Soller v.

Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 144261-62
May 9, 2001
Gonzaga-Reyes, J.:
Facts:
In the evening of March 14, 1997, Jerry Macabael a municipal guard, was
shot and illed along the national highway at !ansud, "riental Mindoro while
driving a motorcycle together with petitioner #ollers son, $incent M% #oller% &is
body was brought to a medical clinic located in the house of petitioner 'r% (rudente
#oller, the Municipal Mayor, and his wife 'r% (reciosa #oller, who is the Municipal
&ealth "fficer% )he incident was reported to and investigated by petitioner #("4
Mario Matining% *n autopsy was conducted on the same night on the cadaver of
Jerry by petitioner 'r% (reciosa #oller with the assistance of petitioner +odolfo
#alcedo, #anitary Inspector, and petitioner Josefina Morada, +ural &ealth Midwife%
"n the basis of the foregoing incident, a complaint was later filed against
the petitioners by the widow of Jerry Macabael with the "ffice of the "mbudsman
charging them with conspiracy to mislead the investigation of the fatal shootout of
Jerry Macabael by ,a- altering his wound ,b- concealing his brain. ,c- falsely stating
in police report that he had several gunshot wounds when in truth he had only one.
and d- falsely stating in an autopsy report that there was no blacening around his
wound when in truth there was%
)he "ffice of the "mbudsman recommended the filing of an Information
for "bstruction of Justice ,$iolation of (%'% 1/09-, and two ,0- Informations 10 were
filed with the #andiganbayan which were doceted as 2riminal 2ases Nos% 03301
and 03300%
Issue:
4hether or not #andiganbayan acted without or in e5cess of 6urisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac of 6urisdiction in holding that it has
6urisdiction over the offense charged in sub6ect criminal cases nos% 03301 and 03300
Held:
7es% )he rule is that in order to ascertain whether a court has 6urisdiction or
not, the provisions of the law should be in8uired into% 9urthermore, the 6urisdiction
of the court must appear clearly from the statute law or it will not be &eld to e5ist% It
cannot be presumed or implied% 9or this purpose in criminal cases, the 6urisdiction of
the court is determined by the law at the time of the commencement of the action%
In Binay v. Sandiganbayan, this 2ourt held that the Municipal Mayor, who
occupies #alary :rade 07 in the hierarchy of positions in the government under
+epublic *ct No% ;73/ and the Inde5 of "ccupational #ervices% (osition )itles and
#alary :rades, falls within the e5clusive original 6urisdiction of the #andiganbayan%
)he bone of contention here is whether the offenses charged may be
considered as committed in relation to their office as this phrase is employed in the
above<8uoted #ection 4%
*s early as Montilla v. Hilario, this 2ourt has interpreted the re8uirement
that an offense be committed in relation to the office to mean that the offense cannot
e5ist without the office or that the office must be a constituent element of the crime
as defined and punished in 2hapter )wo to #i5, )itle #even of the +evised (enal
2ode ,referring to the crimes committed by the public officers-% People v. Montejo
enunciated the principle that the offense must be intimately connected with the office
of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance, though improper or
irregular of his official functions% )he 2ourt, speaing through 2hief Justice
2oncepcion said that although public office is not an element of the crime of murder
in ,the- abstract, the 9acts in a particular case may show that <555 the offense therein
charged is intimately connected with ,the accuseds- respective offices and was
perpetrated while they were in the performance though improper or irregular, of their
official functions% Indeed ,the accused- had no personal motive to commit the crime
and they would not have committed it had they not &eld their aforesaid offices% )he
co<defendants of respondent =eroy #% !rown obeyed his instructions because he was
their superior officer, as Mayor of !asilan 2ity%
)he case of Republi v. !sunion categorically pronounced that the fact that
offense was committed in relation to the office must be alleged in the information>
)hat the public officers or employees committed the crime in relation to their office,
must, however, be alleged in the information for the #andiganbayan to have
6urisdiction over a case under #ection 4 ,a- ,0-% )his allegation is necessary because
of the unbending rule that 6urisdiction is determined by the allegations of the
information%
9or this purpose what is controlling is not whether the phrase committed in
violation to public office appears in the information. what determines the 6urisdiction
of the #andiganbayan is the specific factual allegation in the information that would
1
indicate close intimacy between the discharge of the accuseds official duties and the
commission of the offense charged in order to 8ualify the crime as having been
committed in relation to public office%
In this case, the Informations sub6ect of 2riminal 2ases Nos% 03301 and
03300 8uoted earlier, fail to allege that petitioners had committed the offenses
charged in relation to their offices% Neither are there specific allegations of 9acts to
show the intimate relation?connection between the commission of the offense
charged and the discharge of official functions of the offenders, i%e% that the
obstruction of and apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders was
committed in relation to the office of petitioner (rudente #oller, whose office as
Mayor is included in the enumeration in #ection 4 ,a- of (%'% 1;@; as amended%
*lthough the petitioners were described as being all public officers, then being the
Municipal Mayor, Municipal &ealth "fficer, #(" II, (" I, #anitary Inspector and
Midwife, there was no allegation that the offense of altering and suppressing the
gunshot wound of the victim with intent to impair the veracity, authenticity and
availability as evidence in the investigation of the criminal case for murder ,2riminal
2ase No% 03301- or of giving false and fabricated information in the autopsy report
and police report to mislead the law enforcement agency and prevent the
apprehension of the offender ,2riminal 2ase No% 03300- was done in the
performance of official function% Indeed the offenses defined in (%'% 1/09 may be
committed by any person whether a public officer or a private citiAen, and
accordingly public office is not an element of the offense% Moreover, the Information
in 2riminal 2ase No% 03300 states that the fabrication of information in the police
and autopsy report would indicate that the victim was shot by $incent #oller, the son
of herein petitioners spouses (rudente and (reciosa #oller% )hus there is a categorical
indication that the petitioners spouses #oller had a personal motive to commit the
offenses and they would have committed the offenses charged even if they did not
respectively hold the position of Municipal Mayor or Municipal &ealth "fficer%
* cursory reading of the duties and functions of the Municipal Mayor as
enumerated in #ection 444 of the =ocal :overnment 2ode will readily show that the
preparation of police and autopsy reports and the presentation and gathering of
evidence in the investigation of criminal cases are not among such duties and
functions, and the broad responsibility to maintain peace and order cannot be a basis
for construing that the criminal acts imputed to petitioner Mayor fall under his
functions as Municipal Mayor% 4hat is obvious is that petitioners spouses probably
acted as the parents of the alleged assailant and if at all, were motivated by personal
reasons rather than official duty%
2onse8uently, for failure to show in the informations that the charges were
intimately connected with the discharge of the official functions of accused Mayor
#oller, the offenses charged in the sub6ect criminal cases fall within the e5clusive
original function of the +egional )rial 2ourt, not the #andiganbayan%
Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 136806
Auust 22, 2000
Gonzaga-Reyes, J..:
Facts:
In this petition for certiorari under +ule ;3 of the +ules of 2ourt, petitioner
alleges that the #andiganbayan11 gravely abused its discretion when it Issued its
+esolution dated July 0/, 199/ denying his demurrer to evidence and the subse8uent
+esolution dated 'ecember 17, 199/ denying his motion for reconsideration in
2riminal 2ase No% 0B@;9%

