Russia Disad

1NC Russia DA
Russian resurgence into Latin America is growing
Wells 4-26 (Miriam, Wells is a journalist who has previously worked for BBC Radio News and for Human Rights Watch. She has worked for InSight Crime since
2012, specializes in Latin American Reporting, Should Russian Anti-Drug Aid to LatAm Worry the US? 2013 http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/should-russian-
drug-aid-latam-worry-us)
Russian involvement in Latin America has been growing for several years, particularly in
left-leaning countries, a harkback to the Soviet era which has led some to suggest the alliances are more about
geopolitics than fighting drug trafficking. However, anti-drugs cooperation also has major
economic benefits to Russia, particularly in terms of arms sales, which have soared in the last 10 years.
In 2009 Russia took the United States' place as the main supplier of arms to Latin
America for the first time, with sales totalling $5.4 billion. Russian arms sales to Latin America grew 900
percent between 2004 and 2009, according to Russian newspaper Pravda. "We are getting back
forgotten, old Soviet markets, like Peru, for example," Russia's director of Military Sales Services, Alexander Fomin, said last
month. Ties between Latin America and Russia began to deepen in earnest in 2008
when then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev carried out a Latin American tour in his first year in office, visiting Peru,
Brazil, Venezuela and Cuba. One Russian diplomat claimed that cooperation "could be broader than in the Soviet
era," and hinted at broader strategic motives by stating that "Latin America has
already ceased to be the United States' backyard." Since then, Moscow has signed far-
reaching defense, energy and trade agreements with countries such as Ecuador, Bolivia and Brazil, and Russia-Brazil
bilateral trade is predicted to increase to $10 billion annually in the next three years.
But US action in the region encroaches on Russias SOI
Blank 2009 (Stephen Blank is Professor of Russian National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, Russia in Latin
America: Geopolitical Games in the USs Neighborhood Ifri, RussiaNIS Center April, wwwifriorgdownloadsifriblankrussiaandlatinamericaengapril09pdf )
Unfortunately Moscows current foreign policyand that of supporters like president of Venezuela Hugo Chavez, albeit for different
reasonsaims to embroil the continent in a contest with Washington. Russia still covets
a global or even superpower status equal to that of the United States. Thus it wants
to be a member of every international organization that exists whether it has any
real interests in the area. Accordingly Russia expressed its interest in becoming an observer at the South American Defense Council that is part of
the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). Russia also wants to be an observer in the Latin American Association of Peace Operations Training Centres (ALCOPAZ).22
This craving for status lies at the heart of Russian foreign policy.23 In 1997 at the nadir of Russian
fortunes, Sergey Rogov, Director of the Institute for US and Canadian Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences and an advisor to the government, wrote that:
Moscow should seek to preserve the special character of Russian-American
relations. Washington should recognize the exceptional status of the Russian
Federation in the formation of a new system of international relations, a role
different from that which [] any other center of power plays in the global
arena.24 Consequently Russian policy in Latin America is ultimately an American
policy. It aims to instrumentalize the region as a series of countries or even a weak
but still discernible political bloc to support Russian positions against US
dominance in world affairs. Therefore Latin American states that wish to challenge
America need to rely on Moscow. Thus President Daniel Ortega pledged Nicaraguas opposition to a unipolar world and welcomed
Russias presence in Latin America25 Moscows policy is part of its larger effort, to realize this so-
called multipolar world Thus in November 2008 Lavrov stated that: We welcome Latin Americas role in the efforts to democratize international
relations in the context of the objectively growing multipolarity in the world. We believe that these processes are in the interests of the whole [of] mankind. Russia is interested
in the closest cooperation with our Latin American partners in reply to the reciprocal interest they are showing26
Russia conducts its foreign policy in terms of zero sum influence
these conflicts spill over and destroy relations
Blank 2011 (Steven, Professor of Russian National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College Russias Second Wind in
Latin America, Perspectives on the Americas A Series of Opinion Pieces by Leading Commentators on the Region August 18 https://www6.miami.edu/hemispheric-
policy/Perspectives_on_the_Americas/Blank-Latam2011-FINAL.pdf)
Indeed, Russian policy is not driven by Latin Americas views, but by classical desires
for profit and influence, mainly at the expense of the United States, and a visceral anti-
Americanism. Analysts like Fedor Lukyanov, Vladimir Shlapentokh and Leonid Radzhikhovky all attest to the virtually
obsessive anti-Americanism that drives much of Russian foreign policy.3 Indeed,
powerful people like Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, Premier Vladimir Putins right-hand man, apparently want to
conduct a Latin American policy of anti-Americanism and destabilization
regardless of the consequences. Sechin reportedly promoted economic deals and
arms sales to Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua, and the formation among these three of
an alliance as Moscow considers the formation of such a union a worthy response
to U.S. activity in the former Soviet Union and the placement of missile defenses in
Poland and the Czech Republic.4 Not surprisingly Sechin advised Putin that Moscow should
upgrade its relations with these countries in particular, and with Latin America in general.5 As Deputy Prime Minister, Sechin
appears to have encouraged Venezuelan president Hugo Chvez to develop a nuclear program and Sechin negotiated the transfer of nuclear technology and weapons to
Venezuela. In July 2009 he arranged a deal with Cuba that allowed Russia to conduct deep-water drilling in the Gulf of Mexico.6 Whereas in the
previous thrust into Latin America, Moscow focused primarily, though not exclusively, on
reliable friends like Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua, to whom it either sold a lot of arms or gave considerable
economic and energy assistance, today Moscow fully appreciates Brazils dominant position in Latin America, has cemented bilateral
and multilateral ties with it through the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) organization, and devotes its primary
attention on Brazil, while not neglecting other targets of opportunity. Putin has called Brazil a strategic partner for Russia and cited bilateral cooperation in the energy sector, as
well as in nuclear energy, space, metals, biotechnologies and telecommunications7 Beyond that, Russia has long sought entre into Brazils arms market and it continues to do
so vigorously. Whereas earlier Moscow wanted to show Washington that Moscow could
play in Latin America too, now Moscows broader primary objective is support for
Russias goal of a multipolar world that constrains U.S. power and forces
Washington to heed Moscows voice before acting Thus Russias new activity builds upon previous
policy statements by leading officials. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Latin America and Russia are natural
partners, not because of Latin Americas economic growth, but because of the
congruence between Latin governments foreign policies and Russias support of a
multipolar world.8 Similarly Putin also stated that Latin America is becoming a noticeable
link in the chain of the multipolar world that is forming we will pay more and
more attention to this vector of our economic and foreign policy.9

Destruction of Russian relations causes nuclear war, nuclear
terrorism, and destroys hegemony.
Cohen 2011 Ph.D., professor of Russian studies at New York University and Professor of Politics Emeritus at Princeton University (Stephen, Obamas Russia
Reset: Another Lost Opportunity? http://www.thenation.com/article/161063/obamas-russia-reset-another-lost-opportunity?page=full)
An enduring existential reality has been lost in Washingtons postcold war
illusions and the fog of subsequent US wars: the road to American national security still runs through
Moscow. Despite the Soviet breakup twenty years ago, only Russia still possesses devices of mass destruction
capable of destroying the United States and tempting international terrorists for years to
come. Russia also remains the worlds largest territorial country, a crucial Eurasian frontline in the conflict
between Western and Islamic civilizations, with a vastly disproportionate share of
the planets essential resources including oil, natural gas, iron ore, nickel, gold,
timber, fertile land and fresh water. In addition, Moscows military and diplomatic reach
can still thwart, or abet, vital US interests around the globe, from Afghanistan,
Iran, China and North Korea to Europe and Latin America. In short, without an
expansive cooperative relationship with Russia, there can be no real US national
security. And yet, when President Obama took office in January 2009, relations between Washington and Moscow were so bad that some close observers, myself included, characterized them as a
new cold war. Almost all cooperation, even decades-long agreements regulating nuclear weapons, had been displaced by increasingly acrimonious conflicts. Indeed, the relationship had led to a military
confrontation potentially as dangerous as the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The Georgian-Russian War of August 2008 was also a proxy American-Russian war, the Georgian forces having been supplied and trained
by Washington What happened to the strategic partnership and friendship between post-Soviet Moscow and Washington promised by leaders on both sides after 1991? For more than a decade, the American
political and media establishments have maintained that such a relationship was achieved by President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s but destroyed by the antidemocratic and neo-
imperialist agenda of Vladimir Putin, who succeeded Yeltsin in 2000 In reality, the historic opportunity for a postcold war
partnership was lost in Washington, not Moscow, when the Clinton
administration, in the early 1990s, adopted an approach based on the false
premise that Russia, having lost the cold war, could be treated as a defeated
nation. (The cold war actually ended through negotiations sometime between 1988 and 1990, well before the end of Soviet Russia in December 1991, as all the leading participantsSoviet President
Mikhail Gorbachev, President Ronald Reagan and President George H.W. Bushagreed) The result was the Clinton administrations triumphalist, winner-take-all approach, including an intrusive crusade to
dictate Russias internal political and economic development; broken strategic promises, most importantly Bushs assurance to Gorbachev in 1990 that NATO would not expand eastward beyond a reunited
Germany; and double-standard policies impinging on Russia (along with sermons) that presumed Moscow no longer had any legitimate security concerns abroad apart from those of the United States, even in its
own neighborhood. The backlash came with Putin, but it would have come with any Kremlin leader more self-confident, more sober and less reliant on Washington than was Yeltsin Nor did Washingtons
triumphalism end with Clinton or Yeltsin. Following the events of September 11, 2001, to take the most
ramifying example, Putins Kremlin gave the George W. Bush administration more
assistance in its anti-Taliban war in Afghanistan, including in intelligence and
combat, than did any NATO ally. In return, Putin expected the long-denied US-
Russian partnership. Instead, the Bush White House soon expanded NATO all the
way to Russias borders and withdrew unilaterally from the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty, which Moscow regarded as the bedrock of its nuclear security Those deceptions have not been forgotten in Moscow Now Russias political class,
alarmed by the deterioration of the countrys essential infrastructures since 1991, is locked in a struggle
over the nations futureone with profound consequences for its foreign policies. One
side, associated with Putins handpicked successor as president, Dmitri Medvedev, is calling for a democratic
transformation that would rely on modernizing alliances with the West. The
other side, which includes ultra-nationalists and neo-Stalinists, insists that only Russias
traditional state-imposed methods, or modernization without Westernization, are possible. As
evidence, they point to NATOs encirclement of Russia and other US perfidies.
The choice of modernizing alternatives will be made in Moscow, not, as US policy-makers once thought, in
Washington, but American policy will be a crucial factor. In the centuries-long struggle
between reform and reaction in Russia, anti-authoritarian forces have had a
political chance only when relations with the West were improving. In this regard,
Washington still plays the leading Western role, for better or worse.


Uniqueness

2NC Uniqueness Wall

Extend the 1NC wells evidence- massive increase in Russia influence
in Latin America due to arms, technology and energy contacts
solidifies the region in their sphere of influence
Russian resurgence in Latin America high counterbalancing the US
Sudarev 2012 (Vladimir Sudarev Doctor of Political Science, Professor of the European and American Countries History and Politics Department of the
MGIMO University, " Is Russia returning to Latin America?" RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS COUNCIL, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=252#top)
Make-or-break moment in the relationships with Latin America region countries
occurred in the wake of the Yeltzin era. Latin American countries themselves seem to have
contributed a lot to it Already in 1999 the Rio Group uniting the regions leading states turned out to be, actually, the only grouping in the
world which condemned the bombing of Yugoslavia and pointed out in its declaration specific articles of the UN Charter violated by the NATO
member- states [3]. In February 2003 Mexico and Chili as non-permanent UN SC members, in fact, vetoed the second
Anglo-American resolution authorizing Iraq intervention, despite their economic
dependence on the USA. These actions seem to have made the Kremlin look at the
perspectives of cooperation with Latin American countries at a new angle. Thus, in March
2003 President Putin received in Kremlin the delegation of the Rio Group and held
official talks with them. Both sides agreed not to confine themselves to regular contacts (launched in 1995) within the framework of
the UN General Assembly, but also conduct meetings in Russia and countries of the Group member-states. By mid-decade the exchange of
high level delegations between the sides had intensified. Only one example, in November 2008 President
Medvedev visited four countries during his tour of the region - Peru, Brazil, Venezuela and Cuba. Commenting on his visit, President Medvedev
remarked: we visited the states which previous Russian leaders had never been to It means only that we failed to pay due
attention to these countries before, and, to a certain extent, it is only now that we are
starting a full-fledged and I hope mutually beneficial cooperation with the heads of these states
and between our economies. : We mustnt be shy and timid and be afraid of
competition. We must boldly engage in the battle In order to display its interest to the presence in the region
Russia resorted to a number of un-common and spectacular actions. In November 2008 a
warship squadron with the fleet nuclear-powered cruiser Peter the Great of the
Russian Navy as a flagship entered the territorial waters of US-hostile Venezuela
to participate in joint naval exercises of the North Fleet of the Russian Federation Navy. Simultaneously, within the
framework of the resumed patrolling of the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans two Russian long-range strategic bombers landed at a Venezuelan naval
base. The so-called comeback of Russia to Latin America was to a great extent
preconditioned by the leftist drift in the region which resulted in the emergence
of the group of states that viewed the expanding relations with Russia as an
important lever for strengthening their position in conflict relations with the USA.
Many of these countries perceived Russia as the successor of the former USSR
might and influence, with the vision of a new world order of both sides being
practically identical it should be multilateral, not individually tailored to the
interests of a single superpower. This position was set out in numerous joint documents signed at the summits practically
all the leaders of the most prominent Latin American countries paid official visits to Moscow during the first decade of the 21st century. The
breakthrough happened also in the military and technical field. Starting from 2004 Venezuela has
begun purchases of scale of the Russian arms to the amount of over $4bln. Russia established military and technical cooperation with other countries of
the region apart from Venezuela: Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Bolivia also procured Russian military hardware. Russia tried to
establish closer economic ties with its major partners in the region. At the end of the decade
Russias oil and gas producing companies LUKOIL and GASPROM were already operating in Venezuela RUSAL made heavy investments in bauxite
industry of Guyana. ROSNEFT got its chunk for oil exploration in Cuban shelf of the Mexican Gulf. Trade between Russia and the countries of the
region has been roaring recently over the last decade trade turnover has tripled and amounted to $15bln [4]. However, despite the qualitative changes
in the structure of Russian export the share of machinery and equipment has a little increased it still leaves much to be desired. Take Brazil, for
example: mineral fertilizers have made up 90% of Russian export, while Brazil has been exporting to Russia mostly meat and tropical goods. Largely,
Brazil has always been the weakest link of Russias regional policy despite its participation in the BRIC group At any rate, the role of Brazil in Russias
foreign policy is much smaller than those of China and India. It should be recognized that Russia has failed so far to establish strategic partnership with
Brazil, which had been planned for as early as 1997.

Russia ramping up involvement in LA- key to their foreign policy
strategy
Paniev 2012 (Yuri, One of the great experts on Latin America, Russian Academy of Sciences, Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations,
RUSSIA TURNING ON LATIN AMERICA, v1, n1, Jan-Jun 2012 | pp.37-50 online)
Aromatic coffee, ripe bananas, fancy orchids, fiery samba, soap operas this is kind of standard Russian associations, which arise when Latin America
is mentioned And although the peak of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the "flaming continent was left behind in the 1970s, the modern
Russia is catching up. As a result the Latin American direction has become, perhaps, the
most spectacular component of Moscows international activities in recent
years. Billions of dollars in contracts, joint projects in various spheres, state-of-the art
technologies this is what brings together Russia and Latin American states
today. Russia has diplomatic relations with all of the 33 countries in the region,
with 18 of them it has agreements based on new cooperative principles nothing of
the kind has ever existed before. Some analysts predict a new "golden age" for
Russia - Latin American cooperation. According to Vladimir Davydov, the director of the Institute of Latin America and
corresponding member of the RAS, the unprecedented intensity of Russia-Latin American
dialogue is due to the fact that Russias leaders have realized the strategic
importance of Latin America. "For years the initiative was coming from Latin
America, the Latin Americans were coming, breaking through with their exports,
seeking to raise the level of political contacts. Moscow was reacting without real
inspiration, noted Davydov. "Fortunately, the situation has changed drastically"2.
Involvement will only increase directly to counter American
influence
Blank 2011 (Steven, Professor of Russian National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College Russias Second Wind in
Latin America, Perspectives on the Americas A Series of Opinion Pieces by Leading Commentators on the Region August 18 https://www6.miami.edu/hemispheric-
policy/Perspectives_on_the_Americas/Blank-Latam2011-FINAL.pdf)
In 2008 Russia generated many headlines by overtly angling for a big role in Latin
Americas international politics.1 Although Russian interest in Latin America seemingly waned after that, recent
signs suggest Russia is gaining a second wind in Latin America. This new upsurge begins from that
2008 baseline. Although it utilizes the same instruments of arms sales and energy
exploration, Moscow appears to have refocused its priorities without sacrificing its
friends in Caracas and Havana. Thus, this new campaign validates President Dmitry
Medvedevs 2008 remarks that Russia was only beginning to upgrade its ties with
Latin America, which he and other officials recognize as a growing presence in world affairs.2 He further emphasized that Russia
would undertake comprehensive and multidimensional relations with Latin
America. So we should not expect a full Russian retreat from Latin America, even
if its foreign policy retrenches. Instead, further advances and, to be frank, anti-
American probes, should be expected.


Uniqueness- Russia Up- CELAC
Investment up- CELAC
Nechepurenko 4-30 (Ivan Nechepurenko, an analyst of foreign and internal affairs of Russia and the CIS. He has worked for
several think tanks and governmental organizations including the OSCE and Carnegie Moscow Center. He holds a Master of Science in International
Relations from the London School of Economics and International Relations Moscow Times, Russia Seeks to Restore Influence in Latin America,
2013 http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russia-seeks-to-restore-influence-in-latin-america/480827.html#ixzz2VqW1fLZn)
Russia has demonstrated its increasing leverage in Latin America with Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov meeting representatives of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States in Moscow on Wednesday.
The foreign ministers of Cuba, Costa Rica and Haiti and the deputy foreign minister of Chile discussed trade, political
dialogue and a visa-free regime with Lavrov, with everyone in agreement that Russia's
relations with the region are ripe enough to establish "a permanent mechanism
for political dialogue and cooperation in a Russia-CELAC format," a statement from Russia's
Foreign Ministry said. CELAC was founded in 2010 as a counterweight to the U.S.-led
Organization of American States. It consists of 33 states representing almost 600 million people and producing $7 trillion
in annual GDP. "This is a serious attempt by Latin American states to counter
U.S. economic and political influence in the region," said Mikhail Belyat, an independent
Latin American expert and lecturer at the Russian State University for the Humanities.

