Bank of The South CP - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors

NDI 2013 6WS Bank of the South
Counterplan
***Bank of the South CP***

1NC Shell Reform

The Banco del Sur authority should fund __________________ and
pass and comply with reforms that:
-divides the bank into a regional development and central bank
-passes a credit policy directed toward the strengthening of publicly owned companies

Current lack of consensus prevents bank success- reforms and inclusion of national bank
efforts would solve
(Marshall 11 -
B S N w Lkg I J P 2011)
These objectives cover a wide gamut of institutional responsibility. Given the fact that there is still no consensus on the
basic structure of the bank in its mature form, there is also no agreement regarding whether the banks should
attend to all the mentioned objectives. If Banco del Sur is only to operate as a regional development bank, only objectives 5 and 6
can be given full attention. However, if the bank functions as two entities, one resembling a central bank and the other resembling a
development bank, Banco del Sur could fulfill all the objectives listed in Table 1. In Marshall and Rochon (2010), we expand
on the framework established in the Quito Declaration (CADTM 2008) and propose a bank that would be divided between a
regional development bank and a regional central bank, which would issue a regional currency. Under this
scheme, each member country would retain all the functions of its national central bank and
would continue to use its national currency in domestic transactions. Yet under a regime of capital controls,
national currencies would not be convertible with any currency except for the regional currency, which would in turn be fully
convertible with all other currencies. As such, the central banking role of Banco del Sur would be to act as a
clearinghouse between member countries at the regional level, converting all domestic
currencies into the regional currency for international transactions. Simultaneously, its relations with the
rest of the world would not differ tremendously from a typical modern central bank, managing the price of the regional currency in
relation to currencies outside the region. Banco del Sur would therefore operate under a similar scheme as that proposed by Keynes
at Bretton Woods, favoring regional equilibrium while acting as a financial buffer between the region and the rest of the world.
This monetary framework would aid in narrowing regional imbalances and reducing capital
flight. It would also provide the necessary framework for member countries to create and channel domestic credit, although
this task would primarily be the responsibility of national banks, as will be argued throughout the rest of the paper. Such a
proposal varies from other schemes, which do not mention possible downstream linkages with
already existing publicly owned banks. Whether Banco del Sur operates as one entity or two, it is always envisioned
as an institution completely independent and apart from the entities that govern the banking systems of its member countries. As
will be argued, this vision excludes the relevant supports that national banks, in particular publicly owned
ones, could offer to the regional bank in the future and omits the role that these types of banks have played in the past,
effectively achieving many of the objectives proposed for Banco del Sur in diverse times and
places.

BOS CPNeolib Net BenefitCP solves

Counterplan solves neoliberalism--

The Bank of the South is a critical turning point for mobilizing more effective activism against
neoliberalism
(Hart-Landsberg 09, Martin Hart-Lbg P Lw k g Lg LB Bk
S: g Pb Rw 2009 V 61 I 04)
The current period is marked by three overlapping developments: the failure of neoliberalism, the crisis of the East Asian export-led
growth model, and South American efforts to advance an alternative regional development strategy. The
combination has created a political environment offering important opportunities for those committed to the international struggle to supplant capitalism. The failure of
neoliberalism to deliver its promised growth has led to the creation of anti-neoliberal political
movements throughout Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. Although a welcome development, their emancipatory potential has remained
limited, in part, because many activists and intellectuals continue to draw a sharp distinction
between neoliberalism and capitalism: while they strongly oppose the former, they remain
unwilling to reject the latter. Most tend to blame the development failures of their respective nations on government policies that liberalized, deregulated, and privatized
economic activity. Many believe that the East Asian experience demonstrates that active state direction of economic activity can produce successful capitalist development. Therefore, they have often directed
their efforts at enhancing the capacities of their respective states in an attempt to recreate East Asian economic successes. However, we are now at a point where it
may be possible to win a majority of these activists and intellectuals to an anti-capitalist
perspective, a critical change if we are to build the movement clarity and strength needed to advance a socialist alternative. One reason is that the
exploitative nature of East Asian growth is becoming clearer. Another is that the regions export-led growth
strategy has finally run up against its own limits as an ever-deepening global economic crisis, triggered by imbalances in the U.S. economy, has thrown
these economies into their own downward economic spiral. P w b g ( b -market and state-directed forms) has weakened,
the governments of a number of South American countries are working to advance new regional initiatives that have the potential to promote
and strengthen socialist-inspired development alternativesthe most significant are the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) and the
Bank of the South. Although these two initiatives do not have the explicit mission of promoting socialist transformation, they are important because they concretize the existence of
alternatives to capitalist growth strategies and, in the case of ALBA, offer support to governments that are themselves pursuing a socialist-inspired process of transformation.

The Bank of the South solvessends a global signal about the sustainability of neoliberalism
by redefining the role of emerging markets
(Paez 11, Pedro Paez, Plenipotentiary Ambassador for the Ecuadorian Government on the New International Financial
Architecture and Chair of the Ecuadorian Presidential Technical Commission for the design of Banco S F g
beyond the crisis creating an innovative Ob 2011
http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/PedroPaezInterview-en-final.pdf)
The second vector is related to the transformation of the relationship between the financial and the productive spheres in order to
recover the coherence between production and consumption, which has currently broken down due to the
exacerbated fragmentation caused by the evolutionary process of globalization and the parasitic hypertrophy of
financial capital. The development of the capitalist system in recent decades has demonstrated that the financial sector has
hijacked the process of accumulation, separating it from the productive process through financial instruments and innovation,
which rather than facilitating and empowering the development of productive forces, create mechanisms to
undermine the value generated in the real economy under the umbrella of profit and the
exploitation of society as a whole. Under this horizon, a fundamental aspect is to open space in an
economy based on a rationale that is different from the capitalist one and which is currently being
assimilated into this logic by the forces and conditions of the market. The structural crisis of capitalism as a way of production and
life, can only be overcome from a logic that puts the life of the people first, which is to say human labour, and which recognizes
another type of productive logic, another type of distribution mechanisms and a structure of incentives that give rise to processes
which, while they are not dominant under the current logic of the market and capitalist profitability, can gradually stabilize and
moreover can be replicated and are sustainable in time. Finally, the third fundamental vector of the New International
Financial Architecture, which is based on the previous two, is related to the renegotiation of the role of emerging
economies as a periphery in the international division of labour. This is built on a foundation of a new articulation between the
private capitalist economy, the role of the State and the grassroots economy in all of its diversity. On the other hand, a new
relationship between production and finances could redefine the role of emerging economies
as a periphery in the international division of labour that is now outdated. In fact, one of the clearest
expressions of the structural crisis we are currently facing is related to global macroeconomic imbalances. The logic of growth based
on the growing debt of central countries, accompanied by the creation of a semi-periphery that produces
manufactured goods and a periphery that is increasingly relegated to providing raw materials. This is absolutely
unsustainable, not only in environmental and social terms but also from the local of capital
itself.

BOS CPSolvencyEconomy
Only the CP solves the economy sustainably by avoiding neoliberalism

Solves debt dependency
(Lendman 07, Stephen Lendman, Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization, The Bank of the South: An
Alternative to IMF and World Bank Dominance, Centre for Research on Globalization, http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-bank-of-
the-south-an-alternative-to-imf-and-world-bank-dominance/7207, 29 October 2007)
Venezuelan finance minister Rodrigo Cabeza explained the bank will help develop the region by offering South
Americans more credits I bg b w bk
It also aims to increase liquidity and revive socioeconomic
development and infrastructure investments in participating countries and keep them outside the
restrictive control of the IMF and World Bank that are fast losing influence and being phased out of the region. In 2005, 80% of
IF $81 b w L T 1% w $17 b g Tk
Pakistan. The World Bank is also being rejected. Venezuela had already paid off its IMF and World Bank debt ahead of schedule
when Hugo Chavez symbolically anno 30: We will no longer have to go to Washington nor to
the IMF nor to the World Bank R wg H IF
debt, suspended World Bank loans, accused the WB of trying to extort money from him when he was economy and finance minister
2005 Bk g x he face.
The Banco del Sur will replace these repressive institutions with $7 billion in startup capital when it begins operating in 2008. It will
be under a new financial architecture for regional investment with the finance ministers of
each member nation sitting on the banks administrative council with equal authority over its
operations as things now stand. Venezuelan Finance Minister Rodrigo Cabeza stressed the banks Latin roots saying:
T g b b g gation
proj H : There will not be credit subjected to economic policies. There will not be credit that
produces a calamity for our people and as a result, it will not be a tool of domination like the international
lending agencies. Hg z b g IF Bk I-American
Development Bank (IBD) control that condemn millions to poverty through their lending practices. Helped by windfall oil profits, his
government is already doing it with an unprecendented commitment to provide financial aid and below-market priced oil to regional
S $9 b k g-controlled kind, it comes at
low cost and with good will, a cooperative spirit and few if any strings. Nb J Sgz gz z
B S Ob 10 H One of the advantages of
having a Bank of the South is that it would reflect the perspectives of those in the South (while in
IF Bk ) (g) Stiglitz met with Hugo Chavez on his visit
and praised his redistributive social policies. He also crz g b x g
() g q g g get as
b t the expense of the region and its people. Venezuelas acting
ambassador to the Permanent Mission to the UN, Aura Mahuampi Rodriguez de Ortiz, warned the world body
about Latin American debt during her participation in the General Debate on Macroeconomic Policies in October. She
: The persistence of the foreign debt of the developing countries affects negatively on
its process of development. It is not worthy to direct resources for the development of poor
countries if such resources end up directed to the payment of the foreign debt gg
economic development internally. She also spoke of the new Bank of the South, how it will help strengthen
regional integration and also fairly distribute investments and finance projects to reduce
poverty and social exclusion. A less publicized Bank of ALBA (Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas) will also begin
g b w g w g ncial
reso Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia and Nicaragua. Chavez first proposed ALBA as an alternative to the
Free Trade of the Americas (FTAA) in 2001 with Venezuela, Cuba and Bolivia its original members in December, 2004. Nicaragua then
joined the alliance in January, 2007 under its newly elected president, Daniel Ortega, who signed on as his first act in offi LB
g b I g g I
boldly based on member states complementarity, not competition; solidarity, not domination; cooperation, not exploitation; and
g g g b g rate giants. In April, the
5th ALBA summit was held in Caracas to discuss ways to improve the alliance. Initiatives covered included a Permanent
(coordinating) Secretariat and a plan to create 12 public companies to be co-managed by ALBA member states. Its goal is to
strengthen key economic sectors in areas of energy, agriculture, telecommunications, infrastructure, industrial supplies and cement
production. ALBA country foreign ministers then agreed in June to create a development Bank of ALBA to help finance these
ventures with low-cost credit. It will complement the Banco del Sur and also be headquartered in Caracas. Uncertain Future
Prospects Socially responsible regional banks, like those discussed above, will challenge the dominant
institutions of finance capital if they fulfill their promise. But therein lies the problem. These new institutions
g x w g I utonomy
w g g g w g g wg z b
industries, an end to one-way WTO-style trade deals, socially redistributing national resources, developing local economies,
achieving land and housing reform plus a sweeping commitment to social equity and a resolve to end a 25 year neoliberal
g F 1960 1980 g gw w 82% F 1980 2000 w w 9%
2000 to 2005 only 4%. For the region, it meant sweeping poverty, inequality and the most extreme disparity between the super-rich
and desperate poor in the world. Change is needed, and Venezuela under Hugo Chavez has done most in the region to achieve it.
Finance Minister Rodrigo Cabezas just g 2008 bg N b 46%
social spending. It devotes special attention to health and education but also to subsidized and free food, land reform, housing,
micro credit, job training, coope z
people. Since he took office, social spending per person is up more than threefold and in 2006 was 20.9% of GDP. Chavez now has
an ally in Ecuador under Raphael w g H w b
drafted in the next six months and then put to a national referendum next year. Other Bank of the South founding countries like
Brazil, Argentina and Bolivia, however, claim to be center-left but, in fact, embrace 1990s neoliberalism, and financial autonomy
w g The Bank of the South will only work if it fulfills a mandate to prioritize local
needs and development, not corporate ones T g w b w
member, Brazil under Lula, closely tied to Washington and in its grip. Nonetheless, small signs of change are emerging, the Bank of
the South may be one of them, and a new generation of leftist bk g wkg (b
g) g T every step forward means more power to the people and
another possible world.

