VOL I I I * NO 6

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FEBRUARY 1945
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VOL. Ill NO. 6 FEBRUARY 1945
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
M I L I T A R Y I N T E L L I G E N C E D I V I S I O N
WAR DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON, D . C .
TABLE OF CONTENTS
GERMAN
Page
FORTRESS BATTALIPNS AND HOW THEY ARE USED 1
Their Purpose and Missions 1
The Three Basic Types 3
Notes on Tactics 7
MORE NOTES ON ANTI TANK TACTICS 10
The Antitank Company 12
Bazooka and Grenade-discharger Squads 13
A "Fire Team" in the Withdrawal 14
Failure of a Tactic 15
A Delaying Position 16
DISCOVERED I N COMBAT 19
Reaction to Artillery Fire Against Towns 19
Combat in Towns 20
Tank-Infantry Night Attack 21
Enemy Pigeon Service 21
"The Americans Are Coming" 22
Captured Artillery Ammunition 22
Vulnerability of Pillboxes to "Sealing"' 22
ROUNDI NG U P T HE BOOBY T RAP S 24
Devices Actuated by Pull-igniters 25
Devices Actuated by Pressure 28
Antilifting Devices on Mines 28
Miscellaneous 29
T H E GERMAN VOLKSSTURM 31
I N BRI EF , 37
A Raid on a U.S. Outpost 37
Minefield Marking 39
Tactic Against Infantry-with-Tanks < 41
New German Flakpanzer 42
JAPAN
J APANESE DI VERSI ONARY TACTI CS
f
44
Organization and Doctrine *)
Burma ' ^2
Philippines ^4
Southwest Pacific 50
II
TABLE OF CONTENTS III
Page
THE 150-MM MORTAR 57
ENEMY MINES ON LEYTE 60
Bomb Mines 60
Coconut Mines 62
Box Mines 63
Antiboat Mines 64
REMOTE-CONTROL MINES IN ANTITANK WARFARE 65
PORTABLE FLAME THROWER 68
Fuel Unit 68
Fuel Hose 70
Flame Gun 70
Characteristics and Operation 70
Japanese Flame-thrower Troops 71
NEW JAPANESE ARMY INSIGNIA 72
Don't Remove Insignia 73
UNITED NATIONS
BRITISH RAID IN BURMA. 74
ORDNANCE INTELLIGENCE TEAMS UNCOVER TECHNICAL SECRETS.. 81
Index to Volume III, Nos. 1-6 88
Cover Illustration German bazooka teams in action against U.S. tanks
(story on page 10) .
German Fortress Battalions now take part in the
defense of fortified lines.
IV
These newly created German units are
charged with the defense of such strongly
fortified lines as the West Wall.
rartress battalions
. . . and how they are used
A large number of German "Fortress Battalions", intended
to man the West Wall, were formed during the crucial period
following the enemy's collapse in France, and may be expected
to take an important part in the defense of that fortified line.
A Fortress Battalion may be one of three basic types: the For-
tress Infantry Battalion, the Fortress Machine-gun Battalion,
and the Super-heavy (Independent) Machine-gun Battalion. In
the late summer of 1944, General Heins Guderian issued an or-
der giving details regarding the various types and discussing
their tactical use. The following notes are based on the most
important parts of his order.
THEIR PURPOSE AND MISSIONS
German Fortress Battalions are Army GHQ troops, and are
controlled by the Army High Command. As a rule, they are
meant to be used only in the defense of fortified lines and other
fortified positions. By assignment these Battalions operate un-
der local commanders.
If the field troops retire to new positions, the Fortress Bat-
talions are withdrawn to the nearest permanent fortifications.
In contrast with the standard 1944 battalion organization in
the German infantry division, Fortress Battalions have less per-
sonnel butas the enemy sees itgreater combat effectiveness
because of a more liberal allotment of automatic weapons and
mortars, and especially because antitank rocket-projector pla-
toons are attached.
A thorough knowledge of the terrain, (especially a knowl-
edge of the possible avenues of approach and the areas in which
hostile forces are concentrated) and a carefully prepared de-
fense plan are regarded as prerequisites for the correct em-
placement of the automatic weapons and mortars, and as an
indispensable basis for the tactical employment of the Bat-
talions.
If time permits, defensive measures are tested, and defensive
action is rehearsed, on the basis of theoretical Allied attacks.
This, of course, is a customary practic efor all units throughout
the German Armed Forces.
The Germans may employ these battalions not only in a for-
tified line and in the outer defenses of forts, but in prepared
rear defensive positions, entirely independent of the fortified
line. The Battalions also may be committed as a screening force
in threatened sectors or in sectors which may be tactically im-
portant for other reasons.
The enemy believes that Fortress Battalions preferably should
be given missions such as these:
1. To defend against weaker hostile forces which have
broken through unexpectedly.
2. To delay the opposition's advance by forcing its advance
guards to fight before they reach the actual fortified line or
position, and by blocking defiles and other tactically useful cor-
ridors.
3. To allow fighting troops falling back toward the mam
defensive position to be absorbed into that position.
4. To occupy quickly and to defend points or sectors of
special importance.
5. To counterattack with the limited objective of cleaning
up hostile penetrations into a prepared line or position.
The purpose of such missions is to prevent an Allied force
from capturing key defensive points without a battle, and to
gain time and space for subsequent operations by German
forces.
The tactical principles that Fortress Battalions will observe
are the same as the standard German principles of defense, and
are not affected by the location and specific combat mission of
any individual Battalion.
Normally, the Battalions will be assigned to existing fortified
lines or positions, or to those under construction. To increase
the effectiveness of their assigned sectors of defense, Battalions
will make use of natural obstacles and will construct additional
blocks. The units are told that they can greatly increase the
defense potential of their positions by the skillful employment
of all available automatic weapons and mortars; interlocking
bands of fire, organization in depth, and flanking fire are
stressed. However, only the local commander is allowed to al-
ter the defense lines or to authorize changes in a fortification
plan.
THE THREE BASIC TYPES
Differences in armament, strength, and mobility determine
different special uses for the three basic types of Fortress Bat-
talions. Here are General Guderian's comments about the vari-
ous types and the ways in which they should be committed.
Fortress Infantry Battalions
1. Bicycle Company
Infantry companies equipped with bicycles are especially suitable
for reconnaissance and mobile warfare. The following missions are
recommended:
a. Long-range reconnaissance. For combat reconnaissance, all com-
panies must furnish patrols because of the small number of mobile
forces.
\A well concealed Ger-
ntan pillbox showing
center embrasure with
vision slit at right. This
pillbox for light ma-
chine guns was captured
during the assault on
the Siegfried Line. Other
vision slits are on other
sides of the pillbox, af-
foraing a wide field of
observation.
of an embrasure in >
the rear of a German
pillbox used to protect
the^ rear entrance from
assault. The steel plate
with slot is embedded
in the center of the
concrete wall.
Closeup of center ma-
thine - gun embrasure,
measuring 8 by 12 inches,
showing closure plate
partly closed. The vision
slit at the right is prob-
ably for observation of
gunfire and hostile troops
wfahout interfering with
the machine gunner.
Interior of German pill- >'
box showing details of
embrasure closure plate.
The plate is locked by
the eccentric wedges.
Pinion for mounting the
-machine gun, apparently
added after the pillbox
iifas completed, is below
the embrasure. The let-
tering means "No lights
when slit is open."
b. The swift occupation of important terrain features.
c. The protection of front, flank, or rear when no other German unit
is available for this.
d. Employment as a mobile reserve, at the disposal of the Fortress
Battalion commander. Weapons, ammunition, and necessary pieces of
equipment are to be fastened onto the bicycles.
2. Rifle Company
The heavy machine gun squad in each rifle company is particularly
well adapted for defensive fighting in depth from concealed, flanking
firing positions. Covered positions may be employed.
If the assault platoon is equipped with the submachine gun 44
(Machinenpistole 44), the fire power of the company is greatly in-
creased. This platoon should be employed for counterthrusts, in case
of hostile penetrations, and at local defense points where the terrain
does not permit effective use of of such long-range weapons as the
heavy machine gun and the 81-mm mortar.
Up to a range of 450 yards, the M.P. 44 is as accurate as the rifle.
The principal value of the M.P. 44 lies in its accuracy and high rate
of fire (22 to 28 rounds per minute) as a semiautomatic weapon, and
in its alternate use as an automatic weapon, when it is fired in short
bursts of 2 to 3 rounds (40 to 50 rounds per minute). Generally, the
weapon is set for single fire. Bursts will be fired only when beating
off an enemy assault, making a counterthrust (against a penetration,
in close combat), or at very short ranges during combat in trenches,
towns, or woods. Strict fire discipline must be observed. Conserve
ammunition! Remember that this weapon fires a short cartridge, not
interchangeable with ordinary rifle or machine-gun ammunition.
In addition to being equipped with antitank hollow charges, the
antitank rocket-projector platoon enables the rifle company to build
up a powerful and deeply echeloned antitank defense in, or immedi-
ately behind, the main line of resistance.
3. Heavy Company
By means of fire from its heavy machine-gun platoon (4 or 6 guns),
the heavy company supplements the heavy machine-gun fire of the
rifle company. Whenever possible, the platoon fires from covered
positions.
The mortar platoons support the action of the rifle companies by
commitment as a unit and with concentrated fire. The mortar-platoon
6
observation posts are to be situated so that they can maintain com-
munication with the company commander in whose sector they are
committed. The firing positions should be close enough to permit
continued observed fire, even if technical means of communication are
destroyed. This can be achieved by situating observation posts close
to the firing positions.
Fortress Machine-gun Battalion
The usual German tactical rules for the defense apply, with certain
natural modifications, to the Fortress Machine-gun Battalion. The lat-
ter is committed in the first line of defense and in terrain where the
best use can be made of the shock power of the heavy machine gun.
The machine-gun company is committed by squads or platoons. The
heavy machine guns usually will take advantage of every opportunity
to fire from the flanks. Concentrated fire is placed on terrain features
which are especially threatened.
Antitank rocket-projector platoons are committed by squads or
teams, for the protection of firing positions.
The heavy company receives a liberal allotment of 81-mm mortars
and 75-mm infantry howitzers, to permit heavy concentrations of fire.
The engineer platoon is committed in the usual manner.
Super-heavy (Independent) Fortress Machine-gun Battalion
The companies equipped with single-barrel, 20-mm machine guns
are primarily intended to combat ground targets from concealed or
covered firing positions. These positions are selected with an eye toward
the possible use of the guns against air targets, as well.
The antiaircraft company, equipped with four-barrel, 20-mm guns, is
committed principally against air targets, and from concealed positions
at important terrain features. However, when the firing positions are
selected, the possibility that the guns may also be used against ground
targets is taken into account.
NOTES ON TACTICS
The Germans recognize that Fortress Battalions often will be
on their own, especially in the early stages of an operation.
This is why the enemy believes in conducting tactical and ter-
rain reconnaissance frequently, for a considerable distance, and
in ample time to permit planning. Moreover, early liaison is
established with approaching reinforcements and with German
troops falling back to the fortified positions. Ruses and decep.
tions are used.
Great care is taken to prevent a hostile force from penetrat-
ing a fortified line or position unexpectedly or occupying rear
positions before German troops can reach them. Therefore, in
addition to performing reconnaissance, Fortress Battalions take
the necessary measures to guard the fortified positions and to
keep them in readiness for defense on very short notice. In this
connection, no time is lost in constructing additional positions,
with emphasis on sectors considered suitable for a hostile ap-
proach; frequent alerts and drills are ordered, to reduce the
time needed to man the installations; and mobile elements are
dispatched forward.
The Germans believe that counterthrusts and other fighting
outside the fortifications can be conducted successfully only by
mobile elements. Such elements are selected at the earliest pos-
sible time (they may be drawn from the mobile forces of the
Battalion), and are equipped with the necessary weapons and
supplies.
Because of the independent nature of a Fortress Battalion,
the headquarters company takes care of the supply of all com-
panies in the Battalion. Thus the company commanders become
free to devote their entire.time to leading their units in training
and in combat, and are not obliged to concern themselves with
supply problems beyond maintaining a general supervision.
(This type of organization is called "freie Gliederung," or
"freeing organization," since it frees the company commander
for combat duties only. It represents a trend which is becoming
noticeable in the organization of all German armored units and
some Volksgrenadier units.) According to General Guderian,
the principal job of Fortress Battalion company commanders
should be to weld the whole organizaJian into a perfectly coor-
dinated fighting unit. However, as with all German units, it is
required that an "adequate" amount of time be set aside for
National Socialist education and indoctrination. Even Fortress
Battalions, charged with conducting a desperate defense within
the borders of Germany itself, are not permitted to forget that
Nazi domination of the world still is the ultimate goal.
MORE NOTES ON ANTITANK TACTICS
With German antitank activity coming in-
creasingly into the spotlight, these new notes
on enemy antitank tactics have a special sig-
nificance. Moreover, it must be expected that
such measures will become even more vigor-
ous as the threat to the German homeland
grows.
A German two-man bozooka team firing on U. S. tanks.
U. S. combat experiences in Italy and the interrogation of
German officers have yielded fresh information about German
antitank tactics, which today are playing a more important part
than ever in the enemy's stubborn defensive fighting. The fol-
lowing tactical notes deal with the antitank company, -the
bazooka and grenade-discharger squads, and ground-mount anti-
tank guns, tanks, and self-propelled artillery in the withdrawal.
In addition, a new German technique of preparing delaying posi-
tions is discussed and illustrated. The latter information comes
from a U. S. armored division now fighting in Germany.
II
THE ANTITANK COMPANY
Companies of the German division antitank battalion, as well
as the regimental 14th Company, are employed in support of
the infantry regiments, but their orders for deployment nor-
mally come from the antitank battalion headquarters, rather
than from the regiment. The Germans believe that this proce-
dure ensures a higher degree of coordination in the antitank de-
fense throughout the division sector. However, the following
tactical principles are followed by companies of both types.
The guns are brought into an assembly area, and the com-
pany and platoon commanders go forward to make a detailed
reconnaissance of firing positions. If the company commander
has had enough time, he will have made a preliminary survey
of the entire sector, and will have prepared a map designating
areas as Panzersicher (tank-proof), Panzer gefahrdet ^difficult
for tanks), or Panzermoglich (good tank terrain). The over-all
allotment of antitank guns will have been made on the basis of
this map, with the object of covering those areas designated as
Panzermoglich. Great care is taken with the siting of each gun;
whenever possible, this is done by the platoon commander.
The caliber of the guns determines the nature of the positions
which are chosen. The Germans stipulate that the 50-mm anti-
tank gun must be sited in defilade and must fire to the flanks.
This is why the Germans choose such positions as the reverse
slopes of hills and the reverse edges of small woods. Houses
are avoided, on the principle that they attract too much artillery
fire. The Germans also prefer flanking fire for their 75-mm
antjtank guns, but the U. S. and British practice of advancing
with infantry in the lead and tanks following in support makes
this difficult to achieve. And since the Germans believe that
these 75's can pierce the front armor of Allied tanks at ranges
up to 2,000 yards, the guns usually are sited to fire forward,
and are well camouflaged instead of being defiladed. Guns of
12
all calibers are sited in depth, at varying distances behind the
main line of resistance, depending on the situation and the ter-
rain. Invariably, the guns have infantry in front of them for
local protection. The positions are arranged so that the guns
can support each other, each gun covering positions from which
other guns might be attacked by Allied tanks in hull-down posi-
tions.