Uniqueness- Russia Up- BRIC
Russia influence growing BRIC
Mahapatra 6-3 (Debidatta Aurobinda Mahapatra,an Indian commentator. His areas of interests include conflict, terrorism, peace and development, Kashmir, South Asia, and
strategic aspects of Eurasian politicsBRICS see greater role in Latin America, Russia and India Report, 2013 http://indrus.in/world/2013/06/03/brics_see_greater_role_in_latin_america_25721.html)
Last week witnessed some crucial developments from BRICS perspective. The Cuban
foreign minister visited New Delhi and sought BRICS partnership with Latin
American countries, representatives from Cuba, Haiti, Costa Rica and Chile met Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei
Lavrov in Moscow and sought Russian cooperation for the development of Latin American
countries and Chinese President, Xi Jinping toured Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica and Mexico to widen Chinese engagement in the region. Like Africa, Latin
America is emerging as a hub of economic development with huge natural
resources; it is but natural that it has gained increasing attention of the world. In this
context, BRICS engagement in the region, consisting of 33 countries with population of 600 million, has become timely. The
establishment of Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) in 2011 has
provided the region a unified voice, and with Brazil being a member of BRICS as well as CELAC, the BRICS
engagement in the region will be mutually beneficial with larger implications for
the globe. Cuban Foreign Minister, Bruno Eduardo Rodrguez Parrilla told in New Delhi that CELAC
wants to improve relations with BRICS. He also stated, We wish to seek a higher level of economic cooperation with the India
and the other BRICS nations, which we consider to be valuable India is the first dialogue partner of the CELAC, which has provided the group a format to develop closer
relations with India in diverse areas particularly information technology, medical services and tourism as elaborated by the Cuban minister He further announced, We see an
opportunity for mutually beneficial economic relations with India The CELAC has a similar format of dialogue with China, which can be further extended to Russia and South
Africa. The CELAC, which consists of all countries of the two American continents, but without the US and Canada, has recently started exploring economic relations with other
countries including economic power houses of the BRICS. Parrilla pointed out that there are many common values and objectives between CELAC and BRICS, which need to be
further explored. The foreign ministers of Cuba, Haiti and Costa Rica and deputy foreign minister of Chile met Sergei Lavrov in
the Russian capital to deliberate on various issues including promoting dialogue,
trade and visa-free regime. The joint communiqu brought out the commonalities
of interests in the areas of tackling terrorism, developing economic relations,
promoting democracy, advancing principles of international law and the United
Nations Charter, countering transnational organized crime, and tackling other
threats and challenges. Lavrov stated at the end of the meeting, Our friends have expressed their desire
to make permanent contacts between the CELAC and BRICS We believe this is a
very attractive suggestion and we will definitely discuss it with other states that are
members of this association. Russian foreign ministry also expressed the idea of
establishing a permanent mechanism for political dialogue and cooperation
between Russia and CELAC. China has started pursuing vigorously its Latin American policy. It has already replaced the US as the largest trading
partner of Brazil and Chile. Its trade with Latin America has grown since the last decade. From 2000 to 2011, it has grown 20 fold, from $3.9 billion to $86 billion. Chinese
Assistant Foreign Minister, Zheng Zeguang on the eve of Xi Jinpings visit to Latin America dispelled any notion of competition between China and the US in the region and
stated that China can work with the US in a framework based on mutual trust, equality and inclusiveness. Xi was received by the Prime Minister of Trindad and Tobago, Kamla
Persad-Bissessar. Besides this Caribbean country, Jinping also visited Costa Rica and Mexico. China is looking forward to widen its investment in the exploration of natural
resources including energy resources in the region. The BRICS engagement with CELAC is not only a factor in promoting multilateralism and fostering a multi-polar world
structure, but it also accrues economic advantages to both the groupings. While the BRICS members are fast rising economies with huge financial resources, the CELAC
countries have also registered growth despite global economic slowdown. The Latin American countries are also rich in natural resources. The Union of South American Nations
on Natural Resources and Integral Development in its meeting in Venezuelan capital Caracas last week emphasized on natural resources and their exploration for the
development of the region. Latin America reportedly has 38 percent of copper, 21 percent of iron, 65 percent of lithium reserves, 42 percent of silver, and 33 percent of tin. It
also contains about 30 percent of the total of the worlds water resources and 21 percent of the worlds natural forests Some of the Latin American countries such as Mexico and
Venezuela are rich in energy resources. The huge population of CELAC makes the region a vast market
for investment and also for import from the BRICS countries. The rising prowess
of the BRICS will grow with its Latin American engagement. Though many of the initiatives discussed above
are related to individual members of the BRICS, this adds to the collective sphere of influence of the grouping. As the members Latin
American engagement takes more dynamic shape, the prospects of collective
engagement as a group can be explored. The grouping can evolve common
strategies in exploring the resources in the region for mutual advantage. In this venture, the
proposed BRICS bank can be an effective tool.


Uniqueness- Russia Up- Counter narcotics
Investment Up counter-narcotics
Bargent 3-20 (James, WriterEditorResearcher at InSight Crime, Journalist at Nearshore Americas, Russia Looks to Increase Influence in Latin America
Drug War , 2013 http:wwwinsightcrimeorgnews-briefs/russia-influence-latin-america-drug-war)
Russia is to step up multilateral cooperation in counternarcotics operations in
Latin America, in what may also be a play to increase its geopolitical influence in
the region. The director of Russia's Federal Narcotics Service, Viktor Ivanov, announced plans to work with
several Latin American countries in carrying out joint counternarcotics
operations, training law enforcement agencies, improving user rehabilitation
facilities, and helping develop common anti-drug policies.


Uniqueness- Cuba
Influence increasing- New bilateral agreements
Xinhua 2-23 (Medvedevs tour enhances Russias presence in Latin America, 2013 http:englishcntvcn20130224103262shtml)
Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev's latest tour to Brazil and Cuba strengthened Moscow's ties with the two Latin
American countries by sealing bilateral economic and defense deals. The four-day visit, which ended on Saturday, further
enhanced Moscow's presence in Latin America four years after Medvedev, then in
the capacity of Russian president, marked Moscow's high-profile return to the so-
called backyard of Washington in a tour in November 2008. In Cuba, Medvedev signed 10 bilateral
agreements in areas such as education, health, hydrometeorology, aeronautics and space technology. The most eye-catching was a new
accord governing Cuba's outstanding debt to Russia, which is estimated to be at about 30 billion U.S. dollars and
has been a thorn in bilateral relations. "We signed various important and useful agreements," Cuban daily Granma quoted Medvedev as saying, adding
that the Cuban government also agreed to purchase three commercial aircraft from
Russia. Medvedev said that the bilateral relations between Russia and Cuba are historical,
solid, strategic, and are on an upward path, official news agency Prensa Latina reported. Medvedev stressed that there were
no obstacles in enhancing cooperation with Cuba in economy, humanitarian
affairs and administration, adding that the two countries had wide prospects for
developing and enhancing the links in energy, industry, advanced technology,
medicine and space. He called on Moscow and Havana to strengthen bilateral trade, which stood at about 214 million U.S. dollars in 2011. Cuban President Raul Castro
also expressed satisfaction with his talks with Medvedev, Granma reported on Saturday. "It has been a good visit," said
Castro after Medvedev wrapped up his three-day visit to Cuba, where he also met with former leader Fidel Castro. This was Medvedev's second trip to Cuba. He visited the island country as head of state in 2008,
during which he pledged to further political and economic ties with the traditional partner in the Caribbean Sea. Russia was Cuba's main political and economic ally for three decades. After the disintegration of the
former Soviet Union in 1991, their relations cooled off, but since 2005, both countries have been working intensively to
rebuild their ties.
Increased influence in Cuba
The World Reporter 2012 (Russia and Latin America: Geopolitical Considerations, Jan 26
th

http://www.theworldreporter.com/2012/01/russia-and-latin-america-geopolitical.html#.UbX9hpz9XKc)
With Cuba, relationships were initially damaged after the fall of Soviet Union in 1991.
In the world after the Cold War, Havana didn't hope to matter anymore to
Moscow. The comming to power of Vladimir Putin has changed this geopolitical
situation. Since Cuba was still suffering because of U.S. embargo established in 1962, the
Russian President was personally involved in the Cuban affairs, supporting the
lifting of economic sanctions by the UN, on one hand, and by providing financial
credit for many areas, on the other hand. In November 2008, Moscow offered Havana a
loan of $ 335 million for the purchase of Russian equipment for the oil, mining and
transport sectors. In early 2009, the two countries have signed new agreements. These
agreements mainly concern the food and fishing industries, cooperation in
education, scientific research, sports and tourism. This Russian-Cuban dialogue
allows Moscow to have guaranteed new markets for its products, to expand its
influence on the castrist regime and to maintain its presence here, at less than 300 km from the
U.S. coastline.


Uniqueness- Venezuela
Cooperation strong
ITAR-TASS 4-15 (ITAR-TASS News Agency, President-elect Maduro to continue Chavezs policy for stronger relations with Russia - Venezuela
embassy, 2013 http:wwwitar-tass.com/en/c154/707045.html)
The cooperation between Russia and Venezuela, a strategic alliance of high level
between our countries will be strengthened, the diplomat noted. He noted that Russia and Venezuela
are cooperating in different spheres, including agriculture, military, energy and
technological spheres, as well as education. The high level of cooperation between
the two countries is also proved by the fact that Nicolas Maduro will visit Moscow in
early June this year to participate in a forum of the gas exporting countries, Martinez remarked Our countries are having a
larger number of exchanges and contacts every new day, the diplomat pointed out. Speaking on the early
presidential elections in Venezuela, he noted that Maduros victory is an important triumph for the
Bolivarian Revolution, which we expected.
Involvement up- oil
Mrquez 3-18 (Humberto, has been a journalist for more than 25 years, specialising in international news. He worked for 15 years with Agence France-
Presse (AFP), 10 as assignment editor in Caracas, covering Venezuela, the Caribbean and the Guyanas, Russia to Get Venezuelan Oil for a Few Cents a Barrel, 2013 Interpress
Service, http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/03/russia-to-get-venezuelan-oil-for-a-few-cents-a-barrel/)
Russian state oil firm Rosneft and Venezuelas PDVSA (Petrleos de Venezuela S.A.) have agreed to
form a partnership to exploit an oilfield with estimated reserves of 40 billion
barrels, strengthening the alliance between the two countries. For 1.5 billion dollars, the
Russian company will take over 40 percent of a project at a Venezuelan deposit
expected to produce 400,000 barrels per day (bpd) of crude in five years time, executives from the two companies said It
is an attractive deal for Rosneft to buy, or gain access to, reserves at a very low
price. That 40 percent interest buys 16 billion barrels at a cost of 10 cents of a
dollar per barrel, Vctor Poleo, a professor of graduate studies in oil economics at the Central University of Venezuela, told IPS. The cost of a barrel of oil
on the international market is between 90 and 110 dollars.
Involvement up- Oil/trade deals
The World Reporter 2012 (Russia and Latin America: Geopolitical Considerations, Jan 26
th

http://www.theworldreporter.com/2012/01/russia-and-latin-america-geopolitical.html#.UbX9hpz9XKc)
Venezuela is the key element in the Russian-Latin-American game. The parallel
anti-american positions of Russia and Venezuela are already known: Russia out of interest
and willingness to become a respected power like USSR used to be, Venezuela by Chavez's ideology and willingness to impose himself as a lider in his
country as well throughout the South-American continent. For the anti-imperialist sentiment is growing rapidly in an over-exploited Latin-America by
the 'yankee' 's interests for so long. Caracas is a reliable ally for Moscow in the new energy cold war
that is foreshadowing. First producer of gas from South America and fifth
worldwide producer of oil, Venezuela incites the Russian gas and oil appetite. In
November of 2008, Russian companies Lukoil and Gazprom signed an agreement with the PDVSA oil
group which was targeting the exploitation of oil in Orinoco, a river located in the East of the country,
hoping to produce more than 1 million barrels per day. If this project materializes, we'll be
talking about the most powerfull alliance in the world of oil. Far from being limited to hydrocarbons,
Russian strategy in Venezuela is making profit from Venezuela's chavist
government military ambitions. Between 2005 and 2007 Caracas signed with Moscow 12
contracts for arms worth 4.4 billion dollars, buying 24 Sukhoi fighter jets, 50 fighter helicopters and 100,000 Kalachnicov
rifles. In 2010 Caracas obtained from Moscow a loan of $ 2.2 million to buy T-72 tanks and an undisclosed number of S-300 air-defense bombs, in 2011
negociating a new agreement with Russia to get a $ 4 billion loan, half of which is destined to equip and modernize the armed forces. Also, with
Chavez's visit to Moscow in 2010, relations with Russia have been strengthened, Russian President saying that
Russia may sell equipment and machinery to Venezuela, and Venezuela might sell
agricultural products to Russia. Medvedev claimed that Russia is ready to take part
in various regional organizations and Latin American forums which requires a
joint task approach such as terrorism, transnational crime, drug trafficking,
environmental issues, sustainable development and economic aid. Furthermore,
Medvedev considers that Venezuela 'has acted like a true friend' when it followed
Russia and recognized former Georgian republics South Ossetia and Abkhazia at the
last visit Chavez had made to Moscow in 2009.

Uniqueness- US Russia Relations Up
Relations warming
Englund 5/10/13 Washington Post Staff (Will Englund, US, Russia finding room to talk, May 10, 2013, http:articleswashingtonpostcom2013-05-
10/world/39158618_1_foreign-minister-sergei-lavrov-russia-chemical-weapons)
Even as the chill in relations between the United States and Russia continues, the two
countries are at least talking to each other more these days. With Secretary of State John F. Kerry and FBI
director Robert Mueller both having come here this week for substantive discussions, Russian officials seem to have borrowed a talking point from the Obama administration:
Although no one is actually using the word reset, the Kremlin is nonetheless
promoting the idea that Russia and the United States can pursue productive cooperation
where their interests coincide and agree to disagree on other matters. How far-reaching that cooperation might prove
to be is an open question A State Department official praised Russias help with logistics in arranging for FBI agents investigating the Boston
bombings to make inquiries here. But when it comes to the substance of intelligence sharing, both sides remain wary. On Syria, likewise, Kerrys visit ended with a pledge by the
United States and Russia to sponsor a new peace conference, within the month. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said American and Russian intelligence agencies will coordinate
their efforts in trying to determine whether chemical weapons have been used in Syria and by whom. But even as the countries seem to be trying to feel their way toward a
resolution of the Syrian crisis the U.S. ambassador to Syria, Robert Ford, took part in the Moscow talks they still fundamentally disagree on the legitimacy of the Syrian
government. Still, Kerrys visit here Tuesday and Wednesday, which included meetings with
Lavrov and President Vladimir Putin, was well-received by his hosts. Russia and
the United States have certain common interests on which the two countries can and
should work together, Lavrov said afterwards including not only anti-terrorism efforts, but initiatives against drug trafficking and organized crime.
Secretary Kerrys visit underscored that 2013 has the potential to produce a
more productive trajectory in our bilateral relations, US Ambassador Michael McFaul wrote on his blog For the
past 17 months, ever since Putin began his presidential election campaign, he has been casting the United States as a patron of disorder in Russia and a threat to Russian
security. Relations with Washington steadily deteriorated, as each country banned a handful of officials from the other, American adoptions of Russian orphans were barred and
American aid across a spectrum of causes was rejected. Russia repeatedly blocked efforts by the United States and other countries to commit the United Nations to resolving the
conflict in Syria. Both sides trace the marked change in tone to April 15, when Tom Donilon, President Obamas security adviser, handed a letter from his boss to Putin,
suggesting ways to put the relationship back on course. The Kremlin quickly promised to reply in kind. On that same day, a few hours later, the two bombs went off in Boston.
When the connection to the troubles in Russias North Caucasus became apparent, the security services of both countries had a compelling reason to open lines of
communication, at the very least. Yet all this is happening just as the Russian government itself appears to be going through a potentially serious transition, in a direction that is
not at all clear Vladislav Surkov, a deputy prime minister and once Putins chief ideological adviser, was forced out of his job Wednesday in what is widely seen as the most
serious move so far by Putin against his onetime protege, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev. Putin, who has steadily betrayed a lack of respect for Medvedev since early this year,
castigated Medvedevs cabinet the day before Surkovs resignation for its inability to get things done Surkov, back when he was in favor, coined the idea of sovereign
democracy as a description of Putins system of control from the top down But his standing fell during last years political protests, and he has most recently been in a public
dispute with the countrys chief criminal investigator over allegations of corruption at a new high-tech center called Skolkovo one of Medvedevs pet projects Surkovs exit
illuminates public splits within the Russian ruling circle that until recently would never have been brought to light. The government announced Thursday that he is being
replaced by Sergei Prikhodko, who for 16 years was the chief foreign policy adviser in the Kremlin. Some opposition leaders, who in the past castigated Surkov as a propagandist,
worried nevertheless that his ouster may be a sign that hard-liners from the military, police and Federal Security Service have won the upper hand At Thursdays Victory
Day parade in Red Square, Putin could be seen conferring and smiling with Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, standing by the presidents right hand on the Kremlin reviewing
stand, while Medvedev, to the left, stood slightly apart and in silence. Mikhail Prokhorov, the oligarch and Brooklyn Nets owner who ran for president last year, blogged that it
was the end of the era of sovereign democracy Kerry, who was here to discuss areas where the two
countries can work together, was careful to strike a balance. He met on Tuesday with World War II veterans
preparing for the 68th anniversary of the end of the war in Europe, and he laid a wreath by the eternal flame that burns just outside the Kremlin wall. But he also met
Wednesday with representatives of civil society organizations at Spaso House, the US ambassadors residence.


Uniqueness- US Action in LA Down
US influence waning
Ben-Ami 6-5 (Shlomo Ben-Ami, a former Israeli foreign minister and internal security minister, is Vice President of the Toledo International Center for Peace.
Is the US Losing Latin America?, http:wwwproject-syndicate.org/commentary/the-new-nature-of-us-influence-in-latin-america-by-shlomo-ben-ami 2013)
It is a mantra increasingly heard around the world: US power is in decline. And
nowhere does this seem truer than in Latin America. No longer is the
region regarded as Americas backyard; on the contrary, the continent has
arguably never been so united and independent. But this view fails to capture the true nature of US influence in Latin
America and elsewhere as well. It is true that US attention to Latin America has waned in recent
years. President George W. Bush was more focused on his global war on terror His successor, Barack Obama, seemed
to give the region little thought as well, at least in his first term. Indeed, at the Summit of the Americas in Cartagena in April 2012,
Latin American leaders felt sufficiently confident and united to challenge US
priorities in the region. They urged the US to lift its embargo on Cuba, claiming that it had damaged relations with the rest of the continent, and to do
more to combat drug use on its own turf, through education and social work, rather than supplying arms to fight the drug lords in Latin America a battle that all acknowledged
has been an utter failure.

Links

Link- Latin America
Russian involvement in Latin America isnt benign increased US
involvement results in conflict
Bugajski 2-8 (Janusz , a policy analyst, writer, lecturer, and television host based in the United States, and the author of 18 books on Europe, Russia, and
trans-Atlantic relations, Russias Soft Power Wars, 2013 http:ukrainianweekcomWorld71849)
Third, while the US promotes cordial relations between its own allies and Russia,
Moscow remains fixated on its own primacy or exclusivity. For instance, Washington supports closer
bilateral relations between Poland or other Central-East European countries and Russia as it believes this generates regional stability and lessens the
need for U.S. security guarantees. In stark contrast, the Kremlin does not support closer relations between
Ukraine or the CIS states and the US, calculating that this deprives Moscow of its political leverage,
undermines its privileged interests, and could be the harbinger of a political and
military alliance. Fourth, the Kremlin actually promotes conflicts between its
allies and the US to weaken Americas influence or seeks to capitalize on disputes
between Washington and third parties. For example, Moscow has endeavored to buttress
the Hugo Chavez government in Venezuela into a more assertive regional player in Latin
America that can create security headaches for the US. By contrast, Washington
actively discourages disputes between Moscow and its former satellites. Moreover, it is
not obsessed with alleged Russian encirclement when Moscow sends military
vessels to Cuba or Venezuela. However, when a U.S ship sails into the Black Sea or
Washington sells military equipment to Georgia, the Kremlin claims that
Washington is launching a new Cold War. For Russian officials, alliances and partnerships
are in themselves zero sum calculations in a constant struggle for influence and
advantage with the United States. Soft power is thereby understood by Moscow as an arm of Russian state influence and a
valuable tactical tool employed to achieve specific geostrategic ambitions.
Only a strategic US pause will prevent Russian retaliation
Aron 3-8 (Leon, Director of Russian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, The Putin Doctrine Russias Quest to Rebuild the Soviet State, 2013 Foreign
Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139049/leon-aron/the-putin-doctrine)
Much in Russian foreign policy today is based on a consensus that crystallized in the early 1990s. Emerging from
the rubble of the Soviet collapse, this consensus ranges across the political spectrum -- from pro-Western liberals to leftists and nationalists. It rests on three
geostrategic imperatives: that Russia must remain a nuclear superpower, a great
power in all facets of international activity, and the hegemon -- the political, military, and economic leader -
- of its region. This consensus marks a line in the sand, beyond which Russia cannot
retreat without losing its sense of pride or even national identity. It has proven
remarkably resilient, surviving post-revolutionary turbulence and the change of political regimes from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin. After his election
as president in 2000, Putin added to this agenda an overarching goal: the recovery of
economic, political, and geostrategic assets lost by the Soviet state in 1991. Although he has never
spelled it out formally, Putin has pursued this objective with such determination, coherence, and consistency that it merits being called the Putin Doctrine. Domestically, the
doctrine has guided the regime to reclaim the commanding heights of the economy
(first and foremost, the oil and natural gas industries) and reassert its control over national politics, the judicial system, and the national
television networks, from which an overwhelming majority of Russians get their news. In foreign and security policy, the
doctrine has amounted to a reinterpretation of Russia's geostrategic triad, making
its implementation and maintenance considerably more assertive than originally
intended. Although U.S. President Barack Obama has signaled lately that he will attempt to
revive the "reset" with Russia, Washington's best option may well be a
strategic pause: a much-scaled-down mode of interaction that reflects the growing disparity in values and
objectives between the two countries yet preserves frank dialogue and even cooperation in a few select areas.