Cduardo *larilla, mayor of Meycauyan, !ulacan, was accused of leveling
and aiming a %43 caliber pistol and threatening to ill #imeon :% =egaApi on a public
hearing% "n 'ecember 1, 1993, the "ffice of the "mbudsman, acting through the
"ffice of the #pecial (rosecutor, filed an information with the #andiganbayan
charging petitioner Cduardo *% *larilla with the crime of grave threats as defined in
*rticle 0/0 of the +evised (enal 2ode% "n the same day, a second information was
filed charging petitioner of having violated section B ,e- of +epublic *ct No% B@19%
)hese informations were doceted as 2riminal 2ase Nos% 0B@;9 and 0B@7@,
respectively% 2riminal 2ase No% 0B@7@ was raffled to the #econd 'ivision of the
#andiganbayan% *cting upon a motion for reinvestigation filed by petitioner, the
"ffice of the #pecial (rosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the information13, which
motion was eventually granted by the #andiganbayan on July 1;, 199;% Meanwhile,
2riminal 2ase No% 0B@;9 was assigned to the 9irst 'ivision of the #andiganbayan%
(etitioner also filed a motion for reinvestigation with the court on May /, 199;, to
which the prosecution ob6ected% "n June 1/, 199;, the court Issued a resolution
deferring action on petitioners motion for reinvestigation until compliance by the
prosecution with the courts resolution of March 0@ and 0/, 199;, re8uiring the
amendment of the information so as to indicate the office<related character of the
crime charged% )he #andiganbayan admitted the information%
0
Issues:
I% 4hether or not the first division of the #andiganbayan acted without or in
e5cess of its 6urisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioners demurrer to evidence
II% 4hether or not the first division of the #andiganbayan acted without or in
e5cess of its 6urisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the
offense charged in criminal case no% 0B@;9 falls within its 6urisdiction
Held:
I% No% 4ith regard to the first Issue, petitioner claims that the elements
constituting the crime of grave threats have not been proven% &e insists that the
prosecution had not established that his act of pointing a gun at complainant #imeon
=egaspi, assuming that it had actually occurred, constituted grave threats% &owever,
8uite to the contrary, the #andiganbayan found that the prosecutions evidence,
standing unrebutted by any opposing evidence, sufficiently established the crime
charged% )he resolution of a demurrer to evidence should be left to the e5ercise of
sound 6udicial discretion% * lower courts order of denial shall not be disturbed, that
is, the appellate courts will not review the prosecutions evidence and precipitately
decide whether or not such evidence has established the guilt of the accused beyond
a reasonable doubt, unless accused has established that such 6udicial discretion has
been gravely abused, thereby amounting to a lac or e5cess of 6urisdiction% Mere
allegations of such abuse will not suffice% 9or the special civil action of certiorari to
lie, it is crucial that there must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical e5ercise of
power, the very antithesis of 6udicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of
both civil law and common law traditions% )o warrant the issuance of the
e5traordinary writ of certiorari, the alleged lac of 6urisdiction, e5cess thereof, or
abuse of discretion must be so gross or grave, as when power is e5ercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, pre6udice or personal hostility, or
the abuse must be so patent as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty en6oined by law, or to act at all, in contemplation of
law%
4hen there is no showing of such grave abuse, certiorari is not the proper
remedy% +ather, the appropriate recourse from an order denying a demurrer to
evidence is for the court to proceed with the trial, after which the accused may file an
appeal from the 6udgment of the lower court rendered after such trial% In the present
case, we are not prepared to rule that the #andiganbayan has gravely abused its
discretion when it denied petitioners demurrer to evidence% (ublic respondent found
that the prosecutions evidence satisfactorily established the elements of the crime
charged% 2orrespondingly, there is nothing in the records of this case nor in the
pleadings of petitioner that would show otherwise%
II% No% It is well established that the 6urisdiction of a court to try a criminal
case is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action%
"nce the court ac8uires 6urisdiction over a controversy, it shall continue to e5ercise
such 6urisdiction until the final determination of the case and it is not affected by
subse8uent legislation vesting 6urisdiction over such proceedings in another
tribunal% * recogniAed e5ception to this rule is when the statute e5pressly provides,
or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate upon actions pending
before its enactment% &owever, where such retroactive effect is not provided for,
statutes altering the 6urisdiction of a court cannot be applied to cases already
pending prior to their enactment%
)hus, to fall within the e5clusive and original 6urisdiction of the
#andiganbayan, the crime charged must be either one of those mentioned in
$iolations of +epublic *ct No% B@19, as amended, otherwise nown as the *nti<:raft
and 2orrupt (ractices *ct, +epublic *ct No% 1B79, and 2hapter II, #ection 0, )itle
$II of the +evised (enal 2ode abovementioned or one committed by a public officer
in relation to his office% )he 2ourt has &eld that an offense is deemed to be
committed in relation to the accuseds office when such office is an element of the
crime charged or when the offense charged is intimately connected with the
discharge of the official functions of accused%
)he 6urisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint
or information% In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that
the accused, petitioner herein, too advantage of his official functions as municipal
mayor of Meycauayan, !ulacan when he committed the crime of grave threats as
defined in *rticle 0/0 of the +evised (enal 2ode against complainant #imeon :%
=egaspi, a municipal councilor% )he "ffice of the #pecial (rosecutor charged
petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to ill =egaspi during a public
hearing, after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioners
administration% 2learly, based on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately
connected with the discharge of petitioners official functions% )his was elaborated
upon by public respondent in its *pril 03, 1997 resolution wherein it &eld that the
accused was performing his official duty as municipal mayor when he attended said
public hearing and that accuseds violent act was precipitated by complainants
criticism of his administration as the mayor or chief e5ecutive of the municipality,
during the latterDs privilege speech% It was his response to private complainants
attac to his office% If he was not the mayor, he would not have been irritated or
B
angered by whatever private complainant might have said during said privilege
speech% )hus, based on the allegations in the information, the #andiganbayan
correctly assumed 6urisdiction over the case%
Subido v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. 122641
!a"ua#y 20, 199$
"avide,Jr.,J.:
Facts:
!ayani #ubido, then !I' 2ommissioner and +ene (arina, then !I' #pecial
*gent conspired and caused the issuance of a warrant of arrest against James
Masimu% )he accused new hat MasimuDs deportation order was not yet final
and e5ecutory pending a Motion for +econsideration, resulting in the detention of the
latter which caused him undue in6ury% * case for arbitrary detention was filed against
the accused with the #andiganbayan% )he petitioners filed a motion to 8uash
contending that in view of the effectivity of +* 7973, which is an act to #trengthen
the 9unctional and #tructural "rganiAation of the #andiganbayan, the #andiganbayan
had no 6urisdiction over the offense charged and the person of the accused% #aid
motion was denied, hence this petition%
Issue:
4hether or not the #andiganbayan has 6urisdiction over the case at bar
Held:
7es% It is true that the crime committed no longer falls within the purview of
+* 7973% &owever, +* 7973 only too effect one year after the commission of the
crime charged% It must be remembered that for purposes of #ection 4 of +* 1;@;
which provides that #andiganbayan has e5clusive 6urisdiction over cases committed
by public officer and employees in relation to their office, the reconing point is the
time of the commission of the crime% Ender (' 1;@;, the #andiganbayan has
6urisdiction over a person who at the time of the commission of the crime is
occupying a position having a #alary :rade 07 or higher% It is true that (arina &eld a
position with a salary grade of less than F07G% &owever, he is being prosecuted as co<
conspirator of the principal accused who &eld a position higher that grade F07G thus,
section 4 of (' 1;@; which provides that Fin cases where none of the principal
accused are occupying the position to salary grade 07 or higher, +)2, M)2, MC)2
or M2)2 shall have e5clusive 6urisdictionG will apply% It must be noted that before
the enactment of +* 7973, what matters is not the ind of offense so long as it is
alleged in the crime committed in relation to the office of the public official,
#andiganbayan has 6urisdiction try and hear the case% )his has been cured by #ection
4 of +* 7973 by limiting its 6urisdiction only to persons ,principal accused- having a
salary grade of F07G% )his, being a curative statute, may be given retroactive effect%
Binay v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 120681-83
%cto&e# 1, 1999
#apunan, J.:
Facts:
2ases were filed by the "mbudsman in the #andiganbayan ,#! for brevity-
against Mayor !inay of Maati for HIllegal Ese of (ublic 9undsD under *rticle 00@ of
the revised (enal 2ode and H$iolation of *nti< :raft and 2orrupt (ractices *ctD ,+*
B@19- on #eptember 1994% )he informations filed constituted crimes which were
committed by the petitioner in his incumbency in the year 19/7% )he petitioner filed
a motion to 8uash alleging that the delay of more than ; years constituted a violation
of his constitutional right of due process% &is arraignment therefore was &eld in
abeyance pending the resolution of the motions% #ubse8uently, the #! Issued a
resolution denying petitionerDs motion to 8uash and further the latterDs motion for
reconsideration% In the meantime, the prosecution filed a motion to suspend the
accused pendente lite ,benefits- which was later granted and ordered for a 9@<day
suspension%
(etition for certiorari was filed by Mayor !inay in the #2 praying that the
resolution denying his motion for reconsideration be set aside and claimed that he
was denied of his rights when the suspension was ordered even before he could file
his reply to the petitionerDs opposition% #2 then, directed the #! to permit petitioner
to file said reply% )he #! nonetheless reiterated its previous resolutions and order
after the submission of the reply%
Meanwhile, +* 7973 redefining the 6urisdiction of #! too effect on May
1993 so much so that the petitioner filed before #! a motion to refer his cases to the
+)2 of Maati alleging that the #! has no 6urisdiction over said cases when it Issued
its resolutions and suspension order on June 1993% )he #! in a follow<up resolution
denied the petitionerDs motion%
&ence this present petition, prohibition and mandamus 8uestioning the
6urisdiction of #! over the criminal cases%
4
Issue:
4hether or not #andiganbayan has 6urisdiction over the case of after the
passage of +* 7973
Held:
7es% +epublic *ct 7973 which was further amended by +* /049 states that
the #andiganbayan shall e5ercise e5clusive original 6urisdiction in all cases involving
violations of +epublic *ct No% B@19 otherwise nown as the *nti<:raft and 2orrupt
(ractices *ct, +epublic *ct No% 1B79, and 2hapter II, #ection 0, )itle $II, !oo II of
the +evised (enal 2ode, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying
the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity at the time of the commission of the offense> 1% "fficials of the e5ecutive
branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified
as grade I07I and higher of the 2ompensation and (osition 2lassification *ct of
19/9% Ender the 2ompensation and (osition 2lassification *ct of 19/9, mayors are
Ilocal officials classified as :rade H07D and higher%
Sanchez v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 120011
'e(te)&e# $, 1999
Pardo, J.:
Facts:
(etitioners are officers of the (hilippine *rmy ,(*-% =t% 2ol% =ino *%
#ancheA at times material hereto was 2ommanding "fficer, 9th (ost Cngineer
'etachment, &ead8uarters and &ead8uarters #upport :roup ,&&#:-, (hilippine
*rmy% Ma6or $icente #% Managay was :<4, &&#:, (hilippine *rmy% * pre<trial
investigating officer, submitted a report to the 2ommanding :eneral, (hilippine
*rmy, stating that there was a prima facie case against petitioners for violation of the
*rticles of 4ar for causing the wrongful release of (399,347%@@ for payment of
renovation of an office in the (hil% *rmy% "n the basis of the report, they initiated
court martial proceedings against petitioners before the (hilippine *rmy (ermanent
:eneral 2ourt Martial% !oth of the petitioners were arraigned before the 2ourt
Martial and both pleaded not guilty% )he investigating officers also referred the
findings to the (rovincial (rosecutor while there were court martial proceedings
against the petitioners recommending the filing of an information with the
#andiganbayan against petitioners for violation of +%*% No% B@19% )he petitioners
filed a motion to dismiss the case for lac of 6urisdiction and was denied through a
resolution stating that the offenses charged in the court martial are distinct and
separate from each other% )hus, the petitioners were also arraigned in #andiganbayan
and they pleaded not guilty% (etitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the
denial reiterating that the #andiganbayan had no 6urisdiction over the case as the
court martial had ac8uired original and e5clusive 6urisdiction over the case, pursuant
to +%*% No% 7@33, and that the acts complained of in the charge sheet in the court
martial and the Information before the #andiganbayan were the same or identical%
)he #andiganbayan denied the motion for lac of merit% &ence, the petitioners filed
the case to the #upreme 2ourt%
Issue:
4hether or not #andiganbayan had 6urisdiction over the case
Held:
No% )hough the #andiganbayan had 6urisdiction when the case was filed, it
no longer had 6urisdiction over the case under +* 7973% )his law removing the
6urisdiction of #andiganbayan over the case was passed before the motion for
reconsideration was submitted% )herefore, the #andiganbayan acted without
6urisdiction when the motion for reconsideration was denied%
Uy v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 10*96*-$0
Auust 9, 1999
Pardo, J.:
Facts:
(etitioner :eorge Ey was the deputy comptroller of the (hilippine Navy
designated to act on behalf of 2aptain 9ernandeA, the latterDs supervisor, on matters
relating the activities of the 9iscal 2ontrol !ranch% #i5 informations for Cstafa
through falsification of official documents and one information for violation of
#ection B of +* B@19 ,anti<graft and corrupt practices act- were filed with the
#andiganbayan against the petitioner and 19 other accused for alleged% )he petitioner
was said to have signed a (%"% stating that the unit received 1,@@@ pieces of seal rings
when in fact, only 1@@ were ordered% )he #andiganbayan recommended that the
informations be withdrawn against some of the accused after a comprehensive
investigation% (etitioner filed a motion to 8uash contending that it is the 2ourt
Martial and not the #andiganbayan, which has 6urisdiction over the offense charged
or the person of the accused% (etitioner further contends that +* 1/3@, which
provides for the 6urisdiction of court martial should govern in this case%
3
Issue:
4hether or not the #andiganbayan has 6urisdiction over the sub6ect criminal
cases or the person of the petitioner
Held:
In the case at bar, while the petitioner is charged with violation of +* B@1/,
his position as =ieutenant 2ommander of the (hilippine Navy is a ran lower than
Fnaval captains and all officers of higher ranG% It must be noted that under the
present law, both the nature of the offense and the positions occupied by the accused
are the conditions sine 8ua non before the #andiganbayan can validly tae
cogniAance of the case% )hus, regular courts shall have e5clusive 6urisdiction over the
person of the accused as provided by the #andiganbayan =aw which states that Fin
case where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to #alary
:rade 07 or higher, e5clusive original 6urisdiction shall be vested in the proper +)2,
M)2, M2)2 or MC)2 pursuant to !( !lg% 109%
Lacson v. Executive secretary
G.R. No. 128096
!a"ua#y 20, 1999
Martinez, J.:
Facts:
Cleven ,11- persons believed to be members of the Juratong !aleleng gang,
an organiAed crime syndicate involved in ban robberies, were slain by elements of
the *nti !an +obbery and Intelligence )as :roup ,*!+I):-% (etitioner =acson
and petitioners<intervenors *cop and Kubia were members of *!+I):% #("0 'e
=os +eyes e5posed to the media that what actually happened between the members
of the Juratong !aleleng and the *!+I): was a summary e5ecution ,rub<out- and
not a shoot<out% "mbudsman 'esierto formed a panel to investigate the incident%
Epon investigation, all the (N( officers and personnel allegedly involved in the
incident were absolved from any criminal liability because it was a legitimate police
operation% &owever, a review board modified the panelLs ruling and recommended
the indictment for multiple murder against 0; respondents, including =acson, *cop
and Kubia% )he "mbudsman approved the recommendation and 11informations for
murder were filed against =acson, as principal, *cop and Kubia as accessories before
the #andiganbayanLs #econd 'ivision% Epon motion by all the accused in the 11
informations, the #! allowed them to file a motion for reconsideration of the
"mbudsmanDs action% *fter a reinvestigation, the "mbudsman filed 11 amended
informations before the #andiganbayan, wherein =acson was charged only as an
accessory% )he accused filed separate motions 8uestioning the 6urisdiction of the #!,
asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the 6urisdiction
of the +)2 pursuant to #ection 0 of +%*% 7973% )hey said that the said law limited
the 6urisdiction of the #! to cases where one or more of the Mprincipal accusedN are
government officials with #alary :rade 07 or higher or (N( officials with the ran of
2hief #uperintendent or higher% )hey did not 8ualify under the said re8uisites
because the highest raning principal has the ran of only a 2hief Inspector and none
has the e8uivalent of at least #: 07% )hus, the #! admitted the amended information
and ordered the cases transferred to the O2 +)2, which has original and e5clusive
6urisdiction under +%*% 7973% )he "ffice of the #pecial (rosecutor moved for
reconsideration, insisting the cases should remain with the #andiganbayan% (etitioner
and some of the accused opposed% (ending the motions for reconsideration, +* /049
was approved amending the 6urisdiction of the #! by deleting the word principal
from the phrase Mprincipal accusedN in #ection 0 ,a P c- of +epublic *ct 7973% Cven
before the Issue of 6urisdiction came up with the filing of the amended informations,
the house bill for that was already introduced in 2ongress%
Issues:
I% 4hether or not #ections 4 P 7 of +%*% /049 is unconstitutional
II% 4hether the case falls within the +egional )rial 2ourtDs 6urisdiction
Held:
I% 7es% #ections 4 and 7 of +%*% /049 are constitutional% )he Issue on due
process and e8ual protection is too shallow to deserve merit% )here were no
concrete evidence and convincing argument presented% )he classification made by
the law was reasonable and not arbitrary% )here is nothing e5 post facto in the
statute% :enerally, e5 post facto laws deal with the retroactive effect of penal laws
and the said +epublic *ct is procedural in nature%
II% 7es% )he regional trial court has e5clusive original 6urisdiction over the
cases% 9or a case to be within the 6urisdiction of the #andiganbayan, it must be
shown that the offense charged in the information was committed in relation to the
office of the accused% In People v. Montejo, the court &eld that an offense is said to
have been committed in relation to the office if it is intimately connectedN with the
office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his
official functions% )his MintimacyN must be alleged in the information, which is what
determines the 6urisdiction of the court% 4hat is controlling is the specific factual
allegations in the information that would show the close intimacy between the
discharge of the accused official duties and the commission of the offense charged%
;
It does not even matter whether the phrase Mcommitted in relation to his office
appears in the information or not%
In the case at bar, what the amended information contains is a mere
allegation that the offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to
his office and that is not sufficient% #uch phrase is merely a conclusion of law% #ince
it was not proven that the crime of murder was committed in the discharge of their
duties, the #andiganbayan does not have 6urisdiction over the cases%
Olaguer v. Regional Trial Court
G.R. No. 8138*
Fe&#ua#y 21, 1989
Ganayo, J.:
Facts:
(hilippine Journalists Inc ,(JI- e5ecuted a mortgage in favor of
'evelopment !an of (hilippines ,'!(- for certain financing accommodations% (JI
assigned ;7Q of stocs to '!(% '!( appointed certain (JI stocholders as pro5ies%
(JI failed to comply with its obligation to '!( leading to the cancellation of
appointment of petitioners and designated "laguer, $eleA, and 'e =eon
,(etitioners-%"laguer also ased some of respondent to assign shares not only to the
three pro5ies by '!( but also to two others to be chosen by him so they can sit in
the (JI board of directors% )hough "laguer was voted chairman of the board and
2C" of (JI, he failed to comply with his commitment which gave respondents to
cancel the assignment% &e also did some illegal acts which gave rise to several
complaints in court against herein (etitioners% !efore the cases were resolved, then
(resident 2ory *8uino terminated his appointment as member of the board of
directors of '!(% 'espite the termination, "laguer still continued with the
performance of his functions% )here was an agreement entered into b '!( and herein
respondents calling for a special stocholders meeting to elect a new board of
directors% "laguer contends that the agreement cannot be implemented because
"laguer claims that he has 6ust been designated the fiscal and team leader of the
(2:: assigned to (JI and that all his actions are sanctioned and reported to (2::,
and that it is (2:: which e5ercises the voting rights of all (JI common stocs
se8uestered since 19/;% "laguer then filed a motion to dismiss the cases against him
on the ground that the court has no 6urisdiction over the persons of herein petitioners%
)he motion to dismiss was denied thus this petition
Issue:
4hether or not the trial court has 6urisdiction over the case
Held:
No% )he trial court has no 6urisdiction over the case% It is the #andiganbayan
who has 6urisdiction over (2:: cases%
)here is no dispute that (JI is now under se8uestration by the (2:: and that civil
case no% @@B3 was filed in #andiganbayan wherein the (JI is listed as among the
corporations involved in the une5plained wealth case against Marcos% +ecords also
show that "laguer was acting in behalf of the (2:: and under #ection 0 of C" RS,
the #andiganbayan has e5clusive and original 6urisdiction over all cases regarding
the une5plained wealth of Marcos% )he decision of the #andiganbayan is sub6ect to
review on certiorari e5clusively by the #upreme 2ourt% In the e5ercise of its
functions, the (2:: is a co<e8ual body with the +)2 and co<e8ual bodies have no
power to control the other%
Reublic o! the "hiliines v. Asuncion
G.R. No. +-108208
Ma#c, 11, 1994
"avide, jr., J.:
Facts:
(rivate +espondent *le5ander 'ionisio 7 Manio, a member of the
(hilippine National (olice,(N(- assigned to the 2entral (olice 'istrict 2ommand
#tation 0 in Novaliches, OueAon 2ity, was dispatched by his 2ommanding "fficer to
'umalay #treet, Novaliches to respond to a complaint that a person was creating
trouble there% 'ionisio proceeded there, where he subse8uently shot to death )?#gt%
+omeo #adang% (ursuant to #ec% 7, +ule 110 of the +ules of 2ourt, the "ffice of the
2ity (rosecutor filed a case with the +egional )rial 2ourt ,+)2- of OueAon 2ity an
information charging 'ioniso with the crime of homicide% 4hile trial was already in
progress, the respondent Judge Issued an order, $otu propio, an order re8uiring the
prosecution and the defense to comment on whether the 2ourt should still proceed
with the trial of the case% In view of the decision of the #2 in the case of 'eloso v%
'omingo, the #andiganbayn has 6urisdiction over offenses committed by public
officers when the penalty prescribed by law for the offense is higher than prision
orreional% )he murder charge against petitioner carries the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its ma5imum period to death hence it is cogniAable by the
#andiganbayan, and the "mbudsman has primary 6urisdiction to investigate it%
+espondent Judge dismissed the 2riminal 2ase for re<filing with the #andiganbayanN
on the ground that the #andiganbayan, and not the +)2 has 6urisdiction over the
7
case% (rivate prosecutor moved for reconsideration, citing the opinion of the
#ecretary of Justice that crimes committed by (N( members are not cogniAable by
the #andiganbayanN because Mthey fall within the e5clusive 6urisdiction of the regular
courtsN as provided in #ection 4; of +%*% No% ;973 and the #andiganbayan is not a
regular court but a special court% )he respondent 6udge denied the motion% &ence this
petition
Issue:
4hether or not +epublic *ct No% ;973 vests the e5clusive 6urisdiction in
criminal cases involving (N( members only in the regular court which e5cludes the
#andiganbayan since it is constitutionally and statutorily a special court
Held:
7es% (olice forces have traditionally been under the civil authority% )he
overwhelming sentiment of the framers of the 19/7 2onstitution against martial law
regime and the militariAation of the police forces prompted them to e5plicitly direct
the establishment and maintenance of one police force% +%* No% ;973 on the (N( are
intended to implement #ection ;, *rticle T$I of the 19/72onstitution, national in
scope and civilian in character% )his civilian character is un8ualified and
unconditional and is therefore, all<embracing% )he 'eclaration of (olicy ,#ection 0-
of +%*% No%;973 faithfully carried out this mandate% )he civilian character refers to
its orientation and structure% )he mandate of #ection 4; +%* ;973 is to divest courts<
martial of any 6urisdiction over criminal cases involving (N( members and to return
or transfer that 6urisdiction to the civil court sand was e5plicitly provided for in the
original #ection ;/ of the &ouse !ill No% 0B;14% )he terms civil courts and regular
courts were used interchangeably or were considered as synonymous by the
!icameral 2onference 2ommittee and then by the #enate and &ouse of
+epresentatives% *ccordingly, the term regular courts in #ection 4; of +%*% No% ;973
means civil courts% )here could have been no other meaning intended since the
primary purpose of the law is to remove from courts<martial the 6urisdiction over
criminal cases involving members of the (N(%
+egular 2ourts are those within the 6udicial department of the government,
namely, the #upreme 2ourt and such lower courts as may be established by law% (er
#ection 1;, 2hapter 4, !oo II oft he *dministrative 2ode of 19/7, such lower
courts include the 2ourt of *ppeals, #andiganbayan, 2ourt of )a5 *ppeals, +egional
)rial 2ourts, #haria 'istrict 2ourts, Metropolitan )rial 2ourts, Municipal )rial
2ourt, Municipal 2ircuit )rial 2ourts, and #haria 2ircuit 2ourts% )he #andiganbayan
was created by (%'% No% 14/; pursuant to the mandate of #ection 3, *rticle TIII oft
he 197B 2onstitution% )his was revised by (%'% 1;@; and amended by (%'% 1/;@ then
1/;1%Ender the amendments introduced by (%'% No% 1/;1, the #andiganbayan has
6urisdiction over the following cases> Ma% C5clusive original 6urisdiction> $iolations of
*nti<:raft and 2orrupt (ractices *ct, +%*% 1B79, and 2hapter 0 )itle $II of the
+(2. 0% "ther offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in
relation to their office%
Endoubtedly then, #andiganbayan is a regular court and is thus included in
the term regular courts of #ec% 4; +%*% No% ;973% 2ourts of special 6urisdiction,
which are permanent in character, are also regular courts% )he #andiganbayan is a
court with special 6urisdiction because its creation as a permanent anti<graft court is
constitutionally mandated and its 6urisdiction is limited to certain classes of offenses
)his is further strongly indicated by #ec% 1 of (%'% No% 1;@; which vests upon it Mall
the inherent powers of a court of 6usticeN and places it on Mthe same level as the 2ourt
of *ppeals,N and by #ection 4 thereof, as amended by (%'% No% 1/;1, which grants it
appellate 6urisdiction over certain case decided by the +)2, Me)2, M)2, and
M2)2%
)hat the public officers or employees committed the crime in relation to
their office must, however, be alleged in the information for the #andiganbayan to
have 6urisdiction over a case under #ec% 4,a-,0-% )his allegation is necessary because
of the unbending rule that 6urisdiction is determined by the allegations of the
information%
#inaol v. Baldado
A.M. No. R-!-92-898
Auust *, 1993
Per %uria$:
Facts:
In a sworn letter dated 0; *ugust 1990 ,+ollo, 0<B-, complainant charges
the respondent Judge with grave abuse of discretion, ignorance of the law and
conduct unbecoming a member of the bench in that notwithstanding the fact that the
spouses 2roAoro (alermo and Jovy (alermo, accused in 2riminal 2ase No% 773<:
for murder, had not yet been arrested pursuant to the warrant of arrest he had Issued
on B March 1990 and were Ifreely roaming in the municipality of :uihulngan,I said
respondent Judge entertained a petition for bail and set the same for hearing despite
the vigorous opposition of the complaining witness%
/
2omplainant further alleges that the two accused have been Iseen
conspicuously after the filing of the petition for bail inside the chambers of this court
1+)2U accompanied by a younger brother of a congressmanI. that it was the said
congressman who supposedly IsponsoredI the appointment to the Judiciary of the
respondent Judge. and that the accused spouses are Irelatives of the said
congressman%I
)he Information for Murder in 2riminal 2ase No% 773<: was filed on 0/
9ebruary 1990 by Brd *ssistant (rovincial (rosecutor 'iosdado &ermosa of Negros
"riental before the respondent JudgeLs sala ,!ranch 43 of the +egional )rial 2ourt of
Negros "riental-% No bail was recommended for the provisional liberty of accused
2roAoro (alermo and Jovy (alermo% "n B March 1990, the respondent Judge Issued
a warrant for the arrest of the accused% "n 9 March 1990, before the trial court could
ac8uire 6urisdiction over their persons, accused filed through their counsel, the (aras
and *ssociates law office, a motion to grant and fi5 bail which the respondent Judge
set for hearing on 04 *pril 1990%

