court warrants the dismissal of
the case.

Tourist Duty Free Shops, inc. vs The Hon. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 107395, January
26, 2000, 323 SCRA 358
Doctrine:
If no motion to dismiss has been filed, an of the grounds for dismissal provided
for in the Rules may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer and, in the
discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss
had been filed.
Dissenting Opinion:
A recognized test fro identity is to discover whether a judgment in the prior action
would be conclusive on the liability sought to be enforced in the second and would thereby
support the pleas of res judicata.

Facts:
! This petition seeks to nullify and set aside the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan,
Second Division, dated June 15, 1992 and September 23, 1992, which (1)
dismissed the complaint for injunction and specific performance filed by petitioner
against private respondents; and (2) denied the motion for reconsideration
thereof, respectively.
! The PCGG, through Commissioner Bautista, issued a sequestration order
against petitioner.
! PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution and damages against 4 Tantocos, Dominador Santiago,
sps Ferdinand Marcos (Civil Case No. 0008) The complaint alleged, among
others.
" Defendants . . . collaborated in the latter's scheme, devices and
stratagems to appropriate and conceal the ownership of assets illegally
obtained to the grave damage of Plaintiff among others.
! Petitioner assailed the sequestration order via a complaint for injunction and
specific performance against herein respondents before the Sandiganbayan
(Civil Case No. 0142)
" In its complaint, petitioner alleged that the writ of sequestration is void
because:
# (1) it was issued without any investigation;
# (2) all the assets, funds and properties of petitioner were
lawfully acquired and earned;
# (3) the writ of sequestration was signed by only one of the
five commissioners of the respondent PCGG; and
# (4) the respondent PCGG has not filed any action against
petitioner to recover the latter's assets, funds and properties,
nor has it registered any list of the sequestered assets with
the respondent Sandiganbayan pursuant to Section 26,
Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution
5
and therefore, the writ
of sequestration is now deemed automatically lifted.
" As regards respondent Bank of America (BA) and respondent Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), petitioner asserts that said
banks refuse to comply with their contractual obligation to allow herein
petitioner to withdraw its funds and to honor its checks.
! Petitioner likewise filed an ex-parte motion to assign the case to the Second
Division of the Sandiganbayan praying that the complaint be assigned to the said
division where Civil Case No. 0008 is pending.
! December 23, 1991. Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution requiring the private
respondents to file their answers. In its answer, respondent PCGG asserts inter
alia:
" (1) that the writ of sequestration is valid and implemented within the
bounds of law;
" (2) that the PCGG is not the proper party-in-interest but the Republic of
the Philippines;
" (3) that the Republic and the PCGG are immune from suit; and
" (4) that the case should be dismissed on the ground of litis pendencia
or should be consolidated with Civil Case No. 0008 where the subject
assets and funds deposited with respondents BA and RCBC are
among those placed under sequestration.
8

! Respondent RCBC and BA filed their separate answers basically contending that
they are merely obeying the writ of sequestration issued by respondent PCGG
and that the case should be merely between petitioner and respondent PCGG.
! March 23, 1992. Petitioner filed a motion for immediate relief pendente lite. The
motion was granted in a Resolution dated April 8, 1992.
" RCBC was ordered to honor the checks of the petitioner issued in
payment.
" May 7, 1992. Petitioner filed another omnibus motion praying for the
reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution, to resolve its pending
motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and to
set the case for pre-trial conference.
! June 15, 1992. Sandiganbayan, without acting on the pending motion of herein
petitioner, issued the now assailed Resolution, the decretal portion of which
reads
" WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant case is hereby
dismissed, without costs, and without prejudice to the re-filing by
plaintiff of the proper motions in Civil Case No. 0008. Consequently, all
pending incidents herein are hereby deemed moot and academic.
! Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that respondent Sandiganbayan
erred in dismissing the case motu proprio and in dismissing the case based on
litis pendencia,
14
a ground not enumerated in Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court.

Issue/s:
1. Whether or not Sandiganbayan dismissed the case without any motion to dismiss
having filed by the PCGG. NO.
2. Whether or not Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case on the ground of litis
pendencia. YES

Held:
1. No. It is erroneous for petitioner to claim that respondent Sandiganbayan dismissed the
case without any motion to dismiss having been filed by the private respondent. The
dismissal of petitioner's complaint was prayed for by respondent PCGG in its answer and
other pleadings. In its answer, the respondent PCGG alleged that:
14. This case should be dismissed on the ground of litis pendencia or
there is another action pending involving the same parties for the same cause, i.e.
"Republic of the Philippines vs. Bienvenido Tantoco, et al, Civil Case No. 0008;
or should be consolidated and/or treated a mere incident of Civil Case No. 0008.
15. The subject assets and funds, deposited with defendants Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Bank of America (BA)
sequestered by PCGG are among the assets of the defendants in Civil Case No.
0008;
Hence, while no motion to dismiss was filed, respondent PCGG has been
constantly pleading for the dismissal of the case in its answer and in the subsequent
pleadings submitted to the respondent Sandiganbayan. This is allowed under Section 6,
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court which provides that if no motion to dismiss has been filed,
any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in the Rules may be pleaded as an affirmative
defense in the answer and, in discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing may be had
thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed. A preliminary hearing on the affirmative
defense invoking any of the grounds for dismissal is not even mandatory as may be shown
from the use of the word "may" in the above rule.

2. Yes. Nonetheless, it was erroneous for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss this case on the
ground of litis pendencia. The requisiutes of litis pendencia, to note, are the following:
1. Identify of parties or of representation in both cases,
2. Identify of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
3. The relief must be founded on the same facts and the same basis,
and
4. Identity in the two preceding particulars should be such that any
judgment which may be rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res judicata on the action under consideration.
These requisites are absent in this case. For one, there are no identity of parties
in the present case and Civil Case No. 0008. Here, petitioner, RCBA and BA are not parties
in Civil Case No. 0008. Neither are the defendants in the latter case parties to the present
case. Also, there is no identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for. The action in Civil
Case No. 0008 involved "reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages"
against defendants therein which does not include petitioner, RCBC or BA, while the main
thrust of the instant case is for specific performance against RCBC and BA. The evident
and logical conclusion then is that any decision that may be rendered in any of these two
cases cannot constitute res judicata on the other. The instant case and Civil Case No. 0008,
therefore, ought to be resolved independently. To merge the former with the latter case via
mere motion is clearly unwarranted.

SC: The Resolutions of the respondent Sandiganbayan dated June 15, 1992 and
September 23, 1992 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Dino vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 113564, June 23, 2001, 359 SCRA 91

DOCTRINE: (T)rial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground
of prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed
time-barred; and it may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss (Sec. 1,f, Rule 16, Rules
of Court), or an answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense (Sec. 5, Rule
16), or even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for
reconsideration; or even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement
thereof is found in the pleadings; or where a defendant has been declared in default. What
is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive
period be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in the
averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise established by the evidence."

FACTS: Petitioners spouses Dino, doing business under the trade name "Candy Claire
Fashion Garment" are engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling shirts.
Respondent Sio is part owner and general manager of a manufacturing corporation doing
business under the trade name "Universal Toy Master Manufacturing."

Petitioners and respondent Sio entered into a contract whereby the latter would
manufacture for the petitioners 20,000 pieces of vinyl frogs and 20,000 pieces of vinyl
mooseheads. These frogs and mooseheads were to be attached to the shirts petitioners
would manufacture and sell.

Respondent Sio delivered the products. The last delivery was made on September 28,
1988. Petitioner fully paid the agreed price. Subsequently, petitioners returned to
respondent 29,772 pieces of frogs and mooseheads for failing to comply with the approved
sample.

Petitioners then demanded from the respondent a refund of the purchase price of the
returned goods in the amount of P208,404.00. As respondent Sio refused to pay,
petitioners filed on July 24, 1989 an action for collection of a sum of money RTC Manila.

TC: TC ruled in favor of the petitioners.

Respondent Sio sought recourse in the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial courts
decision. Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration alleging therein that the petitioners' action for collection of sum of
money based on a breach of warranty had already prescribed.

CA: Respondent court reversed its decision and dismissed petitioners' Complaint for
having been filed beyond the prescriptive period.

"Even if there is failure to raise the affirmative defense of prescription in a motion to dismiss
or in an appropriate pleading (answer, amended or supplemental answer) and an
amendment would no longer be feasible, still prescription, if apparent on the face of the
complaint may be favorably considered

ISSUE: WON CA erred in dismissing the petitioners complaint and holding that the
defense of prescription would still be considered despite the fact that it was not raised in
the answer, if apparent on the face of the complaint.

HELD: NO

The contract executed by and between the petitioners and the respondent was a contract
for a piece of work.

Petitioners aver that they discovered the defects in respondent's products when customers
in their (petitioners') shirt business came back to them complaining that the frog and
moosehead figures attached to the shirts they bought were torn. Petitioners allege that they
did not readily see these hidden defects upon their acceptance. A hidden defect is one
which is unknown or could not have been known to the vendee.

Article 1567 provides for the remedies available to the vendee in case of hidden defects,
viz:

"Art. 1567. In the cases of Articles 1561, 1562, 1564, 1565 and 1566, the vendee
may elect between withdrawing from the contract and demanding a proportionate
reduction of the price, with damages in either case."

By returning the 29,772 pieces of vinyl products to respondent and asking for a return of
their purchase price, petitioners were in effect "withdrawing from the contract" as provided
in Art. 1567. The prescriptive period for this kind of action is provided in Art. 1571 of the
New Civil Code, viz:

"Art. 1571. Actions arising from the provisions of the preceding ten articles shall
be barred after six months from the delivery of the thing sold.

There is no dispute that respondent made the last delivery of the vinyl products to
petitioners on September 28, 1988. It is also settled that the action to recover the purchase
price of the goods petitioners returned to the respondent was filed on July 24, 1989, more
than nine months from the date of last delivery. Petitioners having filed the action three
months after the six-month period for filing actions for breach of warranty against hidden
defects stated in Art. 1571, the appellate court dismissed the action.