The enemy's normal practice has been to withdraw the com-
pany's prime movers to lines about half a mile to a mile behind
the gun positions, but, because of Allied heavy artillery superi-
ority, this is no longer possible. The more usual procedure now
is to send back all but one prime mover out of range of artillery
fire. The remainding prime mover serves for any local changes
of position which prove necessary. Since such changes of posi-
tion are likely to be fairly frequent, it is standard enemy prac-
tice to prepare alternate positions for the guns as soon as the
original positions have been prepared. Of course, a company
with only one prime mover forward is not able to undertake a
sudden withdrawal. (If the probable necessity for a with-
drawal is foreseen, the prime movers are kept near the guns,
and are disposed in whatever cover can be found.)
If the company makes a planned withdrawal, assembly areas
as well as new lines of resistance are reconnoitered to the rear
of the initial positions. The guns then withdraw singly, under
cover of the remaining weapons.
BAZOOKA AND GRENADE-DISCHARGER SQUADS
Bazooka and grenade-discharger squads are allotted to those
infantry companies whose sectors are considered most likely to
be attacked by tanks. The bazooka is regarded as a relatively
static weapon, to be fired from a prepared position, whereas the
grenade discharger is regarded as a mobile reserve weapon, and
usually is held back at the Antitank Company command post.
13
Wherever possible, bazookas are used in groups of three, and
are sited in a V with its prongs toward the opposition.
This permits at least two weapons to engage a tank approach-
ing from any direction. The individual rocket launcher is em-
placed in a V-shaped pit, with the prongs pointing toward the
opposition. The weapon is carried to either end of the V, ac-
cording to the direction from which the tank to be engaged is
approaching. Having loaded the weapon, the loader takes shel-
ter in the opposite arm of the V, to avoid the back-flash of the
rocket. He usually is armed with a submachine gun, and is
responsible for the ground protection of the position. In the
general defense plan of the company, bazooka sections have the
mission of defending narrow tank lanes and defiladed ap-
proaches. The antitank guns cover the open areas of attack.
A "FIRE TEAM" IN THE WITHDRAWAL
Ground-mount antitank guns, tanks, and self-propelled artil-
lery frequently constitute a "fire team" in German withdrawal
actions. The ground-mount antitank guns are sited singly, in
groups of two or three, in positions permitting all-around de-
fense. Wire entanglements and minefields surround these posi-
tions, and infantry in company or platoon strength is maintained
in the immediate vicinity. The infantry stays close to the road,
14
and their positions are planned for ready withdrawal. For this
reason the infantry engage mostly with frontal fire, and fire
only a few rounds before pulling back. Small groups of tanks
deploy on the flanks of their position, serving both as protec-
tion for the antitank guns and as an incentive to hostile armor
to deploy similarly. In retreat, these tanks engage the hostile
armor and afford time for the ground-mount weapons to retire
to their next position.
The mission of the self-propelled guns in an action of this
kind is to remain in the rear, between the antitank guns in the
center and the armor on the flanks. The self-propelled guns
provide fire support, changing position continually and avoid-
ing a direct engagement with the hostile armor. The Germans
consider them especially valuable in helping antitank guns to
defend a road block. By changing their positions so often, the
self-propelled guns place interdictory fire of heavy caliber on
the obstacle area without endangering themselves to any appre-
ciable extent.
FAILURE OF A TACTIC
A prisoner declared that the antitank company never was
used in support of advancing tanks; its chief mission was to
attack Allied tanks and cover the German retreat.
The three guns of a platoon were staggered in the following
manner:
ill:
3

JOOy -|
15
In theory, the No. 1 gun was to start firing so as to attract
return fire from the hostile tanks. As soon as it was feasible to
do so, the No. 1 gun was to change position to the rear. In the
meantime, the No. 2 gun was to fire in order to attract the oppo-
sition's attention. As soon as the Allied tanks' fire was directed
toward the No. 2 gun, that gun was supposed to cease firing and
move to the rear, leaving the No. 3 gun to take over until the
No. 1 gun was in position and ready to start firing again.
In actual practice, however, this system seldom worked. Fire
on advancing tanks was opened at 400 yards; the prisoner con-
sidered this range much too short to permit a successful change
of position as outlined in the theory. Since the prisoner was
captured by advancing Allied infantry because he had been
unable to move his gun to the rear quickly enough, his conten-
tion seems pretty reasonable.
No spare barrels were carried by the enemy, and only the
gun sight was used. The prisoner's platoon once had a range
finder calibrated up to 10,000 meters, but the prisoner had
never seen it in action. Fire control was independent for each
gun, and was handled by the noncom in charge, who relied on
field glasses.
In the prisoner's opinion, the following ranges for the 75-mra
antitank guns were the most effective:
Against tanks or other moving targets
Against attacking infantry
Against strongpoints
Against houses
400 yards
1,000 yards
1,200 yards
1,500 yards
A DELAYING POSITION
In recent weeks a U. S. armored division has been encounter-
ing German delaying positions designed to destroy the leading
tanks of an armored column and to cause confusion and delay.
One type of set-up in particular has been encountered re-
16
peatedly, and evidence shows that the Germans have been prac-
ticing and perfecting the technique very studiously indeed.
As shown in the illustration, a covered and perfectly camou-
flaged foxhole for a two-man bazooka team normally is dug in
a semicircular pattern around the corner of a house or other
building anywhere from 5 to 50 yards off a road. A camou-
flaged escape trench leads from the rear of the bazooka emplace-
ment to any nearby place of concealment, such as garden
shrubbery, outbuildings, or woods. Machine guns are placed in
a V, with the prongs of the V about 300 to 400 yards away
from the road and facing the direction from which an Allied
approach is expected.
When an advancing Allied column is preceded by a dis-
mounted point, fire is withheld until the bazooka team can be
certain of knocking out the leading vehicles.
^4 representative German delaying position.
17
When the bazooka fires, all the machine guns open up on the
remainder of the column, not so much to cause casualties as to
create confusion and to make it difficult for the Allied force
to tell the spot from which the bazooka fire has come. In fact,
the Germans rely on a combination of factorsthe excellent
camouflage of the positions and the escape trench, besides the
confusion created by the cross-firing machine gunsto make it
difficult for Allied soldiers to determine the points from which
the resistance originates.
18
LJiscovered
m
Combat
Military gains may be measured, not only in terms of areas
liberated or conquered, but also in terms of the knowledge we
acquire about our opponent. From U. S. unit commanders and
staff officers who have been engaged in recent fighting in West-
ern Europe comes currently valuable information regarding the
German enemy. Further intelligence notes of this type will ap-
pear in subsequent issues of the Intelligence Bulletin.
REACTION TO ARTILLERY FIRE AGAINST TOWNS
"When U. S. heavy artillery destroyed buildingseven forti-
fied buildingsin Brest, without making sure that the direct-
support artillery could maintain neutralization until the infan-
try assaulted the area, the Germans made the most of their op-
portunity when our fire was lifted. They promptly moved back
in, and constructed fortifications from the rubble. When the
Germans did this, their new positions often were harder to re-
duce than the original buildings would have been."
"German troops in Brest who were provided with adequate
cover seem to have been affected only slightly by intermittent
harassing fire, even when the fire was from heavy artillery. As
soon as the men became convinced that their cover afforded
reasonable protection, occasional rounds failed to disturb their
normal routine."
COMBAT IN TOWNS
"At no time while our outfit was engaged in mopping-up op-
erations in Aachen did the enemy fire a shot from behind our
lines. As we went along, we searched every room and closet in
every building, and blew every sewer which might have afforded
the enemy a hiding place. Not only were our fighting men re-
lieved of the fear of being sniped at from the rear, but com-
mand and supply personnel functioned more efficiently."
"In Aachen the enemy covered all avenues of approach with
antitank guns and used his tanks and self-propelled guns as
roving weapons in a series of positions which changed continu-
ally. The Germans tried to use their 120-mm mortars at a
range of 400 yards, because they felt that in this way they
gained effectiveness and made it harder for us to locate the
weapons."
"As the fighting in Brest progressed, small groups of Ger-
man soldiers often were led to surrender because the call for
them to lay down their arms came to them in their native lan-
guage. One sergeant's ability to speak German resulted in
many prisoners being taken. In two days 120 enemy soldiers
20
came out in answer to his call for surrender, and many similar
experiences occurred elsewhere."
TANK-INFANTRY NIGHT ATTACK
"On one occasion the Germans launched a tank-infantry at-
tack at night against our positionsand over muddy ground.
After taking the objective, the tanks withdrew before daylight,,
leaving their infantry to hold the ground. A counterattack re-
stored our position.
"In the attack the Germans sprayed the area with fire, and
used star shells and flares, in an attempt to frighten our troops.
The enemy tanks didn't stick to the roads, but maneuvered
across country, racing their engines and milling around to cause
confusion among our infantry. Our infantry fired machine
guns in the direction from which the sounds of the tanks came,
and the sparks from ricochets located the vehicles sufficiently
to permit the tank destroyers to fire. Incidentally, a German
self-propelled gun was knocked out as a result of this activity."
ENEMY PIGEON SERVICE
"It has been found that German agents have been using car-
rier pigeons to transmit information to Germany from localities
21
behind Allied lines. From small lofts the pigeons fly to larger
and more centrally situated lofts; the latter transmit the infor-
mation to Germany by radio. Most of these German pigeons
carry on their leg rings the lettering "Wehrmacht" or "Wehr-
macht Brieftaube," as well as several numbers. Birds that the
enemy has commandeered from France, Belgium, and Holland
have other markings." (Personnel of at least one U. S. division
have been ordered to capture or kill pigeons suspected of being
enemy message carriers.)
"THE AMERICANS ARE COMING"
"On previous occasions it has been reported that certain Ger-
man units have a poor opinion of the 'noise discipline' main-
tained by U. S. soldiers. Prisoners captured recently have been
saying much the same thingin effect, that U. S. troops ad-
vancing to attack German positions have approached the latter
so noisily that the important element of surprise has been sacri-
ficed."
CAPTURED ARTILLERY AMMUNITION
"The projectiles of captured German 105-mm ammunition
will fit U. S. shell cases and guns, but the case will not. To use
the captured ammunition, we have modified some of our shell
cases so that they can be used over and over. The case is cut
down to the size of the German case, and the primer from the
German case is removed and is screwed into the U. S. shell case.
It requires about 3 hours to complete this modification."
VULNERABILITY OF PILLBOXES TO "SEALING"
"The amount of TNT needed to blow German pillboxes can
be reduced considerably if the escape hatches can be found and
plugged beforehand. These hatches, which are encountered m
22
nearly all pillboxes, are about 2 feet square. They are likely
to be plastered over and hard to detect.
"Pillboxes have been vulnerable to effective demolition when
charges have been placed in the ventilation pipes, which run
vertically through the side walls near the pillbox entrance. First
the bottoms of the pipes are plugged, then 30 to 50 pounds of
TNT are dropped in, primed, and tamped. In one instance,
firing the charge breached the wall completely, and the surviv-
ing occupants were either wounded or stunned by the flying
concrete.
"Embrasure openings have been obstructed by means of ther-
mite grenades. If the sliding door of the embrasure is closed,
a grenade is placed on the slideway, is activated, and becomes
a molten mass. Although the door itself is not welded, it is
jammed by the mass, which hardens and thus obstructs the slide-
way. A single grenade is sufficient to jam a small door, but two
grenades are used against large doors with armor plate more
than 2 inches thick. If the grenade cannot be placed on the
slideway, a trough of ^4-inch metal may be used, to cause the
molten mass to run into the slideway. The surface on which
the weld is to be made should be clean and dry. If the door of
a German pillbox works on hinges, jamming cannot be accom-
plished by means of thermite grenades, since the molten mass
cannot be controlled sufficiently to create a strong band between
the door and the frame."
23
\\x)unding up
the
>by \_raps
"We haven t seen any booby traps for the
past two weeks." That's the kind of statement
that can spell trouble if it leads to any slack-
ening of precautionary measures. As soon as
Allied vigilance relaxes, the stage is set for
the Germans to use one of the most vicious
techniques of modern warfare. A technique,
incidentally, at which the enemy is highly
proficient.
A well-prepared booby trap looks like a perfectly harmless
object, of course. A bicycle resting against a farm house, a
wheelbarrow standing outside the barn, a bucket waiting to be
dipped into the cool wellthese are everyday sights in the coun-
try, and yet nothing is simpler than for a German soldier to
connect each of these to a pull-igniter before his unit withdraws.
Clearly, certain elementary precautions are necessary when it
is known that the enemy has occupied, or even merely passed
through, a certain area. Trip and tension wires may be present
in what seem to be the least likely places. After all, traps may
be detonated by any normal activity such as opening a door or
window, treading on loose floor boards, or disturbing any inani-
mate object indoors or out.
Nothing should be interfered with simply out of curiosity.
In this business, continuous vigilance is the price of safety.
What sort of booby traps has the enemy been using lately?
Here is a roundup, from the Western and Southern fronts, of
typical instances of recent German booby-trapping activity. The
traps may be divided into four categories: those actuated by
pull-igniters, those actuated by pressure, mines with antilifting
devices, and miscellaneous contrivances.
DEVICES ACTUATED BY PULL-IGNITERS
1. Helmet.A steel helmet lying on the ground covered a Spreng-
horper 28 charge containing a Z.Z. 35 pull-igniter, which was connected
by wire to the inside of the helmet. A second wire connected the
charge to a fixed point. Lifting or kicking the helmet would have set
off the trap.
25
2. Mine in Oven.A Tellennine'42,
was found secured to the rear of an
oven door in the kitchen of a private
house. A Z.Z. 35 igniter had been in-
serted in the mine, with a wire con-
necting the igniter to the back of the
oven. The door was slightly ajar; if it
had been opened further, the mine
would have exploded.
3. Corpses.Egg grenades have been
placed in the pockets of enemy dead.
The actuating cords of the grenades
are tied to strings, and the strings, in turn are tied to inconspicuous
pickets driven into the ground nearby. When the corpse is moved, the
grenade explodes.
4. Fruit Trees.Fruit trees have
been fitted with wires leading to pull-
igniters and charges of high explo-
sive. When Allied soldiers reach for
the lower branches or try to climb
the tree, the charges are detonated.
5. Hedges.The following instance
of booby-trapping a hedge at a point
where Allied soldiers would be likely
to work their way through is typical
of many others. Three picric blocks
with Z.Z. 35 pull-igniters inserted in
them were covered with stones, and
were connected with wires to a nearby hedge.
6. Fence Posts.Trip wires lead-
ing from the base of fence posts,
and connected to pull-igniters and
large buried charges of TNT, have
been reported. Also, taut wires have
led from fence posts to tension-re-
lease igniters (Zu.Z.Z. 35). The lat-
ter set off small charges, which fire
detonating fuzes and large buried
charges.
26
7. River Banks.-The banks on either side of a river ford, usable
only at certain times of the year, were booby-trapped in the following
manner. Three 3-kilogram charges (Geballte Ladung) were laid side
by side in each bank, with two Z.Z. 42 pull-igniters screwed vertically
into the outer charges. Ten-foot length of trip wire led from the igniters
and were secured to wooden stakes. Anyone attempting to use the
banks would have been likely to trip the wires.
8. Roads.The Germans have tied grenades to trees on each side of
narrow roads, and have strung trip wires across the roads so that the
fish-pole aerials or other parts of vehicles-will trip the wires.
