Legal Cases Jan-Dec 2011

DIGESTED CASES
2011

LEGAL ETHICS

January- grejean may atale
February- Shai Saldaa
March- cristobal rimando
April- Kristine angeles
June- faye caraig
Jully- james castillo
August- Kristine angeles
September- Janine mabilangan
October- mark ignacius
November- mark ignacius
December- Janine mabilangan

January

Jessie R. De Leon vs. Atty. Eduardo G. Castelo,
A.C. No. 8620, January 12, 2011.

Facts:
- On April 29, 2010, administrative case, which Jessie R. De Leon initiated, concerns respondent
attorneys alleged dishonesty and falsification committed in the pleadings he filed in behalf of the
defendants in the civil action in which De Leon intervened.
- On January 2, 2006, the Government brought suit for the purpose of correcting the transfer
certificates of title (TCTs) covering two parcels of land located in Malabon City then registered in the
names of defendants Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu due to their encroaching on a public callejon
and on a portion of the Malabon-Navotas River shoreline to the extent, respectively, of an area of 45
square meters and of about 600 square meters.
- De Leon, having joined Civil Case No. 4674MN as a voluntary intervenor two years later (April 21,
2008), now accuses the respondent, the counsel of record of the defendants in Civil Case No.
4674MN, with the serious administrative offenses of dishonesty and falsification warranting his
disbarment or suspension as an attorney.
-Attorney; dishonesty. Respondent was accused of filing various pleadings on behalf of parties who
were already deceased
-On September 3, 2010, the complainant submitted a reply,1[6] whereby he asserted that the
respondents claim in his comment that he had represented the Lim family was a deception, because
the subject of the complaint against the respondent was his filing of the answers in behalf of Spouses
Lim Hio and Dolores Chu despite their being already deceased at the time of the filing. The
complainant regarded as baseless the justifications of the Office of the City Prosecutor for Malabon
City in dismissing the criminal complaint against the respondent and in denying his motion for
reconsideration.

Issue:
- Weather or not respondent committed dishonesty and falsification

Held:
- Respondent lawyer was found not liable as he had disclosed in a pleading the death of the deceased
parties and the fact that he was representing the successors in interest of the deceased parties.
-The respondent, as attorney, did not commit any falsehood or falsification in his pleadings in Civil
Case No. 4674MN. Accordingly, we dismiss the patently frivolous complaint.
- To all attorneys, truthfulness and honesty have the highest value A lawyer must be a disciple of
truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing
of any in court and he shall conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. He should bear in mind that as
an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of
the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion. The courts, on the other hand,
are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. While
a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his clients rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in
defense of his clients cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth.

Judge Philbert I. Iturralde, et al. vs. OIC Branch Clerk of Court Babe SJ.
Ramirez, et al.,
A.M. No. P-03-1730, January 18, 2011.
Facts:
-On November 24, 1998, Judge Paterno G. Tiamson, RTC, Branch 69, Binangonan, Rizal, rendered a
judgment in the civil case based on a compromiseagreement submitted by the parties On the
plaintiffs motion, the court issued an order on August 18, 2000 directing the issuance of a writ of
execution. The complainants alleged that they did not receive a copy of Judge Tiamsons order
granting their motion; neither did Ramirez issue the writ of execution.
- On September 18, 2000, exactly a month after Judge Tiamson issued the order, Judge
Iturralde and Gumarang went to the court to inquire into the status of their motion. They came upon
clerk Flordeliza who appeared surprised when she saw them. She also appeared at a loss, nervous and
apparently unaware of what to tell them. She seemed not to know where the records were, and acted
as if she was waiting for somebody to tell her what to do. They insisted that Flordeliza look for the
records. When the records were found, they discovered to their dismay that the court order (with the
original and all carbon copies) was still attached to the records. They claimed that at that point the
defendants already had a copy of the order.
-On July 3, 2002The plaintiffs, however, found the writ to be defective as it had no case number and
the two principal defendants both natural persons were only mentioned in the case title as ET
AL.
-They believe that the defects were designed to hide the principal defendants identities and to
frustrate the garnishment and/or levy. Realizing the devious scheme employed by the Branch Clerk
of Court and to correct the same,2[6] the plaintiffs manually wrote the names of the principal
defendants, Renato J. Marias and Felix B. Marias, and also the case number
-On July 29, 2002, the plaintiffs again brought Salvador to the Metrobank head office to withdraw
the garnished amount. For the second time, Salvador refused to enforce the alias writ of execution
and even challenged Judge Iturralde to file an administrative case against him. Salvador claimed
that there were still issues to be resolved, at the same time admitting that the non-enforcement of
the writ was upon Judge Tiamsons instructions. No temporary restraining order (TRO) or
injunction, however, had been issued to lawfully stop the enforcement of the writ.
-The respondents were accused of failing to serve a court order and delaying the issuance and
implementation of the writ of execution. Due to this negligence, the writs implementation was
delayed for almost two years, thereby gave the defendants sufficient time to conceal and/or dissipate
their assets to thwart plaintiffs efforts to recover in full the judgment awarded to them. Court
employees bear the burden of observing exacting standards of ethics and morality. This is the price
one pays for the honor of working in the judiciary. Those who are part of the machinery dispensing
justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must conduct themselves with utmost decorum
and propriety to maintain the publics faith and respect for the judiciary.
Issue:

Weather or not Court personnel; conduct prejudicial to service.

Held:
-Respondents Ramirez, Flordeliza and Salvador deserve to be sanctioned, but we differ in the
degree of the respondents culpability and in the imposable penalties.
-Respondents were held guilty of conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service.

Reina Edenlyne Garcia vs. Robert V. Alejo, Sheriff IV, RTC, Br.
142, Makati City,
A.M. No. P-09-2627, January 26, 2011

Facts:
- March 14, 2008, Reina Edenlyne Garcia charges Robert V. Alejo, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court
(Branch 142), Makati City, with Gross Misconduct, Gross Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the
Interest of the Service for having been in the payroll of Concorde Condominium, Inc. (Concorde for
brevity), a plaintiff in Civil Case No. 00-1547 entitled Concorde Condominium, Inc. v. Pulp & Paper,
Inc.
- The complainant claims to be the legitimate president of Concorde, a domestic corporation engaged
in real estate development and management which, since 1999, has been managed and controlled by a
group of what she described as usurpers purporting to be the officers of Concorde. The complainant
alleges that when the legitimate board of directors took over the management of the corporation, it
was discovered that, in order to maintain power, anomalies and irregularities were committed by the
usurpers including conspiring with people who willingly cooperated with the former.
- The complainant alleges that one of the people with whom the usurpers conspired was Sheriff
Robert V. Alejo. She submitted a copy of the summary of expenses for legal fees by Concorde which
showed that the respondent was allegedly paid sheriffs fees without court approval.
- The complainant also alleges that Sheriff Alejo had been in the payroll of Concorde since January
2005, having received a monthly allowance of P2,500 as evidenced not only by the aforementioned
summary of expenses for legal fees but also by photocopies of the checks issued by Concorde in the
respondents name the dorsal portion of which showed that it was respondent himself who encashed
the checks using his Supreme Court identification card. Another cash voucher dated July 27, 2004
showed that the respondent received the amount of P12,500.00 as advanced sheriffs fees, which
amount was taken from the rent collected from a tenant of Concorde named Dra. Anduiza.
- The complainant asserts that the respondent had been acting as an employee of Concorde by
collecting rentals from the tenants of the said corporation and that he had been receiving a monthly
allowance of P2,500.00 as compensation.
- The complainant claims that these arrangements, i.e., receiving fees without court approval and
monthly allowances, explains the respondents precipitate actions in serving the courts writs and
processes to the complainant and to the tenants of Concorde.
- May 14, 2008, respondent Sheriff Robert V. Alejo vehemently denies the charges made against him
by the complainant, declaring the accusations as baseless, groundless, founded on pure speculations
and conjectures and devoid of any factual and legal justifications. He avers that the instant complaint
is purely a harassment suit against him and that he was merely performing his ministerial functions
in serving the writs and processes issued by RTC (Branch 142) in connection with Civil Case No. 00-
1547.
- The respondent likewise claims that he rejected the offer of compensation because of the existing
prohibition on court employees. He, however, finally consented to accept the minimal amount of
P2,500.00 to cover transportation and other incidental expenses.

Issue:
-Weather or not Court personnel; dereliction of duty.
Held:
- Robert V. Alejo, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 142, Makati City, is SUSPENDED for six
(6) months without pay for dereliction of duty and violation of office rules and regulations as well as
the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel. Alejo is also STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar offense in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Office of the Court Administrator vs. Marissa U. Angeles, etc./
Judge Analie C. Aldea-Arocena vs. Marissa U. Angeles, etc.,
A.M. No. P-11-2887/A.M. No. P-10-2880, January 18, 2011.

Facts:
- A.M. No. P-10-2880 arose from the 1
st
Indorsement, dated February 19, 2008, with
accompanying documents of Judge Analie C. Aldea-Arocena [Municipal Trial Court (MTC),
Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija] to Executive Judge Cicero D. Jurado of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 38, San Jose City, informing him of the alleged failure of Ms. Marissa U. Angeles (Clerk of
Court of the MTC, Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija) to remit/deposit cash and bail bonds and other
collections of the
- On March 12, 2009, pursuant to the Courts Resolution of November 26, 2008, the case records of
A.M. No. P-06-2276 (formerly OCA IPI No. 03-16-03), entitled Beatriz F. Villar v. Marissa U.
Angeles, were transmitted3[5] to Judge Florendo, prompting her to request that she be given the
authority to investigate A.M. No. P-10-2880 in her capacity as Executive Judge.
- In the resolution4 consolidating the two cases, the Court directed Angeles to (1) restitute the balance
of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) shortage of P398.20, and submit to the OCA the machine-
validated copy of the deposit slip as proof; and (2) submit valid documents that withdrawn cash
bonds and undeposited cash bond collections amounting to P64,200.00 and P64,000.00,
respectively, were deposited in the Courts Fiduciary Fund (FF) savings account, or were refunded to
the concerned bondsmen/litigants; otherwise, to restitute these amounts.
-The Court also directed Ms. Ligaya G. Linsangan, court interpreter and former OIC clerk of
court of the same court, to (1) restitute P3,000.00, representing withdrawals of cash bonds. bond
collections amounting to P40,000.00, otherwise, to restitute the amount; and submit to the OCA
valid documents (court order, acknowledgement receipt or official receipt) supporting the
withdrawals made on the Courts FF savings account, amounting to P15,695.98.

-The Court likewise directed Mrs. Nirvana P. Rubi, OIC court interpreter, to submit to the OCA
valid documents supporting the withdrawals made on the FF savings account amounting to
P11,000.00.
-Finally, the Court directed Judge Arocena to ensure strict compliance with the Courts
issuances, particularly on the handling of judiciary funds, to avoid repetition of the same
accountability problem that involved Angeles and Linsangan.
- Respondent failed to (1) immediately account for and return the excess in the cash bond she
received; (2) issue appropriate receipts; (3) safekeep monies received; and, (4) remit/deposit cash
bonds in the government depository upon receipt.

Issue:
-Weather or not Court personnel; dishonesty.

Held:
-WHEREFORE, premises considered, Ms. Marissa U. Angeles, Clerk of Court II, MTC,
Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija, is declared LIABLE for dishonesty and grave misconduct, and is
DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits, if any, and
with prejudice to her re-employment in any branch or service of the government, including
government-owned and controlled corporations.
-The Court Management Office of the Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to validate
and confirm Angeles compliance with the Courts directives of March 9, 2009; otherwise, part or the
whole of what Angeles shall receive as accrued benefits should answer for her accountabilities, if any.

Report of the Financial Audit Conducted on the Books of Account
of Sonia L. Dy and Atty. Graciano D. Cuanico, Jr., RTC, Catarman
Northern Samar/Virgilio O. Gallano vs. Atty. Graciano D.
Cuanico, Jr., Clerk of Court and Sonia L. Dy, Social Welfare
Officer II etc.,
A.M. No. P-07-2364/A.M. No. P-11-2902. January 25, 2011.
Facts:
- In 2007, a Financial Audit Team (OCA Audit Team) from the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) conducted an audit of the books of account of Sonia L. Dy (Dy), Social Worker II and former
Officer-in-Charge, and Atty. Graciano D. Cuanico, Jr. (Cuanico), incumbent Clerk of Court, of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Catarman, Northern Samar. The audit on Dys accountability covered
the period from July 2002 to July 31, 2003, while that of Cuanicos covered the period from August
2003 until February 28, 2007.
- August 29, 2007, the Court adopted the OCA Audit Teams recommendations. The employees
involved were required to comply with the Courts directives. Only Cuanico, Divina D. Mendez
(Mendez), and Helen C. Anaviso (Anaviso) filed their respective explanations.
-In her explanation, Anaviso denied the allegations against her. She narrated that, on September 12,
2003, one Juanita F. Estacio came to the Office of the Clerk of Court to post a P5,000.00 cash bond.
Since Dy was not around, Anaviso received the amount and issued the official receipt. Anaviso
claimed that she could not deposit the amount because she did not know the bank account number
and she was not authorized to make the deposit. Upon Dys return, Anaviso turned over the amount to
her. Dy then stamped the official receipt cancelled. When the case was dismissed, the bondswoman
filed a motion for the release of the P5,000.00 bond.
- September 19, 2006, when the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted a confirmation audit, that the
discrepancies came to light. Prior to said confirmation audit, he had failed to detect any discrepancy
between the amounts reflected in the original copies of the official receipts and those in the duplicate
and triplicate copies, because Dys anomalous transactions were cleverly planned. He narrated that
the duplicate and triplicate copies of the official receipts, except those found by the audit team to be
missing and those acknowledged by Dy as lost, conformed to the amounts deposited in the offices
accounts. Even the COA auditors, in an earlier audit, failed to detect the discrepancies.
- The OCA audit team discovered unreported and unremitted collections that respondent made in
connection with his duties. The Court found him guilty for dishonesty and grave misconduct. He
violated OCA Circular 50-95, which states that all collections from bail bonds, rental deposits, and
other fiduciary collections shall be deposited within 24 hours by the Clerk of Court concerned, upon
receipt thereof, with the Land Bank of the Philippines. Likewise, he violated OCA Circular 26-97,
which directed judges and clerks of court to compel collecting officials to strictly comply with the
provisions of the Auditing and Accounting Manual citing Article VI, Sections 61 and 113 which
required collecting officers to promptly issue official receipts for all money received by them.
Issue:
Weather or not Court personnel; dishonesty.
Held:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Court finds:

(1) ATTY. GRACIANO D. CUANICO, JR. liable for Simple Neglect of Duty, and is
SUSPENDED from office for six (6) months effective immediately. He is STERNLY WARNED
that a repetition of the same or a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely; and

(2) SONIA L. DY and DIVINA D. MENDEZ both guilty of Dishonesty, and are
DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except leave credits, with
disqualification from reemployment in any government office, including government owned or
controlled corporations. SONIA L. DY is hereby ORDERED to IMMEDIATELY RESTITUTE
the balance of the shortage incurred in the Fiduciary Fund amounting to P2,576,586.44.

The FISCAL MANAGEMENT OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR,
is ORDERED to process the terminal leave pay of Sonia L. Dy, dispensing with the usual
documentation requirements, and to APPLY the same as part of the restitution of the shortages in
the Judiciary Development Fund and Fiduciary Fund.

The OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR is also DIRECTED to file the
appropriate criminal action against respondents Sonia L. Dy and Divina D. Mendez.

EXECUTIVE JUDGE NORMA MEGENIO CARDENAS is REMINDED to exercise
effective supervision over the personnel of her court, especially those charged with the collection of
the Fiduciary Fund and other Trust Funds.

Office of the Court Administrator vs. Victorio A. Dion, Former
Clerk of Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San Fabian-San
Jacinto, Pangasinan,
A.M. No. P-10-2799, January 18, 2011.
Facts:
- On February 22, 1996 plaintiff in Civil Case 832 (SJ-96), Rhey Osborn P. Columbres v. Gerardo R.
Abarcar, deposited P30,000.00 with Dion as required by the court and for which he issued a mere
temporary receipt. Dion explained that the plaintiff pleaded with him not to deposit the money with
the courts fiduciary fund anymore since the parties were going to settle the case and he wanted to get
his money back immediately.
- Three years later or on January 8, 1999 the plaintiff in Civil Cases 913 and 922, Letecia N. Herrera
v. Perfecto Cerezo, also deposited P30,000.00 with Dion as required by the court but Dion did not
report the collection nor did he deposit the money with the courts fiduciary fund account.5[3] Nine
months later on October 8, 1999 Judge Madronio ordered the release of the P30,000.00 to plaintiff
Herrera. Dion paid her on October 11, 1999 by withdrawing the amount from the fiduciary fund
account.
- On July 30, 2007 the audit team leader had a dialogue with Dion. He tried to refute the evidence
presented against him, but in the end he admitted the misdeed. Later, he settled his accountability.
- The OCA audit team discovered unreported and unremitted collections that respondent made in
connection with his duties. The Court found him guilty for dishonesty and grave misconduct. He
violated OCA Circular 50-95, which states that all collections from bail bonds, rental deposits, and
other fiduciary collections shall be deposited within 24 hours by the Clerk of Court concerned, upon
receipt thereof, with the Land Bank of the Philippines. Likewise, he violated OCA Circular 26-97,
which directed judges and clerks of court to compel collecting officials to strictly comply with the

provisions of the Auditing and Accounting Manual citing Article VI, Sections 61 and 113 which
required collecting officers to promptly issue official receipts for all money received by them.

Issue:
Weather or not Court personnel; grave misconduct.

Held:
- WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS Victorio A. Dion guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct and
DISMISSES him from the service effective immediately. All benefits except accrued leave credits that may
ordinarily be due him are ORDERED forfeited with prejudice to re-employment in the government service
including government-owned and controlled corporations.

Office of the Court Administrator vs. Jose M. Ramano, Deputy
Sheriff, Regional Trial Court, Branch 140, Makati City,
A.M. No. P-90-488. January 25, 2011.

Facts:
- January 2004 was filed against respondent Claudio M. Lopez (respondent), Process Server of the
Municipal Trial Court of Sudipen, La Union, for violation of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA
9165), otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
-An Information was filed against respondent for possession of dangerous drugs. Consequently, an
administrative complaint was filed against him. The Court defines misconduct as a transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence
by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption,
willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by
substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of
grave misconduct. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or
fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit
for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. An act need not be
tantamount to a crime for it to be considered as grave misconduct as in fact, crimes involving moral
turpitude are treated as a separate ground for dismissal under the Administrative Code.
- On 29 April 2009, respondent submitted a one-page answer/comment
4
alleging that a criminal case
docketed as Criminal Case No. 3064 for violation of RA 9165 was pending before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 34, Balaoan, La Union (RTC-Br. 34) and that from the evidence presented, it was clear
that the prosecution failed to prove its case and that the case might be dismissed. Respondent
prayed that the instant complaint be dismissed.
-On 17 June 2009, this Court issued a Resolution
5
noting respondents answer/comment and referred
the administrative matter to the OCA for designation of an investigating judge to conduct an
investigation.
-Judge Ferdinand A. Fe (Investigating Judge), Acting Presiding Judge of the RTC-Br. 34, was
designated investigating judge to conduct the investigation and thereafter submit a report and
recommendation on the administrative matter.
Issue:
Weather or not Court personnel; gross misconduct.
Held:
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS respondent Claudio M. Lopez, Process Server of the Muncipal Trial
Court of Sudipen, La Union, from the service with FORFEITURE of all benefits, except accrued
leave benefits, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government including government-owned or controlled corporations. This decision is immediately
executory.

Office of the Court Administrator vs. Merlinda T. Cuachon and Fe
P. Alejano, Court Stenographer, MCTC, Ilog-Candoni, Negros
Occidental,
A.M. No. P-06-2179, January 25, 2011.

Facts:
- On July 6, 1990, complainant Jose S. Dela Riva filed before the Sandiganbayan, an
Information for violation of Section 3 (f) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, against respondent Jose M.
Ramano (Ramano) for alleged extortion, deliberate delay in serving court processes, and refusal to
levy, relative to Civil Case No. 35349. The complaint against Ramano was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 15166 entitled People of the Philippines v. Jose M. Ramano

- On August 7, 1990, pursuant to the En Banc Resolution dated March 12, 1981, then Court
Administrator Meynardo A. Tiro filed the instant administrative case against Ramano.

-Subsequently, in a Resolution dated August 27, 1990, the Court required Ramano to file his
Comment on the instant complaint.

-In his Comment, Ramano adopted his previous Comments filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan. He maintained his denial of the charges against him. He
reiterated that the delay in the implementation of the Writ of Execution was due to complainant Dela
Rivas continued and unexplained refusal to consult with his lawyer, as well as his failure to locate and
point out the properties to be levied upon. He vehemently denied complainant's allegation of
extortion and his demand for a 35% share on all recoveries.

-On October 10, 1990, the Court resolved to hold in abeyance the administrative proceedings in
the instant case pending judgment in Criminal Case No. 15166.
-On November 4, 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision convicting Ramano for
violation of RA 3019. Ramano moved for reconsideration, but was denied on June 15, 1992. The
petition for review on certiorari was also dismissed by this Court and, subsequently, an entry of
judgment was issued on March 25, 1993. Later, due to Ramano's failure to appear during the
promulgation of judgment on June 15, 1993, the court ordered his arrest. To this date, Ramano
remains at-large.
.
- On February 13, 2008, the Court referred the instant administrative matter to the OCA for
evaluation, report and recommendation.

- On May 19, 2008, in its Report, the OCA considered the Sandiganbayan's findings that
Ramano refused to take any sincere or determined effort to implement the Writ of Execution in
order to compel complainant Dela Riva to agree to his demand for a 35% share in whatever may
be collected. It concluded that Ramano's refusal to perform his duty was deliberate and was
adopted as a means to obtain some consideration.
- Respondent sheriff refused to take any sincere effort to implement the Writ of Execution in order to
compel the complainant to agree to his demand for a 35% share in whatever may be collected. The
Court found the respondent guilty of gross misconduct. Time and again, the Court has pointed out the
heavy burden and responsibility which court personnel are saddled with in view of their exalted
positions as keepers of the public faith. They should, therefore, be constantly reminded that any
impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions must be
avoided. Those who work in the judiciary must adhere to high ethical standards to preserve the courts
good name and standing. They should be examples of responsibility, competence and efficiency, and
they must discharge their duties with due care and utmost diligence, since they are officers of the
court and agents of the law.

Issue:
Weather or not Court personnel; gross neglect of duty.
Held:
- WHEREFORE, the Court finds JOSE M. RAMANO, Deputy Sheriff, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 140, Makati City, GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT and orders his DISMISSAL from
the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if
any, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.

Corazon Tenorio, represented by Imelda Tenorio-Ortiz vs. Alyn
C. Perlas, Sheriff III,
A.M. No. P-10-2817, January 26, 2011
Facts:
- On December 22, 2008, Sheriff Perlas, accompanied by other persons, arrived at her store,
Ten Rey Gravel and Sand and Construction Materials, located at No. 377 McArthur Highway,
Corazon, Calumpit, Bulacan. Upon their arrival, Sheriff Perlas served upon her a Notice of Levy on
Attachment clearly addressed to spouses Edgardo Pile and Marissa Pile (spouses Pile) of Apalit,
Pampanga. Tenorio emphasized that Sheriff Perlas served the notice in a discourteous and arrogant
manner.

-After this, Tenorio showed Sheriff Perlas the Certificate of Car Registration of their two (2)
units of dump trucks and pleaded to her not to take the trucks away because they were the registered
owners of the trucks. However, despite this, Sheriff Perlas forcibly took the two (2) units of trucks
without even verifying with the Land Transportation Office (LTO) as to who were the true registered
owners of the trucks.

-Aggrieved, Tenorio filed a Complaint-Affidavit dated January 12, 2009 before the Office of the
Court Administrator, charging Sheriff Perlas with Oppression, Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct
under RA 6713 and with Violation of RA 3019. According to Tenorio, Sheriff Perlas used her public
office as Sheriff to oppress and harass her. Further, Tenorio said that the humiliating manner by
which Sheriff Perlas rudely and insolently served the Notice of Levy on her caused her serious mental
anxieties, moral shock, and sleepless nights.

- Respondent sheriff levied on the trucks of the complainant even if the notice of levy was addressed
to another person. The complainant claimed ownership of the trucks but the respondent sheriff went
ahead with the levy without taking steps to first ascertain the trucks ownership. Well-settled is the
rule that [t]he duty of a sheriff in enforcing writs of execution is ministerial and not discretionary.
However, errors in the levy of properties do not necessarily give rise to liability if circumstances exist
showing that the erroneous levy was done in good faith. In the instant case however, the conduct of
respondent is inexcusable. The facts clearly show that the two (2) trucks seized by her did not belong
to the addressee of the notice but to herein complainant.

Issue:
Weather or not Court personnel; misconduct.
Held:

Freddy Reyes vs. Vivian Pabilane, Court Interpreter, MTC,
Tagkawayan, Quezon, A.M. No. P-09-2696, January 12, 2011.

Facts:
- For consideration are the findings and recommendations of the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) in its Memorandum of August 26, 20086 on the financial audit conducted in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Ilog-Candoni, Negros Occidental. A financial audit was
conducted because of respondent Clerk of Court Merlinda T. Cuachons (Cuachon) compulsory
retirement on November 25, 2005. The audit covered transactions from September 1, 2000 to
September 30, 2005, and included the books of account of respondent Fe P. Alejano (Alejano), Court
Stenographer and designated Officer-in-Charge (OIC)Clerk of Court from September 1, 2000 to
March 15, 2001.
- Resolution dated July 11, 2007, the Court directed Alejano: to pay and deposit her shortage of
P12,800.00 in the Fiduciary Fund (which amount resulted from the re-computation of Alejanos
accountability based on additional documents presented); to furnish the Fiscal Monitoring Division,
Court Management Office, OCA, with the machine-validated deposit slip as proof of compliance
thereto; and to explain why she failed to record in the cashbook and report to the Court the amount of
one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) she had collected pertaining to the unaccounted and missing OR No.
116544551 dated December 12, 2000.

-In a Letter dated March 28, 2008,Alejano asked the Court, for clearance purposes, for a
clarification of the status of her accountability. She also stated that she had tried her best to recover
the necessary documents to prove that the funds were not used for her personal gain. As of November

14, 2007, Alejanos remaining accountability showed a balance of nine thousand eight hundred pesos
(P9,800.00), after the OCA considered the additional documents she had submitted.
- Respondent failed to reflect in the minutes of the hearing the correct documentary evidence marked.
A court interpreter is duty-bound to prepare and sign the minutes of court sessions which is an
important document, for it gives a brief summary of the events that take place thereat including a
statement of the date and time of the session; the name of the judge, clerk of court, court
stenographer, and court interpreter who are present; the names of the counsel for the parties who
appear; the parties presenting evidence; the names of the witnesses who testified; the documentary
evidence marked; and the date of the next hearing.

Issue:
Weather or not Court personnel; simple neglect of duty

Held:
- WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds as follows:
1. MERLINDA T. CUACHON, Clerk of Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Ilog-Candoni,
Negros Occidental, GUILTY of gross neglect of duty for which she is FINED five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00), to be deducted from her retirement benefits.
2. FE P. ALEJANO, Court Stenographer, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Ilog-Candoni, Negros
Occidental, GUILTY of gross neglect of duty for which she is FINED five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00). She is also directed to RESTITUTE the amount of nine thousand eight
hundred pesos (P9,800.00) as payment for her remaining accountability. Both amounts are
to be deducted from her retirement benefits.
3. The Financial Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator, is directed to
RELEASE respondent MERLINDA T. CUACHONs retirement benefits and the monetary
value of her accrued leave credits, deducting therefrom five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) as
payment for the fine imposed.
4. The Financial Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator, is directed to
RELEASE respondent FE P. ALEJANOs retirement benefits and the monetary value of
her accrued leave credits, deducting therefrom five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), as
payment for the fine imposed, and nine thousand eight hundred pesos (P9,800.00), as
payment for her remaining accountability.
5. Presiding Judge VICTOR P. MAGAHUD of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Ilog-
Candoni, Negros Occidental, is directed to CLOSELY MONITOR the financial
transactions of the court; otherwise, he can be held equally liable for the infractions by the
employees under his supervision. He is advised to STUDY and IMPLEMENT procedures
that shall strengthen the courts internal control over financial transactions.

Report of the Financial Audit Conducted on the Books of Account of Sonia L. Dy
and Atty. Graciano D. Cuanico, Jr., RTC, Catarman Northern Samar/Virgilio O.
Gallano vs. Atty. Graciano D. Cuanico, Jr., Clerk of Court and Sonia L. Dy, Social
Welfare Officer II etc., A.M. No. P-07-2364/A.M. No. P-11-2902. January 25,
2011.
Facts:
- On July 6, 1990, complainant Jose S. Dela Riva filed before the Sandiganbayan, an Information for
violation of Section 3 (f) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, against respondent Jose M. Ramano
(Ramano) for alleged extortion, deliberate delay in serving court processes, and refusal to levy,
relative to Civil Case No. 35349. The complaint against Ramano was docketed as Criminal Case No.
15166 entitled People of the Philippines v. Jose M. Ramano.
- Thus, on August 7, 1990, pursuant to the En Banc Resolution dated March 12, 1981, then
Court Administrator Meynardo A. Tiro filed the instant administrative case against Ramano.

-Subsequently, in a Resolution dated August 27, 1990, the Court required Ramano to file his
Comment on the instant complaint.

-In his Comment, Ramano adopted his previous Comments filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan. He maintained his denial of the charges against him. He
reiterated that the delay in the implementation of the Writ of Execution was due to complainant Dela
Rivas continued and unexplained refusal to consult with his lawyer, as well as his failure to locate and
point out the properties to be levied upon. He vehemently denied complainant's allegation of
extortion and his demand for a 35% share on all recoveries.

-On October 10, 1990, the Court resolved to hold in abeyance the administrative proceedings in
the instant case pending judgment in Criminal Case No. 15166.
On November 4, 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision convicting Ramano for violation
of RA 3019. Ramano moved for reconsideration, but was denied on June 15, 1992. The petition for
review on certiorari was also dismissed by this Court and, subsequently, an entry of judgment was
issued on March 25, 1993. Later, due to Ramano's failure to appear during the promulgation of
judgment on June 15, 1993, the court ordered his arrest. To this date, Ramano remains at-large.
- On February 13, 2008, the Court referred the instant administrative matter to the OCA for
evaluation, report and recommendation.

-On May 19, 2008, in its Report, the OCA considered the Sandiganbayan's findings that
Ramano refused to take any sincere or determined effort to implement the Writ of Execution in order
to compel complainant Dela Riva to agree to his demand for a 35% share in whatever may be
collected. It concluded that Ramano's refusal to perform his duty was deliberate and was adopted as a
means to obtain some consideration.

-The OCA likewise pointed out that Ramano is technically a fugitive as he has remained at-
large for more than a decade since his conviction having been absent from work without leave since
July 1993.

- Respondent clerk of court failed to detect the irregularities committed by the court employees in
handling the court funds. The Clerk of Court is primarily accountable for all funds that are collected
for the court, whether personally received by him or by a duly appointed cashier who is under his
supervision and control. Being the custodian of the courts funds, revenues, and records, the Clerk of
Court is likewise liable for any loss, shortage, destruction, or impairment of said funds and property.
The Court held that his failure to properly supervise and manage the financial transactions in his
court constituted simple neglect of duty. Simple neglect of duty is the failure to give attention to a
task, or the disregard of a duty due to carelessness or indifference. As the Court has pronounced in the
past, even simple neglect of duty lessens the peoples confidence in the judiciary and, ultimately, in
the administration of justice.

Issue:
Weather or not Court personnel; simple neglect of duty

Held:
- Thus, the Court cannot allow those who commit this offense to escape liability. Report of the
Financial Audit Conducted on the Books of Account of Sonia L. Dy and Atty. Graciano D. Cuanico,
Jr., RTC, Catarman Northern Samar/Virgilio O. Gallano vs. Atty. Graciano D. Cuanico, Jr., Clerk of
Court and Sonia L. Dy, Social Welfare Officer II etc.

Re: Letter-complaint of Atty. Ariel Samson C. Cayetuna, et al.,
all employees of Associate Justice Michael P. Elbinias against
Associate Justice Michael P. Elbinias, CA Mindanao Station,
A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-127-CA-J. January 11, 2011.
Facts:
- The instant case precipitated from a letter-complaint, dated February 6, 2008, filed by a
litigant (petitioner in CA-G.R. SP No. 01580, entitled Algabre v. RTC, Branch 15, Davao City, which
was raffled to Justice Elbinias as ponente) before the Presidential Action Center (PAC) of the Office of
the President requesting assistance for the resolution of the case which has been pending before the
CA Mindanao Station for almost a year since its filing on March 6, 2007. The letter-complaint was
referred by the PAC to Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Reuben P. Dela Cruz, in-charge for Regions
IX-XII, for appropriate action.

-Consequently, on April 8, 2008, then DCA Jose P. Perezindorsed the letter-complaint to the
CA Mindanao Station for appropriate action. On April 21, 2008, Justice Elbinias received a copy of
said letter-complaint thru an Indorsement dated April 18, 2008 from CA Executive Justice Romulo V.
Borja.

-Justice Elbinias assigned Atty. Cayetuna to draft the letter-reply explaining what transpired
with the case which had already been decided on February 28, 2008. Justice Elbinias, however, asked
Atty. Cayetuna to sign the letter-reply and he would simply note it. This was not palatable to Atty.
Cayetuna who balked at signing the letter-reply. On April 24, 2008, he wrote Justice Elbinias
explaining why he could not, in conscience, sign it. This earned the ire of Justice Elbinias who
peremptorily terminated Atty. Cayetunas employment with the CA through a letterdated April 24,
2008 to Ruby Jane B. Rivera, Personnel Officer of the CA Mindanao Station.

-The very next day, or on April 25, 2008, when the RATA for the lawyers and the salaries of the
CA employees in the CA Mindanao Station were released, Atty. Cayetuna did not receive his salary
for the second half of April 2008 and RATA for that month on account of his termination. Likewise,
he was informed on April 28, 2008 that he would no longer receive his EEA and midyear bonus.
These are the subjects of Atty. Cayetunas April 30, 2008 letter to then Chief Justice Puno.
- On July 3, 2008, complainants sent another unverified letter-complaint7 dated June 18,
2008 thanking the Court for the speedy acceptance of their resignation letters. Therein, they
additionally alleged Justice Elbinias belligerent attitude whenupon receipt on May 8, 2008 of the
Courts approval and acceptance of complainants resignation letters, which inadvertently excluded
Atty. JamerosJustice Elbinias wrote a letter to the Personnel Officer of the CA Mindanao Station
terminating Atty. Jameros employment but antedating it May 7, 2008. Moreover, complainants
raised another grievance against Justice Elbinias who, allegedly under flimsy reasons, refused to sign
their clearances. Finally, they imputed malevolent intent on Justice Elbinias who allegedlyalthough
not confirmedgave a list of their names to then newly appointed CA Associate Justice Ayson in
connection with the applications of some of them. In fine, they reiterated their plea for the preventive
suspension of Justice Elbinias pending resolution of the instant case to prevent him from using his
position to further harass them.