Increased US involvement causes a push back from Russia
Gee 2008 (Alastair Gee, a San Francisco-based journalist and has written for the Economist, the New York Times, and the Lancet How Russia Is Trying to
Regain Influence in Latin America, US News and World Report, http:wwwusnewscomnewsworldarticles20081014how-russia-is-trying-to-regain-influence-in-latin-
america?page=2)
Links with Latin America may also help further Russia's aim of becoming a
counterweight to the United States on the international stage. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister
Putin have criticized the United States for causing the financial crisis and fostering
global instability, particularly as a result of the Iraq war. Additional sore points are U.S. involvement in the Georgia conflict and the missile defense system it
plans for eastern Europe. And, like the United States and China, Russia hopes to benefit from Latin America's raw materials and energy deposits. All of this
plays into the hands of the left-leaning Latin American nations that are looking to
pull out of the United States' orbit. U.S.-Venezuelan tensions have ratcheted up since Chvez came to power, and in September, Bolivia
expelled the U.S. ambassador after accusing the United States of fomenting unrest in the country. Even among friendlier nations, the United States has
lost much of its influence, says Peter Hakim, head of the Inter-American Dialogue, a think tank in Washington that specializes in the Americas.
"The financial turmoil greatly reduces our credibility. Economic management was
the area that Latin American most looked to us: They wanted U.S. trade; they
wanted U.S. investment." This could be good for Russiaassuming it continues to seek close ties with the region.
But Russia may simply be looking to Latin America now to make a point about Georgia, says Gregory Weeks, a Latin America expert at the University of North Carolina-
Charlotte. "It's a signal to the United States about U.S. involvement in what Russia
considers its own sphere of influence," he says. "I don't see this as something that Russia intends to continue with or expand.
Rather, they're saying to us, 'You've been pushing us too far, and we can push back.'

Link- Cuba
New Overtures towards Cuba encroach on Russias plan to contain
America- it escalates. Putin rhetoric proves
Lulko 2012 (Lyuba, Journalist at Pravda.Ru, studied at Universidade Lomonossov, Faculdade de Geografia Russia to revive army bases in three oceans,
August 1 http://english.pravda.ru/russia/politics/01-08-2012/121804-russia_army_base-0/)
The Russian government intends to restore the military-technical support of their ships at
the former military base in Cam Ranh (Vietnam), Lourdes (Cuba) and the Seychelles. So far, this is not about plans for a military presence, but rather the restoration of the
crew resources. However, a solid contractual basis should be developed for these plans. The intentions were announced on July 27 by the Russian Navy Commander Vice
Admiral Viktor Chirkov. "At the international level, the creation of logistics points in Cuba, the Seychelles and Vietnam is being worked out," Chirkov was quoted by the media.
The issue was specifically discussed at the meeting with the leaders of all countries. President of Vietnam Truong Tan Sang has recently held talks with Prime Minister Dmitri
Medvedev in Moscow and President Putin in Sochi. Cuban leader Raul Castro met with Putin in Moscow earlier this month. A little earlier the President of the Republic of
Seychelles, James Michel made an unequivocal statement. "We will give Russia the benefits in Cam Ranh, including the development of military cooperation," the President of
Vietnam told the media. Cuba that has an American military base in Guantanamo Bay and is
protesting against the deployment of new U.S. bases in Colombia, of course, wants to acquire
an ally in Russia to be able to contain the United States. Seychelles in the Indian Ocean has always been in the zone
of Soviet influence. In 1981, the Soviet Navy helped the government to prevent the military coup and before the collapse of the USSR the Soviets had a constant presence in the
area. In June of 2012, at the opening of an Orthodox church in the capital city of Victoria, James Michel spoke of Russia's role in combating piracy and supported the Russian
idea to build a pier in the port of Victoria, designed for the reception of the Navy warships of Russian Federation. Following the statement by Vice-Admiral, Russian Foreign
Ministry and Defense Ministry made it clear that they were talking about rest and replenishment of the crews after the campaign in the area and not military bases. It is clear,
however, that Russian warships could do both without special arrangements, given the good attitudes of the leaders of these countries toward Russia. It can be assumed that the
Russian Admiral unwittingly gave away far-reaching plans of the Russian leadership. That would be great, because from the time of Peter the Great, Russia had a strong fleet and
army. In addition, it is worth mentioning Putin's statement at the G20 meeting in June. After the meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama,
Putin made a sudden harsh statement to the press. "In 2001 I, as the President of the Russian
Federation and the supreme commander, deemed it advantageous to withdraw the radio-electronic center Lourdes from
Cuba. In exchange for this, George Bush, the then U.S. president, has assured me that this decision
would become the final confirmation that the Cold War was over and both of our
states, getting rid of the relics of the Cold War, will start building a new relationship based on
cooperation and transparency. In particular, Bush has convinced me that the U.S. missile defense system will never be deployed in Eastern
Europe. The Russian Federation has fulfilled all terms of the agreement. And even more. I shut down not
only the Cuban Lourdes but also Kamran in Vietnam. I shut them down because I gave my word of honor. I, like a man, has kept my word.
What have the Americans done? The Americans are not responsible for their own
words. It is no secret that in recent years, the U.S. created a buffer zone around
Russia, involving in this process not only the countries of Central Europe, but also the Baltic states, Ukraine and the Caucasus. The only response
to this could be an asymmetric expansion of the Russian military presence abroad,
particularly in Cuba. In Cuba, there are convenient bays for our reconnaissance
and warships, a network of the so-called "jump airfields." With the full consent of
the Cuban leadership, on May 11 of this year, our country has not only resumed work in the
electronic center of Lourdes, but also placed the latest mobile strategic nuclear
missiles "Oak" on the island. They did not want to do it the amicable way, now let
them deal with this," Putin said. It is obvious that Russia will not stop simply at "resting"
their sailors in the area. Now back to the statement of Chirkov. Americans have not officially resented it. For example, the Pentagon spokesman
George Little said that Russia had the right to enter into military agreements and relationships with other countries, as does the United States, according to France Press Agency.
The reason is simple: American analysts believe that Russia now cannot afford to create its own military bases. The Americans talk about Russia's lack of influence, money and
the actual fleet. Western media quoted an "independent expert on the defense" in Moscow Paul Fengelgauer. He said that Russia does not have the necessary naval resources to
provide constant presence outside its territorial waters, as it has only 30 major warships that serve five fleets. Therefore, the possibility of placing an additional station does not
mean the expansion of sea power in Russia. This is largely an objective assessment. But since the crisis in the West in 2008,
Russia began to recover part of its navy. The loss was not that great - about a quarter of the Soviet
reserve. Another thing is that we should talk about the modernization of the fleet. There is much to maintain. On Thursday, Chirkov said that this year
Russia's naval forces can be replenished with another 10-15 warships, including
destroyers and nuclear submarines. As for the influence, judging by the words of the Russian President,
Russia is also actively growing in this regard, although work in this direction has only begun. As we can see, Pacific, Atlantic and
Indian Oceans are involved. This is due not only to geopolitical reasons, but the growing economic
presence of Russia in the regions. For example, "Gazprom" is actively working on offshore Vietnam. In the Caribbean, it also participates in
the construction of Meso-American pipeline and field development in Venezuela. An ammunition plant is under construction in Cuba.
Economic engagement with Cuba displaces Russia in the region.
Vakulenko 2012 (Darya , Research Associate at Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Economic Cold War: Russia And US Battle For Influence In Western
Hemisphere Analysis, Aug 29
th
http://www.eurasiareview.com/29082012-economic-cold-war-russia-and-us-battle-for-influence-in-western-hemisphere-analysis/)
The current economic competition between the Russian Federation and the United
States in the Western Hemisphere bears striking similarity to the political antagonism prevalent during the
Cold War. This deep seated rivalry still influences world affairs, as the United Nations Security Council cannot enact any
major decision without an agreement between those two powers. However, a pragmatic view of the world economy plays a greater role now in the determination of
Russias priorities and strategies as it begins to catch up with the U.S. in its
exposure to Latin American economic interests. As of late, the Russian Federation has gained
economic ground over the United States in various parts of the Latin American
region. For example, Washingtons embargo on Cuba gives Russia the opportunity to fill in
the economic hollows left by the imperialist neighbor. While Washington
engages in very limited trade with its ancient foe, Russia-Cuban links have been
growing stronger with each passing year. Recently, the Russian oil company Zarubezhneft announced its plan to invest $100 million USD in Cuba by 2025.
Considering that deposits of Cuban oil are estimated to reach 20 billion barrels,
the Russians investment plan appears as if it will bring considerable profits in the near
future to both sides.[1] The recent activity in Ecuador presents another aspect of Russias growing economic attraction to Latin America At the end of July 2012, the Ecuadorian government signed the
memorandum of understanding with Gazprom, Russias largest oil and gas company The memorandum will launch the exploration of the natural-gas field in the southern coastal areas of Ecuador.[2] This
Bolivarian country (in reference to the states left-leaning state ideology) will gain ample royalties in conjunction with the development of its energy sector, while Russia will secure market access into Ecuador via
their already impressive natural gas reserves. Notably, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa continues to advocate continental leadership independent of U.S. influence, thereby welcoming Russian influence.
Gazprom, together with another oil company, Rosneft, are clearly linked to Russian foreign policy. The Russian government owns 50.002 percent of shares in Gazprom and 75 percent in Rosneft thus President of
Russia, Putin, oversees strategies of both companies[3] Gazprom is the worlds largest producer of natural gas and the second largest producer of oil in the world with 9.7 million barrels per day, just behind Saudi
Aramco Rosneft is the worlds 15th largest oil and gas producer[3] The wielding of such economic weight serves as a
powerful foreign relations force as Russia looks to enter new global markets,
firming up the already inextricable relationship between politics and economics. The
Cuban and Ecuadorian examples demonstrate how the United States continuing ideologically-based economic ties with Latin America could invite other large world players to represent investment portfolios to
the region. The United States clearly does not take full advantage of its geographical proximity to Latin America, even as Russia pushes for greater markets throughout that region. At the time of the Cold War,
bipolarity was intensified by a constant ideological race to include as many Third World countries under either Soviet Union or or the U.S. umbrella. Today the two compete over
markets and trade partners throughout Latin America. In this battle Russia is
clearly winning, because of its firm economic pragmatism. One observes the phenomenon of increasing Russian influence
in Latin America in the development a solid relationship between ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas) and Moscow. Although Russia is not technically allied with ALBAwhich is known for its left-wing
ideologyMoscow is not wasting the opportunity to support anti-Western declarations espoused by the Bolivarian states. Former Russian President, Medvedev, has declared significant perspectives for
cooperation, especially in economic development, highlighting the pragmatic nature that Russian economic policy has adopted over the last 20 years.[4] Possible future
nationalization of Russian assets by Latin American governments and political
disagreements within the region have yet to deter Russia from vigorously
embracing the emerging market. The Russian Federation has proven capable of
negotiating with various leftist governments and has worked around the U.S.
embargo against Cuba. The country appears to prioritize potential returns on its
investments over ideology and public opinion by investing in controversial
industries including arms and pipelines. The economic potential of some countries
could have a lasting impact on how we view the world politically. The words
investment, profit and trade have been added to the everyday vocabulary of
politicians. However, Russian politicians are ready to apply those words in
Spanish more often than other counterparts.




Link- Venezuela
In the wake of Chavezs death US involvement in Venezuela
encroaches on Russias Sphere of influence- results in conflict
Razuvaev 4-15 (Aleksander, ." Head of Research Alpari. Exchange. Defended his thesis on "Investing in the shares of commercial banks in an economy in
transition" at the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IE RAS). He worked at the Center for Financial and Banking Studies IE RAS, Head of market
analysis, the deputy chief of analytical department of the investment department of Sobinbank. Worked as the head of the analytical department of the IR "Galleon Capital,
Translated By Rina Hay Maduro Is Not Just a Shadow of Chavez, Watching America 2013 http:watchingamericacomNews203710maduro-is-not-just-a-shadow-of-
chavez/)
Nicolas Maduro has won the presidential election in Venezuela with 50.76 percent of the vote, while his rival, Henrique Capriles,
captured 49.07 percent. Capriles announced that he would not recognize the results of the election until the votes were recounted. Vladimir Putin has congratulated Nicolas
Maduro on his victory. The situation is highly irregular, and it is important to Russia on both an economic and a
geopolitical level. The gap between the two candidates is so small that it has become a good excuse for civil unrest and tensions ideal for a colored
revolution In the last few days the complicated relationship between Russia and the U.S. has been
further strained, and Venezuela could become a site of direct
confrontation. Whether or not the Americans will risk it is still an open question. Venezuela is not Libya. The former Libyan leader had not been our ally in
recent years. He simply gave his debt to the president of France, and he also unfortunately put more than a billion dollars into the trustworthy hands of Goldman Sachs.
Sometimes it is cheaper and pleasanter to liquidate a creditor than to fulfill one's obligations. Only cowards fulfill their debts, and Anglo-Saxons are
certainly not cowards. In addition, the wartime premium on oil during the Libyan conflict has covered the loss of Russian income but not the fact that in
the future, contracts will definitely be fulfilled on the Libyan side. For Russia, Venezuela represents serious money
and serious politics. As we know, in 2006 Americans introduced an embargo on arms
deliveries to Venezuela, after which Chavez opened up relations with Russia.
According to rough estimates, the current value of our signed arms contracts with
Venezuela is valued at around $10 billion. Half of this has already been fulfilled, and half has yet to be worked out.
Participation in oil projects in Venezuela, according to various estimates, will cost Russia $20 to 38
billion. The main actor on our side is Rosneft, which is controlled by Parliament. Some actors in the financial market even fear that the opposite outcome in the elections
could strike Rosneft's participation in the current market. Some of my colleagues have asked me with surprise how I, a stockbroker and market fundamentalist, can support the
left-wing Venezuelan president. My answer is simple: He buys weapons from us and takes from the West in
order to give us his oil. The color of the cat is not important as long as it catches
mice. From the geopolitical point of view, Venezuela is like a bone stuck in the U.S.' throat. It
is our last trump card on the chessboard of the world. It seems that the
army is on the side of Nicolas Maduro. However, if the situation worsens, he will have to prove his qualities of leadership and prove that he is
not just a shadow of Chavez But for now, the general opinion of him is that hes a good lad, but not an eagle The situation in Venezuela is
highly important. Big politics and big money are at stake. Even if everything ends
up going well, the victory will not be guaranteed and will come with a chance of
future destabilization. Our liberals love to reminisce and shed tears over those
suppressed by Soviet troops during the Prague Spring, forgetting that if
Czechoslovakia had withdrawn from the USSR's sphere of influence, it would
automatically have entered that of the U.S. There are only the political interests of
one's own country and the financial interests of one's own corporations. Nothing
else deserves one's attention. During the 2004 Orange Revolution in the Ukraine, one liberal radio station in Moscow threw a fit
every half hour because the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate was allegedly in Kiev. Unfortunately, this was too good to be true. Both Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's foreign
policies were nothing more than playing at giveaway. The Munich speech and the Battle of Tskhinvali in 2008 showed the West that it was finished. But the West does not
believe it and requires further confirmation.
Zero Sum Game in Venezuela
Ramrez 2010 (Pablo Telman Snchez, Phd, Specialist Professor in International Law and Political and Social Sciences, professor at Instituto Tecnolgico y de Estudios Superiores de
Monterrey, Mexico City campus He is a Member of the Mexican National Research System, Level 2Is a New Climate of Confrontation Between Russia and the United States Possible in Latin America?, Latin
American Policy Volume 1, Issue 2, pages 230243, December 2010, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.2041-7373.2010.00017.x/abstract )
The case of Venezuela is the most analyzed. The President of Venezuela, Hugo Chvez, has visited Moscow seven times since gaining power, and the President of Russia received
him in the Kremlin only on his last two visits. Since the election of Chvez to the presidency of Venezuela, Russia has maintained a position
of caution toward Caracas and the avidity of the Latin American country to tighten political, military,
and economic relations with the Kremlin more and more. Although the objectives of each government were not similar, the differences were not
notable. On the one hand, Hugo Chvez insisted on incorporating as many countries as he could in an anti-imperialistic bloc led by him. On the other hand, the
Russian government attempted to consolidate a multipolar international order
with the active and equal participation of all great powers so as to avoid the
hegemony of one single country. Both countries targeted their objectives
toward the dominance and hegemony of the United States. Since 2008,
Moscow has tightened its relationship with the government of Hugo Chvez and the mutual visits have
increased, particularly from Russia to Venezuela The vice president of Russia, Igor Sechin, who is one of of Prime Minister Vladimir Putins right-hand men, visited
Venezuela three times in 2008 In addition, Prime Minister Putins visit to Caracas in April 2010 confirmed Moscows intention to
tighten and diversify its relationship with Venezuela. As a result of the Seventh Intergovernmental RussiaVenezuela
meeting, some agreements were signed in matters of agriculture, energy, and defense.
Moreover, the creation of a combined consortium of petroleum integrated by Petrleos de Venezuela, SA (PDVSA) and Russias Rosneft, Lukoil, TNK-BP, Gazprom, and
Surgutneftegas was approved. The objective of this project is to increase the production of petroleum in the Orinoco stripe (La Jornada, 2010, p. 14). The new enterprise, in
which Venezuela would have 60% of the shares and Russia 40%, would build the infrastructure to produce 450,000 barrels of crude petroleum in the Junin 6 deposit in
Venezuela over a period of five years with an investment of US$30 billion. Venezuela is the main buyer of weapons from
Russia in Latin America and the fourth in the world. Likewise, President Hugo Chvez has become the principal
political ally of Moscow in the region. Only two Latin American governments
supported and recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in
2008. One of them was Venezuela. Venezuela imports weapons, submarines, tanks, defense systems, jets, helicopters, and rifles from
Russia to modernize its armed forces. Since 2005, Russia has signed contracts to supply weapons to Venezuela and has since sold arms with a value of more than US$4.4 billion.
Chvez paid $2 billion for the weapons and signed important agreements on energy matters, which facilitated the development of the activities of the Russian consortium in
Venezuela (Arutunyan, 2008). In his next visit to Russia, President Chvez met Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Medvedev and signed
two important agreements on energy matters and the Russian governments
commitment to grant Caracas a credit of $1 billion (680 million Euro) to buy arms and
military equipment from Russia (Fernndez, 2008). The offer was made the same day that Medvedev announced that Russia would invest
in the modernization of its missile system and nuclear submarines (Fernndez, 2008). According to sources from the military industry, Venezuela has bought airplanes,
helicopters, warships, submarines, and armor plates from Russia. Between 2005 and 2007, Moscow and Caracas signed a dozen contracts with a value of US$4.4 billion (3
billion Euro), including the sale of more than 20 strike fighters and 53 combat helicopters. As a result of a contract in which SU-30MK2 fighter aircrafts (Granma, 2007, p. 5)
were bought, 196 pilots and technicians from Venezuela were in Russia receiving special training. Moreover, the agreement in the energy
sector establishes the construction of a consortium that includes the main Russian
and Venezuelan enterprises: Gazprom (Russian natural gas export company) and Venezuelas state-owned PDVSA. The collaboration between
the countries is present in the exploitation of oilfields in the Orinoco basin and other zones, in the extraction of hydrocarbons, and in the construction of infrastructure.
Furthermore, Moscow proposed the possibility of helping Venezuela in the development of nuclear energy, although this proposal has not been established formally in any
contract. Gazprom has a presence in Venezuela, where it has invested approximately 70 million Euro and has plans to begin drilling. The RussiaVenezuela alliance was
consolidated in 2008 when two strategic TU-160 bombers and military ships of the Northern Russian fleet, capable of transporting nuclear missiles,5 visited Venezuela for the
first time. In addition, combined military maneuvers were conducted in the Caribbean Sea zone. (On this occasion Russian ships also visited Cuba and Nicaragua; Baranets,
2008.) This had symbolic, rather than military or ideological, significance. Nevertheless, the international press insisted on manipulating
and interpreting these actions as the beginning of a new Cold War between Russia and the United
States. These military exercises in the Caribbean Sea are a message to the
government of the United States, which intended to deploy an antimissile shield in Eastern Europe. Russia experiences a similar situation
in its buffer zone in Central Asia: increas- ing the Russian military, political, and economic presence
in the zone so as to counteract the clout of the United States, liberating itself from
isolation, and increasing its international power and clout by using a balance of
powers that openly benefits it in the case of Latin America.
Venezuela = In Russias Sphere
The World Reporter 2012 (Russia and Latin America: Geopolitical Considerations, Jan 26
th