)he accused did not appear on 04 *pril 1990% In view thereof, the
respondent Judge Issued an order ,a- denying the motion to grant bail on the ground
that the court Ihas not ac8uired 6urisdiction over the person of the accused,I ,b-
ordering the issuance of an alias warrant of arrest and ,c- directing the (N( of
:uihulngan Ito e5ert utmost efforts for the arrest of the accusedI ,+ollo, 3/-% )he
alias warrant of arrest was then Issued on 0/ *pril 1990 ,+ollo, 39-% "n that same
date, however, the accused < this time through *tty% *lfonso !riones < filed an urgent
motion for the reconsideration of the 04 *pril 1990 "rder on the ground that Ithe
accused are forthcoming, and are willing to voluntarily submit to the 6urisdiction of
the 2ourtI ,+ollo, ;@-% *cting thereon, and on the basis of *tty% !rionesL
confirmation of Ithe willingness of the accused to surrender to the custody of the
court as stated in said motion,I respondent Judge Issued an order on 4 May 1990
resetting the hearing of the motion to grant and fi5 bail for 7 May 1990 at />B@
oLcloc in the morning, sub6ect to the condition that Ithe accused shall surrender to
the custody of the court%I +espondent Judge further directed the issuance of
subpoenas to the prosecution witnesses and warned the prosecution Ithat failure to
present evidence on said date without 6ustifiable reason will be considered as lac of
strength of its evidenceI 'espite their commitment and *tty% !rionesL confirmation
on their behalf that they would voluntarily surrender on 7 May 1990, the accused
failed to appear on the set date% 4hile the prosecution was ready with one witness, it
did not present the latter as the accused were still at large and not under the
6urisdiction of the court% Nevertheless, Iin the interest of substantial 6ustice and to
avoid delay in the administration of 6ustice,I the respondent Judge Issued on the said
date an order resetting, once again, the hearing of the motion for B@ June and 1 and B
July 1990% )his e5tension was, however, sub6ected to the condition that Ion or before
June B@, 1990, accused shall have voluntarily surrendered and submitted themselves
to the custody of the #upreme 2ourt%
Issue:
4hether or not the court can entertain an accusedDs motion or petition for
bail when the accused is not yet in the custody of law
Held:
No% It is a5iomatic that a court cannot entertain an accusedLs motion or
petition for bail unless he is in the custody of the law% !ail is defined #ection 1, +ule
114 of the +evised +ules of 2ourt as Ithe security given for the release of a person in
custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his
appearance before any court as re8uired under the conditionsI specified in #ection 0
thereof% * person is considered to be in the custody of the law ,a- when he is arrested
either by virtue of a warrant of arrest Issued pursuant to #ection ;, +ule 110, or even
without a warrant under #ection 3, +ule 11B in relation to #ection 7, +ule 110 of the
+evised +ules of 2ourt, or ,b- when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the
6urisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper authorities% Clsewise stated, the
purpose of re8uiring bail is to relieve an accused from imprisonment until his
conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial &!l$eda v. 'illaluz, (( S%R! )*
+,-./0, iting Green v. Petit, S1eri22, /3 4.5. 6d 6*,7. *ccordingly, it would be
incongruous to grant bail to one who is free &8eliiano v. Pasiolan, 6 S%R! ***
+,-(,0, iting Manigbas v. 9una, /6 :.G. ,3;/< see also Mendoza v. %ourt o2 8irst
=nstane o2 >uezon, /, S%R! )(- +,-.)07. )he right to bail is guaranteed by the
2onstitution% #ection 1B, *rticle III of the 19/7 2onstitution provides in part that> *ll
persons, e5cept those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties,
or be released on recogniAance as may be provided by law