9. Telephone Lines.An enemy patrol came across an artillery
observation-post line and cut it. In the immediate vicinity, they buried
two S-mines, about 10 yards apart, so that the prongs of the igniters
were about 1 inch above the ground level. Each loose end of the tele-
phone wire was attached to a piece of fine cord about 12 inches long,
and each cord led to a mine. The result Avas that, in the dark, a lines-
man picked up what he thought was merely a loose end of wire, and an
S-mine exploded. (As the Intelligence Bulletin has previously reported,
this ruse has also been employed by the Japanese.) The potential dan-
ger of such booby traps is of course considerably less in the daytime.
10. Rubbish Heaps.The usual booby trap in a rubbish heap con-
sists of an attention-catching object of some value as a souvenir, which
is connected to a pull-igniter and a charge or antipersonnel mine by
means of a wire or cord.
11. Molotov Cocktails as Traps.
Molotov cocktails may be used as
booby traps when the Germans be-
lieve that particularly successful dam-
age can be caused by fire. Just such
a trap was found in a lumber yard.
A small explosive charge of cordite
with a detonator and primer had
been attached to a large bottle of
gasoline, which, in turn, had been
lashed to a board. The device was
to have been deton'ated by a pull-igniter, actuated by a trip wire. If
the trap had worked, it 'would have spread flaming gasoline over a
fairly large area, probably inflicting severe burns on personnel and cer-
tainly making fire fighting extremely difficult.
27
DEVICES ACTUATED BY PRESSURE
1. Inverted Tellermines.The Germans often inverted a Tellermine
and inserted a D.Z. 35 push-igniter in the bottom hole to make the
device antipersonnel in effect.
2. Mines under Planks.A combination of S-mines and Tellermines
may be buried in a road trail, and covered with a plank. Thus pressure
caused either by a vehicle or by personnel would lead to detonation.
ANTILIFTING DEVICES ON MINES
1. Delay Igniters.Thirty-second delay igniters have been reported
fixed to mines, presumably directed against personnel who may attempt
to lift such mines by using a cable.
2. Dummy Trip Wires.Recently a new type of antilifting device
has appearedone which could be used with almost any type of mine,
and particularly with wooden mines. Such a device, used in conjunc-
tion with an Italian four-igniter mine, employed a stake driven into the
ground about 3 feet from the mine, which had been buried about Vfa
feet below ground level. A dummy trip wire connected the top of the
mine with the stake, while another wire led from a pull-igniter in the
bottom of the mine to the bottom of the stake. If the latter wire had
been disturbed, it of course would have produced detonation.
3. Devices on S-mines.A wire may connect an S-mine with a
standard 1-kilogram charge. One end of the wire is wound around the
base of the mine's S. Mi.Z. 35 igniter, while the other end is attached
to a Z.Z. 35 pull-igniter screwed into the 1-kilogram charge.
Also worth mentioning is an instance in which a wooden stake about
12 inches long was driven into the ground, with its top about 2 inches
below the surface. A standard 200-gram charge (Sprengkorper 28)
was wired to the stake, and a Z.Z. 35 pull-igniter screwed into the
charge. An S-mine with a wire string attached, then was placed in a
prepared hole, and the other end of the wire was connected to the
Z.Z. 35 igniter. The igniter safety pin was withdrawn, and the S-mine
itself was armed. As a result, detonation would be caused by anyone
lifting the mine carelessly and rapidly, without having disconnected the
wire sl-inp;. In addition, the S-mine itself remained a threat to unwary
foot-sloggers.
4. Pressure-release Antilifting Device.A mine may be laid on the
pressure-lifting device E.Z. 44 (Entlastungzunder 44), which is subse-
quently armed and packed around with earth. Lifting the mine allows
28
a rod, which has been kept down by the weight of the mine, to rite
and release a striker in the E.Z. 44. This sets off the charge in the
igniter and detonates the mine.
MISCELLANEOUS
1. Abandoned Vehicles.Aban-
doned vehicles, either wrecked or
still intact, often are booby-trapped
so that any movement of the
wheels will result in an explosion.
In the case of a motor vehicle,
the booby-trap may be intended
to function when the engine is
started. The Germans sometimes
use farm wagons in road blocks,
and the possibility that such vehicles may have been booby-trapped
should not be ignored. On a road in Holland, three abandoned farm
wagons had been loaded with 15 cases of grenades and miscellaneous
shells, and left blocking the road in such a manner as to give the
impression that they had been abandoned in haste. Fortunately, a cor-
poral inspected them carefully before ordering his detail to move them
off the road. He found ten 200-gram charges on the bottom of one of
the wagons, with a friction igniter (Zdschn. Anz. 29) attached by means
of wire to a spoke of one of the wheels. Any movement of this wagon
would have resulted in detonation.
2. Tellermine Crates. Tellermines in their original packing cases
have been found fitted with igniters to prevent the mines from being
withdrawn and used.
3. Charges Concealed in Weapons.
The Germans sometimes conceal a small
charge in the mechanism of a rifle or
Luger pistol that they plan to leave be-
hind in a farly obvious place, to attract
the attention of Allied soldiers. The
charge, which is sufficiently powerful to
injure a man severely, is detonated if the trigger of the weapon is
pressed.
4. False Signs.The Germans have been known to post signs in
English indicating that road shoulders have been cleared of mines,
when mines actually are present in these areas.
29
Whether dressed in civilian clothes or varied uniforms, Volkssturm
members near the organization s arm band.
30
THE GERMAN
Volksshmu
Of the measures taken to mobilize speedily the last man-
power resources of the German nation, the most extreme is the
creation of the Volkssturm, a national militia designed to sup-
plement the defense of the homeland. The call to arms, which
was issued on 18 October 1944, was literally a dragnet, sweep-
ing into a single organization virtually all German males be-
tween the ages of 16 and 60 who were not already members of
the German Armed Forces. The creation of the Volkssturm
serves a double purpose, as far as the Nazi Party is concerned:
first, to strengthen the defense of the Reich, and, second, to keep
a large part of the population so thoroughly under military con-
trol that any incipient revolt against the Party will have a hard
time thriving. It is the enemy's intention to have a strong hard
core of Nazi fanatics dominating the Volkssturm at all levels.
In announcing the formation of the new militia, Hitler desig-
nated the Chief of the Storm Troopers, Schepmann, as Inspector
of Weapons Training, and the Chief of the Nazi Motor Corps,
Kraus, as Inspector of Technical Training. Himmler is charged
with ordering the actual employment of the Volkssturm for local
defense. However, it must be remembered that the militia is
currently in the training stage, with its members continuing their
ordinary jobs. When the Volkssturm is operating on a full-time
basis, its employment may be directed by the Army.
The Volkssturm is definitely a bottom-of-the-barrel organiza-
31
German males between the age of 16 and 60 are liable for service
in the nciv national militia.
lion. Althougli it may succeed in mustering more than ten mil-
lion men for local defense inside the Reich, a conservative esti-
mate indicates that less than half of these will be physically fit.
In one capacity or another, many of the J'olkssturm personnel
already were contributing their services to the German war
effort when the call to arms was issued. It will be recalled that
dozens of Nazi semi-military, service, and political organiza-
tions, regimenting practically every walk of German hie, "
atl
been in existence for some time. Because of these organizations,
and because Nazi Party officialdom itself is so extensive that it
even includes city "block leaders", the Nazi authorities long
had had a very fair knowledge of the military and service pos-
sibilities of every male in Germany. Much had been done to
exploit German manpower on a part-time basis wherever full-
time service could not be performed. Thus service in the Volks-
sturm becomes merely an added duty for men who already have
part-time jobs in other defense organizations or who work in
war industries. As the Germans envisage it, a man who per-
forms ARP tasks during an air raid, who has a route to patrol
as a member of the Stadtwacht (City Guard), or who is a skilled
laborer in a Messerschmidt plant will take his post in a Volks-
sturm squad and fight as an infantryman when his home area is
attacked by Allied ground forces.
It is logical to infer that, as Volkssturm units are being
formed, the abilities, physical fitness, and war work of the re-
cruits will be taken into account. Limited-service personnel will
be given local or static defense missions. Invalids and cripples,
it is reported, will be reserved for headquarters work. Although
youths of 16 are to be included in the Volkssturm, the lower age
brackets in general are likely not to be represented very gener-
ously, in view of the fact that the German Armed Forces in-
creasingly are drafting men younger than 18. Also, if a Volks-
sturmmann is drafted into the Armed Forces, his membership
in the militia automatically terminates.
Despite the fact that the Volkssturm is inducting by age
classes, an appeal for "volunteers" is being conducted in the
usual Nazi manner. Working through the factory cells of the
German Labor Front organization and other groups directly
supervised by the Party, Nazi leaders have induced the entire
personnel of certain factories and businesses to "volunteer" in
a body, with the result that recruits pour in as fast as the train-
ing facilities can handle them, and faster than if they all had
been drafted formally.
With the Nazi Party in charge of organizing the Volkssturm,
the early stages in the development of this national militia have
been expedited. Although each Gauleiter, or Nazi District
Leader, is charged with the leadership, enrollment, and organi-
zation of the Volkssturm in his district, the largest Volkssturm
unit seems to correspond to the next smaller territorial subdi-
vision of the Nazi Party organizationthe Kreis. In a city,
Volkssturm organization might run something like this:
Territorial Political Unit Military Unit
Kreis (roughly equivalent to a U. S. Bataillon (battalion)
county; there are 920 kreise
in Greater Germany)
Ortsgruppe (roughly equivalent to a Kompanie (company)
U. S. Congressional dis-
trict)
Zelle (literally "a cell"; roughly equi- Zug (platoon)
valent to a U. S. precinct)
Block (a city block) Gruppe (squad)
Not only each Gauleiter, but each Kreisleiter, has a Volks-
sturm Chief of Staff to assist in handling militia problems.
Although differentials may be introduced in the selection and
assignment of personnel, Nazi leaders assert that all Volkssturm
members will be given the same instruction. This is to consist
of infantry training, with special emphasis on close combat. The
rifle is the basic weapon. It is to be supplemented by subma-
chine guns and light machine guns. Since there is almost no
limit to the number of models of such weapons taken over by
the Germans from conquered nations, it would be difficult to
state exactly which small-arms models the Volkssturm will use.
German, Czech, and Polish Mauser rifles already are in service,
34
The rifle is the basic weapon of the Volkssturm, which receives
infantry training, with special emphasis on close combat.
and use will be made of the many thousands of captured Rus-
sian rifles and machine guns. Other equipment includes egg
hand grenades and potato-masher hand grenades. For antitank
defense, the Panzerfaust hollow-charge launchers have been
promised to the Volkssturm. (The latest of these recoilless wea-
pons has a range of 88 yards; earlier models have a range of
only 33 yards.) German bazookas also may be furnished. In-
struction in the handling of antitank and antipersonnel mines
already is being given.
At present any turnout of the Volkssturm is likely to present
a rag-tag-and-bobtail appearance, in dress as well as armament.
The only item of clothing or insignia currently issued is a
black arm band with the lettering "Deutscher Volkssturm" in
a light color and with the word "Wehrmacht" directly
underneath this. The Nazis have asserted that this arm band
officially makes the Volkssturm members a part of the Wehr-
macht (Armed Forces). It is left to the individual to provide
the rest of the clothing. Uniforms of the Storm Troopers,
35
Hitler Youth, and Party territorial leaders will be encountered.
Many men will simply wear civilian clothes. Already the lack
of complete official uniform has caused a great deal of disgrun-
tlement throughout the new militia. Many members feel that
they are assuming the duties of soldiers, with none of the privi-
leges. (Incidentally, there is no remuneration for service in
Volkssturm, except when a member is taking part in actual
combat.)
The effectiveness of the Volkssturm remains to be tested. In
the past, organized defense of urban and rural areas by the
local populace fighting in support of regular troops has indi-
cated that a people defending their homes under such condi-
tions are capable of putting up a most determined defense.
Volkssturm elements were used in combat near Metz, but the
poor showing that they made must be attributed primarily to
the fact that they had only recently been mustered and that most
of their brief time in the militia had been spent in digging for-
tifications. In future months the Nazis will discover and try to
correct the outstanding defects of the Volkssturm, and their un-
questioned talent for organization and military training must
be expected to show at least a few tangible results. Just how
much success the Nazis will have in using Volkssturm members
as guerrilla fighters after local areas have been overrun by the
Allies cannot be predicted. Much would seem to depend on how
hard a core of Nazi fanatics each element contains.
[Note: As the Intelligence Bulletin goes to press, it is reported
that rank insignia worn by the Volkssturm consist of silver stars
worn on the lapel or on the collar. One star will indicate a
squad leader, two a platoon leader, three a company com-
mander, and four a battalion commander.]
36
A RAID ON A U.S. OUTPOST
Early one morning the Germans staged a raid on a U. S. out-
post, and -captured or killed an officer and 10 men. Although
there are certain discrepancies between the stories of the few-
available witnesses, the following is believed to be. a reasonably
accurate account of what happened.
The battalion was holding a small town with a platoon. An
outpost at "A" was manned by the Platoon's headquarters, with
outguards to the right and left. Another Platoon, 2 miles to the
east, had an outpost manned at "B" with outguards to the front.
A daylight observation post was situated in a church steeple at
"D," 11/2 miles to the south, and a mortar squad was situated
in the town at "C" across the road from the Platoon's command
post.
In the afternoon the Germans shelled the town and the steeple
observation post with remarkable accuracy. Early the next
morning, when it was very dark and stormy, a barrage of Nebel-
werfer (rocket projector) and mortar fire fell in the vicinity
37
of the other Platoon's outpost at "B, " and about 300 rounds of
medium artillery fell in the town. This outpost was engaged by
a 10-man enemy patrol just as the- mortar and Nebelwerfer bar-
rage was lifted. The patrol withdrew after a brief fire fight.
In the meantime, medium artillery fire continued to fall on
the town. Just before this barrage was lifted, the outpost at
"A" manned by the Platoon headquarters heard someone pound-
ing on the door and yelling in very good English, "Let me in,
will you? I want to get out of this barrage!" One of our sol-
diers opened the door, and the enemy tossed in a hand grenade,
A U. S. soldier who had been posted outside the house escaped
during the raid, but the remaining officer and nine men were not
seen again. One other American was found dead in the house the
following morning; he had been shot through the head, evidently
while standing near a window. The strength of the raiding
party was not determined.
At about the same time the raid on the outpost-headquarters
was being conducted, trouble was getting under way at the
mortar squad's position. A voice behind the protecting wall
was heard asking, "What have you got on the other side of this
wall?" The mortarmen replied, "Two mortars," whereupon a
hand grenade was thrown over the wall. Another grenade was
dropped into a mortar barrel, and the barrel was blown open.
Obviously the enemy raid had been well planned and co-
ordinated. The party had worked its way directly to the out-
post they intended to raid. Following closely behind the
German barrage, the enemy soldiers had passed the U. S. out-
guards unobserved. It is clear that the Germans were in
possession of detailed and accurate information regarding the
U. S. dispositions, presumably having obtained it from civilians
in that area. The coordination of the artillery barrage with the
activity of the raiding party was excellent, indicating that the
raiders were continually in contact with their supporting
artillery.
The exact time of the incident was not determined, but it
occurred in the early hours of the morning. At 0300 the platoon
leader reported by radio, "Nothing unusual."