http://www.theworldreporter.com/2012/01/russia-and-latin-america-geopolitical.html#.UbX9hpz9XKc)
In the civil nuclear area, Russians and Venezuelans have signed a bilateral agreement on controlled thermonuclear synthesis and safety of nuclear
installations and radiation sources. The nuclear cooperation is also accompanied by a military cooperation. On September 10, 2008, two Russian
bombers capable of carrying nuclear bombs landed at Palo Negro in Venezuela to participate in joint manuevers with Hugo Chavez's Bolivarian armed
forces. In December 2008, a similar training of naval forces of the two countries, called "VenRus", took place in the Caribbean. These military exercises
employed 2,300 people of the Russian and Venezuelan fleet, 3 frigates, an amphibious vehicle and 8 patrol vessels. This strategic
cooperation serves Moscow's interests who wants to propose an alternative to the
American presence in the region. In fact, the geopolitical situation between these two
countries illustrates how the relationship between Russia and Latin America
becomes more important day by day, not only because of the weapons sold in the
region, but also because of the diplomatic resources that Moscow had used in
South America. The continously cold relationship between Venezuela and the U.S. in
addition to Washington's controversial relationship with Moscow will contribute
further to the substantial strengthening of military and diplomatic ties between
Russia and Venezuela. This possibility can't make U.S. happy. The new situation facing Washington
is that Russia will be a growing factor when it comes to leftist governments in the
region, who want autonomy from U.S. policy makers, and which Washington
considers dangerous, but that Moscow considers to be very good. In conclusion, we can say that
the policy led by Moscow in Latin America is the product of old aspirations: to
establish Russia the status of a great power and of a country which promotes a
multipolar world; in fact, it's more of a closing towards USA than an economic
policy with strategic objectives.



Internal Links

Escalates
These zones of influence are zero sum and conflicts will escalate
Ellis 2011 (Evan, assistant professor at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies His research focus is on Latin Americas relationship
with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, Emerging Multi-Power Competitions in Latin America,
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2011/2011-1/2011_1_03_ellis_eng_s.pdf)
The second major cleavage dividing external actors in Latin America is the question of
the developed world (North) versus the developing world (South). Particularly with left-of-center regimes in Latin
America, countries such as China, India and Iran emphasize their common South-South ties as countries in development, generally in political meetings indirectly pursuing
commercial deals for their companies. Russia often fits uneasily into this coalition, seeking to define itself, in its relations with
populist countries such as Venezuela, as an up and coming power (eg Part of the BRIC nations), or as alternative to the status quo
powers (the US and Europe), even though it has not been traditionally categorized as a
developing nation. Within the political space created by such coinciding cleavages, Latin America also serves as a
target for important, but differing internal and international agendas pursued by each actor. For the PRC, Latin Americas principal tie to
domestic politics is Taiwan. 12 of the 23 nations in the world which continue to recognize the Republic of China (ROC) as the legitimate Chinese government are found in Latin
America. Externally, the PRC also seeks to participate in the regions institutions, such as the IADB and OAS, and prevent another power such as the US from dominating those
institutions, or other regional structures, in such a way that could shut it out of the region and jeopardize its strategic commercial goals. None of other external actors in the
region explicitly oppose these goals, but rather, each pursues its own goals in parallel. This include Iran, for which support from Latin America reinforces the international
stature of its leadership in the Iranian regimes messianic efforts to advance its brand of radical Islam with Iran at its center In a more pragmatic sense, Latin American ties,
including financial institutions such as the International Development Bank in Venezuela, direct airline flights, factories in remote areas, and technology collaboration, help Iran
to circumvent international sanctions to develop a nuclear capabilities, and possibly fund and create a logistics base for terrorist operations that could reach the United States, in
the event that Iran wishes to wage such a conflict in the future. For Russia, in a manner similar to Iran, Latin American ties help the
current regime to demonstrate to a domestic audience that Russia is once again playing a
significant international role, harkening back to its height of Cold War power as the heart of the Soviet Union. Latin America
also provides the platform for Russia to generate counter-pressures to US
activities in Eastern Europe, the Caspian sea, and Central Asia, which Russia regards as its sphere of influence, such as November 2008, when Russia sent supersonic
Tu-160 bombers and a squadron of ships to Venezuela for maneuvers in the Caribbean, as a counterpoint to the US projection of power in the Black Sea during the succession
crisis in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Because of the shared anti-western focus and because the
specific geopolitical agendas pursued by actors such as Russia, India and China in
Latin America generally complement each other, these nations are not likely to
come into conflict over their courtship of populist regimes such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia. The critical exception to this harmony, however,
involves strategic commercial issues, such as which nation gets to develop the preponderance of Venezuelas petroleum in the Orinoco belt, or the significant deposits of iron and
lithium, and perhaps uranium, in Bolivia. Commercial Competition. With respect to commerce, the goals of each external actor are defined by its position within the global
economy and other elements of its national situation, as interpreted by its leadership. The PRC, because of its position as a global manufacturer, and because of its aggressive
process of capital formation, looks to Latin America as a source of commodities, while its attitude toward markets focuses it on owning key parts of the production chain, or
having strong contractual presence there where possible, as evidenced in interest by Chinese companies in Peruvian, Bolivian and Chilean mines, or Venezuelan and Ecuadorian
oil fields Chinas combination of a large population and limited agricultural land also drives an interest in Latin America as a source of foodstuffs, particularly in countries with
large tracts of land usable for agriculture, such as Brazil and Argentina, which have become significant soy exporters for China. Neither Russia, Iran, nor India have export-led
manufacturing sectors which generate a level of demand for commodities similar to that of China. Nonetheless, as the Indian economy continues to grow, its companies will
increasingly come into contact with those of China in Latin America as part of their global search for commodities. In the case of Russia and Iran, both
have significant petroleum industries which them to participate in the petroleum sector of Latin
America as part of larger global business strategies With respect to Latin American markets, Chinas position in the
world economy as manufacturer makes its ability to sell its products abroad and move up the value added chain a strategically critical objective, particularly as growth in
traditional markets for Chinese exports, such as the US, Europe, and Japan, has slowed. Moreover, the middle-income nature of Latin Americas $3 trillion, 500 million person
market, and its sensitivity to price creates particular opportunities as the PRC seeks to gain experience in a range of strategically important sectors such as cars, aircraft,
computers, telecommunications, military goods, and space. For similar reasons, Latin America is also an important market for India in select sectors, such as high-end
manufactures and technology-intensive goods, laying the basis for an emerging competition in this area. Russia also competes for select segments of the high-end manufacturing
market in Latin America, such as military end items and nuclear technology. Although Iran sells very few goods to Latin America, those purchases are important for its efforts to
break free of the international isolation imposed on that country for its pursuit of a nuclear capability. Beyond specific competitions for resources and markets, there are also
areas in which the commercial objectives of external actors in Latin America coincide, creating opportunities for future collaboration. All generally benefit, for example, from
efficient infrastructure in the region, although they may differ on the focus, with India and China arguably benefitting more than Russia and Iran from improved ports, roads
and rail networks oriented toward the Pacific ocean. All generally benefit from respect for contractual and property
rights, and predictable legal, regulatory, and political environments in the
countries with which they wish to do business, although new entrants, such as China, Russia, India, and Iran, also
tend to benefit initially from significant changes, since their commercial holdings in
these countries have traditionally been eclipsed by US and European companies, and changes such as
those brought about by Latin American populist movements tend to open up new opportunities. On the other hand, such change also opens up
potentially destabilizing new competitions between these players to see who will
benefit most from the new actors and new rules of the game. Sectorial Competitions The currently emerging
competitions between external powers in key Latin American business and
technology sectors are likely to intensify, with the possibility for combinations of
direct competition and cooperation as the situation dictates, and with each country leveraging the weight of
its government where possible. The key players, their relative strengths, and their level of engagement will be different in each sector,
reflecting the differing situation of each nation, and its companies, in the global economy. Emerging competitions include those for (1) oil and gas resources, (2) mineral
resources, (3) agricultural goods, (4) high-end manufactured goods, (5) military goods, (6) infrastructure projects, and (7) telecom and technology services.
Encroachment on Russias Sphere of Influence incites backlash-
escalates
Bugajski 2-8 (Janusz , a policy analyst, writer, lecturer, and television host based in the United States, and the author of 18 books on Europe, Russia, and
trans-Atlantic relations, Russias Soft Power Wars, 2013 http:ukrainianweekcomWorld71849)
Western soft power influences are therefore viewed as a form of geostrategic
competition that must be curtailed and eventually eliminated. As a result, in recent
months Moscow has mounted a campaign to sever links between Russian NGOs
and Western institutions and is encouraging its neighbors to do likewise.
Simultaneously to its anti-Western offensive, Moscow deploys its own soft power
weaponry to achieve specific regional integrationist ambitions. These have ranged
from diplomatic offensives and informational warfare to energy blackmail and the
exploitation of ethnic disputes. President Putin is also injecting a new form of soft power pressure by pursuing claims that
Russian culture, language, history, and values should all predominate among the post-Soviet states. SOFT POWER BATTLEGROUND In
Moscows calculations, Russia and the West are embroiled in a long-term
competition over zones of dominance in the wider Europe and in Central Asia, despite the fact that the US and its
European allies have refused to acknowledge or legitimize such a great game Russias drive for its own sphere in a "multipolar" world contributes to
retarding the formation of stable democratic states along its borders. Governments in these countries turn to authoritarianism to maintain the integrity
and stability of the state or simply to cling to power. Such a process is invariably supported by Moscow as it contributes to disqualifying these countries
from the process of Western integration. Moscow opposes any encroachment by outside powers in
its self-proclaimed privileged zone of interests or the further expansion of NATO, EU, and US influence.
Russia views itself as a regional integrator, expecting neighbors to coalesce around its leadership, rather than a country to be integrated in multi-
national institutions in which its own sovereignty is diminished. In this context, Russian soft power in all its
manifestations is understood as a means for supplementing Russias foreign policy
objectives and enhancing regional integration under Moscows tutelage. In marked contrast,
the Wests soft power approach is intended to generate reform, internal stability, external security, democratic development, and open markets to
make targeted states compatible with Western systems and institutions. In the case of the EU, the prospect of membership itself has been the primary
soft power tool as it entices governments to meet the necessary legal, economic, and regulatory standards to qualify for Union accession. However,
EU or NATO membership remain voluntary and are not pressured by inducements and threats, as is the case with Moscow-centered organizations.
While the West promotes the pooling of sovereignty among independent states, Russia pushes for the surrender of sovereignty within assorted
Eurasian organizations To advance its strategic goals, the Kremlin needs to demonstrate that it is in competition with the West and that Washington
and Brussels are seeking to impose their political structures and value system on the gullible Eurasian countries. This is a classic form of psycho-
political projection, with Russias leaders acting as if Western objectives were similar to their own in undermining national independence and
eliminating countervailing foreign influences. Putin launched a blistering attack on Western soft
power in an article in Moskovskiye Novosti (Moscow News) in February 2012. He claimed that this weapon was
being increasingly used as a means for achieving foreign policy goals without the
use of force, but by exerting informational and other levers of influence. According to
Putin, Western "soft power" is deployed to develop and provoke extremist,
separatist, and nationalistic attitudes, to manipulate the public and to conduct
direct interference in the domestic policy of sovereign countries Evidently, for the Kremlin,
democratic pluralism is a form of extremism, national independence is a form of
separatism, and state sovereignty is a form of nationalism. Putin contends that
there must be a clear division between normal political activity and illegal
instruments of soft power." Hence, he engages in scathing attacks on "pseudo-NGOs"
inside Russia and among the post-Soviet neighbors that receive resources from Western governments and
institutions, viewing this as a form of subversion. In reality, the Kremlin is envious that Western values are
often more appealing to educated and ambitious segments of the population than traditional Russian values.
Violation of Russias perceived sphere of influence results in war
Weiner 2008 (Bernard, Ph.D., has taught government & international relations at universities in California and Washington, worked as a writer/editor at the
San Francisco Chronicle for two decades, and currently serves as co-editor of The Crisis Papers The Crisis Papers, Violating Someones "Sphere of Influence" Can Be
Dangerous, Sept 2
nd
http://archive.truthout.org/article/violating-someones-sphere-influence-can-be-dangerous)
Such U.S. ignorance (which derives from a belief that America as the world's self-
designated Good Guy and lone superpower can do whatever it wants) inevitably leads to big
trouble. For instance, even with the U.S. spread thin and quagmired in Iraq and Afghanistan, the CheneyBush
regime seems anxious to provoke a major quarrel with a resurgent Russia in a relatively
minor regional dispute in the Caucasus. In the midst of the juicy theatre of presidential campaigns, it might be wise for all of us to step back and attend to
that foreign-policy reality and to consider the grim implications of a renewed Cold War between the
U.S. and Russia. The Larger Picture I'm not just referring to the contretemps over what's happening in the Caucasus right now, especially with regard to
Georgia. No, we're talking about major realignments of political, economic and military
forces that, if not handled correctly, could put Russia and the U.S. into a potential
active conflict. It's clear that John McCain and his neo-conservative backers would look forward to such a confrontation; they thrive on crisis; it's where they
come alive and can roll out their black/white simplicities and threats to use force, utilize an "enemy" as their way to increase their domestic power, cranking-up the old military-
industrial complex. And, at least for the purposes of the election campaign, Barack Obama and Joe Biden have joined in, using
Russia as a bete noir and are warning Russia to back off and back down and back
away. Part of the problem is that Superpower America continues to see the world
almost exclusively through U.S. eyes and thus is not taking into account how the
world appears to Russia and others. Thus, diplomacy is ignored and the Cold War,
and potential hot wars, draw closer. And, of course, all this is taking place between two fading empires, as new major powers emerge in
Asia/South Asia (China, India). Russia and the U.S., in effect, are battling for regional dominance before the new
movers and shakers are fully up to speed.

Zero Sum

Influence in the region is a zero sum game
Adomanis, 3-13 ( Mark Adomanis, Contributor to Forbes - specializes in Russian economics and demographics, The Putin Doctrine And The Real
Reason For Russian-American Conflict, http:wwwforbescomsitesmarkadomanis20130313the-putin-doctrine-and-the-real-reason-for-russian-american-conflict/
2013)
Aron spends a lot of time diagnosing the supposedly unique ills of Putinism and describing the Russian regimes by now all too familiar litany of crimes.
But he never answers, or even attempts to answer, the question that most obviously arises from his analysis: how would the United
States make peace with with a deliberately hegemonic Russian foreign policy? I
think the answer is very clear: it cant. There is simply no way to square the circle
of an American foreign policy designed around global leadership and a Russian
foreign policy premised on regional hegemony. These two things just dont fit
together, something that is true completely independent of the Russian regimes democratic or autocratic credentials The two ideas
are, unfortunately in a zero-sum conflict. Either the United States allows the Russians a sort
of Monroe doctrine for the near abroad, or the Russians give up on the attempt to
exert hegemony throughout the post-Soviet space. But if neither side changes its
approach, if the United States continues to view any attempt by a non-aligned power
to exert regional influence as a threat to be countered and if Russia continues to believe
that it has the final say on the economic and political trajectory of its neighbors,
then conflict is inevitable.



Impacts

Russia Relations Good War
US-Russian Relations are essential to prevent nuclear war
Elliot 1995 (Michael Elliott, News Week, Why Russia still matters to America, May 15)
"Russia," says Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, "is a big country." That it is; lop off the newly independent states born within the old Soviet husk and you've still got a lot left -- a
highly educated work force sitting on top of some of the globe's most valuable resources. True, much of that vast territory has an awful climate (climate matters-for different reasons than
Russia's, it explains why Australia will never be a great power). But unlike India and China, two other "giant" states, Russia will be able to husband its vast resources without the additional strain
of feeding -- and employing-more than a billion souls. It also, of course, is the only country that can launch a devastating nuclear attack on
the United States. That kind of power demands respect. And sensitive handling. Stephen Sestanovich, head Russia watcher at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace in Washington, argues that present U.S. policy is geared too much to "dismantling Russian military
might" -- a policy that, since it breeds Russian resentment of Western meddling, is self-defeating. "We have to reorient Russian power," says Sestanovich, "not
eliminate it. Because we can't eliminate it." Indeed, Washington should prefer a strong Russia. A Russia so weak, for example, that it could not resist a Chinese land
grab of its Far East without resorting to nuclear weapons is a 2lst-century nightmare. All this implies a close U.S. -- Russian relationship stretching
into the future. American officials say it will be a "pragmatic" one, recognizing that Russian and U.S. national interests will sometimes collide. The danger, for the United States, is that a
pragmatic relationship could be dominated by security issues. In Western Europe, some futurists say that in the coming decades Russia will talk to the United States about nuclear weapons but to
the European Union about everything else-trade, economic development and the rest.

A US-Russian war is the only scenario for extinction. Such existential risks outweigh diseases,
world wars, and smaller nuclear wars.
Bostrom 02
(Dr. Nick, Professor of Philosophy and Global Studies at YALE, "Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards," 3-8-02,
http://www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html)
Risks in this sixth category are a recent phenomenon. This is part of the reason why it is useful to distinguish them from ot her risks. We have not evolved mechanisms,
either biologically or culturally, for managing such risks. Our intuitions and coping strategies have been
shaped by our long experience with risks such as dangerous animals, hostile individuals or tribes, poisonous foods, automobile accidents, Chernobyl,
Bhopal, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, draughts, World War I, World War II, epidemics of influenza, smallpox, black
plague, and AIDS. These types of disasters have occurred many times and our cultural attitudes towards risk have been shaped by trial-and-error in managing such hazards. But
tragic as such events are to the people immediately affected, in the big picture of things from the perspective of humankind
as a whole even the worst of these catastrophes are mere ripples on the surface of the great sea of life. They
havent significantly affected the total amount of human suffering or happiness or determined the long-term
fate of our species. With the exception of a species-destroying comet or asteroid impact (an extremely rare occurrence), there were probably no
significant existential risks in human history until the mid-twentieth century, and certainly none that it was within our power to do
something about. The first manmade existential risk was the inaugural detonation of an atomic bomb. At the time, there was some concern that the explosion might start a runaway chain-reaction
by igniting the atmosphere. Although we now know that such an outcome was physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential risk that was present at the time. For there to be a
risk, given the knowledge and understanding available, it suffices that there is some subjective probability of
an adverse outcome, even if it later turns out that objectively there was no chance of something bad happening.
If we dont know whether something is objectively risky or not, then it is risky in the subjective sense. The
subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on.[2] At any given time we must use our best current subjective estimate of what
the objective risk factors are.[3] A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US
and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with
consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry
among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would
occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the
US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately.
There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India
and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankinds potential
permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid
strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century. The special nature of the challenges posed by existential risks is illustrated by the following points:
Our approach to existential risks cannot be one of trial-and-error. There is no opportunity to learn from errors.
The reactive approach see what happens, limit damages, and learn from experience is unworkable. Rather, we must take a proactive approach. This requires foresight to anticipate new types
of threats and a willingness to take decisive preventive action and to bear the costs (moral and economic) of such actions. We cannot necessarily rely on the institutions, moral norms, social
attitudes or national security policies that developed from our experience with managing other sorts of risks. Existential risks are a different kind of beast. We might find it hard to take them as
seriously as we should simply because we have never yet witnessed such disasters.[5] Our collective fear-response is likely ill calibrated to the magnitude of threat. Reductions in existential
risks are global public goods [13] and may therefore be undersupplied by the market [14]. Existential risks are a menace for everybody and may
require acting on the international plane. Respect for national sovereignty is not a legitimate excuse for failing
to take countermeasures against a major existential risk. If we take into account the welfare of future
generations, the harm done by existential risks is multiplied by another factor, the size of which depends on whether and how
much we discount future benefits [15,16].