&owever, Fonly those persons who have been either arrested, detained or
otherwise deprived of their liberty will ever have occasion to see the benefits of
said provisionG ,Herras ?ee1an@ee v. Rovira, ./ P1il. ()3 +,-3/07. )hus, it logically
follows that no petition for bail can be validly entertained for as long as the petitioner
is N") in the custody of the law%
#ince the accused in 2riminal 2ase No% 773<: were not arrested by virtue
of both the original warrant arrest and the alias warrant of arrest, and did not
voluntarily submit to the 6urisdiction of the trial court, they had no standing in court
9
to file a motion for bail% Nor did the court have any business setting the same for
hearing% !y setting the said motion for hearing despite the fact that his court had not
yet ac8uired 6urisdiction over the persons of the accused, the respondent Judge
blatantly disregarded established rule and settled 6urisprudence% 4hile he
subse8uently rectified his error by denying the motion in his "rder of 04 *pril 1990,
he nevertheless bactraced by granting the motion for reconsideration and setting
anew the hearing of the motion for bail this time with a warning to the prosecution
that its failure to present evidence on the scheduled date Iwill be considered as lac
of strength of its evidence%I 4e find neither rhyme nor reason for this warning
because if there was any party to be warned, it should have been the accused who
had abused the liberality of the respondent Judge and belittled the authority of the
court% 4orse, the respondent Judge still accommodated the accused < who had
already reneged on their commitment to submit to the courtLs 6urisdiction < by
resetting the hearing of the motion for bail after they failed to appear a second time%
)hese acts of the respondent Judge compounded his already 8uestionable disregard
of the rule and doctrine aforecited% &e opted to perpetuate his defiance thereto and
e5periment on a new procedure which we cannot sanction% *ccording to 2anon 1/ of
the 2anons of Judicial Cthics, a Judge violates his duty as a minister of 6ustice if he
sees to do what he may personally consider substantial 6ustice in a particular case
and disregards the general law as he nows it to be binding on him%
Larranaga v. Court o! Aeals
G.R. No. 130644
Ma#c, 13, 1998
Puno, J.:
Facts:
(etitioner =arranaga was charged with two counts of idnapping and
serious illegal detention before the +)2 of 2ebu 2ity% &e was arrested and was
detained without the filing of the necessary Information and warrant of arrest% )he
petitioner alleged that he must be released and be sub6ect to a preliminary
investigation% &owever pending the resolution of the 2ourt for the petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with writs of preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory in6unction filed by the petitioner, +)2 6udge issued a warrant of arrest
directed to the petitioner%
Issue:
I% 4hether petitioner is entitled to a regular preliminary investigation
II% 4hether petitioner should be released from detention pending the
investigation
Held:
I% 7es% )he #upreme 2ourt is not altered by the fact that petitioner has been
arraigned on "ctober 14, 1997% )he rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is
waived when the accused fails to invoe it before or at the time of entering a plea at
arraignment% (etitioner, in this case, has been actively and consistently demanding a
regular preliminary investigation even before he was charged in court% *lso, petitioner
refused to enter a plea during the arraignment because there was a pending case in this
2ourt regarding his right to avail of a regular preliminary investigation% 2learly, the
acts of petitioner and his counsel are inconsistent with a waiver% (reliminary
investigation is part of procedural due process% It cannot be waived unless the waiver
appears to be clear and informed%
II% No% )he filing of charges and the issuance of the warrant of arrest against a
person invalidly detained will cure the defect of that detention or at least deny him the
right to be released because of such defect%)he original warrantless arrest of the
petitioner was doubtless illegal% Nevertheless, the +egional )rial 2ourt lawfully
ac8uired 6urisdiction over the person of the petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest
it issued on *ugust 0;, 199B against him and the other accused in connection with the
rape<slay cases% It was belated, to be sure, but it was nonetheless legal%
Allado v. #io$no
G.R. No. 113630
May *, 1994
Bellosillo, J.:
Facts:
(etitioners 'iosdado Jose *llado and +oberto =%MendoAa, alumni of the
2ollege of law, Eniversity ofthe (hilippines, are partners of the =aw 9irm of#alonga,
&ernandeA and *llado% In the practice oftheir profession, and on the basis of an
allegede5tra6udicial confession of a security guard ,Embal-, they have been accused
of the heinous crime of idnapping with murder of a :erman national named $an
)west by the (residential *nti<2rime 2ommission ,(*22- and ordered arrested
without bail by respondent 6udge% (etitioners filed this petition and principally
contended that respondent 6udge acted with grave abuse of discretion and in e5cess
of 6urisdiction in Iwhimsically holding that there is probable cause against
petitioners without determining the admissibility of the evidence against petitioners
and without even stating the basis of his findings,I and in Irelying on the +esolution
of the (anel and their certification that probable cause e5ists when the certification is
flawed%I (etitioners maintain that the records of the preliminary investigation which
1@
respondent 6udge solely relied upon failed to establish probable cause against them to
6ustify the issuance of the warrant of arrest% (etitioners liewise assail the
prosecutorsL Iclear sign of bias and partiality%I "n the other hand, the "ffice of the
#olicitor :eneral argues that the determination of probable cause is a function of the
6udge who is merely re8uired to personally appreciate certain facts to convince him
that the accused probably committed the crime charged%
Issue:
4hether or not the respondent 6udge committed grave abuse of discretion in
the preliminary in8uiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest%
Held:
In the "rder of respondent 6udge, it is e5pressly stated that I1tUhis court after
careful evaluation of the evidence on record, believes and rules that probable cause
e5ists. and therefore, a warrant ofarrest should be issued% I&owever, we are unable to
see how respondent 6udge arrived at such ruling% 4e have painstaingly e5amined
the records and we cannot find any support for his conclusion% "n the contrary, we
discern a number of reasons why we consider the evidence submitted to be
insufficient for a finding of probable cause against petitioners% )he (*22 relies
heavily on the sworn statement of #ecurity :uard Embal who supposedly confessed
his participation in the alleged idnapping and murder of $an )west% 9or one, there is
serious doubt on $an)westLs reported death since the corpus delicti has not been
established, nor have his remains been recovered% Embal claims that $an )west was
completely burned into ashes with the use of gasoline and rubber tires from around
ten oLcloc in the evening to si5 oLcloc the ne5t morning% )his is highly improbable,
if not ridiculous% * human body cannot be pulveriAed into ashes by simply burning it
with the use of gasoline and rubber tires in an open field% Cven crematoria use
entirely closed incinerators where the corpse is sub6ected to intense heat% )hereafter,
the remains undergo a process where the bones are completely ground to dust%
#trangely, if not awwardly, after $an )westLsreported abduction which
culminated in his decimation by cremation, his counsel continued to represent him
before 6udicial and 8uasi<6udicial proceedings% &ence, even *sst% #olicitor :eneral
Cstoesta believes that counsel of $an )west doubted the latterLs death%

$erily, respondent 6udge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
warrant for the arrest of petitioners it appearing that he did not personally e5amine
the evidence nor did he call for the complainant and his witnesses in the face of their
incredible accounts% Instead, he merely relied on the certification of the prosecutors
that probable cause e5isted% 9or, otherwise, he would have found out thatthe
evidence thus far presented was utterly insufficient to warrant the arrest of
petitioners%
In #oliven v% Maasiar, we said that the 6udge ,a-shall personally evaluate
the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
e5istence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. or, ,b-
if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, may disregard the fiscalLs report
and re8uire the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusion on the e5istence of probable cause%
In (eople v% Inting, it had been emphasiAed that the important features of the
constitutional mandate> ,a- )he determination of probable cause is a function of the
6udge. it is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain% "nly the 6udge and
the 6udge alone maes this determination. ,b- )he preliminary in8uiry made by a
prosecutor does not bind the 6udge% It merely assists him in maing the determination
ofprobable cause% )he 6udge does not have to follow what the prosecutor presents to
him% !y itself, the prosecutorLs certification of probable cause is ineffectual% It is the
report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes ,if any-, and all other
supporting documents behind the prosecutorLs certification which are material in
assisting the 6udge in his determination of probable cause. and, ,c-Judges and
prosecutors alie should distinguish the preliminary in8uiry which determines
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary
investigation proper which ascertainswhether the offender should be held for trial or
released% Cven if the two in8uiries be conducted inthe course of one and the same
proceeding, there should be no confusion about their ob6ectives% )he determination
of probable cause for the warrant is made by the 6udge% )he preliminary investigation
proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty
of the offense charged and therefore, whether or not he should be sub6ected to the
e5pense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is a function of the prosecutor%
%iranda v. Tuliao
GR No. 1*8$63
Ma#c, 31, 2006