The CP is the key part of economic integration
(Ogloblina 09last cited reference from 2009, Elizaveta V. Ogloblina, assistant professor of International Banking and Finance
at the Finance University of the Government of the Russian Federation Rg F: L
International Banking and Finance Department Finance University under the Government of the Russian Federation,
http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/academy/content/pdf/participant-papers/2011/april/biec-roa-nua/1regional_monetary_fund-
_the_case_for_latin_america-_elizaveta_v._ogloblina.pdf)
Finally we have arrived to the following conclusion. One of the main tasks of the Bank of the South consists in
development of effective mechanisms in overcoming the crises and its negative consequences. Otherwise
the countries would undertake uncoordinated measures, which will cause damage to the regional interests. A survey of the
new regional financial architecture leads to the conclusion that presently the Bank of the
South is the main pillar of the integration processes in the South American region. The establishment
of this financial institution is the prerequisite in emerging the common economic space. The
aspiration of the Bank is to direct the economic activity toward the real sector, to develop industrial capacities and transport
infrastructure, that will allow to co-ordinate the economic growth with the social development. Indeed, the success in the
realization of this project depends on the political will that would be embodied in the actions and accelerate the beginning of the
Bank of the South.

The presence of a large public bank in emerging markets solves all possible scenarios for
economic decline
(Marshall 11 -
B S N w Lkg Irnational Journal of Political Economy, 2011)
South America finds itself in an enviable and unique ly increase productive investment and
promote internal savings, and by doing so slowing capital flight, a credit policy directed toward the
strengthening of publicly owned companies and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) is essential. These two
types of company have several characteristics in common. On the one hand, both tend to operate exclusively in domestic markets.
As such, their survival depends on local conditions, and without interests in other countries,
there is little incentive to overlook local development in favor of channeling resources to other countries.
Beyond their incentives, the mere ability to export capital is much more limited in these types of companies. Unlike the MNC,
which often has strong ties to foreign banks that facilitate and even promote capital flight, SMEs and
publicly owned companies do not tend to maintain such ties. In addition, particularly in the case of SMEs,
entrepreneurs tend to lack both the so- phistication and the resources to profit from the export of capital. This combination of
factors leaves publicly owned companies and SMEs without many other options than saving in domestic banks. The same
local ties that promote domestic saving create incentives from greater domestic investment. A
key element in this sense is the democratizing aspect of the publicly owned company and the SME. Publicly owned companies can
certainly stray from their public mission in search of personal enrichment, but under a democratic government, changes in political
regimes can modify the institutional behavior of such companies. This is not the case with foreign-owned
companies, which can favor personal enrichment over investment required for essential services with no fear of
political repercussions in local politics.5 At the same time, a strong SME presence offers diversity to an economy. Even though
SMEs do not tend to operate in strategic sectors, their presence in other areas minimizes the economic
concentration that grants a disproportional political presence and economic control to large
corporations that can assume monopolistic or oligopolistic power in certain markets. Economic decentralization is
one of the strongest prohibitive factors in the formation and maintenance of monopolistic or
oligopolistic sectors that permit corporations to register earnings disproportionate to their
investments. Although the very presence of publicly owned companies and SMEs encour- ages domestic investment and
savings, and therefore slows capital flight, the recuperation of these types of companies requires a
coherent credit policy. After the change of government and economic model of Argentina in 2002, publicly owned banks
have given an explicit priority to the financing of publicly owned companies and SMEs. Although the characteristics of SMEs tend to
complicate their financing, Argentinean publicly owned banks maintain a strong leadership in the channeling of resources toward
this type of business, which realized roughly 70 percent of productive investment in the country following the crisis (CAME 2005).
The situation in Mexico offers a sharp contrast. Without a strong public commercial bank g
bkg - S g g g 16 S
bkg k (B x 2009) Lkw kg x b w
P x (P) F (F on),
have had to finance themselves in international capital markets in quantities to the order of $50 billion (SHCP 2009).

Cp solves the sustainability of the Latin American economies
(Marshall 11 -
B S N w Lkg I J P 2011)
The transformation in the composition of local economies was accompanied by the elimination of all filters between national economies and the global
economy. The Washington consensus, which inspired the policy of financial opening and the subsequent
g bk w g x gbz stent and growing
dollarization of the region, thereby creating a double monetary circuit in which much of investment in local currencies is converted into
dollars and saved or invested abroad, and in which the expected strength of the dollar has become one of the most important references for private
sector investment decisions (Correa 2008; Parguez 2010). The dollarization of Latin American economies has led to
persistent capital flight at times of financial calm and has created pervasive situations of
currency mismatching that have been key contributors to banking crises in the region during the
Washington consensus era. Much like previous periods of Latin American history, the Washington con-sensus period has been able to flourish through
partnerships between the local elite and their international sponsors. However, in this more recent era, much of the extraction of
wealth from the region has been achieved through MNCs and international banking
conglomerates working in conjunction and using many of the tools common to the era of financialization. As in L
history, the Washington consensus period has been characterized by the transfer of wealth, not
only out of the region but also internally, from the majority of the regions citizenry to the
local elitea fact attested to by growing levels of economic inequality. In recent years, these tendencies have been reversed to varying degrees
in South America, as the increased public participation in political processes has led to significant, yet in many cases only partial, ruptures with
Washington consensus policies in most of the region. However, particularly in the current moment of such great global
economic uncertainty, if these gains are to be consolidated, the region must continue to increase its
economic sovereignty and, in particular, reduce its dependence on external financing. As will be argued,
proposals regarding the Banco del Sur must be seen within the context of the replacement of external
financing with affordable and stable domestic financing, achievable only through the recovery of
fiscal, monetary, and credit policies, which in turn require the strengthening of the role of domestically owned firms, particularly
state-owned ones, and the recuperation of national banking systems.

Bank of the South is keyglobal institutions increase the risk of economic decline
(Jackson 08 V Jk N S T P S T IF L :
S x g Vz 2008
http://forms.gradsch.psu.edu/diversity/mcnair/mcnair_jrnl2008/files/Jackson.pdf)
There are clear benefits for Latin American countries to separate relations with the IMF.
Whatever the economics involved, severing relations with the IMF is always good politics, in Latin America in particular (Economist
2008). After Brazil's finance ministry announced that it would repay early its entire debt of $15.5 billion owed to the IMF over the
next two years, the government immediately urged Nestor Kirchner, Argentina's president, into an identical declaration. He said his
government would repay $9.8 billion to the Fund, before the end of the month. Both governments claimed they would make
financial gains from the move. Brazil saved over $900m in interest payments, and Argentina saved $842m (Economist 2008).
Through this it is shown that individual countries profit from disentangling from IMF loans and the debt they subsequently cause. In
Venezuela, leaders of several South American nations have signed a founding document to create a new body, the Bank of the
South. This institution is proposed as an alternative to multilateral credit organizations such as the International
F Bk T w w b Vz P Hg z T w g
is not, I insist, anti-globalization but globalization with a conscience -for human development, equity and democracy; globalization
b ' b Hugo Chavez (Interview w/ New Perspectives Quarterly.) While Chavez
has been mistakenly accused of Anti-Americanism and also Anti-globalization, he argues firstly for a regional globalization
that is fairer to underdeveloped countries as they are not given an equal voting power in the
current IMF decision making process. Once countries are given the opportunity to trade and cooperate on a regional
level there is a greater prospect for development to compete on a global level. Conclusions In the quantitative methods of my
study I found that IMF loans are correlated with lower GDP growth and higher rates of poverty. In
years IMF loans increased, I saw that poverty rates also increased, and GDP growth either
declined or remained stagnant. In the qualitative respect I found three distinct responses to the IMF and globalization
varying from a conservative neoliberal approach to one that favored greater economic equality in the international monetary
system. Since my research suggests that the processes of the IMF are linked to an extreme imbalance of
power, the idea of greater Latin American unification and specifically a Bank of the South as
proposed by President 79 Hugo Chavez seems the most effective approach. I would also hypothesize regional
unification across the globe would be most effective.