Russia Relations Good- Economy
Cooperation is key to global economic recovery
Hamilton 2003 (Lee, Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Former Chairman of the House Committee on International
Relations, The International Economy, June 22)
While it has proven premature to speak of a positive transformation in U.S.-Russian relations, the breadth of our common interests
suggests that partnership is preferable to confrontation. The United States and
Russia each have an interest in strengthening Russia's economy. The United States should forgive some
Soviet-era Russian debt, repeal the outdated Jackson-Vanik amendment, and support Russian accession into the World Trade Organization, in return for greater transparency
and market reform within Russia. A Russian economy tied more to the West would strengthen the
global economic recovery, reduce Russia's interest in dealing in nuclear
technology with countries like Iran, and enable the full development of Russia's oil
and gas reserves. The United States and Russia also have overlapping security
concerns. While we should speak out vigorously against Russian human rights violations in Chechnya, the United States must
continue working with Russia in the war on terror and the stabilization of Central
Asia. We should also bring Russia closer to NATO, as cooperation reduces the
likelihood of a return to Russian expansionism.

Extinction
Kemp 10 [Geoffrey Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for national security
affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
2010, The East Moves West: India, China, and Asias Growing Presence in the Middle East, p 233-4]
The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong.
The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan
suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand
falls and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back
dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different
radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is
challenged, and there are more failed states Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in
Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear
weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran,
always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances
nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under
these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in
either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the
world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with dire
consequences for two-thirds of the planets population .


Russia Relations Good- China War
US Russian relations are key to prevent US war with China- it forms a cooperative deterrence.
Levgold 2k3 professor of political science at Columbia University
(Robert, All the Way: Crafting a U.S.-Russian Alliance Central Asian Nexus, Winter 03 http://www.columbia.edu/cu/siwps/publication_files/legvold/All%20the%20Way%20-%20Legvold.pdf
//WLT
So what might animate a U.S.-Russian alliance? The core focus can and should be stability and mutual security in and around the Eurasian land mass. This has three aspects. First, as Alexander
Vershbow, the current U.S. ambassador in Moscow, puts it: "Russia is the most important key to the stability of Eurasia" itself, without which neither
Europe nor Asia, two regions in which the United States has vital interests, can "be stable and prosperous." As long as Russia respects the sovereignty of the former Soviet republics, the
United States has every reason to cooperate with Russia in stabilizing and aiding those states. In this regard, as well as others,
alliance does not mean condominium; U.S.-Russian collaboration must not imply a readiness to decide matters over the heads of
Russia's neighbors. On the contrary, an alliance's purpose would be to strengthen their sovereignty and vitality. One example
of the subtle way in which the revolution in Russian foreign policy makes this kind of alliance possible concerns Belarus. Putin's new agenda has led to a sharp cooling in Russia's relations with
Alexander Lukashenko's regime. As a consequence, a leadership that flouts the values on which modern European security is based is increasingly isolated, the prospect of a Russian-Belarusian
union has faded and Ukraine's fears of encirclement have eased. Although not perfectly parallel, U.S. and Russian interests in Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova now converge sufficiently to make
promoting stability and successful reform there a matter of common U.S. and Russian ground. Second, to borrow the formulation of Alexei Bogaturov, in the 21st century no longer is peninsular
Europe or Northeast Asia the critical "strategic rear" of the United States, but the vast turbulent region stretching from eastern Turkey to western China and along Russia's south. As the
United States girds to cope with the threats emanating from this area, no country brings more value as a potential
ally than Russia. As things stand, the United States has backed into Central Asia with military power as part of the war against terrorism, and in the process it has offered quasi-
security commitments to its new partners, almost certainly without careful consideration of their wider implication. Central Asia forms the unstable core of Inner Asia; it is an area--the only one
in the CDI Russia Weekly #236 http://www.cdi.org/russia/236-13-pr.cfm 2 of 3 2/8/07 10:28 PM world--surrounded by four nuclear powers, two of whom recently teetered on the brink of war. It
contains multiple points of friction, from Kashmir to the Fergana Valley to northwest Kazakhstan to China's Xinjiang province, each of them capable of bleeding into a larger conflict. It is
populated by regimes whose stability is universally suspect. And it contains wealth, particularly in energy resources, that will make it increasingly important to both Asian and European
consumers. Not only, therefore, are the United States and Russia directly but separately implicated in the stability of the region, but a third country, China, is as well. This raises the
third aspect of a U.S.-Russian alliance to enhance Eurasian stability. China will be a decisive actor in Inner
Asia, not the least because it forms an integral part of the region. Unfortunately, China enters through its underdeveloped northwest territories, including Xinjiang, precisely where it feels
most vulnerable. In part because of this sense of vulnerability, and in part because of the general state of Sino-American relations, China has not welcomed the arrival
of American military power in Central Asia. On the contrary, while excusing a temporary deployment in the
context of a war that it supports, China's leadership has opposed an extended U.S. presence there as an element
of a hostile encirclement stratagem. Russia and the United States have good reason to act jointly, not only to
enhance their common stake in regional stability, but to draw China into a constructive dialogue over the role
all three will play in Central Asia. Russia, with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, is already engaged in such an effort. Talking to the Russians
about U.S. military activities in Central Asia (and Georgia) builds mutual confidence by promoting
transparency, but it is not so far-fetched to imagine a far more ambitious trilateral dialogue among Russia, China, and the United States. Much as the United States and its European
allies share assessments of threats at the edges of Europe, plan for coordinated action, and struggle to create the necessary machinery, so can and should Russia and the United States do the same
in Eurasia, with Chinese participation when appropriate. Russia and the United States allied against the new century's primary strategic
threats, particularly those emanating from within and around the Eurasian land mass, would have much the
same significance in the emerging international order as key U.S. alliances have had in the last. Even more so will this be
the case if the alliance is underpinned by Russia's successful integration into the international economy and safe passage to
democracy. BACK transparency, but it is not so far-fetched to imagine a far more ambitious trilateral dialogue among Russia, China, and the United States. Much as the United States and
its European allies share assessments of threats at the edges of Europe, plan for coordinated action, and struggle to create the necessary machinery, so can and should Russia and the United States
do the same in Eurasia, with Chinese participation when appropriate.
The Impact is Extinction
Wittner 11 professor of history emeritus at SUNY Albany (Lawrence Wittner, Professor of History emeritus at SUNY Albany, Huffington Post World, 11-30-
2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-wittner/nuclear-war-china_b_1116556.html)
While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all,
for centuries international conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their
deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up
providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension
between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China's
growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged
China's claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties
with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was "asserting our own position as a Pacific
power." But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that
it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of
nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during their
conflict over the future of China's offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared
publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would "be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else." Of course, China
didn't have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of
national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and
Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast
nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised,
nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent
wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven't been very many -- at least not yet. But the
Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan,
should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear
war. Pakistan's foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use "any weapon" in its arsenal. During the
conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is
claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don't
nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn't feel deterred, for,
throughout the Cold War, NATO's strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional
military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the
nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they
would not have resorted to championing "Star Wars" and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive -- and probably
unworkable -- military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line
for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater
than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over 5,000
nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly
300 . Moreover, only about 40 of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States
would "win" any nuclear war with China. But what would that "victory" entail? An
attack with these Chinese nuclear weapons would immediately slaughter at least
10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more
dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a
nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering,
radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions
would blot out the sun and bring on a "nuclear winter" around the globe --
destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and
destruction. Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be
far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and
by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double its number of nuclear weapons
that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend
hundreds of billions of dollars "modernizing" its nuclear weapons and nuclear
production facilities over the next decade.



Russia Relations Good- Warming
Cooperation key to check environmental destruction and warming
Rojansky and Collins, 10 an ex-US ambassador to the Russian Federation [James F. Collins Director, Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie
Endowment and an ex-US ambassador to the Russian Federation, Matthew Rojansky the deputy director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment, August 18, 2010, Why
RussiaMatters, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/08/18/why_Russia_matters, SM]
4. Russia's environment matters. As the catastrophic fires across Western Russia have dramatically illustrated, Russia is both a victim of global
climate change and a steward of natural resources -- including many of the forests now badly burned -- needed
to reverse the global warming trend. With more than one-tenth of the world's total landmass, vast freshwater
and ocean resources, plus deposits of nearly every element on the periodic table, Russia is an
indispensable partner in the responsible stewardship of the global environment. On
climate change, there is work to be done, but progress is evident. Russia today is the world's fourth-largest carbon emitter, but as a signatory
to the Copenhagen Accord, it has pledged to reduce emissions to 20 to 25 percent below 1990 levels. Another black spot is Russia's
use of "flaring" -- a technique that burns natural gas into the open atmosphere during oil extraction, but Medvedev agreed to capture 95 percent of the gas
currently released through flaring. Last year he also signed Russia's first law on energy efficiency, which takes such
steps as requiring goods to be marked according to their energy efficiency and banning incandescent light
bulbs after 2014. True, most of Russia's other commitments are short on deadlines and concrete deliverables. But like China's
cleanup for the Beijing Olympics, Moscow could transform resolve into reality with surprising speed,
given the right amount of international engagement. And in the meantime, Russia's natural climate-cleaning properties are
vast; the Siberian provinces alone contain more clean oxygen-producing forests and reserves of freshwater than continental Europe.
Warming is anthropogenic and causes extinction
DEIBEL 7 (Terry L. Deibel, professor of IR at National War College, Foreign Affairs Strategy, Conclusion: American
Foreign Affairs Strategy Today Anthropogenic caused by CO2)
Finally, there is one major existential threat to American security (as well as prosperity) of a nonviolent nature, which,
though far in the future, demands urgent action. It is the threat of global warming to the stability of the
climate upon which all earthly life depends. Scientists worldwide have been observing the
gathering of this threat for three decades now, and what was once a mere possibility has
passed through probability to near certainty. Indeed not one of more than 900
articles on climate change published in refereed scientific journals from 1993 to
2003 doubted that anthropogenic warming is occurring. In legitimate scientific circles, writes Elizabeth
Kolbert, it is virtually impossible to find evidence of disagreement over the fundamentals
of global warming Evidence from a vast international scientific monitoring effort accumulates
almost weekly, as this sample of newspaper reports shows: an international panel predicts
brutal droughts, floods and violent storms across the planet over the next century; climate change could literally alter
ocean currents, wipe away huge portions of Alpine Snowcaps and aid the spread of cholera and malaria; glaciers in the Antarctic and in Greenland are melting much faster
than expected, andworldwide, plants are blooming several days earlier than a decade ago; rising sea temperatures have been accompanied by a significant global increase in
the most destructive hurricanes; NASA scientists have concluded from direct temperature measurements that 2005 was the hottest year on record, with 1998 a close second;
Earths warming climate is estimated to contribute to more than 150,000 deaths and 5 million illnesses each year as disease spreads; widespread bleaching from Texas to
Trinidadkilled broad swaths of corals due to a 2-degree rise in sea temperatures The world is slowly disintegrating, concluded Inuit hunter Noah Metuq, who lives 30 miles
from the Arctic Circle They call it climate changebut we just call it breaking up From the founding of the first cities some 6,000 years ago until the beginning of the
industrial revolution, carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere remained relatively constant at about 280 parts per million (ppm). At present they are accelerating toward 400
ppm, and by 2050 they will reach 500 ppm, about double pre-industrial levels. Unfortunately, atmospheric CO2 lasts about a century, so there is no way immediately to reduce
levels, only to slow their increase, we are thus in for significant global warming; the only debate is how much and how serous the effects will be. As the newspaper stories quoted
above show, we are already experiencing the effects of 1-2 degree warming in more violent storms, spread of disease, mass die offs of plants and animals,
species extinction, and threatened inundation of low-lying countries like the Pacific nation of Kiribati and the
Netherlands at a warming of 5 degrees or less the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets could disintegrate, leading to a sea
level of rise of 20 feet that would cover North Carolinas outer banks, swamp the southern third
of Florida, and inundate Manhattan up to the middle of Greenwich Village. Another catastrophic effect would be
the collapse of the Atlantic thermohaline circulation that keeps the winter weather in Europe far warmer than its
latitude would otherwise allow. Economist William Cline once estimated the damage to the United States alone from moderate levels
of warming at 1-6 percent of GDP annually; severe warming could cost 13-26 percent of GDP. But the most frightening
scenario is runaway greenhouse warming, based on positive feedback from the buildup of water
vapor in the atmosphere that is both caused by and causes hotter surface temperatures. Past ice age
transitions, associated with only 5-10 degree changes in average global temperatures, took place in just decades, even though no one
was then pouring ever-increasing amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. Faced with this specter, the best one can conclude is that
humankinds continuing enhancement of the natural greenhouse effect is akin to playing Russian roulette with the earths climate
and humanitys life support system At worst, says physics professor Marty Hoffert of New York University, were just going
to burn everything up; were going to het the atmosphere to the temperature it was in the Cretaceous when there were
crocodiles at the poles, and then everything will collapse During the Cold War, astronomer Carl Sagan popularized a
theory of nuclear winter to describe how a thermonuclear war between the Untied States and the Soviet Union would not only
destroy both countries but possible end life on this planet. Global warming is the post-Cold War eras
equivalent of nuclear winter at least as serious and considerably better supported
scientifically. Over the long run it puts dangers form terrorism and traditional military challenges to
shame. It is a threat not only to the security and prosperity to the United States, but potentially
to the continued existence of life on this planet.




ATs

AT: China/US Competition Thumps

Not competing
Global Times-Agencies 5-31 (China, US not competing over Latin America: expert, 2013
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/785721.shtml#.UbXoCJz9XKc)
While Xi kicks off his visit, US Vice President Joe Biden is concluding his Latin America visit on
the same day, as he leaves Brazil Friday. Some media reports described "dueling visits" by
Chinese and US leaders, and said that the "competition between the world's two
biggest economies for influence in Latin America is on display." Both the US
and China deny they are competing with each other. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hong
Lei said last week that the two countries can "carry out cooperation in Latin America by giving
play to their respective advantages." Tao Wenzhao, a fellow of the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, told the Global Times that it is a coincidence that the two leaders chose to visit Latin
America at a similar time, and that China has no intention to challenge US
influence in the area. "It's not like in the 19th century when countries divided their
sphere of influence in a certain area. China and the US' involvement in Latin
America is not a zero-sum game," Tao said, explaining that it is a good thing for Latin America.