The enemy unit which perpetrated this raid could not be
identified, but the manner in which it performed its mission
suggests that it must have been a special assault detachment, of
the type organized in each regiment under a policy established
by Kesselring during the Anzio beachhead stalemate.
MINEFIELD MARKING
Although German minefield marking varies at the discretion
of local commanders, a fairly recent set of instructions issued
39
by an enemy division is helpful in adding to our knowledge of
current practices.
The division or-
dered that minefields
more than P/4 miles
behind the main line
of resistance were to
be marked off by
fences 3 feet 3 inches
high, consisting of
three strands of wire.
Intermittent s i gn s
were to bear the fa-
miliar "Minen" or "Achtung! MinerC but the skull and cross-
bones were to be omitted.
In wooded terrain, minefields in front of the main line of
resistance were to be marked by a fence 3 feet 3 inches high,
without any signs at all.
In open terrain, minefields were to be marked by a low fence,
without signs, on the German side only. The fences were to be
as inconspicuous as possible, so as not to give away the posi-
tions of the centers of resistance in the main line.
No special fences were to be erected around wire obstacles
with booby traps or around "ramp" mines (Rampernminen)
on roads.
Minefields at a short distance behind the main line of re-
sistance were to be fenced around on all sides, and were to be
marked with unobtrusive signs.
All pickets used for marking minefields were to be provided
with a short verticle length of barbed wire.
Paths through minefields were to be 13 feet wide, with a
central guiding wire suspended loosely between 4-inch stakes
driven into the ground at intervals of 10 feet, to serve as a
40
guide for reconnaissance parties. Each path was to be covered
by observed or fixed machine-gun fire.
The engineer company in each sector of the line was to
inform all troops in its own sector regarding the position of all
minefields. Local battalion commanders were held responsible
for keeping an up-to-date plan of these minefields, and for
ensuring that all members of their commands were fully in-
formed about the locations and boundaries of the fields.
Incidentally, it is reported that in some instances dummy-mine-
field signs in any three colors excluding blue, whereas true mine-
fields are identified by any three colors including blue.
TACTIC AGAINST INFANTRY-WITH-TANKS
The commander of a U. S. tank company describes a tactic
that the Germans like to employ against Allied infantry sup-
ported by tanks:
"It was late in the afternoon, and one of my tank platoons
was aiding a company of French infantry in capturing a ridge
occupied by the Germans. The French company commander
asked my platoon leader to fire on a house on the slope of a
ridge about five hundred yards to our front, because it con-
tained enemy machine gunners. The tank-platoon leader com-
plied with his request, and with a few well-placed rounds of 75,
soon chased the Germans from the house. The French infantry
then continued to move on up the ridge. They soon ran into
another house which presented the same obstacle as the previous
one. This house was located about 1,000 yards away and a
little to our right. As the tanks started to fire on the second
target, the French captain noticed shells hitting the first house,
around which some of his infantry had already established
themselves. He hurriedly asked my platoon leader to cease
firing on this place and to fire only at the new target. The
platoon leader informed him that the shells were not coming
41
from our guns, and they must have been fired by the enemy.
It took some time to convince him of this fact, for the bursts
looked much like those of our 75's and had occurred at the
same time our tanks had fired on the second target.
"This same thing has happened several timesvarying
slightly, of course, depending on the situation. We have found
it to be a favorite trick of the Germans. It not only gives them
a sure target and inflicts heavy casualties on us, but also tends
to cause dissension between the tanks and infantry.
"We have learned to expect this return fire immediately after
taking a certain position, and have made sure that the infantry
unit we are working with understands what may happen. In
certain cases we have attempted to keep the enemy confused by
continuing light firing on an objective after having taken it
(where the situation permits), and by keeping the infantry
away from the definite points that we have just captured, such
as buildings and well-defined terrain features."
NEW GERMAN FLAKPANZER
A new German Flakpanzer, the third and latest type of anti-
aircraft tank the Germans have put into action on the western
front, has been captured by U. S. troops during recent combat
in France.
This self-propelled weapon consists of a 4-barrelled 20-mm
antiaircraft gun, the Flakvierling 38, mounted on the standard
Pz.Kpfw. IV chassis. The open-top turret is octagonal in shape,
with each of the eight sides made of two plates or 1.6-inch
armor. The top and bottom plates of each side are slanted
inward at approximately 30 degrees from the vertical, and the
turret has a 360-degree traverse.
It is a further development of the Flakpanzer which mounts
the single-barrelled 37-mm Flak 43 on the same model chassis.
The Flakvierling 38 is a quadrupled version of the single-
barrelled 20-mm Flak 38, a gun that the Germans have
42
mounted on a modified ex-Czech tank chassis, the Pz.Kpfw.
38 (t), for use as another type of Flak panzer.
The Flakvierling 38, a four-barrelled 20-mm antiaircraft gun
mounted on the Pz.Kpfw. IV chassis, is 'he newest version of
the Flak panzer to make its appearance with the German
Army in combat.
Correction
An incorrect and dangerous method of throwing the Panzer-
wurf mine is illustrated in the photograph on page 79 of Intelli-
gence Bulletin, Vol. Il l , No. 3.
The soldier in this photograph is holding the Panzerwurf-
mine in the armed condition, with the cloth vanes open. This
is the proper way to handle the weapon: Grasp the grenade,
holding the vanes in the closed position, and remove the cap.
Maintain this grip as the weapon is thrown.
43
Diversionary tacticsthe Japanese version
of commando raidshave become a standard
form of warfare in the Japanese Army. U. S.
troops in action in the Pacific must be pre-
pared for harassing raids designed to disrupt
supply lines, to create confusion in rear
areas, and to divert attention from other op-
erations.
JAPANESE DIVERSIONARY TACTICS
44
ORGANIZATION AND DOCTRINE
To compensate for lack of air power and effective long-range
artillery, the Japanese Army has adopted the practice of organ-
izing special troops equipped to penetrate enemy lines to raid
airdromes, supply areas, and headquarters, and to disrupt com-
munications in the combat zone by harassing or destroying
supply trains and other motor convoys.
Organized into groups known officially as Diversionary
Units, these soldiers are trained to strike with surprise, to
create a maximum of confusion and devastation, and to with-
draw as suddenly as they had appeared. They may be espe-
cially equipped for their work, and may move to their opera-
tions area by submarine, by air, or by infiltrating in small
groups through the forward positions of the opposing force.
Although not activated on the same large scale as British
Commandos and U. S. Rangers, the Japanese have been known
to organize diversionary troops for specific missions. These
units may vary in size from well-equipped companies of se-
lected men to hastily organized raiding parties of a squad or
more. There appears to be no provision in the Japanese Army
tables of organization for a permanently established and stan-
dardized Diversionary Unit. The more complex of'these units
apparently are composed mostly of volunteers organized into
temporary companies. These companies are attached to a
larger field force for the duration of a specific campaign. If
the mission should require it, several of these companies may
be banded together to form an even larger organization under
the command of a colonel.
A typical diversionary company of this type is composed of
approximately 200 officers and men organized as three platoons
of three squads each. Unusual is the fact that a large per-
centage of the personnel may be commissioned, an average
45
platoon consisting of a first lieutenant serving as platoon leader,
12 second lieutenants serving as squad leaders and assistant
squad leaders, and 18 men. There may be practically no non-
coms, since their duties are performed by junior officers. About
half the unit strength may consist of men who have volunteered
for this type of combat.
Although a Diversionary Unit may be employed regularly
in raiding missions against ground positions, headquarters, air
fields, and similar installations, some of their primary missions
are to attack convoys of supply trucks, artillery, or headquar-
ters units in transit. Such raids are conducted on the theory
that, during a movement, security is less stringent and the com-
bat capabilities of a unit are diminished.
One well-organized Diversionary Unit advocated two methods
of operating against a so-called "moving objective"the "at-
tack in force" and the "concealed attack." Such tactics are
typical of the methods by which a Diversionary- Unit will try
to operate, although in actual combat thev seldom achieve such
smooth operation.
Attack in Force
The attack in force, as the name, implies, is a swift, all-out
attack delivered either from ambush against a moving convoy,
or, by surprise, against a unit in transit which has halted or
bivouacked for the night. In either case, the primary mission
is the destruction of the vehicles and the weapons or supplies
they carry. The common procedure is to deal a hard blow to
personnel, and, in the resulting confusion, to destroy, burn, or
capture equipment.
The preparations for an attack on a motor convoy are essen-
tially the same as those involved in an ordinary Japanese as-
sault operation. Before a definite plan is made, a detailed
46
reconnaissance is made. Painstaking care is taken to collect
terrain information and to find the most traveled supply routes,
the customary rest or bivouac areas, the extent of routine
march-security measures, and the type of motor transport oper-
ating in the sector.
Along the supply route, an area is selected to offer a mini-
mum of cover and protection to a convoy, but to permit the dis-
position of ambushing troops so they may fire upon and charge
the convoy effectively. Road blocks or land mines are prepared
to block the front and rear of the column at the moment the
attack begins. If necessary, the flanks of the road may be
mined to prevent the escape of vehicles across country.
The disposition of the Japanese unit will vary according to
the terrain. Usually, it will be concealed along one flank of
the convoy route, either massed or disposed in groups at several
points. The distance between the ambushing troops and the
road will depend upon the terrain and the degree of security
methods expected from the convoy. Fire power is concentrated
in the foremost ranks of the ambush; on occasions when equip-
ment is the main objective of the attack, the attackers may be
divided into a covering unit and a demolition unit.
Once the unit has taken its ambush position, every man re-
mains on the alert to strike at any moment. Because a large
number of observers might disclose the existence of the ambush,
the unit commander himself watches for a hostile column.
When the convoy enters the ambush, the advance guard is
allowed to pass unmolested, and the Diversionary Unit waits
for the main body. At the most opportune moment, the road
is blocked according to plan, the ambush opens fire, and an
attack is launched at the height of the ensuing confusion. If
the convoy is traveling with a large interval between vehicles,
the ambush may not open fire and attack until the lead vehicle
47
has been halted and until the following vehicles have been
allowed to close up and shorten the column.
In conducting such an attack, the Diversionary Unit depends
for success upon the total surprise and disorganization of the
convoy. In training instructions, overenthusiastic officers are
admonished "not to foolishly expend your energy to accomplish
the mission if it is perceived that the enemy has prepared for
resistance." Similarly, once the shock of surprise and disorder
has passed, and the immediate mission has been completed as
well as circumstances permitted, the Japanese raiders do not
hang around to mop up isolated elements that have succeeded
in defending themselves. Instead, the attackers withdraw and
proceed to a predetermined assembly point.
Concealed Attack
The so-called "concealed attack" advocated for use by Diver-
sionary Units is a Japanese expression for the normal under-
cover sabotage of supply lines that might be expected of guer-
rilla units operating in enemy occupied territory. In this type
of operation, the Diversionary Unit will try to avoid contact
with opposing troops, and will attempt to operate with secrecy
from a base established behind their opponent's lines.
Great stress is placed on the use of explosives and mines to
destroy vehicles, to block supply routes, and to demoralize
rear-area troops. One Japanese headquarters encouraged the
following methods of concealed attack:
1. A tree on the side of a mountain road is cut almost through. A
steel wire, tied to this tree, is stretched across the road so that a pass-
ing vehicle that strikes the wire will fell the tree thus causing damage
I the vehicle.
2. Vehicles crossing a bridge are destroyed by pressure mines placed
the planking.
48
A tree on the side of a mountain road is cut almost through. A
steel wire, tied to this tree, is stretched across the road so that a
passing vehicle that strikes the wire ivill fell the tree, thus causing
damage to the vehicle.
3. One section of a bridge is damaged so that the weight of a passing
vehicle will cause it to collapse.
4. Obstacles are laid on steep, winding roads.
5. Land mines or time bombs are laid at intervals along extended
routes in forests, swamp areas, and cliff areas. They are adjusted so
that the explosion of the farthest mine would cause the explosion of
other mines.
Presumably, this arrangement is designed to damage several
vehicles when the lead vehicle of a convoy detonates the key
mine.
Whenever possible, a Diversionary Unit engaged in anti-
vehicle operations of this type will establish a hidden command
post, from which rear-area traffic can be observed. Demolition
details will be dispatched from this command post to execute
specific missions. Commanders are instructed to ensure that,
whenever an explosive is used, a few men are left behind to
observe its effectiveness.
Although, under many circumstances, Diversionary Units
may be employed on suicide missions, they are not organized
to be expended recklessly in combat. When the mission has
been completed, or when the unit is not able to sustain itself
longer in the hostile territory, it will return to the Japanese
lines either by infiltration, or by- a prearranged evacuation by
water.
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
It is known that the Japanese have had various diversionary
companies throughout the Southwest Pacifica typical com-
pany strength being from 100 to 140 men. Organization within
these companies is apparently extremely flexible, with the use
of various attack "units" advocated for tactical purposes.
Although no definitely identified commando raids are on
record in this theater, early in 1944 a Japanese headquarters
issued its interpretation of rules for commando warfare based
upon the experiences of a First Lieutenant who had commanded
a so-called "commando unit" in the Southwest Pacific. These
lessons were reported as being particularly applicable to com-
mando warfare in the "uncivilized" jungle country of New
Guinea.
Like all diversionary companies and other Japanese raiding
troops, the commando unit depends upon surprise to enable its
comparatively few men to attack larger bodies of hostile troops.
Its missions parallel those of other raiding parties in that the
commando unit also is designed to strike at hostile higher head-
quarters, air fields, advance bases, and supply lines.
50
The commando unit recommended by the enemy headquar-
ters is distinguished by its unusual organization. The military
personnel of the unit are specially selected mennot more
than 30 in number. If possible, however, the unit will have as
many natives as soldiers at its command. When traveling in
the jungle, each man will carry complete equipment, but in
action a commando soldier will carry no more than approxi-
mately 40 pounds of equipment, including arms and ammuni-
tion.
Apparently this recommended Japanese commando unit is
intended to work in close cooperation with friendly natives.
Prior to an operation, the unit will endeavor to set up a spy net
of natives in the operation area.
Its intelligence complete, this commando-native force gen-
erally will have some distance to travel before it reaches the
objective to be attacked. Usually this distance will not be more
than 40 miles from the unit's base, but, if necessary, the com-
mandos will extend the range of their activity by setting up two
or three advance bases between their main base and the point
of attack. When the unit travels on foot, it will move from
8 to 15 miles a day. By native canoe, the commandos generally
will try to make approximately 20 miles a day when traveling
up a river, or 40 to 50 miles when traveling downstream. When
supply is by manpower, the load should not exceed approxi-
mately 40 pounds per man.
Before an attack is launched, an assembly point somewhere
between the advance base and the point of attack is decided
upon. The Japanese describe the ideal assembly point as one
which has natural defensive features, is some distance from
rivers and roads, and consequently is not easily approached by
hostile troops.
Preparations for the attack will be made during the day, and
51
the attack will be launched at dusk, during the night, or at
dawn. Before attacking, the commandos will attempt to infil-
trate to within 100 yards of the objective, provided the situa-
tion permits. An attack during a torrential rain or gale is
recommended, but it is pointed out that escape afterward is
sometimes "difficult." The commandos are instructed that when
they attack a headquarters, an effort should be made to capture
codes, new weapons, and documents. However, they are cau-
tioned not to lose the opportunity to escape so they may par-
ticipate in future action.