Petitioners fault the ruling on the ground that it was too late in the day for respondent to
raise the defense of prescription. The law then applicable to the case at bar, Rule 9,

Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court, provides:
"Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer are deemed waived; except the failure to state a cause of action . . . "

Thus, they claim that since the respondent failed to raise the defense of prescription in a
motion to dismiss or in its answer, it is deemed waived and cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal in a motion for reconsideration of the appellate court's decision.

As a rule, the defense of prescription cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. However,
this is not a hard and fast rule. In Gicano v. Gegato,

we held:

". . .(T)rial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the
ground of prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record
show it to be indeed time-barred; and it may do so on the basis of a motion
to dismiss (Sec. 1,f, Rule 16, Rules of Court), or an answer which sets up
such ground as an affirmative defense (Sec. 5, Rule 16), or even if the
ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for
reconsideration; or even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as
where no statement thereof is found in the pleadings; or where a defendant
has been declared in default. What is essential only, to repeat, is that the
facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period be otherwise
sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in the
averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise established by the
evidence."

In Aldovino, et al. v. Alunan, et al., the Court en banc reiterated the Garcia v. Mathis
doctrine cited in the Gicano case that when the plaintiff's own complaint shows clearly that
the action has prescribed, the action may be dismissed even if the defense of prescription
was not invoked by the defendant.

It is apparent in the records that respondent made the last delivery of vinyl products to the
petitioners on September 28, 1988. Petitioners admit this in their Memorandum submitted
to the trial court and reiterate it in their Petition for Review. It is also apparent in the
Complaint that petitioners instituted their action on July 24, 1989. The issue for resolution is
whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals could dismiss the petitioners' action if the
defense of prescription was raised for the first time on appeal but is apparent in the records.

Following the Gicano doctrine that allows dismissal of an action on the ground of
prescription even after judgment on the merits, or even if the defense was not raised at all
so long as the relevant dates are clear on the record, we rule that the action filed by the
petitioners has prescribed. The dates of delivery and institution of the action are undisputed.
There are no new issues of fact arising in connection with the question of prescription, thus
carving out the case at bar as an exception from the general rule that prescription if not
impleaded in the answer is deemed waived.

Even if the defense of prescription was raised for the first time on appeal in respondent's
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate court's decision, this does not
militate against the due process right of the petitioners. On appeal, there was no new issue
of fact that arose in connection with the question of prescription, thus it cannot be said that
petitioners were not given the opportunity to present evidence in the trial court to meet a
factual issue. Equally important, petitioners had the opportunity to oppose the defense of
prescription in their Opposition to the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed in the
appellate court and in their Petition for Review in this Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the impugned decision of the Court of Appeals
dated January 24, 1994 is AFFIRMED. No costs.

Indians Aerospace University vs. Commission on Higher Education (CHED) G.R. No.
139371, April 4, 2001, 356 SCRA 367 GAUDIEL

Doctrine:

A writ of certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory
ruling, it is resorted only to correct grave abuse of discretion. In the case at bar, there was
no grave abuse of discretion in the lower courts denial of the Motion to Dismiss since the
acts of CHED such as declaring in a newspaper that Indiana was ordered closed for illegal
advertisement, undermined the public's confidence in Indiana as an educational institution.

Facts:
CHED received a letter from the Chairman of Professional Regulatory
Commission inquiring whether Indiano Aerospace already acquired university status in view
of its advertisement as such in Manila Bulletin. Upon investigation, it was verified from SEC
that Indiana School of Aeronautics failed to amend its articles if Incorporation to change its
name to Indiana Aerospace University. Thus, CHED ordered it to desist from using the term
University.
Prior thereto, Indiana Aerospace filed a complaint for damages with a prayer for
Writ of Preliminary Injunction. CHED, on the other hand filed a motion to Dismiss. The
lower court dismissed the Motion to Dismiss and Granted Indianas prayer for Preliminary
Injunction.
Likewise, Indiana Aerospace filed before the lower court a Motion to declare
CHED in Default. CHED filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File its Answer

TC:
The lower court ruled on Indianas motion to declare CHED in Default and
directed it to present evidence ex parte.

CA:
CA ruled that Indiana had no cause of action against CHE since it failed to show
that it had been granted university status by CHED, and ruled that CHED should not have
been declared in default since its Answer had long been filed before the lower court ruled
upon Indianas Motion to declare it in default.

Issue:

Was the certiorari petition properly and timely filed because it was filed out of
time and was not preceded by a motion for reconsideration in the RTC?

HELD: Yes.

SC:
CHEDs Petition for Certiorari was seasonable filed. In computing its
timeliness, what should have been considered is the date when the respondent received
the Order declaring it in default. In the case at bar, CHED was able to comply with the 60-
day reglamentary period to file its Petition for Certiorari.

As to its contention that a motion for reconsideration should precede the petition
for certiorari, the general rule is that the lower court should be given the opportunity to
correct itself and thus a motion for reconsideration should precede a petitioner for certiorari.

However, exception to such are: a) when issues are purely legal; b) public
interest is involved; c) extreme urgency; d) special circumstances so warrant. In the case at
bar, regulation of educational institutions is invested with public interest; thus there is not
need to resort first to a motion for reconsideration.

Lastly, an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory; the proper remedy is
to appeal after a decision has been rendered.

A writ of certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory
ruling, it is resorted only to correct grave abuse of discretion. In the case at bar, there was
no grave abuse of discretion in the lower courts denial of the Motion to Dismiss since the
acts of CHED such as declaring in a newspaper that Indiana was ordered closed for illegal
advertisement, undermined the public's confidence in Indiana as an educational institution.
This was a clear statement of a sufficient cause of action.

San Lorenzo Village Association, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals G. R. No. 116826, March
26, 1998, 288 SCRA 115

Doctrines:
1) A complaint states a cause of action where it contains (3) essential elements of a cause
of action
a. The legal right of the plaintiff
b. The correlative obligation of the defendant
c. The act or omission of the defendant in violation of the said right
2) A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action in the complaint
hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged therein. However, the admissions do not
extend to conclusions or interpretations of law, nor does it cover allegations of fact the
falsity of which is subject to judicial notice
3) It is not lack or absence of cause of action that is a ground for dismissal of the
complaint, but rather that the complaint states no cause of action

Facts:
Almeda Development was the owner the parcel of land situated in San Lorenzo Village. In
the Transfer Certificates, the owner of the said land is required to be a member of San
Lorenzo Village Association, the lot shall only be used for residential purposes, and
buildings shall not be higher than 5 meters above ground. The said restrictions were
imposed by San Lorenzo Company.

Almeda Development prayed for the issuance of TRO directing San Lorenzo Company to
cease and desist from making petitioner a member of the village association and prohibiting
the petitioner to construct taller buildings

San Lorenzo Village Association filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of
action and ADECs lack of personality to sue. It alleges that ADEC was not a registered
owner of the land covered by the Transfer Certificate of Title and that the sale of the
property by the previous owner to Almeda Development could not bind 3rd parties.

Issue: Whether there is Almeda Development has a cause of action against San Lorenzo
Village Association?

Held: YES, Almeda Development has a cause of action. When Almeda Development
purchased the property from the previous owner, it became the a successor in interest of
the vendor, if not the owner of the property. Hence the restrictions in the title should be
nullified not only because it is contrary to law but also because the condition under which
they were imposed had ceased to exist.

The averments in the complaint like the title of Almeda Developments vendor, the
execution of the sale by the said vendor to Almeda, the status as the vendors successor in
interest, and the altered physical improvement in Pasay road , are well within the
hypothetical admission principle. As such, the averments satisfy the (3) elements of cause
of action

California and Hawaiian Sugar Company; Pacific Gulf Marine, Inc. and C.G. Sharp &
Company vs. Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation G.R. No. 139273, November
28, 2000, 346 SCRA 214

Doctrine:

Facts: The vessel MV "SUGAR ISLANDER" arrived at the port of Manila carrying a cargo of
soybean meal in bulk consigned to several consignees, one of which was the Metro Manila
Feed Millers Association (Metro). Discharging of cargo from vessel to barges commenced.
From the barges, the cargo was allegedly offloaded, rebagged and reloaded on
consignees delivery trucks. Respondent, however, claims that when the cargo [was]
weighed on a licensed truck scale a shortage of 255.051 metric tons valued at
P1,621,171.16 was discovered. Such shipment was insured with private respondent
against all risk in the amount of P19,976,404.00.

Petitioners refuse to settle their liabilities. Insurer paid consignee Metro.

Sometimes later, as alleged subrogee of Metro, private respondent filed a complaint for
damages against herein petitioners. Within the reglementary period to file an Answer,
petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground that respondents claim is
premature, the same being arbitrable. Private respondent filed its Opposition thereto and
petitioners filed their Reply to Opposition.

RTC issued an order deferring hearing on the Motion to Dismiss until the trial and directing
petitioners to file their Answer. % Petitioners moved to reconsider said Order % Denied by
RTC (on the ground that the reason by which its Motion to Dismiss and Motion for
Reconsideration relies upon is a defense that must be proven with their evidence).

Petitioners filed their Answer with Counterclaim and Crossclaim alleging therein that
plaintiff, herein respondent, did not comply with the arbitration clause of the charter party;
hence, the complaint was allegedly prematurely filed. % RTC set case for pre-trial.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Defer Pre-Trial and Motion to Set for Preliminary Hearing the
Affirmative Defense of Lack of Cause of Action for Failure to comply with Arbitration Clause
% Private respondent did not file an Opposition to the said Motion to Set for Preliminary
Hearing.

RTC: Issued an Order denying Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

CA: Affirmed the RTC. CA held that petitioners cannot rely on Section 5, Rule 16 because
a Motion to Dismiss had previously been filed. Further, it ruled that the arbitration clause
provided in the charter party did not bind respondent.

"Petitioners reliance on said provision is misplaced. The above-
mentioned provision contemplates a situation where no motion to dismiss is
filed. If a motion to dismiss has been filed, as in the case at bar, Section 5,
Rule 16 of the Old Rules of Court will not come into play. Furthermore, the
same provision gives the judge discretion whether to set for preliminary
hearing the grounds for affirmative defenses. Respondent judge deferred
the hearing and determination of the Motion to Dismiss until the trial since
the ground relied upon by petitioners therein did not appear to be
indubitable. Petitioners then filed their Answer as ordered by the Court
again raising as an affirmative defense lack of cause of action for failure to
comply with [the] arbitration clause, praying for the dismissal of the
complaint against them, and filing afterwards a Motion to Set for Preliminary
Hearing the Affirmative Defense of lack of Cause of Action. In effect,
petitioners are asking the trial court to set aside its Order denying the
Motion to Dismiss and Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration thereof.