-On June 4, 2010, complainants filed their Omnibus Reply and Manifestation,8 dated June 3, 2010,
to Justice Elbinias comments and duly submitted the instant case for resolution based on the
pleadings filed. They argued that their unverified complaints were properly treated by the Court as
anonymous complaints, since respondent justice admitted the material allegations therein relative to
the DTR of Leofer Andoy, failure to timely act on cases with Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), the
undertakings they submitted as per respondents instructions, non-signing of their clearances and
deterring Justice Ayson from hiring some of them. Moreover, they asserted that Atty. Cayetunas
drafts could not have been stolen by the author thereof, and that they did not violate Republic Act No.
(RA) 3019 in divulging confidential information to unauthorized persons as then Chief Justice Puno
could not be considered an unauthorized person.
Issue:
Weather or not Judges; administrative Proceedings against judges; how instituted.
Rulling:
-WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant administrative complaint is hereby
DISMISSED.

Re: Letter-complaint of Atty. Ariel Samson C. Cayetuna, et al., all
employees of Associate Justice Michael P. Elbinias against Associate
Justice Michael P. Elbinias, CA Mindanao Station,
A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-127-CA-J. January 11, 2011.
Facts:
-The instant case precipitated from a letter-complaint, dated February 6, 2008, filed by a litigant
(petitioner in CA-G.R. SP No. 01580, entitled Algabre v. RTC, Branch 15, Davao City, which was
raffled to Justice Elbinias as ponente) before the Presidential Action Center (PAC) of the Office of the
President requesting assistance for the resolution of the case which has been pending before the CA
Mindanao Station for almost a year since its filing on March 6, 2007. The letter-complaint was

referred by the PAC to Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Reuben P. Dela Cruz, in-charge for Regions
IX-XII, for appropriate action.
-Consequently, on April 8, 2008, then DCA Jose P. Perez indorsed the letter-complaint to the
CA Mindanao Station for appropriate action. On April 21, 2008, Justice Elbinias received a copy of
said letter-complaint thru an Indorsement dated April 18, 2008 from CA Executive Justice Romulo V.
Borja.

-Justice Elbinias assigned Atty. Cayetuna to draft the letter-reply explaining what transpired
with the case which had already been decided on February 28, 2008. Justice Elbinias, however, asked
Atty. Cayetuna to sign the letter-reply and he would simply note it. This was not palatable to Atty.
Cayetuna who balked at signing the letter-reply. On April 24, 2008, he wrote Justice Elbinias
explaining why he could not, in conscience, sign it. This earned the ire of Justice Elbinias who
peremptorily terminated Atty. Cayetunas employment with the CA through a letter9[6] dated April
24, 2008 to Ruby Jane B. Rivera, Personnel Officer of the CA Mindanao Station.

-The very next day, or on April 25, 2008, when the RATA for the lawyers and the salaries of the
CA employees in the CA Mindanao Station were released, Atty. Cayetuna did not receive his salary
for the second half of April 2008 and RATA for that month on account of his termination. Likewise,
he was informed on April 28, 2008 that he would no longer receive his EEA and midyear bonus.
These are the subjects of Atty. Cayetunas April 30, 2008 letter to then Chief Justice Puno.

-The other complainants, in solidarity with Atty. Cayetuna, filed the instant unverified letter-
complaint.

-In the meantime, acting on the requested acceptance of their resignation letters, then CA
Presiding Justice Conrado A. Vasquez, Jr. issued a recommendation on May 6, 2008 for the approval

of the resignations of complainants to then Chief Justice Puno. The resignations were duly approved
on May 7, 2008. The approved resignations, however, inadvertently excluded that of Atty. Cynthia Y.
Jamero. Thus, on May 8, 2008, CA Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. likewise recommended for
approval Atty. Jameros resignation, which was approved on May 9, 2008.
-On July 3, 2008, complainants sent another unverified letter-complaint dated June 18, 2008
thanking the Court for the speedy acceptance of their resignation letters. Therein, they additionally
alleged Justice Elbinias belligerent attitude whenupon receipt on May 8, 2008 of the Courts
approval and acceptance of complainants resignation letters, which inadvertently excluded Atty.
JamerosJustice Elbinias wrote a letter to the Personnel Officer of the CA Mindanao Station
terminating Atty. Jameros employment but antedating it May 7, 2008. Moreover, complainants
raised another grievance against Justice Elbinias who, allegedly under flimsy reasons, refused to sign
their clearances. Finally, they imputed malevolent intent on Justice Elbinias who allegedlyalthough
not confirmedgave a list of their names to then newly appointed CA Associate Justice Ayson in
connection with the applications of some of them. In fine, they reiterated their plea for the preventive
suspension of Justice Elbinias pending resolution of the instant case to prevent him from using his
position to further harass them.
Issue:
Weather or not Judge; burden of proof
Held:
-An unverified complaint against a judge, where the facts alleged are disputed or are not easily
verifiable from public records, will generally be dismissible for being unsubstantiated.

Re: Anonymous Letter Relative to the Alleged Corruption in the Court of
Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City,
A.M. No. 07-6-14-CA, January 18, 2011.

Facts:
-July 13, 2008, Justice Elbinias vehemently denied the charges. While admitting telling complainants
that he would fire them, he said this was on account of the poor, inefficient and sloppy draft work of
the complainants-lawyers, and the unsatisfactory performance of complainants driver and utility
worker. He attributed the concerted efforts of complainants to preempt their dismissal by filing the
instant complaint as also an attempt to put him in a bad light. On the issue of the firing of Atty.
Cayetuna allegedly on his refusal to sign the letter-reply to Mr. Algabre, Justice Elbinias asserted that
the mention of CA Associate Justice Lim therein was factual as shown in Atty. Cayetunas drafts and
did not put Justice Lim in a bad light. Moreover, he maintained that he never forced Atty. Cayetuna
to sign the letter-reply, but the latter set him up by raising such an issue and writing an insincere
written objection about it. And having lost confidence in Atty. Cayetuna, he had no option but to fire
him.
-on July 24, 2009, all the current employees assigned in the Office of Justice Elbinias in the CA
Mindanao Station sent the Court a letter10[12] of support for Justice Elbinias dated July 13, 2009.
-On June 4, 2010, complainants filed their Omnibus Reply and Manifestation,11[19] dated June 3,
2010, to Justice Elbinias comments and duly submitted the instant case for resolution based on the
pleadings filed. They argued that their unverified complaints were properly treated by the Court as
anonymous complaints, since respondent justice admitted the material allegations therein relative to
the DTR of Leofer Andoy, failure to timely act on cases with Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), the
undertakings they submitted as per respondents instructions, non-signing of their clearances and
deterring Justice Ayson from hiring some of them. Moreover, they asserted that Atty. Cayetunas
drafts could not have been stolen by the author thereof, and that they did not violate Republic Act No.
(RA) 3019 in divulging confidential information to unauthorized persons as then Chief Justice Puno
could not be considered an unauthorized person.
-Besides, complainants stressed, no liability under Articles 363 (planting of evidence), 364 (blemish
reputation of another), 353 (public and malicious imputation of a crime, etc.) and 183 (perjury) of the
Revised Penal Code can be attributed to them, since their letter-complaints were filed with utmost
circumspection and confidentiality. To debunk their alleged inefficiency and assert the contrary of
respondents allegation that they preempted their inevitable termination by filing the instant
complaints, they submitted their respective but similar performance ratings of Very Satisfactory,
together with the comparative Judicial Data Statistics from the Information and Statistical Data
Division of the CA, which tended to show that the output data on case disposition of Justice Elbinias
did not substantially change before and after they resigned from his office. They contended that all
these prove that their alleged inefficiency had no factual basis. Finally, they maintained that they had
already contemplated resigning way before the incidents involving Atty. Cayetuna and Abugho
happened because of, they reiterate, his demeaning and terrorizing actuations against them.
Issue:

Weather or not Judge; burden of proof
Held:
-After an assiduous study of the parties allegations and counter-allegations, with due
consideration of the documents they submitted to bolster their respective positions, the Court is
constrained to dismiss the instant case for being unsubstantiated.

-Both the letter-complaints of April 30, 2008 and June 18, 2008 are unverified, while the June
3, 2010 Omnibus Reply and Manifestation of complainants is not under oath. It must be noted that
most of the complainants are lawyers, and are presumed and ought to know the formal requirement
of verification for administrative complaints as stated under Section 1, Rule 140:
-Moreover, it has been said that confidential employees work at the pleasure of the appointing
authority. Thus, there is no quibble that when the relation between respondent CA Associate Justice
Elbinias and his lawyers has deteriorated to the extent that there is no longer intimacy between them
that insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals
of personal trust or confidential matters of state, then the confidential employment is no longer
tenable. The right of respondent to change the confidential employees in his office cannot be
disputed.

Even if the allegations have not been substantially proved, still it is incumbent for Justice
Elbinias to reflect on how the conflict between him and his staff came about. While we take notice of
the letter of support from other employees in the CA Mindanao Station, and the Resolutions from
the YMCA and the City Council of Cagayan de Oro City commending him, we hope that Justice
Elbinias learns from this experience to better and improve the management and supervision of his
staff.
-WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant administrative complaint is hereby DISMISSED.

Imelda R. Marcos vs. Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan,
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2062. January 18, 2011.
Facts:
-on November 15, 2006, Marcos filed a complaint-affidavit charging Judge Pamintuan with Gross
Ignorance of the Law for reversing motu proprio the final and executory order of then Acting
Presiding Judge Antonio Reyes (Judge Reyes) dated May 30, 1996 (and modified in the September 2,
1996 order), in Civil Case No. 3383-R, entitled Albert D. Umali, in his capacity as the exclusive
administrator and as President of the Treasure Hunters Association of the Philippines v. Jose D.
Roxas, et al.

-Judge Reyes dismissed Civil Case No. 3383-R in an order, dated May 30, 1996, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises and further, for failure to
comply with Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 dated April 1, 1994 on
forum shopping, the petition is DISMISSED.

It is further ORDERED that the Buddha statuette in the custody of this Court be
immediately RELEASED to the children of the late Rogelio Roxas, namely, Henry
Roxas and Gervic Roxas and to decedents brother, Jose Roxas, IN TRUST FOR the
estate of the late Rogelio Roxas.

SO ORDERED.
-On June 25, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its own motion for
reconsideration which was also denied in a court order dated September 2, 1996.

-Ten (10) years later, in an order dated May 9, 2006, Judge Pamintuan set the case for hearing on
June 29, 2006 purportedly to formally and finally release the Golden Buddha to its rightful owner.
Marcos was one of the subpoenaed parties, being a person with interest in the case.

-On August 15, 2006, Judge Pamintuan issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in accordance with the final and executory Order of this Court
dated September 2, 1996, the Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica is awarded to the
estate of Rogelio Roxas. However, the Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica shall be
under custodia legis until the final settlement of the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas, or
upon the appointment of his estates administrator.

This Court further rules that the Golden Buddha in its custody is a fake one, or a
mere replica of the original Golden Buddha which has a detachable head, which has
been missing since 1971 up to the present, or for a period of thirty five (35) years by now,
and has been in unlawful possession of persons who do not have title over it, nor any
right at all to possess this original Golden Buddha.

-Marcos averred that the act of Judge Pamintuan in reversing a final and executory order constituted
gross ignorance of the law. In her complaint, citing A.M. No. 93-7-696-0, she argued that final and
executory judgments of lower courts were not reviewable even by the Supreme Court. Judge
Pamintuan reversed a final and executory order not upon the instance of any of the parties in Civil
Case No. 3383-R but motu proprio. He even failed to indicate where he obtained the information that
the Golden Buddha sitting in his sala was a mere replica. Marcos claimed that his order was in
conflict with Rule 36 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that a judgment or final
order shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it (his order) is based xxx.

-In his Comment, Judge Pamintuan argued that Marcos could have just filed a pleading manifesting
lack of interest or moving for the recall of the subpoena, but she did not. In fact, her counsel, Atty.
Robert Sison, entered his appearance and actually appeared in court. With her appearance through
counsel, she subjected herself to the jurisdiction of the court. She should have filed a motion for
reconsideration of the August 15, 2006 Order instead of filing an administrative complaint. As she did
not, Judge Pamintuan opined that her lost judicial remedies could not be substituted with the filing of
this case.

-Marcos, in her Reply-Affidavit, stated that she was not a party in Civil Case No. 3383-R, hence, she
could not file a motion for reconsideration. She cited Section 1 of Rule 37 which provides that only
the aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration within the period for taking an appeal.
-Respondent was charged with gross ignorance of the law for reversing motu proprio a final and
executory order rendered by another court ten years earlier. The Court ruled that the respondent is
guilty of gross ignorance of the law. He failed to conform to the high standards of competence
required of judges under the Code of Judicial Conduct. Competence is a mark of a good judge

Issue:
Weather or not Judge; gross ignorance of the law.

Held:
-The Court doubts if he ever took seriously its previous warnings that a repetition of his offenses
would merit a more severe sanction from this Court. His conduct in this case and his prior infractions
are grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service. As shown from the cited administrative cases
filed against Judge Pamintuan, he was liable not only for gross ignorance of the law but for other
equally serious transgressions. This Court should, therefore, refrain from being lenient, when doing so
would give the public the impression that incompetence and repeated offenders are tolerated in the
judiciary.

-WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City, Branch 3, is DISMISSED from the service. He shall forthwith CEASE and DESIST from
performing any official act or function appurtenant to his office upon service on him of this decision.

Spouses Democrito and Olivia Lago vs. Judge Godofredo B. Abul,
Jr., RTC, Br. 43. Gingoog City,
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2255, January 17, 2011.
Facts:
-December 29, 2009, filed by Spouses Democrito C. Lago and Olivia R. Lago (complainants), charging
Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr. (respondent judge) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43,
Gingoog City, with acts and omissions violative of the Standards of Conduct Prescribed for Judges by
Law, the Rules of Court, and the Code of Judicial Conduct.
-Complainants were the defendants in a civil action for Preliminary Injunction, Easement of Road
Right of Way, and Attorneys Fees, with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), filed on
July 2, 2009 by Christina M. Obico (Obico) before the RTC, Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental, and
docketed as Civil Case No. 2009-905. The action was spawned by the alleged threats of complainants
to close the access road leading to Obicos property, where the latters milkfish (bangus) farm is
located. Obico claimed that, if the access road leading to her property was closed, she would be
prevented from harvesting her milkfish, causing massive fish kills, and leading to heavy financial
losses on her part.
-On July 7, 2009, respondent judge issued an Order directing the issuance of a TRO effective seventy
two (72) hours from date of issue, without requiring Obico to put up a bond. Complainants allege
that at that time, they were not yet in receipt of the summons and copy of the complaint, as well as
Obicos affidavit and bond. Complainants claim that this is violative of Section 4(c) and (d) of Rule 58
of the Rules of Court.

-On July 14, 2009, respondent judge issued an Order extending the 72-hour TRO, which had already
expired, for another period provided that the total period should not exceed twenty days. Again,
respondent judge failed to require Obico to put up a bond even as complainants assert that it is
already of judicial notice that a TRO under the amended new rules has been elevated to the level of an
injunction.

-In his Resolution dated August 11, 2009, respondent judge ordered, among others, the issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction conditioned upon the application of a bond by Obico in the amount
of P100,000.00. Complainants argue, however, that said directive was violative of Section 5, Rule 58
of the Rules of Court since they were not required to show cause, at a specific time and place, why the
injunction should not be granted.
-Complainants assert that the civil complaint was never raffled, and that no notice of raffle was ever
served upon them, yet the case went directly to Branch 43, where respondent judge is the acting
presiding judge. He is also the acting executive judge of RTC, Gingoog City. Complainants claim that
this is violative of Section 4(c), Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.
-Respondent judge failed to cause the raffle of an injunction case and failed to follow the procedural
requirements in issuing a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction as he issued them without prior
notice to the defendant and without a hearing. The Court found respondent judge liable for gross
ignorance of the law and procedure. Though not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law or
of the rules, and that, when committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, the
rule applies only in cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. When the law or the rule is
so elementary, not to be aware of it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of
the law.

Issue:
Held:
-Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross ignorance of the law or procedure as a
serious offense for which the imposable sanction ranges from dismissal from the service to
suspension from office, and a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. Under
the premises, this Court finds it appropriate to impose on respondent judge the penalty of a fine in
the amount of P25,000.00.
-WHEREFORE, Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Gingoog City,
is found liable for Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure, and is hereby meted a fine of
P25,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same, or any similar infraction in the future,
shall be dealt with more severely.
-SO ORDERED.

Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Benjamin P. Estrada,
RTC, Br. 9, Malaybalay, Bukidnon and Judge Josefina Gentiles-
Bacal, RTC, Br 10, Malaybalay, Bukidnon,
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2173, January 18, 2011
Facts:
-The case arose from the Memorandum, dated October 16, 2008, of Atty. Nicandro A. Cruz, officer-in-
charge, Court Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), addressed to then
Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Reuben P. De la Cruz, regarding nomalies in the disposition of
cases in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Malaybalay City, Bukidnon

-Atty. Cruz reported that in the course of reviewing the Monthly Report of cases from the MTCC
Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, the Statistical Division of the Court Management Office, OCA, noted
several orders, attached to the report, that were issued by Executive Judge Josefina Gentiles-Bacal,
RTC, Malaybalay City, and Judge Benjamin P. Estrada, RTC, Branch 9, same station, dismissing the
cases then pending in the MTCC.

-Atty. Cruz pointed out that the MTCC, Malaybalay City had no regular presiding judge at the time the
orders were issued, as Judge Estrada, the former presiding judge, had been appointed to preside over
the RTC, Branch 9, Malaybalay City, on June 1, 2008. Atty. Cruz commented that Judge Estrada could
no longer take cognizance of cases pending in his former sala after he took his oath on July 17, 2008;
neither could Judge Bacal do the same even if she had then been the executive judge of the RTC,
Malaybalay City.
- On March 3, 2009, the OCA submitted its report. It found Judge Estrada and Judge Bacal
guilty of gross ignorance of the law for taking cognizance of cases pending before another court the
MTCC, Malaybalay, Bukidnon. The two judges admitted the acts, although they tried to avoid liability
by professing that they did not intend to violate the law and that they acted as they did out of their
desire to uphold the right of the accused to liberty in the cases they took cognizance of.
-The OCA recommended that both judges be fined P40,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law.
Issue:
Held:
-Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies ignorance of the law or procedure as a serious
charge for which Section 11 imposes the following sanctions: ( a ) dismissal from the service, forfeiture
of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations, provided,
however, that forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; (b) suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) months but not exceeding six (6)
months; or (c) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

-We note that Judge Estrada and Judge Bacal are being made to answer administratively for the first
time for action while in office. In this light and as their actions were motivated by noble intentions to
administer justice, we find a fine of P21,000.00 in order, with a stern warning that the commission of
the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

-WHEREFORE, premises considered, Executive Judge Josefina Gentiles-Bacal, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 10, Malaybalay City, and Presiding Judge Benjamin P. Estrada, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 9, Malaybalay City, are hereby found GUILTY OF IGNORANCE OF THE LAW.
Accordingly, they are FINED P21,000.00, each, with a STERN WARNING that the commission of
the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
-SO ORDERED.

FEBRUARY
Benigno B. Reas v. Carlos M. Relacion,
A.M. No. P-05-2095. February 9, 2011.

Facts: Reas alleged in his complaint that by prior arrangement, the Clerk of Court of the RTC (COC)
delivered to the Cebu CFI Community Cooperative (Cooperative) the salary checks of court
personnel with outstanding obligations with the Cooperative to pay for their loans; that his salary
check for the period of September 1 to 15, 2004 in the amount of P4,280.00 was delivered by the
COC to the Cooperative for that purpose; that when he asked for the receipt corresponding to his
payment, the Cooperative informed him that his salary check had been "inadvertently surrendered" to
Relacion after the latter had harassed the Cooperative "to a point of violence" to release his
(Relacion) own check for that period; that Relacion did not return the salary check to the Cooperative
despite repeated demands; that when he confronted Relacion, the latter admitted taking his salary
check; that Relacion mauled him when he refused Relacion's offer to pay his salary check with
Relacion's Judicial Development Fund (JDF) check; and that it was only after the Cooperative
confronted Relacion that the latter paid his salary check.

On February 5, 2005 Relacion denied harassing or threatening the employees of the Cooperative,
explaining that on September 8, 2004, he went to the COC to get his own salary check for the first
half of September 2004; that while a COC staff member was distributing the salary checks to the
court personnel in the presence of a Cooperative representative, he expressed his intention to get his
own salary check because he needed the money; that the Cooperative's representative agreed to his
request; and that after signing the payroll, the Cooperative's representative handed to him a salary
check.

Issue: Whether or not Relacion was guilty of simple misconduct?

Ruling: Relacion's failure to immediately return Reas' salary check was improper and constituted
misconduct. According to Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma misconduct is a transgression of
some established rule of action, an unlawful behavior, or gross negligence by a public officer. The
misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate
the law, or disregard of long-standing rules, which must be established by substantial evidence.
Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. That Relacion did not maliciously or deliberately take Reas'
salary check rendered him liable only for simple misconduct.

Under Section 52 (B) (2), Rule IV, of the Revised Uniform Rules On Administrative Cases In the Civil
Service, simple misconduct is a less grave offense with a penalty ranging from suspension for one
month and one day to six months for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense.
Considering that the misconduct was Relacion's first offense, the penalty imposable on him is
suspension for one month and one day to six months. However, we should note that, firstly, Reas
already forgave him and Relacion indemnified Reas in the amount of P100.00, as evidenced by their
compromise agreement; secondly, the amount of the salary check was only P4,280.00 and was
already reimbursed to Reas; and, lastly, Relacion was contemplating on retiring due to a lingering
illness. The penalty of suspension would be too severe under the circumstances. Instead, the
imposition of a fine of P5,000.00 suffices, and accords with the rulings involving simple misconduct
committed by court employees.

Re: Anonymous Complaint against Ms. Hermogena F. Bayani
A.M. No. 2007-22-SC. February 1, 2011.

Facts: Bayani was charged with dishonesty for failure to disclose in her Personal Data Sheet that she
was previously admonished in an administrative case. Bayani invoked good faith as her defense. In
her Personal Data Sheet, Bayani stated that she was never convicted of any administrative offense,
when in fact in 1995, she was admonished, in a Memorandum issued by the Office of Administrative
Services Office of the Court Administrator (OAS-OCA) but signed by then Chief Justice Narvasa,
for being remiss in the performance of her duties. Bayani explained that it was due to her
understanding that there was no conviction on the administrative case against her, because she was
merely admonished and warned therein.
Issue: Whether or not Bayani is guilty of dishonesty:
Ruling: While her defense of good faith may be difficult to prove as clearly it is a question of intention,
a state of mind, erroneous judgment on the part of Bayani does not, however, necessarily connote
the existence of bad faith, malice, or an intention to defraud. In administrative proceedings, only
substantial evidence is required to warrant disciplinary sanctions. Substantial evidence is defined as
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Thus,
after much consideration of the facts and circumstances, while the Court has not shied away in
imposing the strictest penalty to erring employees, neither can it think and rule unreasonably in
determining whether an employee deserves disciplinary sanction. Bayani was admonished and
warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant the imposition of a mere severe
penalty. The Court ruled that Bayani is not guilty of dishonesty. Dishonesty is defined as intentionally
making a false statement in any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or
fraud in securing his examination, registration, appointment or promotion. Thus, dishonesty, like bad
faith, is not simply bad judgment or negligence. Dishonesty is a question of intention. In ascertaining
the intention of a person accused of dishonesty, consideration must be taken not only of the facts and
circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by the respondent, but also of his state of mind at
the time the offense was committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of
meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could have had at that
moment. While Bayani made an erroneous judgment in choosing not to disclose her previous
infraction, she cannot be blamed for believing that such was irrelevant to: (1) question no. 25 for
this incident had long been resolved and is no longer pending; and (2) question no. 27 for clearly
being admonished and warned for being remiss in the performance of her duties do not necessarily
equate to conviction as question no. 27 seeks to determine.

Teresita D. Santeco v. Atty. Luna B. Avance,
A.C. No. 5834. February 22, 2011.
Facts: The complainant filed a case before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City against
respondent Atty. Luna B. Avance for mishandling Civil Case No. 97-275, an action to declare a deed
of absolute sale null and void and for reconveyance and damages. While respondents five-year
suspension from the practice of law on account of an earlier administrative case was still in effect, she
appeared and actively participated in at least three cases where she misrepresented herself as Atty.
Leizl Tanglao when in fact her name is Luna B. Avance. She then refused to heed two orders from
the SC for her to answer the new charge against her for which she was found guilty of indirect
contempt and fined in the amount of P30,000. However, the respondent failed to pay the fine
imposed.

Issue: 1. Whether or not Atty. Luna B. Avance is guilty of gross miscounduct?
2. Whether or not Atty. Avance wilfully disobey lawful orders of court?

Ruling:In view of the foregoing, the Court found the respondent unfit to continue as a member of the
bar. As an officer of the court, it is a lawyers duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court. The
highest form of respect for judicial authority is shown by a lawyers obedience to court orders and
processes. Here, respondents conduct evidently fell short of what is expected of her as an officer of
the court as she obviously possesses a habit of defying the Courts orders. Failure to comply with
Court directives constitutes gross misconduct, insubordination or disrespect which merits a lawyers
suspension or even disbarment.
Respondent willfully disobeyed the Court when she continued her law practice despite the five-year
suspension order against her and even misrepresented herself to be another person in order to
evade said penalty. Thereafter, when she was twice ordered to comment on her continued law
practice while still suspended, nothing was heard from her despite receipt of two Resolutions from
this Court. Neither did she pay theP30,000.00 fine imposed in the September 29, 2009 Resolution.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court a member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from office as an attorney for gross misconduct and/or for a willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court. In repeatedly disobeying the Courts orders, respondent proved
herself unworthy of membership in the Philippine Bar. Worse, she remains indifferent to the need to
reform herself. Clearly, she is unfit to discharge the duties of an officer of the court and deserves the
ultimate penalty of disbarment.

In matter of the charges of plagiarism, etc. against Associate J ustice Mariano C. Del Castillo,
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC. February 8, 2011.

Facts: Supreme Court Associate Justice Castillo was accused of plagiarism in connection with the
decision he wrote for the Court in the case entitled Vinuya v. Romulo (G.R. No. 162230). The Court
dismissed the charges against Justice Castillo. Plagiarism, a term not defined by statute, has a
popular or common definition. To plagiarize, says Webster, is to steal and pass off as ones own
the ideas or words of another. Stealing implies malicious taking. Blacks Law Dictionary, the worlds
leading English law dictionary quoted by the Court in its decision, defines plagiarism as the
deliberate and knowing presentation of another persons original ideas or creative expressions as
ones own. The presentation of another persons ideas as ones own must be deliberate or
premeditateda taking with ill intent. While the academic publishing model is based on the originality
of the writers thesis, the judicial system is based on the doctrine of stare decisis, which encourages
courts to cite historical legal data, precedents, and related studies in their decisions.
Issue: Whether or not there is an issue of Plagiarism in the decision of Associate Justice Mariano C.
del Castillo in Vinuya v. Romul?

Ruling: The rule exonerating judges from charges of plagiarism applies also to lawyers. Although as a
rule they receive compensation for every pleading or paper they file in court or for every opinion they
render to clients, lawyers also need to strive for technical accuracy in their writings. They should not
be exposed to charges of plagiarism in what they write so long as they do not depart, as officers of
the court, from the objective of assisting the Court in the administration of justice. The judge is not
expected to produce original scholarship in every respect. Citing published articles or work of a
number of legal writers, the Court ruled that a judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial or
appellate, is exempted from a charge of plagiarism even if ideas, words or phrases from a law review
article, novel thoughts published in a legal periodical or language from a partys brief are used without
giving attribution. Judges are free to use whatever sources they deem appropriate to resolve the
matter before them, without fear of reprisal. This exemption applies to judicial writings intended to
decide cases for two reasons: the judge is not writing a literary work and, more importantly, the
purpose of the writing is to resolve a dispute. As a result, judges adjudicating cases are not subject
to a claim of legal plagiarism.

Manuel P. Calaunan v. Reynaldo B. Madolaria, Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 217, Quezon City,
A.M. No. P-10-2810. February 8, 2011.
Facts: Respondent sheriff enforced the writ of execution and evicted the complainant without the
required prior notice to vacate. The requirement of a notice to vacate is based on the rudiments of
justice and fair play. A notice be served on the person against whom the judgment for the delivery or
restitution of real property is rendered and all persons claiming rights under him. It is only when such
persons resist after service of notice and demand to vacate that the sheriff can forcibly enforce the
writ by bodily removing them from the premises.
Issue: Whether or not respondent sheriff is constitute simple negligence?
Ruling: Sheriffs, as officers of the court and agents of the law, are bound to use prudence, due care,
and diligence in the discharge of their official duties. Where rights of individuals are jeopardized by
the sheriffs actions, they may be properly fined, suspended, or dismissed from office by virtue of this
Courts administrative supervision over the judicial branch of the government.
11

In the case at bar, respondent failed to comply with the procedure laid down in Section 10(c) of Rule
39 of the Rules of Court in the implementation of a writ of execution which requires that the sheriff
must first give notice of such writ and a demand to the judgment obligor to vacate the property within
three days. Only after such period can the sheriff enforce the writ by the removal of defendant and his
personal belongings.
A sheriff who enforces the writ without the required notice or before the expiration of the three-day
period runs afoul with Section 10(c) of Rule 39.Respondents contention that he complied with the
requirement by serving copies of the notice to vacate on November 27, 2007 upon the wife of the
caretaker and the security guard of the subdivision for distribution to the homeowners of the
subdivision, as shown in his Partial Return of December 20, 2007,does not lie.
The requirement of a notice to vacate is based on the rudiments of justice and fair play.1avvphi1 The
aforementioned provision requires that a notice be served on the "person against whom the judgment
for the delivery or restitution of real property is rendered and all persons claiming rights under him. It
bears noting that complainant was not a party to the case in the decision which was executed.
Respecting complainants allegation that respondent is responsible for the demolition of his house,
there is indeed no proof thereof.
Failure to observe the requirements of Section 10(c), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court constitutes simple
neglect of duty which is a less grave offense punishable by one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6)
months suspension
The OCA recommended that respondent be dismissed from the service as he had been previously
found administratively
guiltyof inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties, conduct prejudicialto the b
est interest of the service, insubordination and loafing or frequent unauthorized absences for which
he was suspended for one year without pay.
Indeed, the Court is duty-bound to sternly wield a corrective hand to discipline its errant employees
and shove away the undesirable ones. Absent a showing of malice and bad faith on respondents
part, however, but taking into account his above-stated previous infractions, the Court finds that
respondents suspension without pay for one year is in order.

Daniel G. Sevilla v. J udge Francisco S. Lindo, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 55, Malabon
City,
A.M. No. MTJ -08-1714. February 9, 2011.
Facts: Complainant is the private complainant in a BP 22 case before the sala of respondent judge.
Even as the case was covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, Respondent judge constantly
postponed hearings without valid cause. Respondent judge is liable for delay in the disposition of
cases tantamount to inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of his official duties. Although
the postponement of a hearing in a civil or criminal case may at times be unavoidable, the Court
disallows undue or unnecessary postponements of court hearings, simply because they cause
unreasonable delays in the administration of justice and, thus, undermine the peoples faith in the
Judiciary, aside from aggravating the financial and emotional burdens of the litigants.
Issue: Whether or not there is a disposition of case?
Ruling: The Court has enjoined that postponements and resettings should be allowed only upon
meritorious grounds, and has consistently reminded all trial judges to adopt a firm policy against
improvident postponements. Yet, respondent judge postponed five hearings for lack of material time
without bothering to state the specific causes why his court lacked material time. He also reset four
hearings supposedly upon the agreement of the parties, which the complainant credibly denied
because that was prejudicial to his interest. Respondent judge cited the absence of the public
prosecutor in one hearing and of the PAO lawyer in two hearings as justifications for the cancellation
of the hearings. Such excuses for delay were not credible, however, for he could have summoned a
relief prosecutor and a relief PAO attorney, or made arrangements for their attendance pursuant to
the Courts Circular 1-89 (dated January 19, 1989) to avoid unnecessary postponements.

Pio Angelia v. J udge J esus L. Grageda, RTC, Branch 4, Panabo City,
A.M. No. RTJ -10-2220. February 7, 2011.
Facts: Respondent judge failed to resolve a motion within the prescribed period. Respondent judge
insisted that the delay was not intentional but simply brought about by sheer volume of work in his
sala. Respondent judge is guilty of undue delay in resolving a motion.
Issue: Whether or not the Respondent Judge is in disposition of case?
Held: he Court has consistently held that failure to decide cases and other matters within the
reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative
sanction against the erring magistrate. Delay in resolving motions and incidents pending before a
judge within the reglementary period of ninety (90) days fixed by the Constitution and the law is not
excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency. The Court finds no merit in Respondent judges
explanation that the reason for the delay in resolving the motion was the pressure from equally urgent
matters in connection with the 800 pending cases before his sala. Firstly, he is duty-bound to comply
with the above-cited rules under the Canons in the Code of Judicial Conduct, and the administrative
guidelines laid down by this Court. Secondly, the Court is not unmindful of the circumstances that
may delay the speedy disposition of cases assigned to judges, Respondent judge should have
seasonably filed a request for an extension to resolve the subject motion. For failing to do so, he
cannot evade administrative liability.

J udge Napoleon E. Inoturan, RTC, Branch 133, Makati City v. J udge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, J r.,
MCTC, Valladolid, San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental/Sancho E. Guinanao v. J udge
Manuel Q. Limsiaco, J r., MCTC, Valladolid, San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental,
A.M. No. MTJ -01-1362/A.M. No. MTJ -11-1785. February 22, 2011.

Facts: Respondent judge failed to file the required comment as required by the Supreme Courts
show cause resolution in a pending administrative case against him despite several opportunities
given to him. Compliance with the rules, directives and circulars issued by the Court is one of the
foremost duties that a judge accepts upon assumption to office.

Issue: Whether or not Respondent Judge failed to comply with SC directives and circulars?

Ruling: The obligation to uphold the dignity of his office and the institution which he belongs to is also
found in Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 2.01 which mandates a judge to behave
at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Under the
circumstances, the conduct exhibited by respondent judge constitutes no less than clear acts of
defiance against the Courts authority. His conduct also reveals his deliberate disrespect and
indifference to the authority of the Court, shown by his failure to heed our warnings and directives.
Respondent judges actions further disclose his inability to accept the Courts instructions. Moreover,
his conduct failed to provide a good example for other court personnel, and the public as well, in
placing significance to the Courts directives and the importance of complying with them. Respondent
judge was held administratively liable.