BOS CPSolvencyEnergy

The bank solves energy investment while avoiding neoliberal linkages of current policies
(Zibechi 07, Ral Zibechi, researcher in social movements, journalist and writer. He is a columnist and international analyst for La Jor Bk
of the South: Tw F 10 J 2007 ://wwg//-archives-60/805-bank-of-the-south-toward-
financial-autonomy)
In some ways, the Bank of the South forms part of the process of distancing their economies from
neoliberal economic policy that has characterized many of the countries in the region to one degree or another. In 2006 both
Brazil and Argentina paid off their IMF loans ahead of schedule and began to withdraw in practice from that institution. Last March,
the eleven countries of the Union of South American Nations (formerly the CSN) proposed the creation of a regional stabilizing fund
of US$5 billion7 to prevent speculative attacks on national currencies. According to the member countries, this was a means
to avoid dependence on the IMF in crisis situations, thereby creating a complementary mechanism to that proposed in
the Bank of the South. Nevertheless, in order to comply with its charter the BoS should not simply play a regional financial role but
should counteract the effects of decades of deregulation and reduced economic protection. Neoliberalism is not just an economic
creed but a determining factor in all facets of society. For that very reason the BoS cannot limit itself to competing with the IADB,
the World Bank, and the CAF in financing development projects, but should instead question the core definition of the term
"development" as understood by these organizations8. To begin with, the new bank should confront the process of
converting the planet into an object of international finance, which is a key precept of
neoliberal policy. Also, it should provide an impetus for development based on sovereignty of the peoples and integration
that is not founded on free market precepts but on egalitarian and fraternal relations between peoples, regions, and nations. As
such, the financing of large infrastructure projectsone of the main themes for all regional banksshould give priority to internal
development. Until recently, the common interpretation of the term infrastructure was that of finding the best way to link regional
countries with markets in the developed world to export their raw materials to serve multinationals and northern markets.
Argentine economist Aldo Ferrer writes, "The Bank of the South should not be considered as an
alternative to the IMF purely in the sense of its financial operations, instead it should be viewed as a bank for
investment in technological and social change. 9" Energy will be one of the first priorities of
the new bank and one of its first projects will be to finance the proposed South American Gas Pipeline, which will link
Venezuela with Argentina, passing through Brazil. This will be a real regional integration project because the
gas transport is oriented toward regional economic development as opposed to exporting it to
markets in the developed world. Finally the Bank of the South can play a decisive role in reuniting a region divided by decades of
neoliberalism. To implement the neoliberal model, its main beneficiariesthe financial institutions and monopolistic corporations
have weakened or dismantled the power of the nation state. It may be that one of the primary tasks of the BoS
could be rebuilding state control and regulations . These types of questions are at the center
of the Latin American regional agenda. The Bank of the South should not be considered an end in itself but rather a
tool to further the changes currently underway. This is its main potential. It is coming into being to accomplish this, and all other
tasks should be considered secondary. It will be, above all, a different kind of bank: its members shouldn't see it as a way of
advancing their personal careers, its funds should not be destined to accumulate maximum earnings but dedicated to fulfilling the
needs of the peoples and those who have historically been excluded.

BoS solvency for energy investment + banking reform
(Zibechi 07, Ral Zibechi, researcher in social movements, journalist and writer. He is a columnist and international analyst for La Jor Bk
of the South: Tow F 10 J 2007 ://wwg//-archives-60/805-bank-of-the-south-toward-
financial-autonomy)
The founding documents of the BoS propose the creation of a financial architecture that will bring greater autonomy to the region,
buffering it from international capital markets. "To break the vicious circle of financing in the region, where our reserves are placed
in northern banks at interest rates below what we are charged when they lend to us," the document states6. In short, the new bank
offers the dual benefits of escaping the financial controls exercised by developed countries and capital markets. The six member
countries currently have US$164 billion deposited in northern developed countries. In some ways, the Bank of the South forms part
of the process of distancing their economies from neoliberal economic policy that has characterized many of the countries in the
region to one degree or another. In 2006 both Brazil and Argentina paid off their IMF loans ahead of schedule and began to
withdraw in practice from that institution. Last March, the eleven countries of the Union of South American Nations (formerly the
CSN) proposed the creation of a regional stabilizing fund of US$5 billion7 to prevent speculative attacks on national currencies.
According to the member countries, this was a means to avoid dependence on the IMF in crisis situations, thereby creating a
complementary mechanism to that proposed in the Bank of the South. Nevertheless, in order to comply with its charter the BoS
should not simply play a regional financial role but should counteract the effects of decades of
deregulation and reduced economic protection. Neoliberalism is not just an economic creed but a determining
factor in all facets of society. For that very reason the BoS cannot limit itself to competing with the IADB, the World Bank, and the
CAF in financing development projects, but should instead question the core definition of the term
"development" as understood by these organizations8. To begin with, the new bank should
confront the process of converting the planet into an object of international finance, which is a key
precept of neoliberal policy. Also, it should provide an impetus for development based on sovereignty of the peoples and integration
that is not founded on free market precepts but on egalitarian and fraternal relations between peoples, regions, and nations. As
such, the financing of large infrastructure projectsone of the main themes for all regional
banksshould give priority to internal development. Until recently, the common interpretation of the term
infrastructure was that of finding the best way to link regional countries with markets in the developed world to export their raw
materials to serve multinationals and northern markets. Argentine economist Aldo Ferrer writes, "The Bank of the South
should not be considered as an alternative to the IMF purely in the sense of its financial operations, instead
it should be viewed as a bank for investment in technological and social change.9" Energy will
be one of the first priorities of the new bank and one of its first projects will be to finance the proposed South American
Gas Pipeline, which will link Venezuela with Argentina, passing through Brazil. This will be a real regional integration
project because the gas transport is oriented toward regional economic development as
opposed to exporting it to markets in the developed world. Finally the Bank of the South can play a
decisive role in reuniting a region divided by decades of neoliberalism. To implement the neoliberal
model, its main beneficiariesthe financial institutions and monopolistic corporationshave weakened or dismantled the power of
the nation state. It may be that one of the primary tasks of the BoS could be rebuilding state control and regulations10. These types
of questions are at the center of the Latin American regional agenda. The Bank of the South should not be considered an end in itself
but rather a tool to further the changes currently underway. This is its main potential. It is coming into being to accomplish this, and
all other tasks should be considered secondary. It will be, above all, a different kind of bank: its members shouldn't see
it as a way of advancing their personal careers, its funds should not be destined to accumulate
maximum earnings but dedicated to fulfilling the needs of the peoples and those who have
historically been excluded.