Issues:
1) WON CA erred in denying petitioners Motion for Preliminary Hearing the affirmative
defense for lack of cause of action? YES.
2) WON CA committed grave abuse of discretion? YES.

Held:
1) YES. Section 5, Rule 16 of the pre-1997 Rules of Court, reads:

"Sec. 5. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. - Any of the grounds for
dismissal provided for in this Rule, except improper venue, may be pleaded as
an affirmative defense, and a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a
motion to dismiss had been filed."

Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules specifically provides that a preliminary hearing on
the affirmative defenses may be allowed only when no motion to dismiss has been filed.
Section 6, however, must be viewed in the light of Section 3 of the same Rule, which
requires courts to resolve a motion to dismiss and prohibits them from deferring its
resolution on the ground of indubitability. Clearly then, Section 6 disallows a preliminary
hearing of affirmative defenses once a motion to dismiss has been filed because such
defense should have already been resolved. In the present case, however, the trial court
did not categorically resolve petitioners Motion to Dismiss, but merely deferred resolution
thereof.

The present Rules are consistent with Section 5, Rule 16 of the pre-1997 Rules of Court,
because both presuppose that no motion to dismiss had been filed; or in the case of the
pre-1997 Rules, if one has been filed, it has not been unconditionally denied. Hence, the
ground invoked may still be pleaded as an affirmative defense even if the defendants
Motion to Dismiss has been filed but not definitely resolved, or if it has been deferred as it
could be under the pre-1997 Rules.

2) Due to this, CA can be held to have committed a grave abuse of discretion for denying
the motion for a preliminary hearing. Undeniably, a preliminary hearing is not mandatory,
but subject to the discretion of the trial court. In the light of the circumstances in this case,
though, we find that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
grant the Motion.

We note that the trial court deferred the resolution of petitioners Motion to Dismiss
because of a single issue. It was apparently unsure whether the charter party that the bill
of lading referred to was indeed the Baltimore Berth Grain Charter Party submitted by
petitioners.1wphi1

Considering that there was only one question, which may even be deemed to be the very
touchstone of the whole case, the trial court had no cogent reason to deny the Motion for
Preliminary Hearing. Indeed, it committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied a
preliminary hearing on a simple issue of fact that could have possibly settled the entire
case. Verily, where a preliminary hearing appears to suffice, there is no reason to go on to
trial. One reason why dockets of trial courts are clogged is the unreasonable refusal to
use a process or procedure, like a motion to dismiss, which is designed to abbreviate the
resolution of a case.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Carmel Development, Inc. G.R. No. 142572, February
20, 2002, 377 SCRA 459
FACTS:

Carmel Development, Inc. filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City a Complaint
for recovery of possession with preliminary injunction against the DECS and the Caloocan
City School Board (School Board for brevity). Carmel sought to recover possession of a
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (64007)15807, allegedly
occupied by the Pangarap Elementary School and the Pangarap High School which were
established by the Department of Education.

The DECS filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer dated April 16, 1998 as well
as a Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss dated April 24, 1998.

On April 27, 1998, Carmel filed a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default alleging that the
period to answer had already lapsed since the subpoenas were served upon the DECS and
the School Board on April 2, 1998 and March 2, 1998, respectively. On the same day,
April 27, 1998, the trial court granted the motion declaring the DECS and the School Board
in default and allowing Carmel to present its evidence ex parte.

In an Order dated April 29, 1998, the trial court declared the Motion for Extension of Time
to File Answer filed on April 28, 1998 by the DECS and the School Board as moot and
academic. Thereafter, in an Order dated April 30, 1998, the trial court declared that no
action shall be taken on the Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss filed on April 30, 1998 by
the Department of Education and the School Board considering that the defendants have
already been declared in default and have lost their standing in court.

On May 14, 1998, the DECS filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Orders dated April 27,
29 and 30, 1998 and to Lift Order of Default. It contended that it seasonably filed its motion
for extension of time to file its answer on April 16, 1998. It also claimed that it filed its
motion to dismiss within the reglementary period. It explained that the summons issued on
March 23, 1998 was received by the School Board on March 27, 1998 and not on March 2,
1998 as erroneously found by the trial court. The Department of Education further claimed
that Carmel failed to notify and furnish it with a copy of the motion to declare it in default.
Aside from praying for the lifting of the order of default, the Department of Education
likewise sought the dismissal of the case for violation of Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 04-94 on forum shopping. Carmel filed an Opposition on June 8, 1998.

In an Order dated June 15, 1998, the trial court set aside its orders dated April 27, 29 and
30, 1998 and lifted the order of default. The trial court, however, denied the dismissal of
the case, explaining thus:

The Court after considering the arguments in support of and against the motion resolves
as it hereby RESOLVED to grant the same.
The interest of justice would be better served if the defendants shall be allowed to file their
answer to enable them to ventilate their defenses and to enable the plaintiff to prove its
causes of action and claims against the defendant, setting aside technicalities. This
objective could only be attained in a full-blown trial.
The defendants likewise moved for the dismissal of the case for the alleged violation by the
Plaintiff of the Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The Court finds, however,
substantial compliance of the aforesaid circular, hence the motion for the dismissal of this
case is hereby DENIED.

The Department of Education filed a Manifestation with Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order dated June 15, 1998. It contended that the trial courts finding of substantial
compliance with the Supreme Court Circular had no factual or legal bases to stand on. It
also maintained that Carmel is engaged in forum shopping. Carmel filed its Opposition
dated July 31, 1998 claiming that the issues in the other pending cases are different. On
August 17, 1998, the trial court issued an Order denying the Department of Educations
motion for reconsideration, reasoning out as follows:

x x x.
Aside from the bare assertion that the instant case is similar to the cases pending before
Branch 126, RTC, Caloocan City, no other proof, however, has been submitted by the
movants to support the same. Moreover, in the case of Kavinta vs. Castillo, Jr., 249 SCRA
604, our court ruled that `Administrative Circular No. 04-94 is mandatory but substantial
compliance therewith is sufficient.
x x x.

Dissatisfied, the DECS filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure before the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the trial courts
orders dated June 15, 1998 and August 17, 1998. Carmel filed a Comment as well as a
Supplemental Comment while the Department of Education filed its Reply.

On August 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Department of Educations
petition for certiorari and denied on March 17, 2000 the motion to reconsider the same.
Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE (Relevant to CivPro): Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that
grave abuse of discretion was committed by the RTC when the latter denied petitioners
motion to dismiss notwithstanding the fact that private respondents pleading shows litis
pendentia

HELD: Yes.

The DECS takes exception to the finding of the Court of Appeals that no fault may be
attributed to the trial court when it denied its motion to dismiss on the ground of litis
pendentia since petitioner did not attach to its Motion to Dismiss and Motion for
Reconsideration the proper pleadings in said civil cases to show that the civil cases and the
complaint filed before respondent judge involve the same issues of ownership and
possession.

The DECS alleged in its Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss that Carmel is engaged in
forum shopping and did not inform the court that plaintiff and defendants are parties in two
other civil cases pending before Branch 126 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City
involving the same issues of ownership and possession of subject land, namely:

1. Civil Case No. 17762, entitled: Carmel Farms vs. Clarita M. Martinez et al., an action to
enjoin public respondents from pursuing the construction of the proposed additional school
building of Pangarap High School on plaintiffs lots;
2. Civil Case No. C-16181, entitled Pangarap Neighborhood Association Inc. vs. Carmel
Farms, et. al for Declaration of Ownership and/or Quieting of Title, Cancellation of
Annotation with Damages.

The Court of Appeals, in brushing aside this issue, agreed with the trial court that no proof
was attached to the Motion to Dismiss and to the Motion for Reconsideration to support this
allegation.

Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 16 (Motion to Dismiss) of the 1997 Rules allow the presentation
of evidence during the hearing on the motion to dismiss as follows:

SEC. 2. Hearing of motion. At the hearing of the motion, the parties shall submit their
arguments on the questions of law and their evidence on the questions of fact involved
except those not available at that time. Should the case go to trial, the evidence presented
during the hearing shall automatically be part of the evidence of the party presenting the
same.
SEC. 3. Resolution of motion. After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action or
claim, deny the motion, or order the amendment of the pleading.
The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground relied
upon is not indubitable.
In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor.

These sections provide that at the hearing of the motion, the parties shall submit all
arguments and evidence then available. If the case goes to trial, the evidence presented
shall automatically constitute part of the evidence of the party who presented the same.
Thus, it is not necessary to attach to the motion to dismiss the evidence required to
establish the movants cause and failure to do so is not fatal to his case.

The requisites in order that an action may be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia are:
(a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions;
(b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which
party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other. Forum shopping exists where
the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in the other.

The Department of Education points out that aside from Civil Case No. 18264, subject of
the instant petition, there are two other cases pending before another court involving
identical parties, issues and reliefs prayed for. The Department of Education asserts that in
Civil Case No. 18264, Carmel seeks to recover possession against the Department of
Education and the School Board the parcel of land allegedly occupied by Pangarap High
School. In Civil Case No. 17762, Carmel seeks to enjoin Clarita M. Martinez, school
principal of Pangarap High School and a representative of the Department of Education,
from proceeding with the construction of additional school buildings on the same parcel of
land. Meanwhile, Civil Case No. C-16181 is an action for declaration of ownership and
quieting of title involving the same parcel of land. In sum, the Department of Education
argues that all three cases revolve around the same parties' conflicting claims of
ownership and possession over the same parcel of land.

Carmel posits the contrary and insists that there can be no litis pendentia or forum
shopping. According to Carmel, the Department of Education and the School Board are
not parties in Civil Case No. C-16181 which involves ownership of a parcel of land. It also
claims that Civil Case No. 17762 is an injunction case to enjoin the school principal and
other defendants from constructing additional school buildings. It further contends that
these cases are different from Civil Case No. 18264, subject of the instant petition, which is
an action for recovery of possession. To bolster its stance, Carmel points out that
assuming it obtains a favorable judgment in the injunction case, this would not
automatically entitle it to eject the Department of Education or recover possession of the
property and that a separate action for this purpose is necessary.