Lydelle L. Conquilla v. J udge Lauro G. Bernardo, MTC, Bocaue, Bulacan,
A.M. No. MTJ -09-1737. February 9, 2011.
Facts: In a verified complaint dated 30 July 2008, complainant Conquilla charged respondent judge
with usurpation of authority, grave misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law.

Complainant alleged that on 4 July 2008, a criminal complaint for direct assault was filed against her
before the MTC of Bocaue, Bulacan. The complaint was signed by Police Chief
Inspector Rizalino Andaya of the Bocaue Police Station.

On 8 July 2008, respondent judge conducted a preliminary investigation and found probable cause to
hold the complainant for trial for the crime of direct assault. Respondent judge then issued a warrant
of arrest dated 8 July 2008, with the bail fixed at P12,000.

On 10 July 2008, upon motion of complainant, respondent judge issued an order reducing the bail for
complainants provisional liberty to P6,000. On the same date, complainant posted cash bail
of P6,000 for her provisional liberty.

Complainant then filed an administrative complaint, alleging that under A.M. No. 05-08-[2]6-SC, first
level court judges no longer have the authority to conduct preliminary investigations. Thus,
complainant avers that respondent judge committed an illegal act constituting gross ignorance of the
law and procedure when he conducted the preliminary investigation and issued the warrant of arrest.
Complainant claims that the hasty issuance of the warrant of arrest was without legal basis and
unjustly prejudiced complainant and deprived her of her liberty. Complainant submits that respondent
judge usurped the power of the prosecutor, who was not even given the chance to comment on
complainants Motion to Reduce Bail. Furthermore, complainant alleges that when she learned about
the warrant of arrest, she called respondent judges wife, who said she would help in having the bail
reduced to P6,000.00 and would have the case for direct assault against herein complainant
dismissed provided herein complainant cancel the wifes debt of P35,000.00 and provided that herein
complainant loan the wife an additional amount of P50,000.00. Respondent judge states that he
issued the warrant of arrest in good faith because he was convinced that there was probable cause
and that it was necessary to place the complainant under immediate custody to prevent a frustration
of justice. Although respondent judge knew that the Supreme Court already amended Rules 112 and
114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure by removing the conduct of the preliminary
investigation from judges of first level courts, he argues that the power to personally determine
probable cause in the issuance of a warrant of arrest cannot be revoked. Besides, even if such power
to determine probable cause was indeed revoked by the amendment, respondent judge submits that
technical rules can be relaxed if their implementation will result in injustice.
Issue: Whether or not there is a gross ignorance of the Law?
Ruling: Under Section 2 of Rule 112, only the following officers are authorized to conduct preliminary
investigations: (a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants; (b) National and Regional State
Prosecutors; and (c) Other officers as may be authorized by law. Clearly, MTC judges are no longer
authorized to conduct preliminary investigation. The complainant is charged with direct assault with
an imposable penalty of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years. It was therefore incumbent upon
respondent judge to forward the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for
preliminary investigation, instead of conducting the preliminary investigation himself. When a law or a
rule is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply the law. Anything less is gross ignorance of
the law. Judges should exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and
procedural rules, and should be diligent in keeping abreast with developments in law and
jurisprudence. Respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct stresses the importance of propriety and the appearance of propriety to the
performance of all the activities of a judge. Respondent judge should bear in mind that judges should
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities. Furthermore, judges and
members of their families are prohibited from asking for or accepting any gift, bequest, loan or favor in
relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him in connection with the
performance of judicial duties.

Rene C. Ricablanca v. J udge Hector B. Barillo, A.M. No. MTJ -08-1710.
February 15, 2011.
Facts: Respondent judge, acting as an investigating judge, issued orders archiving several criminal
cases instead of forwarding them to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for review and appropriate
action (this rule is prior to the amendments introduced by A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC removing from judges
of first level courts the authority to conduct preliminary investigations).
Issue: Whether or not Respondent Judge is liable for gross ignorance of the law?
Ruling: The Court found the respondent judge liable for gross ignorance of the law. A judge owes it
to himself and his office to know basic legal principles by heart and to harness that knowledge
correctly and justly, failing which publics confidence in the courts is eroded. In issuing the orders
archiving the criminal cases, respondent judge failed to consider that he was acting not as a trial
judge but an investigating judge of an MTC whose actions were thus governed by Section 5, Rule
112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure on preliminary investigations. He ought to have known that
after conducting preliminary investigation on the criminal cases, it was his duty to transmit his
resolution thereon to the provincial or city prosecutor for appropriate action. His failure to do so
betrays an utter lack of familiarity with the Rules. The complaint against respondent is for gross
ignorance of the law in which the acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence; it must have been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption the presence
of which in the present case is not clear. Be that as it may, such leeway afforded a judge does not
mean that he should not evince due care in the performance of his adjudicatory functions. Sanctions
are still in order as such lapses in judgment cannot be countenanced. As the Court has repeatedly
stressed, a judge, having applied for the position and appointed as such, is presumed to know the
law. Thus, when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

J udge Napoleon E. Inoturan, RTC, Branch 133, Makati City v. J udge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, J r.,
MCTC, Valladolid, San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental/Sancho E. Guinanao v. J udge
Manuel Q. Limsiaco, J r., MCTC, Valladolid, San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental,
A.M. No. MTJ -01-1362/A.M. No. MTJ -11-1785. February 22, 2011.

Facts: It took respondent judge more than two years to decide an ejectment case after it was
declared submitted for resolution. Judge Limsiaco failed to file his motion for reconsideration and the
required explanation. Despite the grant of the extension of time, no explanation for the show cause
resolution was ever filed.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Limsiaco is guilty of gross inefficiency?
Ruling: The delay in deciding a case within the reglementary period constitutes a violation of Section
5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates judges to perform all judicial duties,
including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with promptness. In line with
jurisprudence, respondent judge is liable for gross inefficiency for his failure to decide a case within
the reglementary period.
Daniel G. Sevilla v. J udge Francisco S. Lindo, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 55, Malabon
City,
A.M. No. MTJ -08-1714. February 9, 2011

Facts: On July 4, 2007, Daniel G. Sevilla charged Hon. Francisco S. Lindo, then the Presiding
Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 55, in MalabonCity with delay in the disposition
of Criminal Case No. J-L00-4260 (a prosecution for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 [BP 22]
entitled People v. Nestor Leynes).
Sevilla alleged that he was the private complainant in Criminal Case No. J-L00-4260, which
was filed on June 10, 2003, and raffled to Branch 55, presided by Judge Lindo; that he testified once
in the case, but his testimony pertained only to his personal circumstances; that after he gave such
partial testimony, Judge Lindo adjourned the session for lack of material time, and persistently reset
the subsequent hearings for lack of material time; that Judge Lindos indifference was designed to
force him to accept the offer of an amicable settlement made by the accused; and that Judge Lindos
coercion was manifested in open court and in his chamber by telling him in the presence of the
accused: Mr. Sevilla, ang hirap mo namang pakiusapan. Konting pera lang yan. Bahala ka maghintay
sa wala.

Sevilla asserted that Judge Lindo thereby violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, which requires that a judge should administer justice impartially and without delay; that
Judge Lindo also violated Section 1, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that justice be
impartially administered without unnecessary delay; that Judge Lindos unreasonable resetting of the
hearings 12 times rendered inconsequential his right to the speedy disposition of his case; and that
such resettings were made upon the instance of Judge Lindo, not upon motion of the parties.
Issue: Whether or not retired Judge Lindo was administratively liable for the numerous
postponements in Criminal Case No. J-L00-4260.
Held: We agree with and adopt the report and recommendation of the OCA that Judge Lindo be held
liable for delay in the disposition of his cases that was tantamount to inefficiency and incompetence in
the performance of his official duties, and that he be meted a fine of P21,000.00 to be deducted from
his retirement benefits due to his compulsory retirement from the Judiciary effective July 24, 2007.
We point out that the findings of the OCA were based on the records of Judge Lindos Branch that the
OCA subjected to a judicial audit in anticipation of his mandatory retirement. Although the
postponement of a hearing in a civil or criminal case may at times be unavoidable, the Court
disallows undue or unnecessary postponements of court hearings, simply because they cause
unreasonable delays in the administration of justice and, thus, undermine the peoples faith in the
Judiciary, aside from aggravating the financial and emotional burdens of the litigants. For this reason,
the Court has enjoined that postponements and resettings should be allowed only upon meritorious
grounds, and has consistently reminded all trial judges to adopt a firm policy against improvident
postponements. he strict judicial policy on postponements applies with more force and greater reason
to prosecutions involving violations of BP 22, whose prompt resolution has been ensured by their
being now covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. The Court has pronounced that the Rule on
Summary Procedure was precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of
cases.
Yet, Judge Lindo postponed five hearings for lack of material time without bothering to state
the specific causes why his court lacked material time. He also reset four hearings supposedly upon
the agreement of the parties, which the complainant credibly denied because that was prejudicial to
his interest. He even cancelled the hearing of May 25, 2007 on the ground that he had to file on May
28, 2007 his application for compulsory retirement and leave of absence until July 24, 2007, and set
the next hearing on August 17, 2007, when he could have set the hearing sooner either on May 26 or
May 27 in view of his impending long period of absence. Considering that we cannot discern any
rationality for his actions in the handling of Criminal Case No. J-L00-4260, a simple BP 22 case
involving only P2,000.00, we can only adjudge such actuations as smacking either of indolence and
utter inefficiency, or of bias, if not hostility, towards Sevilla, or both.

Judge Lindo cited the absence of the public prosecutor in one hearing and of the PAO lawyer
in two hearings as justifications for the cancellation of the hearings. Such excuses for delay were not
credible, however, for he could have summoned a relief prosecutor and a relief PAO attorney, or
made arrangements for their attendance pursuant to the Courts Circular 1-89 (dated January 19,
1989) to avoid unnecessary postponements.
As can be seen, Judge Lindo made or allowed too many unreasonable postponements that inevitably
delayed the proceedings and prevented the prompt disposition of Criminal Case No. J-L00-4260 out
of manifest bias in favor of the accused, to the prejudice of Sevilla as the complainant in Criminal
Case No. J-L00-4260. Thus, he flagrantly violated the letter and spirit both of Rule 1.02 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, which enjoined all judges to administer justice impartially andwithout delay; and of
Canon 6 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which required him as a trial judge to be prompt in
disposing of all matters submitted to him, remembering that justice delayed is often justice denied.
That his conduct proceeded from his bias towards the accused rendered his acts and omissions as
gross misconduct. It is settled that the misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements
of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or disregard of long-standing rules, which must be
established by substantial evidence; otherwise, the misconduct is only simple.

Gaudencio B. Pantilo III v. J udge Victor A. Canoy,
Facts: Respondent judge granted bail even in the absence of any written application. Respondent
judge invokes the constitutional right of the accused to bail and Section 17(c), Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which does not require that a person be charged in court
before he or she may apply for bail. To his mind, there was already a constructive bail given that only
the papers were needed to formalize it. The complainant, Pantilo, the brother of the homicide victim
in the above-mentioned criminal case, recounts in his letter-complaint that, on September 3, 2008, at
around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he, along with police officers Ronald C. Perocho (Perocho) and
Santiago B. Lamanilao, Jr. (Lamanilao), acting as escorts of Leonardo Luzon Melgazo (Melgazo), the
accused in Criminal Case No. 8072, went to the City Prosecutors Office, Surigao City, to attend the
inquest proceedings. Later, at around 8 oclock in the evening, Pantilo was informed by Perocho that
Melgazo had been released from detention. The following day, September 4, 2008, Pantilo went to
the Surigao City Police Station to verify the information. Upon arriving there, Custodial Officer
Anecito T. Undangan told him that Melgazo had indeed been released at around 6:30 p.m. on
September 3, 2008, as shown in the Police Logbook of Detention Prisoners and as authorized by
Chief of Police Supt. Ramer Perlito P. Perlas.
Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and
circulars?
Held:The Court held that respondent judge is guilty of a less serious charge of violation of Supreme
Court rules, directives and circulars under Sec. 9, Rule 140. Sec. 17, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure allows that any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply
for bail with any court in the province, city or municipality where he is held. However, in the case at
bar, despite the absence of any written application, respondent judge verbally granted bail to the
accused. Moreover, in clear departure from Sec. 14 of Rule 114, respondent judge verbally ordered
the clerk of court to accept the cash deposit as bail, to earmark an official receipt for the cash deposit,
and to date it the following day. The bail should be deposited in the nearest collector of internal
revenue or provincial, city or municipal treasurer. Worse, respondent judge did not require the
accused to sign a written undertaking containing the conditions of the bail under Sec. 2, Rule 114 to
be complied with by the accused. Immediately upon receipt by the clerk of court of the cash deposit
of PhP 30,000 from the accused, respondent judge ordered the police escorts to release the accused
without any written order of release. In sum, there was no written application for bail, no certificate of
deposit from the BIR collector or provincial, city or municipal treasurer, no written undertaking signed
by the accused, and no written release order. As regards the insistence of respondent judge that such
may be considered as constructive bail, there is no such species of bail under the Rules. Despite
the noblest of reasons, the Rules of Court may not be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice
of the rights of another. Procedural rules have their own wholesome rationale in the orderly
administration of justice. Justice has to be administered according to the Rules in order to obviate
arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality. In this case, the reason of respondent judge is hardly
persuasive enough to disregard the Rules.

Marciano Alcaraz v. J udge Fatima Gonzales-Asdala, Regional Trial Court, Branch 87, Quezon
City,
Facts: Complainant filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal before the sala of the respondent
judge. She pointed out that Alfredo, during the pendency of the appeal, has not made any rental
deposits with the RTC as required by Section 19 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. About three months
after, complainant Marciano Alcarazas representative of Emelita in the pending caseinquired with
the RTC about the status of the motion for execution pending appeal. The complainant was informed
that the appeal was already deemed submitted for decision but the respondent had not taken any
action, much less issued any order or resolution, regarding the motion for execution pending appeal.
Issue: Whether or not there is an administrative fault may be attributed on the part of the respondent?
Held: From the filing of the Motion, a period of more than five (5) months had to pass before the
respondent judge finally directed a writ of execution be issued. However, the Court ruled that
respondent judge is not administratively liable due to the defective notice of hearing in complainants
motion. First. Rather than being addressed to the adverse party, the notice of hearing in
complainants motion was directed to the Branch Clerk of Court. Such gaffe actually contradicts a
basic purpose of the notice requirementi.e., to inform an adverse party of the date and time of the
proposed hearing. Second. The notice of hearing did not specify a date and time of hearing. The
notice is merely an instruction for the clerk of court to submit the motion for the consideration and
approval of the trial court immediately upon receipt or at any time convenient with the said
court. Jurisprudence had been categorical in treating a litigious motion without a valid notice of
hearing as a mere scrap of paper. An important aspect of the above judicial pronouncement is the
absence of any duty on the part of the court to take action on a motion wanting a valid notice of
hearing. Accordingly, a judge may not be held administratively accountable for not acting upon a
mere scrap of paper. To impose upon judges a positive duty to recognize and resolve motions with
defective notices of hearing would encourage litigants to an unbridled disregard of a simple but
necessary rule of a fair judicial proceeding.

Re: Report on the J udicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, Mandaue
City, Cebu,
A.M. No. 09-7-284-RTC. February 16, 2011.

Facts: During a judicial audit, it was discovered that there were many pending cases before the sala
of the respondent judge which were awaiting resolution but were already beyond the reglementary
period.
Issue: Whether or not the Respondent is liable for failure to decide cases within the reglementary
period?
Held: The Supreme Court is aware of the heavy caseloads heaped on the shoulders of every trial
judge. But such cannot excuse him from doing his mandated duty to resolve cases with diligence and
dispatch. Judges burdened with heavy caseloads should request the Court for an extension of the
reglementary period within which to decide their cases if they think they cannot comply with their
judicial duty. Corollarily, a heavy caseload may excuse a judges failure to decide cases within the
reglementary period but not their failure to request an extension of time within which to decide the
case on time. Hence, all that respondent judge needs to do is request for an extension of time over
which the Court has, almost customarily, been considerate. Moreover, it is not enough that he pens
his decision; it is imperative to promulgate the same within the mandated period. The lack of staff
that will prepare and type the decision is equally inexcusable to justify the delay in the promulgation of
the cases. Failure to render decisions and orders within the mandated period constitutes a violation of
Rule 3.05, Canon 3, of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which then makes respondent judge liable
administratively. Section 9, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court classifies undue delay in
rendering a decision or order as a less serious charge punishable under Section 11 (B) of the same
Rule.

MARCH
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011.

Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A statement by the Faculty of the
University of the Philippines College of Law on the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation in
the Supreme Court

administrative Cases Initiated by Supreme Court; procedure.

Respondent law professors asked for alternative reliefs should the Court find their
Compliance unsatisfactory, that is, that the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing and for
that purpose, they be allowed to require the production or presentation of witnesses and
evidence bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R.
No. 162230) and the plagiarism case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC) and
to have access to the records of, and evidence that were presented or may be presented in
the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. It should be clarified that this is not an indirect
contempt proceeding and Rule 71 (which requires a hearing) has no application to this case.
As explicitly ordered in the Show Cause Resolution this case was docketed as an
administrative matter. The rule that is relevant to this controversy is Rule 139-B, Section 13,
on disciplinary proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court, to wit:
SEC. 13. Supreme Court Investigators.In proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court
or in other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case
for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower
court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in sections 6 to 11
hereof, save that the review of the report of investigation shall be conducted directly by the Supreme
Court.
From the foregoing provision, it cannot be denied that a formal investigation, through a
referral to the specified officers, is merely discretionary, not mandatory on the Court.
Furthermore, it is only if the Court deems such an investigation necessary that the procedure
in Sections 6 to 11 of Rule 139-A will be followed. As respondent professors are fully aware,
in general, administrative proceedings do not require a trial type hearing.

A.M. No. RTJ -10-2247, March 2, 2011.

Jocelyn Datoon v. Judge Bethany G. Kapili, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 24,
Maasin City, Southern Leyte,

Administrative Proceedings; burden of proof.

A complaint charging Judge Kapili with Conduct Unbecoming of a Member of the Judiciary,
and Gross Misconduct amounting to Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct was dismissed
because of the failure of the complainant to meet the burden of proof required in
administrative proceedings. Administrative charges against judges have been viewed by this
Court with utmost care, as the respondent stands to face the penalty of dismissal or
disbarment. Thus, proceedings of this character are in their nature highly penal in character
and are to be governed by the rules of law applicable to criminal cases. The charges in such
case must, therefore, be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

A.C. No. 8253, March 15, 2011

Erlinda R. Tarog v. Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort, .

Attorney; breach of fiduciary duties.
Atty. Ricaforts act of obtaining money from his clients under the respective pretexts that the
amount would be deposited in court and that he would prepare and file the memorandum for
them erected a responsibility to account for and to use the amounts in accordance with the
particular purposes intended. For him to deposit the amount in his personal account without
the consent of the clients and to fail to file the memorandum and not return the money upon
demand, constituted a serious breach of his fiduciary duties as their attorney. He reneged on
his duty to render an accounting to his clients showing that he had spent the amounts for the
particular purposes intended. He was thereby presumed to have misappropriated the moneys
for his own use to the prejudice of his clients and in violation of the clients trust reposed in
him. He could not escape liability, for upon failing to use the moneys for the purposes
intended, he should have immediately returned the moneys to his clients. Atty. Ricaforts
plain abuse of the confidence reposed in him by his clients rendered him liable for violation of
Canon 16, particularly Rule 16.01, supra, and Canon 17, all of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. His acts and actuations constituted a gross violation of general morality and of
professional ethics that impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment.

.

A.M. No. P-09-2637. March 29, 2011.

Office of the Court Administrator v. Atty. Magdalena L. Lometillo, Former Clerk of Court VII, Victoria
S. Patopaten, Cashier II, Linda C. Guides, Administrative Officer I, Lenny Gemma P. Castillo, Clerk
III, and Brenda M. Linacero, Clerk III, All of Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City,

Clerk of Court; gross inefficiency.
Atty. Lometillo utterly failed to perform her duties with the degree of diligence and
competence expected of a clerk of court. The performance of ones duties in a perfunctory
manner is never justified especially when reliance on employees of lower rank projects
nothing else but gross inefficiency and incompetence. Next to the judge, the clerk of court is
the chief administrative officer charged with preserving the integrity of court proceedings. A
number of non-judicial concerns connected with trial and adjudication of cases is handled by
the clerk of court, demanding a dynamic performance of duties, with the prompt and proper
administration of justice as the constant objective. The nature of the work and of the office
mandates that the clerk of court be an individual of competence, honesty and integrity. The
Clerks of Court perform a very delicate function as custodian of the courts funds, revenues,
records, property and premises. They wear many hats those of treasurer, accountant,
guard and physical plant manager of the court, hence, they are entrusted with the primary
responsibility of correctly and effectively implementing regulations regarding fiduciary funds
and are thus, liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of such funds and
property

A.M. No. P-09-2637. March 29, 2011

Office of the Court Administrator v. Atty. Magdalena L. Lometillo, Former Clerk of Court VII, Victoria
S. Patopaten, Cashier II, Linda C. Guides, Administrative Officer I, Lenny Gemma P. Castillo, Clerk
III, and Brenda M. Linacero, Clerk III, All of Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, .

Clerk of Court; gross neglect of duty.

Atty. Lometillos 42-year stint in office provides the Court a reasonable expectation that she
was aware of the consequences that delay in the remittances of collections constitutes
neglect of duty. Surely, her long service to the judiciary must have made her realize the
effect of delayed deposit of collections: that the court is deprived of the interest that may be
earned if the amounts are deposited in a bank.

A.M. No. P-09-2686. March 28, 2011.

Priscilla L. Hernando v. Juliana Y. Bengson, Legal Researcher, RTC, Branch 104, Quezon City,

Court Personnel; conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

Bengson should be liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service in view of
her act of offering her services for facilitation of the land transfer papers at the BIR and
representing that her half-sister and niece had the power, influence and capacity to facilitate
the titling of subject property. Bengsons act begrimed both the image and integrity of her
office. At this point, the Court would like to once again underscore that the conduct of every
court personnel must be beyond reproach and free from suspicion that may cause to sully the
image of the judiciary. They must totally avoid any impression of impropriety, misdeed or
misdemeanor not only in the performance of their official duties but also in conducting
themselves outside or beyond the duties and functions of their office. Every court personnel
are enjoined to conduct themselves toward maintaining the prestige and integrity of the
judiciary for the very image of the latter is necessarily mirrored in their conduct, both official
and otherwise. They must not forget that they are an integral part of that organ of the
government sacredly tasked in dispensing justice. Their conduct and behavior, therefore,
should not only be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility but at all times be
defined by propriety and decorum, and above all else beyond any suspicion.

A.M. No. P-11-2914, March 16, 2011.

Dy Teban Trading Co., Inc. v. Archibald C. Verga, Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 33 Butuan City,
Court Personnel; grave misconduct.

Respondent Sheriffs unilateral and repeated demands for sums of money from a party-
litigant, purportedly to defray the expenses of execution, without obtaining the approval of the
trial court for such purported expense and without rendering to that court an accounting
thereof, in effect, constituted dishonesty and extortion. That conduct, therefore, fell far too
short of the required standards of public service. Such conduct is threatening to the very
existence of the system of the administration of justice. For grave misconduct, dishonesty
and neglect of duty, Archibald C. Verga, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Butuan
City, was suspended from office without pay for six months. In Sanga v. Alcantara, the Court
had another occasion to remind sheriffs on the performance of their duty: Under Section 9,
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the sheriff is required to secure the courts prior approval of
the estimated expenses and fees needed to implement the court process. A sheriff is guilty of
violating the Rules if he fails to observe the following: (1) prepare an estimate of expenses to
be incurred in executing the writ, for which he must seek the courts approval; (2) render an
accounting; and (3) issue an official receipt for the total amount he received from the
judgment debtor. The rule requires that the sheriff execute writs or processes to estimate the
expenses to be incurred. Upon the approval of the estimated expenses, the interested party
has to deposit the amount with the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff. The expenses shall
then be disbursed to the executing Sheriff, subject to his liquidation, within the same period
for rendering a return on the process or writ. Any unspent amount shall be refunded to the
party who made the deposit. A sheriff is an officer of the court. As such, he forms an integral
part of the administration of justice, since he is called upon to serve the orders and writs and
execute all processes of the court. As such, he is required to live up to the strict standards of
honesty and integrity in public service. His conduct must at all times be characterized by
honesty and openness and must constantly be above suspicion.

A.M. No. MTJ -08-1727, March 22, 2011.

Milagros Villaceran and Omar T. Miranda v. Judge Maxwel S. Rosete and Process Server Eugenio
Taguba, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Santiago City, Isabela,

Court Personnel; grave misconduct.

Respondent Tagubas act of collecting or receiving money from a litigant constitutes grave
misconduct in office. Grave misconduct is a grave offense that carries the extreme penalty of
dismissal from the service even on a first offense. Court personnel, from the lowliest
employee, are involved in the dispensation of justice; parties seeking redress from the courts
for grievances look upon court personnel, irrespective of rank or position, as part of the
Judiciary. In performing their duties and responsibilities, these court personnel serve as
sentinels of justice and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor
and dignity of the Judiciary and the peoples trust and confidence in this institution.
Therefore, they are expected to act and behave in a manner that should uphold the honor and
dignity of the Judiciary, if only to maintain the peoples confidence in the Judiciary. This
expectation is enforced, among others, by Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel which mandates that [c]ourt personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift,
favor or benefit based on any or explicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall
influence their official actions. Section 2(e), Canon III, on the other hand, mandates that
[c]ourt personnel shall not x x x [s]olicit or accept any gift, loan, gratuity, discount, favor,
hospitality or service under circumstances from which it could reasonably be inferred that a
major purpose of the donor is to influence the court personnel in performing official duties.
The acts addressed are strictly prohibited to avoid the perception that court personnel can be
influenced to act for or against a party or person in exchange for favors.

A.M. No. P-10-2803. March 30, 2011.

Presiding Judge Jeoffre W. Acebido, Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Cagayan de Oro City v.
Ludycissa A. Halasan, Court Stenographer III, and Joel A. Largo, Utility Worker I, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 41, Cagayan de Oro City,

Court Personnel; immoral conduct

. The sole issue in this case is whether respondents Halasan and Largo, who admitted to
having an illicit relationship with each other, are guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct.
The Court once again reminds its employees that the image of a court of justice is mirrored in
the conduct, official or otherwise, of the women and men who work in the judiciary, from the
judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court employees are enjoined to adhere to the exacting
standards of morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to
preserve the good name and integrity of the court of justice. In this case, we found
respondents Halasan and Largo guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct for which they may
be held administratively liable.

A.M. No. P-09-2651, March 23, 2011.

Emmanuel M. Gibas, Jr. v. Ma. Jesusa E. Gibas, Court Stenographer I, Municipal Trial Court,
Guiguinto, Bulacan, and Franconello S. Lintao, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos
City, Bulacan,

Court Personnel; immorality.
This is an administrative complaint for immorality filed against respondent Gibas and
respondent Lintao who were accused of having an illicit relationship. Court employees should
maintain moral righteousness and uprightness in their professional and private conduct to
preserve the integrity and dignity of the courts of justice. Court personnel should avoid any act
of impropriety which tarnishes the honor and dignity of the Judiciary, thus: Every employee of
the judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Like any public
servant, he must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the
performance of his official duties but in his personal and private dealings with other people, to
preserve the courts good name and standing. It cannot be overstressed that the image of a
court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work
thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court employees have been enjoined to
adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional and private
conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of courts of justice

A.M. No. P-09-2677, March 9, 2011.

Angelina C. Lim and Vivian M. Gaduang v. Maribeth G. Aromin, Records Officer I, OCC, MTC,
Meycauayan, Bulacan,

Court Personnel; misconduct.
Aromin actually interfered with the execution of a valid certificate of sheriffs sale in behalf of
her friend without regard to the impropriety of her acts considering that she is a court
employee. As a public servant, she should have known that she is enjoined to uphold public
interest over and above personal interest at all times. Employees of the judiciary should be
living examples of uprightness not only in the performance of official duties but also in their
personal and private dealings with other people so as to preserve at all times the good name
and standing of the courts in the community. The image of the court, as being a true temple of
justice, is aptly mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work
thereat, from the judge to the least and lowliest of its personnel.

A.M. No. P-09-2677, March 9, 2011.

Angelina C. Lim and Vivian M. Gaduang v. Maribeth G. Aromin, Records Officer I, OCC, MTC,
Meycauayan, Bulacan,

Court Personnel; professionalism.

An administrative complaint was filed against a court employee for using her position to
assist a friend in stopping the implementation of a courts judgment. In addition, the court
employee was absent from work to attend to this and did not even file a leave. Time and
again, the Supreme Court has emphasized that court personnel must devote every moment
of official time to public service. The conduct and behavior of court personnel should be
characterized by a high degree of professionalism and responsibility, as they mirror the image
of the court. Specifically, court personnel must strictly observe official time to inspire public
respect for the justice system. Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel mandates that court personnel shall commit themselves exclusively to the
business and responsibilities of their office during working hours.

A.M. No. 2010-11-SC, March 15, 2011.

Re: Employees Incurring Habitual Tardiness in the Second Semester of 2009,

Court Personnel; punctuality.
Administrative employees of the Court are being sanctioned herein for their habitual
tardiness. It is a canon under the Constitution that a public office is a public trust. This canon
includes the mandate for the observance of prescribed office hours and the efficient use of
every moment of such hours for the public service, because only thereby may the public
servants recompense the Government and the people for shouldering the costs of
maintaining the Judiciary. Accordingly, court officials and employees must at all times strictly
observe official hours to inspire the publics respect for the justice system. Absenteeism and
tardiness are, therefore, impermissible.

A.M. No. P-06-2206, March 9, 2011.

Executive Judge Leonilo B. Apita, RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City v. Marissa M. Estanislao, Court Legal
Researcher II, RTC, Br. 34, Tacloban City,

Court Personnel; reassignment by executive judge.
Section 7, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel expressly states that court
personnel shall not be required to perform any work outside the scope of their job
description. While the executive judge may not require court personnel to perform work
outside the scope of their job description, except duties that are identical with or are
subsumed under their present functions, the executive judge may reassign court personnel of
multiple-branch courts to another branch within the same area of administrative supervision
when there is a vacancy or when the interest of the service requires, after consultation with
the presiding judges of the branches concerned. The reassignment of court personnel in
multiple-branch courts to another branch within the same area of the executive judges
administrative supervision must involve (1) work within the scope of the court personnels job
description or (2) duties that are identical with or are subsumed under the court personnels
present functions.

A.M. No. P-06-2206, March 9, 2011.


Court Personnel; temporary designation.
This is an administrative complaint of first impression involving the designation of court
personnel, specifically a legal researcher as court interpreter, by an executive judge. While
the Manual for Clerks of Court provides that court personnel may perform other duties the
presiding judge may assign from time to time, said additional duties must be directly related
to, and must not significantly vary from, the court personnels job description. However, in
case of a sudden vacancy in a court position, the judge may temporarily designate a court
personnel with the competence and skills for the position even if the duties for such position
are different from the prescribed duties of the court personnel. The temporary designation
shall last only for such period as is necessary to designate temporarily a court personnel with
the appropriate prescribed duties. Such temporary designation cannot go on for an indefinite
period, or until the vacancy is filled up.

A.M. No. P-06-2206, March 9, 2011.


Court Personnel; temporary designation.

Requiring a Legal Researcher to perform the work of a Court Interpreter is counter-productive
and does not serve the ends of justice. Not only will respondent jeopardize her present
position as Legal Researcher by constantly shifting from one job to another, her qualification
as Court Interpreter will also be put in question. This arrangement does nothing but
compromise court personnels professional responsibility and optimum efficiency in the
performance of their respective roles in the dispensation of justice

A.M. No. MTJ-08-1718, March 9, 2011.

Atty. Rafael T. Martinez and Spouses Dan and Edna Reyes v. Judge Grace Gliceria F. De Vera,
Presiding Judge, MTCC, San Carlos City, Pangasinan,

Judges; administrative complaint not a substitute for judicial remedy.
An administrative complaint for gross ignorance of the law was filed against Judge De Vera
for denying admission of a position paper due to her mistaken belief that the same was filed
out of time. Upon a showing of the judges good faith and efforts to rectify her mistake, the
complaint was dismissed. An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for
every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is
available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari.
Disciplinary proceedings against a judge are not complementary or suppletory to, nor a
substitute for these judicial remedies whether ordinary or extraordinary. For, obviously, if
subsequent developments prove the judges challenged act to be correct, there would be no
occasion to proceed against her at all. Besides, to hold a judge administratively accountable
for every erroneous ruling or decision rendered, assuming she has erred, would be nothing
short of harassment and would make her position doubly unbearable.

A.M. No. RTJ -10-2241, March 9, 2011.
Ferdinand C. Bacolot v. Hon. Francisco D. Pao, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 93, San Pedro, Laguna,

Judges; administrative complaint not a substitute for judicial remedy.
As to the allegation of grave misconduct against Judge Pao in holding a hearing
notwithstanding the fact that defendants counsel already rested his case, the same has no
leg to stand on. Time and again, the Supreme Court has ruled that the acts of a judge,
pertaining to his judicial functions, are not subject to disciplinary action, unless they are
tainted with fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith. If the complainant felt aggrieved, his
recourse is through judicial remedies, i.e., to elevate the assailed decision or order to the
higher court for review and correction. Indeed, disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions
against magistrates do not complement, supplement or substitute judicial remedies, whether
ordinary or extraordinary. An inquiry into their civil, criminal and/or administrative liability may
be made only after the available remedies have been exhausted and decided with finality

A.M. No. RTJ -08-2149, March 9, 2011.

Lydia A. Benancillo v. Judge Venancio J. Amila,

Judges; conduct unbecoming of a judge.
In his Comment on an administrative complaint filed against him, respondent judge used
derogatory and irreverent language in relation to the complainant. Verily, we hold that Judge
Amila should be more circumspect in his language. It is reprehensible for a judge to
humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness. The act betrays lack of patience, prudence and
restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his language. He must choose his
words, written or spoken, with utmost care and sufficient control. The wise and just man is
esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech increases his persuasiveness. Accordingly,
respondent Judge Venancio J. Amila is hereby found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a
judge.

.
A.M. No. MTJ -08-1718, March 9, 2011.