Throughout the course of these operations, the unit will keep
in touch with its higher headquarters by radio, or, if necessary,
by runner. Friendly airplanes will be signalled by smoke
candles or fire smoke.
BURMA
A recent analysis of the infiltration tactics of Japanese troops
in Burma, coupled with information from enemy sources, in-
dicates that the Japanese there established three distinct roles
for units assigned to diversionary missions behind Allied for-
ward defense positions.
Although the mission of some of these raiding parties closely
paralleled that of more highly trained Diversionary Units, there
is no evidence to indicate that the troops involved in Burma
have been other than the ordinary infantry and engineer sol-
diers of the Japanese Army organized on the spot for their
specific missions. Most of the raiding activity was confined to
within a few thousand yards behind the Allied line, and has
been of a type which always must be expected of any Japanese
ground force.
The Japanese have classified raiding parties into three types
according to their general missionsthe Teishintai, or raid
unit; the Betsudotai, or flying column; and the Toppatai, or
penetration unit. This seems to be the pattern of diversionary
tactics in Burma.
Raid Unit
The Teishintai, or raid unit, is the infantry-engineer demoli-
tion team which has been encountered in nearly every large-
scale jungle operation. This infiltration unit of between 20 and
30 men is given the mission of demolishing guns and motor
equipment in artillery positions and vehicle parks.
One battery experienced five of these suicide assaults, and
an officer commented that as long as artillerymen are prepared
to cope with these attacks, they are of a nuisance value only.
On occasion these raid units, rather than assault the artillery
positions openly, would take up a position on a nearby hill
where, with automatic weapons fire, they would attempt to wipe
out the gun crews.
Flying Column
Raids of a harassing nature, designed to disrupt rear com-
munications temporarily before the raiding party returns to
its own lines, are the function of the Betsudotai, the so-called
"flying column."
Such a Japanese force, of about 150 soldiers and fifth-
columnists, infiltrated through the Allied lines in the Arakan,
Burma, on one occasion. Moving through the hills to a point
10,000 yards in the rear of the Allied forward positions, they
launched an attack upon the line of communication, timing this
assault with a general Japanese attack on the Allied eastern
flank. This attempt to create disorder in the rear area actually
resulted in little more than some slightly damaged bridges and
a few burned trucks.
53-
Penetration Unit
The mission of a penetration unit, the Toppatai, is very
similar to that of the flying column, except that the tactical
employment of the unit is related to offensive operations.
In conjunction with a general offensive, units of a company
or larger will infiltrate, or seize by assault, a key terrain feature
or some other tactically advantageous position in rear of the
forward Allied line. This position, which usually will be on the
line of communication, will be held at all costs until it is
reached by the main Japanese advance.
Two instances of such a maneuver have been reported. Once
a general Japanese offensive in the Arakan opened after a pene-
tration unit of about one company with medium machine guns
seized and occupied a hill about 3,500 yards behind the Allied
positions. A similar attempt was made by a penetration unit
which established a strong position in a group of small hills
2,000 yards behind the then-existing forward lines. The posi-
tion served as a base for enemy patrols, and at times diverted
some Allied troops in attempts to liquidate it. It was necessary
only to drive the force from the outer edges of the position to
neutralize the tactical value of this penetration.
PHILIPPINES
The current Philippine campaign has produced a clear
example of action by Japanese troops from a well-organized
Diversionary Unit. It took place when a small-scale airborne
raid was attempted behind the American lines on Leyte. The
operation was typical of the type advocated for Diversionary
Units, but it best illustrates how Japanese tactical doctrine,
when given the test of actual execution, so often falls short of
the enemy's expectations.
54
An enemy source says Diversionary Units may infiltrate ,jby
airthat "parachutes, gliders and transport planes can J>e em-
ployed. As landings are to be accomplished at dawn or at dusk,
the location of the landing area, its condition, and the route
of infiltration after the landing must first be investigated
secretly and thoroughly."
Early on the morning of last 27 November, three transport
planes each loaded with from 20 to 25 commandos from a
former Southwest Pacific Diversionary Unit deliberately crash-
landed in U. S. occupied territory. Two of the planes landed
on the beaches on the east coast of Leyte. The third plane was
shot down over an airfield before it could land.
The two planes which crash-landed on the beaches succeeded
in discharging their cargoes of raiders in an area not imme-
diately occupied by U. S. troops. Two Japs from one plane
were killed by troops approaching the landing in an amphibious
vehicle, the remainder fled into the jungle, to be tracked down
by U. S. patrols.
The planes which crash-landed on the beaches succeeded in
discharging their cargoes of raiders in an area not immediately-
occupied by U. S. troops.
55
exact objective of these airborne raiding parties may
be determined, but apparently they were sent upon a
mission of raiding and destruction to divert attention from the
operations in western Leyte, then entering their final and deci-
sive phase. An examination of the equipment of the dead com-
mandos disclosed musette bags filled with hand grenades, anti-
tank mines, demolition charges, and concentrated rationsthe
accoutrements of the diversionary commando.
THE 150-MM MORTAR
The Japanese Army, which has relied heavily upon the
trench mortar for fire support, has developed a 150-mm mortar.
Called a "medium" mortar by the Japanese, this Model 97
(1937) 150-mm weapon is a conventional smooth-bore, muzzle-
loading, bipod-mounted mortal
1
of sturdy construction. Cap-
tured on Peleliu Island, this weapon is the largest Japanese
mortar yet found. There it was emplaced in a concrete pit with
the muzzle level with the top of the pit.
This 150-mm mortar, which resembles in design the standard
U. S. 81-mm mortar, weighs 770 pounds complete with sight,
and fires a conventional type of high-explosive shell weighing
approximately 57 pounds.
The weapon is sighted by means of a 3-power panoramic
elbow telescope, and the Japanese claim it will throw a projec-
tile a maximum 2,187 yards. Bursting radius of the shell is
reported to be 65 feet, with some fragments thrown 100 feet
further.
For transport, the mortarincluding the sightbreaks down
into these five component parts:
Tube 257 pounds
Base Plate 337 pounds
Bipod and elevating gear 100 pounds
57
Traversing gear, shock-absorbers, and
mortar clamps 71.5 pounds
Sight 1.5 pounds
The Japanese Model 97 150-mm mortar, largest enemy weapon of
this type yet encountered by U. S. troops in the Pacific.
58
The 150-mm mortar shell weighs approximately 57 pounds. The
bursting radius is reported to be 65 feet.
The tube is 75.37 inches long and has a reinforcing muzzle
band, while the heavy, ribbed-steel base plate measures 17.75
inches by 35.5 inches.
The weapon is assembled, adjusted for fire, and operated
like the U. S. 81-mm mortar. However, the firing mechanism
resembles that of the Japanese Model 99 81-mm mortar, using
a firing-pin cam shaft built into the base-cap, rather than a
fixed firing pin.
The. Japanese are known to have another Mo;lel 97 150-mm
mortar, which has not yet been encountered. It is reported to
weigh 1,540 pounds and to have a maximum range of 3,828
yards. There is a possibility that this mortar may be installed
on a mobile mount.
59
First reports from Leyte tell of increased
e of land mines by the Japanese defenders.
ENEMY MINES ON LEYTE
As had been anticipated from the trend of previous opera-
tions, U. S. troops landing on Leyte found that the Japanese
hafl made practical and extensive use of minefields and booby
traps in the planned defense of the island.
Preliminary reports indicate that although a decided effort
at mining had been attempted, improvised mines were used
more often than standard enemy demolitions. Chief of these
were aircraft bombs set into the ground with an armed nose
fuze exposed as the detonator. A haphazard use of bombs in
this manner was encountered before by Sixth Army troops in
several Southwest Pacific operations.
BOMB MINES
On Leyte, the principal minefields were found on the air
strips at Tacloban and Dulag. Here 63-kilogram aircraft bombs
had been planted in groups of three at intervals along the
length of the runwaysan obvious attempt to destroy aircraft
66
63 Kg bomb
I 100 Kg bomb
Tacloban air strip. Dots indicate the approximate location of
Japanese bomb mines found buried on the runways and th*>
nearby beach.
61
>vhich might try to land on the strip. Bomb mines of this type
were planted also on the beach which runs parallel to the
nearby Tacloban airfield and which was a logical vehicle route.
Near Dulag, armed bombs, which could be detonated by a truck
Japanese Coconut Mine
tire brushing against the fuze, were laid on the surface along
roads and camouflaged with grass.
In addition to the bomb mines, the Japanese on Leyte em-
ployed two types of improvised mine that Jfrave not been found
in general use in past operations. These were the so-called
"coconut mine," and an improvised box mine.
COCONUT MINES
The coconut mine was a simple but not particularly effective
device. The Japanese had taken a large quantity of coconut
shells, hollowed them out, and then filled them with black
powder. A Model 91 hand grenade was imbedded in the powder,
with only the grenade's 5-second pressure detonator exposed.
These makeshift antipersonnel mines were used as pressure
detonated booby traps, and were easy to camouflage in natural
62
surroundings. An observer has reported that these improvised
demolitions also served the enemy as hand bombs when whirled
and thrown at the end of a 3-foot fiber rope. On detonating,
they made a terrific explosion, but did little damage.
Japanese Improvised Box Mine
BOX MINES
Crude, improvised box mines were found to be a fairly com-
mon device. Constructed in several sizes, these mines consisted
of a wooden box filled with picric acid or ammonium picrate
explosive blocks. Like the coconut mine, these demolitions
were detonated by a Model 91 or Model 97 pressure-detonated
hand grenade which was set into the explosive, but with the
armed fuze exposed. Many of these mines were found hidden
in the grass along roadsides, or set as booby traps beneath stair-
cases and floorboards in houses where the Japanese had been
storing ammunition.
Many different sizes of this box-type mine were found con-
structed for time-fuze or electrical detonation. On the Maintez
River the retreating enemy attempted to demolish a bridge with
63
eight of these mines bolstered by 21 cases of 75-mm shells. The
electric caps used were of a type similar to U. S.- manufacture.
Although improvised mines were most common, many stand-
ard Model 93 (tape-measure), Model 99 (magnetic), and
Model 3 (pottery) mines were found stored in ammunition
dumps or emplaced along roads as antivehicle demolitions.
Some Model J-13 antiboat mines also were found on A-day
near the landing beaches ("A-day" for the Leyte operation was
the equivalent of the familiar designation, "D-day").
ANTIBOAT MINES
At one place a tank trap consisting of a ditch 20 feet wide
and 10 feet deep was located 100 yards inland of a landing
beach. This trap was discovered to be heavily mined with this
hemisphere antiboat mine. The enemy had made no attempt
to place these mines according to a definite pattern. Some were
buried completely, some half buried, and others lay exposed
above-ground. But all were scattered haphazardly throughout
the barrier.
Although indications on Leyte are that the Japanese have
tended to use mine warfare to an extent greater than has been
encountered in the past, preliminary reports indicate the Ja-
panese are still lacking in adequate land mines and minefield
doctrine. However, as the enemy improves his technique with
time, U. S. troops must be prepared for more effective anti-
personnel and antivehicle mining by Japanese units.
iLemote-^ontrol WLines
in Anti-Tank Warfare
One of the latest antitank methods now advocated by the
Japanese is the use of remote-control land mines operated by
engineer troops. These are men who have been trained to func-
tion as an integral part of infantry antitank assault teams.
Known to the enemy as Close Quarter Combat Units, these
teams have been in a state of continual development in the
Japanese Army since the advent of tank warfare in the Pacific.
Instructions issued last summer to Japanese troops in the
Southwest Pacific clarified the duties of these units, and out-
lined controlled-mine tactics, in an apparent effort to raise tank
fighters to a status above that of arbitrarily organized suicide
squads.
The basic components of a Close Quarter Combat Unit are
its so-called "land-mine squads" and "destruction squads."
These squads, of which there may be several in the unit, may
be supported in action by a "reserve squad" and a "covering
squad."
The successful tactical employment of such a unit seems to
hinge upon the part played by the land-mine squads. These
squads are composed of ten men each, with a noncommissioned
65
officer in command of each squad. Since they must be exper-
ienced in minelaying, a good portion of the engineer strength
of a unit is likely to be included in its land-mine squads. One
man in each squad is designated as an "igniter"; presumably his
is the responsibility of exploding the controlled mines at the
proper moment. Actually, a squad must play a dual role: it
not only lays and explodes the land mines, but must engage
hostile supporting infantry as the antitank assault develops.
Consequently, each squad is equipped with two, and sometimes
three, light machine guns.
In preparing to attack hostile tanks, the land-mine squads
plant remote-control mines along a road, defile, or similar cor-
ridor through which the advance of tanks is anticipated. These
mines, usually electrically detonated, may be standard Japanese
antitank mines, prepared dynamite charges, or aircraft bombs
wired for detonation from a safe distance. It is interesting to
note that the Japanese have conducted large-scale experiments
with bombs used in this manner and claim that they are highly
successful. When the mines have been laid, the Close Quarter
Combat Unit takes an ambush position in such a way that the
destruction squads can attack the tanks and the land-mine
squads can engage the supporting infantry.
After the hostile tanks and infantry enter the mined area,
the designated igniters explode the mines at a time when they
will have the greatest effect, and the mine squads engage the
infantry, attempting to separate them from the tanks.
In the resulting confusion, and while the supporting infan-
try is supposedly engaged, the destruction squads will rush the
tanks with armor-piercing mines and prepared explosive
charges, to destroy tanks not disabled by the controlled mines.
Throughout this action the reserve squad and the covering
squad give support fire to both the mine and destruction
66
squads. As the action progresses, personnel of the reserve
squad are used as replacements for the mine and destruction
squads as they are needed.
When the tank-destroying mission has been completed, the
unit withdraws under the protective fire of the covering squad.
67
PORTABLE FLAME THROWER
The portable flame thrower, a standard weapon of pillbox
assault teams, has not been used extensively by the Japanese.
However, the enemy is known to be equipped both with flame
throwers and with flame-thrower troops, and must be consid-
ered capable of using this weapon extensively in future opera-
tions. Thus far he has used them only in isolated instances
ever since the start of the present Pacific war.
Two types of portable flame thrower are standard through-
out the Japanese Armythe Model 93 and the Model 100.
However, since there is so little difference between the con-
struction of the two types, they may be regarded virtually as
identical weapons. Each model consists of three principal
groups: fuel unit, fuel hose, and flame gun. A modification
in the construction of the flame gun is the only difference
between the two types of flame thrower.
FUEL UNIT
The flame-thrower fuel unit consists of two 15-inch cylindri-
cal tanks, each of which is 6 inches in diameter. Hemisphere-
shaped at both ends, the tanks are connected at the top and
bottom by a welded pipe which permits fuel and pressure to
flow evenly in both tanks so that they may operate as a single
unit. The total fuel capacity is 3^4 gallons.
68
The Japanese flame thrower, showing the fuel and pressure tanks,
the flame gun, and the disassembled igniting-cartridge magazine.
A third tank, slightly smaller but of the same shape, is in-
cluded in the fuel unit, and contains nitrogen or air under
pressure. This pressure cylinder is attached to the back and
center of the two fuel tanks. Air pressure, which forces the
fuel from the tanks into the flame gun, is let into the fuel
tanks through a tube running from the top of the pressure
cylinder to the top of the left fuel tank. This pressure is con-
trolled by a manually operated needle valve, one on the top
of each of these two cylinders. The top of the right-hand
fuel tank is fitted with a screw cap for filling the containers with
fuel.