An important issue of fact exists - whether there are two other similar cases pending in
another court as alleged in the motion to dismiss. Since resolution of this issue requires
presentation of proof, the trial court should not have decided the issue without giving the
parties an opportunity to present proof of their respective stand in a hearing duly held for
that purpose.

In light of Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 16, the appellate court erred in finding that there was no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in precipitately denying the motion to
dismiss without so much as a hearing and giving the party concerned an opportunity to
present its proof. Verily, the charge of forum shopping or litis pendentia, which works
havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, requires the presentation of proof and the
Department of Education should have been given an opportunity to do so.

Heirs of Loreto Maramag v.Maramag, G.R. No. 181132, June 5, 2009
FACTS: The petition alleged that: (1) petitioners were the legitimate wife and children of
Loreto Maramag (Loreto), while respondents were Loretos illegitimate family; (2) Eva de
Guzman Maramag (Eva) was a concubine of Loreto and a suspect in the killing of the latter,
thus, she is disqualified to receive any proceeds from his insurance policies from Insular
Life Assurance Company, Ltd. (Insular) and Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation
(Grepalife); (3) the illegitimate children of LoretoOdessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie
were entitled only to one-half of the legitime of the legitimate children, thus, the proceeds
released to Odessa and those to be released to Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie were
inofficious and should be reduced; and (4) petitioners could not be deprived of their
legitimes, which should be satisfied first.

In answer, Insular admitted that Loreto misrepresented Eva as his legitimate wife and
Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie as his legitimate children, and that they filed their
claims for the insurance proceeds of the insurance policies; that when it ascertained that
Eva was not the legal wife of Loreto, it disqualified her as a beneficiary and divided the
proceeds among Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie, as the remaining designated
beneficiaries; and that it released Odessas share as she was of age, but withheld the
release of the shares of minors Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie pending submission of letters
of guardianship. Insular alleged that the complaint or petition failed to state a cause of
action insofar as it sought to declare as void the designation of Eva as beneficiary, because
Loreto revoked her designation as such in Policy No. A001544070 and it disqualified her in
Policy No. A001693029; and insofar as it sought to declare as inofficious the shares of
Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie, considering that no settlement of Loretos estate
had been filed nor had the respective shares of the heirs been determined. Insular further
claimed that it was bound to honor the insurance policies designating the children of Loreto
with Eva as beneficiaries pursuant to Section 53 of the Insurance Code.

In its own answer with compulsory counterclaim, Grepalife alleged that Eva was not
designated as an insurance policy beneficiary; that the claims filed by Odessa, Karl Brian,
and Trisha Angelie were denied because Loreto was ineligible for insurance due to a
misrepresentation in his application form that he was born on December 10, 1936 and, thus,
not more than 65 years old when he signed it in September 2001; that the case was
premature, there being no claim filed by the legitimate family of Loreto; and that the law on
succession does not apply where the designation of insurance beneficiaries is clear.

TC: The trial court issued a Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads
WHEREFORE, the motion to dismiss incorporated in the answer of defendants
Insular Life and Grepalife is granted with respect to defendants Odessa, Karl
Brian and Trisha Maramag. The action shall proceed with respect to the other
defendants Eva Verna de Guzman, Insular Life and Grepalife.

CA: It dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the decision of the trial
court dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action involved a pure question
of law.

ISSUES:
! In determining the merits of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of
action, may the Court consider matters which were not alleged in the Complaint,
particularly the defenses put up by the defendants in their Answer?
! In granting a motion for reconsideration of a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a cause of action, did not the Regional Trial Court engage in the examination and
determination of what were the facts and their probative value, or the truth
thereof, when it premised the dismissal on allegations of the defendants in their
answer which had not been proven?

HELD: THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED.

The grant of the motion to dismiss was based on the trial courts finding that the petition
failed to state a cause of action, as provided in Rule 16, Section 1(g), of the Rules of Court,
which reads

SECTION 1. Grounds. Within the time for but before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on
any of the following grounds:

x x x x

(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action.

A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. A
complaint states a cause of action when it contains the three (3) elements of a cause of
action(1) the legal right of the plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant; and
(3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right. If any of these
elements is absent, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground
of failure to state a cause of action.

When a motion to dismiss is premised on this ground, the ruling thereon should be based
only on the facts alleged in the complaint. The court must resolve the issue on the strength
of such allegations, assuming them to be true. The test of sufficiency of a cause of action
rests on whether, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged in the complaint to be true, the
court can render a valid judgment upon the same, in accordance with the prayer in the
complaint. This is the general rule.

However, this rule is subject to well-recognized exceptions, such that there is no
hypothetical admission of the veracity of the allegations if:
1. the falsity of the allegations is subject to judicial notice;
2. such allegations are legally impossible;
3.the allegations refer to facts which are inadmissible in evidence;
4. by the record or document in the pleading, the allegations appear unfounded;
or
5. there is evidence which has been presented to the court by stipulation of the
parties or in the course of the hearings related to the case.

In this case, it is clear from the petition filed before the trial court that, although petitioners
are the legitimate heirs of Loreto, they were not named as beneficiaries in the insurance
policies issued by Insular and Grepalife. The basis of petitioners claim is that Eva, being a
concubine of Loreto and a suspect in his murder, is disqualified from being designated as
beneficiary of the insurance policies, and that Evas children with Loreto, being illegitimate
children, are entitled to a lesser share of the proceeds of the policies. They also argued
that pursuant to Section 12 of the Insurance Code, Evas share in the proceeds should be
forfeited in their favor, the former having brought about the death of Loreto. Thus, they
prayed that the share of Eva and portions of the shares of Loretos illegitimate children
should be awarded to them, being the legitimate heirs of Loreto entitled to their respective
legitimes.

It is evident from the face of the complaint that petitioners are not entitled to a favorable
judgment in light of Article 2011 of the Civil Code which expressly provides that insurance
contracts shall be governed by special laws, i.e., the Insurance Code. Section 53 of the
Insurance Code states

SECTION 53. The insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper
interest of the person in whose name or for whose benefit it is made unless
otherwise specified in the policy.

Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only persons entitled to claim the insurance
proceeds are either the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is already
deceased, upon the maturation of the policy. The exception to this rule is a situation where
the insurance contract was intended to benefit third persons who are not parties to the
same in the form of favorable stipulations or indemnity. In such a case, third parties may
directly sue and claim from the insurer.

Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and Grepalife and, thus,
are not entitled to the proceeds thereof. Accordingly, respondents Insular and Grepalife
have no legal obligation to turn over the insurance proceeds to petitioners.

SC: DENIED
RULE 17 Dismissal of Action

Producers Bank of the Phils. v. CA, G.R. No. 125468, Oct. 9, 2000, 342 SCRA 327

FACTS:
Producers Bank of the Philippines filed a complaint with prayer for preliminary attachment
against New Cotton (Phil.) Corporation concerning a loan of three million pesos. The bank
alleged that private respondent Lan Shing Chin, New Cotton's president, issued Promissory
Note No. PC 015/88, for said amount. As agreed by the parties, the loan would mature in
55 days, or on May 16, 1988.It was renewed once, with maturity on July 15, 1988. Private
respondents allegedly failed to pay the loans on their due dates. Hence the complaint was
filed before the Regional Trial Court. The court issued an order granting the writ. It
approved the attachment bond on February 6, 1989. Later, the court recalled its order
dated February 6, 1989 approving the bond.

On June 7, 1989, petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of summons, which the trial
court granted. Only private respondent Wilson Kho was served summons through
substituted service. The whereabouts of the other defendants were unknown. The
corporation had already ceased operations. Lan Shing Chin and Shin Man Wan, the
two other defendants who were not Filipinos, were reportedly already in Hongkong.

Only Kho filed an answer and received by the trial court on July 21, 1989. Kho denied the
genuineness and due execution of the surety (bond) agreement guaranteeing the six
million peso loan of New Cotton, claiming that he never signed nor authorized anyone to
sign the surety in his behalf. He avers that the signature appearing on the surety
agreement was a forgery.

On February 27, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to reinstate the order of attachment, which
was opposed by private respondent Kho. At the hearing, the trial court noted that there was
no return of service of the summonses to New Cotton, Lan Shing Chin and Shin May Wan.
The trial judge deferred consideration of the motion until said summonses were duly served.
On June 22, 1990, Kho filed a manifestation and motion alerting the trial court that trial had
not yet commenced one and a half years since the case was filed. Kho moved for
scheduling of pre-trial conference and thereafter trial, without having to await for the return
of the service of summonses.

On June 28, 1990, the trial court denied private respondent Kho's motion and ordered the
court's process server to immediately serve the summonses on the other three respondents.
The summonses, however, remained unserved.

On July 6, 1990, petitioner filed a motion for service of summons by publication against
aforesaid respondents. One year and seven months had lapsed since the complaint was
filed, and over one year since petitioner knew summonses could not be served personally
or by substituted service. On August 14, 1990, the court granted petitioner's application for
service of summons by publication. The summonses and a copy of the complaint were
published in The Philippine Star.

On November 20, 1990, Kho moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to prosecute. The
same was denied by the court in an order dated March 21, 1991, which also set for April 16,
1991, the hearing for the reinstatement of the writ of preliminary attachment.

On June 3, 1991, the trial court granted petitioner's application for preliminary attachment
but only as against New Cotton Corp., Lan Shing Chin and Shin May Wan. It denied
attachment as to Kho.

Due to setting and re-setting of pre trial conference by petitioner and respondent, the
pre-trial took one year and seven months.

Even before trial began, on January of 1993, petitioner filed for urgent motion to reset
scheduled hearings. It explained that its principal witness was still abroad on a business trip,
and two other witnesses were unavailable. Kho did not object. The lower court granted the
motion to re-set with stern warning that should petitioner fail to present its evidence, the
court would consider petitioners right to present evidence waived.

Before the scheduled hearing on February 9, 1993 and despite the stern warning from the
court, the peritioner filed its fourth motion for postponement because its witnesses can not
attend the trial because of prior commitments. The respondent did not object and the trial
court set the hearing on March.