Atty. Rafael T. Matinez and Spouses Dan and Edna Reyes v. Judge Grace Gliceria F. De Vera,
Presiding Judge, MTCC, San Carlos City, Pangasinan,

Judges; gross ignorance of law.
An administrative complaint for gross ignorance of the law was filed against Judge De Vera
for denying admission of a position paper due to her mistaken belief that the same was filed
out of time. To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the subject
decision, order or actuation of respondent judge in the performance of her official duties is
contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, she must be moved by bad
faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or
improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of
the law can find refuge. The complaint is dismissed

A.M. No. SCC-98-4, March 22, 2011.
Ashary M. Alauya, Clerk of Court, Sharia District Court, Marawi City v. Judge Casan Ali M.
Limbona, Sharia Circuit Court, Lanao del Sur,

Judges; gross misconduct.

When Judge Limbona was appointed as a judge, he took an oath to uphold the law, yet
in filing a certificate of candidacy as a party-list representative without giving up his judicial
post, he violated not only the law, but the constitutional mandate that no officer or employee
in the civil service shall engage directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political
campaign. The NBI investigation on the authenticity of Judge Limbonas signatures on the
certificate of candidacy unqualifiedly established that the judge signed the certificate of
candidacy, thus negating his claim that his signatures were forged. The filing of a certificate
of candidacy is a partisan political activity as the candidate thereby offers himself to the
electorate for an elective post. For his continued performance of his judicial duties despite his
candidacy for a political post, Judge Limbona is guilty of grave misconduct in office. While we
cannot interfere with Judge Limbonas political aspirations, we cannot allow him to pursue his
political goals while still on the bench. We cannot likewise allow him to deceive the Judiciary.
In light of the gravity of Judge Limbonas infractions, we find OCAs recommended penalty of
dismissal to be appropriate. Under the Rules of Court, dishonesty and gross misconduct are
punishable by dismissal.

A.M. No. RTJ -08-2149, March 9, 2011.
Lydia A. Benancillo v. Judge Venancio J. Amila,
Judges; impropriety.

Respondent judge acted inappropriately in calling the complainant and the intervenors to a
meeting inside his chamber and using derogatory and irreverent language in relation to a
complainant. Accordingly, he was found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. The New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary exhorts members of the judiciary, in the
discharge of their duties, to be models of propriety at all times. Sections 1 and 6, Canon 4 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct clearly enjoin judges not only from committing acts of
impropriety but even acts which have the appearance of impropriety. The Code recognizes
that even acts that are not per se improper can nevertheless be perceived by the larger
community as such. Be it stressed that judges are held to higher standards of integrity and
ethical conduct than attorneys and other persons not [vested] with public trust.

A.M. No. MTJ -11-1782, March 23, 2011.
Josefina Naguiat v. Judge Mario B. Capellan, Presiding Judge, MTCC, Br. 1, Malolos City, Bulacan,

Judges; undue delay in rendering a decision or order.
It took respondent judge six (6) years to resolve, on technicality, a case governed by the rule
on summary procedure. When confronted with administrative charges of delay, the Court
shall be guided by the period allowed by law. Reglementary periods fixed by law and the
various issuances of the Court are designed not only to protect the rights of all the parties to
due process but also to achieve efficiency and order in the conduct of official business. The
Court has time and again admonished judges to be prompt in the performance of their solemn
duty as dispenser of justice, since undue delays erode the peoples faith in the judicial
system. Delay not only reinforces the belief of the people that the wheels of justice grind ever
so slowly, but invites suspicion, however unfair, of ulterior motives on the part of the judge.
The raison dtre of courts lies not only in properly dispensing justice but also in being able to
do so seasonably.

A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011.

the Supreme Court,

Law Professors; academic freedom; limitation.

A novel issue involved in the present controversy, for it has not been passed upon in any
previous case before this Court, is the question of whether lawyers who are also law
professors can invoke academic freedom as a defense in an administrative proceeding for
intemperate statements tending to pressure the Court or influence the outcome of a case or
degrade the courts. Applying by analogy the Courts past treatment of the free speech
defense in other bar discipline cases, academic freedom cannot be successfully invoked by
respondents in this case. The implicit ruling in jurisprudence is that the constitutional right to
freedom of expression of members of the Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as
lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to uphold the publics faith in the legal
profession and the justice system. To our mind, the reason that freedom of expression may
be so delimited in the case of lawyers applies with greater force to the academic freedom of
law professors. It is not contested that respondent professors are, by law and jurisprudence,
guaranteed academic freedom and undisputably, they are free to determine what they will
teach their students and how they will teach. We must point out that there is nothing in the
Show Cause Resolution that dictates upon respondents the subject matter they can teach
and the manner of their instruction. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the principle of
academic freedom for this Court to subject lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action for
contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue intervention in favor of a party in a
pending case, without observing proper procedure, even if purportedly done in their capacity
as teachers.

A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011.

Restoring Integrity: A statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on
the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court,
Law Professors; engaged in practice of law.
It would do well for the Court to remind respondent law professors that, in view of the broad
definition in Cayetano v. Monsod, lawyers when they teach law are considered engaged in
the practice of law. Unlike professors in other disciplines and more than lawyers who do not
teach law, respondents are bound by their oath to uphold the ethical standards of the legal
profession. Thus, their actions as law professors must be measured against the same
canons of professional responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar as the fact of
their being law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that they are lawyers. Re:
Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled

A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011.

the Supreme Court,

Law Professors; freedom of expression and speech; limitation.
Respondent law professors claim that the Court, upon its issuance of the Show Cause
Resolution, has interfered with their constitutionally mandated right to free speech and
expression. In a long line of cases, this Court has held that the right to criticize the courts and
judicial officers must be balanced against the equally primordial concern that the
independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or interference. In cases
where the critics are not only citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly
affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline lawyers whose statements regarding the
courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of fair
comment and common decency. Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions
of the Statement exceeded the limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed as protected
free speech.

A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011.

the Supreme Court,

Law Professors; respect for courts.
For the disposition of the Court are the submissions of 37 respondent law professors in
response to the Resolution directing them to show cause why they should not be disciplined
as members of the Bar for issuing a statement which alleged acts of plagiarism and
misrepresentation in the Supreme Court. Even as lawyers passionately and vigorously
propound their points of view they are bound by certain rules of conduct for the legal
profession. This Court is certainly not claiming that it should be shielded from criticism. All the
Court demands is the same respect and courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under
established ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees,
professors or private practitioners, are officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken an
oath, as an indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with
good fidelity towards the courts. There is no exemption from this sworn duty for law
professors, regardless of their status in the academic community or the law school to which
they belong.

APRIL
Legal Ethics Cases: Month of APRIL 2011
Patricio Gone Vs. Atty. Macario Ga(April 6,2011)
Facts: A complaint for disciplinary action was filed against Atty. Macario Ga due to his failure
to reconstitute or turn over to his client the records of the case in his possession. The Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to serve their clients with competence and
diligence. Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04 state: Rule 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable;
Rule 18.04. A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the clients request for information. Respondent Atty. Ga
breached these duties when he failed to reconstitute or turn over the records of the case to
his client, herein complainant Gone. His negligence manifests lack of competence and
diligence required of every lawyer.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Macario Ga is guilty of negligence.
Held: Yes. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to serve their clients with
competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04 state:
Rule 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04. A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.
His failure to comply with the request of his client was a gross betrayal of his fiduciary duty
and a breach of the trust reposed upon him by his client. Respondents sentiments against
complainant Gone is not a valid reason for him to renege on his obligation as a lawyer. The
moment he agreed to handle the case, he was bound to give it his utmost attention, skill and
competence. Public interest requires that he exert his best efforts and all his learning and
ability in defense of his clients cause. Those who perform that duty with diligence and candor
not only safeguard the interests of the client, but also serve the ends of justice. They do honor
to the bar and help maintain the communitys respect for the legal profession.

Ma. Chedna Romero Vs. Pacifico B. Villarosa Jr.(April 12,2011)
Facts: On December 6, 2005, Romero had already received the amount of P10,000.00 from
Enriqueta Laurente in partial compliance with the obligation. Failing to receive the balance
of P20,000.00 in accordance with the Compromise Agreement, Romero filed a Motion for the
Issuance of a Writ Execution dated April 18, 2006, for which a corresponding writ was issued
on August 8, 2006. In response thereto, Enriqueta Laurente attested that she had delivered
the amount of P20,000.00 to Sheriff Villarosa, as supported by a certification executed by the
latter himself, dated May 9, 2007, that they had fully paid such amount. Romero added that
Sheriff Villarosa demanded a total amount of P1,500.00 from her on two occasions as sheriffs
fee.
Sheriff Villarosas failure to comply with Section 9 of Rule 39 by delaying the deposit of the
final amount he received (from a judgment debtor pursuant to a writ of execution) and not
delivering the other amounts to the Clerk of Court; and to faithfully account for the amounts
he received thru his failure to deliver the exact amounts, are clear manifestation of conduct
unbecoming of a government employee, tantamount to grave abuse of authority and
dishonesty. The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
enunciates the state policy to promote a high standard of ethics in public service, and enjoins
public officials and employees to discharge their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity
and competence.
Issue: Whether or not there is a grave abuse of authority and dishonesty.
Held: Section 4 of the Code lays down the norms of conduct which every public official and
employee shall observe in the discharge and execution of their official duties, specifically
providing that they shall at all times respect the rights of others, and refrain from doing acts
contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, and public interest.
Thus, any conduct contrary to these standards would qualify as conduct unbecoming of a
government employee.
Sheriff Villarosas guilt was thus proven by substantial evidence, which is that amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
such being the quantum of proof required in administrative cases.
A sheriff is a front-line representative of the justice system in this country. Once he loses the
peoples trust, he diminishes the peoples faith in the judiciary. High standards of conduct are
expected of sheriffs who play an important role in the administration of justice. They are
tasked with the primary duty to execute final judgments and orders of the courts. When a writ
is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it becomes his ministerial duty to proceed with reasonable
celerity and promptness to implement it in accordance with its mandate. It must be stressed
that a judgment, if not executed, would be an empty victory on the part of the prevailing
party.
All court employees, regardless of rank, being public servants in an office dispensing justice,
must always act with a high degree of professionalism and responsibility. Their conduct must
not only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but must also be in accordance with the
law and court regulations. No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness
from its holder than an office in the judiciary. Court employees should be models of
uprightness, fairness and honesty to maintain the peoples respect and faith in the judiciary.
The conduct of court personnel therefore, must not only be, but must also be perceived to be,
free from any whiff of impropriety, both with respect to their duties in the judiciary and to
their behaviour outside the court.

Any act or omission of any court employee diminishing or
tending to diminish public trust and confidence in the courts will not be tolerated.
All court employees, regardless of rank, being public servants in an office dispensing justice,
must always act with a high degree of professionalism and responsibility. Their conduct must
not only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but must also be in accordance with the
law and court regulations. No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness
from its holder than an office in the judiciary. Court employees should be models of
uprightness, fairness and honesty to maintain the peoples respect and faith in the judiciary.
The conduct of court personnel therefore, must not only be, but must also be perceived to be,
free from any whiff of impropriety, both with respect to their duties in the judiciary and to
their behavior outside the court.

Any act or omission of any court employee diminishing or
tending to diminish public trust and confidence in the courts will not be tolerated.

Antonio Exequiel A. Momongan Vs. Primitivo A. Sumayo, Clerk III and Ariel A.
Momongan(April 12,2011)
Facts: The crux of the complaint against respondent is that he forged his civil service eligibility
in that someone took the civil service examination in his stead, and he lacked one accounting
subject in his course, hence, contrary to his claim, he was not a college graduate.
Respondent explains, however, that since he majored in banking and finance and had fully
satisfied the number of required units in accounting, he dropped that accounting subject, and
the University of Visayas allowed him to receive his college diploma.
Respecting the allegation that he is not a civil service eligible, respondent vaguely proffers
that his civil service eligibility was passed upon, checked and ratified by the Civil Service
Commission which approved his appointment.
Acting on the complaints, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) wrote the Registrar of
the University of Visayas in Cebu requesting a Certification of Graduation, it appearing from
his scholastic records that he was given two incomplete grades in two subjects Government
Accounting and Auditing Part II in his last semester (second semester, 1982-1983) in
college. The University of Visayas did not, however, respond to the letter-request. The Court,
on recommendation of the OCA, referred the complaints against respondent to the Executive
Judge of RTC Cebu for report and recommendation. Respecting the complaint against Ariel,
since the position of Process Server does not require civil service eligibility, the OCA dismissed
the same.
Issue: Whether or not there is a falcification of public records.
Held: Respondents failure to adduce documentary proof of his civil service eligibility and of his
graduation from the University of Visayas, Cebu indicates that any information he may divulge
or present would be detrimental to his cause. Inevitably, the Court is led to the conclusion
that, contrary to his representation, he was neither a college graduate nor did he pass the
requisite civil service exam.
Clearly, respondent misrepresented his qualifications as to his educational attainment and
eligibility for government service. This misrepresentation amounts to plain and simple
dishonesty which, in this case, refers to the act of intentionally making a false statement on
any material fact in securing one's appointment. It is a serious offense reflective of a person's
character and the moral decay he suffers from, virtually destroying all honor, virtue and
integrity. It is a malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary. No other office in the
government service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness from an employee than
a position in the judiciary.
Any act of dishonesty, misrepresentation, or falsification done by a court employee that may
lead to moral decadence shall be dealt with severely. Respondent Clerk of Court is found guilty
of gross dishonesty and falsification of public records, and is dismissed from the service.

Judge Renato A. Fuentes Vs. Rogelio F. Fabro(April 6,2011)
Facts: On May 19, 2009, Judge Fuentes wrote the OCA to report the negligence
committed by Atty. Fabro and Salazar in not elevating to the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro
City (CA) for more than six (6) years the records of Civil Case No. 29,537-2003,
entitled Teodoro Polinar, et al. v. Hon. Antonio D. Laolao.

In his second letter to the OCA, Judge Fuentes again reported the negligence of Atty.
Fabro and Salazar for failing to elevate to the CA the records of Civil Case No. 29,019-2002,
entitled Medardo E. Escarda v. Celso E. Escarda and the Register of Deeds of Davao City. Judge
Fuentes claimed that he approved Medardo Escardas Notice of Appeal in his April 10,
2007 Order and directed the Branch Clerk of Court to elevate the entire records to the
CA. Apparently, the records were not elevated because Medardo Escardas counsel, Atty.
Santos E. Torrea, Jr., wrote Judge Fuentes on July 14, 2009 to inquire if their appeal and
records have been forwarded to the CA. Atty. Torrea enclosed a CA letter stating that
*t+here is no showing that the case was elevated on appeal to this Court as per verification
from the records and list of cases from 2007 until the present time.

The OCA required Atty. Fabro to comment on Judge Fuentes letter. Atty. Fabro filed his
comment on August 8, 2009. He averred that the records of Civil Case No. 29,537-2003 have
been elevated to the CA and that Salazar admitted that it was her own fault and that she
found that the record, already bounded for transmittal to the Court of Appeals, was indeed
mixed up with the files of old cases transferred to the other store room at a time when the
staff of the RTC Branch 17 was decongesting the office store room to give way to newly filed
cases. He also mentioned that his office was a very busy one, that he had his own duties, and
that he could not at all times spend his time supervising subordinate employees to ensure
their performance of their normal duties without prejudice to his own duties and
responsibilities.
The OCA Report stated that although the records of the cases have already been
transmitted to the CA, the OCA cannot tolerate the long delay in transmission nor give
credence to Atty. Fabros reasons for the delay. The OCA stressed that the administrative
functions of the Branch Clerk of Court are vital to the prompt and proper administration of
justice and that the timely transmittal to the appellate court of the records of appealed cases
ensures the speedy disposition of cases; any delay in the transmission of the case records
would hamper the proper administration of justice. The OCA added that it has been held that
the failure of the clerk of court to transmit the records of the case constitutes negligence and
warrants disciplinary action.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of gross negligence.
Held: We agree with the OCA finding that Atty. Fabro was guilty of gross negligence of duty as
branch clerk of court for being remiss in his duty to transmit to the CA the records of civil cases
within the required period (the records were elevated to the Court of Appeals after six years
from issuance of the RTC Order requiring him to do so).

Mary Jane Abanag Vs. Nicolas B. Mabute(April 4,2011)
Facts: In her verified letter-complaint dated September 19, 2003, the complainant, a 23-year
old unmarried woman, alleged that respondent courted her and professed his undying love for
her. Relying on respondents promise that he would marry her, she agreed to live with him.
She became pregnant, but after several months into her pregnancy, respondent brought her
to a manghihilot and tried to force her to take drugs to abort her baby. When she did not
agree, the respondent turned cold and eventually abandoned her. She became depressed
resulting in the loss of her baby. She also stopped schooling because of the humiliation that
she suffered.
In his comment on the complaint submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator,
the respondent vehemently denied the complainants allegations and claimed that the charges
against him were baseless, false and fabricated, and were intended to harass him and destroy
his reputation. He further averred that Norma Tordesillas, the complainants co-employee,
was using the complaint to harass him. Tordesillas resented him because he had chastised her
for her arrogant behavior and undesirable work attitude. He believes that the complainants
letter-complaint, which was written in the vernacular, was prepared by Tordesillas who is
from Manila and fluent in Tagalog; the respondent would have used the waray or English
language if she had written the letter-complaint.

The respondent, for his part, confirmed that he met the complainant when he joined the
Singles for Christ. He described their liaison as a dating relationship. He admitted that the
complainant would join him at his rented room three to four times a week; when the
complainant became pregnant, he asked her to stay and live with him. He vehemently denied
having brought the complainant to a local manghihilot and that he had tried to force her to
abort her baby. He surmised that the complainants miscarriage could be related to her
epileptic attacks during her pregnancy. The respondent further testified that the complainants
mother did not approve of him, but the complainant defied her mother and lived with him. He
proposed marriage to the complainant, but her mother did not like him as a son-in-law and
ordered the complainant to return home. The complainant obeyed her mother. They have
separated ways since then, but he pledged his undying love for the complainant.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct.
Held: The Court defined immoral conduct as conduct that is willful, flagrant or shameless, and
that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community. To justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or an act so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a
high degree.
We find it evident that the sexual relations between the complainant and the respondent
were consensual. They met at the Singles for Christ, started dating and subsequently became
sweethearts. The respondent frequently visited the complainant at her boarding house and
also at her parents residence. The complainant voluntarily yielded to the respondent and they
eventually lived together as husband and wife in a rented room near the respondents office.
They continued their relationship even after the complainant had suffered a miscarriage.
While the Court has the power to regulate official conduct and, to a certain extent, private
conduct, it is not within our authority to decide on matters touching on employees personal
lives, especially those that will affect their and their familys future. We cannot intrude into
the question of whether they should or should not marry. However, we take this occasion to
remind judiciary employees to be more circumspect in their adherence to their obligations
under the Code of Professional Responsibility. The conduct of court personnel must be free
from any taint of impropriety or scandal, not only with respect to their official duties but also
in their behavior outside the Court as private individuals. This is the best way to preserve and
protect the integrity and the good name of our courts.

Re: Complaint of Concerned Members of Chinese Grocers Association Against Justice Socorro
B. Inting of the Court of Appeals(April 12,2011)
Facts: Sometime in 2008, Romualdo dela Cruz (dela Cruz) filed a petition for the issuance of a
new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 42417, claiming that the old owners duplicate copy
had been misplaced. This petition was assigned to the sala of then Judge Inting, presiding
Judge of Branch IV, RTC Manila.

In the petition, dela Cruz claimed that: (a) the Office of the Register of Deeds had
already been notified of the loss through an Affidavit of Loss; (b) TCT No. 42417 issued in the
name of the CGA is still valid and subsisting; (c) copies of the Notice of Hearing have been duly
posted, as evidenced by the Sheriffs Certificate of Posting; and (d) dela Cruzs interest in filing
this petition is based on his right as a vendee of the property, as evidenced by the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated August 19, 2008, allegedly executed between CGA, represented by Ang E.
Bio, and dela Cruz.
In their letter complaint dated November 15, 2010, the Concerned Members of CGA claimed
that Justice Inting acted with gross neglect when she granted dela Cruzs petition for the
issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 42417. To recall, dela Cruz filed the
petition as the alleged vendee of the property. However, the complainants point out that the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 15, 2008, the basis for dela Cruzs interest and right to
file the petition, should have aroused Justice Intings suspicion as it was allegedly signed on
behalf of CGA by Ang E. Bio, who died on August 28, 2001. The complainants also found it
suspicious that Justice Inting did not question dela Cruz on the particulars of the sale i.e,
what the basis was of Bios authority to represent CGA in the sale, whether dela Cruz had paid
the applicable taxes in relation to the alleged sale, and why the land was sold for
only P5,500,000.00 when it was worth at least P50 million before granting the petition. The
complainants further faulted Justice Inting for not asking dela Cruz why he, and not CGA, filed
the petition.
In her comment filed on February 23, 2011, Justice Inting averred that there was
nothing suspicious in dela Cruz filing the petition as a vendee since Section 109 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) allows another person in interest to file a
petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate title. She further explained that on May 8,
2009, the Acting Chief of the Clerks of Court Division issued a Notice of Hearing addressed to
dela Cruz, the Register of Deeds of Manila and the CGA, setting the case for hearing on June 3,
2009. The courts process server also posted this Notice of Hearing on May 13, 2009 at three
conspicuous public places in Manila. However, no representative of CGA appeared to
participate in the proceedings or oppose the petition at the initial hearing on June 3,
2009. Accordingly, Justice Inting allowed dela Cruz to present his evidence ex-parte before
Atty. Cheryl Morales, the Chief of the Clerks of Court Division of the Land Registration
Authority. Based on the evidence presented, consisting of the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale
between CGA and dela Cruz, and the Affidavit of Loss registered with the Register of Deeds
and annotated at the back of the original title in the possession of the Register of Deeds of
Manila, and given CGAs lack of opposition, Justice Inting granted the petition.

Justice Inting further emphasized that she did not transfer title over the land to dela
Cruz; rather, she merely issued an order granting the issuance of a new owners duplicate
copy of TCT No. 42417, with the same terms and conditions as the original. She also denied
the complainants claim that she knew dela Cruz prior to this case, stressing the fact that she
only met dela Cruz when he appeared before her court with his attorney to comply with the
petitions jurisdictional requirements.

Justice Inting also questioned the complainants failure to take the necessary remedial
actions against the order, such as filing a petition for relief of judgment within the
reglementary period, as well as their failure to file any criminal action against dela Cruz, the
instigator of the alleged fraudulent sale.

Issue: Whether Justice Inting, in granting dela Cruzs petition, is guilty of misconduct.
Held: In the present case, however, no one from CGA appeared during the proceedings to
oppose dela Cruzs petition or to bring to Justice Intings attention the fact that Ang Bio was
already dead at the time the deed of sale was allegedly executed. Given the lack of any
evidence to assume otherwise, Justice Inting correctly relied on the notarized Deed of Sales
presumption of regularity.

As for the complainants allegation that Justice Inting had the duty to inquire into the details of
the alleged sale, we reiterate that in a petition for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate
copy of a certificate of title, the RTC, acting only as a land registration court with limited
jurisdiction, has no jurisdiction to pass upon the question of actual ownership of the land
covered by the lost owner's duplicate copy of the certificate of title.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in
the complaint with substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
Apart from the questionable nature of the Deed of Absolute Sale in dela Cruzs favor, brought
to light only now upon the presentation of the Certificate of Death, the complainants have not
presented any other evidence to support the charge of misconduct leveled against Justice
Inting.
Given the lack of any evidence to prove that Justice Inting acted with any bad faith or ill-
motive in acting on the petition, or even committed any error in issuing the assailed order, we
dismiss the complaint against her.

Assistant Special Prosecutor III Rohermina J. Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory S. Ong, et
al.(April 12,2011)
Facts: The complainant, then an Assistant Special Prosecutor III in the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, filed an affidavit-complaint dated October 23, 2008 charging Justice Ong, Justice
Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada, as the Members of the Fourth Division of the
Sandiganbayan with: (a) grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming a Justice, and conduct grossly
prejudicial to the interest of the service (grounded on their failing to hear cases as a collegial
body during the scheduled sessions of the Fourth Division held in Davao City on April 24-28,
2006, with Justice Ong hearing cases by himself and Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada
hearing other cases together; and on their having unreasonably flexed their judicial muscle
when she objected to the procedure); (b) falsification of public documents (grounded on their
issuance of orders relative to the hearings in Davao City, signed by all three of them, that
made it appear as if all of them had been present during the particular hearing acting as a
collegial body, when in truth they were not); (c) improprieties in the hearing of cases that
amounted to gross abuse of judicial authority and grave misconduct.
Nonetheless, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez pray for exoneration, contending that
they are not liable for simple misconduct despite the irregularity of their conduct for the
simple reason that, as the Decision has indicated, they have not been ill-motivated or inspired
by an intention to violate any law or legal rules in adopting the erroneous procedure, but had
been seeking, instead, to thereby expedite their disposition of cases in the provinces; their
actions were not willful in character or motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional
purpose; or even if their actions might be irregular, wrongful, or improper, such could not
be characterized as simple misconduct necessitating administrative sanction.

Also, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez posit that they cannot be made accountable for
unbecoming conduct because they admittedly posed questions on the law schools of origin of
the counsel appearing before them; that their propounding the queries, per se, did not justify
a finding of unbecoming conduct on their part considering that they thereby never derided
any law school or belittled the capabilities of lawyers on the basis of their school affiliations,
nor exhibited bias for or against any lawyer based on their alma mater.

In the alternative, Justice Ong prays that the sanction imposed upon him be made equal
to that meted on Justice Hernandez. He implores the Honorable Court to re-examine the
propriety of imposing a different and heavier penalty against him and take into due
consideration its own pronouncement in its decision that the Sandiganbayan is a collegial
court, and in a collegial court, the members act on the basis of consensus or majority rule.

For her part, the complainant insists that respondent Justices be found guilty of all
administrative charges made against them; and that the penalties or chastisement be
increased to be commensurate to their infractions.

Issue: Whether or not the respondents are guilty of misconduct.
Held: We point out that publicizing professional qualifications or boasting of having studied in
and graduated from certain law schools, no matter how prestigious, might have even revealed,
on the part of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez, their bias for or against some lawyers. Their
conduct was impermissible, consequently, for Section 3, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, demands that judges avoid situations that may reasonably
give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality in their personal relations
with individual members of the legal profession who practice regularly in their courts. Judges
should be dignified in demeanor, and refined in speech. In performing their judicial duties,
they should not manifest bias or prejudice by word or conduct towards any person or group
on irrelevant grounds. Their language must be guarded and measured, lest the best of
intentions be misconstrued. In this regard, Section 3, Canon 5 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, mandates judges to carry out judicial duties with
appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff,
and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the
proper performance of such duties. In view of the foregoing, Justice Ong and Justice
Hernandez were guilty of unbecoming conduct, which is defined as improper performance.
Unbecoming conduct applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of social
behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed method.

Antonino Monticalbo Vs. Judge Crescente Maraya Jr.(April 13, 2011)
Facts: The case was dismissed by the said court in its February 1, 2008 Order on the ground
that the representative of Fatima Credit Cooperative had no authority to prosecute the case.
The MCTC, however, did not rule on the counterclaim of complainant Monticalbo for
attorneys fees and litigation expenses. For said reason, he filed a motion for reconsideration
which was, however, denied by the court.
Complainant Monticalbo imputes the following errors on the part of respondent judge: (1)
respondent erred in ruling that Civil Case No. CN-89 is covered by the Rules on Summary
Procedure, considering that the total claim of the plaintiff in the said case
exceeded P10,000.00; (2) respondent, motivated by bad faith and corruption, cited the non-
existent case of Jaravata v. Court of Appeals in his questioned Order; and (3) respondent
accepted bribes in the form of food from plaintiff cooperative in Civil Case No. CN-89, through
Margarito Costelo, Jr., then Sheriff of the trial court presided over by respondent judge, and
Chairman of the Board and President of the said cooperative.
Complainant further avers that he personally witnessed the respondent judge enjoying a
drinking spree with Costelo and his other male staff members in a nipa hut annexed to the
building of the trial court during office hours in the afternoons of July 9, 2008, August 6,
2008 and September 10, 2008.
In his Comment and Manifestations dated December 29, 2008, respondent judge refutes all
the accusations hurled by complainant against him. He explains that he decided to dismiss
complainants appeal because it was filed out of time under the Rules on Summary
Procedure. This decision was made in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of the MCTC
and of his sound discretion. Secondly, he argues that complainants accusation of bad faith
and corruption is baseless and that the complaint was filed upon the urging of Atty. Alexander
Lacaba, his counsel, in an attempt to get even with him (respondent judge) for having lost the
appeal in the case. Lastly, respondent denies having participated in any drinking spree with his
staff members or Costelo, who has been prohibited by his doctor from drinking alcoholic
beverages. He claims that he only eats his meals in the nipa hut because he has to refrain
from eating in public eateries for security reasons.
In sum, it is recommended that respondent Judge be ABSOLVED from the charge of grave
misconduct and corruption. However, the citation of a non-existent case by the respondent
Judge in his assailed order of dismissal is tantamount to a misrepresentation and therefore
reflect poorly on his esteemed position as a public officer in a court of justice, it is therefore
recommended that he be ADMONISHED AND STRICTLY WARNED that a repetition thereof will
be more severely dealt with.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of grave misconduct and corruption.
Held: In order to merit disciplinary action, it must be established that respondents actions
were motivated by bad faith, dishonesty or hatred or were attended by fraud, dishonesty or
corruption. In the absence of such proof, the decision or order in question is presumed to have
been issued in good faith by respondent judge. In cases where a judge is charged with bribery
or grave misconduct, bias or partiality cannot be presumed. Neither can bad faith or malice be
inferred just because the judgment or order rendered by respondent is adverse to
complainant.
Before a judge can be held liable for deliberately rendering an unjust judgment or order, one
must be able to show that such judgment or order is unjust and that it was issued with
malicious intent to cause injustice to the aggrieved party.
Well-established is the rule in administrative proceedings that the burden of proof rests on the
complainant, who must be able to support and prove by substantial evidence his accusations
against respondent.

In this case, complainant has nothing but mere assertions and conjectures to buttress his
allegations of grave misconduct and bribery on the part of respondent who, if complainant is
to be believed, accepted bribes of food and engaged in drinking sprees with court employees
during office hours. Contrary to complainants statement, the Investigating Justice found that
respondent was attending to his cases during the dates when he allegedly had those drinking
sessions.

JUNE
A.M. No. P-11-2931 June 1, 2011
JOHN A. MENDEZ, et. al. vs. NERISSA A. BALBUENA

Facts: In a Verified Complaint-Affidavit dated November 3, 2006, Mendez narrated that in the early morning
of May 4, 2006, the respondent, who lived next door to his rented room in the house of Angelito, called him up
by phone, complaining that two (2) of the respondents boarders were almost sideswiped by the motorcycle of
his co-workers. The respondent demanded an apology from them. Mendezs co-workers did what the
respondent demanded and apologized to one of the boarders. Not content with the apology given by Mendezs
co-workers, the respondent turned her ire on Mendez and asked whether he has a license to operate his mineral
water refilling station. He answered that its owner has a license to operate and sell.

To avoid any further argument with the respondent, Mendez decided to pack his clothes and other
belongings, and to transfer temporarily to his mothers house. However, before he could leave his place, the
respondent called by phone, hurled invectives at him and called him a shameless person. The respondent told
him to immediately leave the premises, threatening that she would secure police assistance to bodily carry him
from his rented room to the street. The respondent kept shouting while pounding hard on the wall that separates
their rooms.

Mendez further claimed that in the early morning of May 5, 2006, Ivy went to see him at his mothers
house to report that the respondent, accompanied by three (3) police officers, barged into his place, ransacked
his room, and threw all his clothes out into the street. The respondent also cut-off his telephone line.

Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of Oppression and Conduct Unbecoming a Public Officer.

Held: Employees of the judiciary should be very circumspect in how they conduct themselves inside and
outside the office, particularly when they use agents of the law in their actions. By her actions, she directly
implied that she was using her court position to unilaterally enforce what she wanted i.e., to harass
complainant Mendez. By so doing, she brought the image of the judiciary to disrepute, as this is not the way of
the law and of those who enforce the law. It matters not that her acts were not work-related. Employees of the
judiciary should be living examples of uprightness, not only in the performance of official duties, but also in
their personal and private dealings with other people, so as to preserve at all times the good name and standing
of the courts in the community. Any scandalous behavior or any act that may erode the peoples esteem for the
judiciary is unbecoming of an employee. Professionalism, respect for the rights of others, good manners and
right conduct are expected of all judicial officers and employees. At all times, court employees should avoid
situations which tend to arouse suspicions that they are utilizing their official position for personal gain or
advantage, to the prejudice of the public.

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that court personnel must not only be, but also be perceived to be, free
from any impropriety with respect to both their official duties and their behavior anywhere else. The image of
the judiciary is mirrored in the conduct of its personnel whether inside or outside the court. Thus, court
personnel must exhibit a high sense of integrity not only in the performance of their official duties but also in
their personal affairs. The respondents ugly display of an oppressive and overbearing character failed to meet
the exacting standards required of employees of the judiciary and deserves administrative sanctions from the
Court. The respondents continued harassment of complainants to force them to leave the premises so she could
occupy the whole place cannot and should not be countenanced. Clearly, respondent is guilty of oppression and
of conduct unbecoming a court employee acts that amount to simple misconduct.

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2246 June 1, 2011
ATTY. RANDY P. BARENG vs. JUDGE ZENAIDA R. DAGUNA

Facts: On July 8, 2009, Atty. Bareng filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) his complaint-
affidavit, charging Judge Daguna with gross misconduct and manifest abuse of functions of her office, based on
the following allegations:

1. That Judge Daguna, in her December 4, 2006 Order, insinuated that there was pecuniary estimation
attached to the manifestation and motion filed by Atty. Bareng; this, according to Atty. Bareng, was unfair and
tainted with malice;
2. That despite Atty. Barengs explanation, Judge Daguna found him guilty of contempt of court;
3. That he filed a motion for reconsideration and supplement to the motion for reconsideration;
4. That after the lapse of almost one year, he filed his first motion to resolve;
5. That after more than one month, he filed a manifestation and second motion to resolve;
6. That Judge Daguna claimed that she had resolved the motion for reconsideration as early as July 31, 2007
but apparently the order had not been released; and
7. That he filed a notice of appeal on May 20, 2008 but Judge Daguna had not acted on the appeal despite
his motion to resolve and/or elevate appeal dated June 19, 2009.

In her July 31, 2009 Comment, Judge Daguna denied that the delays attributed to her were her fault. She
blamed her staff for the delay.

Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and manifest abuse of functions of her office.

Held: We agree with the OCAs finding that Judge Daguna is liable for gross inefficiency for failing to adopt a
system of record management in her court. Judge Daguna violated Rule 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct that
provides:

Rule 3.08 A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain professional
competence in court management, and facilitate the performance of the administrative functions or other judges
and court personnel.