BOS CPSolvencyStability/Democracy
BoS reform and investment Solves Latin American stability/democracy
(Buono & Barra 09,Richard A. Dello Buono, Professor of Sociology at Manhattan College, Ximena de la Barra, international
NIF L Pb P L America after the Neoliberal Debacle: Another Region is
Pb 2009 g 259-261)
The Bank of the South needs to be considered from a geopolitical point of view as a strategy for
recovering sovereignty. It seeks to form new contractual arrangements that can overcome the kinds of market dynamics
b b T - cial architecture of the region and stands to give the
region greater bargaining power when negotiating with the United States and Europe. By the time of its initial formation at the end
of June 2007, the participant countries of the Bank of the South included Argentina. Brazil, Bolivia. Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay,
and Venezuela. Surinam and Guyana have also joined. On the other hand, Chile, Colombia, and Peru resisted the idea because it
would pay lower interest rates on capital when compared to other international options. (Chile, nevertheless, participates as an
observer.) T " b demarcate which countries prefer to privilege their status as
" States at the expense of greater regional sovereignty. Although Brazil ultimately agreed to join, it
backed away from the magnitude of investment initially con T w gg w
Brazilian government over its international conduct. Nevertheless, Optimists like President Rafael Correa of Ecuador think that the
Bank of the South Latin American Central Bank. He argues that it should carefully
distance itself from the logic of markets and draw closer to the logic of cooperation and development. He
also recalled that "the nancial logic privileging the interests of speculative capital has failed in
combating poverty as the World Bank and IMF stated they would, making it imperative for us to create our own
institutions with this new regional nancial logic and with the nal objective of regional
integration as the 'patria grtmde"' (Ramos, 2007). The lack of a popular character in the integrationist policies of Brazil
became once more evident in the case of the founding of the Bank of the South. lt became apparent that the project as seen by
Brazil did not intend to respond to any sort of emancipatory agenda, but rather to its interests of g g
affairs (Buela. 2007). Brazil remained stead- fastly focused on cultivating its image as one ofthe emerging international points of
reference and a worthy Latin American partner for participation in the transnational dominated global economy. Brazil's resistance
to fully participate in the Bank of the South until its novel edges were smoothed out was among other things symbolized by its
intention to force the incipient (0 g I Ig of Regional
infrastructure in South America (IIRSA) infrastructure project (Zibechi, 2007b; Ugarteche, 2007). This attempt to ensure the future
of IIRSA, largely rejected by other b b b and collateral
negative impacts on the region, via linkage to the Bank of the South would guarantee that the Banco Nacional de Desarrollo
Economico y Social de Brasil (BANDES; National Social and Economic De- velopment Bank) continued being the principal
development bank in the region. On the other hand, Eric loussaint, president ofthe Belgium-based Committee for the Cancellation
ofthe'|'hird World Debt [CAIJTM] argues for the necessity to prevent the Bank of the South from becoming trans- formed into
another World Bank whose objective would be to support transnational capital in place of improving the quality of life of the re-
gion's excluded majority. ln a surprising twist, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe decided to support the Bank of the South once it
became clear that his efforts to win * w S w gg all in the U.S. Congress. Even at the
launching of the bank, full agreement was still lacking with respect to the initial allotments of capital and the overall guidelines for
member contributions. ln the end, this resulted in a much smaller initial sum of working capital in the bank than originally con-
templated. The Bank of the South has also captured the imagination of many of the regions
social movements. In an open letter to the presidents of the Bank of the South member countries. a number of civil
society organizations acknowledge its potential role but demanded that democratic
procedures for popular participation be incorporated We believe that the Bank of the South must be part of
a unitary regional response. together with the founding of a South stabilization fund, a common regional currency, the
undertaking of audits ofi nternal and external debt claims, and the non-payment of those debts illegitimately demanded of our
countries. A response that contributes to cutting the ties of dependency with uncertain and highly
speculative global capital markets, enabling the region to channel its own savings power, stop
g w social and economic needs of the people. 'The debate on the
implementation of an autonomous South-South bank is of utmost importance, and for that reason we support the demand of
many organizations and movements in the region, that national and regional instances be created immediately in order to insure
the necessary information, participation, and consultation with the organizations in societies which will be affected by the creation
of the South Bank. We think that it is essential that the South Rank start out with clear deni- tions
regarding its resources, obiectives, organization, regulations, decision- making, management,
and operations, in such a way that: ) I g b the region's
own development with sovereignty and in solidarity. Development dened as the unfolding of the attributes,
resources, and potential of persons, communities and peoples; a process that cannot take place
without their being the principal protagonists. 2) it constitutes its capital and management structure in an
egalitarian way among the member countries. 3) It clearly defines that credit allocations will
be for the strengthening of the public and social sector; giving priority to the redistribution
of wealth and to environmental protection; contributing to the overcoming of existing
asymmetries; w their economic. social, cultural, and environmental rights and
for their g w -determination. For this reason we propose that the South Bank
direct its nancing to socially and envi- ronmentally sustainable projects and do not use them
to fund IIRSA and other mega projects, as well as extractive contaminating or socially ex- clusive investments that do not
rely on the agreement and do not benefit the affected populations. lt explicitly establishes open mechanisms
for public information and control, establishing that the bank's officials and employees will
have no personal immunity or scal privileges, that the rendering of accounts will he made known and put to the
consideration of Parliaments and of civil society, and that all information shall be considered public. We believe that all of the
b kg w S Q May 3rd, 2007, where : T g g-
ernments a mandate to provide the region with new instruments of integration. For development that must be based on
democratic, transparent, and participatory schemes that are responsible to their constituencies."
BOS CPSolvencyInfrastructure
CP has the capacity to invest in infrastructurekey priority
(Perez 10, Pedro Pez Perez, President of the Ecuadorian Presidential Technical Commission for the design of the Bank of the
S G P R NFI T T
International Financial Regime:T Bk S R Lxbg F Ob 2010 ://x-
europa.info/publications/articles/bank_of_the_south/)
The Banco del Sur is closely tied to another Latin American organization, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR or
UNASUL), founded in 2008. Slightly oversimplified, one could say that Banco del Sur is the in-house bank of UNASUR. It is possible
to identify three goals for the Banco del Sur: regional integration under the new notion of supranational sovereignty reduction
of asymmetries within and between the South American countries, and financing an alternative development The new major
development priorities agreed by the seven presidents are: food sovereignty health sovereignty energy
sovereignty, and sovereignty in knowledge production financing adequate to the popular economy deployment of physical
infrastructure with continental projections That means, on the one hand, productive investments, including support for small and
medium-sized enterprises, or for infrastructural projects which promote the growing together of the continent. On the
other, it means social investments, including those in education, the health system and sewage systems more or less the opposite
of what we are familiar with the old financial architecture institution (IMF, World Bank, etc). A regional system of health care
prevention and certification, research and development for the neglected illness that are not profitable market for the transnational
corporations, affecting basically millions of poor people, the production of generic medicines: all those projects could be developed
with Banco del Sur. The high prestige of the so-called Gas Pipeline of the South is to carry Venezuelan gas to Bolivia and Argentina.
This project may provide an important impulse for further regional development, as South America has hitherto been split between
importers and exporters of gas. Brazil and Chile, as importers, would like to diversify their imports, and become as independent as
possible from imports from Latin American countries. But also, we have the copper to wave the grid towards the most remote zone
of the continent. And also, geothermal, eolic, hydroelectric potential could be included in a continentally coherent platform of
energy provision. Food sovereignty is possible too: A regional system of virtual inventories upon the bases of a net of networks of
locally managed silos and warehouses, with the participation of the local producers, in order to guarantee a strategic reserve of food
for any contingency in the continent, mobilizing also peasant and indigenous productions, stabilizing crops prices, an adequate
system of post-harvest management, etc. Here, the Banco del Sur could help strengthen the material foundations
for regional cooperation. The expansion of the transport infrastructure is a further goal to facilitate the massive exchange
of goods, and people, for instance, with a network of railroads for the whole continent. All those projects will install
science and technology at the core of the Latin American integration process.
BOS CPSolvencyHealth System/Disease Prevention
CP solves health investmentskey priority
S G P R NFI T T
International Financial Regime:T Bk S R Lxbg F Ob 2010 ://x-
medium-sized enterprises, or for infrastructural projects which promote the growing together of the continent. On the other, it
means social investments, including those in education, the health system and sewage systems more or less
the opposite of what we are familiar with the old financial architecture institution (IMF, World Bank, etc). A regional system
of health care prevention and certification, research and development for the neglected
illness that are not profitable market for the transnational corporations, affecting basically millions of poor people, the
production of generic medicines: all those projects could be developed with Banco del Sur.
BOS CPSolvencyEducation

Counterplan solves education investmentskey priority
S G P R NFI The Transformation of the
I F Rg:T Bk S R Lxbg F Ob 2010 ://x-
sovereignty, and sovereignty in knowledge production financing adequate to the popular economy
deployment of physical infrastructure with continental projections That means, on the one hand, productive investments, including
support for small and medium-sized enterprises, or for infrastructural projects which promote the growing together of the
continent. On the other, it means social investments, including those in education, the health system and
sewage systems more or less the opposite of what we are familiar with the old financial architecture institution (IMF, World Bank,
etc). A regional system of health care prevention and certification, research and development for the neglected illness that are not
profitable market for the transnational corporations, affecting basically millions of poor people, the production of generic medicines:
all those projects could be developed with Banco del Sur.

BOS CPSolvencyAgriculture
Counterplan solves food production and priceslocal investments are sustainable
South and the Government Plenipotenti R NFI T T
I F Rg:T Bk S R Lxbg F Ob 2010 ://x-
medium-sized enterprises, or for infrastructural projects which promote the growing together of the continent. On the other, it
means social investments, including those in education, the health system and sewage systems more or less the opposite of what
we are familiar with the old financial architecture institution (IMF, World Bank, etc). A regional system of health care prevention and
certification, research and development for the neglected illness that are not profitable market for the transnational corporations,
affecting basically millions of poor people, the production of generic medicines: all those projects could be developed
with Banco del Sur. The high prestige of the so-called Gas Pipeline of the South is to carry Venezuelan gas to Bolivia and
Argentina. This project may provide an important impulse for further regional development, as South America has hitherto been
split between importers and exporters of gas. Brazil and Chile, as importers, would like to diversify their imports, and become as
independent as possible from imports from Latin American countries. But also, we have the copper to wave the grid towards the
most remote zone of the continent. And also, geothermal, eolic, hydroelectric potential could be included in a continentally
coherent platform of energy provision. Food sovereignty is possible too: A regional system of virtual inventories upon
the bases of a net of networks of locally managed silos and warehouses, with the participation of the
local producers, in order to guarantee a strategic reserve of food for any contingency in the continent,
mobilizing also peasant and indigenous productions, stabilizing crops prices, an adequate system of
post-harvest management, etc.

BOS CPSolvency-- Currency Swaps
Bank of the South nations can do currency swapsthe CP solves
(Grabel 13, Ilene Grabel, Professor of International Economics, Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of
Denver , T Rbg P I P R I 2013
http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_301-350/WP318.pdf)
The re-emergence of more populist governments in Latin America and the success of large
commodity exporters in the region have stimulated growth of regional, subregional, bilateral, and
unilateral initiatives. One such initiative is the Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR). Like CMIM, FLAR is a regional reserve pooling
arrangement; its capitalization and the modalities by which it provides financial support to distressed countries has broadened
considerably during the current crisis. Another Latin American institution, the Latin American Development Bank, has taken on an
increasingly active and important role in the region during the crisis. Latin America is also home to two new (and
related) initiatives that bear mentionthe Bank of the South and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our Americas.
In 2012 the BRICS countries (namely, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) began discussions about the creation of a new
development bank, a credit rating agency and a reserve pooling arrangement. Preliminary proposals for operationalizing these
institutions and arrangements are to be discussed at the BRICS Summit in South Africa in March 2013. There are also a variety of
bilateral initiatives among developing countries, especially involving currency swaps and mechanisms
aimed at settling trade transactions without using the US dollar as the vehicle currency (e.g., between Brazil and
Argentina, and more broadly among a group of twelve Latin American nations). During the current crisis
bk ( Bz N Bk S Bk)
have also become active lenders outside their borders and regions.