This three-tank unit is fitted with straps which permit it to
be carried on the operator's back like an infantry pack.
69
FUEL HOSE
The fuel hose, 45 inches long, is made of reinforced fabri-
cated rubber tubing, with brass fittings on both ends. One
end is attached to the bottom of the right-hand fuel tank, and
the other is fitted to the flame gun.
FLAME GUN
The flame gun, which is either 3 or 4 feet long, consists of
a fuel tube 1 inch in internal diameter. The fuel ejection
handle is located near the fuel hose connection, and the l/^-inch
nozzle with the firing mechanism is attached to the other end
of the tube.
The firing mechanism is a 10-chamber magazine resembling
the magazine of an ordinary revolver. Loaded with 10 rim-
less cartridges, it rotates around the nozzle, and, when fired,
ejects an ignition flash parallel to the spurt of fuel. The
cartridges are loaded into the front of the magazine, and are
held in place by a threaded retaining cap with holes in line
with the cartridge chambers.
The fuel ejection handle, which fires the cartridges when it
opens the fuel ejection valve, is in the closed position when it
is parallel to the fuel tube. When this handle is turned at
right angles to the tube, a continuous jet of fuel is released
and a cartridge is fired, thus igniting the fuel. When the
handle is returned to its position parallel to the tube, the flow
of fuel stops, and the magazine revolves to place a new cart-
ridge in the firing position.
CHARACTERISTICS AND OPERATION
The Japanese flame thrower may be carried easily. When
filled, the tank assembly weighs 55 pounds. The fuel tanks
will hold 3.25 gallons of fuela mixture of kerosene, gaso-
line, and fuel oil. This fluid can be thrown to a maximum
70
range of 25 to 30 yards. The duration of a continuous dis-
charge is from 10 to 12 seconds.
To operate the flame thrower, the operator First opens the
valve on the pressure tank. The valve on the left fuel tank
then is opened, and the gun is ready for firing. To fire, the
operator aims the gun at his target, and turns the fuel ejection
handle on the gun 90 degrees to the right. This simultaneously
ejects the fuel and ignites it when the igniting cartridge fires.
To shut off the fuel, the fuel ejection handle is returned to its
original position.
JAPANESE FLAME-THROWER TROOPS
It is known that flame-thrower companies exist in the Jap-
anese Army, and that Japanese infantry also have, used this
weapon. Division engineer regiments are equipped with from
six to a dozen.
Like other armies, the Japanese Army employs flame throw-
ers principally in assault operations against pillboxes and
similar fortifications.
The Japanese also use the flame thrower as an antitank
weapon. Experiments have convinced them that a flame-
thrower either can temporarily stop a tank and thus leave it
vulnerable to destruction by explosives, orif the weapon is
used to full effect against the air intakescan put the tank
and crew permanently out of commission.
71
NEW JAPANESE ARMY INSIGNIA
As the U. S. Pacific offensive draws closer to the Japanese
homeland, American soldiers may find on killed and captured
Japanese a new type of collar and sleeve insignia.
Before the war began, the Japanese were very security-con-
scious. Their Army planned to discard, in wartime, not only
insignia which would identify the number of the unit to which
a man belonged, but even insignia of rank and arm or service.
In practice this program proved a failure. Field commanders
not only ordered the retention of rank insignia, but even orig-
inated cloth badges of various types. These were inscribed
with the bearer's name, his unit, sometimes the name of his
commander, and even a symbol for his division.
After the Japs had been at war with {he British Empire and
the U. S. for two years, the Japanese High Command finally
decided to give official recognition to the demand for clear-
cut identification of rank and of command. It was announced
in October 1943 that a new type of insignia would go into
effect on 1 January 1944.
Most interesting is the institution of badges for officers
in command of units ranging from companies up through
general officer commands (or a field officer holding a com-
mand calling for a general). These badges are made of
aluminum, with silver leaves for company and field grade
commanders, and gold leaves for officers holding general
officer's commands. This is comparable to the U. S. practice
of painting rank insignia on the helmet. It should aid snipers
and other personnel in singling out Japanese unit commanders.
To make rank more obvious, insignia of rank is also to be
worn on the cuffs of officer's coats and overcoats. Insignia
of arm or service, hitherto worn only in action by military
police and medical units, will take the form of a narrow col-
ored strip beneath the usual collar insignia of rank. It is be-
lieved that this collar insignia will be somewhat larger than
the familiar patches now generally encountered.
Since shoulder rank insignia of a type in use for some
decades still are being encountered in all the Pacific and
Asiatic theaters, there is little likelihood of the new insignia
replacing the old overnight. In view of current Japanese sup-
ply headaches, a gradual replacement of present insignia is
more likely.
DON'T REMOVE INSIGNIA
When this new insignia appears, souvenir hunters must be
warned again against ripping insignia of rank from enemy
uniformsespecially from officer's uniforms. Insignia col-
lections and souvenirs for home are of no value when vital
combat intelligence is lost. Combat troops must learn to leave
all insignia on the uniforms of captured personnel so that in-
telligence officers can select, without difficulty, good pros-
pects for interrogation. If these intelligence officers can get
hold of the right Japs at the right time, they can learn urgently
needed facts about the enemy's strength, his troop dispositions,
his weapons, and the combat practice of his command. In-
formation of this type may enable a U. S. commander to turn
a possibly costly operation into a highly successful campaign.
7S
Jjritish jxaid
in T>
urma
Careful Planning and Rehearsal Pay Off
In the course of operations against the Japanese in Burma,
several small British patrols reported considerable Jap activity
in the vicinity of points X, Y, and Z (see map on page 75)
and the possible use of dry stream beds 1 and 2 as supply
routes toward point C, a deserted native village. The patrols
also reported that the Japs were constructing positions at
points X and Z.
As a result, it was decided to send a strong patrol consisting
of an company into the area, to gain further information about
the enemy supply routes and to kill as many Japs as possible.
The area between the No. 1 and No. 2 stream beds is cov-
ered with dense jungle vegetation. In places the ground rises
3,000 feet from the stream beds to a hill crest, along which
there is a foot path.
The company was to start from the vicinity of point A.
Each man would carry enough rations for eight days'. lh
e
march to point C was to be carried out silently and secretly,
and by day. Since any movement of a large body would at-
74
Route of a strong British patrol reconnoitering enemy supply
routes in Burma.
tract the attention of native spies, it was decided to move the
company in parties of six to four men. These parties were
dispatched at irregular intervals over a period of about four
hours. It was hoped that, with the company moving in this
manner, anyone seeing one or more of the parties would sup-
pose that they were merely small patrols.
The company left point A early in the morning. Each of
the small parties was well briefed before leaving. The destina-
tion for the first day was point B. The route ran through
fairly open terrain and across several hill features until it
entered the dry watercourse at point M. From this point it
followed the dry watercourse to point N, where it joined the
mule track leading to point P, and thence to point B. No mules
or other transport were used.
The second day's march, from point B to point C, was a
hard oneup steep hills most of the wayand took about 9
hours to complete. It was made in the same manner as the
previous day's march had beenby infiltration of small
parties. By 1600 the entire company had assembled at point
C. This was to be the company base during the execution of
the mission.
The actual camp site was about half a mile west of the
village. This site was in dense jungle and behind a hill. Sen-
tries were posted around the camp to observe and report any
enemy movement into the area.
These orders were issued:
1. No movement by anyone by day or night outside the camp
area.
2. Talking during the day to be limited to verbal orders. No
talking at night.
76
3. One hour before sunset, and thereafter, lights and smoking
to be forbidden.
4. Pits to be dug for all fires, and roofed over to disperse the
smoke.
No cooking pots or pans were carried. Each man cooked
his meals in his mess tin.
On the morning of the third day, three reconnaissance pa-
trols were sent out.
One patrol, consisting of an officer and an enlisted man, was
ordered to find out whether there were any Japs along the hill
north of stream bed No. 1. The patrol returned early in the
day, and reported that the hillside was very steep and covered
with dense vegetation, and that no Japs had been seen in the
area.
The second patrol, consisting of an officer and an enlisted
man, went down stream bed No. 2. They were ordered to go
as far as point Z, to reconnoiter a Jap position reported to be
there. Returning the same evening, the patrol reported no
Japs along stream bed No. 2. An unoccupied Jap position,
consisting of well constructed trenches and foxholes, had been
found at point Z.
A third patrol, consisting of two officers and three enlisted
men, was ordered to reconnoiter toward point X and was given
the following missions:
1. Find out whether it would be possible to make a two-platoon
frontal attack on the Jap position at point X.
2. Describe the Jap positions at point X. Are they surrounded
by wire or booby traps?
The instructions given to these patrols emphasized that they
were reconnaissance patrols intended for reconnaissance only,
and that they should be extremely careful to avoid getting in-
volved with the enemy.
Each man was equipped with a stabbing knife, a rifle, and
50 rounds of ammunition. Faces and hands were painted
jungle green. To ensure complete camouflage, leaves and
branches were sewn to the clothes and tied to the rifles. Each
man took his pay book, haversack, and a native hat with him.
Some native food was placed in each haversack. The idea was
that if it became necessary to fight a small Jap patrol or a Jap
sentry, the British would kill the Japs, leave the native equip-
ment, and move out of the area immediately. If other Japs
were to come across the native equipment, they probably would
not suspect the presence of British forces in the area.
The third patrol moved along the foot path to within a few,
hundred yards of the Jap positions at point X. The three en-
listed men were stationed in a well concealed position, and
the officers then moved south of point X to an ideal observation
post, from which they could watch Jap activity at a distance
of only 100 yards. One officer then went back for the three
men, and all five hid themselves at the observation post.
Suddenly they noticed a patrol of about 12 Japs approach-
ing in their direction, but moving along a course which would
pass the observation post about 100 yards further down the
hillside. Two Japs out on the flank were coming directly
toward them. When the Japs got within several yards, an en-
listed man became excited and, rising to his knees, quickly shot
one of the Japs at point-blank range. At once the officers shot
the other Jap. They then fired another round apiece, aiming
at the heads, to make sure that both Japs were dead. Leaving
the native equipment, the patrol left the observation post and
went around to the other side of the hill. The officers re-
turned to point C to report; the enlisted men went back to the
78
observation post to resume observation after the Japs had re-
moved their dead.
On the fourth day, orders were issued for an attack on the
Jap positions, and the day was devoted to preparatory man-
euvers.
On the fifth morning, the entire company moved out to
launch the attack. (The leaf and branch camouflage on uni-
forms and rifles, as well as the green paint on faces and hands,
was repeated. In addition, each man wore a green wool stock-
ing cap and sneakers.) Two platoons moved in a single file
down the trail to within 600 yards of the Jap positions. De-
ploying in the jungle, they adopted a two-platoon front at a
distance of 400 yards. They remained in this position during
the night, which passed uneventfully. The third platoon moved
down the No. 1 stream bed and spent the night at point Y.
Contact was made with the three enlisted men who were still
at their observation post and who now rejoined their platoons.
One of these men led a sergeant forward to the Jap sentry in
front of point X. The sentry was quietly killed with a knife
10 minutes before H-hour, which was to be 0630.
At 0630 the 2-inch mortars started firing, and the two
platoons advanced. Enemy resistance was overcome, except
for several machine guns firing from bunkers and occasional
firing from Japanese 4-inch mortars. By 0915 the third
platoon had reached a position 200 yards east of point X.
They had cut the Jap telephone wire, and had booby-trapped
the ends of the cut wire by attaching them to the partly pulled
pins of hand grenades concealed in the grass.
A party of Jap linesmen moved out to restore communica-
tions. It was wiped out by the third platoon. The enemy was
expected to counterattack, and did. A Jap platoon moved up
79
12 men abreast, almost shoulder to shoulder, and 12 more
men close behind them. Fire was opened on these Japs at a
range of 10 yards, and most of them were killed or wounded.
Also, 35 grenades were thrown at the enemy.
Another Jap platoon in the same formation was coming up
behind the first platoon, now almost entirely wiped out. Not
having seen what had happened to the first platoon, the second
platoon continued to advance. Unwillingly, however. Their
platoon commander was behind them, shouting commands in
Japanese and Urdu, and striking them on the back with his
sword. Suddenly the commander was shot by a British sniper
who had been posted in a tree and instructed to kill enemy
officers. Deprived of their leader, the Japs ran to take cover
in the jungle. Several of them were killed as they ran.
It had been arranged that operations would cease at 1400,
with everyone withdrawing to camp at point C. Therefore, all
the platoons returned to camp, leaving the bunkers still in ene-
my hands, but planting a generous number of booby traps be-
fore departing.
The two platoons which had made the frontal attack suf-
fered 16 casualtiesthree killed and 13 wounded. The third
platoon, which had done most of the fighting, returned with
nine men missing. The next day seven of these men returned
to the camp. They had spent the night near the enemy bunkers,
watching the Japs taking away their dead and wounded.
The Jap casualties were estimated at between 70 and 80.
The percentage of Japs killed was high.
80
Ordnance teams are saving lives by master-
minding the enemy's weapons. Careless treat-
ment of captured materiel may deprive the
U. S. of vital information.
ORDNANCE INTELLIGENCE TEAMS
UNCOVER TECHNICAL SECRETS
"One of the biggest difficulties that Ordnance Intelligence
Teams face is the continued refusal of combat units to recog-
nize the importance of technical information gained from a
study of enemy ordnance." The man who said this knew what
he was talking about. He is a lieutenant in charge of an Ord-
nance Technical Intelligence Team now operating in the Pa-
cific.
This officer's report emphasized an unfortunate condition
which has existed for a long time. Combat troops, preoccupied
with fighting or souvenir hunting, are unaware of the part cap-
tured enemy equipment plays in the progressive development
of our own weapons, and of its usefulness in enabling intelli-
gence officers to predict the probable widespread use of new
weapons by enemy troops.
This difficult master-minding is a job of the Army Service
Forces Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service Teams. These
teams include trained personnel from each technical service.
81
Specifically, where weapons are concerned, it is a job for
Ordnance Technical Intelligence, which must keep the army up
to date in this highly technical aspect of warfare.
Early in the war, the U. S. Army saw the necessity for im-
mediate first-hand technical observation, and in December
1942 the first Ordnance Intelligence Team, a handful of spe-
cially-trained officers and enlisted men, was dispatched to a
combat zone. Its mission was to procure enemy weapons and
ship them to the United States to be used in a continuous study
of the latest developments and trends in the enemy armament
industry and to rapidly develop counter weapons. Today
teams of trained technical observers work in every theater of
operations.
Many times these intelligence teams have landed with the
assault echelon of U. S. invasion, forces, often going in with
the first or second wave. Their work begins immediately, in-
asmuch as they must be on hand to gather enemy weapons as
they are captured and before the materiel has been needlessly
damaged or carted away by souvenir hunters. As soon as pos-
sible, a field headquarters is, established, and the investiga-
tion of captured weapons begins.
Because they are schooled in the intracacies of enemy wea-
pons, the personnel of Ordnance Intelligence Teams often have
turned captured weapons against the enemy. Such was the
case recently in France when Ordnance Intelligence men were;
able to "cannibalize" enough from captured German artillery
pieces to equip U. S. artillerymen with 50 German 105-mm
pieces.
American soldiers on the Western Front firing French shells from
a German mortar. This kind of improvisation with captured
weapons is made possible by the field research work of Ordnance
Technical Intelligence men.