Rule 3.09 A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and
efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service and
fidelity.

On July 31, 2007, Judge Daguna also resolved Atty. Barengs motion for reconsideration which was filed
on January 31, 2007, or way beyond the required period. There was also a delay in sending the records of the
appealed case to the CA. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that A judge shall
dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.

A.M. No. P-10-2794 June 1, 2011
DANELLA G. SONIDO vs. JOSEFINA G. ILOCSO

Facts: Sonido is the mother of Nathalie Mae G. Sonido who filed with the Rizal Prosecution Office a complaint
against one Kristel Ann S. Asebo for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, the Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004, in Criminal Case No. 08-7977.

Sonido received a copy of the resolution recommending the filing of an information against Kristel
on January 28, 2008. The following day, January 29, 2008, she went to the Metropolitan Trial Court in
Morong, Rizal, to inquire about the status of the case. She was told that the case had been raffled to Branch 80.
When she asked whom she should talk to about the case at Branch 80, she was advised to see Ilocso or Ka
Pining, which she did. Ilocso then told Sonido that she would prepare the warrant of arrest. She advised
Sonido to return the following day to get a copy of the warrant. Sonido returned the next day and several more
times thereafter, but Ilocso consistently failed to give her a copy of the warrant and instead gave excuses for her
repeated failures.

Exasperated about the delay in the issuance of the warrant of arrest, Sonido confronted Ilocso about
it. Ilocso allegedly assured Sonido that copies of the warrant had already been mailed to the proper authorities
for implementation. Sonido claimed, however, that it was only on June 26, 2008 that Ilocso gave her a copy of
the warrant with the remark, sige ipahuli mo na yan. Thankful that she was finally able to get a copy of the
warrant, Sonido even gave Ilocso P100.00. She immediately gave the warrant to SPO3 Minerva SG Marcelino,
a police investigator, for execution.

The following day, June 27, 2008, Sonido alleged that she learned from PO1 Alsander R. Ecalnir (a
member of the Teresa, Rizal Police and a resident of Morong) that the warrant had not been implemented as
Kristel left the country in May 2008 to work as a caregiver in Taiwan. Sonido was dejected by this turn of
events; her efforts to have Kristel arrested had all been in vain. She also doubts if Ilocso had really sent copies
of the warrant of arrest to the police authorities, as Kristel was apparently able to secure police and National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) clearances for her travel to Taiwan. She believes that Ilocso gave her a copy of
the warrant of arrest when Kristel had already left the country.

Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of Obstruction of Justice and Grave Misconduct.

Held: For knowingly delaying the release of the warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. 08-7977, Ilocso had
placed the court in a very negative light. It prejudiced the Courts standing in the community as it projected an
image of a Court that is unable to enforce its processes on time. For this reason, we find her liable not only for
simple neglect of duty, but for the more serious offense of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

Without doubt, Ilocsos very much delayed action on Sonidos request for a copy of the warrant of arrest
in the criminal case and in the delivery of the warrant to the police authorities cast doubts on the capability of
the court to administer justice fairly and expeditiously. Any misconduct similar to Ilocsos act is likely to reflect
adversely on the administration of justice.
[21]
Thus, Ilocso should be made to answer for her infraction in a way
that will serve as a lesson to everyone in the judiciary to be forthright in his dealings with the public, and to act
speedily on matters within his area of responsibility, regardless of who is involved. To be sure, the prejudice she
caused and her liability for her conduct can in no way be extinguished or mitigated by the issuance of a second
warrant of arrest, or by the complainants subsequent voluntary desistance from pursuing the case. The harm
had already been done on the aggrieved party and on the judiciary when these developments transpired.

A.M. No. SCC-11-16-P June 1, 2011
SULTAN PANDAGARANAO A. ILUPA vs. MACALINOG S. ABDULLAH

Facts: The complainant alleges in support of the charge that the respondent exhibited ignorance of his duties as
clerk of court when he issued a certificate of divorce, (OCRG Form No. 102) relying mainly on an illegal
Kapasadan or Agreement. He claims that the agreement was executed under duress and intimidation; the
certificate of divorce itself is defective and unreliable as there were erroneous entries in the document and
unfilled blanks. He claims that the respondent took away his beautiful wife by force or had a personal interest
in her.

The complainant believes that the respondent should not have issued the divorce certificate because
divorce is not recognized in the country and the Kapasadan or separation agreement had already been
revoked by Philippine civil law. In a supplemental letter, the complainant alleges that he signed the
Kapasadan because the Principal of the Mindanao State University, a certain Mackno, and Police Officer
Hadji Amin threatened to kill him. For this reason, he wrote a letter to the SCC judge of Marawi City, assailing
the agreement; he even personally handed a copy of the letter to the respondent who took no action on the
matter.

To save his marriage with Nella Rocaya Mikunug originally solemnized on May 19, 1959, based on
the Maranao culture, and later renewed through a civil wedding before a Marawi City judge the complainant
filed a petition for restitution of marital rights with the SCC, Marawi City. To his dismay, the judge dismissed
the petition without any notice or summons to him. He suspects that the dismissal was due to the respondents
hukos-pukos or manipulation.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent abused his authority in issuing certificate of divorce.

Held: We agree with the OCA and Judge Disalo that the complaint is devoid of merit. The issuance of a
certificate of divorce is within the respondents duties, as defined by law.

We quote with approval the following excerpt from the OCAs Report:

Evidently, respondent Clerk of Court merely performed his ministerial duty in accordance with the
foregoing provisions. The alleged erroneous entries on the Certificate of Divorce cannot be attributed to
respondent Clerk of Court considering that it is only his duty to receive, file and register the certificate of
divorce presented to him for registration. Further, even if there were indeed erroneous entries on the certificate
of divorce, such errors cannot be corrected nor cancelled through [his] administrative complaint.

x x x
Finally, on the allegation that the respondent Clerk of Court manipulated the dismissal of his petition for
restitution of marital rights, we find the same unsubstantiated. Aside from complainants bare allegation, there
was no substantial evidence presented to prove the charge. It is a settled rule in administrative proceedings that
the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in his or her complaint with substantial evidence. In
the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his duties
will prevail (Rafael Rondina, et al. v. Associate Justice Eloy Bello, Jr., A.M. No. CA-5-43, 8 July 2005).

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2087 June 7, 2011
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE MA. ELLEN M. AGUILAR

Facts: The complaint for Falsification of Public Document, Perjury and Estafa against Atty. Aguilar and
Angelina Cuevas was filed by Arnel Sison before the Regional State Prosecutor, and was docketed as I.S. Nos.
03-S-2282 to 03-S-2284. After preliminary investigation, Angelito V. Lumabas, Acting City Prosecutor of
Olongapo City, issued a Resolution dated March 2, 2004, dismissing the complaint for lack of probable cause.

Meanwhile, proceedings on Arnel Sisons complaint for Dishonesty and Misconduct against Atty.
Aguilar, filed before the Ombudsman and docketed as OMB-L-A-03-0718-G, continued. Atty. Aguilar filed her
counter-affidavit therein on October 2, 2003.

Following her retirement as City Legal Officer of Olongapo City effective December 13, 2003, Atty.
Aguilar, through a letter

dated September 3, 2004, addressed to the JBC Chairman, applied for the position of
judge, preferably at the RTC Branch 71, of Iba, Zambales. In support of her application, Atty. Aguilar
accomplished and submitted a Personal Data Sheet (PDS), which consisted of four pages. Question No. 23 of
the PDS asked: Is there any pending civil, criminal or administrative (including disbarment) case or complaint
filed against you pending before any court, prosecution office, any other office, agency or instrumentality of the
government, or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines? In answer to said question, Atty. Aguilar wrote
None. The PDS was notarized in September 2004.

Issue: Whether or not respondent should be dismissed from office.

Held: With respect to Judge Aguilars supposed omission in her PDS submitted with her judgeship application,
we are guided by the ruling in Plopinio v. Zabala-Cario, wherein we clarified that a person shall be considered
formally charged in administrative cases only upon a finding of the existence of a prima facie case by the
disciplining authority, in case of a complaint filed by a private person. However, Judge Aguilars failure to
disclose OMB-L-A-03-0718-G in her PDS filed upon her assumption of office when she already had notice of
the adverse decision therein constitutes dishonesty, considered a grave offense under the Administrative Code
of 1987, as well as the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Civil Service Rules), with
the corresponding penalty of dismissal from service even for the first offense.

Nonetheless, Rule IV, Section 53 of the Civil Service Rules also provides that in the determination of
the penalties to be imposed, extenuating, mitigating, aggravating or alternative circumstances attendant to the
commission of the offense shall be considered. Among the circumstances that may be allowed to modify the
penalty are (1) length of service in the government, (2) good faith, and (3) other analogous circumstances.

In several jurisprudential precedents, the Court has refrained from imposing the actual administrative penalties
prescribed by law or regulation in the presence of mitigating factors. Factors such as the respondent's length of
service, the respondent's acknowledgement of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family
circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations, respondent's advanced age, among other things, have
had varying significance in the determination by the Court of the imposable penalty.

A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC June 7, 2011
Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the
University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in
the Supreme Court

Facts: In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, Professors Catindig and Laforteza relied on the following
grounds:
GROUNDS

A. THIS PROCEEDING, WHILE OSTENSIBLY DOCKETED AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MATTER, IS PREMISED ON A FINDING OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT. ACCORDINGLY, WITH
ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
RESPONDENTS BREACHED THEIR ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS WITHOUT OBSERVANCE OF
THE DUE PROCESS SAFEGUARDS GUARANTEED IN AN INDIRECT CONTEMPT
PROCEEDING.

B. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT (1) THE
PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION ISSUES IN THE VINUYA CASE AND IN A.M. NO.
10-7-17-SC HAVE NO RELATION TO THE RESTORING INTEGRITY STATEMENT AND THE
SHOW CAUSE RESOLUTION, AND THEREFORE (2) THE RESPONDENTS ARE NOT
ENTITLED TO ACCESS AND ADDRESS THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN A.M. NO. 10-7-17-SC,
TO PRESENT THEIR OWN EVIDENCE IN RESPECT OF THE PLAGIARISM AND
MISREPRESENTATION ISSUES, AND TO SUPPORT THEIR RESPONSE TO THE SHOW CAUSE
RESOLUTION WITH SUCH EVIDENCE.

C. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
RESPONDENTS ARE IN BREACH OF THEIR ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS FOR HAVING ISSUED
THE RESTORING INTEGRITY STATEMENT.

Issue: Whether or not respondents are guilty of indirect contempt of court.

Held: A charge of indirect contempt, if proven in due proceedings, carry with it penal sanctions such as
imprisonment or a fine or both.

The very same contumacious speech or conduct directed against a court or judicial officer, if committed
by a member of the Bar, may likewise subject the offender to disciplinary proceedings under the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which prescribes that lawyers observe and promote due respect for the courts. In
such disciplinary cases, the sanctions are not penal but administrative such as, disbarment, suspension,
reprimand or admonition.

A.M. No. P-10-2835 June 8, 2011
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CLERK OF COURT VII ATTY. JEOFFREY S.
JOAQUINO

Facts: On April 13, 2011, respondent Joaquino filed a second motion for reconsideration, raising the following
grounds in support of his motion: (1) that he issued the questioned March 17, 2008 writ of execution based on
his honest reliance on and obedience to the September 6, 2006 Order of the RTC, granting the partial summary
judgment, and the March 6, 2008 Order of the RTC, declaring the partial summary judgment final and
executory, and directing the issuance of a writ of execution; (2) that the penalty of six (6) months without pay is
too harsh and severe for the violation charged against him, based on the penalty imposed in Separa v. Atty.
Maceda.

Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of grave misconduct, abuse of authority, and gross ignorance of the
law.

Held: Considering the circumstances attendant to this case, and in the spirit of compassion, we resolve to lower
the penalty imposed on respondent Joaquino based on the recent pronouncements of the Court.

However, respondent Joaquino is sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the
future shall merit his dismissal from the service. Clerks of court occupy a sensitive position in the judicial
system, they are required to safeguard the integrity of the court and its proceedings, to earn and preserve respect
therefor, to maintain loyalty thereto and to the judge as superior officer, to maintain the authenticity and
correctness of court records, and to uphold the confidence of the public in the administration of justice.

A.M. No. P-09-2715 June 13, 2011
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. EFREN E. TOLOSA

Facts: On February 16, 2000, upon the plaintiffs motion, the RTC directed the issuance of a Writ of Execution.
Accordingly, Branch Clerk of Court William D. Erlano issued the corresponding Writ of Execution on February
29, 2000, directing the Provincial Sheriff or any of his deputies to enforce and implement the decision pursuant
to the provision of the Rules of Court and to make a return of the writ within the time provided for by
law. The respondent was furnished a copy of the writ on March 31, 2000.

Three (3) months thereafter, or on July 3, 2000, the complainants mother wrote Clerk of Court Marilyn
D. Valino inquiring about the status of the writ. In a 1
st
Indorsement dated July 4, 2000, Clerk of Court Valino
forwarded the letter to Tolosa, directing him to immediately execute and/or implement the Writ of Execution
in accordance with the decision and [in consonance] with the existing rules, and inviting his attention to the
provisions of Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

On July 17, 2000, Tolosa complied and submitted a Sheriffs Partial Return, reporting that he attempted
to serve the writ twice, on April 17, 2000 and May 12, 2000, but defendant Vicente Go was not in his house on
both occasions. He was able to implement the writ only on June 14, 2000. He reported that he received from
defendant Vicente Go several postdated checks in the total amount of P118,000.00, in partial satisfaction of the
judgment, and that he informed the complainants counsel of his receipt of the checks. Counsel did not make
any comment on whether to accept the checks or not.

On September 22, 2000, Espiritu, apparently unaware that there was a partial implementation of the
writ, wrote Judge Madrid, complaining that Tolosa has failed to do his task, as mandated by the Rules of Court,
despite that several months have passed and requesting that a substitute Sheriff be designated. In a
1
st
Indorsement dated September 26, 2000, Judge Madrid required Tolosa to comment on Espiritus letter.

On October 10, 2000, Tolosa filed his comment/manifestation, explaining that as early as July 17, 2000,
he already made a partial return of the Writ of Execution and that he had encashed the matured checks in the
amount of P60,000.00. On the same day, he deposited the amount of P60,000.00 with the Branch Clerk of
Court of the RTC, Branch 51, together with the other postdated checks. He enclosed an Acknowledgment
Receipt dated October 10, 2000, signed by Branch Clerk of Court Erlano

Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty for Undue Delay in the Disposition of a Case and/or Manifest Bias or
Partiality.

Held: The Court finds that the respondent committed two offenses in this case, (1) failure to make a return of
the writ within the period provided by the Rules of Court; and (2) failure to turn over the checks he received by
virtue of the implementation of the writ, to the court issuing it within the same day he received them.

The Court finds Sheriff Tolosas explanation on his delay to make a return of the writ in due time flimsy
and untenable. The duty of a sheriff to make a return of the writ is ministerial and it is not his duty to wait for
the plaintiff to decide whether or not to accept the checks as payment. A purely ministerial act or duty is one
which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without
regard to the exercise of his own judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. When a writ is
placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to the contrary, to proceed with
celerity and promptness to execute it according to its mandate.

A sheriff has no discretion whatsoever with respect to the disposition of the amounts he receives. If he
finds that there is a need to clarify what to do with the checks, prudence and reasonableness dictate that
clarification be sought immediately from the clerk or judge issuing it.

As an officer of the court, sheriffs are chargeable with the knowledge of what is the proper action to take in
case there are questions in the writ which need to be clarified, and the knowledge of what he is bound
to comply. He is expected to know the rules of procedure pertaining to his functions as an officer of the
court, relative to the implementation of writs of execution, and should, at all times, show a high degree of
professionalism in the performance of his duties. Any act deviating from the procedure laid down by the Rules
is misconduct that warrants disciplinary action.

A.M. No. P-06-2130 June 13, 2011
SUSANA E. FLORES vs. ARIEL D. PASCASIO

Facts: In her complaint-affidavit dated June 2, 2004, the complainant narrated that on March 5, 2004, an
auction sale of a JVC DVD player and a Sony TV set was conducted by the respondent at the Office of the
Clerk of Court, Olongapo City. She submitted a bid of Ten Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P10,200.00) for the
two (2) items. During the public auction, the two items were sold separately, the JVC DVD player
for P2,520.00 and the Sony TV set for P2,500.00. The complainant claimed that the respondent manipulated the
bidding process to make it appear that she submitted a bid of only One Thousand Two Hundred Pesos
(P1,200.00) instead of her bid of Ten Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P10,200.00). She further alleged that the
respondent even scolded her for questioning the conduct of the auction sale. According to her, when she asked
the respondent why she lost the bidding, he replied, Wala kang magagawa dahil ako ang masusunod dito. Ako
ang sheriff dito, kung kanino ko gustong mapunta ang items, yun ang masusunod.

Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty Grave Misconduct and Grave Abuse of Authority.

Held: Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice and high standards are expected of them.
Their conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum but must, at all times, be
above suspicion. Part of this stringent requirement is that agents of the law should refrain from the use of
abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing or otherwise improper language. Judicial employees are expected to
accord due respect, not only to their superiors, but also to others and their rights at all times. Their every act and
word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy and dignity. The respondents arrogant behavior,
telling complainant, Wala kang magagawa dahil ako ang masusunod. Ako ang sheriff dito, kung kanino ko
gustong mapunta ang items, yun ang masusunod, was an evident violation of these rules of conduct for judicial
employees.

Dishonesty means a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity,
lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; and disposition to
defraud, deceive or betray.

Given the above parameters, the Court finds the respondent guilty of dishonesty as recommended by
OCA. Under Section 52, B(2), Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, dishonesty is punishable by dismissal from the service. Since the respondent had previously been
ordered dismissed from the service, suspension is no longer possible. Thus, instead of suspension, the
respondent, shall be imposed a fine as alternative penalty. We deem the fine equivalent to three- month salary
to be appropriate in light of the penalty of dismissal that it replaces and the potential damage that his dishonesty
caused.

A.M. No. P-10-2829 June 21, 2011
JUDGE EDILBERTO G. ABSIN vs. EDGARDO A. MONTALLA

Facts: In his letter-complaint dated 23 November 2009, Judge Absin alleged that in the Resolution dated 23
October 2009 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. 01280-MIN (Heirs
of Victoriano Magallanes, et al. v. Ernesto Pono and Crispina Pono), the CA noted that Montalla failed to
submit signed copies of the TSNs taken on the following dates: (1) 13 October 2004 on the witness
MariaSabuero; (2) 11 January 2005 on the witness Rodolfo Omboy; (3) 26 April 2005 on the witness
Rosalinda Magallanes; (4) 12 October 2005 on the witness Ernesto Pono; (5) 7 December 2005 on the
witness Crispina Pono; and (6) 25 January 2006 and 2 March 2006 on the witness
Rogelio Magallanes. Montalla allegedly asked for time to submit the required TSNs but failed to submit the
same. Montallawas repeatedly reminded to comply with the CAs resolution but he still did not comply.

In his Comment dated and mailed on 10 March 2010, Montalla admitted he was the stenographer who
took down the stenographic notes on the dates mentioned and both the presiding judge and the clerk of court
repeatedly reminded him to transcribe the stenographic notes of the proceedings. Montalla, however, claimed he
was prevented from performing his tasks due to poor health as he was diagnosed with pulmonary tuberculosis,
peptic ulcer, and diabetes. Montalla now seeks the compassion of the Court as he is allegedly still recovering
from his illnesses.

Issue: Whether or not respondent has been negligent in performing his duties.

Held: Montalla should be reminded that it is the duty of the court stenographer who has attended a session of a
court to immediately deliver to the clerk of court all the notes he has taken, the same to be attached to the record
of the case.

The Court has ruled, in a number of cases, that the failure to submit the TSNs within the period
prescribed under Administrative Circular No. 24-90 constitutes gross neglect of duty. Gross neglect of duty is
classified as a grave offense and punishable by dismissal even if for the first offense pursuant to Section
52(A)(2) of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

As a stenographer, Montalla should realize that the performance of his duty is essential to the prompt
and proper administration of justice, and his inaction hampers the administration of justice and erodes public
faith in the judiciary. The Court has expressed its dismay over the negligence and indifference of persons
involved in the administration of justice. No less than the Constitution mandates that public officers must serve
the people with utmost respect and responsibility. Public office is a public trust, and Montalla has without a
doubt violated this trust by his failure to fulfill his duty as a court stenographer.

A.C. No. 6683 June 21, 2011
RE: RESOLUTION OF THE COURT DATED 1 JUNE 2004 IN G.R. NO. 72954 AGAINST, ATTY.
VICTOR C. AVECILLA

Facts: On 30 July 2003, following a diligent search for the rollo of G.R. No. 72954, Atty. Dimaisip
apprised Chief Justice Davide that the subject rollo could not be found in the archives. Resorting to the tracer
card of G.R. No. 72954, Atty. Dimaisip discovered that the subject rollo had been borrowed from the JRO on 13
September 1991 but, unfortunately, was never since returned. The tracer card named the respondent, although
acting through a certain Atty. Salvador Banzon (Atty. Banzon), as the borrower of the subject rollo.

The next day, or on 31 July 2003, Chief Justice Davide took prompt action by directing Atty. Dimaisip
to supply information about how the respondent was able to borrow the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 and also to take
necessary measures to secure the return of the said rollo.

On 18 August 2003, almost twelve (12) years after it was borrowed, the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 was
finally turned over by Atty. Avecilla to the JRO.

On 22 September 2003, Chief Justice Davide directed the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) of this
Court, to make a study, report and recommendation on the incident. On 20 November 2003, the OCAT
submitted a Memorandum to the Chief Justice opining that the respondent may be administratively charged, as
a lawyer and member of the bar, for taking out the rollo of G.R. No. 72954.

Issue: Whether or not respondent is liable.

Held: We find that there are sufficient grounds to hold respondent administratively liable.

First. Taking judicial records, such as a rollo, outside court premises, without the courts consent, is an
administratively punishable act. In Fabiculana, Sr. v. Gadon, this Court previously sanctioned a sheriff for the
wrongful act of bringing court records home, thus:

Likewise Ciriaco Y. Forlales, although not a respondent in complainant's letter-complaint, should be
meted the proper penalty, having admitted taking the records of the case home and forgetting about them. Court
employees are, in the first place, not allowed to take any court records, papers or documents outside the court
premises. It is clear that Forlales was not only negligent in his duty of transmitting promptly the records of an
appealed case to the appellate court but he also failed in his duty not to take the records of the case outside of
the court and to subsequently forget about them.

Second. The act of the respondent in borrowing a rollo for unofficial business entails the employment of
deceit not becoming a member of the bar. It presupposes the use of misrepresentation and, to a certain extent,
even abuse of position on the part of the respondent because the lending of rollos are, as a matter of policy, only
limited to official purposes.

As a lawyer then employed with the government, the respondent clearly violated Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance
his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties. (Emphasis supplied).

Third. However, We find the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1)
year as too harsh for the present case. We consider the following circumstances in favor of the respondent:
1. G.R. No. 72954 was already finally resolved when its rollo was borrowed on 13 September 1991.
Thus, the act of respondent in keeping the subject rollo worked no prejudice insofar as deciding G.R. No. 72954
is concerned.
2. It was never established that the contents of the rollo, which remained confidential despite the finality
of the resolution in G.R. No. 72954, were disclosed by the respondent.
3. After his possession of the subject rollo was discovered, the respondent cooperated with the JRO for
the return of the rollo.

We, therefore, temper the period of suspension to only six (6) months.

A.M. No. MTJ-11-1786 June 22, 2011
FELICISIMA R. DIAZ vs. JUDGE GERARDO E. GESTOPA, JR.

Facts: Complainant alleged that on April 27, 2009, she filed an unlawful detainer case before the MTC of
Naga, Cebu, entitledFelicisima Rivera-Diaz v. Spouses Ruel & Diana Betito and Isidro Pungkol, docketed as
Case No. R-595. On July 8, 2009, the case was scheduled for pre-trial conference. Since complainant cannot
attend the conference because of her heart ailment, she instead sent her nephew, Elmer Llanes, to appear in her
behalf.

During the conference, Judge Gestopa recommended the case for barangay conciliation, pursuant to
Section 408 (g) of the Local Government Code. Complainant's counsel objected and moved for mediation
instead. However, respondent judge insisted that he has the authority to refer it back to barangay for
conciliation.

Judge Gestopa concluded that since the subject property is in Naga, and that complainant has always been
a resident of Naga, it is therefore proper to refer the case for barangay conciliation. Complainant, on the other
hand, claimed that she is no longer a resident of Naga.

Complainant moved for reconsideration. She argued that the referral of the case to the lupon is a
violation of the Rules on Summary Procedure. She stressed that she is no longer a resident of Naga and is now
actually residing in Dumlog, Talisay City, Cebu. Complainant further pointed out that the case had already
been previously referred to the lupon. In fact, a Certification to File Action in court had been issued on May 20,
2008. She further admitted that she did not attach the certificate to the complaint since she believed that the
same was not required anymore, considering that the parties are not residents of the same barangay or
municipality.

On July 20, 2009, Judge Gestopa denied the motion for reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty for incompetence, gross ignorance of the law, neglect of duty, and
conduct unbecoming of a judge.

Held: Considering that complainant had already manifested in court, albeit belatedly, the presence of what it
considered to be a valid Certification to File Action in court due to unsuccessful conciliation, respondent's act of
referring the case to barangayconciliation rendered its purpose moot and academic.

Time and again, we have reiterated that the rules of procedure are clear and unambiguous, leaving no
room for interpretation. We have held in numerous cases that the failure to apply elementary rules of procedure
constitutes gross ignorance of the law and procedure. Neither good faith nor lack of malice will exonerate
respondent, because as previously noted, the rules violated were basic procedural rules. All that was needed for
respondent to do was to apply them.