%1io-4azario, J.:
Facts:
"n / March 199;, two burnt cadavers were discovered in (uro Nibulan,
+amon, Isabela, which were later identified as the dead bodies of $icente !auAon
11
and CliAer )uliao, son of private respondent $irgilio )uliao% )wo informations of
murder were filed against police officers, one of which remained at large during the
trial% )he +)2 convicted said accused personnel and sentenced reclusion pertua% )he
#upreme 2ourt, on automatic review, reversed the decision and ac8uitted the police
officers based on reasonable doubts%
#ometime in #eptember 1999, #("0 Maderal was arrested% "n 07 *pril
0@@1, he e5ecuted a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose 2% Miranda,
("B +omeo !% "con, and #("B *lberto (% 'almacio, a certain !oyet dela 2ruA and
*mado 'oe, as the persons responsible for the deaths of $icente !auAon and
CliAer)uliao% +espondent )uliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against
petitioners, !oyet dela 2ruA, and *mado 'oe, and submitted the sworn confession of
#("0Maderal% "n 03 June 0@@1, *cting (residing Judge 4ilfredo )umaliuan issued
warrants of arrest against petitioners and #("0 Maderal%
"n 09 June 0@@1, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary
investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and?or 8uash the warrants of arrest% )he
petition was denied by Judge )umaliuan on the ground of the absence of petitioners,
thus, the court did not ac8uired 6urisdiction over them% Judge *nghad too over the
case and ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest% +espondent file a petition
praying that a temporary restraining order be issued to en6oin Judge *nghad to form
proceeding with the case% )wo days after the +esolution of the 2ourt granting the
prayer of respondent, Judge *nghad dismissed the two Informations for murder
against petitioner%
Issues:
I% 4hether or not the trial court ac8uired 6urisdiction over the petitioners on
their petition to cancel the warrant of arrest.
II% 4hether or not the 2* erred in ordering the reinstatement of the cases.
III% 4hether or not double 6eopardy would attach
Held:
I% 7es% *s a general rule, one who sees an affirmative relief is deemed to
have submitted to the 6urisdiction of the court% *s we held in the past decisions of the
#upreme 2ourt, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary
appearance% *fter Judge )umaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners,
petitioner Miranda appealed the assistant prosecutorDs resolution before the #ecretary
of Justice% Judge *nghad, shortly after assuming office, 8uashed the warrant of arrest
on the basis of said appeal% *ccording to Judge *nghad, F5 5 5 prudence dictates and
because of comity, a deferment of the proceedings is but proper%
Ouashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion% It is inconceivable to
charge Judge )umaliuan as lacing in prudence and oblivious to comity when he
issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners 6ust because the petitioners might, in
the future, appeal the assistant prosecutorDs resolution to the #ecretary of Justice%
!ut even if the petition for review was filed before the issuance of the warrants of
arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the review of the
prosecutorDs resolution is not a ground to 8uash the warrants of arrest%

II% No% 2ourt of *ppeals liewise declared the proceedings conducted by
Judge *nghad void% 2ertainly, the declaration of nullity of proceedings should be
deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified
proceedings% Judge*nghadDs order 8uashing the warrants of arrest had been nullified.
therefore those warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed un8uashed%

III% No% In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before
arraignment does not constitute double 6eopardy% 'ouble 6eopardy cannot be
invoed where the accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his e5press
motion that the case was dismissed%
&aldivia v Reyes
G.R. No. 102342
!uly 3, 1992
Facts:
* complaint was filed before the fiscalDs office constituting an offense in
violation of a city ordinance% )he fiscal did not file the complaint before the court
immediately but instead filed it B months later% )he defendantDs counsel filed a
motion to 8uash on ground that the action to file the complaint has prescribed% )he
fiscal contends that the filing of the complaint before his office already interrupts the
prescription period%
Issue:
4hether or not the filing of information?complaint before the fiscal office
constituting a violation against a special law?ordinance interrupts prescription
Held:
No% )he mere filing of complaint to the fiscalDs office does not interrupt the
running of prescription on offenses punishable by a special law% )he complaint
should have been filed within a reasonable time before the court% It is only then that
the running of the prescriptive period is interrupted% *ct BB0; is the governing law
10
on prescription of crimes punishable by a special law which states that prescription is
only interrupted upon 6udicial proceeding%
Reodica v. Court o! Aeals
G.R. No. 12*066
!uly 8, 1998
"avide, Jr., J.:
Facts:
Isabelita +eodica was allegedly reclessly driving a van and hit !onsol
causing him physical in6uries and damage to property amounting to ( /,340%@@%
)hree days after the accident a complaint was filed before the fiscalDs office against
the petitioner% #he was charged of I+ecless Imprudence +esulting in 'amage to
(roperty with #light (hysical In6ury%I *fter pleading not guilty trial ensued% +)2 of
Maati rendered the decision convicting petitioner of I8uasi offense of recless
imprudence, resulting in damage to property with slight physical in6uriesI with
arresto mayor of ; months imprisonment and a fine of ( 1B,340%@@% (etitioner made
an appeal before the 2* which re<affirmed the lower courtDs decision% In its motion
for reconsideration, petitioner now assails that the court erred in giving its penalty on
comple5 damage to property and slight physical in6uries both being light offenses
over which the +)2 has no 6urisdiction and it canDt impose penalty in e5cess to what
the law authoriAe reversal of decision is still possible on ground of prescription or
lac of 6urisdiction%
Issues:
I% 4hether or not the penalty imposed is correct.
II% 4hether or not recless imprudence resulting to damage to property and
recless imprudence resulting to slight physical in6uries are light felonies.
III% 4hether or not there is a comple5 crime applying *rticle 4/ of the +(2.
I$% 4hether or not the duplicity of the information may be 8uestioned for the
first time on appeal.
$% 4hether or not the +)2 of Maati has 6urisdiction over the case.
$I% 4hether the 8uasi offenses already prescribed%
Held:
I% No% )he proper penalty for recless imprudence resulting to slight
physical in6ury is public censure ,being the penalty ne5t lower in degree to arresto
menor V see the e5ception in the si5th paragraph of *rticle B;3 applies-% )he proper
penalty for recless imprudence resulting to damage to property amounting to
/,340%@@ would be arresto mayor in minimum and medium periods%
II% 7es% +ecless imprudence resulting to slight physical in6uries is a light
felony% (ublic censure is classified under article 03 of +(2 as a light penalty and it
belongs on the graduated scale in *rticle 71 of the +(2 as a penalty ne5t lower to
arresto menor% +ecless imprudence resulting to damage to property is punishable by
a correctional penalty of arresto mayor and thus belongs to less grave felony and not
as a light felony as claimed by petitioner%
III% No% *rt% 4/ on penalty for comple5 crime provides that when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is necessary
a means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its ma5imum period% !oth offenses cannot
constitute a comple5 crime because recless imprudence resulting to slight physical
in6uries is not either a grave or less grave felony% )herefore each felony should be
filed as a separate complaint sub6ect to distinct penalties%
I$% No% +ule 10@, section B of the +ules of 2ourt provides that when two or
more offenses are charged in a single complaint and the accused fails to ob6ect
against it before the trial, the court may convict the accuse to as many offenses as
charged and impose a penalty for each of them% 2omplainant failed to mae the
ob6ection before the trial therefore the right to ob6ect has been waived%
$% No% Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the duration of the penalty
and the fine imposed as prescribed by law to the offense charged% +ecless
imprudence resulting to slight physical in6uries and recless imprudence resulting to
damage to property is within the 6urisdiction of the M)2%
$I% No% 9iling of a complaint in the fiscalDs office involving a felony under
the +(2 is sufficient to interrupt the running of prescription% !ut filing a complaint
under the fiscalDs office involving offenses punished by a special law ,i%e%
ordinance- does not interrupt the running of prescription% *ct BB0; is the governing
law on prescriptions of crimes punishable by a special law which states that
prescription is only interrupted upon 6udicial proceeding%
1B
"residential Ad 'oc (act)(inding Co**ittee v. #esierto
G.R. No. 130140
%cto&e# 2*, 1999
"avide, Jr., %.J.:
Facts:
"n "ctober / 1990, (resident 9idel $% +amos issued *dministrative "rder
No% 1B, creating the (residential *d &oc 9act<9inding 2ommittee on !ehest =oans,
with the 2hairman of the (2:: as 2hairman. the #olicitor :eneral as $ice
2hairman. and one representative each from the "ffice of the C5ecutive #ecretary,
'epartment of 9inance, 'epartment of Justice, 'evelopment !an of the
(hilippines, (hilippine National !an, *sset (rivatiAation )rust, :overnment
2orporate 2ounsel, and the (hilippine C5port and 9oreign =oan :uarantee
2orporation as members% In its 9"E+)CCN)& ,14)&- +C("+) "N !C&C#)
="*N# to (resident +amos, dated 13 July 199B, the 2"MMI))CC reported that the
(hilippine #eeds, Inc%, ,hereafter (#I- of which the respondents in "M!<@<9;<@9;/
were the 'irectors, was one of the twenty<one corporations which obtained behest
loans% "n 0 March 199;, the 2"MMI))CC through "rlando "% #alvador, the (2::
consultant detailed with the 2"MMI))CC, filed with the "M!E'#M*N a sworn
complaint against the 'irectors of (#I namely, Jose K% "sias, (acifico C% Marcos,
Cduardo $% +omualdeA, 9ernando 2% "rdoveAa, and Juanito "rdoveAa. and the
'irectors of the 'evelopment !an of the (hilippines who approved the loans for
violation of paragraphs ,e- and ,g- of #ection B of +epublic *ct No% B@19, otherwise
nown as *nti<:raft and 2orrupt (ractices%
Issue:
4hether or not the imprescriptibility of the right of the #tate to recover ill<
gotten wealth apply to both civil and criminal cases
Held:
No% )he so<called imprescriptibility as provided in #ection 13 of *rticle TI
of the 2onstitution applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill<gotten wealth, and
not to criminal cases, such as the complaint against the respondents in "M!<@<9;<
@9;/% )his is clear from the proceedings of the 2onstitutional 2ommission of 19/;%
#ince the law alleged to have been violated, i%e%, paragraphs ,e- and ,g- of #ection B,
+%*% No% B@19, as amended, is a special law, the applicable rule in the computation
of the prescriptive period is #ection 0 of *ct No% BB0;, as amended, which provides,
F(rescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not nown at the time, from the discovery thereof and
institution of 6udicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment%G In the
present case, it was well<nigh impossible for the #tate, the aggrieved party, to have
nown the violations of +%*% No% B@19 at the time the 8uestioned transactions were
made because, as alleged, the public officials concerned connived or conspired with
the Fbeneficiaries of the loans%G )hus, the prescriptive period for the offenses with
which the respondents in "M!<@<9;<@9;/ were charged should be computed from
the discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such commission%
Salazar v. "eole
G.R. No. 1*1931
'e(te)&e# 23, 2003
%allejo Sr., J.:

Facts:
In 1997, petitioner *nmer #alaAar and Nena Jaucian )imario were charged
with estafa before the =egaApi 2ity +egional )rial 2ourt% )he estafa case allegedly
stemmed from the payment of a chec worth (014,@@@ to private respondent J%7%
!rothers Mareting 2orporation ,J7!M2- through Jerson 7ao for the purchase of
B@@ bags of rice% )he chec was dishonored by drawee (rudential !an as it is
drawn against a closed account% #alaAar replaced said chec with a new one, this
time drawn against #olid !an% It is again dishonored for being drawn against
uncollected deposit ,'*E'-%
)he '*E' means that the account to which the chec was drawn had
sufficient funds% &owever, the fund cannot be used because it was collected against a
deposited chec which is yet to be cleared% )rial ensued% *fter the prosecution
presented its evidence, #alaAar filed a demurrer to evidence with leave of court,
which the trial court granted% In 0@@0, the trial court rendered 6udgment ac8uitting
#alaAar, but ordered her to remit to J7!M2 (014,@@@% )he trial court ruled that the
evidence of the prosecution failed to establish the e5istence of conspiracy beyond
reasonable doubt between the petitioner and the issuer of the chec, )imario% *s a
mere endorser of the chec, #alaAarLs breach of warranty was a good one and did not
amount to estafa under *rticle B13 ,0-,d- of the +evised (enal 2ode% )imario
remained at large% *s a result, #alaAar filed a motion for reconsideration on the civil
aspect of the decision with a plea to be allowed to present evidence% )he trial court
denied the motion% !ecause of the denial of the motion, she filed petition for review
on certiorari before the
14
#upreme 2ourt alleging she was denied due process as the trial court did not give her
the opportunity to adduce evidence to controvert her civil liability%
Issue:
4hether or not #alaAar was denied of due process
Held:
7es% #alaAar should have been given by the trial court the chance to present
her evidence as regards the civil aspect of the case%)he ac8uittal of the accused does
not prevent a 6udgment against him on the civil aspect of the case where ,a- the
ac8uittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is re8uired.
,b- where the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil. ,c- where
the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of
which the accused was ac8uitted% Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is
e5tinguished if there is a finding in the final 6udgment in the criminal action that the
act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not e5ist or where the
accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him% If the accused is
ac8uitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders 6udgment on the civil aspect of
the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the 6udgment of ac8uittal as it
would place the accused in double 6eopardy% &owever, the aggrieved party, the
offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the 6udgment on the civil
aspect of the case within the period therefor%
Ender the +evised +ules of 2riminal (rocedure, the 2ourt e5plained the
demurrer to evidence partaes of a motion to dismiss the case for the failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt% In a case where the accused
files a demurrer to evidence without leave of court, thereby waives his right to
present evidence and submits the case for decision on the basis of the prosecutionLs
evidence he has the right to adduce evidence not only on the criminal aspect, but also
on the civil aspect of the case of the demurrer is denied by the court% In addition, the
2ourt said if the demurrer is granted and the accused is ac8uitted by the court, the
accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the
court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not e5ist%
If the trial court issues an order or renders 6udgment not only granting the
demurrer to evidence of the accused and ac8uitting him but also on the civil liability,
the 6udgment on the civil aspect of the case would be a nullity as it violates the
constitutional right to due process%
"eole v. Beriales+ et al.
G.R. No. +-39962
A(#.l $, 19$6

%onepion, Jr.:
Facts:
)hree men who were charged for the murder of #aturnina on #ept% 1B, 1974%
'uring the hearing on Nov% 0;, 1974, upon motion of the defense the 2ourt ordered
the re<investigation of the case pending submission of the 9iscal of its reports%
2ouple of postponements was made until 'ec% 1B, 1974 hearing when the 2ourt
proceeded with the arraignment and trial in the absence of the 9iscal and its report on
re<investigation, and over the disagreement of the defense% )he 29I of =eyte relied
on the private prosecutor being authoriAed by the 9iscal to present evidence and the
defense presumed to have waived its right over its disagreement% )rial then
proceeded and the B found guilty of the offense% )hus, this appeal on the
constitutional re8uirement of due process%
Issue>
4hether or not due process of law had been observed
Held:
No% 2onstitutional due process was violated, thus, case remanded to 29I for
arraignment and trial% 2ourt should have held in abeyance the trial while the report
on e<investigation was still pending% 2onsistent disregard of the defense ob6ection on
the arraignment, trial, presentation of private prosecutorDs evidence, and rendition of
6udgment violates due process% (rosecutor or 9iscal entrusted with the investigation
is duty bound to tae charge until final termination% )hey shall have direction and
control of the criminal prosecution over private prosecutors%
%obilia "roducts ,nc. v. U*eza-a
G.R. Nos. 1493*$ a"d 149403
Ma#c, 4, 200*
%allejo, Sr., J.:
13
Facts >
4hile EmeAawa was woring in Mobilia (roducts, Inc%, he established
another company, *stem (hilippines 2orporation,with his wife and sister without the
nowledge of the 2ompany% *stem 2ompany engaged inthe same business as
Mobilia (roducts% )hey also recruited the former (roduction Manager of Mobilia
(roducts to wor in their company% EmeAawa and others wanted to accelerate the
maret potentials of *stem by participating in a 9urniture 9air in #ingapore% )he fair
re8uired that the furniture for the e5hibits arrive at a certain date before the e5hibit%
(ressed with time, as *stem had yet no e8uipment and machinery, no staff and no
ready personnel, EmeAawa, with grave abuse of the confidence reposed in him as the
president and manager of Mobilia (roducts, stole prototype furniture from Mobilia
for the e5hibit% *ccused alleged that that there was no valid charge against him
because the resolution authoriAing the filing of the case was approved by a mere
minority of the members of the M(I !oard of 'irectors%
)he trial court dismissed the case for lac of 6urisdiction% )he dispute
between the private complainant and the accused over the ownership of the
properties sub6ect of the charges is intra corporate in nature, and was within the
e5clusive 6urisdiction of the #C2% "n the other hand the appellate court granted the
petition and nullified "rders of the +)2% It ruled that the issue of ownership of the
properties sub6ect of the Information was not an intra<corporate dispute%
Issues:
I% 4hether or not petition for certiorari of the (eople in the 2* assailing the
decision of the decision of the )2 was time<barred%
II% 4hether or not the +)2 had 6urisdiction over the crime charged in the said
Informations
III% 4hether or not the Informations sufficiently charge the felonies of 8ualified
theft and estafa% If in the affirmative, and whether or not all the elements of
8ualified theft and estafa are alleged in the Informations
Held:
I% 7es% &owever, 2ourt still holds that the 2* erred in dismissing the
petition of the (eople of the (hilippines simply because the public prosecutor erred
in not himself filing a motion for reconsideration of the 6oint order of the trial court,
on his perception that by being present during the hearing of the motion for
reconsideration of M(I, he thereby adopted the said motion as of the #tateDs% the
settled rule is that the #tate is not stopped by the mistaes of its officers and
employees% Institution of 2riminal and 2ivil *ctions. *ll criminal actions
commenced by complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the public prosecutor. )he offended party may intervene in the criminal
action personally or by counsel, who will then act as private prosecutor for the
protection of his interest and the interest of the speedy and ine5pensive
administration of 6ustice%
)he intervention of the private offended party, through counsel, and his
prosecution of the case shall be under the control and supervision of the public
prosecutor until the final termination of the case%)he public prosecutor may turn over
the actual prosecution of the criminal case, in the e5ercise of his discretion, but he
may, at any time, tae over the actual conduct of the trial% )he private complainant or
offended party may not undertae such motion for reconsideration or appeal on the
criminal aspect of the case. the offended party or private complainant may file a
motion for reconsideration of such dismissal or ac8uittal or appeal therefrom but
only insofar as the civil aspect thereof is concerned. )he private complainant or
offended party need not secure conformity of the public prosecutor% (ublic and
private prosecutors are not precluded whenever feasible, from filinf a 6oint motion
for the reconsideration of the dismissal of the case or the ac8uittal of the accused, on
the criminal and civil aspects of the cases%
II% 7es% !ased on the material allegations of the Informations in the three
cases, the court a 8uo had e5clusive 6urisdiction over the crimes charged% )he bare
fact that the respondent was the president and general manager of the petitioner
corporation when the crimes charged were allegedly committed and was then a
stocholder thereof does not in itself deprive the court a 8uo of its e5clusive
6urisdiction over the crimes charged% )he property of the corporation is not the
property of the stocholders or members or of its officers who are stocholders%
III% 7es% )he #upreme 2ourt find and so hold that the Informations state all the
essential elements of estafa and 8ualified theft%It was ade8uately alleged that
respondent EmeAawa, being the (resident and :eneral Manager of petitioner M(I,
stole and misappropriated the properties of his employer, more specifically,
petitioner M(I%
Creso v. %ogul
G.R. No. +-*33$3
!u"e 30, 198$
Ganayo, J.:
1;
Facts>
"n *pril 1/, 1977 *ssistant 9iscal (roceso J% de :ala with the approval of
the (rovincial 9iscal filed an information for estafa against Mario 9l% 2respo in the
2ircuit 2riminal 2ourt of =ucena 2ity% 4hen the case was set for arraignment the
accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending
petition for review filed with the #ecretary of Justice of the resolution of the "ffice
of the (rovincial 9iscal for the filing of the information% In an order of *ugust 1,
1977, the presiding 6udge, &is &onor, =eodegario =% Mogul, denied the motion% *
motion for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of *ugust 3, 1977 but
the arraignment was deferred to *ugust 1/, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to
elevate the matter to the appellate court% * petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for a preliminary writ of in6unction was filed by the accused in the 2ourt of
*ppeals% In an order of *ugust 17, 1977 the 2ourt of *ppeals restrained Judge
Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until further orders of
the 2ourt%
In a comment that was filed by the #olicitor :eneral he recommended that
the petition be given due course% "n May 13, 197/ a decision was rendered by the
2ourt of *ppeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining the 6udge from
enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the
'epartment of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review% "n March
00, 197/ then Endersecretary of Justice, &on% 2atalino Macaraig, Jr%, resolving the
petition for review reversed the resolution of the "ffice of the (rovincial 9iscal and
directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against
the accused% * motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the
(rovincial 9iscal dated *pril 1@, 197/ with the trial court, attaching thereto a copy of
the letter of Endersecretary Macaraig, Jr% In an order of *ugust 0, 197/ the private
prosecutor was given time to file an opposition thereto%
"n November 04, 197/ the Judge denied the motion and set the
arraignment, stating that Fthe motionDs trust being to induce this 2ourt to resolve the
innocence of the accused on evidence not before it but on that adduced before the
Endersecretary of Justice, a matter that not only disregards the re8uirements of due
process but also erodes the 2ourtDs independence and integrity%G )he accused then
filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the
issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and?or temporary restraining order in the
2ourt of *ppeals%
* motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was
denied in a resolution of 9ebruary 19, 19/@% &ence this petition for review of said
decision% (etitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs while the
#olicitor :eneral filed a Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that the decision of
the respondent 2ourt of *ppeals be reversed and that respondent Judge be ordered to
dismiss the information%
Issue:
4hether the trial court, acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed
by the (rovincial 9iscal upon instructions of the #ecretary of Justice to whom the
case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the
arraignment and trial on the merits
Held:
7es% )he rule in this 6urisdiction is that once a complaint or information is
filed in 2ourt any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or
ac8uittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the 2ourt% *lthough the fiscal
retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the
case is already in 2ourt he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court% )he 2ourt is
the best and sole 6udge on what to do with the case before it% )he determination of
the case is within its e5clusive 6urisdiction and competence% * motion to dismiss the
case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the 2ourt who has the option to grant
or deny the same% It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of
the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions
of the #ecretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation%
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the
#ecretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the
trial court, the #ecretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from
entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the
complaint or information has already been filed in 2ourt% )he matter should be left
entirely for the determination of the 2ourt%
Serag v. Court o! Aeals
G.R. No. 163818
%cto&e# 20, 200*
%allejo, Sr., J.:
17
Facts:
In the wee hours of May 11, 0@@1, *tty% Jesus #ibya, Jr%, a mayoralty
candidate in #an Joa8uin, Iloilo during the 0@@1 elections, was shot to death in front
of his residence% &is driver, Norberto #alamat III, was also wounded% )he 2riminal
Investigation and 'etection :roup in Iloilo 2ity filed a criminal complaint for
murder and attempted murder against =ino Napao, then incumbent mayor of #an
Joa8uin, and #ebastian #erag% )he private offended party also filed criminal
complaint against #erag and 14 others% )he (rovincial then filed an information for
Murder and an Information for *ttempted Murder with the use of unlicensed firearm
against the accused%
)he accused<petitioners then filed a petition for review of the Joint
+esolution of the (rovincial (rosecutor before the 'epartment of Justice ,'"J-% )he
#ecretary of Justice% Meanwhile, the trial court find a probable cause and issued
warrants of arrest directed against the accused% (ending the resolution by the
#ecretary of Justice of the said petition for review, the proceedings were suspended%
#ubse8uently, however, the arraignment of the accused was set on May 01, 0@@0% It
was, thereafter, reset to June ;, 0@@0 which, by agreement of the prosecution and the
defense, was FintransferrableG in character%
!efore the scheduled arraignment, the #ecretary of Justice issued a
resolution stating that the crime charged be downgraded to &omicide and *ttempted
&omicide% In compliance with the said resolution the (rovincial (rosecutor filed a
Motion for =eave to 9ile a #econd *mended Information for homicide and attempted
homicide in the two cases, and for the court to admit the said second *mended
Informations% "n July 3, however, private offended parties filed a motion for
reconsideration before the #ecretary of Justice assailing the said resolution% )he +)2
ordered the information to be amended and the arraignment pursued% )he private
complainant forthwith assailed the orders of the trial court and the arraignment of the
accused on June ;, 0@@0 via a petition for certiorari in the 2ourt of *ppeals ,2*-%
)he 2* issued a )emporary +estraining "rder en6oining +)2 from proceeding with
the case% In the meantime, the #ecretary of Justice issued a +esolution on November
1/, 0@@0, granting the motion for reconsideration of the private complainant, setting
aside its first +esolution and ordering the prosecutor to reinstate its original
information%
)he petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration of the +esolution of
the #ecretary of Justice but was denied% )hey filed a petition for certiorari before the
2* assailing the resolution% !ut 2* did not act on the same as it laced the necessary
re8uirement of a certification of non<forum shopping%
Issue:
4hether or not, the prosecutor and the +)2 acted with grave abuse of
discretion holding the arraignment of the case