AT: Chavez Death = Increased US Influence

Maduro will keep Russian ties
ITAR-TASS 4-17 (ITAR-TASS news Agency, Nothing threatens privileged relations between Russia and Venezuela after Maduros victory , 2013
http://www.itar-tass.com/en/c142/709820.html)
Russia welcomed Nicolas Maduros victory at the early presidential elections in Venezuela. Although,
sources in the Russian diplomatic circles stated that the bilateral relations would
not have sustained drastic changes, even if oppositionist Enrique Capriles had won,
and it will be much more comfortable to work with the successor of Hugo Chavezs
policy, the Kommersant daily reported with confidence. It looks like Moscow is confident of Nicolas Maduros
victory, the newspaper reported. In late March President Vladimir Putin invited Hugo Chavezs successor for a
second summit of the members in the Forum of Gas Exporting Countries (a summit will be held in Moscow on July 12). Maduro
took this proposal with pleasure. I will be there, he wrote in his Twitter blog. On Monday, the
Kremlin press service reported that the two presidents had a telephone
conversation and they assured each other that the countries will continue the
policy of strategic partnership. The presidents discussed several practical issues
of cooperation. The experts are confident that in the near future Nicolas Maduro will
continue to pursue the policy, which Hugo Chavez had taken up, the newspaper noted.
Venezuela will hardly stop the anti-American rhetoric, which was characteristic of the
late previous countrys leader Actually the relations between Caracas and Washington are not so bad Russian Ambassador in Venezuela Vladimir
Zayemsky told the Kommersant daily that his U.S. counterpart said to him the United States still buys at least 60% of Venezuelan oil and 7080% of
imports in Venezuela is delivered from the U.S. despite all U.S rhetoric. The experts noted that nothing threatens
privileged relations between Russia and Venezuela. One of the explanations of this
fact is that during Chavezs rule the two countries established close economic
relations, primarily in the oil producing sphere. Now the Russian National Oil Consortium produces only 1,800
barrels of oil daily at the Venezuelan oil deposit Hunin-6. But in the near future the consortium is planning to bring this figure to 50,000 barrels of oil
daily. This will be possible, if the problem of oil transportation is solved. Now the oil is transported in the automotive tanks, but the construction of a
pipeline from the oil production fields to the oil terminals is planned. According to the forecasts of the Russian National Oil Consortium, the oil
production volume will reach 200,000 barrels of oil daily by 2019.
They will hold tight to Russia- even post Chavez the tide is against
American hegemonic control
Nazemroaya 3-31 (Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, An award-winning author and geopolitical analyst, Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya is the author of The Globalization of NATO (Clarity
Press) and a forthcoming book The War on Libya and the Re-Colonization of Africa. He has also contributed to several other books ranging from cultural critique to international relations. He is a Sociologist and
Research Associate at the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG), a contributor at the Strategic Culture Foundation (SCF), Moscow, and a member of the Scientific Committee of Geopolitica, Italy Post-
Chavez Latin America Will Continue to Drift Away from the United States, 2013 Global Research http:wwwglobalresearchcapost-chavez-latin-america-will-continue-to-drift-away-from-the-united-
states/5329402)
Many questions are arising about what direction the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Latin
America will take now that Hugo Chavez has died of cancer. The answer seems to be that the
trend towards regional autonomy and populism in what academics would call a question of, either imagined or real,
multi-dimensionality and agency will continue. This is more than just about the so-called pink tide It is about anti-hegemonic
alliances that have brought different groups together in Latin America. The work of Antonio
Gramsci, the Italian activist and the leader of the Factory Councils in Turin, can help us conceptualize this process. Not
only did Gramsci inspire Chavez, but his ideas can be used to explain these alliances. Despite alienating much of what can be called the Venezuelan middle class, Hugo
Chavez campaigned to form united fronts, domestically and internationally, during his presidency. From the start, he burst into
Venezuelas political scene with a mixed coalition of activists, a spectrum of leftists, career soldiers, and small capital He tried to bring the mosaic of different peoples that
represented Venezuelan society together formatively. Even when the middle class was being distanced from his Bolivarianism as it radicalized, Chavez admitted that it was of
high importance to align with them. As part of a larger cultural project, this included communicating with them through a politics of what the sociologist Stuart Hall would call
articulation Bolivarian Historic Bloc Building In the context of class hegemony, the coalition Chavez built is what Antonio Gramsci would
describe as a process of historical bloc building. This bloc building process is part of a
continuous war of maneuver and continuous war of position for hegemony. In June 2007,
Chavez would even refer to his Bolivarian Revolution in Gramscian terms as a bloc building process during a speech he delivered to his supporters. He would tell his supporters
that they were witnessing the formation of a new historical bloc and that a historic crisis was unfolding with the dying of the old, capitalist society of the Republic of Venezuela
(or the Venezuelan Fourth Republic) and the formation of the new, socialist society of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Bloc formation has not only been important for
Chavezs Bolivarian project If not all of them, historic bloc formation has been an important part of the vast spectrum of social movements; this is why the scholar Peter Thomas
refers to Gramscis work on historical blocs as leading to a theory of social power for various social movements In Some Aspects of the Southern Question, Gramsci
emphasises that the factory workers movement in Northern Italy could not position itself for the leadership of the Italian state without the creation of a historic bloc with the
peasants of Southern Italy This alliance was the real magic formula for taking over the state according to Gramsci and not a division of land and estates for the peasantry as
the socialists claimed In Venezuelas past, after it declared independents, on July 4, 1811, it was defeated by Spanish royalists who convinced the slaves and poorest strata of
Venezuelan society to align with them against Simon Bolivars republican patriots After the defeat of what is called the Venezuelan First Republic, a Venezuelan Second
Republic would be established in 1814. This too would be defeated, because the poor and slaves would oppose the republicans. Bolivar would realize that slavery had to be
abolished and that he needed to form a historic bloc with the slaves and lower strata to become successful. In the case of Chavez and other socialists in Latin America this has
also included sectors of local capital. Bolivarian Historic Bloc Building in Neo-Gramscian Terms The political shift in Venezuela can also be analyzed in terms of an organic,
Gramscian historical crisis unfolding in Latin America. This includes an indigenization of and a localization of political decision making in Latin America. To a degree, the
transformations in Venezuelan society can be viewed in microcosm as the
transformations in Latin America. Behind this transformation is a populist drive
aimed at establishing regional autonomy for both socialist movements and local
capital, which also explains the strange alliances of Latin American governments
that support neo-liberalism, like Argentina and Brazil, with Venezuela. In the context of hegemony at an
international relations level, neo-Gramscians would also use a term like bloc
building to describe the alliances that Latin America has formed with countries
like Russia and Iran. This united front concept has led to pragmatic alliances. An example is the
Honduran President Jose Manuel Zelayas alliance with Venezuela and ALBA, even though Zelaya was relatively right-wing. This again is tied to the common platform of
regional autonomy that is serving to unit left-wing and right-wing governments in Latin America. Chavez made Venezuela pursue a
regional agenda as an anti-hegemonic force working to reduce the regional
influence of the United States. Just as Simon Bolivar realized, while in exile in Jamaica in 1815, that Venezuelas freedom could only be
attained through a hemispheric pan-Latin American project, so did Chavez. This is why both adopted historic bloc building agendas regionally and internationally. Both
realized that a broader struggle or broader struggles were being reflected locally
and that networking with others struggling against the same enemy was
important. This is what got Bolivar to get the British to be neutral and what has led
to Venezuelas modern alliances with China, Belarus, Iran, and Russia. Regionally, Bolivar built an alliance with the Haitians,
who armed him in exchange for a promise to free all the slaves he came across, whereas Chavez has formed the regional organization ALBA and aligned Venezuela with Cuba,
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua. In 2005, the humiliation of the US government at the Mar del Plata Summit of the Americas through
the rejection of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA/ALCA) is an example of the
combined success of bloc building and the rising demand for regional autonomy by Latin Americas socialist movements and capital The
Bolivarian Cultural Mission Social movements would be handicapped without bloc formations or a politics of articulation that aims to secure consent for their leadership by
convincing the greater part of society to support them. This struggle for power, which sits at the heart of the Gramscian notion of hegemony, is also tied to a cultural and
educational project that needs the intelligentsia. The media and intellectuals are important parts of this. Chavez also reached out to many Venezuelan intellectuals and brought
them into his administration. This too has Gramscian contours. Firstly, intellectuals are the representatives of culture. Secondly, organic intellectuals work as the agents and
officers of their classes. Thirdly, intellectuals act to organize the structure(s) of society within the realms of the private and public. Gramsci believed that every person through
their faculty of reasoning was an intellectual and that there was no such thing as a non-intellectual What defines an intellectual in the Gramscian sense is an intellectuals
immediate social function as a professional or specialist in a society. Moreover, he categorized intellectual within a typology of two: organic and traditional. The organic
intellectual is the representative of its class which works for its collective benefit. The traditional intellectuals are specialists who are not directly involved in class politics; they
supposedly circumvent it. Thus, organic intellectuals play important roles in the process of establishing hegemony or creating anti-hegemonic movements as functionaries of a
specific group and its interests. It is through them that the dominant ideology in a society is constructed. Without intellectuals the lower strata that form the mass of society will
not give their consent to a societys ruling class either In the context of class, this is why Gramsci explains that one of the most important tasks of a struggle for empowering
itself is to effectively assimilate and win over the traditional intellectuals and turn them into that struggles organic intellectuals. Gramsci wrote that it was of importance to
break the bond between the intellectuals and peasantry in Southern Italy, because the traditional intellectuals deceitfully kept the peasantry passive and in check under capitalist
exploitation for the big landlords, banks, and North Italian capital Chavezs Bolivarian project has also tried to do this The cultural aspects of
Chavezs project are also tied to a politics of articulation, which included his special talk show. Chavez
managed to get his message out to the masses that Bolivarianism was working for
their interest. This uprooted the articulation of the old elite just enough to allow
Chavez to break their ideological dominance in Venezuelan society. This has additionally polarized
Venezuelan society, as two cultural projects are competing for hegemony in society Simon Rodriguez, the teacher of Chavezs hero Simon Bolivar, said that the people that
illuminate humanitys horizons are not born when they see the light of the world, they are born when they begin to radiate their own inner light onto the world. Hate or
love the late Hugo Chavez; he has served as a vanguard for Latin American autonomy and
helped countries like Argentina pay off their debts to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The
process he led in Venezuela has allowed much of Latin America to marshal itself
against Washington.



Aff Answers



Non Unique- Russia/US Clash in LA


Clash in LA now- US ramping up military response to Russia arms
sales
Blank 2009 (Stephen Blank is Professor of Russian National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, Russia in Latin
America: Geopolitical Games in the USs Neighborhood Ifri, RussiaNIS Center April, wwwifriorgdownloadsifriblankrussiaandlatinamericaengapril09pdf )
In 2008, Russia, like Columbus, discovered Latin America. Or so Western and Russian media would have us believe.
Leading commentators speculated about the motives behind presidential and
ministerial visits to and from Russia; major arms, trade and energy deals; visits by
Russian long-range bombers, and joint naval exercises with Venezuela, and fleet calls to
Nicaragua and Cuba occurred. Although the Pentagon professes no alarm, Washington sent Thomas Shannon, the Assistant
Secretary of State for Latin America, to Moscow to ascertain Russias precise aims.
Having expressed US concerns regarding the destabilizing effects of Russian arms
sales to Venezuela, Shannons visit undoubtedly proved that Russia could get
Washingtons attention.1 Moreover, for the first time in years, the Pentagon in 2008 stood up the Fourth
Fleet in the South Atlantic. Its formal missions are to safeguard maritime routes, conduct disaster relief, engage in humanitarian operations, and
conduct multilateral operations with Latin American navies.2 Nevertheless, observers naturally see it as a response to
heightened risk perception.


Non Unique- Relations Down

Relations Down- Magnitsky, Syria
BRINKLEY 2013 (JOEL BRINKLEY is a professor of journalism at Stanford University and a Pulitzer Prize winning former foreign correspondent for the New York Times. He
writes a nationally syndicated column on foreign affairs MayJune Foreign Affairs, Russia Talks Peace, then Ships Missiles, http:wwwworldaffairsjournalorgarticlerussia-talks-peace-then-ships-missiles)
Watching Russia these days, it feels like Cold War dj vu. Not only is President Vladimir Putin
growing ever more authoritarian with each passing day, but relations between Moscow and
Washington are quickly deteriorating. As examples, last week Russia expelled an American
lawyer who is a former Justice Department official, apparently because he turned down a request to become a spy for the
Russian government. Just a few days later Russian security services also expelled Ryan Fogle, a 29-year-old US Embassy officer,
accusing him of trying to recruit a Russian counterterrorism officer as a spysomeone
knowledgeable about the North Caucasus region, where the alleged Boston Marathon bombers came from. At almost the same time, on May 20th, the Putin administration
began an effort to shut down the Levada Center, Russias only independent public-opinion polling organizationall because the publics
opinion, as the pollsters found, was turning against the Kremlin. The government labeled Levada a foreign agent
because some American foundations including the Open Society Institute are
among its funding sources. All this is causing unrest with Russia not just in Washington
but in a variety of Western capitals. For example, the Russian government wrote a letter to the Irish Parliament a few weeks ago warning that Moscow would end discussions of a cross-border adoptions agreement
if the legislature went through with a motion to sanction Russia officials for the death of Sergei Magnitsky, the lawyer who died in a Russian jail after uncovering fraud among state officials. The sanctions proposal
was similar to one the United States enacted last year, prompting Russia to prohibit American adoptions of Russian children and forbid 18 present and former American officials from traveling to Russia. In
Irelands case, Parliament backed down. For most countries, however, Moscows most troubling decisions of late involve
Syria. Early this month, Secretary of State John Kerry visited Moscow primarily to discuss the Syrian civil war. So far,
close to 80,000 people have died there, but Moscow still provides Damascus with advanced weaponry and
unremitting support. Well, Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey V. Lavrov announced they would
hold an international conference intended to end the Syrian war. That seemed like
a possible breakthrough. But rather than using his strong leverage to bring Syrian President
Bashar al-Assad to the negotiating table, instead Putin sent him a passel of advanced anti-ship
cruise missilesalong with promises of more surface-to-air missiles. A few days after receiving the new
weapons, Assad, in an interview with Argentinas Clarn newspaper, said he thought arranging a peace conference was a
pointless endeavor. We do not believe many Western countries actually want a
solution in Syria, Assad said, because those very countries support the terrorists who, he says, are at war with him. So the peace-conference
plan is stalled. Thanks to President Putin.

Non Unique- Death of Chavez

Relationship wont survive post Chavez Death no oil, no arms sales
Kommersant Online 3-7 (Russia Seen Losing Positions in Venezuela Following Chavez Death, 2013
http://www.buhodlepost.com/2013/03/10/russia-seen-losing-positions-in-venezuela-following-chavez-death/)
But whoever wins the elections, Venezuela`s policy course, experts believe, will undergo
considerable change. No new regime will stick to the fierce anti-Americanism that
guided Chavez. Should Maduro win, Caracas`s relations with the United States will
begin to gradually improve. If, on the other hand, the opposition comes to power,
the country will rapidly reorient itself toward the United States, Fedor Lukyanov, chairman of the
presidium of the Russian Federation Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, told Kommersant. The Kremlin expressed the hope yesterday,
it is true, that the positive and constructive agenda for Russo-Venezuelan relations will remain a constant At the same time Mr Lukyanov is
convinced: `The anomaly of the 2000s, when Venezuela became one of the Russian
Federation`s main world partners, is unlikely to survive Chavez since it was
connected with his figure personally, his specific political views and ambitions`. The
expert believes that many agreements between Moscow and Caracas will simply remain on
paper, others will be reconsidered Vladimir Semago, deputy head of the Russo-
Venezuelan Business Council, is even more emphatic. Following the departure of
Chavez, the entire camouflage of so-called friendship with Venezuela will
disappear, he told Kommersant We had no real cooperation, there were merely attempts to
persuade Russians that Moscow was in imperial fashion getting into the Latin
American countries as in Soviet times it got into Africa He says that one of the most ambitious projects the
formation of a Russian National Petroleum Consortium for development of the
Orinoco Belt together with the Venezuelan PDVSA is a big myth. The consortium has thus far
produced nothing and has recovered nothing. And just two companies, Lukoil and Rosneft, actually remain on the Russian side, Kommersant`s source explained The
future of Russo-Venezuelan cooperation in the defense sphere gives rise to even
more questions a(euro) it was from the outset tied to Chavez personally. The two first major contracts
a(euro) for the delivery of 40 Mi-35 combat helicopters and their maintenance and the training of personnel ($500 million) and also for the purchase of 100,000 AK-103
assault rifles ($54 million) a(euro) were signed during his visit to Moscow in 2004 The work was proving tough-sledding, but as soon as Chavez joined in the negotiations,
mutual understanding emerged practically immediately, a source close to Rosoboroneksport told Kommersant And in all subsequent arms deals he participated directly In
2011, Hugo Chavez was able to secure the signing of an agreement on Russia`s allocation
of a $4 billion loan for Venezuela`s purchase of Russian arms. Despite the fact
that the allocation of this loan was almost suicidal, we took this step, all the same:
it was important for us to maintain friendly relations with Caracas, a source close to the Federal
Military-Technical Cooperation Service told Kommersant But it was clear even then that dialogue could be pursued
only with Chavez. The other members of the Venezuelan delegation made
practically no contact.


No Link- Not Zero Sum
Competition over Latin America isnt zero sum
Ramrez 2010 (Pablo Telman Snchez, Phd, Specialist Professor in International Law and Political and Social Sciences, professor at Instituto Tecnolgico y de Estudios Superiores de
Monterrey, Mexico City campus He is a Member of the Mexican National Research System, Level 2Is a New Climate of Confrontation Between Russia and the United States Possible in Latin America?, Latin
American Policy Volume 1, Issue 2, pages 230243, December 2010, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.2041-7373.2010.00017.x/abstract )
Russia is demonstrating to the White House its position of establishing a global
strategic equilibrium and its capability of defending its own national interests.
There is no ideological conflict between the government of the United States and
its Russian counterpart like there was during the Cold War because the latter shares the values of democracy
and a market economy. Russias strategy in Latin America does not consist of
establishing a political regional alliance to face the hegemonic power
of Washington, but it does send a message to the White House. The Kremlin is moving closer to Latin
America with the objective to establish not an ideological or military competition
with the United States, but a competition guided by considerations that will
prioritize pragmatism and mutual advantage. Russia is attempting to increase its presence in Latin America and will
accomplish this through the signing of commercial, energy, and military agreements with some left-wing countries of the region such as Venezuela, Nicaragua, Argentina,
Ecuador, Brazil, Bolivia, and Cuba. There is also the possibility of signing energy and military agreements with left-wing countries such as Peru, Colombia, and Mexico.
Russia advocates for the end of the unipolar world and feels that the hegemonic
power of the United States is in decline. Moscow is taking advantage of this
situation and establishing alliances in regions far away from its vital interests, such as
Latin America. Nevertheless, a new Russian foreign policy document (2008) points out that Latin
America, along with Africa, is still in last place among regional priorities. In the specific case of Venezuela the
Kremlin has attempted to obtain a circumstantial if not temporary ally with the incentive of the wealth of Venezuela in terms of hydrocarbons. The example of Cuba during the
Cold War and its alliance with the Soviet Union is not comparable because there were clear ties stressed by the MarxistLeninist ideology and the confrontation between two
superpowers. It is risky to assert that Venezuela would turn into a strategic and durable ally for Russia as Cuba did for the Soviet Union. The future of the current government of
Venezuela is uncertain, given its internal political instability and the economic crisis. Both represent a blow for the country, and the Russian government would become involved
politically and militarily in the government of Hugo Chvez with difficulty. However, Russia continues to move forward with its objectives of tightening economic and
commercial ties with Venezuela in strategic spheres of convenience such as the sale of weapons and military technology; collaboration in the peaceful use of nuclear energy; and
the extraction, exploitation, transportation, and sale of hydrocarbons. The current Russian strategy in Latin America
does not consist of establishing a solid political alliance with countries of this
region so as to face the hegemonic power of the United States, as President Chvez has
attempted to demonstrate. Russia neither shares the anti-imperialistic positions of
Hugo Chvez nor supports unconditionally the Venezuelan presidents attempts at
regional leadership. Conversely, Chvez wants to take advantage of his approach to Russia to strengthen his plans for leadership in the region, and he
attempts to demonstrate that his close ties with Russia are part of an anti-imperialistic global alliance. During his visit to Moscow in July 2008, Chvez negotiated new contracts
for the sale of weapons and mentioned that, Russia has enough potential as to guarantee its presence in many places around the world. If the Armed Forces of the Russian
Federation want to stay in Venezuela, they will be received enthusiastically. . . . [T] he sale of Russian weapons will serve as an instrument to guarantee the sovereignty of
Venezuela which is threatened by the United States We are in a process of rearmament (Exclsior, 2008)

Other countries will fill in
Sudarev 12 Professor of American Countries History and Politics (Vladimir Sudarey, Doctor of Political Science, Professor of the European and American
Countries History and Politics Department of the MGIMO University, " Is Russia returning to Latin America?" February 20, 2012,
http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=252#top)
It can be largely attributed to the fact that Russian leadership has no priority system in interacting with this country. The latter,
from our perspective, is explained by poor understanding of how much inter-complimentary could be the interests of the two resource-rich countries in the decades to come.
Unfortunately, China, and lately India have been much more economically active in the
region than Russia, filling the niches in the market that could have been well filled
by Russia. Another question is why Brazilian dimension of Russian foreign policy is much weaker than the Chinese one? Why do we transfer to China, the
relationships with which in the 20th century were abundant with conflicts including the armed ones, unique military aircraft building technologies, while denying this to Brazil
with which we have never had conflicts or clashes on the international arena? Perhaps, it is the residual principle inherent of the USSR leadership and successfully inherited in
1990-s by the Russian leadership that is applied to this region. But, while the USSR used to have Cuba as a strategic partner, the Russian Federation, having curtailed the ties
with the Island of Freedom, didnt bother to start looking for new partners and paid as little attention to the relations with Brazil as with any other Latin American country. If
Russia is really interested in serious and politically influential partners, then it is the Brazil dimension that should be prioritized as the major vector of Russian policy in the
region. It means establishing a special system of partnership which will include an overhaul of the current system of trade and economic relations, an introduction of a new
system of preferential terms of advanced know-how transfer and exchange, particularly in aerospace field For that sake its necessary to maximally intensify the relations with
Brazils leadership and take them to a higher level, with the head of state or the government taking control of it. However, the growing understanding of the Russian upper
echelons of power of the necessity to shift the focus of economic cooperation with the countries of the region on to scientific and technical sphere arouses certain optimism. It is
in the field of advanced technologies where Russia is most competitive, and no wonder that the main emphasis during the April 2010 visit of President Medvedev to the
countries of the region was laid on this very issue. Low competitiveness of Russia vis--vis other countries
undertaking huge efforts with a view to building up their political and economic
position in this region continues to persist. Besides, our investment capability is
also much lower than that of USA, China, EU and even India.


No Link- Venezuela
No war over Venezuela
Ramrez 2010 (Pablo Telman Snchez, Phd, Specialist Professor in International Law and Political and Social Sciences, professor at Instituto Tecnolgico y de Estudios Superiores de
Monterrey, Mexico City campus. He is a Member of the Mexican National Research System, Level 2Is a New Climate of Confrontation Between Russia and the United States Possible in Latin America?, Latin
American Policy Volume 1, Issue 2, pages 230243, December 2010, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.2041-7373.2010.00017.x/abstract )
As of 2008, the Russian Federation has launched an intensive diplomatic, economic, and
even cultural offensive in Latin America, but the course that this policy takes will
depend on the positions undertaken by the White House in the near future. The
Kremlin must consider seriously whether it wants to establish a constructive and
stable relationship with the United States at the expense of moderating its
relationships with the left-wing governments of Latin America. Russia includes in its current strategy for
Latin America the most stable and centrist countries in the Latin American traditional left, such as Brazil and Chile (recently a center-right president took office), and the most
radical, such as Ecuador, Argentina, Nicaragua, and Bolivia. Although some analysts consider that the main
interests of the Kremlin are in Venezuela with attempts to create an alliance to
weaken U.S. clout in the region, this is false. Ties between Latin America and Russia will
be only temporary and will depend on the position that the United States takes
toward Russia. The Kremlin considers that Europe and the United States have high geopolitical and economic importance for its national security. If the
United States hypothetically decided to invade Venezuela, Russia would probably
not take a position in any military conflict in favor of the Venezuelan government.
Russia has another priority closer to its territory where it is investing more money and more diplomacy: the buffer zone. Countries such as Ukraine and Georgia represent the
geopolitical priorities of the Russian Federation, and the structuring of foreign policy relies on these circumstances. In this sense, Latin America
becomes a secondary priority that might occupy the position left by the Eastern
European territories and the Baltic countries, although the distance that separates
Russia from Latin America and the instability of Latin Americas political systems (in
Chile, one of the most stable countries politically and economically, the right has taken over the presidency after two decades of leftist governments) are a
warning for the Kremlin with regard to the extent of its bilateral ties with the
region.