JULLY
A.M. No. P-11-2888 July 27, 2011 (formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 09-3252-P)
GOLDEN SUN FINANCE CORPORATION, represented by RACHELLE L. MARMITO, Complainant,
vs. RICARDO R. ALBANO, Sheriff III, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 62, Makati City, Respondent.
FACTS: Complainant alleged that on January 7, 2009, it filed a complaint for the recovery of a Honda Civic Sedan with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Quezon City, Branch 81, against one Lucila S. Reyes, docketed as Civil Case No. 0964026. The
subject motor vehicle, registered in the name of Reyes, as shown in the Certificate of Registration issued by the LTO. The
complainant found out that the motor vehicle had already been levied upon by the respondent by virtue of a writ of
execution issued by the MeTC, Makati City, for violation of BP 22 against Reyes. It was sold at a public auction conducted
by the respondent, with the Royal Makati Credit Resource as the highest bidder. The complainant averred that the levy
and sale of the motor vehicle by the respondent was illegal. It claimed that the respondent was negligent when he levied
upon the motor vehicle and proceeded with the auction sale without looking into the cars Certificate of Registration to
determine whether it was encumbered or not.
Required by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to comment on the charges against him, the respondent
contended that he had no knowledge that the car was encumbered because the Certificate of Registration was never
shown to him. He also had no knowledge that the car was the subject of a writ of replevin in Civil Case No. 0964026.
THE OCAS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: The encumbrance in the instant case has been properly recorded in
the LTO and, as attested to by the complainant, in the Register of Deeds of Rizal Province. Such record is constructive
notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. This presumption cannot be defeated by
lack of notice or knowledge of what the public record contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he
was ignorant of the provisions of law. Hence, the respondent is charged with knowledge of the duly registered
encumbrance on the property he levied. In the instant administrative complaint, the respondent not only levied the
encumbered vehicle, but sold it in an execution sale, the proceeds of which would not satisfy the judgment debt
because of the existing encumbrance. Thus, the implementation of the writ of execution, although impressively carried
out with such celerity and promptness, had been to naught. It must be pointed out that the recovery of the vehicle itself
was the subject of Civil Case No. 0964026 filed by GSFC before the Quezon City RTC, Branch 81.
HELD: We fail to find sufficient basis to declare the respondent administratively liable for simple neglect of duty. Section
9(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states the manner by which judgments for money may be satisfied by levy: SEC.
9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced. (b) Satisfaction by levy. If the judgment obligor cannot pay all
or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the
officer shall levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be
disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution giving the latter the option to immediately choose
which property or part thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not
exercise the option, the officer shall first levy on the personal properties, if any, and then on the real properties if the
personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment.
The sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the personal or real property of the judgment obligor which has been
levied upon. When there is more property of the judgment obligor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful
fees, he must sell only so much of the personal or real property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees.
Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or any interest in either real or personal
property, may be levied upon in like manner and with like effect as under a writ of attachment. We emphasize that a
sheriffs duty to execute a writ is simply ministerial, and he is bound to perform only those tasks stated under the Rules
of Court and no more. Any interest a third party may have on the property levied upon by the sheriff to enforce a
judgment is the third partys responsibility to protect through the remedies provided under Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court. Thus, we cannot hold the respondent liable on the ground that the complainant cites. If at all, the respondent
should have required, as a matter of sound established practice, the production of the certificate of registration, but this
is an altogether different matter that we do not here pass upon.
A.M. No. P-10-2852 July 27, 2011 (Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3270-P) OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES,
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, vs. LEDA O. URI, Court Stenographer I, Municipal Trial Court,
Alaminos, Laguna, Respondent.
FACTS: On September 23, 2009, the Leave Division of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) reported on the
tardiness incurred by Leda O. Uri, Court Stenographer I, MTC Alaminos, Laguna. The report showed that Leda was tardy
13 times in July 2009 and 10 times in August 2009. Attached to the report were copies of Ledas Daily Time Records for
July and August 2009.Leda was asked to comment on the report of her tardiness in the OCAs 1st endorsement dated
October 23, 2009. Leda submitted her comment where she did not deny her tardiness and she said that she would
accept any penalty but asked for a lighter penalty, if possible.
HELD: In its Report dated June 8, 2010, the OCA found that Ledas explanation does not merit consideration to justify her
habitual tardiness, citing Re: Imposition of Corresponding Penalties where we ruled that moral obligations, performance
of household chores, traffic problems, health conditions, domestic and financial concerns are not sufficient reasons to
excuse habitual tardiness. The OCA recommended that the case be redocketed as a regular administrative matter and
that Leda be reprimanded for habitual tardiness with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense would
warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.Leda has acknowledged her infraction and has felt remorse for her
tardiness in the months of July and August 2009. Considering that she has been in the service for fourteen (14) years and
had been suspended without pay for one month for her tardiness in September and October 2009, we find the penalty
of severe reprimand to be proper for the prior tardiness she committed in the earlier months of July and August
2009.WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Leda O. Uri, Court Stenographer I, Municipal Trial Court, Alaminos,
Laguna, GUILTY of habitual tardiness. She is hereby SEVERELY REPRIMANDED, with the WARNING that any future finding
of habitual tardiness, within the next two (2) years from notice of this Resolution, shall merit a penalty graver than the
one-month suspension previously imposed on her.
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2060 July 27, 2011(Formerly OCA IPI No. 06-2498-RTJ)
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, represented by its President CYRIL DEL CALLAR, Complainant, vs. JUDGE SANTOS
B. ADIONG, RTC, BRANCH 8, MARAWI CITY, Respondent.
FACTS: An administrative complaint filed by the National Power Corporation (NPC) through its president Cyril C. Del
Callar, charging respondent Judge Santos B. Adiong, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, with gross
ignorance of the law, manifest partiality and conduct unbecoming a member of the Judiciary. The complaint arose in
connection with the cases for damages.Subsequently, Judge Adiong issued a Resolution on February 28, 2006, ordering
NPC to refund the amount of P114,000,000, representing the Fuel Compensating Cost, Foreign Exchange, and
Incremental Cost Charges collected from April 1991 to December 1995; to refund the amount of P176,000,000, qand to
pay the amount ofP97,537,000 as attorneys fees. NPC sought reconsideration of the order alleging that no pre-trial was
conducted and yet respondent judge already passed upon the merits of the case. NPCs motion, however, was denied by
Judge Adiong. Judge Adiong reasoned that before issuing the questioned resolution, full-blown hearings were conducted
and NPC was afforded all the opportunities to present its evidence and to participate actively in the hearings. Having
done so, NPC has submitted itself to the courts jurisdiction and could no longer claim that no pre-trial was conducted.
Later, Judge Adiong also directed Sheriff Otto Gomampong to implement the February 28, 2006 Resolution ratiocinating
that the same has already become final. Thus, NPC filed the present administrative complaint, asserting that the
issuance of the February 28, 2006 Resolution is contrary to and violative of the Rules of Court because said resolution
was issued by respondent judge without first conducting the requisite pre-trial conference and despite the fact that no
formal offer of exhibits was made by plaintiffs in support of their allegations. Also, NPC complains of respondent judges
failure to lay down the basis for granting the plaintiffs ex-parte motion to release the PPA refunds, and in awarding the
exorbitant amount of P97,537,000.00 as attorneys fees. NPC further states that while it admits that judges are not to be
administratively charged for acts committed in the exercise of their judicial functions, respondent judge had acted in
violation of elementary rules that was equivalent to intolerable and inexcusable gross ignorance of the law.
Specifically, Justice Ayson noted that in Civil Case No. 1918-03, Judge Adiong failed to conduct a pre-trial conference and
erred in conducting the series of hearings in the case without determining the existence of necessary pre-conditions
before the court could take cognizance of the case. Records revealed that Judge Adiong failed to resolve (1) the issue on
the insufficiency of the complaint as a class suit; (2) the issue of nonpayment of docket fees necessary to vest the court
with jurisdiction over the case; (3) the issue on forum-shopping allegedly committed by therein plaintiffs; and (4) the
question regarding the alleged failure of therein plaintiffs to state with particularity their respective residences. Justice
Ayson noted that without a proper resolution of these threshold jurisdictional questions, any decision in the case is
premature and without factual and legal basis. In other words, the court would only be engaged in a useless exercise
and would merely be wasting the time and resources of the parties.
HELD: The Investigating Justice also noted the well-entrenched rule that a judge may not be held administratively liable
for every erroneous decision he renders, for no person called upon to determine the facts or interpret the law in the
administration of justice can be infallible. However, he also noted that there is a prominent exception to the rule, that is,
when the law is so elementary that not to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. In said cases, a judge
committing such error may face administrative sanctions.
Further, the Investigating Justice stressed that the conduct of a pre-trial is mandatory. He explained that pre-trial is a
procedural device whereby the court is called upon to compel the parties and their lawyers to appear before it and
negotiate an amicable settlement or otherwise make a formal statement and embody in a single document the issues of
fact and law involved in the action. However, Justice Ayson opined that under the circumstances, Judge Adiong should
have scheduled the case for pre-trial as he was already aware of the procedural defect. His act of not minding the setting
of pre-trial, when he had every opportunity and reasonable time to do so, can be characterized as negligent and
imprudent, according to Justice Ayson. Considering Judge Adiongs long years of service, a total of thirty-nine (39) years
in the Judiciary, more than anyone else, he should be presumed to be conversant with the law and the rules. The law
involved in this case being elementary, failure to consider it or to act as if he does not know it, constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.
However, opined that while the power to grant or deny immediate or advance execution is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court, it is required that good reason exists for granting execution pending appeal as provided under
Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Absent any such good reason, the special order of execution must be struck
down for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.Here, respondent judge failed to conduct the pre-trial
conference itself. It is elementary and plain that the holding of such a pre-trial conference is mandatory and failure to do
so is inexcusable. When the law or procedure is so elementary, such as the provisions of the Rules of Court, not to know
it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Such ignorance of a basic rule in court
procedure, as failing to conduct pre-trial, sadly amounts to gross ignorance and warrants a corresponding penalty.
As to the allegations of poor judgment and gross ignorance of basic legal principles in granting the motions for execution
pending appeal for flimsy and unsupported reasons, we find that the particular reasons relied upon by respondent judge
for issuing the writ of execution pending appeal are so unreliably weak and feeble that it highlights the lack of
knowledge of respondent judge with regard to the proper appreciation of arguments. Considering, however, that in
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1826, this Court has already dismissed Judge Adiong, the penalties of suspension from office without
salary and dismissal from the service are no longer possible. Hence, the penalty of fine is more appropriate.
A.M. No. P-11-2944 April 27, 2011(Formerly OCA IPI No. 10-3342-P)CAROL A. ABADIANO, CLEOFE ABADIANO-
BONACHITA, RYAN M. ABADIANO and CHERRY MAE M. ABADIANO, Complainants, vs. GENEROSO B. REGALADO,
Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Cebu City, Respondent.
FACTS: Subject of this disposition is the complaint of Carol A. Abadiano, Cleofe Abadiano-Bonachita, Ryan M. Abadiano,
and Cherry Mae M. Abadiano (complainants) filed on February 4, 2010 before the Office of the Court
Administrator against respondent Generoso B. Regalado (Regalado), Sheriff-IV of the RTC, Branch 16, Cebu City for
Grave Abuse of Authority, Oppression and Gross Misconduct. Without informing his siblings and without leave from the
Court, Armando obtained a loan that exceeded the amount of the subject expenses and offered one of their late fathers
properties as security. About eight months into the mortgage, the mortgagee, Alfredo Genosolango, initiated a Petition
for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure with RTC-Branch 16. To protect their interests, the complainants filed a complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Loan Agreement, Real Estate Mortgage, Damages, and Attorneys Fees (annulment case) before
the RTC Branch 23.
On January 25, 2008, while the annulment case was pending, Regalado served a Writ of Possession on the complainants
and placed Genosolango in actual possession of the mortgaged property previously owned by the late Pablo Abadiano.
Complainants immediately filed their Verified Motion/ Petition to Cancel Writ of Possession but the same was eventually
denied by the RTC-Branch 16. On October 10, 2009, Regalado went to the subject property and prevented the
complainants from collecting rentals from its occupants. He then threatened them with estafa if they would insist on
collecting rentals. Regalado even arrogantly told the complainants that they already lost the case and that a motion for
reconsideration would surely be denied. When challenged, Regalado openly showed a Special Power of
Attorney executed by Genosolango authorizing him to do so. This was the basis for the subject complaint.
In his Comment, Regalado denied the allegations in the complaint and claimed that all the proceedings in the
implementation of the Writ of Possession were in accordance with law. He was merely performing his duty when he
installed the new owner of the subject property. He denied using the Special Power of Attorney which he called a "stray
paper," since it was Genosolangos lawyer who received the rentals on behalf of his client. He claimed that he was
simply misquoted when he informed the complainants that Genosolangos lawyer might file a case for estafa if they
would continue to collect the rentals.Moreover, the agreement entered into by respondent sheriff with Mr.
Genosolango is without the knowledge and consent of the court which does not bode well of the conduct of a judicial
employee. Verily, the act of the respondent sheriff being assailed of constitutes Conflict of Interest."
In the present case, Regalados moonlighting activity is inescapably linked to his work as a sheriff. It is connected or
somehow related to the performance of his official functions and duties as a sheriff.1 He was, after all, in charge of
implementing the writ of possession over the property contested by the Abadianos and Genosolango. Yet, a special
power of attorney was also issued in his favor to act for and on behalf of Genosolango. Undoubtedly, there is a conflict
of interest. Given its complicities, this moonlighting activity of Regalado definitely constitutes an act of impropriety.
HELD: Time and again, this Court has pointed out the burden and responsibility that bound every officer and staff of the
Judiciary by reason of their exalted positions as keepers of the publics faith in the courts. They should, therefore, avoid
any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of their official functions. Indeed, those who
work in the judiciary must adhere to high ethical standards to preserve the courts' good name and standing. They should
be examples of integrity, competence and efficiency, and they must discharge their duties with due care and utmost
diligence for they are officers of the court and agents of the law. Any conduct, act or omission on the part of those who
would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the
judiciary shall not be countenanced.Sheriffs, in particular, being officers of the court and agents of the law, are exacted
to use prudence, due care, and diligence in the discharge of their official duties. Where rights of individuals are
jeopardized by their actions, sheriffs may be properly fined, suspended, or dismissed from office by virtue of this Court's
administrative supervision over the judicial branch of the government. WHEREFORE, Generoso B. Regalado, Sheriff IV,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Cebu City, is found GUILTY of Misconduct and is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (10,000.00) with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future
would be dealt with more severely.
A.M. No. 07-9-214-MTCC July 26, 2011 RE: APPLICATION FOR INDEFINITE LEAVE AND TRAVEL ABROAD OF PRESIDING
JUDGE FRANCISCO P. RABANG III, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, COTABATO CITY
FACTS: Judge Francisco P. Rabang III (Judge Rabang), the Presiding Judge of the MTCC, Cotabato City, filed an application
dated 16 May 2007 for indefinite leave and travel abroad. Judge Cader P. Indar, Al Haj (Judge Indar), the Executive Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Maguindanao and Cotabato City, sent a letter to then Deputy Court Administrator Reuben
De la Cruz seeking guidance on Judge Rabangs application for indefinite leave. The Court issued a Resolution directing
Judge Rabang to explain in writing his failure to comply with Memorandum Order No. 14-2000. In the same Resolution,
the Court likewise disapproved Judge Rabangs application for indefinite leave of absence and his absences were
considered unauthorized. The Court further directed Judge Rabang to immediately report back to work; otherwise, his
name would be dropped from the Rolls. The Financial Management Office was directed to withhold his salaries and
benefits. The NBI reported that Judge Rabang left for Canada sometime in 2007. His wife, Bernadette, is working there
as a Staff Nurse. Sometime in October 2008, one of Judge Rabangs sons died in Canada and his mother Athena went
there to attend the wake.The OCA reported that Judge Rabang has been absent from his station and out of the country
for more than three years already and recommended that Judge Rabang be dismissed from the service
for misconduct and abandonment of office with forfeiture of his salaries and allowances as well as retirement benefits,
except his accrued leave credits, and that he be barred from re-employment in all branches of the government,
including government-owned and controlled corporations. The OCA further recommended that Judge Rabangs position
in the MTCC, Cotabato City, be declared vacant.
HELD: We have ruled that the absenteeism of judges or court employees and/or their irregular attendance at work is a
serious charge that may warrant the imposition of the penalty of dismissal or suspension from service. Frequent and
prolonged leaves without permission from the Court and abandonment of office have been considered gross
misconduct. Gross misconduct is a serious charge under Section 8, Rule 140 and may be punishable by dismissal from
service, suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than 3 but not exceeding 6 months, or a fine
of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.In the present case, Judge Rabang has been absent without leave or
AWOL for more than four years from the time he left for abroad in May 2007. There has been no word from him since
then. Judge Rabangs attitude betrays his lack of concern for his office. It is clear that Judge Rabang has abandoned his
office and committed gross misconduct. Judge Rabang is presumed to know his duties and responsibilities under the
Code of Judicial Conduct. Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should administer
justice impartially and without delay. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the same Code decrees that a judge shall dispose of the
courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. Rule 3.09, Canon 3 further provides that a judge
should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and required
at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity.
The Code of Judicial Conduct decrees that a judge should administer justice impartially and without delay. A judge
should likewise be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to
promptly administer justice. The trial court judges being the paradigms of justice in the first instance have, time and
again, been exhorted to dispose of the courts business promptly and to decide cases within the required period because
delay results in undermining the peoples faith in the judiciary from whom the prompt hearing of their supplications is
anticipated and expected, and reinforces in the minds of the litigants the impression that the wheels of justice grind
ever so slowly.Unauthorized absence and irregular attendance are detrimental to the dispensation of justice and, more
often than not, result in undue delay in the disposition of cases; they also translate to waste of public funds when the
absent officials and employees are nevertheless paid despite their absence.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS Judge Francisco P. Rabang III of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cotabato City from the
service for Gross Misconduct and Abandonment of Office, with FORFEITURE of all benefits due him, except accrued
leave benefits, if any, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations. His position in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cotabato City is declared VACANT. This
Decision is immediately executory.
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2261 July 26, 2011 (Formerly oca ipi No. 10-3386- RTJ) ATTY. JOSE VICENTE D.
FERNANDEZ, Complainant, vs. JUDGE ANGELES S. VASQUEZ, Respondent.
FACTS: Complaint for gross dishonesty and falsification of an official document against Judge Vasquez, RTC, Branch 13,
Ligao City. In a complaint received by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on 7 March 2010, Atty. Jose Vicente D.
Fernandez stated that he was the counsel of Dr. Maria Susan L. Raola in several cases instituted for the recovery of the
properties the latter conjugally owned with her late husband Ronald O. Raola. All these were raffled to the court
presided over by respondent Judge Vasquez.Complainant reported that during the first week of February 2006, he was
asked by respondent judge to file a motion for his inhibition in Civil Case No. 2352 on the ground that respondent judge
was the counsel, prior to his appointment as public prosecutor, of the Raola family. Hence, complainant filed a Motion
for Inhibition dated 23 February 2006 seeking for the recusal of the judge but citing as a ground instead, his blood
relationship with respondent judge. Complainant is closely related by blood with respondent judge since his late
paternal grandmother is also a Vasquez, from the Vasquez clan to which respondent belongs.
No action was taken by respondent judge on the Motion. It was only after a year after complainant filed a Supplemental
Motion for Inhibition, on the ground of manifest bias, partiality and inexcusable delay in the proceedings, that
respondent judge ruled and denied the two motions in an Order dated 13 March 2007.The OCA found respondent
administratively liable for: (a) his failure to act with dispatch on the motion for his inhibition in Civil Case No. 2352; and
(b) dishonesty. The OCA did not sustain respondents flimsy defense of amnesia in concealing from his PDS the fact that
he was charged with indirect bribery. Being charged with a crime is an incident in ones life that cannot be easily
forgotten, especially when the same is made in connection with the performance of ones duty. In the instant case,
respondent was charged with the said crime when he was still a clerk of court. The OCA noted the fact that though
respondent claims that he has forgotten said charge, he can still vividly remember the incident and the circumstances
that he claims to have led to his arrest. Accordingly, the OCA recommended that respondent be fined in the amount of
Forty Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos.
HELD: We agree with the findings of the OCA on respondents gross inefficiency and dishonesty although differ with
respect to the penalty imposed. On the other hand, we see no reason for this Court to look into the rest of the
allegations of the complainant. The allegations of bias and partiality of respondent judge in connection with the denial of
the motions of inhibition filed by complainant are matters which are judicial in character and may not be addressed in
this administrative complaint. As observed by the OCA, respondent judge failed to resolve the motion for his inhibition
within the 90-day reglementary period. In the orderly administration of justice, judges are required to act with dispatch
in resolving motions filed in their court. The parties have the right to be properly informed of the outcome of the
motions they have filed and the Constitutional right to a speedy disposition of their case. Taking into account the
circumstances in this case, we find no reason for respondent judges delayed action. Delay in resolving motions and
incidents pending before a judges sala within the reglementary period fixed by the Constitution and the law is not
excusable and cannot be condoned.
Under Section 15(1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
judges are mandated to dispose of their cases promptly and decide them within the prescribed periods. The failure of a
judge to decide a case seasonably constitutes gross inefficiency. It violates the norms of judicial conduct and is subject to
administrative sanction.
On Respondents Dishonesty, a judge, knows (or should have known) fully well the consequences of making a false
statement in his PDS. Being a former public prosecutor and a judge now, it is his duty to ensure that all the laws and
rules of the land are followed to the letter. His being a judge makes the act all the more unacceptable. Clearly, there was
an obvious lack of integrity, the most fundamental qualification of a member of the judiciary. As visible representation
of the law, respondent judge should have conducted himself in a manner which would merit the respect of the people
to him in particular and to the Judiciary in general. He should have acted with honesty in accomplishing his PDS, instead
of deliberately misleading the JBC in his bid to be considered and eventually appointed to his present position. Such lack
of candor has blemished the image of the judiciary. His contention that the indirect bribery case had been dismissed is
immaterial, he was duty bound to disclose such information when he was applying for judicial position. Had it not been
for this administrative complaint, such matter would have escaped the attention of this Court.
WHEREFORE, for gross inefficiency and dishonesty, respondent Judge Angeles S. Vasquez, RTC, Branch 13, Ligao City, is
hereby ordered to pay a FINE of SIXTY THOUSAND (P60,000.00) PESOS to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
A.M. No. MTJ-09-1736July 25, 2011 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2034-MTJ] ATTY. CONRADO B. GANDEZA,
JR., Complainant, vs. JUDGE MARIA CLARITA C. TABIN, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4,
Baguio City .Respondent.
FACTS: Complainant alleged that a Mitsubishi Galant with plate number UJB 799 driven along Marcos Highway, Baguio
City by Guimba Digermo (Digermo), collided head on with a Ssangyong Musso Pick-Up with plate number XMW 135
driven by Marion Derez. The Mitsubishi Galant is owned by complainant and his wife, Atty. April B. Gandeza, while the
Ssangyong Musso Pick-Up is owned by respondent Judge's nephew, Paul N. Casuga. Complainant claimed that at
the hospital, while both drivers were being subjected to physical examination, respondent Judge, instead of
accompanying her nephew's driver, opted to stand closely beside complainant's driver and kept on suggesting to the
examining doctor that his driver was under the influence of liquor. He added that when respondent Judge came to know
the "negative" result of the alcoholic breath examination of his driver, she protested and demanded another
examination on his driver. Complainant argued that respondent Judge has no personality to interfere with the police
investigation and only the police investigator has the right to request for re-examination. Moreover, complainant
averred that his wife, a practicing lawyer in Baguio City, at one time saw an employee of the Municipal Trial Court of
Baguio, Branch 2, carrying outside of the court premises, the folder of the criminal case filed against their driver. When
asked as to why said staff was carrying the case record outside the court's premises, said employee informed her that
she will bring it to the sala of respondent Judge as the latter requested for it. Complainant insisted that respondent's
actions showed her interest in the criminal case without regard to proper decorum. She, in effect, abused her judicial
position.
Judge Claravall recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Judge Tabin due to insufficient evidence to prove
her guilty of gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming a judge. Judge Claravall pointed out that the charges of
Gross Misconduct and Conduct Unbecoming a Judge are penal in nature; thus, the same must be proven by convincing
proof. The Investigating Judge observed that the act of Judge Tabin in borrowing the records of the criminal case was an
exercise of her right to information. He is convinced that the actions of Judge Tabin were just normal reactions of any
person who comes in defense and aide of a relative.The OCA, however, found Judge Tabin guilty of violation of Canon 4,
Section 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. The OCA reasoned that there was sufficient evidence showing that
respondent Judge is liable for impropriety. Records show that Judge Tabin did not merely look after the safety of her
nephew after the vehicular accident, but she likewise ascertained that the conduct of the investigation was in her
nephew's favor.
HELD: While we agree with the findings of the Investigating Judge that respondent Judge cannot be held liable for gross
misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a judge due to lack of evidence of malice on the part of respondent Judge, we,
however, agree with the findings of the OCA that Judge Tabin is guilty of impropriety. As found by the OCA, it was
inappropriate for respondent judge to direct that a second test be conducted on complainant's driver when the first test
resulted in a "negative." Respondent judge cannot interfere in the conduct of the investigation.
Although concern for family members is deeply ingrained in the Filipino culture, respondent, being a judge, should bear
in mind that he is also called upon to serve the higher interest of preserving the integrity of the entire Judiciary. Canon 2
of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to avoid not only impropriety but also the mere appearance of
impropriety in all activities. We have repeatedly reminded members of the Judiciary to be irreproachable in conduct and
to be free from any appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior, not only in the discharge of their official
duties, but also in their daily life. For no position exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness of an
individual than a seat in the Judiciary. The imperative and sacred duty of each and everyone in the Judiciary is to
maintain its good name and standing as a temple of justice. The Court condemns and would never countenance any
conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm
of public accountability or tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary, as in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Clarita C. Tabin, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Baguio City,GUILTY of
IMPROPRIETY and is hereby REPRIMANDED and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with
more severely.
A.M. No. P-11-2945 July 13, 2011 [Formerly OCA-I.P.I. No. 11-3590-P] RE: LEAVE DIVISION, OFFICE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR,Complainant, vs. FRANCISCO A. PUA, JR., Clerk
of Court V, Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Lucena City, Respondent.
FACTS: This matter concerns the habitual tardiness of Francisco A. Pua, Jr. (Pua), Clerk of Court V of the Branch 55 of
Lucena City (RTC). In a COMMENT, respondent Pua, Jr. acknowledges the tardiness he incurred but attributes the same
to family concerns. Respondent Pua, Jr. states that before reporting for work, he has to attend to the care and meeting
needs of his two (2) children and lack of house help which have made it more difficult to meet the demands of
both work and family. Hence, respondent Pua seeks the indulgence of the Court and undertakes to exert all efforts to
improve work performance.
The OCA found Pua guilty of habitual tardiness and opined that his explanation to justify his habitual tardiness should
not merit any consideration. It further recommended that Pua be reprimanded and warned that a repetition of the same
or similar offense will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.
HELD: The Court approves the OCAs finding and the recommendation Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 23, Series
of 1998 provides that "[a]ny employee shall be considered habitually tardy if he incurs tardiness, regardless of the
number of minutes, ten (10) times a month for at least two (2) months in a semester or at least two (2) consecutive
months during the year."Based on the cited provision, it is undeniable that Pua has been habitually tardy. Such
administrative offense seriously compromises work efficiency and hampers public service. By being habitually tardy, he
has fallen short of the stringent standard of conduct demanded from everyone connected with the administration of
justice.
It cannot be stressed enough that the Clerk of Court plays a vital role in ensuring the prompt and sound administration
of justice. His office is the hub of adjudicative and administrative orders, processes and concerns. He is specifically
imbued with the mandate to safeguard the integrity of the court as well as the efficiency of its proceedings, to preserve
respect for and loyalty to it, to maintain the authenticity or correctness of court records, and to uphold the confidence
of the public in the administration of justice. Thus, he is required to be persons of competence, honesty and probity.
As correctly noted by the OCA, none of the reasons relied upon by Pua to justify his habitual tardiness merits the Courts
consideration. The Court has indeed consistently held that moral obligations, performance of household chores, traffic
problems and health, domestic and financial concerns are not sufficient reasons to excuse habitual tardiness.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Francisco A. Pua, Jr., Clerk of Court V of the RTC, Branch 55, Lucena City, administratively
liable for habitual tardiness. He is hereby REPRIMANDED and WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar offense
will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2284 July 13, 2011 [Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3304-RTJ] SPOUSES SUR AND RITA VILLA AND
LETICIA GOREMBALEM VALENZUELA, Complainants, vs. Presiding Judge ROBERTO L. AYCO, officer-in-charge/ LEGAL
RESEARCHER VIRGINIA M. BARTOLOME and SHERIFF IV CRISPIN S. CALSENIA, JR., All of The Regional Trial Court,
Branch 26, Surallah, South Cotabato, Respondents.
FACTS: The Court resolves the complaint filed by spouses Sur and Rita Villa and Leticia Gorembalem
Valenzuela(complainants) against: (1) Presiding Judge Roberto L. Ayco (Judge Ayco) for undue delay
in resolving motions, gross ignorance of the law, bias and abuse of authority; (2) Officer-in-Charge/Legal
Researcher Virginia Bartolome (OIC Bartolome) for gross ignorance of the law and gross inefficiency; (3) Sheriff IV Crispin
S. Calsenia, Jr. (Sheriff Calsenia) for grave abuse of authority and gross neglect of duty, all the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 26, Surallah, South Cotabato (RTC). The complaint stems from Civil Case No. 386-N entitled "Spouses Sixto and
Yolanda Fernandez v. Spouses Miguel and Marina Gorembalem; Estate of Miguel Gorembalem, represented by Crispina
G. Artienda, et al.. Third Party Claimant" filed before the RTC for Specific Performance with Damages.
HELD: It is the duty of the sheriff to give notice of such writ and demand from the defendant (in this case, the
complainants) to vacate the property within three days. Only after such period can the sheriff enforce the writ by the
bodily removal of defendant and his personal belongings. This notice requirement is anchored on the fundamentals of
justice and fair play. The law discourages any form of arbitrary and oppressive conduct in the execution of an otherwise
legitimate act. Thus, a sheriff must strictly comply with the Rules of Court in executing a writ. Any act deviating from the
procedure prescribed by the Rules of Court is tantamount to misconduct and necessitates disciplinary action.In this case,
Sheriff Calsenia was not able to faithfully do what was required and expected of him.Thus, the Court agrees with the
OCA that Sheriff Calsenia is guilty of simple misconduct.
Under Section 52, B(2), Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, simple
misconduct is punishable by suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense, and
dismissal for the second offense. Considering that it is the first offense of Sheriff Calsenia, the Court hereby imposes
upon Sheriff Calsenia the penalty of three (3) months suspension with stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar offense shall be dealt more severely in the future.
WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent Officer-in-Charge/Legal Researcher Virginia M. Bartolome, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 26, Surallah, South Cotabato, is DISMISSED for lack of merit; respondent Judge Roberto L. Ayco is hereby
pronounced GUILTY for undue delay in resolving the motion for reconsideration of the third-party claimants in Civil Case
No. 386-N and accordingly ADMONISHED with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or equivalent acts shall
be dealt more severely in the future; and respondent Sheriff IV Crispin S. Calsenia, Jr. is found GUILTY of simple
misconduct and accordingly SUSPENDED from the service for three (3) months without pay and other fringe benefits
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall merit a more severe penalty.
A.M. No. P-11-2946 July 13, 2011 [Formerly A.M. No. 11-5-52-MTCC] RE: DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF CORNELIO
RENIETTE CABRERA, Utility Worker I, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Lipa City.
FACTS: The present administrative matter concerns Cornelio Reniette Cabrera (Cabrera), Utility Worker I of the Branch 1
of Lipa City (MTCC). Records of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) disclose that Cabrera has failed to file his
Daily Time Records (DTRs) from October 2010 up to present and to seek leave for any of his absences. The OCA received
Cabreras sick leave applications for the month of September 2010, which covered a total of eleven (11) days. Due to
lack of proper documentation, Presiding Judge Renato M. Castillo disapproved the applications for sick leave and sent a
telegram to Cabrera requiring him to submit a medical certificate to support his applications for leave. Cabrera,
however, did not comply.This prompted the OCA to send two (2) tracer letters to Cabrera - one to his residential
address and another to his court station, directing that he submit his DTRs for the months of October and November
2010. This time, the OCA warned Cabrera that his name would be recommended for dropping from the rolls if he failed
to comply.
Despite being served the tracer letters, Cabrera failed to heed the directive of the OCA. Thus, on December 9, 2010, the
OCA issued its Memorandum ordering the withholding of Cabreras salaries and benefits.In its evaluation of the matter,
the OCA submitted its Agenda Report dated May 17, 2011, wherein, referring to Section 63, Rule XVI of the Omnibus
Rules on Leave it recommended that Cabreras name be dropped from the rolls for being absent without leave (AWOL).
The OCA further recommended that Cabreras position be declared vacant and that he be informed at his residential
address on record of his separation from the service or the dropping of his name from the rolls.The OCA Report also
informed the Court that upon verification, Cabrera had not filed any application for retirement and that no previous
administrative complaint had been filed against him.
HELD: Pursuant to Section 63, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave, as amended by Civil Service Resolution No.
070631, an employees absence without official leave for at least 30 working days warrants his separation from the
service. The Rule specifically provides: Sec. 63. Effect of absences without approved leave.-An official or employee who
is continuously absent without approved leave for at least thirty (30) working days shall be considered on absence
without official leave (AWOL) and shall be separated from the service or dropped from the rolls without prior notice.
However, when it is clear under the obtaining circumstances that the official or employee concerned, has established a
scheme to circumvent the rule by incurring substantial absences though less than thirty working (30) days 3x in a
semester, such that a pattern is already apparent, dropping from the rolls without notice may likewise be justified.
By going on AWOL, Cabrera grossly disregarded and neglected the duties of his office. He failed to adhere to the high
standards of public accountability imposed on all those in government service. Specifically for court personnel, their
conduct and behavior are circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. This Court shall not tolerate any act or
omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public
accountability and diminish or tend to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary. While there is jurisprudence to
the effect that a court employees AWOL for a prolonged period of time warrants the penalty of dismissal from the
service and the forfeiture of his benefits, the Court, given the circumstances of the case, is inclined to adhere to the
evaluation and recommendation of the OCA, and refrain from imposing the administrative penalties of forfeiture of
benefits and disqualification from re-employment.
WHEREFORE, Cornelio Reniette Cabrera, Utility Worker I of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1 of Lipa City, is
hereby DROPPED from the rolls of service and his position is hereby declared VACANT.
A.M. No. 2011-04-SC July 5, 2011 Re: Gross Violation of Civil Service Law on the Prohibition Against Dual
Employment and Double Compensation in the Government Service Committed by Mr. Eduardo V. Escala, SC Chief
Judicial Staff Officer, Security Division, Office of Administrative Services.
FACTS: Before us is an administrative case which arose from the investigation conducted by the Office of Administrative
Services (OAS) in connection with a complaint against Mr. Eduardo V. Escala, SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Security
Division, OAS for alleged gross violation of the Civil Service Law on the prohibition against dual employment and double
compensation in the government service.
The OAS thus found respondents indirect claim of good faith unavailing. His regular receipt of his salaries from the PNP
despite presumably exclusively working with the Court implies a deliberate intent to give unwarranted benefit to himself
and undue prejudice to the government especially so by his regular submission of monthly/daily time record as a
mandatory requirement for inclusion in the payroll.
HELD: Good faith, here understood, is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory
definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design
to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. An individuals personal good faith is a concept of his own mind
and, therefore, may not conclusively be determined by his protestations alone. It implies honesty of intention, and
freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. The essence of good faith lies in
an honest belief in the validity of ones right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach
another.
The OAS found respondents actuation even amounts to gross dishonesty. His receipt of salaries from the PNP despite
not rendering any service thereto is a form of deceit. Jurisprudence states that dishonesty implies a "disposition to lie,
cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray."
Where a conflict of interest exists, may reasonably appear to exist, or where the outside employment reflects adversely
on the integrity of the Judiciary, the court personnel shall not accept the outside employment.
With the undisputed facts of the case, the OAS considers that there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that
respondent is liable for gross dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. His non-disclosure of
the material fact that he was still employed as an active member of the PNP and receiving his monthly salaries therein
during the period that he is already a Court employee is considered substantial proof that he tried to cheat/defraud both
the PNP and the Court. This is an affront to the dignity of the Court. Indeed, respondent has transgressed the
Constitution and the Civil Service law on the prohibition on dual employment and double compensation in the
government service.
All court personnel ought to live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity, considering that their positions
primarily involve service to the public. For knowingly and willfully transgressing the prohibition on dual employment and
double compensation, as well as the Courts rules for its personnel on conflict of interest, respondent violated the trust
and confidence reposed on him by the Court. Considering the sensitive and confidential nature of his position, the Court
is left with no choice but to declare the respondent guilty of gross dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, which are grave offenses punished by dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Eduardo V. Escala, SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Security Division, OAS GUILTY
of gross dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and imposes on him the penalty
of DISMISSAL from the service and forfeiture of all benefits with prejudice to re-employment in any government agency,
including government-owned and controlled corporations.

AUGUST
For the month of AUGUST2011

Re: Letter-Complaint of Mr. Recarredo S. Valenzuela, Clerk IV, Personnel Division, OAS-OCA
against Mr. Ricardo R. Giganto, Utility Worker II, Personnel Division, OAS-OCA.
A.M. No. 2011-01-SC. August 23, 2011.
Facts: Giganto and Valenzuela, co-workers in the Personnel Division of OAS-OCA, got involved
in a fistfight for which they were found guilty of simple misconduct by the Court. In computing
their penalties, the Court considered their length of service, satisfactory performance ratings,
and number of previous administrative charges as mitigating, aggravating and alternative
circumstances, as the case may be.
Issue: Whether or not the need for the conduct and behaviour of every person connected
with the dispensation of justice to be characterized by propriety and decorum.
Held: This standard is applied, not only with respect to a court employees dealings with the
public, but also with his or her co-workers in the service. Conduct violative of this standard
quickly and surely erodes respect for the courts. Misbehavior within and around the courts
vicinity diminishes the courts sanctity and dignity. Any fighting or misunderstanding becomes
a disgraceful sight reflecting adversely on the good image of the Judiciary.

Nilda Verginesa-Suarez v. Judge Renato J. Dilag and Court Stenographer III Concepcion A.
Pascua and Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Renato J. Dilag. Ester A. Asilo, Officer-
in-Charge, Court Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Olongapo City, Zambales
and Atty. Ronald D. Gavino, Deputy Clerk of Court, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional trial
Court, Olongapo City.
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2014 and A.M. No. RTJ-11-2293. August 16, 2011
Facts: The Court found Officer-in-Charge (OIC) Ester Asilo administratively liable for her
inaccurate preparation of monthly case reports, inept monitoring of case records, and
incompetent supervision of court personnel. A Clerk of Court is an essential officer in any
judicial system, her office being the center of activities, both adjudicative and administrative.
Thus, OIC Asilo must recognize that her administrative functions are just as vital to the prompt
and proper administration of justice.
Issue: Whether or not there is an inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official
duties of the court personnel
Held: The court ruled that she cannot proffer as an excuse that she merely inherited and
continued the procedure followed prior to her designation. Upon acceptance of her
designation, her first concern was to know her assumed duties and responsibilities especially
when administrative circulars, issuances and manual of clerks of court are at hand. OIC Asilos
inaccurate preparation of the monthly case reports, inept monitoring of case records, and
incompetent supervision of court personnel, all constituted inefficiency and incompetence in
the performance of official duties. This administrative infraction is a grave offense, punishable
under Rule IV, Section 52, paragraph A(16) of the Civil Service Commission Memorandum
Circular No. 19-99 as follows:
Section 52. x x x
Par. A(16). Inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties
1st offense Suspension (6 mos. 1 day to 1 year)
2nd offense Dismissal

Proserpina V. Anico v. Emerson B. Pilipia, Sheriff IV, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional
Trial Court, Manila.
A.M. No. P-11-2896. August 2, 2011.
Facts: Complainant is one of the plaintiffs in a civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. 02-27454
entitled Ariel Anico and Spouses Arthur and Proserpina Anico v. Robin J. Taguinod and Jerome
T. Cayabyab, for collection of sum of money, specific performance and damages. Complainant
recalled that sometime in September 2007, she called respondent and inquired the status of
the execution. In response, complainant alleged that respondent sheriff demanded the
amount of P5,000.00 to defray his expenses in the implementation of the writ. She claimed
that she had no money at hand, thus, she informed respondent that she could only give
P3,000.00. Respondent sheriff consented. Complainant's sister-in-law, Filipinas N. Villasis,
then personally gave the amount of P3,000.00 to respondent at his office.Finally, respondent
asserted that he did not violate any rule in the implementation of the writ and was never
remiss in the performance of his duties and responsibilities as an officer of the court.
Issue: Whether or not there is dishonesty and gross neglect of duty
Held: It must be stressed that sheriffs are not allowed to receive any voluntary payments from
parties in the course of the performance of their duties. Corollary, a sheriff cannot just
unilaterally demand sums of money from a party-litigant without observing the procedural
steps under Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court: (1) prepare an estimate of expenses to
judgment debtor. Failure to observe these steps would amount to dishonesty or extortion.
Moreover, Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court clearly provides that it is mandatory for
sheriffs to execute and make a return on the writ of execution within 30 days from receipt of
the writ and every 30 days thereafter until it is satisfied in full or its effectivity expires. Even if
the writs are unsatisfied or only partially satisfied, sheriffs must still file the reports so that the
court, as well as the litigants, may be informed of the proceedings undertaken to implement
the writ. Here, the long delay in the execution of the judgments and the failure to accomplish
the required periodic reports demonstrate respondent sheriffs gross neglect and gross
inefficiency in the performance of his official duties. Likewise, respondent sheriffs receipt of
money in his official capacity and his failure to turn over the amount to the clerk of court is an
act of misappropriation of funds amounting to dishonesty.

SEPTEMBER
For the month of AUGUST2011

Re: Letter-Complaint of Mr. Recarredo S. Valenzuela, Clerk IV, Personnel Division, OAS-OCA
against Mr. Ricardo R. Giganto, Utility Worker II, Personnel Division, OAS-OCA.
A.M. No. 2011-01-SC. August 23, 2011.
Facts: Giganto and Valenzuela, co-workers in the Personnel Division of OAS-OCA, got involved
in a fistfight for which they were found guilty of simple misconduct by the Court. In computing
their penalties, the Court considered their length of service, satisfactory performance ratings,
and number of previous administrative charges as mitigating, aggravating and alternative
circumstances, as the case may be.
Issue: Whether or not the need for the conduct and behaviour of every person connected
with the dispensation of justice to be characterized by propriety and decorum.
Held: This standard is applied, not only with respect to a court employees dealings with the
public, but also with his or her co-workers in the service. Conduct violative of this standard
quickly and surely erodes respect for the courts. Misbehavior within and around the courts
vicinity diminishes the courts sanctity and dignity. Any fighting or misunderstanding becomes
a disgraceful sight reflecting adversely on the good image of the Judiciary.