82
Ordnance Technical Intelligence men reconditioning captured
German 105-mm howitzers. Over 25,000 German shells were
fired back at the enemy with captured guns of this type during
initial operations against the Siegfried Line.
The first concern of the intelligence teams is to get posses-
sion of those captured enemy weapons that are of no imme-
diate value to the combat units. These weapons are inspected,
a preliminary report is written, and the guns are then shipped
to a rear-area proving ground operated by the theater ordnance
officer. Here the guns, and other captured equipment, are put
through field tests to determine any new tactical information
American artillerymen fire a captured Pak 43 at the retreating
German army in the area around Metz, France. Ordnance Intelli-
gence Teams often are able to repair weapons damaged by a
retreating enemy and turn the guns against the former owners.
that will fee of immediate value to the troops operating in that
theater. If a gun under test shows no new characteristics, it
may be sent to a theater training area where replacement
troops use it in pre-combat instruction. Should it be a weapon
worth further intelligence analysis, it is shipped immediately
to the U. S.
Contrary to a recent G. I. rumor that captured weapons are
:u
sold at War Bond rallies, test-worthy captured guns, tanks,
ammunition, and vehicles procured by Ordnance Intelligence
Teams are sent from every theater to the Ordnance Research
and Development Center at Aberdeen, Maryland. Here they
are started on a routine of tactical and technical analysis de-
signed to discover every item of information which may be of
value to our own troops and to our munitions program. The
general performance of the equipment is studied, and a report
of the tests is issued to all interested agencies. Often the equip-
ment is broken down, and component parts are shipped to
various laboratories, arsenals, and industries throughout the
country, where they may be studied and tested by highly trained
metallurgists, engineers, and other specialists. The results of
these fine-tooth inspections are submitted to the development
engineers concerned with the design of similar equipment for
the U. S. Army.
Such analysis of enemy equipment has disclosed a wealth
of information of value in the development of U. S. weapons
a fact which perhaps is not generally known. For years the
enemy prepared for war, and consequently was well advanced
in the development of new weapons and the improvement of
the design and manufacturing technique of old equipment.
In only a very few instances has the enemy introduced a new
type of weapon unknown to American designers. However,
there have been occasions when the discovery of a hitherto
unused manufacturing technique in some piece of German
equipment has proved the reliability of a similar, but untested,
American idea. Such a circumstance often has enabled U. S.
engineers to make short-cuts between the designing and pro-
duction of a new or improved weapon.
In addition to disclosing the plausibility of new manufac-
turing techniques, the analysis of captured equipment often
has revealed new and improved design in the minor compo-
86
nents of a weapon. U. S. engineers are quick to adopt such
changes in improving our own equipment. More than 50 de-
sign features in U. S. ordnance materiel have been adapted
from similar German and Japanese equipment captured by
U. S. soldiers and turned in to technical intelligence men.
Because the enemy continually is developing new equipment
designs and modifications to counter our weapons and to com-
pensate for production lost in bombed-out industry, it becomes
increasingly important for technical intelligence men in the
field to procure samples of newly-captured equipment. The
gun which, to an infantryman, appears to be a standard job
the Japs or Jerries have been using all along may actually
be an old design produced under new specifications, and per-
haps with an important modification.
Yet a standard answer encountered by Ordnance Intelligence
officers, when requesting that a certain item of enemy ordnance
be turned over to them by combat troops, is: "What does the
Ordnance Department want with that? It's listed in our own
Enemy Weapons Handbook!"
87
INDEX
1
Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. Ill, Nos. 1-6
AACHEN, Germany, streetfighting, 6:20.
ADMIRALTY ISLANDS:
Japanese minefields, 4:8-9.
Japanese tactics, 3:21-27.
AIRBORNE RAIDING PARTIES, Japanese,
6:54-56.
AMBUSH TACTICS:
British, 2:85; 3:5-8.
Japanese, 3:1-4; 6:46-48.
Japanese reaction to British ambush,
3:5-8.
AMMUNITION:
German:
Hollow-charge shells, 3:71.
Smokeless powder, 2:2.
105-mm, U.S. use, 6:22.
Japanese:
Artillery, 75-mm, 1:71-72, 73.
Explosive and incendiary, illus., 5:
32-34.
105-mm, illus., 3:53-57.
AMPHIBIOUS FORCES, Japanese plans to
defend Eniwetok Atoll, 1:1-28.
AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLES:
German car, illus., 4:59-62.
Japanese:
Landing craft, illus., 1:58-60.
Tanks, illus., 1:66-67.
ANTIAIRCRAFT MEASURES:
German:
AA guns:
20-mm Flak 38, illus., 3:65.
88-mm Flak 18, 36, 37, 41, illus.,
3:66-68.
Flakpanzer, AA guns on tank
chassis, illus., 6:42-43.
Home guard, Heimatflak, 1:89-90.
Japanese:
AA guns:
13-mm machine gun, Model 93
(1933) dual-purpose, illus., 2:
56-57.
20-mm machine cannon, Model 98
(1938) dual-purpose, illus., 2:
59, 60
75-mm, Model 88 (1928), illus.,
2:47-48.
Ammunition for 105-mm M14 AA
gun, 3:54.
Snipers firing at planes, 1:52-53.
ANTITANK MEASURES (see also MINES):
German:
AA guns used as AT guns, illus.,
3:65-68.
Assault guns, illus., 3:70, 72, 73;
4:63-74.
AT guns:
28/20-mm S.Pz.B. 41, tapered-
bore, illus., 3:59,60,61,62.
37-mm Pak, illus., 3:58, 59, 61.
42/28-mm Pak 41, tapered-bore,
illus., 3:61, 62, 63.
47-mm Model 1937 (f), illus.,
3:62,63,64.
50-mm Pak 38, illus., 3:58, 59.
75-mm Pak 40, illus., 3:58, 59.
75-mm Pak 97/38, 3:64.
75/55-mm Pak 41, tapered-bore,
illus., 3:62, 63.
7.62-cm Pak 36 (r), illus., 3:63,
64.
88-mm Pak 43 and its carriages,
illus., 5:52-58.
1
The numerals in bold-face type denote the Bulletin number; the numerals which follow denote
page numbers.
88
88-mm Pak 43/41, 3:59-60; 5:52,
54.
AT rifles, illus., 3:73-74.
Bazooka and grenade - discharger
squads, 6:13-14.
Close combat, 2=26-28; 3:72-79.
Glossary of weapon terms, 3:59-64.
Hollow-charge ammunition, 3:71.
Rocket weapons, illus., 3:74-79.
Stick bombs, 3:72.
Tactics, 6:10-18.
Tank destroyers, illus., 3:68-71;
4:63-74; 5:52,54, 55-56.
Japanese:
Assault teams, 5:12-16.
AT gun position in Burma, illus.,
1:42-47.
AT guns:
20-mm, Model 97 (1937) rifle,
illus., 2:58-60.
37-mm, Model 94 (1934), illus.,
2:57-58.
47-mm Model 1 (1941), illus.,
2:61.
Close-combat, 1:72, 74.
Remote-control mines, 6:65-67.
New Zealand methods offighting Ger-
man Tiger tank, 5:59-63.
Soviet:
Close combat, 2:25-28.
Methods of attacking Pz.Kpfw.VI,
2:25-28.
ARMORED CAR mounting flame thrower,
German, illus., 3:86-88.
ARMORED FORCES. See TANKS.
ARTILLERY. See ANTIAIRCRAFT MEA-
SURES; ANTITANK MEASURES; AS-
SAULT ARTILLERY; FIELD ARTIL-
LERY; FIELD GUNS; HOWITZERS;
MOUNTAIN WEAPONS.
ASSAULT ARTILLERY, German:
Employment, illus., 4:63-74.
75-mm Stu. G., illus., 4:65.
75-mm Stu. G. 40, illus., 3:70, 72, 73;
illus., 4:64-65.
88-mm, Model 43 and its carriages,
4:63, 65; 5:52-58.
Tank destroyers, illus., 3:68-71; 4:63-
74; 5:52, 54, 55-56.
ASSAULT DETACHMENT raid on U. S. out-
post, German, 6:37-39.
ASSAULT SQUADS, engineer, German,
3:95-98.
ASSAULT TEAMS, AT, Japanese, 5:12-16.
AUXILIARY TROOPS, German, 1:80-90; 6:
31-36.
BAMBOO TRAPS, or panjis, 2:88-92; 3:7.
BARGE-UNLOADING POINTS, Japanese^
concealment, illus., 3:17-20.
BARGES, Japanese, illus., 1:58-60.
BAZOOKAS, German, 6:13-14.
BEACH DEFENSES. See COASTAL DE-
FENSES.
BIAK, Japanese cave defenses, illus.,
3:28-37.
BICYCLE COMPANY, German, 6:3,6.
BOMBS:
German, stick, AT, 3:72.
Japanese, aircraft bombs used as
mines, 6:60-62.
BOOBY TRAPS:
German, 2:4-6; 6:24-29.
Japanese, 1:71; 4:24.
BOUGAINVILLE, Japanese defenses on
Cape Torokina, 2:69-72.
BURIAL CEREMONIES, Japanese, 5:5-6.
BUNKERS, Japanese, illus., 2:69-72.
BURMA :
British Indian patrols, 2:83-87.
British operations:
Ambushes, 3:5-8.
Raid, 6:74-80.
Japanese operations:
Ambushes, 3:1-4.
AT gun position, illus., 1:42-47.
Defense of a hill, 3:51-52.
Defense positions, illus., 4:27-30.
Diversionary tactics, 6:44-56.
Mines, AT, used in Arakan, illus.,
1:34-41.
89
Orders of colonel on the eve of
battle, 1:68-69.
CAMOUFLAGE AND CONCEALMENT, Jap-
anese:
AT gun position, illus., 1:42-46.
Barge-unloading points, illus., 3:17-20.
Sniper training, 1:54.
CAPTURED EQUIPMENT; intelligence use,
6:81-87.
CARBINES:
German, machine, M.P. 43, illus.,
1:91-92.
Japanese, 6.5-mm Model 38 (1905);
with grenade launcher Model 100,
illus., 4:31-34.
CAVE DEFENSES on Biak, Japanese, illus.,
3:29-31.
CHEMICAL WARFARE See FLAME THROW-
ERS ; ROCKET AND ROCKET WEAPONS ;
SMOKE.
COASTAL DEFENSES, Japanese:
Beach cave defenses on Biak, illus.,
3:29-31.
Cape Torokina, Bougainville, illus.,
2:69-72.
Eniwetok Atoll, defense plans, illus.,
1:1-28.
Obstacles, beach, 1:26-28.
Obstacles, offshore, illus., 3:38-43.
COMMUNICATIONS; German:
Machine pistols used for target
designation, 3:93.
Pigeon service, 6:21-22.
Very light signals, 2:17-18.
DECEPTIONS, German, 5:72-75.
DEFENSE PLANS (see also TACTICS),
Japanese, for Eniwetok Atoll, illus.,
1:1-28.
DEFENSE POSITIONS:
German, forward, 2:12-18.
Japanese, 1:12-13, 16-20, 23, 25; 3:28-
37; 4:20-21, 27-30.
DEMOLITIONS, U. S. means of destroying
German pillboxes, 5:43-44; 6:23-23.
DIVERSIONARY UNITS, Japanese, 3:45-47;
6:44-56.
DUMMY TANKS, German, illus., 4:75-77.
"ELEPHANT", 88-mm self-propelled gun,
German, 4: 65; 5:52-54.
EMPLACEMENTS, Japanese, AT, in Burma,
illus., 1:42-47.
ENGINEERS (see also BOOBY TRAPS; DE-
MOLITIONS; FLAME THROWERS;
FORTIFICATIONS; MINEFIELDS;
MI NES ; OBSTACLES ; Organization
Todt):
German, assault squad for attacking
positions, 3:95-98.
Japanese regiment, 4:37-38.
ENIWETOK ATOLL, Japanese defense
plans, 1:1-28.
FIELD ARTILLERY (see also ASSAULT
ARTILLERY; FIELD GUNS; HOWITZERS;
MOUNTAIN WEAPONS) :
German, tactics, 2:2-3, 9-10.
Japanese:
Fire control, 4:48-50.
Support of infantry, 4:46-47; 5:25-
26.
Weapons, development, illus., 2:45-
63.
FIELD GUNS; Japanese:
75-mm ammunition, 1:71-72, 73.
75-mm, Model 38 (1905), 2:45.
75-mm, Model 38 (1905), improved,
illus., 2: 51.
75-mm, Model 41 (1908), mountain
(infantry), illus., 2:45-46.
75-mm, Model 90 (1930), illus., 2:52-
53.
75-mm, Model 95 (1935), illus., 2:50,
54.
105-mm ammunition, 3:53-57.
105-mm, Mqdel 92 (1932), illus., 2:49,
53-54; 3:53-57.
105-mm, Model 89 (1929), 2:48,52.
FIRE POWER, German use, 4:46-52.
FLAME THROWERS:
German:
Emplaced or Fougasse, illus., 3:79-
85.
Hand, Model 41 and 42, 1:92-93.
90
Mounted on half-track personnel
carrier, illus., 3:86-88.
Japanese, portable, Models 93 and
100,6:68-71.
FORTIFICATIONS (see also DEFENSIVE
POSITIONS ), Japanese :
Bunkers, illus., 2:69-72.
Cave defenses, illus., 3:28-37.
Defense position in Burma, illus., 4:27-
30.
Grenade walls and well, illus., 4:27-30.
Pillboxes, illus., 1:19-20.
FORTRESS BATTALIONS, German, 6:1-9.
FRANCE, German operations in:
Mine usage, 2:29-30.
Tactics, 2:1-6.
FUZES, Japanese:
Model 3, land mine, illus., 4:2-4.
Model 88 for 105-mm and 150-mm guns
and howitzers, illus., 3:57.
GRENADE DISCHARGERS, Japanese:
Model 89 (1929), 50-mm, illus., 2:61-
63.
Model 100, new type, illus., 4:31-34.
GRENADES:
German, used in booby traps, 2:4-5.
Japanese:
Model 99 (b) (1939), illus., 4:35-
39.
Smoke, 50-mm, illus., 5:34-35.
Used with a number tied together,
4:20.
GUAM, U. S. patrols, 5:76-84.
GUARDS, urban and rural, German, 1:90.
GUNS. See ANTIAIRCRAFT MEASURES;
ANTITANK MEASURES ; AS S AUL T
ARTILLERY; FIELD GUNS; HOWIT-
ZERS; MACHINE GUNS; MOUNTAIN
WEAPONS ; RIFLES ; SUBMACHINE
CUNS.
H A L F - T R A C K PERSONNEL CARRIERS
mounting flame throwers, German,
illus., 3:86-88.
HILLY TERRAIN COMBAT, German, 3:92.
HOLLOW-CHARGE WEAPONS, German:
Ammunition, 3:71.
Panzerfaust, illus., 3:75-78.
Panzerwurfmine, illus., 3:78, 79.
Stick bombs, AT, 3:72.
HOWITZERS, Japanese:
70-mm, Model 92 (1932), illus., 2:63-
64.
105-mm, Model 91 (1931), illus., 2:
50, 53; 3:53-57.
150-mm, Model 4 (1915), illus., 2:
49, 54.
150-mm, Model 96 (1936), illus., 2:
52, 54.
IMPERIAL RESCRIPT, Japanese, 5:28-31.