Bank of the South currency keeps interest rates lowsolves aff internals
(Paez 11 P Pz ( w b S) P
S Bk P P Pz g , Macroeconomics, Sustainable Development and Public
F S G R I F? P 7/1/11,
http://www.politicalaffairs.net/should-we-get-rid-of-the-international-monetary-fund/)
Pedro Paez: Every action of the IMF, especially in the third world, has been an obstacle to
development. Latin America has had a number of bad experiences. Adjustment and austerity policies
generated a chronic fiscal crisis. Other options are possible, linked to the formation of a sovereign
credit system and the reinforcement of the national currency. Here in Latin America, we have developed a new
architecture for finance and development: the Bank of the South [Banco del Sur], based not only on key currencies, but on local
resources and national (and soon, regional) currencies. The architecture of this new bank is the SUCRE: Unitary
System of Regional Compensation, a common currency operating outside of the neoliberal restrictions
of the euro as a savings mechanism for international monies. The Sucre, a kind of mutual credit card among national banks,
simplifies exchanges and avoids the use of the dollar. In this way, we no longer have to play with interest
rates, and each country has greater space to manage exchange, finance, and commercial
policies. Keeping the interest rate low will reduce debt servicing charges for families, businesses, and the
State, thus liberating resources for investment in the common welfare. Moreover, those resources will be
protected from the attacks of speculators and the fragilities of the international market, so we
can use them for jobs and development programs.

BOS CPSolvency--AT: Corruption
Reform avoids corruption holds banks accountable through regulation
(Marshall 09 -
Fg L : T Bk S 2009
http://desire2learn.laurentienne.ca/NR/rdonlyres/BE069B08-80B5-4AFB-BBDC-2FAD57083546/0/Wesley.pdf)
Under this scheme, the regional development bank would have the less complicated operational structure, and
would act solely as a center for the distribution of pooled regional funds and as a regulator for national
development banks that receive the funds. Member countries would agree on specific criteria for which regional funds could be
used, as well as the contributions that each member would commit, and the amount of funding that each country would receive.
Regional inequalities could be addressed through this mechanism, as poorer states, such as Paraguay, for example, would be alloted
a greater amount of funds than it contributes. Intraregional infrastructure projects would also be funded in this fashion, with each
national development or state owned commercial bank carrying out the portion of the project that corresponds to their country.
The Brazilian development bank, Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimiento Economico e Social and the Argentine state owned
commercial bank Banco de la Nacion (BN), already finance infrastructure projects between the two countries in this fashion. The
other task of the regional development bank would be to regulate and supervise national
development banks. The Achilles heel of the public bank has always been corruption, in that
governmen k g bk
control or divert their funds to politically motivated projects of little utility to the national economy. The regional
development bank would therefore receive a clear mandate to regulate banks that receive
their funds, which would state that only a certain, although ample, range of productive
endeavors would be eligible for funding. In addition, the regional 7 development bank would also be charged with
the task of supervising national banks, ensuring that received funds are used for their stated purposes in a efficient manner.
BOS CPSolvencyAT: Competitiveness
No risk of competitiveness Bank of the South is the only way to stabilize banks in the region
and prevent them from becoming neoliberal institutions
(Marshall 11 -
B S the Need for Downstream Lkg I J P 2011)
As has been stressed in this paper, banking failures are often homegrown and endogenous, and an
added benefit of a regional central bank would be the possibility of creating a criteria of bank
supervision and regulation that would be negotiated among member countries and implemented on a national level. Such
banking standards, akin to a Basel-type accord, would attempt to minimize well-known and historically reproduced credit risks that
have often led to endogenous banking crises. As the possibility of having foreign agents (in this case those of countries within the
region) regulate national banking sectors would likely be unpalatable to many, the role of the regional central bank should be limited
to the training of regulatory personnel and the exercising of moral suasion over national regulators when imbalances in national
banking systems are perceived to be growing. All binding supervision and regulation would occur at the national level. A similar
framework could be established for national publicly owned banks that provide services characteristic of a development bank.
Regionwide criteria would be agreed on, both in terms of regulatory and supervisory standards and in relation to what type of
activities could be funded by such banks when using funds from Banco del Sur, and the national banks would subsequently distribute
credit according to the established criteria. Under such a scheme, Banco del Sur would be the linchpin of
the new financial architecture of South America, but it would not represent a financial
institution that competes with any existing bank. To take advantage of installed capacity and to protect the
economic sovereignty of member states, the role of national publicly owned banks would be
strengthened in all senses; the only difference would be that they would operate under a distinct organizational logic. Unlike
bk g w the needs of international financial interests,
central banks and other national banking institutions would pursue the interest of
democratized societies, seeking full employment and equitable economic growth under the
auspices of Banco del Sur.

BOS CPSolvencyAT: Delays

Reforms solve delaygreater coordination
(Ortiz & Ugarteche 08, Isabel Ortiz, Director Global Social Justice Program Initiative for Policy Dialogue at Columbia
University, Oscar Ugarteche , Institute of Economic Research at the National Autonomous University of Mexico, Bk S:
Pg g Nb 15 2008 :///3/?b_=1353450)
It is fundamental to overcome differences among member countries and expedite the working method to
create the Bank of the South. What is at stake is not only the creation of a development bank, but al so a new
regional architecture that entails three interrelated elements: 1. A Monetary Union of the South 2. A monetary
stabilization fund , the Fund of the South 3. A Bank of the South that utilizes existing reserves for regional development. South
America is not alone in this attempt to change the international financial architecture from a regional perspective. The tough reality
that all developing countries face is the current transfer of resources from the South to the North. As shown in the graph below,
since 2000, instead of wealthy co untries in the North transferring capital and development aid to the countries in the South, it is the
reverse: unbelievably, poor countries finance rich countries, resulting in a negative flow of capital from South to North2. It is
necessary to stop to this flow. It is essential that the savings generated in developing countries are not
used to finance consumption in the North, but invested in the development of Southern
countries. Asia with its Chiang Mai Initiative, the Middle East with its Bahrein Initiative and most recently Africa, are all
embarking on processes similar to Latin Ameri I g w g g w I
currency is still not being used despite it was designed and ready to be operational back in 2002. Until now, the Asian bond market
has only served for public bonds and has not yet started to issue private bonds. The process of designing a basket of currencies in
the Middle East is in an intermediate phase, no hints as to when it may be put into practice. The Bank of the South will have a fund
of collateralized guarantees for issuing bonds so that it can keep South American savings and international reserves circulating
w g T L Bk S w b rms of
policy space as well as for the additional funds it will provide to invest in the region. The time for this is now, when the financial crisis
in the United States is turning into an international crisis. Problems with the Work ing Method to Create the Bank of the South To
date, the Bk S decision-making system consists of (1) setting up Ministerial Summits, which
are followed by (2) meetings of experts from the National Technical Commissions who implement the
decisions taken by the Ministers of the member countries. G g g g
Ministers from big countries, the first Ministerial Meeting after signing the Founding Charter on Dec. 9,
2007, did not happen until 120 days later, on April 15, 2008, in Montevideo. Worse, only another Ministerial Summit
has followed since, on June 27 in Buenos Aires, and it was called with such little notice that only four ministers could attend. As a
result, the minutes from Montevideo have notbeen ratified by all countries. The system of first having a Ministerial Meeting and
later a meeting for the National Technical Commissions has proved to be slow and ineffective. It would be much more
efficient and adequate to agree on some terms of reference, and to commission a technical
team that would carry out the work without interruptions, to be later be approved and/or
modified by the member countries. This is a normal working method used by multilateral
development banks and regional organizations, it would speed up the process enormously .
BOS CPSolvencyAT: Funding
Bank of the South has access to 20 billion
(Kilpatrick 10, Alejandro Kilpatrick, Programme Coordinator, Latin America and the Caribbean and the Climate Change
F Pg Sg g g: B S http://global-
mechanism.org/en/News/Spearheading-regional-natural-resource-sovereignty-Banco-del-Sur, 6/14/10)
As a development bank 'with a difference', Banco del Sur (Bank of the South), seeks to break away from traditional bank
business and promote innovative approaches to tackling today's development challenges. Banco del Sur sees development as an
issue of sovereignty and has made achieving regional sovereignty in terms of food, energy, healthcare and natural resources its
ultimate goal. It stands out from the crowd as being the only regional financial institution to have made natural resource
management and combating land degradation a strategic priority. Founded in December 2007, Banco del Sur fosters the
economic and social development of countries belonging to the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) -
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela by promoting South American integration in the
framework of a new regional financial architecture that will enjoy a stable, regional monetary system and its own currency and will
no longer be dependent on international finance. Its anticipated portfolio for the first 10 years is around USD 20
billion. These funds will come exclusively from the region and will be utilized in the region. Non-
lending mechanisms will be the Bank's 'quality stamp'.

It could pull reservescountries have massive savings to invest in the plan
(Tamayo 07, Eduardo Tamayo G., journalist, PHD at the Universidad Andina Simn Bolvar in Quito, correspondent in Latin
I g LI N T Bk S b
5/18/07, http://www.other-news.info/2007/05/the-bank-of-the-south-in-debate/)
Technical committees for the project had met four times within the previous month, demonstrating the political will of these six
countries to bring about the Bank of the South. The May meeting of the Finance Ministers in Quito and the presence at this
gathering of the President of Ecuador, Rafael Correa, is another indicator of the eagerness to realize this initiative. The Bank of
the South would begin with an initial capital of 7 billion dollars, $600 million of which would be contributed
by Venezuela. What is the purpose of the Bank of the South? Minister Patio indicated that the motivation is fundamentally
financial and economic. The six above-mentioned countries have combined international reserves of
$164 billion deposited in banks within the United States and Europe. However, he added that, paradoxically, Our
countries have all these savings gaining interest at very low interest rates, while concurrently they seek
out financial assistance from the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Inter-American Development
Bank (IADB). Our countries have an immense amount of savings that could be used to address our
b w bg bj (1) I w w
institutions paid out to the region in 2005, the IADB spent $4,898 million, the WB $5,087 million and the Andean Development
Corporation (CAF) $1,337 million. This totals $11,322 million, while together we have $164 billion in savings. We have in reserves ten
tim w 2005 w g w P

No disads--- more funding would emerge from consolidation of regional banks into one
financing authority
(Ortiz 08 Ib Oz Nw South-S : O Rg B S
International Development Economics Associates, January 2008)
In 2007 and early 2008, countries from MERCOSUR and ALBA associated to create alternative Banks, Banco del Sur (Bank of
the South), and Banco del ALBA (Bank of ALBA). [4] Several member countries, very critical of the roles of the IMF and the World
Bank, intend that Banco del SurALBA become an instrument of South-South solidarity and fair development.
This alternative to the IFIs is expected to be combined with either a Fund of the South or a
revamped Latin American Reserve Fund (known by its Spanish acronym FLAR), as a regional monetary
fund w b g gainst financial risks. The founding charts of both
Banco del Sur and Banco del ALBA assign one country- one vote, which is an important advance as compared to the rest of
multilateral banks who assign votes according to contributions (so richer countries remain in control). The Bank of the
South intends to raise $7 billion in paid-in capital.