Nilda Verginesa-Suarez v. Judge Renato J. Dilag and Court Stenographer III Concepcion A.
Pascua and Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Renato J. Dilag. Ester A. Asilo, Officer-
in-Charge, Court Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Olongapo City, Zambales
and Atty. Ronald D. Gavino, Deputy Clerk of Court, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional trial
Court, Olongapo City.
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2014 and A.M. No. RTJ-11-2293. August 16, 2011
Facts: The Court found Officer-in-Charge (OIC) Ester Asilo administratively liable for her
inaccurate preparation of monthly case reports, inept monitoring of case records, and
incompetent supervision of court personnel. A Clerk of Court is an essential officer in any
judicial system, her office being the center of activities, both adjudicative and administrative.
Thus, OIC Asilo must recognize that her administrative functions are just as vital to the prompt
and proper administration of justice.
Issue: Whether or not there is an inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official
duties of the court personnel
Held: The court ruled that she cannot proffer as an excuse that she merely inherited and
continued the procedure followed prior to her designation. Upon acceptance of her
designation, her first concern was to know her assumed duties and responsibilities especially
when administrative circulars, issuances and manual of clerks of court are at hand. OIC Asilos
inaccurate preparation of the monthly case reports, inept monitoring of case records, and
incompetent supervision of court personnel, all constituted inefficiency and incompetence in
the performance of official duties. This administrative infraction is a grave offense, punishable
under Rule IV, Section 52, paragraph A(16) of the Civil Service Commission Memorandum
Circular No. 19-99 as follows:
Section 52. x x x
Par. A(16). Inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties
1st offense Suspension (6 mos. 1 day to 1 year)
2nd offense Dismissal

Proserpina V. Anico v. Emerson B. Pilipia, Sheriff IV, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional
Trial Court, Manila.
A.M. No. P-11-2896. August 2, 2011.
Facts: Complainant is one of the plaintiffs in a civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. 02-27454
entitled Ariel Anico and Spouses Arthur and Proserpina Anico v. Robin J. Taguinod and Jerome
T. Cayabyab, for collection of sum of money, specific performance and damages. Complainant
recalled that sometime in September 2007, she called respondent and inquired the status of
the execution. In response, complainant alleged that respondent sheriff demanded the
amount of P5,000.00 to defray his expenses in the implementation of the writ. She claimed
that she had no money at hand, thus, she informed respondent that she could only give
P3,000.00. Respondent sheriff consented. Complainant's sister-in-law, Filipinas N. Villasis,
then personally gave the amount of P3,000.00 to respondent at his office.Finally, respondent
asserted that he did not violate any rule in the implementation of the writ and was never
remiss in the performance of his duties and responsibilities as an officer of the court.
Issue: Whether or not there is dishonesty and gross neglect of duty
Held: It must be stressed that sheriffs are not allowed to receive any voluntary payments from
parties in the course of the performance of their duties. Corollary, a sheriff cannot just
unilaterally demand sums of money from a party-litigant without observing the procedural
steps under Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court: (1) prepare an estimate of expenses to
judgment debtor. Failure to observe these steps would amount to dishonesty or extortion.
Moreover, Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court clearly provides that it is mandatory for
sheriffs to execute and make a return on the writ of execution within 30 days from receipt of
the writ and every 30 days thereafter until it is satisfied in full or its effectivity expires. Even if
the writs are unsatisfied or only partially satisfied, sheriffs must still file the reports so that the
court, as well as the litigants, may be informed of the proceedings undertaken to implement
the writ. Here, the long delay in the execution of the judgments and the failure to accomplish
the required periodic reports demonstrate respondent sheriffs gross neglect and gross
inefficiency in the performance of his official duties. Likewise, respondent sheriffs receipt of
money in his official capacity and his failure to turn over the amount to the clerk of court is an
act of misappropriation of funds amounting to dishonesty.

OCTOBER
Nemesio Floran and Caridad Floran VS. Atty. Roy Prule Ediza (A.C. No. 5325)

Facts:

Spouses Floran sought the help of Atty. Ediza regarding the foreclosure of their property. Then Atty. Ediza filed
a motion to dismiss on the grounds of Lack of Jurisdiction and cause of action. the RTC granted the motion to
dismiss the case without prejudice based on non-compliance with barangay conciliation procedures under the
Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law. Sometime in 1997, the Spouses Floran sold a hectare land to Phividec
Industrial Authority (Phividec) for 25php per square meter totaling to the amount of 272,750php, payable in
instalments. The sale was evidenced by a Deed of Undertaking of Lot Owner executed by Nemesio and
Phividecs representative and notarized by Atty. Ediza. Phividec then required the couple to execute a waiver
in Phividecs favor. The Spouses Floran again sought the help of Atty. Ediza for the preparation and
notarization of the waiver. Atty. Ediza informed the Spouses Floran to have the original owner of the land,
Epal, sign a Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor. Atty. Ediza gave the Spouses Floran several documents for
Epal to sign. Caridad visited Epal in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur and acquired her approval and expressed assent
to the conveyance, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale made by Epal in favor of Nemesio for 2,000php.
Nemesio and Phividec executed the Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land and Phividec paid and
released to the Spouses Floran, Atty. Ediza received the amount of 125,463.38php for the titling of the
remaining portion of the land, other expenses and attorneys fees.
Spouses Floran went back to Atty. Ediza several times to follow-up on the title. However, Atty. Ediza failed to
fulfill his promises. After the lapse of two years, with the land still unregistered, the Spouses Floran asked Atty.
Ediza for the return of their money which Atty. Ediza refused. Thus, Spouses Floran presented their complaint
before the chapter president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Misamis Oriental. Atty. Ediza
refused to return the money but promised to tear a document evidencing sale by the Spouses Floran to him of
one hectare land of their property. The Spouses claimed that they had no knowledge that they executed such
document in favor of Atty. Ediza and suspected that they might have signed a document earlier which Atty.
Ediza told them not to read. The Spouses later discovered that one of the documents given by Atty. Ediza is a
deed of sale for a one hectare land in the same property executed by Epal in favor of Atty. Ediza. Atty. Ediza
claimed that the Spouses voluntarily gave him one hectare of the 3.5525 hectare land as payment for handling
and winning the civil case for foreclosure of mortgage.

Issue: Whether or Not, Atty. Ediza is Guilty of Dishonesty.

Held:

The practice of law is a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess the legal
qualifications for it. Lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and
morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the
legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession
as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. It is clear from the records that Atty. Ediza deceived
the Spouses Floran when he asked them to unknowingly sign a deed of sale transferring a portion of their land
to Atty. Ediza. Atty. Ediza also did the same to Epal when he gave Caridad several documents for Epal to sign.
Atty. Ediza made it appear that Epal conveyed her rights to the land to him and not to the Spouses Floran.
Moreover, when the sale of the Spouses Florans land pushed through, Atty. Ediza received half of the amount
from the proceeds given by the buyer and falsely misled the Spouses Floran into thinking that he will register
the remaining portion of the land. This is an unsavory behavior from a member of the legal profession. Aside
from giving adequate attention, care and time to his clients case, a lawyer is also expected to be truthful, fair
and honest in protecting his clients rights. Once a lawyer fails in this duty, he is not true to his oath as a
lawyer. WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Roy Prule Ediza administratively liable for violating Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1, Canon 15, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months, effective upon receipt of this Decision. He is DIRECTED to
return to the Spouses Nemesio and Caridad Floran the two (2) sets of documents that he misled the spouses
and Sartiga Epal to sign. He is further ORDERED to pay Spouses Nemesio and Caridad Floran, within 30 days
from receipt of this Decision, the amount of 125,463.38php, with legal interest from 8 September 2000 until
fully paid. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.

Tomas P. Tan Jr. VS. Atty. Haide V. Gumba (A.C. No. 9000)

Facts:

Complainant filed a verified complaint against the respondent to the IBP for gross unethical conduct.
Respondent asked the complainant to lend 350,000php. Respondent assured him that she would pay the
principal plus 12% interest per annum after one year. She likewise offered by way of security a 105-square-
meter parcel of land located in Naga City and registered in her fathers name. Respondent showed
complainant a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by respondents parents, and verbally assured
complainant that she was authorized to sell or encumber the entire property. Complainant consulted one
Atty. Raquel Payte and was assured that the documents provided by respondent were valid. Thus,
complainant agreed to lend money to respondent. With the help of Atty. Payte, respondent executed in
complainants favor an open Deed of Absolute Sale over the said parcel of land. Complainant was made to
believe that if respondent fails to pay the full amount of the loan with interest on due date, the deed of sale
may be registered. Accordingly, he gave the amount of 350,000php to respondent. Respondent, however,
defaulted on her loan obligation and failed to pay the same despite complainants repeated demands. Left
with no recourse, complainant went to the Register of Deeds to register the sale, only to find out that
respondent deceived him since the SPA did not give respondent the power to sell the property but only
empowered respondent to mortgage the property solely to banks. Complainant manifested that he had lent
money before to other people albeit for insignificant amounts, but this was the first time that he extended a
loan to a lawyer and it bore disastrous results. He submitted that respondent committed fraud and deceit or
conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.
Issue: Whether or not, Atty. Gumba is Guilty of Grave Misconduct.

Held:

Respondents actions clearly show that she deceived complainant into lending money to her through the use
of documents and false representations and taking advantage of her education and complainants ignorance in
legal matters. As manifested by complainant, he would have never granted the loan to respondent were it not
for respondents misrepresentation that she was authorized to sell the property and if respondent had not led
him to believe that he could register the open deed of sale if she fails to pay the loan. By her misdeed,
respondent has eroded not only complainants perception of the legal profession but the publics perception
as well. Her actions constitute gross misconduct for which she may be disciplined, following Section 27, Rule
138 of the Revised Rules of Court. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Haide B. Vista-Gumba is found
administratively liable for grave misconduct. She is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS,
effective immediately, with a warning that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more
severely.

Pacita Caalim-Verzonilla VS. Atty. Victoriano G. Pascua (A.C. No. 6655)

Facts:

respondent prepared and notarized two Deeds of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Lope
Caalim with Sale. The first deed was for a consideration of 250,000php and appears to have been executed and
signed by Lopes surviving spouse, Caridad Tabarrejos, and her children (complainant, Virginia Caalim-Inong
and Marivinia Caalim) in favor of spouses Madki and Shirley Mipanga. The second deed was for a
consideration of 1,000,000php and appears to have been executed by and for the benefit of the same parties as
the first deed. The two deeds have identical registration numbers, page numbers and book numbers in the
notarial portion. Complainant avers that both deeds are spurious because all the heirs signatures were falsified.
She contends that her sister Marivinia does not know how to sign her name and was confined at the Cagayan
Valley Medical Center, Tuguegarao City, at the time the deeds were allegedly signed by her, as shown by a
certification from said hospital. Complainant further alleges that the two deeds were not presented to any of
them and they came to know of their existence only recently. Lastly, complainant alleges that the two deeds
were used by respondent and Shirley to annul a previously simulated deed of sale dated June 20, 1979
purportedly executed by Lope in favor of the spouses Madki and Shirley Mipanga. Said deed was likewise a
complete nullity because at that time Shirley Mipanga was only sixteen years old and still single. Respondent
admits having prepared and notarized the two disputed Deeds of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with
Sale (subject deeds), but denies any irregularity in their execution.

Issue: Whether or Not, Atty. Pascua is Guilty of misconduct

Held:

With his admission that he drafted and notarized another instrument that did not state the true consideration
of the sale so as to reduce the capital gains and other taxes due on the transaction, respondent cannot escape
liability for making an untruthful statement in a public document for an unlawful purpose. As the second deed
indicated an amount much lower than the actual price paid for the property sold, respondent abetted in
depriving the Government of the right to collect the correct taxes due. His act clearly violated Rule 1.02,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. VICTORIANO G. PASCUA is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years. In addition, his present notarial
commission, if any, is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public for a
period of two (2) years. He is further WARNED that any similar act or infraction in the future shall be dealt
with more severely.

Atty. Florita S. Linco VS. Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal (A.C. No. 7241)

Facts:

Complainant claimed that she is the widow of the late Atty. Alberto Linco
(Atty. Linco), the registered owner of a parcel of land with improvements,
consisting of 126 square meters, located at No. 8, Macopa St., Phase I-A,
B, C & D, Valley View Executive Village, Cainta, Rizal. Atty. Jimmy D.
Lacebal (respondent), a notary public for Mandaluyong City, notarized a
deed of donation2 allegedly executed by her husband in favor of
Alexander David T. Linco, a minor. The notarial acknowledgment thereof
also stated that Atty. Linco and Lina P. Toledo (Toledo), mother of the
donee, allegedly personally appeared before respondent on July 30, 2003,
despite the fact that complainants husband died on July 29, 2003.
Complainant filed the instant complaint and she claimed that
respondent's reprehensible act in connivance with Toledo was not only
violative of her and her children's rights but also in violation of the law.
Respondent's lack of honesty and candor is unbecoming of a member of
the Philippine Bar. respondent admitted having notarized and
acknowledged a deed of donation executed by the donor, Atty. Linco, in
favor of his son, Alexander David T. Linco, as represented by Lina P.
Toledo. Respondent narrated that on July 8, 2003, he was invited by Atty.
Linco, through an emissary in the person of Claire Juele-Algodon
(Algodon), to see him at his residence located at Guenventille II D-31-B,
Libertad Street, Mandaluyong City. Respondent was then informed that
Atty. Linco was sick and wanted to discuss something with him. However,
respondent explained that since he had no idea that he would be
notarizing a document, he did not bring his notarial book and seal with
him. Thus, he instead told Algodon and Toledo to bring to his office the
signed deed of donation anytime at their convenience so that he could
formally notarize and acknowledge the same.

Issue: Whether or not, Atty. Lacebal is Guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Held:

There is no question as to respondent's guilt. However, respondent chose to ignore the basics of notarial
procedure in order to accommodate the alleged need of a colleague. The fact that respondent previously
appeared before him in person does not justify his act of notarizing the deed of donation, considering the
affiant's absence on the very day the document was notarized. In the notarial acknowledgment of the deed of
donation, respondent attested that Atty. Linco personally came and appeared before him on July 30, 2003. Yet
obviously, Atty. Linco could not have appeared before him on July 30, 2003, because the latter died on July 29,
2003. Clearly, respondent made a false statement and violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer. For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the
basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity
of this form of conveyance would be undermined. This responsibility is more pronounced when the notary
public is a lawyer. A graver responsibility is placed upon him by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and
to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. He is mandated to the sacred duties appertaining to his
office, such duties, being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.18 Respondent's failure
to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only in damaging complainant's rights over the property
subject of the donation but also in undermining the integrity of a notary public. He should, therefore, be held
liable for his acts, not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.

Rodolfo A. Espinosa and Maximo A. Glindo v. Atty. Julieta A. Omaa (A.C. No. 9081)
Facts:
Complainants alleged that Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal (Marantal) sought Omaas legal advice on
whether they could legally live separately and dissolve their marriage. Omaa then prepared a document
entitled Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay (contract). Complainants alleged that Marantal and Espinosa, fully
convinced of the validity of the contract dissolving their marriage, started implementing its terms and
conditions. However, Marantal eventually took custody of all their children and took possession of most of the
property they acquired during their union. Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee, complainant
Glindo, a law graduate, who informed him that the contract executed by Omaa was not valid. Omaa alleged
that she knows Glindo but she does not personally know Espinosa. She denied that she prepared the contract.
She admitted that Espinosa went to see her and requested for the notarization of the contract but she told
him that it was illegal. Omaa alleged that Espinosa returned the next day while she was out of the office and
managed to persuade her part-time office staff to notarize the document. Her office staff forged her signature
and notarized the contract. Omaa further presented a letter of apology from her staff, Arlene Dela Pea,
acknowledging that she notarized the document without Omaas knowledge, consent, and authority.
Issue: Whether or Not, Atty. Omaa is guilty of Notarization of Illegal Document
Held:
We cannot accept Omaas allegation that it was her part-time office staff who notarized the contract. We
agree with the IBP-CBD that Omaa herself notarized the contract. Even if it were true that it was her part-
time staff who notarized the contract, it only showed Omaas negligence in doing her notarial duties. We
reiterate that a notary public is personally responsible for the entries in his notarial register and he could not
relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries or any member of his staff. We
likewise agree with the IBP-CBD that in preparing and notarizing a void document, Omaa violated Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that *a+ lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Omaa knew fully well that the Kasunduan Ng
Paghihiwalay has no legal effect and is against public policy. Therefore, Omaa may be suspended from office
as an attorney for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Falsification of daily time records of Ma. Emcisa A. Benedictos, Administrative Officer I, Regional Trial Court,
Malolos City, Bulacan (A.M. No. P-10-2784)
Facts:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint charging Ma. Emcisa A. Benedictos (Benedictos),
Administrative Officer I, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC), Malolos City, Bulacan,
with dishonesty for falsifying her Daily Time Records (DTRs)/bundy cards. Benedictos submitted her bundy
cards for August, October, and November 2004, which the OCA referred to Atty. Emmanuel L. Ortega (Atty.
Ortega), Clerk of Court VII, RTC, Malolos City, Bulacan, for verification of his signatures appearing thereon.
Atty. Ortega reported that only his signature on Benedictoss bundy card for November 2004 was true and
genuine; and he disowned his purported signatures on Benedictoss bundy cards for August and October 2004.
the Court directed Benedictos (1) to show cause why she should not be administratively dealt with for refusing
to submit her comment despite the two directives from the OCA; and (2) to submit the required comment
within five days from notice, otherwise the Court shall take the necessary action against her and decide the
administrative complaint on the basis of the record on hand. When Benedictos failed once more to file a
comment, the Court issued a Resolution on March 26, 2008 ordering Benedictos to pay a fine of P1,000.00.
Yet, Benedictos did not pay the fine nor submitted her comment on Atty. Ortegas letter. Finally, in a
Resolution dated August 17, 2009, the Court deemed Benedictos to have waived her right to file a comment
on Atty. Ortegas letter. The Court already referred the case against Benedictos to the OCA for evaluation,
report, and recommendation.
Issue: Ma. Emcisa A. Benedictos is guilty of Falsification of her Daily Time Record.
Held:
A resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere request, and should be complied with
promptly and completely. Such failure to comply accordingly betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in
character, but also disrespect for the Courts lawful order and directive. This contumacious conduct of
refusing to abide by the lawful directives issued by the Court has likewise been considered as an utter lack of
interest to remain with, if not contempt of, the system. Benedictoss insolence is further aggravated by the
fact that she is an employee of the Judiciary, who, more than an ordinary citizen, should be aware of her duty
to obey the orders and processes of the Supreme Court without delay. WHEREFORE, the Court finds Ma.
Emcisa Benedictos GUILTY of dishonesty and imposes upon her the penalty of SUSPENSION for six (6) months,
effective immediately. The Court further orders Benedictos to pay a FINE in the total amount of P3,000.00 for
her failure to comply with the Resolutions dated June 25, 2007 and March 26, 2008. Finally, the Court issues a
stern warning to Benedictos that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Supreme Court v. Eddie V. Delgado, Utility Worker II, Joseph Lawrence M. Madeja, Clerk IV, and Wilfredo A.
Florendo, Utility Worker II, all of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Second Division. (A.M. No. 2011-07-SC)
Facts:
Atty. Laurea instructed Ms. Puno to have the Agenda photocopied, beginning with the one for the 30 May
2011 session. Agenda was ordered to be photocopied in two (2) sets: one to serve as a duplicate of Atty.
Laurea, while the other as a copy of the Agenda Division of the office. he original Agenda will be left with the
Minutes Division, which will draft the minutes of the session. Following the instructions of Atty. Laurea, Ms.
Puno gave the 30 May 2011 Agenda to Mr. Julius Irving C. Tanael (Mr. Tanael)a Utility Worker II at the OCC-
SDfor photocopying. Mr. Tanael is one of only four personnel in the OCC-SD who are authorized to make
photocopies of Agenda with actions. Before Ms. Puno could furnish Atty. Laurea her copy of the 30 May 2011
Agenda, however, she caught respondent Delgado acting suspiciously while holding and reading sheets of
pink-colored papers, which are similar to that used by the OCC-SD in photocopying Agenda. She then saw
respondent Delgado keep the same sheets inside the drawer of his office desk. he inspection of the duplicates
revealed that one copy of the 30 May 2011 Agendathe one given to the Agenda Divisionhad missing
pages, pages 58, 59 and 70. Later, Ms. Puno was able to confirm her suspicion as she found two (2) of the
missing pages i.e., pages 58 and 59, hidden below a pile of expediente inside the drawer of respondent
Delgados desk. She and Mr. Tanael then stapled back the recovered pages 58 and 59, and replaced the still
unaccounted page 70 in the copy of the Agenda Division. Atty. Tuazon reported the incident involving the
missing pages of a copy of the 30 May 2011 Agenda to Atty. Laurea.[26] Alarmed, Atty. Laurea called
respondent Delgado, Ms. Puno and Atty. Tuazon in her office for an initial investigation.
Issue: Whether or Not, the cour personnel is guilty of Grave Misconduct
Held:
The act of the respondents in causing the removal of several pages in a copy of the 30 May 2011 Agenda is a
malevolent transgression of their duties as court personnelparticularly, as employees detailed at the OCC-
SD. The act is unauthorized and a blatant disregard of the standard operating procedures observed by the
office in handling confidential documents, such as the Agenda. It compromised the ability of the OCC-SD to
efficiently perform its functions and also imperiled the environment of confidentiality the office is supposed to
be clothed with. the respondents palpably failed to meet the high standard expected from them as court
employees. Their conduct is neither excusable nor tolerable. The respondents, through their acts, have
proven themselves to be unfit for continued employment in the judiciary.

Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Uyag P. Usman, Presiding Judge, Sharia Circuit Court, Pagadian
City (A.M. No. SCC-08-12)

Facts:

complainant alleged that respondent acquired a brand new SUV, specifically a Kia Sorento EX, Automatic
Transmission and 2.57 CRDI Diesel for 1,526,000.00; that he paid in cash the total down payment of
344,200.00; and that the remaining balance was payable in 48 months with a monthly amortization of
34,844.00 to the Philippine Savings Bank (PS Bank), Ozamis City Branch. Respondent had just been recently
appointed as a judge and since he assumed his post, he seldom reported for work and could not be located
within the courts premises during office hours. Moreover, he was only receiving a very small take home pay
because of his salary and policy loans with the Supreme Court Savings and Loan Association (SCSLA) and the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), many of which he incurred when he was still a Clerk of Court of
the Sharia Circuit Court in Isabela City, Basilan. Respondents financial capability to acquire said vehicle has
been questioned because he is the sole bread winner in his family and he has seven (7) children, two (2) of
whom were college students at the Medina College School of Nursing, a private school. respondent explained
that he acquired the Kia Sorento vehicle in 2008 but it was a second-hand, and not a brand new, vehicle; that
he had no intention of buying the said vehicle but his friend, who was a manager of KIA Motors, Pagadian City,
convinced him to avail of their lowest down payment promo of 90,000.00 to own a second-hand demo unit
vehicle; that he was hesitant to avail of the promo but his mother, a U.S. Veteran Pensioner receiving a
monthly pension of US$1,056.00, persuaded him to avail of it; that it was his mother who paid the down
payment of 90,000.00 and the monthly installment of more than 30,000.00; that when his mother got sick,
her pensions and savings were used to buy medicines, thus, he defaulted in the payment of the said vehicle
for four (4) months; and that PS Bank foreclosed the mortgage on the said vehicle. The OCA, however, held
respondent liable for violation of Section 8 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees and of Section 7 of R.A. No. 3019, known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for failing to file his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth
(SALN) for the years 2004-2008. Thus, the OCA recommended that respondent be fined in the amount of
10,000.00

Issue: Whether or Not, Judge Uyag is Guilty of Violating RA 6173

Held:

The Court agrees with the finding of the OCA that the charges against respondent were not fully
substantiated. The evidence adduced in the case, consisting of documents submitted by respondent are
sufficient to prove that it was, indeed, his mother who paid the down payment and the monthly amortizations
for the subject vehicle. The Court also agrees with the OCA that respondent is guilty of violating Section 7 of
R.A. No. 3019 and Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713. From the foregoing, it is imperative that every public official or
government employee must make and submit a complete disclosure of his assets, liabilities and net worth in
order to suppress any questionable accumulation of wealth. This serves as the basis of the government and
the people in monitoring the income and lifestyle of public officials and employees in compliance with the
constitutional policy to eradicate corruption, to promote transparency in government, and to ensure that all
government employees and officials lead just and modest lives, with the end in view of curtailing and
minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public
service.

Atty. Franklin G. Gacal v. Judge Jaime I. Infante, Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, in Alabel, Sarangani (A.M.
No. RTJ-04-1845)
Facts:
Judge Gregorio R. Balanag, Jr. of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Kiamba-Maitum, Sarangani issued a
warrant for the arrest of Faustino Ancheta in connection with a murder case. Judge Balanag did not
recommend bail. Ancheta, who had meanwhile gone into hiding, was not arrested. Upon review, the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor, acting through Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfredo Barcelona, Jr., affirmed the
findings and recommendation of Judge Balanag on the offense to be charged, and accordingly filed in the RTC
an information for murder on April 21, 2003 (Criminal Case No. 1136-03), but with a recommendation for bail
in the amount of P400,000.00. Criminal Case No. 1136-03 was raffled to Judge Infantes Branch. Judge Infante
issued twin orders, one granting bail to Ancheta, and another releasing Ancheta from custody. Atty. Gacal,
upon learning of the twin orders issued by Judge Infante, filed a so-called Very Urgent Motion For
Reconsideration And/Or To Cancel Bailbond With Prayer To Enforce Warrant Of Arrest Or Issue Warrant Of
Arrest Anew Or In The Alternative Very Urgent Motion For This Court To Motu Proprio Correct An Apparent
And Patent Error (very urgent motion). Judge Infante denied Atty. Gacals very urgent motion on the ground
that the motion was pro forma for not bearing the conformity of the public prosecutor, and on the further
ground that the private prosecutor had not been authorized to act as such pursuant to Section 5, Rule 110, of
the Rules of Court. The public prosecutor appeared, but did not file any comment. Thereupon, Atty. Gacal
sought authority to appear as a private prosecutor. The public prosecutor did not oppose Atty. Gacals
request. With that, Atty. Gacal moved for the reconsideration of the grant of bail to Ancheta. In response,
Judge Infante required the public prosecutor to file his comment on Atty. Gacals motion for reconsideration,
and again reset the arraignment of the accused to June 20, 2003. the public prosecutor filed a comment,
stating that he had recommended bail as a matter of course; that the orders dated April 23, 2003 approving
bail upon his recommendation and releasing the accused were proper; and that his recommendation of bail
was in effect a waiver of the public prosecutors right to a bail hearing. when no order regarding the matter of
bail was issued, Atty. Gacal sought the inhibition of Judge Infante on the ground of his gross incompetence
manifested by his failure to exercise judicial power to resolve the issue of bail. Atty. Gacal insisted that the
issue of bail urgently required a resolution that involved a judicial determination and was, for that reason, a
judicial function; that Judge Infante failed to resolve the issue of bail, although he should have acted upon it
with dispatch, because it was unusual that several persons charged with murder were being detained while
Ancheta was let free on bail even without his filing a petition for bail; that such event also put the integrity of
Judge Infantes court in peril; and that although his motion for reconsideration included the alternative relief
for Judge Infante to motu proprio correct his apparent error, his refusal to resolve the matter in due time
constituted gross ignorance of law. Atty. Gacal contended that Judge Infante was not worthy of his position as
a judge either because he unjustifiably failed to exercise his judicial power or because he did not at all know
how to exercise his judicial power; that his lack of judicial will rendered him utterly incompetent to perform
the functions of a judge; that at one time, he ordered the bail issue to be submitted for resolution, with or
without the comment of the public prosecutor, but at another time, he directed that the bail issue be
submitted for resolution, with his later order denoting that he would resolve the issue only after receiving the
comment from the public prosecutor; that he should not be too dependent on the public prosecutors
comment considering that the resolution of the matter of bail was entirely within his discretion as the judge;
and that the granting of bail without a petition for bail being filed by the accused or a hearing being held for
that purpose constituted gross ignorance of the law and the rules. Finally, Atty. Gacal stated that Judge
Infante and the public prosecutor were both guilty of violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act[6] for
giving undue advantage to Ancheta by allowing him bail without his filing a petition for bail and without a
hearing being first conducted.

Held:
Being the trial judge, Judge Infante had to be aware of the precedents laid down by the Supreme Court
regarding the bail hearing being mandatory and indispensable. He ought to have remembered, then, that it
was only through such hearing that he could be put in a position to determine whether the evidence for the
Prosecution was weak or strong. Hence, his dispensing with the hearing manifested a gross ignorance of the
law and the rules. Every judge should be faithful to the law and should maintain professional competence. His
role in the administration of justice requires a continuous study of the law and jurisprudence, lest public
confidence in the Judiciary be eroded by incompetence and irresponsible conduct. WHEREFORE, we FIND AND
DECLARE Judge Jaime I. Infante guilty of gross ignorance of the law and the rules; and, accordingly, FINE him in
the amount of P20,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the offense or the commission of another
serious offense will be more severely dealt with.

Antonio Y. Cabasares v. Judge Filemon A. Tandinco, Jr. Municipal Trial Court in Cities, 8th Judicial Region,
Calbayog City, Western Samar (A.M. No. MTJ-11-1793)
Facts:
Cabasares filed a Complaint for Malicious Mischief against a certain Rodolfo Hebaya. The case was docketed
as Criminal Case No. 8864 and subsequently assigned to the branch of respondent Judge. As early as February
27, 2002, the case had been submitted for decision, but respondent judge had yet to render a decision by the
time the complaint was filed on November 6, 2009, which was a clear violation of Section 15 (1), Article VIII of
the Constitution and Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. respondent Judge claimed that he
only came to know of the present administrative complaint against him on December 7, 2009, thru Atty.
Elizabeth Tanchioco, head of the Performance Audit Team at MTCC, Calbayog City. On the second day of the
audit, he left for Tacloban City upon advice of his doctor and was confined at Divine Word Hospital because of
high blood pressure from December 10-13, 2009. Thereafter, he was on leave from December 14-17, 2009
and returned to work only on December 18, 2009. Since it was Christmas time and due to his heavy workload,
the case slipped his mind. Later, however, a decision on the case was prepared and promulgated on January
14, 2010. Thus, respondent Judge prayed that his explanation be deemed sufficient considering that he had
already retired on January 15, 2010. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its Report dated June 1,
2010, found the explanation of respondent judge inexcusable.

Issue: Wether or Not, Judge Tandico committed undue delay in his duty.

Held:
Respondent Judge failed to render a decision within the reglementary period or to even ask for an extension
of time. The Court, in its aim to dispense speedy justice, is not unmindful of circumstances that justify the
delay in the disposition of the cases assigned to judges. It is precisely for this reason why the Court has been
sympathetic to requests for extensions of time within which to decide cases and resolve matters and incidents
related thereto. When a judge sees such circumstances before the reglementary period ends, all that is
needed is to simply ask the Court, with the appropriate justification, for an extension of time within which to
decide the case. Thus, a request for extension within which to render a decision filed beyond the 90-day
reglementary period is obviously a subterfuge to both the constitutional edict and the Code of Judicial
Conduct. Evidently, respondent Judge failed to do any of these options. The Court cannot accept respondent
Judges explanation either that he failed to render the decision because he required medical attention. The
case had long been due for decision before he was even hospitalized in 2009. His admission that the case
may have escaped his mind only shows that respondent Judge failed to adopt an effective court
management system to carefully track the cases for decision or resolution. A judge is expected to keep his
own record of cases and to note therein the status of each case so that they may be acted upon accordingly
and promptly. He must adopt a system of record management and organize his docket in order to bolster the
prompt and effective dispatch of business. the Court cautions judges to be prompt in the performance of
their solemn duty as dispenser of justice, for any undue delay corrodes the peoples confidence in the judicial
system. Delay not only fortifies the belief of the people that the wheels of justice grind ever so slowly, but
provokes suspicion, however unfair, of ulterior motives on the part of the judge.

Teresita Guerrero-Boylon v. Aniceto Boyles, Sheriff III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Cebu City
(A.M. No. P-09-2716)
Facts:
Teresita Guerrero-Boylon (complainant) charges Aniceto Boyles (respondent), Sheriff III, Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, Branch 2, Cebu City, with neglect of duty in connection with his delay and refusal to implement the
writ of execution/demolition (writ) issued in a forcible entry case. According to the complainant, the
scheduled demolition did not take place as the respondent did not show up on time and could not be reached.
In another planned demolition scheduled for the last quarter of 2005, the respondent also failed to show up.
The respondent offered varied excuses to the complainant to justify his non-appearances and his failure to
implement the writ. the writ remained unserved despite the complainants entreaties to the respondent for its
immediate service. The respondent also failed to comply with his representations to the complainant that he
would serve the notices to vacate on the occupants of the property within the period of January 3, 2007 to
January 8, 2007. At the intervention of Hon. Anatalio S. Necesario, the judge who issued the writ, the
respondent, on January 18, 2007, served a notice to vacate on Manuel Tipgos. The respondent designated
Tipgos to deliver the notices to the other occupants in the property. The notices, however, failed to reach the
intended recipients. The respondent clarified that the forcible entry case was docketed as Civil Case No. R-
46168, not Civil Case No. R-75. The respondent denied the accusations in the letter-complaint and prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint. He explained that immediately after the issuance of the writ, he went to serve
the writ to the occupants of the property. The respondent claimed that he failed to implement the writ
because none of the defendants in the civil case were then occupying the property. The respondent also
claimed that he refused to implement the writ because the structures to be demolished were located at a
different parcel of land. He further claimed that Tipgos was not a party to the forcible entry case.
Issue: Whether or Not, Teresita Boylon is Guilty of gross neglect of duty.
Held:
In this case, we find that the respondent was remiss in performing his mandated duties. In the first place, the
respondent failed to implement and enforce the writ within the prescribed period provided under the Rules.
As the records show, the respondent failed to serve the writ and the notices to vacate to the occupants of the
property within three (3) days. Moreover, the respondent failed to evict the occupants of the subject
property, and to remove their personal belongings, and the structures and improvements they introduced.
Aside from these, the respondent failed to make periodic reports, thus depriving the court of the opportunity
to know and ensure the speedy execution of its decision. Gross neglect of duty refers to negligence that is
characterized by glaring want of care; by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act,
not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally; or by acting with a conscious indifference to consequences
with respect to other persons who may be affected. It is the omission of that care that even inattentive and
thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property. In cases involving public officials, there is gross
negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable. Gross inefficiency is closely related to gross neglect
as both involve specific acts of omission on the part of the employee resulting in damage to the employer or
to the latters business. As a final note, court personnel should be constantly reminded that any impression of
impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions must be avoided. Those who work
in the Judiciary must adhere to high ethical standards to preserve the courts good name and standing. They
should be examples of responsibility, competence and efficiency, and they must discharge their duties with
due care and utmost diligence, since they are officers of the Court and agents of the law. Indeed, any conduct,
act or omission violative of the norms of public accountability and that may diminish the faith of the people in
the Judiciary should not be allowed.