Held:
7es% In fine, the +)2 acted with inordinate and precipitate haste when it
granted the (rovincial (rosecutorDs motion for the admission of the #econd *mended
Information for homicide, ordered the withdrawal of 2riminal 2ase No% 90; for
attempted homicide based on +esolution No% 03/ of the '"J #ecretary, and
arraigned the accused therein for homicide%
)herefore, the pendency of an appeal before the '"J is enough reason for
the deferment of any proceedings in the trial court and petitioner, through the private
prosecutors, correctly moved for the deferment of the admission of the second
amended informations for homicide and attempted homicide% It should be
considered that the motion to defer was even with the conformity of the public
prosecutor and the appearance of the private prosecutors is pursuant to #ection 1;,
+ule 11@ of the 0@@@ +ules on 2riminal (rocedure, to wit>
Intervention of the offended party in criminal action%W4here the civil
action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to
+ule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the
offense%
Roberts v. Court o! Aeals
G.R. No. 113930
Ma#c, *, 1996

"avide, Jr., J.:

Facts:
Cnticed by (epsi 2ola (roducts (hilippines, Inc%Ds FNumber 9ever
(romotionG and its announcement that all holders of crowns and?or caps of (epsi,
Mirinda, Mountain 'ew and #even<Ep bearing the winning B<digit number will win
the full amount of the priAe printed on the crowns?caps, complainants bought (epsi
products in the hope of becoming instant millionaire% 4hen the winning B<digits
1/
number FB49G had several thousand claimants before (epsi, the latter refused to
redeem the (epsi crowns?caps% )hus, complainants filed with the "ffice of the 2ity
(rosecutor of OueAon 2ity complaints for estafa, violation of +%*% No% 794,
otherwise nown as the F2onsumer *ct of the (hilippines, violation of C%"% No% 91B
and violation of *ct No% 0BBB or F*n *ct +elative to Entrue, 'eceptive and
Misleading *dvertisementsG as amended by *ct No% B74@ against (epsiDs officials%

Investigating prosecutor +amon M% :erona recommended the filing of an
information against the petitioners and others for the violation of *rticle B1/ of the
+evised (enal 2ode and the dismissal of the complaints for the violation of *rticle
B13, 0,d- of the +evised (enal 2ode. +%*% No% 7B94. *ct No% 0BBB, as amended by
*ct No% B74@. and C%"% No% 91B% )his was later approved by 2ity (rosecutor
2andido $% +ivera and 'ivision 2hief (rosecution Ismel (% 2asabar%
(etitioners claimed that the decisions of the prosecutors were only made
through the complainantsD threats% "n that same date, the petitioners filed in 2riminal
2ase No% O<9B<4B19/ Motions to #uspend (roceedings and to &old in *beyance
Issuance of 4arrants of *rrest on the ground that they had filed the aforesaid (etition
for +eview%

*cting on the (etition for +eview, 2hief #tate (rosecutor Kenon =% 'e :uia
directed the 2ity (rosecutor of OueAon 2ity to inform the '"J whether the
petitioners have already been arraigned, and if not, to move in court for the
deferment of further proceedings in the case and to elevate to the '"J the entire
records of the case, for the case is being treated as an e5ception pursuant to #ection 4
of 'epartment 2ircular No% 7 dated 03 January 199@% (rivate prosecutor Julio
2ontreras then filed an 5A-Parte Motion for Issuance of 4arrants of *rrest%
2onse8uently, petitioners filed a #upplemental Ergent Motion to hold in *beyance
Issuance of 4arrant of *rrest and to #uspend (roceedings% &e stressed that the '"J
had taen cogniAance of the (etition for +eview by directing the 2ity (rosecutor to
elevate the records of I%#% No% (<44@1 and its related cases and asserted that the
petition for review was an essential part of the petitionersD right to a preliminary
investigation%
+)2 denied petitionersD Motion to #uspend (roceedings and to &old In
*beyance Issuance of 4arrants of *rrest and the public prosecutorDs Motion to
'efer *rraignment and directed the issuance of the warrants of arrest and setting the
arraignment on 0/ June 199B% Moreso, it reiterated that it shall be following the
doctrine laid down in %respo v. Mogul. (etitioners then filed with the 2ourt of
*ppeals a special civil action for ertiorari and prohibition with application for a
temporary restraining order contending that Judge *suncion had acted without or in
e5cess of 6urisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the aforementioned
order of 17 May 199B, but this was liewise denied by the appellate court% )he
'epartment of Justice, ,'"J- dismissed petitionersD petition for the review of the
Joint +esolution of the *ssistant 2ity (rosecutor of OueAon 2ity and denying the
motion to reconsider the dismissal%
Issues:
I% 4hether public respondent Judge *suncion committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying, on the basis of %respo v. Mogul, the motions to
suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance the issuance of warrants of arrest
and to defer arraignment until after the petition for review filed with the
'"J shall have been resolved.
II% 4hether public respondent Judge *suncion committed grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest without e5amining
the records of the preliminary investigation.
III% 4hether the '"J, through its FB49G 2ommittee, gravely abused its
discretion in dismissing the petition for review on the following bases> ,a-
the resolution of public respondent 2ourt of *ppeals denying the
application for a writ of preliminary in6unction and ,b- of public respondent
*suncionDs denial of the abovementioned motions.
I$% 4hether public respondent 2ourt of *ppeals committed grave abuse of
discretion ,a- in denying the motion for a writ of preliminary in6unction
solely on the ground that public respondent *suncion had already before
him the Joint +esolution of the investigating prosecutor when he ordered
the issuance of the warrants of arrest, and ,b- in ultimately dismissing the
petition on the ground of mootness since the '"J has dismissed the petition
for review.
$% 4hether the #upreme 2ourt may determine in these proceedings the
e5istence of probable cause either for the issuance of warrants of arrest
against the petitioners or for their prosecution for the crime of estafa%
Held:
I% 7es% )here is nothing in %respo v. Mogul which bars the '"J from
taing cogniAance of an appeal, by way of a petition for review, by an accused in a
criminal case from an unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor% It merely
advised the '"J to, Fas far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for
review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has
already been filed in 2ourt%G )he doctrine laid down in %respo could not have
19
intended otherwise without doing violence to, or repealing, the last paragraph of
#ection 4, +ule 110 of the +ules of 2ourt which recogniAes the authority of the
#ecretary of Justice to reverse the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or
chief state prosecutor upon petition by a proper party%

)he rule therefore in this 6urisdiction is that once a complaint or information
is filed in 2ourt any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or
ac8uittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the court% *lthough the fiscal
retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the
case is already in court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court% )he court is
the best and sole 6udge on what to do with the case before it% )he determination of
the case is within its e5clusive 6urisdiction and competence% * motion to dismiss the
case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the 2ourt who has the option to grant
or deny the same% It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of
the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions
of the #ecretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation%

4hether to approve or disapprove the stand taen by the prosecution is not
the e5ercise of discretion re8uired in cases lie this% )he trial 6udge must himself be
convinced that there was indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused, and this
conclusion can be arrived at only after an assessment of the evidence in the
possession of the prosecution% 4hat was imperatively re8uired was the trial 6udgeDs
own assessment of such evidence, it not being sufficient for the valid and proper
e5ercise of 6udicial discretion merely to accept the prosecutionDs word for its
supposed insufficiency%

II% 7es. #ection 0, *rticle III of the present 2onstitution provides that no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall Issue e5cept upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the 6udge after e5amination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce%

* warrant can Issue only if the 6udge is satisfied after an e5amination in
writing and under oath of the complainant and the witnesses, in the form of searching
8uestions and answers, that a probable cause e5ists and that there is a necessity of
placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
6ustice% )hus the following may Issue a warrant of arrest> ,a- the Metropolitan
)rial 2ourts ,Me)2s- e5cept those in the National 2apital +egion. ,b- Municipal
)rial 2ourts ,M)2s-. and ,c- Municipal 2ircuit )rial 2ourts ,M2)2s- in cases
falling within their e5clusive original 6urisdiction. in cases covered by the rule on
summary procedure where the accused fails to appear when re8uired. and in cases
filed with them which are cogniAable by the +egional )rial 2ourts ,+)2s-

"n the other hand, the 6udge of the Metropolitan )rial 2ourts in the
National 2apital +egion ,Me)2s<N2+- and the +)2s in cases filed with them after
appropriate preliminary investigations conducted by officers authoriAed to do so
other than 6udges of Me)2s, M)2s and M2)2s, is not re8uired to personally
e5amine the complainant and the witnesses, but following established doctrine and
procedure, he shall>

a- personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the
fiscal regarding the e5istence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
Issue a warrant of arrest. or
b- if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscalDs report and re8uire the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the e5istence of
probable cause%
In satisfying himself of the e5istence of a probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, the 6udge, following established doctrine and procedure, may
either>
a- +ely upon the fiscalDs certification of the e5istence of probable cause
whether or not the case is cogniAable only by the +egional )rial 2ourt and
on the basis thereof, Issue a warrant of arrest% 5 5 5
2learly, when respondent Judge *suncion Issued the assailed order of 17
May 199B directing, among other things, the issuance of warrants of arrest, he had
only the information, amended information, and Joint +esolution as bases thereof%
&e did not have the records or evidence supporting the prosecutorDs finding of
probable cause% *nd strangely enough, he made no specific finding of probable
cause. he merely directed the issuance of warrants of arrest Fafter June 01, 199B%G It
may, however, be argued that the directive presupposes a finding of probable cause%
!ut then compliance with a constitutional re8uirement for the protection of
individual liberty cannot be left to presupposition, con6ecture, or even convincing
logic%

III% 7es% &ence, the '"J committed grave abuse of discretion when it
e5ecuted on 0B July 199B a unilateral volte-2ae, which was even unprovoed by a
formal pleading to accomplish the same end, by dismissing the petition for review% It
dismissed the petition simply because it thought that a review of the Joint +esolution
0@
would be an e5ercise in futility in that any further action on the part of the
'epartment would depend on the sound discretion of the trial court, and that the
latterDs denial of the motion to defer arraignment filed at the instance of the '"J was
clearly an e5ercise of that discretion or was, in effect, a signal to the 'epartment that
the determination of the case is within the courtDs e5clusive 6urisdiction and
competence% )his infirmity becomes more pronounced because the reason adduced
by the respondent Judge for his denial of the motions to suspend proceedings and
hold in abeyance issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment finds, as yet,
no support in %respo.