On March, the respondents counsel moved for postponement of trial explaining that he has
prior court commitments. Note that the motion for postponement by the respondent was
triggered by the re-scheduling of previous hearings on motion of petitioner. Petitioner did
not object. Trial court re-set the presentation of petitioners evidence to July. Before July,
petitioners counsel filed another motion for postponement on hearings because he had to
leave for the province to arbitrate a peaceful settlement of a land dispute among members
of his family.

Respondent (FINALLY!) opposed any further postponements and undue delays. He prayed
for dismissal of the case.

RTC finding no merit in the reasons for postponement and finding respondents
opposition well taken, issued an order dismissing the complaint for failure of the petitioner
to prosecute the case.

CA affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUES:
1. W/n the appellate court err in affirming the trial court's ruling that the complaint ought to
be dismissed for failure to prosecute? NO

2. Should the dismissal be with or without prejudice? WITH PREJUDICE

HELD:
Undoubtedly, in the present case, five years have been an unreasonably long time for a
defendant to wait for the outcome of a trial which has yet to commence and on which his
family, fortune and future depend. In a number of previous cases, we have consistently
warned that courts must ensure that litigations are prosecuted and resolved with dispatch.
We also held that although the grant or denial of postponements rests entirely on the sound
discretion of the judge, we cautioned that the exercise of that discretion must be reasonably
and wisely exercised. Postponements should not be allowed except on meritorious
grounds, in light of the attendant circumstances. Deferment of the proceedings may
be allowed or tolerated especially where the deferment would cause no substantial
prejudice to any party. "The desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases should not, if at
all possible, result in the precipitate loss of a party's right to present evidence and either in
the plaintiff's being non-suited or of the defendant's being pronounced liable under an ex-
parte judgment." While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non-prosequitur, the
real test for the exercise of such power is whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff
is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable
promptitude.

Recall that here the complaint was filed on December 9, 1988. In two years and four
months, the court issued a writ of attachment, upon application of petitioner, recalled the
writ, then, only on April 27, 1990, when petitioner moved for reinstatement of the writ,
did the court observe that there were no returns of the service of summonses to
three other defendants. Without any manifestation from either parties, nor any application
for service of summonses by publication, the trial court appropriately ruled to defer
deliberations on the motion to reinstate the writ of attachment until the summonses were
served. When Kho moved that pre-trial be set without having to await for the service of
summonses upon the other respondents, the court again correctly ruled to deny the motion.
It was only on July 6, 1990, that petitioner filed a motion for service of summons by
publication.

Although Section 1, Rule 14 of the Rules, imposes upon the clerk of court the duty to
serve summons, this does not relieve the plaintiff of his own duty to prosecute the
case diligently. If the clerk had been negligent, it was plaintiff's duty to call the
court's attention to that fact. The non-performance of that duty by plaintiff is an
express ground for dismissing an action. If there were no means of summoning any
of the defendants, plaintiffs should have so informed the court and moved for their
exclusion from the complaint, within a reasonable period of time, so that the case
could be disposed of one way or another and the administration of justice would not
suffer delay. Plaintiffs should have asked that the defendants be summoned by
publication at the earliest possible time. In this case, it was not petitioner who called
the court's attention that summons had not been served on the other defendants, it
was private respondent Kho who did. The bank was aware, as early as June 7, 1989,
after the first order to serve summonses was issued, the summonses could not be served
on the three other defendants. It was already aware then that the corporation was already
dissolved and Lan Shing Chin and Shin May Wan were reportedly in Hongkong. It took
more than one year, before the bank acted and applied for service of summons by
publication.

There was also inordinate delay during pre-trial, primarily caused by petitioner. In four
instances, specifically on August 3, 1991, September 17, 1991, May 8, 1992, and July 13,
1992, pre-trial conferences were re-set either because petitioner bank's counsel for
witnesses could not appear. Finally, when trial commenced, in fact even before it did,
petitioner moved for postponements, in all, three times.

Respondent Kho, while indeed asking for the longer postponement, was understandably
constrained to ask for re-setting only because his calendar had been so disrupted by the
constant earlier postponements upon motions of petitioner.

In numerous instances, this court refused to disturb orders of dismissal for failure to
prosecute. Some dismissals were ordered because of delays for a period of four years, or
even less. Given the circumstances elucidated above, we hold that the appellate
court did not err nor abuse its discretion when it upheld the trial court's dismissal of
the complaint for failure to prosecute for five years.

Lastly, petitioner takes issue against the Court of Appeals' holding that the dismissal for
failure to prosecute should be without prejudice to filing the case anew. Section 3 of Rule
17 is clear that the dismissal of an action for failure to prosecute shall have the effect
of adjudication on the merits, unless otherwise provided by the court.

By way of exception to the rule that a dismissal on the ground of failure to prosecute
under Section 3 of Rule 17 is a dismissal with prejudice, Delos Reyes v. Capule, 102
Phil 467 (1957), held that in a case not tried on the merits and whose dismissal was
due to the negligence of counsel rather than the plaintiff, in the interest of justice,
the dismissal of the case should be decreed to be without prejudice to the filing of a
new action. However, unlike De los Reyes, the present case involves as plaintiff/petitioner
a prominent bank, that employs a staff of lawyers and possesses significant resources. It
cannot plead paucity of means, including legal talent it could retain. Petitioner's counsel
inexplicably failed to secure the presence of witnesses when required, failed to appear
during pre-trial and trial duly set, failed to seasonably appeal, failed to timely move for
reconsideration, failed to brief his substitute lawyer; and failed to diligently pursue the
service of summonses. These are acts of negligence, laxity and truancy which the bank
management could have very easily avoided or timely remedied. One's sympathy with the
bank and its counsel could not avail against apparent complacency, if not delinquency, in
the conduct of a litigation. For failure to diligently pursue its complaint, it trifled with the right
of respondent to speedy trial. It also sorely tried the patience of the court and wasted its
precious time and attention.

In the light of the foregoing circumstances, to declare the dismissal in this case without
prejudice would open the floodgate to possible circumvention of Section 3, Rule 17
of the Rules of Court on dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute. It would
frustrate the protection against unreasonable delay in the prosecution of cases and
violate the constitutional mandate of speedy dispensation of justice which would in
time erode the people's confidence in the judiciary. We find that, as held by the trial
court and concurred in by the appellate court, the dismissal of petitioner's complaint is with
prejudice and should have the effect of adjudication on the merits.

Gallardo-Corro vs. Gallardo G.R. No. 136228, January 30,2001, 350 SCRA 568

Pinga v. Heirs of Santiago, G.R. No. 170354, June 30, 2006

Doctrine: Under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal of
the complaint due to the fault of plaintiff does not necessarily carry with it the dismissal of
the counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of the complaint is without
prejudice to the right of defendants to prosecute the counterclaim.

Facts:

The Heirs of Santiago filed an injunction against Pinga alleging that Pinga had been
unlawfully entering the coco lands of the respondent cutting wood and bamboos and
harvesting the fruits of the coconut trees. As a counterclaim, Pinga contests the ownership
of the lands to which Pinga was harvesting the fruits. However, due to failures of Heirs of
Santiago to attend the hearings, the court ordered the dismissal of said case.
Respondents thus filed an MR not to reinstate the case but to ask for the entire action to be
dismissed and not to allow petitioner to present evidence ex parte.

RTC: granted the MR, hence the counterclaim was dismissed. RTC ruled that compulsory
counterclaims cannot be adjudicated independently of plaintiff&s cause of action vis a vis
the dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal of the counterclaim.

CA: Affirmed

Petitioner then elevates it to the SC by way of Rule 45 on pure questions of law. (Santiagos
motive: They just asked for the dismissal of their entire case so that their ownership
wouldn"t be put in controversy in the counterclaim)

Issue: Whether or not dismissal of original complaint affects that of the compulsory counter
claims?

Held: NO PETITION GRANTED. The counterclaims, in this case, can stand on its own.

Rule 17 Sec 3 provides: If for any cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of his
presentation of his evidence x x x the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the
defendant or upon the courts own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to
prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action.

The dismissal of the complaint does not carry with the dismissal of the counterclaim,
compulsory or otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the
right of defendants to prosecute his counterclaim. Section 3 contemplates a dismissal not
procured by plaintiff, albeit justified by causes imputable to him and which, in the present
case, was petitioner's failure to appear at the pre-trial.
This situation is also covered by Section 3, as extended by judicial interpretation, and is
ordered upon motion of defendant or motu proprio by the court. Here, the issue of whether
defendant has a pending counterclaim, permissive or compulsory, is not of determinative
significance. The dismissal of plaintiff's complaint is evidently a confirmation of the failure of
evidence to prove his cause of action outlined therein, hence the dismissal is considered,
as a matter of evidence, an adjudication on the merits.
This does not, however, mean that there is likewise such absence of evidence to prove
defendant's counterclaim although the same arises out of the subject matter of the
complaint which was merely terminated for lack of proof. To hold otherwise would not only
work injustice to defendant but would be reading a further provision into Section 3 and
wresting a meaning therefrom although neither exists even by mere implication.

Thus understood, the complaint can accordingly be dismissed, but relief can nevertheless
be granted as a matter of course to defendant on his counterclaim as alleged and proved,
with or without any reservation therefor on his part, unless from his conduct, express or
implied, he has virtually consented to the concomitant dismissal of his counterclaim.The
present rule embodied in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 ordains a more equitable disposition
of the counterclaims by ensuring that any judgment thereon is based on the merit of the
counterclaim itself and not on the survival of the main complaint.
Certainly, if the counterclaim is palpably without merit or suffers jurisdictional flaws which
stand independent of the complaint, the trial court is not precluded from dismissing it under
the amended rules, provided that the judgment or order dismissing the counterclaim is
premised on those defects. At the same time, if the counterclaim is justified, the amended
rules now unequivocally protect such counterclaim from peremptory dismissal by reason of
the dismissal of the complaint.

RULE 18 Pre-Trial

2004 Guidelines on Pre-Trial and Modes of Discovery Judicial Dispute
Resolution Rule

De Guia vs. De Guia G.R. No. 135384, April 4, 2001, 356 SCRA 287

Facts:

Plaintiffs Mariano, Apolonia, Tomosa and Irene, all surnamed De Guia, filed with the trial
court a complaint for partition against defendatnts Ciriaco, Leon, Victorina and Pablo De
Guia, alleging that real properties were inherited by plaintiffs and defendants from their
predecessors-in-interest, an that the latter unjustly refused to have the properties
subdivided among them.