Actions not zero sum- cooperation over competition
Wells 4-26 (Miriam, Wells is a journalist who has previously worked for BBC Radio News and for Human Rights Watch. She has worked for InSight Crime since
2012, specializes in Latin American Reporting, Should Russian Anti-Drug Aid to LatAm Worry the US? 2013 http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/should-russian-
drug-aid-latam-worry-us)
"We're well past the Cold War era," analyst James Bosworth told InSight Crime. "This really is about drug
trafficking and economic interests. The US has nothing to worry about. As long as
Washington doesn't overreact in response, it won't impact US influence or
interests in the region. Combating organized crime is a potential area for
cooperation, not competition, with Russia."

Russia wont go to war with the US over Venezuela
Ramrez 2010 (Pablo Telman Snchez, Phd, Specialist Professor in International Law and Political and Social Sciences, professor at Instituto Tecnolgico y de Estudios Superiores de
Monterrey, Mexico City campus. He is a Member of the Mexican National Research System, Level 2Is a New Climate of Confrontation Between Russia and the United States Possible in Latin America?, Latin
American Policy Volume 1, Issue 2, pages 230243, December 2010, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.2041-7373.2010.00017.x/abstract )
The government in Moscow is not willing to become involved in the political actions of
Caracas in a more formal manner for many reasons. First, Russia will not openly
confront the United States, which is a priority in Venezuelas foreign policy, and Russia has higher
expectations for dialogue with President Obama.6 Second, Russia is aware that there are
countries that maintain a more moderate position than Venezuela and have their
reservations with regard to Chvezs intention to consolidate an anti-U.S. bloc in the
region. Finally, the extent of the Venezuelan presidents intentions are unpredictable,
especially in foreign policy, leading to Russia adopting a cautious position in its
relationship with Caracas, although Venezuela has grown closer to Moscow since 2008. For example, during President
Medvedevs visit to Caracas in 2010, the two nations signed an agreement of nuclear cooperation so they could build an atomic plant in Venezuela, with
the main objective of producing electric energy. There are similarities with Iran in that the U.S. government is distrustful because of the possible
acquisition of a nuclear weapon.

No Link- Cuba

No trade off- influence is independent
Garrido 2013 (Mario Hubert, The Havana Reporter, Russia-Latin America Relations are Strategic http:havanareporternewscominternationalrussia-
latin-america-relations-are-strategic%E2%80%9D)
Russias relations with Latin America and the Caribbean are strategic and
independent of differences with the United States or other nations in the region, said Russian Prime Minister
Dmitry Medvedev, in an exclusive interview with the Prensa Latina news agency during his official visit to Cuba in February. Medvedev
dismissed the idea that his countrys recent moves toward closer ties with the
region were due to current problems related to Washingtons policy of trying to
wield more influence in the area. Latin America and Caribbean countries are in the middle of economic development and
represent unexplored potentiality, he said. In that sense, he referred to the sovereign manner in which
Moscow has relations in all sectors with nations in the BRICS group (Brazil, India, China and
South Africa, in addition to Russia), and highlighted the progress Russia has made in its relations
with countries such as Chile, Venezuela, Ecuador and Argentina. In that respect he commented on his most recent visit to Brazilimmediately prior to
his visit to Havanaand described it as the worlds fifth-largest economy. Regarding cooperation with Latin
America, Medvedev said that different stages and obstacles have existed from the
1990s to the present, but that the conditions were in place to move forward more
rapidly and to solve existing problems jointly. He also described the historic relationship and ties that unite
Russia to Cuba as special. During his visit to Cuba in February, Moscow and Havana signed some 10 new legal instruments for bilateral cooperation in
the areas of investment, trade, tourism, health, education, science, and culture, among others, he noted. In 2009, during his first meeting in Moscow
with Cuban President Ral Castro, they signed a memorandum establishing strategic relations, and these latest agreements are in line with those plans,
he said. Regarding the economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed by the
United States on Cuba for more than 50 years, he said it was an anachronism of
the past. I want to point out that we are not changing our position, because we
consider that it is an offensive measure, an anachronism of the past. The sooner
they change it, the better it will be for everybody, not just the Cubans, but above
all, for the U.S. people, Medvedev said. He also noted than in 2012, a little over 90,000 Russian tourists visited Cuba, making a
conscious decision to take their vacations in a place where they are welcomed with deep sentiments of friendship.



Link Turn

No impact to Russian Sphere of Influence and US action is the only
way to bring stability
Blank 2009 (Stephen Blank is Professor of Russian National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, Russia in Latin
America: Geopolitical Games in the USs Neighborhood Ifri, RussiaNIS Center April, wwwifriorgdownloadsifriblankrussiaandlatinamericaengapril09pdf )
In analyzing the nature of Russias relations with Latin America, a few conclusions
can be drawn. First, Moscows main motives in Latin America are clearly
geopolitical and tied to its self-presentation as a global superpower and rival of the
US. Second, its capabilities for achieving decisive strategic influence are limited to a
few struggling, leftist Latin American states. Third, the current economic crisis has
constricted those capabilities still further. Fourth, most Latin American states will not
follow Russian policies against their own interests simply to improve trade or let
Russia hijack them for its purposesunless the Obama Administration utterly
neglects or disregards them, which is unlikely. Even Russian commentators and some
military officers recognize and publicly admit that the posturing seen in exercises in Venezuela and the Caribbean is
just that, a display with little or no strategic benefit.88 The only way in
which Russian policy truly threatens the US and Latin America is its military and
intelligence support for Chavez and similar leaders. This support is passed on to
insurgents and narco-trafficantes in order to destabilize pro-American regimes
while strengthening Chavez and his allies. Adequate responses to such threats are
inherently economic and political, and only military as a last resort. Washington
can do much to facilitate security in Latin America: regenerating its own economy;
simultaneously opening up trade markets and eliminating barriers to Latin
American exports; enhancing multilateralism and interoperability among defense
forces as requested by Latin American militaries; and beginning the normalization of Cuba. Havana is no
longer the threat it was, Venezuela has claimed that dubious honor Rehabilitating Cuba, given that Castros days are clearly numbered, would take the
air out of Chavezs balloon; it is quite clear that Havana would probably welcome a path towards better relations with the US, especially the economic benefits they would
inevitably bring. A policy with a more symbolically important impact upon Latin America is
currently difficult to imagine. Nonetheless, there should be no illusion that the security
problems that plague this region are easily overcome, quite the opposite. But that
is all the more reason why the US cannot ignore the area and let it drift to Moscow,
Tehran, and Beijing for want of a better alternative. That outcome would only confirm once again that in world
politics, there is no such thing as benign neglect. Instead neglect is malign and
engenders negative results for the negligent state along with those neglected. The
policies of the Bush administration allowed Russia to gain a foothold in Latin
American politics, a result of Washingtons negligence; under President Obama, the US
should reverse those outcomes and demonstrate what liberal democracy in action
can truly accomplish.

Link Turn- Cuba
*This is for an aff that lifts the embargo
No trade off- influence is independent and lifting the embargo
boosts relations
Garrido 2013 (Mario Hubert, The Havana Reporter, Russia-Latin America Relations are Strategic http:havanareporternewscominternationalrussia-
latin-america-relations-are-strategic%E2%80%9D)
Russias relations with Latin America and the Caribbean are strategic and
independent of differences with the United States or other nations in the region, said Russian Prime Minister
Dmitry Medvedev, in an exclusive interview with the Prensa Latina news agency during his official visit to Cuba in February. Medvedev
dismissed the idea that his countrys recent moves toward closer ties with the
region were due to current problems related to Washingtons policy of trying to
wield more influence in the area. Latin America and Caribbean countries are in the middle of economic development and
represent unexplored potentiality, he said. In that sense, he referred to the sovereign manner in which
Moscow has relations in all sectors with nations in the BRICS group (Brazil, India, China and
South Africa, in addition to Russia), and highlighted the progress Russia has made in its relations
with countries such as Chile, Venezuela, Ecuador and Argentina. In that respect he commented on his most recent visit to Brazilimmediately prior to
his visit to Havanaand described it as the worlds fifth-largest economy. Regarding cooperation with Latin
America, Medvedev said that different stages and obstacles have existed from the
1990s to the present, but that the conditions were in place to move forward more
rapidly and to solve existing problems jointly. He also described the historic relationship and ties that unite
Russia to Cuba as special. During his visit to Cuba in February, Moscow and Havana signed some 10 new legal instruments for bilateral cooperation in
the areas of investment, trade, tourism, health, education, science, and culture, among others, he noted. In 2009, during his first meeting in Moscow
with Cuban President Ral Castro, they signed a memorandum establishing strategic relations, and these latest agreements are in line with those plans,
he said. Regarding the economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed by the
United States on Cuba for more than 50 years, he said it was an anachronism of
the past. I want to point out that we are not changing our position, because we
consider that it is an offensive measure, an anachronism of the past. The sooner
they change it, the better it will be for everybody, not just the Cubans, but above
all, for the U.S. people, Medvedev said. He also noted than in 2012, a little over 90,000 Russian tourists visited Cuba, making a
conscious decision to take their vacations in a place where they are welcomed with deep sentiments of friendship.


No Internal Link

Doesnt Destroy Relations- Russia welcomes competition in Latin
America
Paniev 2012 (Yuri, One of the great experts on Latin America, Russian Academy of Sciences, Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations,
RUSSIA TURNING ON LATIN AMERICA, v1, n1, Jan-Jun 2012 | pp.37-50 online)
Nonetheless, Russias political reasoning might be totally different. Latin American
countries have been consistently increasing their economic potential, their role in
world affairs is steadily enhancing. The examples are not far to seek: Mexico and Chile have joined the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), a grouping of the most developed nations, while Argentina, Brazil and Mexico are now part of G20. In fact we are witnessing how
another center in the multi-polar world is emerging, and this is something impossible to ignore. Moreover, Russia and Latin American countries claim a more significant role in
global economic and financial regulation. Only joint efforts and constructive interaction with other ascending states will help to achieve this goal. Here is what President
Medvedev said describing the geopolitical importance of Latin America: "To certain extent we are just at the
beginning of a robust, full-scale and mutually beneficial relationship with partners
in Latin America. There is no reason to be scrupulous and afraid of competition.
We should just jump into fray"26. By "fray" he obviously meant competition - the
United States are traditionally present in the region, same as Western Europe, and
recently China. The emergence of Russia in Latin America is just a new geopolitical
reality, the evidence of its global interests.
Wont escalate not even proxy wars
Ellis 2011 (R Evan, an assistant professor with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS). His research focus is on Latin Americas relationship with
external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran Emerging Multi-Power Competitions in Latin America, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2011/2011-
1/2011_1_03_ellis_eng_s.pdf)
Although there will be various types of violence within, and perhaps between,
states in Latin America, it is important to emphasize, that the focus of interaction
between states of the region and external actors will be primarily securing an
advantage commerce and national development, rather than in war, with competitions for the
signing of trade accords, and technology sharing agreements, investment, the granting of privileged access to develop a nations mineral and hydrocarbon resources, or who
supports whom in multilateral institutions. It is possible that external powers could become involved in a
proxy war, in an attempt to hold up a regime in which they have strategic commercial interests, but such prospects remain
distant at the present time.


No Impact Relations/War
No Russian War
Weitz 11 (Richard, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor, Global Insights: Putin not a Game-Changer for U.S.-Russia
Ties, http://www.scribd.com/doc/66579517/Global-Insights-Putin-not-a-Game-Changer-for-U-S-Russia-Ties, September 27, 2011)
Fifth, there will inevitably be areas of conflict between Russia and the United States regardless of who is
in the Kremlin. Putin and his entourage can never be happy with having NATO be Europe's most powerful security institution, since Moscow is not a member and cannot
become one. Similarly, the Russians will always object to NATO's missile defense efforts since they can
neither match them nor join them in any meaningful way. In the case of Iran, Russian officials genuinely perceive less of a threat from Tehran than do most Americans, and
Russia has more to lose from a cessation of economic ties with Iran -- as well as from an Iranian-Western reconciliation. On the other hand, these conflicts
can be managed, since they will likely remain limited and compartmentalized .
Russia and the West do not have fundamentally conflicting vital interests of the
kind countries would go to war over . And as the Cold War demonstrated, nuclear weapons are a great
pacifier under such conditions. Another novel development is that Russia is much more integrated
into the international economy and global society than the Soviet Union was, and
Putin's popularity depends heavily on his economic track record. Beyond that, there are objective
criteria, such as the smaller size of the Russian population and economy as well as the
difficulty of controlling modern means of social communication, that will
constrain whoever is in charge of Russia.
Cooperation is impossible
Bovt 12 (9/12 (Columnist-Moscow Times, Whether Obama or Romney, the Reset Is Dead, http:wwwthemoscowtimescomopinionarticlewhether-obama-or-
romney-the-reset-is-dead/467947.html#ixzz274U7VOyl
During every U.S. presidential election campaign, there is a debate in Russia over whether the
Republican or Democratic candidate would be more beneficial for the Kremlin. Russian analysts and
politicians always fail to understand that Americans have shown little interest in foreign policy
since the end of the Cold War. Even when foreign policy is mentioned in the campaign, Russia is far
down the list as a priority item. The volume of U.S-Russian trade remains small. The recent Exxon-Rosneft deal
notwithstanding, U.S. interest in Russia's energy projects has fallen, particularly as the Kremlin has increased its role in this sector. To make matters
worse, the United States is determined to establish clean energy and energy independence, while Russia's gas exports are feeling the pinch from stiff
competition with the U.S. development of shale gas production. Of course, traditional areas of cooperation remain: the transit of shipments to and from
Afghanistan through Russia, Iran's nuclear program and the struggle against international terrorism. But the transit route into Afghanistan cannot, by
itself, greatly influence bilateral relations as a whole, and progress on the other two points seems to have reached a plateau
beyond which little potential remains for bringing the two countries into closer cooperation.
On the positive side, a new visa agreement came into force this week that will facilitate greater
contact between both countries' citizens. But it will be years before that significantly influences
overall U.S.-Russian relations. A new agreement regarding child adoptions has also been implemented after a few disturbing adoption
stories prompted Russia's media, with the help of government propaganda, to spoil the U.S. image in Russia. Meanwhile, both U.S. President Barack
Obama and Republican candidate Mitt Romney support the U.S. missile defense program in principle,
although the exact form and scope of its deployment differ among the candidates. Even though President Vladimir Putin, during his interview with RT
state television last week, expressed guarded optimism over the prospect of reaching an agreement on missile defense with Obama, Russia
seems to underestimate the degree to which Americans are fixated on missile defense as a
central component of their national security. It is highly unlikely that any U.S.
administration Democratic or Republican will ever agree to major concessions on
missile defense. It even seemed that Kremlin propagandists were happy when in March Romney
called Russia the United States' No. 1 foe. They were given another present when Obama, addressing the Democratic National
Convention last week, said Romney's comment only proved that he lacked foreign policy experience and was locked in Cold War thinking. For the
next two months, however, the two candidates are unlikely to devote muc h attention to Russia.
Russia's internal politics will also be one of the key factors shaping future U.S.-Russian
relations. The two-year jail sentence slapped on three members of Pussy Riot for their anti-Putin prayer in Moscow's main cathedral has already
become a subject of discussion between Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Even the most
pragmatic "pro-reset" U.S. administration would criticize to one degree or another
Russia's poor record on human rights. It appears that Russia is moving increasingly
toward confrontation rather than rapprochement with the West. The Kremlin now
seems fully committed to spreading the myth that the U.S. State Department is the cause behind
most of Russia's domestic problems and is bent on undermining its national security by deploying missile defense installations in
Europe and by supporting the opposition. There are other disturbing signals as well. Take, for example, the United Russia bill that
would prohibit Russian officials from owning bank accounts and property overseas, with
particular attention paid to their holdings in the West. The ideological underpinning of this bill
is that assets located in the West are tantamount to betrayal of the motherland. Then there is
Russia's opposition to the U.S. Magnitsky Act. The Kremlin interprets this initiative as yet another confirmation of its
suspicions that Washington is conspiring against it and that the bill's real U.S. motive is to blackmail Russian officials by threatening to freeze their
overseas bank accounts and property. An increase in these anti-Western attitudes does not bode well for
U.S.-Russian relations, even if Obama is re-elected in November. Regardless of which candidate wins, the reset is bound to either
slowly die a natural death under Obama or be extinguished outright under Romney. As a result,
the most we can likely expect from U.S.-Russian relations in the next four years is cooperation
on a limited range of mundane issues. Under these conditions, avoiding excessive anti-Russian or anti-U.S. rhetoric from both
sides would itself be considered a major achievement in bilateral relations.


No Impact- US China War
No US-Sino war
Rosecrance et al 10 (Richard, Political Science Professor @ Cal and Senior Fellow @ Harvards Belfer Center and Former Director
@ Burkle Center of IR @ UCLA, and Jia Qingguo, PhD Cornell, Professor and Associate Dean of School of International Studies @ Peking University,
Delicately Poised: Are China and the US Heading for Conflict? Global Asia 44, http://www.globalasia.org/l.php?c=e251)
Will China and the US Go to War? If one accepts the previous analysis, the answer is no, or at least not
likely. Why? First, despite its revolutionary past, China has gradually accepted the US-led world order and
become a status quo power. It has joined most of the important inter-governmental international
organizations. It has subscribed to most of the important international laws and regimes. It has not
only accepted the current world order, it has become a strong supporter and defender of it. China has repeatedly argued that the
authority of the United Nations and international law should be respected in the handling of international security crises. China has
become an ardent advocate of multilateralism in managing international problems. And China has repeatedly defended the principle
of free trade in the global effort to fight the current economic crisis, despite efforts by some countries, including the US, to resort to
protectionism. To be sure, there are some aspects of the US world order that China does not like and wants to reform. However, it
wishes to improve that world order rather than to destroy it. Second, China has
clearly rejected the option of territorial expansion. It argues that territorial expansion
is both immoral and counterproductive: immoral because it is imperialistic and counterproductive because
it does not advance ones interests Chinas behavior shows that instead of trying to expand its territories, it has been
trying to settle its border disputes through negotiation. Through persistent efforts, China has
concluded quite a number of border agreements in recent years. As a result, most of its land borders are now clearly drawn and
marked under agreements with its neighbors. In addition, China is engaging in negotiations to resolve its remaining border disputes
and making arrangements for peaceful settlement of disputed islands and territorial waters. Finally, even on the
question of Taiwan, which China believes is an indisputable part of its territory, it has adopted a policy of
peaceful reunification. A country that handles territorial issues in such a manner is by no means expansionist. Third,
China has relied on trade and investment for national welfare and prestige, instead of military
conquest. And like the US, Japan and Germany, China has been very successful in this regard. In fact, so successful that it
really sees no other option than to continue on this path to prosperity. Finally, after years of reforms,
China increasingly finds itself sharing certain basic values with the US, such as a
commitment to the free market, rule of law, human rights and democracy. Of course, there are still significant
differences in terms of how China understands and practices these values. However, at a conceptual level, Beijing agrees that these
are good values that it should strive to realize in practice. A Different World It is also important to note that certain changes
in international relations since the end of World War II have made the peaceful rise of a great
power more likely. To begin with, the emergence of nuclear weapons has drastically
reduced the usefulness of war as a way to settle great power rivalry. By now, all great powers either
have nuclear weapons or are under a nuclear umbrella If the objective of great power rivalry is to enhance ones interests or
prestige, the sheer destructiveness of nuclear weapons means that these goals can no longer be achieved
through military confrontation. Under these circumstances, countries have to find other
ways to accommodate each other something that China and the US have been
doing and are likely to continue to do. Also, globalization has made it easier for great powers to increase their
national welfare and prestige through international trade and investment rather than territorial expansion. In conducting its foreign
relations, the US relied more on trade and investment than territorial expansion during its rise, while Japan and Germany relied
almost exclusively on international trade and investment. China, too, has found that its interests are best served by adopting the
same approach. Finally, the development of relative pacifism in the industrialized world, and indeed throughout the world since
World War II, has discouraged any country from engaging in territorial expansion. There is less and less popular support for using
force to address even legitimate concerns on the part of nation states. Against this background, efforts to engage in territorial
expansion are likely to rally international resistance and condemnation. Given all this, is the rise of China
likely to lead to territorial expansion and war with the US? The answer is no.