Each member would be obligated to donate 7 billion in capitalamounts to over 35 billion
(SiBCI 6/12 Bk S Nw I F Bolivian System of Communication and Information
(SiBCI), 6/12/13, http://www.sibci.gob.ve/2013/06/bank-of-the-south-new-international-financial-architecture/)
The Bank of the South (Banco del Sur) cabinet will define schedules for capital payments of the new regional financial
institution, made up by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela. The issue is part of
the agenda approached in the first meeting of that organ, detailed Venezuelan Finance minister Nelson Merentes, setting up the
activity in Caracas, on Wednesday. Authorized resources for its Bank of the Souths operation adds up to 20
billion dollars and its capital is 10 billion dollars, with initial capital of 7 billion dollar per partner, stipulates the
g gement, endorsed in September 2009.

BOS CPSolvency--AT: Instability
Counterplan is key to the integration of the regionno risk of instability
(Mallen 07, Roberto Mallen, COHA Research Associate , BNK OF TH SOTH: NOTHR STP TOR LTIN RIN
INTGRTION H b 7 2007 ://wwwg/bk-of-the-south-another-step-toward-
latin-american-integration/)
Integration has been a recurrent theme on Chvezs political agenda g k b
more regional-centric ALBA (Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas) which is given reality by the oil concessions Venezuela has
negotiated with various Latin American countries, as well as his most recent proposal for a development bank for South
America, which has been given the working title of Banco del Sur (Bank of the South). The Bank of the South
appears to be one of the regions most compelling projects leading towards authentic Latin American financial
bolstering, as well as helping to allow for a new-found autonomy. It appears that for the first time in its history, the region actually
will have its own entirely autonomous financial institution with each of its members having one vote and which is most likely
scheduled to be capitalized from $7 to 8 billion dollars. This large institution will be capable of promoting
financial integration and cooperation b j it will support the development of badly
needed infrastructure projects, especially in the energy sector. This initiative has the support of seven
South American countries (Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay) in addition to several other
Caribbean and Asian nations that already have expressed varying degrees of interest in the project.
BOS CP--AT: Squo SolvesOther Banks
Other banks reinforce the Washington consensusonly reforming the Banco del Sur solves
(Paez 11, Pedro Paez, Plenipotentiary Ambassador for the Ecuadorian Government on the New International Financial
Architectu P T g B S F g
beyond the crisis creating an innovative Ob 2011
http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/PedroPaezInterview-en-final.pdf)
In Latin America, for example, there are more than 100 development institutions and banks operating at
multilateral , regional, sub-regional, national and even sub-national levels. A significant number of these development banks
were linked to the industrialization through import substitution project that had been in place in the region since the
1970s and involved both the World Bank and the InterAmerican Development Bank. Paradoxically these institutions have
gradually moved away from their original purpose. For example, only two years ago the InterAmerican
Development Bank was forced to recognize it had lost more than 20 percent of its social capital due to investment in toxic assets.
Here the natural question arises as to why a development bank for Latin America is making speculative
investments in the United States? Without a doubt, there will be justifications related to treasury management and other
questions, but this only demonstrates the de-naturalization of these types of banks. The same could be said about the Latin
American Development Bank or CAF and the IDB itself in creating loans that have names like Combat
Poverty but in reality are in fact loans to finance consultations on poverty which tend to be linked
to a short list of consultants who basically reproduce the vision and the concepts of the Washington
consensus regarding these problems. In this way, the perspective of the development banks as investment banks on priority
issues for regional development such as the construction of infrastructure for example, have been abandoned and in their place
these development institutions are converted into regional instruments that also represent the old international financial
architecture.

***AFF Answers***
AT: BOS CP--Cant SolveCorruption
CP would avoid anti-money laundering policiesresults in large-scale corruption. Regulations
dont solve.
(Orsak & Valero 08, Brian Orsak, managing editor of ComplianceAdvantage.com and
g news division since 2008, and a reporter for the company since March
2007 V F Y S bk
g L k g 01 2007 ://wwww-
check.com/media/d/content_pressarticle_reference/FortentRijock200708.pdf)
Financial institutions should also be concerned that the organization will become a haven for corrupt
politicians seeking to continue their influence even in the wake of criminal scandals, said Ricardo
Tondo, an AML consultant based in Buenos Aires. Argentina has attached itself to the Banco del Sur to
shelter its corrupt officials as officials of that bank, T L b x ex-
president Antonio de la Rua, who was named president of Mercosur b Even
if the organization adopts FATFs AML and counter terrorism financing standards, it will have
little impact on how money is distributed , according to Antonio Hyman-Bouchereau, counsel for the IMF. T
bk anti-money laundering policies are in no way a priority for Chvez w
about the anti- g bk Whatever the concerns over Banco
S g gz L TF b g Lk
an economist at Carnegie Mellon University and the Washington, D.C.-based think tank, the American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research.