The Branch Clerk of Court issued a Notice setting the case for pre-trial conference on June
18, 1992., 8:30am. Copies of siad notices were sent by registered mail to parties and their
counsel. It turned out that both defendants and counsel failed to attend the pre-trial
conference. It appears, however, that the notice was only received on June 18, 1992 and
by their counsel on June 17, 1992. Defendants were declared in default and plaintiffs were
allowed to present their evidence ex-parte.

Judgement was rendered ordering the partition of the parcels of land, after the Motion for
Reconsideration declaring the defendants in default was denied.

Issue:

WON service of notice for pre-trial to defendants was valid?

Held:

For the guidance of the bench and bar, therefore, the Court in reaffirming the rulin that
notice of pre-trial must be served seperately upon the party and his counsel of record,
restates that while service of such notice to party may be made directly to the party, it is
best that trial courts uniformly serve such notice to party through or care of his counsel at
counsel's address with the express imposition upon counsel of the obligation of notfying the
party of the date, time and place of the pre-trial conference and assuring that the party
either appear thereat or deliver counsel a written authority to represent the party with power
to compromise the case, with the warning that a party who fails to do may be non-suited or
declared in default.

Before, being declared non-suited or considered in default, parties and their counsel must
be shown to have been served with notice of the pretrial conference. If served only on the
counsel, the notice must expressly direct him or her to inform the client of the date, the time
and the place of the pretrial conference. The absence of such notice renders the
proceeding void, and the judgement rendered therein cannot acquire finality and may be
attacked directly or collaterally.

Notice did not contain any imposition or directive that counsel infrom client of the pretrial
conference, merely stating that, You are hereby notified that the above-entitled case will
be heard before this court on the 18
th
day of June.

NOTE: What was applied was Section 1, Rule 20 of the pre-1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Mercader vs. DBP G.R. No. 130699, May 12, 2000, 332 SCRA 82

In relation to our subject matter: The issue on lease-purchase option was not raised in
the original pleading but was included in the pre-trial order and in the supplemental
pleading, which was filed after the pre-trial. Can the new issue be decided by the RTC? -
See HELD.

DOCTRINES:
1. a supplemental pleading was meant to supply deficiencies in aid of the original
pleading, and not to dispense with the latter.

2. Well-known is the rule that departure from procedure may be forgiven where they
do not appear to have impaired the substantial rights of the parties.

3. Pre-trial; The pre-trial is primarily intended to make certain that all issues
necessary to the disposition of a case are properly raised.

FACTS:
Spouses Mercader entered a lease contract with Manreals. Said lot was mortgaged to DBP.
DBP wanted to foreclose said property. Thus, Mercaders prayed that DBP to "respect their
interests by excluding these from the foreclosure proceedings, or if the foreclosure takes
place, declare the same null and void.

Trial court:
Pre-trial took place. In the pre-trial order, the parties agreed that the only issue[s] to be
resolved in this case are as follows:
1. Whether the plaintiff [are] entitled to specific performance of said agreement;
2. Whether the defendant bank can be compelled to recognize the lease contract
entered into between the spouses plaintiff Bernardo Mercader and Gelacio
Manreal; and
3. Whether the foreclosure proceedings of the contract between the defendant bank
is null and void.
The pre-trial in this case is already closed and terminated.

The MERCADERs filed a Supplemental Pleading insisting the consummation of the
lease-purchase option with the payment of the earnest money. The DBP filed its Opposition
to the Supplemental Pleading.

Trial proceeded with the parties presenting evidence tending to establish their respective
allegations. Thereafter, the trial court ordered the Manreals dropped from the case. The
MERCADERs offered no objection.

In its decision, the trial court reiterated the three issues ascertained in the pre-trial order
and resolved all of them in favor of the MERCADERs. On the first issue, the trial court
found that the "DBP had unnecessarily and unjustifiably made xxx [Bernardo] Mercader
understand that his second option [lease-purchase] would be more or less approved,
except that the approval will come from Manila." Anent the second issue, the trial court also
believed "quite firmly" that the "DBP could not have escaped having a foreknowledge of the
existence of the prior unrecorded lease" as the "possession and cultivation of Bernardo
Mercader xxx [was] a matter of open, notorious and public knowledge in the area." In
resolving the third issue, the court first acknowledged that it is a "court of equity and not
merely a court of law" and the "DBP is not authorized to keep real propert[y] longer than ten
years or so;" then the court "required [the] DBP to set aside the area affected by the prior
unregistered lease, known to [it], when [it] accepted the mortgage."

CA: On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court erred in treating the lease-
purchase option as a controversial issue considering that it was "outside the parties'
pleadings." But invoking the Supreme Court's decision in Castro v. Court of Appeals, the
Court of Appeals, as already earlier adverted to, reversed and set aside the appealed
judgment. It entered a new one declaring that the MERCADERs were not entitled to any
compensation from the DBP.

In this petition for review, the MERCADERs assert that in issuing the challenged decision,
the Court of Appeals contravened Section 4, Rule 20 and Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of
Court by holding that the trial court should not have taken cognizance of the lease-
purchase option as a controversial issue since it was not raised in the pleadings. They
maintain that the trial court correctly took cognizance of the lease-purchase option because
it was part and parcel of the pre-trial stages, the determination of which will prevent future
litigation thereon. They also pray that in the event of a favorable judgment, this Court
should refer the case back to the Court of Appeals for a determination of whether the trial
court erred in finding that the lease-purchase option was already consummated.

For its part, the DBP contends that the MERCADERs raise questions of facts which are not
reviewable on appeal and that it had opposed and objected to in and at all stages of the
trial, all attempts by the MERCADERs to introduce evidence on the lease-purchase option.

ISSUE: Whether the lease-purchase option was properly raised in the pleadings

HELD: YES.
This Court agrees with the MERCADERs and finds that the Court of Appeals erred in
disregarding as material the lease-purchase option on the ground that it was not raised in
the pleadings. If the Court of Appeals adverts to the lack of reference to the lease-purchase
option in the initiatory pleadings, this can be simply explained by the fact that the trial court
only took cognizance thereof when it became an integral component of the pre-trial
proceedings. That is why the lease-purchase option was included firstly, in the pre-trial
order as one of the issues to be resolved at trial and secondly, in the supplemental
pleading subsequently filed by the MERCADERs on 7 November 1985. As a supplemental
pleading, it served to aver supervening facts which were then not ripe for judicial relief
when the original pleading was filed. As such, it was meant to supply deficiencies in aid of
the original pleading, and not to dispense with the latter. Hence, it was patently erroneous
for the Court of Appeals to pronounce that the lease-purchase option was not raised in the
pleadings. The DBP was even quite aware and knowledgeable of the supplemental
pleading because it filed an opposition thereto.

The records however reveal that the trial court did not promptly rule on the motion to admit
the supplemental pleading. And during trial, the trial court also failed to rule on the prompt
objection interposed by the DBPs counsel to the MERCADERs introduction of evidence
relative to said lease-purchase option. But undisputed is the trial court's eventual admission
in open court of the MERCADERs supplemental pleading.

The records also show that not only did the DBPs counsel began to rigorously cross-
examine Bernardo Mercader on the lease-purchase option, he also subjected his witness
Mr. Ruben Carpio, then Chief of the Collection Department, DBP to an intensive direct
examination covering said subject matter. He also offered as evidence the DBPs letter
indicating the three options to the MERCADERs as Exhibit "1" and the lease-purchase
option contained therein as Exhibit "1-A."

The DBP is undoubtedly estopped from questioning the trial courts inclusion of the lease-
purchase option as a controversial issue. This action of the trial court finds anchor on
Section 4, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court which reads:
Section 4. Record of pre-trial results. -- After the pre-trial the court shall make an
order which recites the action taken at the conference, the amendments allowed
to the pleadings, and the agreements made by the parties as to any of the matters
considered. Such order shall limit the issues for trial to those not disposed of by
admissions or agreements of counsel and when entered controls the subsequent
course of the action, unless modified before trial to prevent manifest injustice.

Indeed, the pre-trial is primarily intended to make certain that all issues necessary to the
disposition of a case are properly raised. The purpose is to obviate the element of surprise,
hence, the parties are expected to disclose at the pre-trial conference all issues of law and
fact which they intend to raise at the trial, except such as may involve privileged or
impeaching matter. In the case at bar, the pre-trial order included as integral to the
complete adjudication of the case the issue of whether the MERCADERs can demand
specific performance from the DBP relative to the lease-purchase option. Thus, the element
of surprise that the provision on pre-trial attempts to preclude was satisfied. The surprise
factor was further eliminated, as already earlier mentioned and merely to reiterate here,
with the DBP's (1) motion to oppose the supplemental pleading, (2) objection to the
introduction of evidence connected thereto, (3) later information from the trial court of its
definitive ruling admitting the supplemental pleading, (4) own introduction of evidence
related thereto, and finally, by its (5) intensive participation in the direct and cross-
examination of witnesses whose testimonies included said topic. In any case, the filing and
consequent admission of the supplemental pleading by the trial court validated the issues
embraced in the pre-trial order.

SC Ruling: petition is GRANTED DUE COURSE. Judgment and resolution of CA are SET
ASIDE. The case is REFERRED BACK to CA.

Alcaraz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152202, G.R. No. 152202, July 28, 2006

DOCTRINE: A charge of arbitrariness and bias against the trial court, in this case against
the judge as well as all the court personnel, is a serious charge that must be substantiated.
Bare allegations of partiality will not suffice. It must be shown that the trial court committed
acts or engaged in conduct clearly indicative of bias or pre-judgment against a party.

FACTS:
- Case of collection of sum of money filed by Equitable Credit Card Network against
Crisostomo Alcaraz
- Equitable is sue a credit card to Alcaraz. Alcaraz however accumulated unpain credit
despite demand for payment. (Equivalent to 192,000 pesos for the peso account and 8,970
dollars for the dollar account).
- Alcaraz admitted using the credit card, but contested the amount because he was
given the credit card voluntarily and he did not sign the Terms and Conditions regarding
the interest (he was contesting the interest amounts). Thus, he claims that the case is
premature.
- When a case was filed, Alcaraz was declared in default and Equitable presented
evidence ex parte. (NOTE: Alcaraz was in default because he and his legal counsel were
both sick).