No Impact- Warming

Warming wont cause extinction
Barrett 7 professor of natural resource economics Columbia University, (Scott, Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods, introduction)
First, climate change does not threaten the survival of the human species.5 If unchecked, it will
cause other species to become extinction (though biodiversity is being depleted now due to other reasons). It will
alter critical ecosystems (though this is also happening now, and for reasons unrelated to climate
change) It will reduce land area as the seas rise, and in the process displace human populations Catastrophic climate change is
possible, but not certain. Moreover, and unlike an asteroid collision, large changes (such as sea level rise of, say, ten meters)
will likely take centuries to unfold, giving societies time to adjust. Abrupt climate change is also
possible, and will occur more rapidly, perhaps over a decade or two. However, abrupt climate change (such as a weakening in the
North Atlantic circulation), though potentially very serious, is unlikely to be ruinous. Human-induced climate change is an
experiment of planetary proportions, and we cannot be sur of its consequences. Even in a worse case scenario, however, global
climate change is not the equivalent of the Earth being hit by mega-asteroid. Indeed, if it were as
damaging as this, and if we were sure that it would be this harmful, then our incentive to address
this threat would be overwhelming. The challenge would still be more difficult than asteroid defense, but we would have done much
more about it by now.


No Impact- Econ
There is no causal relationship between the economy and conflict
the best study proves.
Brandt and Ulfelder 11*Patrick T. Brandt, Ph.D. in Political Science from Indiana University, is an Assistant Professor of Political Science in
the School of Social Science at the University of Texas at Dallas. **Jay Ulfelder, Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University, is an American political scientist whose
research interests include democratization, civil unrest, and violent conflict [April, 2011, Economic Growth and Political Instability, Social Science Research Network]
These statements anticipating political fallout from the global economic crisis of 2008
2010 reflect a widely held view that economic growth has rapid and profound effects
on countries political stability. When economies grow at a healthy clip, citizens are presumed to be too busy and
too content to engage in protest or rebellion, and governments are thought to be flush with revenues they can use to enhance their
own stability by producing public goods or rewarding cronies, depending on the type of regime they inhabit. When growth
slows, however, citizens and cronies alike are presumed to grow frustrated with their governments, and the leaders at the
receiving end of that frustration are thought to lack the financial resources to respond effectively. The expected result is
an increase in the risks of social unrest, civil war, coup attempts, and regime
breakdown.
Although it is pervasive, the assumption that countries economic growth rates
strongly affect their political stability has not been subjected to a great deal of
careful empirical analysis, and evidence from social science research to date does
not unambiguously support it. Theoretical models of civil wars, coups detat, and transitions to and
from democracy often specify slow economic growth as an important cause or catalyst of those events,
but empirical studies on the effects of economic growth on these phenomena have
produced mixed results. Meanwhile, the effects of economic growth on the occurrence
or incidence of social unrest seem to have hardly been studied in recent years , as
empirical analysis of contentious collective action has concentrated on political opportunity structures and dynamics of protest and
repression.
This paper helps fill that gap by rigorously re-examining the effects of short-term
variations in economic growth on the occurrence of several forms of political
instability in countries worldwide over the past few decades. In this paper, we do not seek to
develop and test new theories of political instability. Instead, we aim to subject a hypothesis common to many prior theories of
political instability to more careful empirical scrutiny. The goal is to provide a detailed empirical characterization of the relationship
between economic growth and political instability in a broad sense. In effect, we describe the conventional wisdom as seen in the
data. We do so with statistical models that use smoothing splines and multiple lags to allow for nonlinear and dynamic effects from
economic growth on political stability. We also do so with an instrumented measure of growth that explicitly accounts for
endogeneity in the relationship between political instability and economic growth. To our knowledge, ours is the first
statistical study of this relationship to simultaneously address the possibility of nonlinearity and problems of
endogeneity. As such, we believe this paper offers what is probably the most rigorous general
evaluation of this argument to date.
As the results show, some of our findings are surprising. Consistent with conventional assumptions, we find that social unrest and
civil violence are more likely to occur and democratic regimes are more susceptible to coup attempts around periods of slow
economic growth. At the same time, our analysis shows no significant relationship between variation in growth and the risk of civil-
war onset, and results from our analysis of regime changes contradict the widely accepted claim that economic crises cause
transitions from autocracy to democracy. While we would hardly pretend to have the last word on any of these relationships, our
findings do suggest that the relationship between economic growth and political stability is
neither as uniform nor as strong as the conventional wisdom(s) presume(s). We think
these findings also help explain why the global recession of 20082010 has failed
thus far to produce the wave of coups and regime failures that some observers had
anticipated, in spite of the expected and apparent uptick in social unrest
associated with the crisis.

No Impact- Terrorism
No terror threat
Walt 12 Stephen M. Robert and Rene Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, "'America the brittle?'" September 10, Foreign Policy,
http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/09/09/inflating_the_terrorist_threat_again
According to yesterday's New York Times, assorted "senior American officials" are upset that adversaries like al Qaeda, the Taliban,
or the Somali pirates are not simply rolling over and dying. Instead, these foes are proving to be "resilient," "adaptable," and
"flexible." These same U.S. officials are also worried that the United States isn't demonstrating the same grit, as supposedly revealed by high
military suicide rates, increased reports of PTSD, etc. According to Times reporters Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, these developments "raise
concerns that the United States is losing ground in the New Darwinism of security threats, in which an agile enemy evolves in new ways to blunt
America's vast technological prowess with clever homemade bombs and anti-American propaganda that helps supply a steady stream of fighters." Or
as Shanker and Schmitt put it (cue the scary music): "Have we become America the brittle?" This sort of pop sociology is not very
illuminating, especially when there's no evidence presented to support the various officials'
gloomy pronouncements. In fact, the glass looks more than half-full. Let's start by remembering that the Somali pirates and
al Qaeda have been doing pretty badly of late. Piracy in the Gulf of Aden is down sharply, Osama bin Laden is dead, and his
movement's popularity is lower than ever. Whatever silly dreams he might have had about restoring the caliphate have proven to be just hollow
fantasies. And as John Mueller and Mark Stewart showed in an article I linked to a few weeks ago, the actual record of post-9/11
plots against the United States suggests that these supposedly "agile" and "resilient"
conspirators are mostly bumbling incompetents. In fact, Lehman Bros. might be the only major world organization that had
a worse decade than al Qaeda did.



Russia CP

Russia Solvency
Solvency- Latin America

New foreign policy strategy means Russia can do the aff
Paniev 2012 (Yuri, One of the great experts on Latin America, Russian Academy of Sciences, Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations,
RUSSIA TURNING ON LATIN AMERICA, v1, n1, Jan-Jun 2012 | pp.37-50 online)
Aromatic coffee, ripe bananas, fancy orchids, fiery samba, soap operas this is kind of standard Russian associations, which arise when Latin America is mentioned. And although the
peak of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the "flaming continent was left
behind in the 1970s, the modern Russia is catching up. As a result the Latin American
direction has become, perhaps, the most spectacular component of Moscows
international activities in recent years. Billions of dollars in contracts, joint projects in
various spheres, state-of-the art technologies this is what brings together Russia
and Latin American states today. Russia has diplomatic relations with all of the 33
countries in the region, with 18 of them it has agreements based on new
cooperative principles nothing of the kind has ever existed before. Some analysts
predict a new "golden age" for Russia -Latin American cooperation. According to Vladimir Davydov, the
director of the Institute of Latin America and corresponding member of the RAS, the unprecedented intensity of Russia-Latin
American dialogue is due to the fact that Russias leaders have realized the
strategic importance of Latin America. "For years the initiative was coming from
Latin America, the Latin Americans were coming, breaking through with their
exports, seeking to raise the level of political contacts. Moscow was reacting
without real inspiration, noted Davydov "Fortunately, the situation has changed drastically"2.
Nowadays Russia has the concept of its foreign policy, approved on July 12, 2008, which directly reflects
Moscow's desire to build up political and economic cooperation with the countries
of Latin America and the Caribbean, expand cooperation with them in the international
organizations, promote exports in the region of high-tech industrial products,
carry out joint projects in energy, infrastructure, high technologies, including
those that make part of the plans, developed by the regional integration
associations3.


Solvency- Mexico

Solvency
Blank 2009 (Stephen Blank is Professor of Russian National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, Russia in Latin
America: Geopolitical Games in the USs Neighborhood Ifri, RussiaNIS Center April, wwwifriorgdownloadsifriblankrussiaandlatinamericaengapril09pdf )
To support this economic and strategic agenda Moscow has made extensive
economic overtures to Latin American governments. Russia has offered them all
deals with respect to oil, gas, nuclear energy, uranium mining, electricity
generation, weapons sales, high-tech defense technology, agriculture and
cooperation with regard to space. The geographical scope of these offers covers the
whole Latin American world from Mexico, Cuba, and Trinidad in the Caribbean to Argentina and Chile in the South
although the mixture of goods and services under consideration naturally varies
from state to state

Solvency- Cuba

Russia Solves
Paniev 2012 (Yuri, One of the great experts on Latin America, Russian Academy of Sciences, Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations,
RUSSIA TURNING ON LATIN AMERICA, v1, n1, Jan-Jun 2012 | pp.37-50 online)
President Medvedev's visit to Havana in November 2008 marked the beginning of a new stage in
Russian-Cuban relations. Recalling that in Soviet times the relations with Cuba
were "quite powerful Medvedev said: "Now it is time to restore them"23. In 2009 the Chairman
of the State Council and the Council of Ministers of Cuba Raul Castro came to Moscow. During the visit a memorandum on the principles
of cooperation was signed, which has laid the foundation for revitalization of
bilateral cooperation. The agreements included joint actions to create a fair and
polycentric world order, implementation of a number of major projects, primarily
in the area of energy, transport, civil aviation, biopharmaceuticals and high-tech.
It seems that the long pause in Russian-Cuban relations is over. But it is also obvious that the
new level of cooperation will require constant efforts on both sides. Moreover, our
companies will have to retake what was once carelessly abandoned by Russia
without bothering to count the losses. Oil explored by Soviet specialists on the shelf, in which considerable resources were invested, is
now produced by Canadians, French and Malaysians As a result, "GazpromNeft, for example, had no other option but to sign an agreement with Malaysian company
"Petronas", according to which it received a 30 percent share in the joint offshore exploration and production in Cubas sector of the Gulf of Mexico Proven oil reserves in this
area are small and amount to 260 mln tons However, the total reserves are much larger: "Cubapetroleo estimates the reserves to be as high as 2.7 bln. tons, the U.S. Geological
Survey - 1.2 bln tons of oil and 21 trillion cubic meters of gas 24.
Solvency
Blank 2009 (Stephen Blank is Professor of Russian National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, Russia in Latin
America: Geopolitical Games in the USs Neighborhood Ifri, RussiaNIS Center April, wwwifriorgdownloadsifriblankrussiaandlatinamericaengapril09pdf )
To support this economic and strategic agenda Moscow has made extensive
economic overtures to Latin American governments. Russia has offered them all
deals with respect to oil, gas, nuclear energy, uranium mining, electricity
generation, weapons sales, high-tech defense technology, agriculture and
cooperation with regard to space. The geographical scope of these offers covers the
whole Latin American world from Mexico, Cuba, and Trinidad in the Caribbean to Argentina and Chile in the South
although the mixture of goods and services under consideration naturally varies
from state to state

Russia can do the aff
Blank 2009 (Stephen Blank is Professor of Russian National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, Russia in Latin
America: Geopolitical Games in the USs Neighborhood Ifri, RussiaNIS Center April, wwwifriorgdownloadsifriblankrussiaandlatinamericaengapril09pdf )
Nonetheless, Russia does have genuine interests in Latin America. Those interests are
commercial and political: the former being a means to secure the latter. In regard
to Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua those interests are more strategic and overtly aimed at
countering US influence in Latin America. Whether visiting the region or hosting
Latin American officials in Moscow, Russian officials take every opportunity to
make rhetorical declarations on a congruence or identity of interests with their
interlocutors on current issues in world politics, including construction of a
multipolar world order.45 In all cases discussion revolves around the following issues:
trade, mainly in commodities but in high-tech and industrial products where possible; energy, whereby Russia either invests
in the other states energy firms or explores for resources there; attempts to gain leverage for each sides investment in the others country; Russian offers of
arms sales and space launch services (particularly to Brazil and Venezuela).

Solvency- Venezuela

Russia can do the aff
Blank 2009 (Stephen Blank is Professor of Russian National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, Russia in Latin
America: Geopolitical Games in the USs Neighborhood Ifri, RussiaNIS Center April, wwwifriorgdownloadsifriblankrussiaandlatinamericaengapril09pdf )
Nonetheless, Russia does have genuine interests in Latin America. Those interests are
commercial and political: the former being a means to secure the latter. In regard
to Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua those interests are more strategic and overtly aimed at
countering US influence in Latin America. Whether visiting the region or hosting
Latin American officials in Moscow, Russian officials take every opportunity to
make rhetorical declarations on a congruence or identity of interests with their
interlocutors on current issues in world politics, including construction of a
multipolar world order.45 In all cases discussion revolves around the following issues:
trade, mainly in commodities but in high-tech and industrial products where possible; energy, whereby Russia either invests
in the other states energy firms or explores for resources there; attempts to gain leverage for each sides investment in the others country; Russian offers of
arms sales and space launch services (particularly to Brazil and Venezuela).


Solvency- Venezuela- Oil

Solves oil development and investment
Paniev 2012 (Yuri, One of the great experts on Latin America, Russian Academy of Sciences, Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations,
RUSSIA TURNING ON LATIN AMERICA, v1, n1, Jan-Jun 2012 | pp.37-50 online)
The fact that cooperation with Russia helps to reduce unemployment - a painful
problem for Latin America was quite convincing in case of Venezuela. The arrival
of Russian state and private corporations, such as "GazpromNeft", "Rosneft", "LUKoil", "Surgutneftegas", TNK-BP
contributed to creating thousands of new jobs in the country. Russian energy
majors, which together with the Venezuelan state company "Petroleos de Venezuela" have
formed the National Oil Consortium (PNC) are getting ready to extract "black gold" at
Junin-6 field in the oil-rich area of Orinocos delta (the estimated crude resources amount to 53 bln barrels) The development of this rich
field will take about 40 years and require total investment of 20 bln. dollars15. Just for
getting access to "Carabobo-2" oilfield, as was agreed in October 2011, "Rosneft" committed 1 bln. dollars16.investment of 20 bln. dollars15. Just for getting access to "Carabobo-
2" oilfield, as was agreed in October 2011, "Rosneft" committed 1 bln. dollars16.


Solvency- Foreign Invesment

Russia can invest in LA
Paniev 2012 (Yuri, One of the great experts on Latin America, Russian Academy of Sciences, Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations,
RUSSIA TURNING ON LATIN AMERICA, v1, n1, Jan-Jun 2012 | pp.37-50 online)
Russia's Policy in Latin America has become by far more intense. Among new
important developments here is the growth of private business activity, which is
considering the region not only as a source for imported goods - primarily food products, but
also a sizable market for Russian industrial goods, including high-tech, as well as promising area for investment. After
all, Latin America comprises rather huge and solvent market amounting to half a
billion of consumers. A good example of such developments can be the creation of the fourth generation mobile communications network in Nicaragua
by a Russian company "Yota", which in terms of quality left behind the services of other competitors. The business interest in Latin
America is being boosted by positive developments in the economy of a number of
countries, the acceleration of GDP growth and the volume of external trade, as
well as the prominent role of these states in WTO and other influential
international organizations. Most Latin American countries have been able to
withstand the shock of the global economic crisis of 2008-2009 by adopting
effective anti-crisis programs and thereby confirming their increased economic and financial stability. It is equally
important that Latin American businessmen have been actively accessing our
market establishing customer and partnership relations in Russia. As a result the
"Latin American accent" in the Russian foreign trade and foreign economic
relations is becoming increasingly more distinct.

ATs

AT: Russia CP = Arms Race

False
Paniev 2012 (Yuri, One of the great experts on Latin America, Russian Academy of Sciences, Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations,
RUSSIA TURNING ON LATIN AMERICA, v1, n1, Jan-Jun 2012 | pp.37-50 online)
Indeed, while promoting cooperation with Latin America Russia is guided by
geopolitical considerations. My country, however, is not unique when looking for ways to
expand its presence in the world using the growing trade and economic
opportunities and demands. This also applies to military cooperation and not just with
Venezuela, but also with such countries as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Peru and Chile, with which corresponding agreements were signed during 2004-2009. As a
major producer and exporter of weapons, Russia, naturally, is looking for new
markets for its products including those in Latin America. All the allegations that it
is contributing to arms race do not stand up to criticism. Here is just one eloquent fact:
the regional leader in military spending is Colombia (4% of GDP), while Venezuela spends
no more than 1.3% of its GDP25. However, arms to Colombia are not coming from Russian, they
come from the United States and France, both, incidentally, being the leading
exporters the Latin American arms market. Up to this point Russia has only
managed to get to the third place in Latin America.

Aff Answers

AT: Russia CP

Russia economic engagement fails
Blank 2009 (Stephen Blank is Professor of Russian National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, Russia in Latin
America: Geopolitical Games in the USs Neighborhood Ifri, RussiaNIS Center April, wwwifriorgdownloadsifriblankrussiaandlatinamericaengapril09pdf )
Still, while Russia will continue expanding ties with Latin America, its capacity for
deep involvement is lower than it wants as is the ability of Latin American states to
support Russian goals. This is especially true for countries like Venezuela that
depend on energy or commodities revenues, their capabilities have also declined
due to the global economic crisis. Thus Russia will only partially meet Latin
American expectations for support, even in stricken economies like Cuba.7 For example,
Russias upcoming loan of 20 million US dollars to Cuba and a possible future
credit of 335 million US dollars will enable it to buy Russian products, providing
only a minimal, short-term boost to Cubas economy8export subsidies hardly
offering mutual benefit. Likewise, Russian companies charged with developing relations
with Latin America recently acknowledged that little or no economic expansion
will occur anytime soon. For example, even though Russia and Venezuela ostentatiously
agreed to establish oil and gas companies together, Russian companies have
no liquid assets to invest in Latin America. Not surprisingly, even Venezuela displays
skepticism about Russias ability to transform its tieswhich consist mainly of arms sales into a
relationship based on large-scale investment and diplomatic coordination.9

Russia doesnt have the capacity to invest
Blank 2009 (Stephen Blank is Professor of Russian National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, Russia in Latin
America: Geopolitical Games in the USs Neighborhood Ifri, RussiaNIS Center April, wwwifriorgdownloadsifriblankrussiaandlatinamericaengapril09pdf )
However, the economic crisis will undoubtedly make itself felt here too. Cuba may want
restoration of former economic cooperation with Russia, but todays Russia
cannot afford it. Nor is large-scale Russian investment in Venezuela possible.
Accordingly projects like the plan to carry gas from Venezuela to Argentina across the Amazon basin
which was under-financed to begin with, and economically questionable as well, will
probably not proceed.83 In fact few projects have actually been signed or
carried out, or will be Medvedev sidestepped Chavezs call for a real alliance and no major agreements were signed during his trip.84 Indeed, Cuba
may be turning back to Moscow because it cannot depend any longer on
Venezuelas energy supplies due to the crisis.85 Similarly although Nicaragua seeks larger trade links between Russia, China,
and Latin American members of ALBA, the difficulties are immense. While Ortega acknowledges the presence of a crisis, it is unlikely that Moscow and Beijing will create an
ALBA monetary zone based on a regional currency as he wishes.86 For the same reason the agreement between Moscow and Caracas to trade in their national currencies may
not go far.87