US involvement is keyCP causes corruption and money laundering, destroying solvency
(Camargo 07 P g B S S F S T g Rg
Rk Pg Ob 26 2007 ://sis.net/2007/10/26/banco-del-sur-is-a-slush-fund-for-sponsors-of-
terror-drug-running-criminals-mafias-racketeers-and-propagandists.aspx)
In the next two weeks, agents from the Chavez government and Soros-backed NGOs [using the phrase loosely] will unveil their new
plans for Banco Del Sur. With no legitimate bank charter and no intentions whatsoever to perform as a development-
investment bank, Banco del Sur should be denounced on arrival for what it is. And what it is ...is a slush fund
for criminal racketeering, money laundering, mafia thugs and propagandists for the New Man of the New World
Order. Crime of this magnitude is not new, it is not manly, and it is not order. What it is however is a composite
of the worst forms of undemocratic acts of repressive economic fascism with a singular focus to bribe and cajole regional
militaries and so called political leaders [off the books] in to a regional blockade on functional financial performance, ceding all
common ground on legitimate financial performances to a singular and extremely dirty
Chavez-backed slush fund. We know this because Hugo Chavez is adding more and more requirements to his latest full
powers act, sometimes called constituent constitutional assemblies. In return for a 30 hour work week at full pay, Chavez promises
to remove any autonomous Central Bank and hold full control over all of Venezuela's government. He does anyway if any cared to
look. Chavez controls the military, the paramilitary, the courts, the Congress, the media and now all financial institutions.
Meanwhile, our utterly disreputable man on the job, always shilling for his real boss from Chile who now works as a consultant for
George Soros, tells us that as long as Chavez pretends that he has actual opposition political parties, Chavez is just all right with the
OAS and is doing a great job. Insulza, you see, is enabling Chavez's dictatorship and his ruinous Banco del Sur because it will weaken
the World Bank-InterAmerican Development Bank demands for globally accepted transparency and operational funding. Chavez and
Insulza think this is a good idea. This is not a good idea and as such legitimizes criminal rackets whose dirty monies are deep and
wide now. Read what Insulza says about Chavez's new fascist governmental plans here. Ignoring the Catholic church, human
rights groups, citizen groups- and the truth- in Venezuela and all normative standards for legitimate governance, Chavez's paid
clowns justify the Chavez end to free speech in Venezuela by repeating their manipulative mantra.." .`Restricting information isn't
restricting the people's right to be informed,' pro-Chvez lawmaker Desire Santos Amaral said. Ìt's avoiding abuses, excesses.'''
And Insulza puts the frosting on this cancer producing cake by telling us he is "concerned" about the many Chavez constitutional
installations now dividing South America in to two regions: one with Chavez already, bought and sold and the other struggling with
the enormous bribery to buy their souls also. The HERALD reports, "But Insulza downplayed concerns that proposed changes in
Venezuela would lead to the establishment of a Cuba-style single-party state, saying Chavez ìs not saying anything about eliminating
the parties in opposition.'" Insulza is a liar. He was never more than a useful Chilean functionary for his socialist president, third rate
at that. Today his ruinous approach to democracy is paving the way to hell for Latin America. Insulza knows very well that Chavez
permits so called opposition in Venezuela for window dressing- in name only- function. There is not one meaningful voice permitted
in Chavez's replica of Castro's prison gulag now. To claim otherwise, as Insulza does, is ethically irresponsible and shows how
degenerated he has become. Insulza's crime is not that he prefers to remain uneducated: he is surrounded by advisors constantly
ranging from Chris Dodd's staff to the total panoply of the Soros pro Chavez, anti Uribe forces of chattering NGOs. Insulza seems to
believe that their assessments hold more value than the oath he took of his high office and does now jigger democracy's tenants to
maintain the onward march of Chavez's socialism-communism-economic fascism- Bolivarianism...call it what you will but never call it
democracy or legitimate, for it is not. Banco del Sur is presented as a legitimate development fund. It is
called a bank. It is not a bank and it is not legitimate. The first thing about a bank- any bank- is integrity and
reporting of facts. Chavez will not permit the facts about his Russian money men, his Iranian
movers and transporters nor his money laundering, sometimes called offshore derivatives
gambits. One cannot legitimize what is not legitimate.
AT: BOS CPCant SolveBacklash
The counterplan causes regional backlash and political divisions that turn instability
(Germain 08 S G J S Bk S R
Sg? Lw B Rw F 2008
http://www.lexisnexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sr&csi=173459)
On taking office for a third term, Mr. Chavez moved quickly to nationalize a number of utilities and has set
in motion another constitutional reform. However, it is unclear whether a majority of voters
support the shift to greater state control. Opinion polls consistently show that Mr. Chavez's support is based on his pro-poor
policies and the rise in real incomes in recent years, rather than ideological support for socialism. His drive to 'deepen the
revolution' could potentially erode support for the government, particularly if at the same time the
government fails to effectively address concerns such as crime, corruption and housing, or if the
economic environment deteriorates. That said, a cohesive opposition leadership is not currently in sight. n107 Recently, Chavez refused to renew
the license of Radio Caracas Television (RCTV), the country's most influential television station, because the station has been openly hostile toward
President Chavez. n108 RCTV supported the coup against Chavez in 2002 and it refused to bend to government directives, Chavez's decision to shut it
down "shows the outright authoritarianism and arbitrary character of the Venezuelan leader." n109 Chavez's decision to shut down RCTV also "reflects
the ineffectiveness of the mechanisms of control which, in democratic systems, balance and [*845] rectify possible abuses on the part of the executive
branch." n110 Although approximately 70 percent of the public was against the closing of RCTV, it happened because of the voi d of any truly
independent institutions in Venezuela. n111 In Venezuela, Chavez is impossible to escape; he is pictured on billboards, posters, and murals, where he is
seen "hugging children, embracing old women, chanting slogans, and plugging energy saving Cuban light bulbs into sockets." n112 The Bank of
the South seems to be both indicative of and an exacerbation of the current political climate
of Latin America. It illustrates the trend of rising nationalism and regionalism in Latin America
as well as the backlash against Washington-based lending institutions that seemed to have done little to quash poverty in Latin America. It also
demonstrates the rift that has formed in Latin America between those countries that still
support the United States and those leftist leaders who follow Chavez. As with most of Chavez's initiatives, the Bank of
the South would not be possible without oil money, demonstrating the rise of resource nationalism in South America generally, but in Venezuela
particularly giving Chavez the ability to economically dominate the South American market and thus politically dominate Venezuela.
AT: BOS CPCant SolveInstability Turn
The CP results in a regional divide that prevents solvencycauses a power struggle between
Brazil and Venezuela
(Germain 08 S G J S Does the Bank of the South Really
Sg? Lw B Rw F 2008
In Latin America, there has been a gradual division into pro-and anti-Chavez nations, and these
divisions also mirror differing attitudes concerning Washington, Chavez's nemesis. n68 "Many officials voice concerns that creation
of the bank will serve to highlight, if not exacerbate, the growing ideological divisions in the region
between left-leaning and more conservative governments, and between those with cool and those with warm relations with
Washington." n69 These regional divisions have risen as a result of "the radicalization of Venezuela and the growth of an anti-
American camp - backed since last year by elections in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua." n70 It may not be that clear-cut. But
imperial overreach by the Bush Administration, and the Iraq debacle, have created a power vacuum that Chavez ... is exploiting.
[Chavez], who seems to fancy himself as Castro's successor, has big plans, casting himself as a populist leader of a revolution, that,
fuelled by petro-dollars, will make Venezuela the linchpin of a rejuvenated continent with elected left-governments in Brazil, Bolivia,
Chile, Ecuador, and Argentina. n71 The United States has made an effort to counter Chavez's aggressive grab for regional
influence by promoting "a year of engagement with Latin America... but many wonder if it is too little too late." n72 "The
diverging views of the project point to the contrasts between Brazil's president, Luiz de Silva, a longtime socialist
who embraced market-friendly policies once in power... and Mr. Chavez, who favors a more assertive role for Venezuela's
government in guiding economic policy here and elsewhere in the region." n73 Brazil and Venezuela have differing ideas
about the proposed Bank of the South. n74 The location of the Bank's headquarters is one such example. n75 Brazil
would like the headquarters to be located in a neutral country, instead of the Venezuelan strong holds of Caracas and Buenos Aires.
n76 Additionally, their views on the role of the bank differ; Chavez's wants the Bank to replace the IMF and World
Bank by usurping its role in the region and financing infrastructure projects. n77 Alternatively, Brazil sees it purely as a development
bank. n78 [*842] The debate over the Bank is evidence of a larger power struggle between Brazil
and Venezuela. n79 And while Brazil's President maintains a good relationship with President Bush, he also maintains a close
relationship with Mr. Chavez. n80 Recently, though, Brazil has begun to distance itself from Venezuela on several key issues. n81 In
March, Brazil's communications minister made a comparison between Venezuela's state run television system and Cuba's. n82 This
is the closest Brazil has come to publicly recognizing and criticizing the apparent anti-democratic drift of Mr. Chavez's Presidency.
n83 Brazil has also rebuked Bolivia's treatment of Petrobras, Brazil's state owned energy firm. n84 Last year, Bolivia's president
"nationalized" oil and gas, an idea backed by Mr. Chavez, which forced Petrobras to accept harsh new terms for its Bolivian
operations. n85 Mr. Morales then issued a decree granting Bolivia's state-owned YPFB a monopoly on the sales from Petrobras's two
Bolivian refineries, basically usurping their cash flow. n86 At this point, the Brazilian government spoke out against the property grab
saying that it could hurt the relationship between the two countries. n87 Petrobras then issued an ultimatum that Bolivia either had
to buy the two refineries for a fair price or face international arbitration. n88 Experts say that the "ostensibly warm
relations between Chavez and Lula mask an intense competition for political and economic
influence ... Venezuela has used oil revenue to win allies, but Lula is employing diplomacy and his prestige as an up-from-the-
factory former union leader who is now Brazil's widely respected head of state." n89 "The Brazilian president has been a strong
proponent of South American integration, a vaguely defined goal that most leaders on the continent endorse in theory. But Lula has
departed from Chavez's anti-U.S. vision of integration, failing to embrace, for instance the Venezuelan's plan for a 'Bank of the
South.'" n90 The emergence of a pro-Chavez, anti-Washington alliance in Latin America has caused concern within the Bush
administration, and as a reaction they have warmly embraced Lula as a moderate leftist and elevated him as a role model for the
region. n91 The two countries recently traded visits, symbolizing efforts to expand Lula's profile in order to offset Chavez's ever-
increasing image. n92

That causes Latin American instabilityBrazil is on the brink of withdrawing as a regional
power now
(come F J x Vz I S P S Vz Lg R
R w Bz g P O P g 2010 http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/5175-
1442-5-30.pdf)
According to the International Monetary Fund, Brazil is the 8th economic power in the world, and represents 40% of the Latin American and the Caribbean GDP,
and 55% of the South American GDP (Arnson/Sotero, 2010). This has helped Brazil to outstand as a global player, being a part of what
g g w I T w ts through the joint effort conducted together
with Turkey to promote an agreement between Iran and the permanent members of the UN Security Council. In this regard, the wish of becoming a permanent member in this
Council once its extension is approved, has been present within the last years. However, it has been remarked (Hurrel in Arnson/Sotero, 2010) that an
ambiguous stance prevails concerning the assumption of regional leadership. However, it has focused
in undertaking an important role to maintain the regional political stability, always encouraging dialog and
negotiations between conflicting parties, whether within the domestic (Bolivia, Venezuela) or bilateral (Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador)
level. In the last year, there is a perception that it is rather withdrawing, that it is determined to pursue its role as a global player
without the problems typical to leadership in a conflictive region, especially in the Andean sub-region. There is the perception that both Mexico and Brazil, the major play- ers,
do not wish to assume the costs of a regional leadership in this sense. It is perceived that there are increasing tensions between its roles as a global and a regional player.
Regarding this debate about the Brazilian leadership, we should ask ourselves whether its
neighbors are willing to accept it. This is an especially relevant question both to Argentina and Venezuela. On the
other hand, ideological discrepancies with Colombian and Peruvian governments pose setbacks. Particularly In the case of Venezuela, as previ- ously stated, a controversial issue
has been whether a competition for regional leadership is unfolding, in spite of the apparent good relations between both neighbors,. There have been speculations as to the
fact that Venezuela, based on its energy power, pursues a Current Challenges for Disarmament and Peace Operations on the Political Agenda 87
leadership that has even been announced as a part of its international strategy. A feeling of an increasing tension between the UNASUR and the ALBA can emerge as an
alternate perspective, but with an asymmetrical relation between Venezuela and the other members.
AT: BOS CPCant SolveFunding
The CP cant leverage sufficient capital for the planzero reserves available
(Conger 09, LUCY CONGER, covers Latin America for publications including Institutional Investor, Emerging Markets, and
B Nw T R Fg P FBRRY 12 2009
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/02/11/the_end_of_the_revolution)
Even before trouble hit the oil market, Chavez was having problems turning his dream of a
unified Latin America into reality. His main regional initiative, the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), was
intended to obstruct the U.S.-promoted Free Trade Area of the Americas. To put teeth into ALBA, Chavez launched
the Banco del Sur, a regional bank signed into existence in December 2007 by founding members Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Banco del Sur hoped to raise between $7 billion and $10 billion
that would be used to capitalize loans for social programs and for an interlocking grid of highways, bridges,
waterways, ports, and power lines. But Banco del Sur still does not have any paid-in capital, nor has it named
officers or staff. And it is not yet engaged in development funding. Early on, Brazilian officials obstructed Chavez's
hopes for tapping neighboring countries' international reserves to capitalize the bank by saying their reserves were
off-limits. Venezuela has signaled it would put up 70 percent to 80 percent of the bank's capital, but hasn't yet delivered.
Venezuela's failure to come up with the cash could have long-term diplomatic consequences.
Venezuela's good relations with other Latin American countries are largely based on Chavez's largesse -- generous donations of oil
and aid, and indirect assistance in aircraft, vehicles, and personnel. No one knows how much has been spent on oil diplomacy. The
biggest ticket item -- donations of crude oil and derivatives to Cuba topping 94,000 barrels a day -- was valued at $3 billion in 2008,
according to some estimates. In Bolivia, where U.S. aid now totals $125 million annually, Venezuela is expected to exceed U.S.
assistance levels. But Chavez's lavish promises to create or upgrade refining capacity in five countries (Brazil, Cuba, Jamaica,
Nicaragua, and Vietnam) have only been fulfilled so far in one country -- Cuba.