TC: Rules in favor of Equitable. Alcarazs motion for new trial was denied. Alcaraz
appealed.

CA: Affirmed TC decision, only changed the amount Alcaraz was to pay (lessened interest
total to 12%).

ISSUES: W/N the TC violated Alcaraz right to due process of law when Equitable was
allowed to present evidence ex parte? NO
W/N the monetary award ordered by the CA is in accordance w evidence, law and
jurisprudence? YES.

HELD: NO, petition is without merit.
Due process issue: The trial court clearly has the discretion on whether to grant or deny a
motion to postpone and/or reschedule the pretrial conference in accordance with the
circumstances then obtaining in the case.

This must be so as it is the trial court which was
able to witness firsthand the events as they unfolded in the trial of a case. Postponements,
while permissible, must not be countenanced except for clearly meritorious grounds and in
light of the attendant circumstances. The trial court's discretion on this matter, however, is
not unbridled. The trial courts are well advised to reasonably and wisely exercise such
discretion. This Court will not hesitate to strike down clearly arbitrary acts or orders of the
lower court. This, however, is not the situation in this case. While it is true that private
respondent Equitable and inclement weather have on occasion caused the postponement
of the pretrial conference, the repeated resetting of the pretrial conference was primarily
due to the petitioner.

In the case at bar, both petitioner Alcaraz and his counsel did not appear at the scheduled
pretrial. Instead, it was the petitioner's wife alone who made the verbal manifestation on
behalf of her husband and his counsel while presenting an unverified medical certificate on
the latter's behalf. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the records are bereft of
any medical certificate, verified or unverified, in the name of petitioner Alcaraz to establish
the cause of his absence at the pretrial conference. Even assuming arguendo that
petitioner Alcaraz and Atty. Ibuyan's absence on the February 23, 1999 pretrial conference
is due to justifiable causes, the petitioner is represented by a law firm and not by Atty.
Ibuyan alone. As such, any of the latter's partners or associates could have appeared
before the court and participate in the pretrial or at least make the proper motion for
postponement if necessary.

A charge of arbitrariness and bias against the trial court, in this case against the judge as
well as all the court personnel, is a serious charge that must be substantiated. Bare
allegations of partiality will not suffice. It must be shown that the trial court committed acts
or engaged in conduct clearly indicative of bias or pre-judgment against a party. The
petitioner failed to do so in this case. The disallowance of a motion for postponement is not
sufficient to show arbitrariness and partiality of the trial court.

Monetary award issue: The petitioner never disputed his use of the credit card issued to
him by the private respondent. While he maintains that there is a "great disparity" between
the amount of credit he availed of and what was actually being collected from him by the
private respondent, nowhere in the records of this case, however, did petitioner Alcaraz
contest any specific purchase or cash advance charged to the credit card, whether the
peso or the dollar account.
The evidence sustains the claim of private respondent Equitable that petitioner Alcaraz is
what is known as a pre-screened client. When a client is classified as pre-screened, the
usual screening procedures of prospective cardholders, such as the filing of an application
form and submission of other relevant documents prior to the issuance of a credit card, are
dispensed with and the credit card is issued outright. Upon receipt of the card, the pre-
screened client has the option of accepting or rejecting the credit card. In the case at bar,
petitioner Alcaraz signified his acceptance of the credit card by signing and subsequently
using the same. This, however, without more, does not confer "honorary membership"
status to the petitioner.

BUT, the petitioner should not be condemned to pay the interests and charges provided in
the Terms and Conditions on the mere claim of the private respondent without any proof of
the former's conformity and acceptance of the stipulations contained therein. Even if we are
to accept the private respondent's averment that the stipulation quoted earlier is printed at
the back of each and every credit card issued by private respondent Equitable, such
stipulation is not sufficient to bind the petitioner to the Terms and Conditions without a clear
showing that the petitioner was aware of and consented to the provisions of this document.
This, the private respondent failed to do.

THUS, Alcaraz is liable to pay only the credit he utilized and not the stipulated monthly
interest. However, since an extra-judicial demand was made, the 12% imposed by the CA
is proper.

SC: Petition dismissed.

RULE 19 Intervention

Hon. Carlos O. Fortich, et. al vs. Hon. Renato C. Corona, et al., G.R. No. 131457,
August 19, 1999, 312 SCRA 751

FACTS
- The case involves a 144-hectare land located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned
by the Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC),
one of the petitioners.

- In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to Del Monte for a period of ten
(10) years. The lease expired in April 1994.

- In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) placed the entire 144-hectare property under compulsory acquisition and assessed
the land value at P2.38 million.

- NQSRMDC resisted the DARs action. It sought and was granted a writ of prohibition with
preliminary injunction.

- Despite the order, the DAR Regional Director issued a memorandum directing the Land
Bank to open a trust account for P2.38 million in the name of NQSRMDC and to conduct
summary proceedings to determine the just compensation of the subject property.
NQSRMDC filed an Omnibus Motion to enforce the order and to nullify the summary
proceedings. The motion was granted.

- Meanwhile, the municipality issued an Ordinance converting or re-classifying the land
from agricultural to industrial/institutional. An application for approval of conversion was
duly submitted. The DAR, however, denied such application. Thus, it ordered the DAR
Regional Director to proceed with the compulsory acquisition and distribution of the
property.

- Governor Fortich appealed the order of denial to the Office of the President and prayed
for the conversion/reclassification of the subject land as the same would be more beneficial
to the people of Bukidnon.

- To prevent the enforcement of the DAR Secretarys order, NQSRMDC, on June 29, 1995,
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction.

- The Office of the President issued a Decision in reversing the DAR Secretarys decision. It
approved the application for conversion of the land. It also granted NQSRMDCs petition.
DAR appealed for reconsideration.

- In compliance with the OP decision, NQSRMDC donated 4 hectares from the subject land
to DECS for the establishment of the high school. When NQSRMDC was about to transfer
the title, it discovered that the title over the subject property was no longer in its name. It
found out that during the pendency of both the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, with
Preliminary Injunction it filed against DAR in the Court of Appeals and the appeal to the
President filed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, the DAR, without giving just compensation,
caused the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title and had it transferred in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines. Thereafter, DAR caused the issuance of Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA) and had it registered in the name of 137 farmer-beneficiaries.

- NQSRMDC filed a complaint with the RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for annulment and
cancellation of title, damages and injunction against DAR and 141 others. The RTC then
issued a Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction restraining the
DAR and 141 others from entering, occupying and/or wresting from NQSRMDC the
possession of the subject land.

- Meanwhile, an Order was issued by then Executive Secretary Torres denying DARs
motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the reglementary period of fifteen
(15) days. The OP decision had already become final and executory. The DAR filed a
second motion for reconsideration.

- The said writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC was challenged by some alleged
farmers before the Court of Appeals.

- Some alleged farmer-beneficiaries began their hunger strike in front of the DAR
Compound in Quezon City to protest the OP Decision. Some persons claiming to be
farmer-beneficiaries of the NQSRMDC property filed a motion for intervention (styled as
Memorandum In Intervention) asking that the OP Decision allowing the conversion of the
entire 144-hectare property be set aside.

Office of the President
- The Office of the President resolved the strikers protest by issuing the so-called Win/Win
Resolution penned by then Deputy Executive Secretary Corona. It modified the previous
OP Decision to the effect that only 44 hectares of the land should be converted, and that
the remaining 100 hectares be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.

No CA, Elevated to the SC
- Governor Fortich with Mayor Baula of Sumilao, Bukidnon and NQSRMDC filed the
present petition for certiorari, prohibition (under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court) and
injunction with urgent prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction (under Rule 58, ibid.), against then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C.
Corona and DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao.

- A Motion For Leave To Intervene was filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries, through
counsel, claiming that they are real parties in interest as they were previously identified by
respondent DAR as agrarian reform beneficiaries on the 144-hectare property subject of
this case.

ISSUE WON Motion to Intervene filed by alleged famer-beneficiaries was meritorious.

HELD No

In their motion, movants contend that they are the farmer-beneficiaries of the land in
question, hence, are real parties in interest. To prove this, they attached in their motion a
Master List of Farmer-Beneficiaries. Apparently, the alleged master list was made pursuant
to the directive in the dispositive portion of the assailed Win-Win Resolution which directs
the DAR to carefully and meticulously determine who among the claimants are qualified
farmer-beneficiaries. However, a perusal of the said document reveals that movants are
those purportedly Found Qualified and Recommended for Approval. In other words,
movants are merely recommendee farmer-beneficiaries.

The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in interest is a party who would be benefited
or injured by the judgment or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Real interest
means a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future,
contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. Undoubtedly, movants interest over the
land in question is a mere expectancy. Ergo, they are not real parties in interest.

Furthermore, the challenged resolution upon which movants based their motion is, as
intimated earlier, null and void. Hence, their motion for intervention has no leg to stand on.

OTHER CIVPRO ISSUES:
1. Was the proper remedy a Petition for Review with the CA in accordance with Rule 43?
No.

Under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of any quasi-
judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial functions, including the Office of the President, may
be taken to the Court of Appeals by filing a verified petition for review within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the said judgment, final order or resolution, whether the appeal involves
questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. In this case, Rule 43 is
inapplicable considering that the present petition contains an allegation that the challenged
resolution is patently illegal and was issued with grave abuse of discretion and beyond
his (Coronas) jurisdiction when said resolution substantially modified the earlier OP
Decision of March 29, 1996 which had long become final and executory. The issue raised
here involves an error of jurisdiction, not an error of judgment which is reviewable by an
appeal under Rule 43. Thus, the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the assailed
resolution is an original special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, as what the
petitioners have correctly done.

2. Did the petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the Win-Win Resolution
before filing the present petition? No.

Said motion is not necessary when the questioned resolution is a patent nullity.

3. Is NQSRMDC guilty of forum shopping? No.

Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. Said cases filed do not show
that they are similar to each other.