NOVEMBER
Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana v. Atty. Yolando F. Busmente (A.C. No. 7269)

Fact:

Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was the counsel for Irene Bides, the plaintiff in Civil Case No.
SCA-2481 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, while Busmente was the counsel for the
defendant Imelda B. Ulaso (Ulaso). Noe-Lacsamana alleged that Ulasos deed of sale over the property subject
of Civil Case No. SCA-2481 was annulled, which resulted in the filing of an ejectment case before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), San Juan, docketed as Civil Case No. 9284, where Busmente appeared as
counsel. Another case for falsification was filed against Ulaso where Busmente also appeared as counsel. Noe-
Lacsamana alleged that one Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty. Liza Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) would accompany
Ulaso in court, projecting herself as Busmentes collaborating counsel. Dela Rosa signed the minutes of the
court proceedings in Civil Case No. 9284 nine times from 25 November 2003 to 8 February 2005. Noe-
Lacsamana further alleged that the court orders and notices specified Dela Rosa as Busmentes collaborating
counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that upon verification with this Court and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, she discovered that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer. Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law
graduate and was his paralegal assistant for a few years. Busmente alleged that Dela Rosas
employment with him ended in 2000 but Dela Rosa was able to continue misrepresenting herself
as a lawyer with the help of Regine Macasieb (Macasieb), Busmentes former secretary.

Issue: Whether or not, Atty. Busmente is Guilty of Aiding illegal Practice of Law.

Held:

Practice of Law implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer for
compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his services. The Court further ruled that holding
ones self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose, such as identifying oneself as
attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for
the general practice of law. In this case, it has been established that Dela Rosa, who is not a member of the
Bar, misrepresented herself as Busmentes collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. The only question is
whether Busmente indirectly or directly assisted Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law.

Rogelio F. Estavillo v. Attys. Gemmo G. Guillermo and Erme S. Labayog. (A.C. No. 6899)

Facts:

Rogelio F. Estavillo (complainant) filed an affidavit-complaint with the Office of the Bar Confidant, charging the
respondents with gross negligence. The complainant and his son, Dexter, engaged the services of the
respondents in Civil Case No. 3183 for Forcible Entry and Damages, filed against them by Teresita A. Guerrero
with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Laoag City. the complainant bewailed that at 5:00 p.m. on June
24, 2005, as he and his son were waiting at the respondents law office, Atty. Guillermo finally arrived; they
told the lawyer about their discovery of the May 31, 2005 order; when they asked him why they were not
advised of the judgment, Atty. Guillermo just answered, We have plenty of work. Taken aback by Atty.
Guillermos response and attitude, they left the law office enraged and confused. The same indifferent
treatment was shown to them by Atty. Labayog who undertook to show them the draft of the notice of appeal
of the May 31, 2005 order. Instead of Atty. Labayog, a new member of the law firm, a certain Atty. Janapin,
came and could only say that she was sorry for what had happened. The respondents submitted their
Comment to the complaint where they vehemently denied the complainants allegations that they had been
grossly negligent. They alleged that the complainant conferred with Atty. Guillermo regarding the civil case.
They learned that Guerrero, the plaintiff, is the former owner of the property in dispute and is residing at a
house built on the property. The Estavillos acquired the property and they wanted to get rid of Guerrero. One
way of doing it, they thought, was to build a fence on the lot, thereby substantially reducing Guerreros
passageway and destroying Guerreros house. Thus, Guerrero prayed for a temporary restraining order and a
writ of preliminary and/or prohibitory injunction. The respondents further maintained that contrary to the
complainants allegations, they represented the complainant and his son in all stages of the proceedings,
except at one hearing when Guillermo had an emergency meeting in connection with a different case. They
also denied that they were not providing updates on the case; the complainants son, Dexter, had been
regularly going to the law office to get feedbacks on the progress of the case.

Held:

Under Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Pursuant to Rule 18.03 cited by the complainant, A lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. After a
review of the facts, we find no reason to reduce the originally recommended penalty of suspension for three
months against the respondents for their mishandling of the Estavillos civil case. Although they filed the
answer, it could no longer serve its purpose as it was filed late (i.e., seven days beyond the required ten [10]-
day period), as found by the court. As a consequence, the answer was stricken off the record to the detriment
of the complainant and his son. The respondents attempted to justify the late filing of the answer by claiming
that, to their mind, the civil case was actually for possession, notwithstanding that its title is for forcible entry.
They thus waited for an order from the court pursuant to Section 4 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure which provides that If no ground for dismissal is found it shall forthwith issue summons which shall
state that the summary procedure under this Rule shall apply. They did not receive a court order so they
presumed that the regular rules apply, under which, the answer shall be filed within fifteen (15) days. We do
not find the respondents stance acceptable as it betrays a lack of the necessary competence and diligence
required by the Code of Professional Responsibility in responding to the courts summons for the Estavillos to
make an appearance in the case and to file an answer to the complaint. The respondents, especially Atty.
Guillermo who was supposed to be the lead counsel for the Estavillos, misappreciated the urgency and the
importance of the courts summons. They mistakenly assumed that the court would issue an order of
dismissal. They waited and when no order issued from the court, they again incorrectly assumed that the
regular rules apply without seeking a clarification from the court or ascertaining exactly when the answer
should be filed. With this rationalization, they then shifted the blame for their failure to file the answer on
time to the court.

Lydia Castro-Justo v. Atty. Rodolfo Galing ( A.C. No. 6174)

Facts:

Complainant Justo alleged that sometime in April 2003, she engaged the services of respondent Atty. Galing in
connection with dishonored checks issued by Manila City Councilor Arlene W. Koa (Ms. Koa). After she paid
his professional fees, the respondent drafted and sent a letter to Ms. Koa demanding payment of the checks.
Respondent advised complainant to wait for the lapse of the period indicated in the demand letter before
filing her complaint. On 10 July 2003, complainant filed a criminal complaint against Ms. Koa for estafa and
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Complainant received a
copy of a Motion for Consolidation filed by respondent for and on behalf of Ms. Koa, the accused in the
criminal cases, and the latters daughter Karen Torralba (Ms. Torralba). Further, respondent appeared as
counsel for Ms. Koa before the prosecutor of Manila. Complainant submits that by representing conflicting
interests, respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. respondent denied the allegations
against him. He admitted that he drafted a demand letter for complainant but argued that it was made only in
deference to their long standing friendship and not by reason of a professional engagement as professed by
complainant. He denied receiving any professional fee for the services he rendered. It was allegedly their
understanding that complainant would have to retain the services of another lawyer. He alleged that
complainant, based on that agreement, engaged the services of Atty. Manuel A. Ao.

Held:

A lawyer-client relationship can exist notwithstanding the close friendship between complainant and
respondent. The relationship was established the moment complainant sought legal advice from respondent
regarding the dishonored checks. By drafting the demand letter respondent further affirmed such
relationship. The fact that the demand letter was not utilized in the criminal complaint filed and that
respondent was not eventually engaged by complainant to represent her in the criminal cases is of no
moment. Under Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, *a+ lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts. The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is founded on principles of public policy and
good taste. In the course of the lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns of the facts connected with the
clients case, including the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of the relationship is, therefore,
one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration
of justice.

Marites Freeman v. Atty. Zenaida P. Reyes (A.C. No. 6246)

Facts:

Complainant engaged the services of respondent who, in turn, assured her that she would help her secure the
visas and obtain the death benefits and other insurance claims due her. Respondent told complainant that
she had to personally go to London to facilitate the processing of the claims, and demanded that the latter
bear all expenses for the trip. she acceded into giving respondent the amount of P20,000.00 for legal costs in
securing the visas, as shown by the Temporary Receipt[3] bearing said date, issued by Z.P. Reyes Law Office
(respondent's law firm). Complainant said that despite repeated follow-ups with respondent, nothing came
out. Instead, she received a picture of her husband's burial, sent by one Stanley Grist, a friend of the
deceased. She later learned that respondent left for London alone, without informing her about it.
Respondent explained that she needed to go to London to follow-up the insurance claims, and warned her not
to communicate with Grist who allegedly pocketed the proceeds of her husband's insurance policy.
Complainant declared that in November 1999, she made a demand upon the respondent to return her
passport and the total amount of P200,000.00 which she gave for the processing of the visa applications. Not
heeding her demand, respondent asked her to attend a meeting with the Consul of the British Embassy,
purportedly to discuss about the visa applications, but she purposely did not show up as she got disgusted
with the turn of events.

Issue: Whether or Not, Atty. Reyes is Guilty of Grave Misconduct

Held:

A disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer is sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, it does not
involve a trial of an action or a suit, but rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there
is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is
its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still fit to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a
member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court, with the end in view of preserving
the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice, by purging the
profession of members who, by their misconduct, have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. Being a sui generis proceeding, the
main disposition of this Court is the determination of the respondent's administrative liability. This does not
include the grant of affirmative reliefs, such as moral and exemplary damages as prayed for by the
complainant, which may very well be the subject of a separate civil suit for damages arising from the
respondent's wrongful acts, to be filed in the regular courts. In the absence of a formal contract, complainant
engaged the legal services of respondent to assist her in securing visa applications and claiming the insurance
proceeds of her deceased husband. There are conflicting allegations as to the scope of authority of
respondent to represent the complainant. When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular
purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for a
particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately
return the money to his client. Law advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields profits. The
returns it births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile
pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from government interference, is impressed with public
interest, for which it is subject to State regulation. Respondent's repeated reprehensible acts of employing
chicanery and unbecoming conduct to conceal her web of lies, to the extent of milking complainant's finances
dry, and deceitfully arrogating upon herself the insurance proceeds that should rightfully belong to
complainant, in the guise of rendering legitimate legal services, clearly transgressed the norms of honesty and
integrity required in the practice of law. This being so, respondent should be purged from the privilege of
exercising the noble legal profession.

Francisco Taguinod v. Deputy Sheriff Rolando Tomas, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Santiago City (A. M.
No. P-09-2660)

Facts:

Complainant Francisco Taguinod (Taguinod), publisher and editor of City Star, a newspaper locally published in
Santiago City, and another individual3 initiated an administrative complaint against Branch 21s presiding
judge, Fe Albano Madrid (Madrid), for irregularities in the allocation of judicial notices for publication by local
publishers. In the course of the investigation by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Taguinod
presented documentary evidence showing receipt by respondent of sums of money from March to November
1996 in exchange for City Stars publication of judicial notices. n his comment to the charge, respondent
readily admitted receiving payments from Taguinod in exchange for City Stars publication of judicial notices.
The OCA investigator6 found respondent liable for violating Section 5 of PD 1079 and Section 2,7 Canon 1 of
the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel (Code of Conduct) and recommended respondents suspension from
service for six months. Further, the investigator recommended the criminal investigation of respondent for
possible violation of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019).

Issue: Whether or not, Court personnel is guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty

Held:

Respondents violation of Section 5 of PD 1079 and Section 2(e), Canon III of the Code of Conduct constitutes
grave misconduct or corrupt conduct in flagrant disregard of well-known legal rules.10 Respondent, who
entered the judiciary in 1996, ought to know these provisions; his multiple transactions with Taguinod show
flagrant disregard of their proscriptions. The administrative offense of dishonesty connotes x x x
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle x x x. respondent has no
business receiving any amount, for whatever purpose, from Santiago Citys newspaper publishers for the
publication of judicial notices from Branch 21. Basic notions of propriety should have alerted respondent of
the inherently unethical nature of such transaction. Instead of refusing the pay-offs, he readily accepted them,
tainting not only his public service record but also the image of the institution he serves. The rule in criminal
proceedings treating confessions as mitigating circumstance finds no rigorous application in administrative
proceedings where the respondent, unlike the accused, stands to lose neither liberty nor property but a public
trust to render service, a privilege burdened with numerous prohibitions such as those respondent violated.
To treat factual admissions of court personnel in disciplinary proceedings as standard basis to relax penalties
not only renders nugatory the penalty structure carefully calibrated in the Uniform Rules but also provides
incentive for erring employees to make strategic admissions calculated to spare them from receiving stiff
penalties. The interest of maintaining a disciplined, ethical, and efficient corps of judicial employees militates
against adopting such policy.

Office of the Court Administrator v. Laraine I. Calingasan Stenographer II, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Sta
Rosa, Laguna (A.M. No. P-11-3010)

Facts:

Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez referred the matter to Atty. Wilhelmina D. Geronga of the Legal
Office of the OCA for the filing of the appropriate administrative complaint. Calingasan explained that her son
underwent an operation on 12 August 2009. His operation obliged her to clean his post-surgery wound every
morning before going to the office until November 2009, when the wound fully healed. She further claims
that, from August 2009 to November 2009, she had to accompany her son to the hospital several times for his
medical checkup. For the month of December 2009, the justification she gave for her absences was that she
was suffering from hypertension. On most mornings, she needed to take her medicine and wait for her blood
pressure to go down before going to work.

Issue: Whether or Not, Respondent committed habitual tardiness in her duty.

Held:

It is clear from the facts that Calingasan has been habitually tardy. Consequently, as an employee of the
judiciary, she failed to live up to the stringent standard of conduct demanded from everyone connected with
the administration of justice. WHEREFORE, LARAINE. I. CALINGASAN, Court Stenographer II, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Sta. Rosa City, Laguna, is hereby REPRIMANDED for her habitual tardiness and WARNED that a
repetition of the same or a similar offense will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.

Concerned Citizen v. Maria Concepcion Divina, Court Stenographer, Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Balanga
City, Bataan. (A.M. No. P-07-2369)

Facts:

An anonymous complaint was filed by a Concerned Citizen against Maria Concepcion M. Divina, Court
Stenographer, Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Balanga City, Bataan, for Grave Misconduct. According to the
letter-sender, respondent demanded Twenty Thousand Pesos (20,000.00) from them in exchange for the
Transcript of Stenographic Notes of their case. Respondent allegedly threatened them that if they failed to
give her money, she would not prepare the Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) they were requesting,
which would result in the delay in the disposition of their case. Considering the gravity of the charges against
the respondent and in order to afford her a chance to answer the accusations against her, the Court, in its
Resolution of October 11, 2006, referred the complaint to Judge Escalada, for a full-blown investigation. Judge
Remigio M. Escalada, Jr. (Judge Escalada) found Divina liable for violation of Section 11 of Rule 141 due to her
unauthorized collection of payments from complainant Ricardo for the TSN in Civil Case No. 7400. Judge
Escalada also found her liable for unjustified delay in preparing the TSN in Civil Case No. 7400 despite repeated
demands of Ricardo and for failure to timely submit the TSN due from her in other cases. The Investigating
Judge, however, accorded Divina the benefit of the doubt on Ricardos allegation of extortion in the light of his
ambiguous testimony on the matter. In the absence of sufficient proof, Judge Escalada absolved Divina of the
extortion charge by the Concerned Citizen, whose identity had remained unknown even until the
investigation was over. Anent the charge of belligerent attitude by Atty. Camacho, Judge Escalada opined that
it was not sufficiently established, although evidence on this score all the more showed how inefficient and
ineffective Divina had become as a stenographer.

Held:

Accusation is not synonymous with guilt. This brings to fore the application of the age-old but familiar rule that
he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it for mere allegation is not evidence. Reliance on mere
allegation, conjectures and suppositions will leave an administrative complaint with no leg to stand on. The
charge of belligerent/arrogant behavior against Divina must likewise fail. A circumspect scrutiny of the records
has revealed that the testimony of Atty. Camacho is inadequate to establish his claim and to hold her liable for
misconduct. In a desperate bid to exonerate herself from administrative liability and to justify her delays,
Divina cited her heavy workload and the need to transcribe the stenographic notes in several other cases as
well. She bared that she had to bring home some of her notes so that she could finish transcribing them and in
the process, she spent a part of her salary for tape recorder, blank cassette tape, batteries and the like. She
also claimed that she had to report for work even on her birthdays and when her children were in the hospital
just to complete her duties and obligations. No less than the Constitution mandates that public officers and
employees must at all times serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity and efficiency. Indeed,
public office is a public trust. Divina indubitably violated this trust by failing to diligently fulfill her duties. Her
delay and inefficiency in punctually transcribing the notes she took of court proceedings assigned to her
definitely prejudiced public service and jeopardized the faith and confidence of the affected litigants in the
Judiciary.

Beatriz B. Onate v. Severino G. Imatong, Junior Process Server, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Piat, Cagayan
(A.M. No. P-11-3009)

Facts:

Respondent Imatong attended a wedding celebration near the house of complainant and stayed until about
seven in the evening. Since it was already late and there was no available means of transportation going back
to his home in Piat, Cagayan, respondent went to complainants house to ask permission if he could spend the
night. Complainant Oate acceded and allowed him to sleep in the living room. while complainant was
preparing herself for work, respondent Imatong allegedly barged into her room. He then proceeded to
embrace and kiss her, while pushing her towards the bed. After the initial shock, complainant fought back and
pushed him away. When complainant was able to finally free herself, she pushed respondent out of the room
while shouting at him at the top of her voice. He backed off and asked that she keep to herself what
transpired between them. Complainant continued shouting at him, until he finally left the premises. According
to complainant Oate, after respondent left, she sent a text message to his wife asking her to come over so
that complainant could relate to her the acts committed by respondent. When the text message was ignored,
complainant reported the incident to the police. Respondent argued that air kisses or beso-beso were commonplace
between him and complainant, even in the presence of her husband when he was still alive. In addition, he questioned
why she would still give him a lift on his way back home.

Issue: Whether or not, Court Personnel is guilty of Simple Misconduct.

Held:

In recommending the dismissal of the administrative Complaint, the OCA relied on the city prosecutors
Resolution, which dismissed the criminal Complaint for attempted rape for lack of merit. However, as pointed
out by complainant, the Prosecutors Office subsequently reconsidered its earlier Resolution and instead
found probable cause for acts of lasciviousness. The dismissal of the criminal Complaint in this case for the
crime of attempted rape did not necessarily foreclose the continuation of the administrative action or carry
with it relief from administrative liability.*7+ Yet, as the Prosecutors Office has reconsidered its earlier findings
with respect to acts of lasciviousness, the Court cannot help but be convinced that there was a breach in
ethical standards committed by respondent when he kissed complainant. To be sure, this Court makes no
finding whatsoever with respect to his criminal liability for acts of lasciviousness, which is properly lodged in
the trial court proceedings. The Courts pronouncements in this administrative case are simply limited to
evaluating the conduct of respondent as a court personnel. Simple misconduct has been defined as an
unacceptable behavior that transgresses the established rules of conduct for public officers.*8+ Respondents
actions transgressed the norms of civility expected of judicial officers, even in their private lives, and
constitute simple misconduct that must be squarely penalized. Although beso-beso or air kissing may be
considered a standard greeting between family members, what respondent did was he not merely greeted his
sister-in-law, but encroached into the territory of unwarranted advances that offended acceptable standards
of decency. Regardless of whether it reached the level of criminal malice or lewdness, his conduct was
unbecoming a court personnel, upon whom is placed the heavy burden of moral uprightness.

OC Teresita Marigomen v. Enrique Manabat Jr., Security Guard I, Court of Appeals, Manila. (A.M. No. CA-
11-24-P)

Facts:

Mr. Reynaldo V. Dianco, Chief of the CA Security Services Unit, informed Hon. Justice Normandie B. Pizarro,
Chairperson of the CA Security and Safety Committee, that at around 8:00 a.m. of June 8, 2009, the
respondent, who was inside the guardhouse, accidentally fired his service pistol, a 9mm FEG Hungary, while in
the process of unloading it for turnover to SG1 Miguel Tamba, the guard on duty for the next shift. the CA
Clerk of Court filed a formal charge[3] against the respondent for gross neglect of duty and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service. The respondent was directed to file a written answer, under oath, within
five (5) days from receipt thereof. the respondent explained that the firing of his service pistol on June 8, 2009
was purely accidental, it was not done with evident bad faith, and it did not cause undue injury to any party;
hence, his dismissal from the service for gross neglect of duty is unwarranted. As cause of the accidental
discharge, the respondent intimated that his pistol may have been defective because during their recent firing
course at Camp Crame, service pistols of the model 9mm FEG Hungary used in the shooting exercises
malfunctioned; that the malfunctioning of the 9mm FEG Hungary pistols was made known to Justice Pizarro;
and that their police instructor at Camp Crame recommended that they no longer use the 9mm FEG Hungary
pistols as they may encounter problems with them in the future.

Issue: Whether or Not, Court personnel committed simple neglect of duty.

Held:

The unexpected discharge of a firearm may occur for a variety of reasons. It can be the result of mechanical
failure such as wear, faulty assembly, damage or faulty design of the firearm, but most often, undesired
discharges result from operator error or due to the carelessness or ineptness of the person handling the
firearm. It is for the latter reason that our court security personnel are taught the basic rules of firearm or gun
safety in order to prevent incidents of undesired discharges. In ruling out mechanical causes, it can only be
concluded that the undesired discharge of the respondents service pistol was the result of his own
negligence; in the usual course of things, a firearm that is being unloaded should not discharge if gun safety
procedures had been strictly followed. What cannot be denied is that the gun fired and the firing could not
have happened unless there was a bullet in the guns chamber. Assuming that the respondent did indeed
remove the magazine and did indeed cock the gun to eject whatever bullet that might have been in the
chamber, obviously, he simply cocked the gun and did not visually examine if the chamber was clear. This is a
basic and elementary precaution that every gun handler, more so a security guard who is provided a gun for
his duties, should know. Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure of an employee to give proper
attention to a required task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or indifference. On the other hand,
gross neglect of duty is characterized by want of even the slightest care, or by conscious indifference to the
consequences, or by flagrant and palpable breach of duty.

DECEMBER
A.C. No. 5355 (December 13, 2011)
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner, vs.ATTY. DANIEL B. LIANGCO, Respondent.
FACTS:
Herein complainant was in open and adverse possession of subject land for a period of more than thirty years which the
municipality of San Luis, Pampanga claimed to own the same lot. The Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga issued
Resolution do hereby consider (sic) the lot under Tax Dec. No. 114 owned by the Municipal Government of San Luis,
Pampanga, specifically the lot where Mr. Hermogenes Gozun and family were squatting as the new site of the Rural
Health Center will rise. With the issuance by the Municipal Mayor of an executive order, the municipality of San Luis may
order the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed in San Luis, Pampanga to effect the eviction of Hermogenes Gozun
and all other persons who may be claiming any right under him from Lot No. 114 covered by tax Declaration No. 6030.
Complainant Gozun was not served with summons or given notice of the petition for declaratory relief. Agents of the
municipal government demolished complainant Gozuns house, using respondent judges resolution and the mayors
executive order as basis. Complainant Gozun filed this administrative complaint with the Office of the Court
Administrator. He averred that respondent judges issuance of the resolution amounts to "gross misconduct, gross
inefficiency and incompetence.
HELD:
The respondent, while an MTC judge, accepted a petition for declaratory relief filed by the Municipal Council of San
Fernando, Pampanga, assigned it to himself, and acted on it, all on the same day and without issuing summons or giving
notice to the complainant who was the part adversely affected by the resolution subject of the Municipal Councils
petition. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain
their independence, integrity and impartiality but they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality,
which may erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. Integrity and impartiality, as well as the appearance thereof, are
deemed essential not just in the proper discharge of judicial office, but also to the personal demeanor of judges. This
standard applies not only to the decision itself, but also to the process by which the decision is made. As a member of
the bar and former judge, respondent is expected to be well-versed in the Rules of Procedure. This is expected upon
members of the legal profession because membership in the bar is in the category of a mandate for public service of the
highest order. Lawyers are oath-bound servants of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of
law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which they have sworn
to be fearless crusaders.

A.M. No. P-07-2300 (December 12, 2011)
ATTY. RUTILLO B. PASOK, Complainant, vs. CARLOS P. DIAZ, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Tacurong
City, Respondent.
FACTS:
The charges stemmed from numerous cases wherein respondent sheriff allegedly extorted money from winning litigants
on the pretext that said amounts will cover the costs of implementing court processes. Complainant averred that if
parties failed to pay the amounts demanded, respondent would also refuse to perform his duty in a nutshell.
HELD:
Under Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the sheriff is required to secure the courts prior approval of the
estimated expenses and fees needed to implement the court process. It is imperative that a sheriff shall observe the
following: (1) the sheriff must make an estimate of the expenses to be incurred by him; (2) he must obtain court
approval for such estimated expenses; (3) the approved estimated expenses shall be deposited by the interested party
with the Clerk of Court and Ex Officio Sheriff; (4) the Clerk of Court shall disburse the amount to the executing sheriff;
and (5) the executing sheriff shall disburse/liquidate his expenses within the same period for rendering a return on the
writ. Any unspent amount shall be refunded to the party who made the deposit. Sheriffs are not authorized to receive
any voluntary payments from parties in the course of the performance of their duties. A sheriff cannot just unilaterally
demand sums of money from a party-litigant without observing the proper procedural steps; otherwise, it would
amount to dishonesty or extortion.
The duty of sheriffs to promptly execute a writ is mandatory and ministerial. Sheriffs have no discretion on whether or
not to implement a writ. There is no need for the litigants to follow-up its implementation. Unless restrained by a
court order, they should see to it that the execution of judgments is not unduly delayed. When respondent took it upon
himself to mediate between litigants and even provided an extension of the implementation of the writ, he appeared to
be lacking in the amount of diligence required of him in the performance of his duties.

A.M. No. P-11-3000 December 14, 2011

ARTHUR M. GABON, Complainant, vs. REBECCA P. MERKA, Clerk of Court II, Municipal Trial Court, Liloan, Southern
Leyte, Respondent.
FACTS:
Complainant charged the respondent with Grave Misconduct (1) for writing eight demand letters in 1993 in behalf of the
Saint Ignatius Loyola Credit Cooperative, Inc. using the MTCs official letterhead and signing the same letters in her
official capacity as the Clerk of Court of the MTC of Liloan, Southern Leyte; and (2) for administering oaths in five
affidavits

and a Kasabutan (Agreement) in 1995 and 2000 that had no relation with her official duties. The respondent
admitted the same but explained that she acted in good faith to aid in declogging court dockets. She insisted that she
was duly authorized to administer oaths under Section M, Chapter VIII of the Manual for Clerks of Court and that she did
not abuse the franking privilege of the court in sending the letters as these letters were in representation of the court.
HELD:
All officials and employees involved in the administration of justice, from judges to the lowest rank and file employees,
bear the heavy responsibility of acting with strict propriety and decorum at all times in order to merit and maintain the
publics respect for, and trust in, the Judiciary. Respondents use of the letterhead of the court and of her official
designation in the demand letters she prepared hardly meets the foregoing standard. Despite her good intentions, she
gave private individuals an unwarranted privilege at the expense of the name of the court. Clerks of Court are notaries
public ex officio. They may notarize documents or administer oaths only when the matter is related to the exercise of
their official functions. Thus, in their ex-officio capacity, clerks of court should not take part in the execution of private
documents bearing no relation at all to their official functions.

A.M. No. P-05-2082 December 12, 2011

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, vs. CLERK OF COURT HERMENEGILDO I. MARASIGAN, Regional
Trial Court, Kabacan, North Cotabato, Respondent.
FACTS:
An OCA audit team conducted a financial audit on the RTC, Kabacan, North Cotabato. The audit covered the
accountabilities of former Clerk of Court-in-Charge Barbara Espinosa, for the period of September 1991 to March 1993,
and of the respondent, from April 1993 to May 2004. The audit team discovered that the cash count for June 7, 2004 fell
short of P660.80. It attributed this anomaly to the respondents practice of depositing his collections on a monthly,
instead of a daily, basis. Also, the team found a big number of missing documents which were vital in the completion of
the audit. These documents consisted of official receipts (recorded and not recorded in the cashbook), cancelled official
receipts without the original copies, deposit slips, deposit slips without machine validation, and Fiduciary Fund (FF)
withdrawals and passbooks.
HELD:
Respondent clerk of court assigned to a cash clerk the collections, remittances, financial reports and accountable forms.
He later found out that some are already missing. The clerk of court is the courts accountable officer, not the cash clerk.
He is the courts chief administrative officer. No amount of good faith can relieve him of his duty to properly administer
and safeguard the courts funds. Clerks of court are officers of the law who perform vital functions in the prompt and
sound administration of justice. They are designated custodians of the courts funds, revenues, records, properties and
premises. They are liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of such funds and property.Respondent is
liable for gross neglect of duty.

A.M. No. P-11-3011 (December 16, 2011)

EVELINA C. BANAAG, Complainant, vs. OLIVIA C. ESPELETA, Interpreter III, Branch 82, Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City, Respondent.
FACTS:
Complainant Evelina C. Banaag charged respondent Olivia C. Espeleta with Gross Immorality and Conduct Prejudicial to
the best interest of the service for engaging in an illicit and immoral relationship with her husband, Avelino C. Banaag.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Olivia C. Espeleta is guilty of immoral conduct?
HELD:
Respondents act of maintaining an illicit relationship with a married man comes within the purview of disgraceful and
immoral conduct, which is classified as a grave offense. The image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct of the
official and personnel who work thereat. Court employees have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of
morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of
courts of justice. This Court has thus consistently penalized court personnel who had been found wanting of such
standards, even if they have precipitately resigned from their positions. Resignation should not be used either as an
escape or as an easy way out to evade an administrative liability or an administrative sanction.

A.M. No. P-11-2927 December 13, 2011

LEAVE DIVISION, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES-Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Complainant, vs.
WILMA SALVACION P. HEUSDENS, Clerk IV Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Tagum City, Respondent.
FACTS:
This case stemmed from the leave application for foreign travel

sent through mail by respondent, Staff Clerk IV of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Tagum City, Davao del Norte. Records disclose that on July 10, 2009, the Employees Leave
Division, Office of Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), received respondents leave
application for foreign travel from September 11, 2009 to October 11, 2009. Respondent left for abroad without waiting
for the result of her application. It turned out that no travel authority was issued in her favor because she was not
cleared of all her accountabilities as evidenced by the Supreme Court Certificate of Clearance.
In her Comment, respondent admitted having travelled overseas without the required travel authority. She explained
that it was not her intention to violate the rules as she, in fact, mailed her leave application which was approved by her
superior, Judge Arlene Lirag-Palabrica, as early as June 26, 2009. She honestly believed that her leave application would
be eventually approved by the Court.
HELD:
The exercise of ones right to travel or the freedom to move from one place to another is not absolute. Section 5 (6),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all
courts and the personnel thereof. This provision empowers the Court to oversee all matters relating to the effective
supervision and management of all courts and personnel under it. Pursuant to this, the Court issued OCA Circular No.
49-2003 to regulate their foreign travel in an unofficial capacity. Such regulation is necessary for the orderly
administration of justice. If judges and court personnel can go on leave and travel abroad at will and without restrictions
or regulations, there could be a disruption in the administration of justice. A situation where the employees go on mass
leave and travel together, despite the fact that their invaluable services are urgently needed, could possibly arise. Thus,
judges and personnel who shall leave the country without travel authority issued by the Office of the Court
Administrator shall be subject to disciplinary action. A judge or a member of the Judiciary, who is not being restricted by
a criminal court or any other agency pursuant to any statutory limitation, can leave for abroad without permission but
he or she must be prepared to face the consequences for his or her violation of the Courts rules and regulations.

A.M. No. P-11-2988 December 12, 2011

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR (OCA), Complainant, vs. ATTY. TEOTIMO D. CRUZ, Former Officer-in-Charge,
Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, San Mateo, Rizal, Respondent.
FACTS:
This administrative case arose from the financial audit conducted by the Court Management Office (CMO) of the books
of account of Atty. Teotimo D. Cruz (Atty. Cruz), former Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional
Trial Court, San Mateo, Rizal (RTC), covering the period from August 21, 2007 to August 31, 2010. Atty. Cruz compulsorily
retired on April 15, 2011. Atty. Cruz succeeded Atty. Fermin M. Ofilas (Atty. Ofilas) who compulsorily retired on August
17, 2007. Atty. Cruzs term ended when Atty. Aris Z. Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge by Executive Judge
Josephine Zarate-Fernandez effective September 1, 2010. The audit conducted by the CMO disclosed that there was a
cash shortage in the amount of P 928,534.24. Of the said amount, P 12,000.00 was incurred during the term of Atty.
Cruz while P 916,534.24 was carried over from the term of Atty. Ofilas and which formed part of the financial
accountability of former Clerk IV Aranzazu V. Baltazar. The audit team found out that the cash shortage of P 12,000.00
was the result of a double withdrawal of cash bond posted in Criminal Case Nos. 6182 and 6183 under Official Receipt
No. 13480917 dated July 21, 2002, which was previously withdrawn and confiscated during the term of Atty. Ofilas but
was again withdrawn during Atty. Cruz term. The records likewise revealed that Atty. Cruz incurred a delay in the
remittances of his collections in violation of Administrative Circular No. 5-93. Per computation, the non-remittances of
court collections deprived the Court of the interest in the amount of P 34,578.17 had the collections been deposited on
time.
HELD:
As custodian of court funds and revenues, it is the duty of a clerk of court to immediately deposit the various funds
received by them to the authorized government depositories for they are not supposed to keep funds in their custody.
Atty. Cruz belated turnover of cash deposited with him is inexcusable and will not exonerate him from liability. His
failure to remit his cash collections on time is violative of Administrative Circular No. 3-2000 which mandates that all
fiduciary collections shall be deposited immediately by the Clerk of Court concerned, upon receipt thereof, with the
Land Bank of the Philippines, the authorized government depository bank.

A.C. No. 4438 (December 12, 2011)
ELPIDIO P. TIONG, Complainant, vs. ATTY GEORGE M. FLORENTINO, respondent.
FACTS:
Herein complainant, an American Citizen, and his wife are real estate lessors in Baguio City. They are likewise engaged in
the assembly and repair of motor vehicles. In 1991, they engaged the services of respondent Atty. George
M. Florentino not only as legal counsel but also as administrator of their businesses whenever complainant would leave
for the United States of America (USA). Sometime in 1993, complainant began to suspect that respondent and his wife
were having an illicit affair. His suspicion was confirmed when, in their residence, he chanced upon a telephone
conversation between the two. Listening through the extension phone, he heard respondent utter the words "I love you,
I'll call you later". When confronted, his wife initially denied any amorous involvement with respondent but eventually
broke down and confessed to their love affair that began in 1993. Respondent likewise admitted the relationship.
Subsequently, at a meeting initiated by respondent and held at the Salibao Restaurant in Burnham Park, Baguio City,
respondent and complainant's wife, Ma.Elena, confessed anew to their illicit affair before their respective spouses.
HELD:
Possession of good moral character is not only a condition for admission to the Bar but is a continuing requirement to
maintain ones good standing in the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of law practitioners to observe the highest
degree of morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the Bar. Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a
lawyer, be it in his public or private activities, which tends to show him deficient in moral character, honesty, probity or
good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant his suspension or disbarment. Respondents act of having an affair with his
clients wife manifested his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. It
showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for his profession. He also violated the trust and confidence reposed
on him by the complainant, which in itself is prohibited under Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. GEORGE M. FLORENDO is hereby found GUILTY of Gross Immorality and
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon notice hereof, with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

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