INFANTRY (see also JUNGLE WARFARE;
PATROLS AND PATROLLING: SNIPERS,
STREET FIGHTING) :
German:
Artillery support, 4:46-47.
Bicycle Company, 6:3,6.
Fortress Battalions, 6:1-9.
German comments on their methods,
4:43-45.
Tank-infantry tactics, 2:23; 4:56-
58; 6:21.
United States:
Attacking pillboxes in the Siegfried
Line, 5:38-48; 6:22-23.
German estimate, 4:40-43; 5:49-50.
Patrolling on Guam, 5:76-84.
INFANTRY SUPPORT WEAPONS, German^
2:15-16.
INFANTRY WEAPONS, Japanese:
37-mm AT gun, Model 94 (1934),
illus., 2:57-58.
75-mm Model 41 (1908), mountain
gun, illus., 2:45-46, 72.
INSIGNIA :
German auxiliary troops, 1:81, 82, 84,
85, 87, 88, 90.
Japanese, 6:72-73.
ISLAND DEFENSES, Japanese plans to de-
fend Eniwetok Atoll, illus., 1:1-28.
91
ITALY, German operations in:
Mine usage, 2:37-40.
Patrol methods, 2:7-11.
Withdrawal tactics, 3:89-93.
JAGDPANTHER, German tank destroyer,
illus., 3:70,71.
JAPANESE SOLDIERS' CHARACTERISTICS, 1:
29-33, 74; 3:5-8, 24-25; 4:22-23;
5:1-11.
JUNGLE TRAPS, or panjis, 2:88-92; 3:7.
JUNGLE WARFARE:
British:
Ambushes, 3:5-8.
Raid in Burma, 6:74-80.
British Indian patrols in the Arakan,
2:83-87.
Japanese:
Ambushes, 3:1-4.
Characteristics of soliders fighting
in jungle, 1:29-33.
Diversionary tactics, 6:44-56.
Weapons suitable for, 2:62, 65, 67,
68.
Japanese appraisal of U. S. tactics,
3:11-14.
LABOR SERVICES, German, 1:80-85.
LANDING CRAFT, Japanese, illus., 1:58-
60.
LEYTE ISLAND, Japanese use of mines
and booby traps, 4:1-6; 6:60-64.
Los NEGROS ISLAND. See ADMIRALTY
ISLANDS.
MACHINE CANNON, Japanese 20-mm,
Model 98 (1938), illus., 2:59, 60.
MACHINE CARBINE, M.P. 43 German,
illus., 1:91-92.
MACHINE GUNS:
German:
Firing by remote control, illus., 4:
78-80.
Fortress machine-gun battalion, 6:
1-9.
Tactics, 2: 1; 3:91-92, 94-95.
Japanese:
Employment, 4:23-24.
Snipers in machine-gun squads, 1:
53-54.
6.5-mm, Model 3 (1914), heavy,
illus., 2:55, 56.
6.5-mm, Model 11 (1922), light,
illus., 2:47.
6.5-mm, Model 96 (1936), light,
illus., 2:58-59.
7.7-mm, Model 92 (1932), heavy,
illus., 2:55, 56.
7.7-mm, Model 99 (1939), light, 2:
60.
13-mm, Model 93 (1933), heavy,
dual-purpose, illus., 2:56-57.
MACHINE PISTOLS. See SUBMACHINE
GUNS.
MEDICAL TREATMENT, Japanese, 5:9.
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE:
Japanese and Germans acquire inform-
ation through U. S. security negli-
gence, 5:85-87.
U. S. Ordnance Intelligence Teams,
6:81-87.
MINEFIELD CLEARANCE, Japanese use of
human detectors, 4:19.
MINEFIELDS :
German: '
Booby-trapped, 2:6.
Markings, 6:39-41.
Mine laying, 2:35, 37-40.
Ruses, 3:90.
Surrounding defense positions, 2:
14-15.
Japanese:
Beach, 5:36-37.
Mine laying, illus., 1:35-39.
Patterns, illus., 1:40-41.
Tactics in the Southwest Pacific, 4:
7-15.
MINES :
German:
Antilifting devices, illus., 2:38-40;
6:28-29.
Concrete ball, illus., 1:75-76.
"Mustard Pot" antipersonnel, illus.,
2:30, 36-37.
92
Riegelmine 43 (R.Mi 43, or Spreng-
riegel 43), illus., 2:30-36.
Scharniermine (pivot mine), AT,
illus., 2:26.
Schii-mine 42, illus., 1:76-79.
S-mines, 2:38-40; 3:98; 4:53-55;
6:28.
S-mine discharger on Tiger tanks,
2:21.
Tellermines, 2:29, 39-40; 6:26-29.
Trends in usage in Italy, 2:37-40.
Types used in France, 2:29-30.
Use in booby traps, 6:24-29.
Japanese:
Antiboat, hemisphere, 5:36-37; 6:
64.
Antitank or antivehicle mines, illus.,
1:34-41.
Beach, 5:36-37.
Bomb, aircraft, 6:60-62.
Box, improvised, 6:64-64.
Coconut, 6:62-63.
"Flying pig", 3:50-51.
Leyte, use on, 6:60-64.
Model 93 pressure-fuze, antitank,
illus., 1:34-41.
Pottery, Model 3, illus., 4:1-6; 5:16.
Remote-control, AT, 6:65-67.
Waterproofed, 5:16.
MOLOTOV COCKTAILS used as booby
traps, German, 6:27.
MORALE BUILDING EFFORTS, Japanese,
1:68-69,74; 5:28-31.
MORALE, German, 6:20, 22.
MORTARS, Japanese:
50-mm, Model 98 (1938)
1
, illus., 2:67.
81-mm, Model 97 (1937), illus., 2:65,
66,67.
81-mm, Model 99 (1939), illus., 2:66,
67.
90-mm, Model 94 (1934), illus., 2:64,
65.
90-mm, Model 97 (1937), 2:66.
150-mm, Model 93 (1933), 2:64.
150-mm, Model 97 (1937), 6:57-59.
Uses, 1:29-31,33.
MOTOR CORPS, NAZI, 1:85-86.
MOUNTAIN WEAPONS, Japanese:
75-mm gun, Model 41 (1908)] illus.,
2:45-46, 72.
75-mm gun, Model 94 (1934), illus.,
2:51,54.
NAZI AUXILIARY ORGANIZATIONS, 1:80-
90; 6:31-36.
NEW BRITAIN, Japanese minefields at
Cape Hoskins, illus., 4:9-11.
NEW GEORGIA ISLAND, Japanese ground
tactics, 3:49-50.
NIGHT OPERATIONS:
German, tank-infantry attacks, 6:21.
Japanese attack tactics, 3:48-49, 50;
5:23-25.
NOEMFOOR ISLAND, Japanese minefields,
4:11-12.
OBSTACLES (see also MINEFIELDS;
MINES)]
Japanese:
Beach, 1:26-28.
Offshore, illus., 3:38-44.
Underwater, 1:27-28.
Panjis or bamboo-spike jungle traps,
illus., 2: 88-92; 3:7.
ORDERS, Japanese:
Island defense, 1:10-12, 14-15, 19-20.
On eve of battle, in Burma, 1:68-69.
ORDNANCE, Japanese (see also INDIVIDUAL
WEAPONS)
Improvised weapons, illus., 1:69-70.
Weapons, general review, illus., 2:41-
68.
ORDNANCE INTELLIGENCE, U.S., 6:81-87.
ORGANIZATION :
German:
Fortress battalions, 6:1-9.
Volkssturm, 6:31-36.
Japanese diversionary units, 3:44-45;
6:44-56.
ORGANIZATION TODT, or (OT), 1:83-
84.
93
PANJIS, or jungle traps, 2:88; 3:7.
PATROLS AND PATROLLING :
British Indian in Arakan area, Burma,
2:83-86.
British raid in Burma, 6:74-80.
German, 1:93; 2:7-11; 3:89-90.
U. S. on Guam, 5:76-84.
PERSONNEL CARRIERS, German, mounting
flame throwers, illus., 3:86-88.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Japanese opera-
tions:
Diversionary Unit tactics, 6:44-56.
Mines and booby traps on Leyte, 4:1-
6; 6:60-64.
PIGEON SERVICE, German, 6:21-22.
PILLBOXES :
German, illus., 5:38-48.
German assault squad attacks, 3:95-98.
Japanese, illus., 1:19-20.
U. S. attacks on German pillboxes,
illus., 5:38-48; 6:22-23.
POLICE, German, 1:86, 88, 90.
POSITIONS (see also DEFENSIVE POSI-
TIONS) :
Japanese:
AT, in Burma, illus., 1:42-47.
Cave defenses on Biak, illus., 3:28-
37.
United States, Japanese estimate, 3:14-
16.
PROTECTIVE MEASURES against shellfire,
4:77-78.
QUARTERMASTER (see also RATIONS, UNI-
FORMS) ; German quarters and
dumps, 1:93-94.
RAIDS:
British, in Burma, 6:74-80.
German, on U. S. outpost, 6:37-39.
RAIDING PARTIES, Japanese, 6:52-54.
RATIONS, Japanese, illus., 2:73-82; 5:34.
RECONNAISSANCE:
British Indian patrols in Burma, 2:83-
84.
German patrols, 2:7, 8.
Japanese, direction signs used, 4:38-
39.
U. S. patrols on Guam, 5:78-79.
"RHINOCEROS", 88-mm self-propelled
gun, German, illus., 3:68, 70; 5:52-
54.
RIFLES:
German, antitank, illus., 3:73-74.
Japanese:
6.5-mm Model 30 (1897), 2:43.
6.5-mm Model 38 (1905), illus.,
1:49; 2:43-44; 4:31-34.
6.5-mm Model 97 (1937), snipers,
1:49; 2:44.
7.7-mm, Model 99 (1939), illus.,
2:60; 4:31-34.
11-mm Model 13 (1880), Murata,
2:43.
11-mm Model 22, 2:43.
20-mm, Model 97 (1937), AT, illus.,
2:58,60.
ROCKETS AND ROCKET WEAPONS, Ger-
man:
Ofenrohr (stovepipe), illus., 3:74, 75.
Panzerfaust (Faustpatrone) weapons,
illus., 3:75-79.
Pilppchen (Dolly), illus., 3:75, 76.
RUSES:
German, 1:93; 2:1-6, 9-11; 3:90, 93;
5:72-75.
Japanese, 1:29-33; 3:25-26; 4:16-19,
21.
SCHOUTEN ISLANDS, Japanese cave de-
fenses on Biak, illus., 3:28-37.
SECURITY, U. S. neglect, 5:85-87; 6:22.
SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY See ASSAULT
ARTILLERY.
SIEGFRIED LI NE, pillbox warfare, illus.,
5:38-48.
SIGNALS AND SIGNAL CORPS See COM-
MUNICATIONS.
SIGNS, direction, Japanese, 4:38-39.
94
SMOKE, 50-mm grenade, Japanese, illus.,
5:34-35.
SMOKELESS POWDER, German use, 2:2.
SNIPERS:
German, 2:2; 4:48.
Japanese, 1:48-57; 4:16, 21.
SNIPER'S RIFLES, Japanese, illus., 1:49;
2:44.
SS TROOPS, German, 1:88-89.
STICK BOMBS, AT, German, 3:72.
STREET FIGHTING, German, and U. S., 6:
20.
SUBMACHINE GUNS, German:
Fire power, 4:47-48.
M. P. 44,6:6.
TACTICS :
British, ambush, 3:5-8.
German:
Attacks, 5:50-51.
Counterattacks, 2:17.
Defense 5:51.
Fighting in wooded and broken ter-
rain, illus., 5:64-71.
Fortress Battalion, 6:1-9.
Hilly terrain combat, 3:92.
Patrol, 2:7-11; 3:89-90.
Raid on U. S. outpost, 6:37-39.
Tactics against infantry-with-tanks,
6:41-42.
U. S. enlisted men report on methods
used in France, 2:1-6.
Withdrawal, in Italy, 3:89-93.
German comment on Allied and Ger-
man methods, 4:40-45.
Japanese:
Advance guard, illus., 5:19-21.
Ambush, 3:1-4.
AT gun positions in Burma, tactical
employment, 1:46-47.
Attack, 5:21-25.
Combat, 5:17-27.
Counterattack, 3:23-24, 50.
Defense, 5:26-27.
Diversionary, 3:45-47; 6:44-56.
Fire support 5:25-26.
Individual soldier, 1:29-33.
Infiltration, 3:21-22, 45.
Last-ditch fight, 3:26-27.
New Georgia Island, 3:49-50.
Night attacks, 3:48-49, 50.
Offensive doctrine, 4:25-26.
United States:
Attacking pillboxes in the Siegfried
Line, 5:38-48; 6:22-23.
German estimate, 5:49-51.
Japanese appraisal, 3:9-16.
TANK DESTROYERS See ANTITANK
MEASURES, ASSAULT ARTILLERY.
TANKS:
German:
Armament, 2:19,20.
Armor shirting, 2:21.
Dummy, illus., 4:75-77.
Employment, 2:23: 4:50-51; 5:59-
63.
Flakpanzer, AA guns on tank chas-
sis, illus., 6:42-43.
Infantry-tank tactics; 2:23: 4:56-
58; 6:21.
Non-magnetic coating on armor,
2:21.
Pz.Kpfw.IV, 2:19-22.
Pz. Kpfw. V, Panther, 2:19-20, 22.
Pz. Kpfw. VI, Tiger, 2:19-21, 25-28;
5:59-63.
Royal Tiger (Konigstiger), illus., 5:
52, 54, 56, 58.
Training principles, 2:22.
Trends, 2:19-22.
Japanese, amphibious, illus., 1:66-67.
TAPERED-BORE GUNS, German, 3:59-63.
TARGET DESIGNATION, German, 3:93.
TOWNS, FIGHTING IN See STREET FIGHT-
ING.
TRAINING, Japanese, sniper, 1:48-57.
UNIFORMS:
British and Indian, jungle, 2:84.
German auxiliary troops, illus., 1:82,
84, 87, 88, 90.
Japanese, tropical, illus., 1:61-65.
95
VERY LIGHT SIGNALS, German 2:17-18. WIRE OBSTACLES:
VOLKSSTURM, German national militia,
German, surrounding defense posi
6:31-36.
tions, 2:13, 14-15.
WAFFEN-SS, Nazi Elite Guard, 1:88-89.
Japanese, illus., 3:39, 41.
WEAPONS (see also ORDNANCE and indi- WOODED TERRAIN, German method of
vidual weapons), Japanese, general fighting in, 5:64-71.
review, illus., 2:41-68.
DISTRIBUTEON:
AAF ( 30) ; AGF ( 30) ; ASF ( 2 ) ; T of Opns (200) except NATO
( 5000) , ETO ( 11, 500) ; Base Comd ( 1 0 ) ; Island Comd ( 10) ; Depts
(10) ; Arm & Sv Bd (2) ; Def Comd (10) ; Tech Sv (10) ; SvC (10);
Area A SvC (10) ; HD (10) ; PC&S (1) ; Seattle PE ( 200) ; Repl Dep
(65) ; Gen & Sp Sv Sch (100) ; USMA (100) ; ROTC ( 3) ; UTC (30);
RTC ( 1 5 0 ) ; Or d Di s t (10) ; A (10) ; CHQ ( 10) ; D (2) ; B ( 2) ; R (2);
S Bn (2) ; C (2) ; AF (2) ; W ( 2 ) ; G (2) ; S (2) ; F ( 2) .