4. Can the previous final and executory OP decision still be modified? No.

SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as
otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days
from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is
filed within such period.
Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained,
save in exceptionally meritorious cases.

It is further provided for in Section 9 that The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory
character whenever practicable.

Therefore, the assailed Win-Win Resolution which substantially modified the Decision of
March 29, 1996 after it has attained finality, is utterly void.

Looyuko v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 102696, July 12, 2001, 361 SCRA 150

Doctrines:
! Intervention can no longer be allowed in a case already terminated by final
judgment
! In exceptional cases, such as when intervenors were indispensable parties, the
Court has allowed intervention notwithstanding the rendition of judgment by the
trial court.
! Intervention. A person may, before or during a trial be permitted by the court, in
its discretion, to intervene in an action, if he has legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or
when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof

(Note: There are 4 consolidated petitions in this case)

Nature: Disputed in these consolidated cases is a house and lot located in Mandaluyong,
previously owned by the Spouses Tomas and Linda Mendoza. Bitterly contesting the
property are the spouses various creditors as well as the creditors alleged assignee.

One set of creditors includes Albert Looyuko and Jose Uy. Their lawyer, Atty. Victoria
Cuyos, has also annotated her attorneys lien over the property. Antonia Gutang and her
children David and Elizabeth, who have substituted their father, comprise another set. Both
sets of creditors rest their claim upon separate levies on execution and their supposed
purchase of the property at public auction. Schubert Tanuliong, who purports to be Looyuko
et al.s and the Gutangs assignee also files a claim.

Facts: On December 2, 1976, spouses Tomas and Linda Mendoza executed a mortgage
over the subject property in favor of FGU Insurance Corporation (creditor). The mortgage
was registered with the Register of Deeds of Pasig.

RTC: As the spouses failed to satisfy the obligation secured by the mortgage, FGU filed an
action with the RTC of Manila against said spouses. The latter filed an Answer but failed to
appear during the pre-trial. Consequently, the Spouses Mendoza were declared as in
default and evidence were received ex-parte.
No appeal was taken from the RTC order and the same subsequently became final and
executory.
RTC issued a writ of execution. The deputy sheriff in a public bidding sold the parcel of land
to FGU, the highest bidder.

Before the new TCT could be issued, however, the Spouses Gutang filed a motion for
intervention and to set aside the judgment of the RTC, alleging that they are the new
registered owners of the property. In an Order the RTC allowed the motion for intervention,
holding that the failure of FGU to implead the Spouses in the action for foreclosure
deprived the latter of due process. The RTC thus set aside its Decision and all orders
issued subsequent and related thereto.

Thereafter, Looyuko et al., and Tanunliong filed their respective motions for intervention,
which the RTC granted as well.

CA: FGU filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in the Court of Appeals,
arguing that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motions for
intervention since the RTC decision, as amended, was already final and executory. CA
upheld decision of RTC.

Issue: Were the motions for intervention filed proper considering that the case was already
final and executory?

Held: No.
However, in exceptional cases such as when intervenors were indispensable parties, the
Court has allowed intervention notwithstanding the rendition of judgment by the trial court.

Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, the law prevailing at the time, read as follows:
Intervention. A person may, before or during a trial be permitted by the court, in its
discretion, to intervene in an action, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in
the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as
to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of
the court or of an officer thereof. [Italics supplied.]

In the present case, the motions for intervention were filed after judgment had already been
rendered, indeed when the case was already final and executory. Certainly, intervention
can no longer be allowed in a case already terminated by final judgment.
Intervention is merely collateral or accessory or ancillary to the principal action, and not an
independent proceeding; it is an interlocutory proceeding dependent on or subsidiary to the
case between the original parties. Where the main action ceases to exist, there is no
pending proceeding wherein the intervention may be based. Here, there is no more
pending principal action wherein the Spouses Gutang and Looyuko et al. may intervene.

In exceptional cases, the Court has allowed intervention notwithstanding the rendition of
judgment by the trial court. In Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, intervention was
allowed even when the petition for review of the assailed judgment was already submitted
for decision in the Supreme Court. Recently in Mago vs. Court of Appeals, the Court
granted intervention despite the case having become final and executory. It must be noted,
however, that in both these cases, the intervenors were indispensable parties. This is not
so in the case at bar.

The Register of Deeds is ordered to issue a new TCT in the name of FGU Insurance
Corporation.

International Pipes, Inc. and ITALIT Construction and Development Corporation v.
F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. G.R. No. 127543, August 16, 2001, 363 SCRA 329

Asian Terminals v. Ricafort, G.R. No. 166901, October 27, 2006
Doctrines:
o A court which has no jurisdiction over the principal action has no jurisdiction over a
complaint-in-intervention.
o Intervention presupposes the pendency of a suit in a court of competent
jurisdiction.
o Jurisdiction of intervention is governed by jurisdiction of the main action
Facts:
o Respondents were duly-licensed importers of vehicles. Sometime in April and May
1998,they imported 72 second hand right-hand drive buses from Japan. When
the shipment arrived at the South Harbor, Port of Manila, the District Collector of
Customs impounded the vehicles and ordered them stored at the warehouse of
the Asian Terminals, Inc. (ATI),a customs-bonded warehouse under the custody
of the Aviation and Cargo Regional Division.
o Conformably with Section 2607 of the Tariff and Customs Code, the District
Collector of Customs issued Warrants of Distraint 3 against the shipment and set
the sale at public auction on September 10, 1998.
o The vehicles were seized by virtue of Section 1, Republic Act (RA) No. 8506,
which took effect on February 22, 1998, which provides that "it shall be unlawful
for any person to import, cause the importation of, register, cause the registration
of, use or operate any vehicle with its steering wheel right hand side thereof in
any highway, street or road, whether private or public, or at the national or local x
x x."
o On November 11, 1998, the importers filed a complaint with the RTC of Paraaque
City,against the Secretary of Finance, Customs Commissioner, and the Chief
Executive of the Societe Generale de Surillee, for replevin with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary and mandatory injunction and damages.
o They contend that the importation of right-hand drive vehicles is not
prohibited under RA No. 8506 provided that conversion kits are
included in the imported vehicles.
o RTC granted writ of replevin.
o Petitioner ATI filed a third party claim against respondent importers for unpaid
warehouse dues.
o Trial court dismissed the complaint along with the Third Party Claim/Motion for
Intervention as the latter is only it being only an accessory to the principal case.
o ATI moved to reconsider and was denied.
o ATI then appealed to the CA which ruled that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
complaint filed by respondents.
o Under the Customs and Tariff Code, the Collector of Customs sitting in
seizure and forfeiture proceedings had the exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and determine all questions relating on the seizure and forfeiture
of dutiable goods.
o Since it was bereft of jurisdiction in the principal case, it also had no
jurisdiction over the third party claim/complaint in intervention as such
is only ancillary and supplemental. Instant Case

Issue:
W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over the instant case
W/N the replevin it issued was valid.

RULING:The Trial Court has no jurisdiction. Replevin is VOID
o Section 602 of the Tariffs and Customs Code provides that the Bureau of Customs
shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over seized and forfeited cars.
o Under Section 2301 of the TCC, the Collector of Customs is empowered to make a
seizure of cargoes and issue a receipt for the detention thereof: SEC. 2301.
Warrant for Detention of Property-Cash Bond. Upon making any seizure,the
Collector shall issue a warrant for the detention of the property; and if the owner
or importer desires to secure the release of the property for legitimate use, the
Collector shall, with the approval of the Commissioner of Customs, surrender it
upon the filing of a cash bond, in an amount to be fixed by him, conditioned upon
the payment of the appraised value of the article and/or any fine, expenses and
costs which may be adjudged in the case: X X X
o As the Court ruled in Jao v. Court of Appeals, Regional Trial Courts are devoid
of any competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure and
forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs and to enjoin
or otherwise interfere with these proceedings.
o It is the Collector of Customs, sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings, who
has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching on the
seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods.
o Thus, the RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for replevin by
respondents herein, issue the writ of replevin and order its enforcement. The
Collector of Customs had already seized the vehicles and set the sale thereof at
public auction. The RTC should have dismissed the petition for replevin at the
outset. By granting the plea of respondents (plaintiffs below) for the seizure of the
vehicles and the transfer of custody to the court, the RTC acted without
jurisdiction over the action and the vehicles subject matter thereof.
o It bears stressing that the forfeiture of seized goods in the Bureau of Customs is a
proceeding against the goods and not against the owner. It is in the nature of a
proceeding in rem, i.e., directed against the res or imported articles and entails a
determination of the legality of their importation. In this proceeding, it is, in legal
contemplation, the property itself which commits the violation and is treated as
the offender, without reference whatsoever to the character or conduct of the
owner.
o In fine, the initial orders of the RTC granting the issuance of the writ of replevin
and its implementation are void
o While it is true that the District Collector of Customs allowed the
release of the vehicles and the transfer thereof to the custody of the
RTC upon the payment by the private respondents of the required
taxes, duties and charges, he did not thereby lose jurisdiction over the
vehicles; neither did it vest jurisdiction on the RTC to take cognizance
of and assume jurisdiction over the petition for replevin.
o As very well explained by the Office of the Solicitor General, the
District Collector of Customs agreed to transfer the vehicles to the
custody of the RTC since the latter had ordered the arrest of those who
would obstruct the implementation of the writ. The District Collector of
Customs had yet to resolve whether to order the vehicles forfeited in
favor of the government, in light of the opinion of the Secretary of
Justice that, under RA No. 8506,the importation was illegal.
o The RTC cannot be faulted for dismissing petitioners complaint-in-
intervention.Considering that it had no jurisdiction over respondents
action and over the shipment subject of the complaint, all proceedings
before it would be void. The RTC had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the complaint-in-intervention and act thereon except to
dismiss the same. Moreover, considering that intervention is merely
ancillary and supplemental to the existing litigation and never an
independent action, the dismissal of the principal action necessarily
results in the dismissal of the complaint-in-intervention.
o Likewise, a court which has no jurisdiction over the principal action has
no jurisdiction over a complaint-in-intervention. Intervention
presupposes the pendency of a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction of intervention is governed by jurisdiction of the main
action

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Civil Procedure | February 14, 2014

Case Digests for Rules 10-19 | page 1

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