The Bank of the South couldnt sustainably solvenot competitive
(Swann 07 Sw R Bkgw L L S Ig z' Bk
S b 9 2007 ://wwwbbg//w?=w&=48Bww)
The Venezuelan government has said the new poverty-fighting bank will have starting capital
of around $7 billion. The governments involved haven't yet determined how they'll divide contributions to the bank or
whether it will turn to capital markets to increase its lending power. The bank will struggle to compete with
existing regional development funds should it fail to secure a strong credit rating, analysts said. This
year, the Inter-American Development Bank, based in Washington, is on course to lend around $8 billion, according to the Bank
Information Center, a Washington-based research organization that monitors international lenders. ``Their capital will
quickly disappear if they do not leverage their funds like other banks,'' said Vince McElhinny, a Latin
American analyst at the Bank Information Center. Countries joining the Bank of the South include Brazil, Latin America's biggest
economy, as well as Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay. Chile, the country with the region's highest credit, has
declined to join. Credit Ratings None of the bank's supporters have an investment grade credit rating.
Both the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank enjoy AAA credit ratings because
of the backing of the U.S. The Corporacion Andina de Fomento has an A+ credit rating from Standard & Poor's. The
rating of any new multilateral lender would also hinge on the commitment of its member
countries, said John Chambers, managing director of sovereign ratings at Standard & Poor's. `Ìt's important that the member
countries provide strong backing for the institution and that they support its priorities,'' Chambers said. The Bank of the
South could be unsettled by disagreements about its role among its leading members. Chavez,
who called President George W. Bush ``the devil'' in a speech last year at the United Nations, is followed in his anti-American stance
by only Ecuador and Bolivia.

Cant solve large scale developmentsminimal capital
(Lawrence 07, Joyce Lawrence, a PhD candidate in political economy and international relations at the Massachusetts Institute of
Tg g IR/PS w k L g m:
Venezuela's P B S 6/11/7 http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/015/6797.pdf) The initial impact of
Banco del Sur will be small compared to the IMF or World Bank. The six countries currently
involved hold international reserves of $164 billion, but the total contribution to the fund is expected
to be $7 billion. The total funds will be $2 billion more than these countries currently contribute to the IDB, but still
substantially smaller than the $100 billion in operating capital of the IDB. The ability for Banco del Sur to act both
as a development lender and as a support mechanism for balance of payments crises is
questionable given the limited funds. Were a severe financial crisis to hit Latin America, countries
would almost certainly look to the IMF . While the scale of Banco del Sur is not large, it symbolizes the desire for an
alternative to current IFIs and more regional financial cooperation. More than just another source of financing, which is already
plentiful, Banco del Sur looks like a political project to increase the anti-imperialist credentials of Chavez. As such, it should be
viewed as an attempt to draw Latin American countries away from the U.S. politically rather than simply another development
project.

AT: BOS CPNBCant Solve Neolib
Cant solve neoliberalismother countries wont commit to withdrawing from neoliberalist
institutions
(Lawrence 07, Joyce Lawrence, a PhD candidate in political economy and international relations at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, graduated from IR/PS with a career track in international politics and a Latin America regional focus,
: Vz' P B S 6/11/7 http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/015/6797.pdf)
Although six countries have committed to joining Banco del Sur, the details of its governance and mission, and the criteria for
lending have yet to be determined. The countries held a preliminary meeting in Ecuador and have agreed to sign the first manifest in
June 2007. One of the primary issues to resolve is whether Banco del Sur will be another
development lender along the lines of the regional development banks or become a crisis lender like the IMF.
While Venezuela has the most extreme view of the bk w IMF,
World Bank, and IDB, other countries have not committed to withdrawing from these
institutions. President Lula of Brazil sees this as an opportunity to push forward with development projects in infrastructure
within Mercosur. Argentina is trying to make sure than neither Venezuela nor Brazil can dominate the group. The smaller countries
are primarily interested in an alternative to financing controlled by U.S.-influenced conditionality. Energy policy is a key area that
divides the members, since oil dependence helps Chavez while Brazil is a leader in biofuels. Competitive dynamics between
Venezuela and Brazil may influence the organizational rules.

Other regional banks solve and crowd out the counterplan
(Barrionuevo 07, Alexei Barrionuevo , American news journalist who writes the Big Deal column for the American newspaper
T Nw Yk T Bk S b Vz bg k Nw Yk T Ob 22 2007
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/22/business/worldbusiness/22iht-bank.4.8001944.html)
Several issues remain unresolved about how the Bank of the South would function, including how much
capital each country would commit, what its lending conditions would be and whether the members would have equal voting
rights. Mantega, Brazil's finance minister, said it was still unclear whether Brazil and Venezuela would enter the bank with higher
capital levels. Brazil appeared to make a major concession recently, however, when Mantega said that each country would have
voting rights in the bank's administrative council. Meanwhile, development banks already based in the
region, like the Corporacin Andina de Fomento in Caracas, are waiting to see how an institution more closely aligned with
Chvez's political objectives will compete in granting loans. The new bank could struggle to be competitive
with the Inter-American Development Bank, especially, which has investment-grade status in the
international markets due to the participation of the United States and other developed
nations, and thus obtains resources at relatively low cost. None of the future partners of the Bank of the
South borrow on terms readily available to rich, industrialized nations.
AT: BOS CP-- Currency SwapsCant Solve
CP mechanism requires regional currencies, a dollar-based currency swap is key
(Chauvin 12, Lu gg k J Bk S g gg k 3/19/12
http://www.emergingmarkets.org/Article/2997115/Bank-of-the-South-gets-more-credit.html)
Pedro Paez, Ecuadors former coordinating minister for economic policy, said the Bank of the
South was an opportunity for the new financial architecture required in the region to safeguard it against
future international crises. The Bank of the South is designed to maximize local currencies. It would
allow countries access to a basket of local currencies to finance development without having
to use the US dollar T w g b gg w

AT: BOS CP--Perm Solvency

US led multilateral development banks are shifting away from neoliberal modelsthe
permutation solves best
(Grabel 13, Ilene Grabel, Professor of International Economics, Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of
Denver , T Rbg P I P R I 2013
http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_301-350/WP318.pdf)
I have suggested that changing world circumstances have placed the IMF in a position of having to adjust to
policy innovations by countries that no longer are under its control. 20 Certainly a new pragmatism at the institution is apparent. But there is also a
deeper transformation underwayone operating at the ideational level. Today IMF staff economists and leading academic
(neoclassical) economists have pulled back from fullbore advocacy of the neoliberal development
model, and have even taken steps toward elaborating a theoretical and empirical case for capital
controls. The rapid succession of financial crises over the past two decades may be having the effect of encouraging those
economists at the IMF who have long had reservations about the neoliberal model to give voice
to their concerns and to assert themselves more effectively and consistently, particularly now that views on capital
controls by academic economists are evolving rather significantly. After all, economists at the Fund are not immune to the loss of confidence of many
economists in the models, theories and policy tools that have long dominated professional practice. A recent statement by the IMFs Chief
Economist, Olivier Blanchard, is instructive in this regard: We have entered a brave new
world. The economic crisis has put into question many of our beliefs. We have to accept the
intellectual challenge *B 2012:225+ My arguments about ideational change complement those advanced by
constructivists (as discussed briefly in the introduction to this paper). However, I do not intend in what follows to engage in process tracing. Instead, I
intend to explore diverse forms of evidence of ideational change regarding capital controls in the economics profession and within many quarters of
the IMF.

Permutation solvesintegrates Latin American concerns into neoliberalist institutions
(Lawrence 07, Joyce Lawrence, a PhD candidate in political economy and international relations at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, graduated from IR/PS with a career track in international politics and a Latin America regional focus,
: Vz' P B S 6/11/7 http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/015/6797.pdf)
By either ignoring or overreacting to Chavez, the U.S. would only help his cause and alienate its neighbors in Latin America.
However, full support of the bank is not realistic since its primary purpose is to undermine U.S.-supported financial institutions.
Therefore, option 3 is the most realistic and beneficial for the U.S. While the U.S. could easily sit back and wait
for Banco del Sur to experience the problems that afflict any multilateral organization, it
should instead take advantage of this opportunity to address at least some of the complaints
of developing countries within the current institutions. The IDB could make significant
improvements in transparency while allowing Latin American countries a larger voice. There will
naturally continue to be conflict between borrowing and lending countries, but even some progress in incorporating the
views of the borrowers could be viewed as a success. The U.S. should not support the elimination of conditionality,
but showing some willingness to compromise on the strictness of the measures would be a positive sign. New
voting rules including increased votes for developing countries would also be viewed favorably, although this may involve difficult
negotiations with Europe. 6 Ultimately, small steps that encourage the involvement of Latin American countries in the future
direction of the IMF would help reestablish the U.S. as a partner in the region. A policy of active engagement with Latin America to
address concerns about conditionality and unfairness within the IFIs is the only way to change the root cause of the anti-
Americanism that Chavez has so effectively exploited.

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