I$% 7es% )he #upreme 2ourt was unable to agree with dis8uisition of
appellate court, for the latter merely assumes at least two things> ,1- that respondent
Judge *suncion had read and relied on the Joint +esolution and ,0- he was
convinced that probable cause e5ists for the issuance of the warrants of arrest against
the petitioners% Nothing in the records provides reasonable basis for these
assumptions% In his assailed order, the respondent Judge made no mention of the
Joint +esolution, which was attached to the records of 2riminal 2ase No% O<9B<
4B19/ on 00 *pril 199B% Neither did he state that he found probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest% *nd, for an undivinable reason, he directed the
issuance of warrants of arrest only Fafter June 01, 199B%G If he did read the Joint
+esolution and, in so reading, found probable cause, there was absolutely no reason
at all to delay for more than one month the issuance of warrants of arrest% )he most
probable e5planation for such delay could be that the respondent Judge had actually
wanted to wait for a little while for the '"J to resolve the petition for review%

$% No% In criminal prosecutions, the determination of probable cause
may either be an e5ecutive or a 6udicial prerogative%

Judges and (rosecutors alie should distinguish the preliminary in8uiry
which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from a
preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be
&eld for trial or released% Cven if the two in8uiries are conducted in the course of one
and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the ob6ectives% )he
determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge% )he
preliminary investigation proper < whether or not there is reasonable ground to
believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or
not he should be sub6ected to the e5pense, rigors and embarrassment of trial< is the
function of the (rosecutor%

)he first ind of preliminary investigation is e5ecutive in nature% It is part of
the prosecutionDs 6ob% )he second ind of preliminary investigation which is more
properly called preliminary e5amination is 6udicial in nature and is lodged with the
6udge% "rdinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this 2ourt%
Its duty in an appropriate case is confined to the Issue of whether the e5ecutive or
6udicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in
e5cess of 6urisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of
6urisdiction% )his is consistent with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may
not be restrained or stayed by in6unction, preliminary or final% )here are, however,
e5ceptions to this rule% *mong the e5ceptions are> ,a- )o afford ade8uate protection
to the constitutional rights of the accused. ,b- 4hen necessary for the orderly
administration of 6ustice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions. ,c- 4hen
there is a pre<6udicial 8uestion which is sub judie< ,d- 4hen the acts of the officer
are without or in e5cess of authority. ,e- 4here the prosecution is under an invalid
law, ordinance or regulation. ,f- 4hen double 6eopardy is clearly apparent. ,g-
4here the court has no 6urisdiction over the offense. ,h- 4here it is a case of
persecution rather than prosecution. ,i- 4here the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by the lust for vengeance. ,6- 4hen there is clearly no pri$a 2aie case
against the accused and a motion. and ,- (reliminary in6unction has been Issued by
the #upreme 2ourt to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners

Inevitably, the petitioners would be e5posed to the harassments of warrants
of arrest Issued by such courts and to huge e5penditures for premiums on bail bonds
and for travels from one court to another throughout the length and breadth of the
archipelago for their arraignments and trials in such cases% 4orse, the filing of these
staggering number of cases would necessarily affect the trial calendar of our
overburdened 6udges and tae much of their attention, time, and energy, which they
could devote to other e8ually, if not more, important cases% #uch a frightful scenario
would seriously affect the orderly administration of 6ustice, or cause oppression or
multiplicity of actions < a situation already long conceded by this 2ourt to be an
e5ception to the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or
stayed by in6unction%
"eole o! the "hiliines v. Sunongco
G.R. No. +-4266*
!u"e 30, 1988

%ortes, J.:

Facts:
01
Juanita *ngeles, the offended party, left her residence at &agonoy, !ulacan to
get rice from the +2* warehouse of 'r% =ansan at :uiguinto !ulacan with !enita
9abian )hey rode a passenger 6eep driven by $irgilio :an% *s they reached the south
approach of )abang !ridge, :uiguinto !ulacan, a car, driven by *rsenio 2alayag,
overtoo them and stopped right in front of their 6eep, thus forcing them to stop%
)hereafter, the three passengers #ilvestre #unpongco, &erminigildo #unpongco and
!en6amin :abriel alighted from the car and boarded the 6eep, after which #ilvestre
#unpongco co ordered its driver to proceed to the old road% #ilvestre #unpongco sat
at the bac of Juanita *ngeles, !en6amin :abriel sat behind the driver, and
&erminigildo #unpongco forced himself at the left side of the driver, while *rsenio
2alayag followed in the 2ar he was driving%

Epon reaching an uninhabited place on the old road, #ilvestre #unpongco
abducted herein complainant% )hey preceded towards Manila, then to the &illtop
&otel in )agaytay 2ity, which is owned by 9ederico #untay, a first cousin of accused
#ilvestre #unpongco where the latter raped the offended party twice% Juanita was
then rescued by her brother 'r% Jose *ngeles with some 2I# agents%

'uring the trial of the criminal case, specifically, after the defense had started
presenting its evidence but before #ilvestre #unpongco too the witness stand, said
accused 6umped bail and it was not until si5 years thereafter that he was arrested and
the trial resumed% *ccording to #ilvestre, he and the complainant actually eloped and
that the latter was only forced by her brother to file the case against him% )his was
corroborated by the other accused<appellants *rsenio 2alayag and &erminigildo
#unpongco%

)he 2ourt of 9irst Instance of !ulacan convicted the three accused<
appellants for the comple5 crime of forcible abduction with rape%

Issue:
4hether or not the trial court erred in holding that it had ac8uired 6urisdiction to
try the case

Held:
No% )he alleged lac of 6urisdiction of the trial court is assailed by accused<
appellants #ilvestre #unpongco and *rsenio 2alayag on the ground that the sworn
complaint of Juanita *ngeles was not formally offered in evidence by the
prosecution during the trial of the case% *rticle B44 of the +evised (enal 2ode and
+ule 11@ section 3 ,formerly section 4 of the +evised +ules of 2ourt- of the 19/3
+ules on 2riminal (rocedure re8uire that the offenses of abduction and rape and
other offenses which cannot be prosecuted de o2iio shall not be prosecuted e5cept
upon complaint filed by the "ffended party% 2ompliance with this is a 6urisdictional
and not merely a formal re8uirement% )he +ules of 2ourt, specifically +ule 1B0,
#ection B3, further provides that evidence which has not been formally offered shall
not be considered by the court% *pplying these rules to the case at bar it is admitted
that the sworn complaint of Juanita *ngeles was not formally offered in evidence by
the prosecution, )his failure to adhere to the rules however is not fatal and did not
oust the court of its 6urisdiction to hear and decide the case% Jurisprudence reveals
that if the complaint in a case which cannot be prosecuted de oficio is forwarded to
the trial court as part of the records of the preliminary investigation of the case, the
court can tae 6udicial notice of the same without the necessity of its formal
introduction as evidence for the prosecution%
"ilail v. ,bay)So*era
G.R. No. 80116
!u"e 30, 1989
Regalado, J.:
Facts:
(etitioner Imelda Manalaysay (ilapil, a 9ilipino citiAen, and private
respondent Crich Cehard :eiling, a :erman national, were married before the
+egistrar of !irths, Marriages and 'eaths at 9riedensweiler in the 9ederal +epublic
of :ermany%

*fter about three and a half years of marriage, private respondent initiated a
divorce proceeding against petitioner in :ermany before the #choneberg =ocal 2ourt
which granted the same% (etitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal
separation, support and separation of property before the +egional )rial 2ourt of
Manila%

More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree in :ermany,
private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the 2ity 9iscal of Manila
alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner Ihad an affair with a
certain 4illiam 2hia and with yet another man named Jesus 2hua sometime%

*ssistant 9iscal Jacinto *% de los +eyes, Jr%, after the corresponding
investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence% &owever, upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution
directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner% (etitioner
then filed a petition with the #ecretary of Justice asing that the aforesaid resolution
00
of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed% )he
#ecretary of Justice, through the 2hief #tate (rosecutor, gave due course to both
petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the 'epartment of Justice
Iif the accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer
further proceedingsI and to elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for
review% (etitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her
arraignment and to suspend further proceedings thereon% *s a conse8uence, Judge
=eonardo 2ruA suspended proceedings in 2riminal 2ase No% /7<304B4% "n the other
hand, respondent 6udge merely reset the date of the arraignment in 2riminal 2ase
No% /7<304B3 to *pril ;, 19/7% !efore such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the
cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said
2riminal 2ase No% /7<304B3 until after the resolution of the petition for review then
pending before the #ecretary of Justice% * motion to 8uash was also filed in the same
case on the ground of lac of 6urisdiction, which motion was denied by the
respondent 6udge% )he same order also directed the arraignment of both accused
therein, that is, petitioner and 4illiam 2hia% )he latter entered a plea of not guilty
while the petitioner refused to be arraigned% #uch refusal of the petitioner being
considered by respondent 6udge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined
and the former was ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment%
=ater, private respondent entered a plea of not guil
Issue:
4hether or not it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for
adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be
unsevered and e5isting at the time of the institution of the action by the former
against the latter

Held:
7es% (rivate respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no
legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit%

Ender *rticle B44 of the +evised (enal 2ode, the crime of adultery cannot
be prosecuted e5cept upon a sworn written complaint filed by the o22ended spouse% It
has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with
this rule is a 6urisdictional, and not merely a formal, re8uirement% )he law
specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person
who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else%
2orollary to such e5clusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the
action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal
representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action% )his is a
familiar and e5press rule in civil actions. in fact, lac of legal capacity to sue, as a
ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the
complaint or petition% It is indispensable that the status and capacity of the
complainant to commence the action be definitely established and, as already
demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably e5ist as of the time he
initiates the action% It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be
determined by his status be2ore or subseBuent to the commencement thereof, where
such capacity or status e5isted prior to but ceased before, or was ac8uired subse8uent
to but did not e5ist at the time of, the institution of the case%
"eole o! the "hiliines s. ,larde
G.R. No. +-*8*9*
%cto&e# 10, 1983

5solin,J.:

Facts:
Cfraim #antibaXeA was married to 2ecile #oriano% #ometime during the last
wee of "ctober, 19/@, while Cfraim went on his normal wor routine to (assi #ugar
Millsite in (assi Iloilo, his son Cdmund told him that his wife 2ecile #orianosos has
been unfaithful and has been having illicit relationship with *tty% !ob Javellana% &e
then devised a plan of catching his wife and her paramour in se5ual intercourse% &e
was later shown the photographs taen inside their master bedroom% Cfraim charged
adultery against his wife and her lover% !efore the conclusion of the preliminary
investigation then being conducted by the 9iscalLs "ffice, Cfraim went to the Enited
#tates for medical attention with his cancer% *fter several re8uests for postponement,
private respondents submitted their memorandum to the 9iscalLs "ffice% 9iscal
:alveA issued a resolution finding the e5istence of a pri$a 2aie case for adultery
against private respondents% (rivate respondents, upon the death of Cfraim, filed a
motion to 8uash the information on the ground that the court did not ac8uire
6urisdiction over the offense charged, as the offended party had not filed the re8uired
complaint pursuant to the provisions of *rticle B44 of the +evised (enal 2ode and
#ection 4, +ule 11@ of the +ules of 2ourt to the effect that Ithe crimes of adultery
and concubinage shall not be prosecuted e5cept upon a complaint filed and the
offended spouseG%

Issue:
4hether or not there has been compliance with the re8uirement of *rticle B44 of
the +evised (enal 2ode, reiterated in #ection 4, +ule 11@ of the +ules of 2ourt, that
0B
Ithe crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted e5cept upon a
complaint filed by the offended party

Held:
7es% In the case at bar, the desire of the offended party, Cfraim #antibaXeA, to
bring his wife and her alleged paramour to 6ustice is only too evident% #uch
determination of purpose on his part is amply demonstrated in the dispatch by which
he filed his complaint with the police% )he ruling in #antos is not applicable to the
case at bar% In that case, the IsalaysayI e5ecuted by complainant !ansuelo was not
considered the complaint contemplated by *rticle B44 of the +evised (enal 2ode
because it was a mere narration of how the crime of rape was committed against her%
&owever, in the affidavit<complainant submitted by Cfraim #antibaXeA, the latter not
only narrated the 9acts and circumstances constituting the crime of adultery, but he
also e5plicitly and categorically charged private respondents with the said offense%

It must be noted, however, that this error could be corrected without
sustaining the motion to 8uash and dismissing the case% (ursuant to section I of
paragraph ,a- of (residential 'ecree No% 77, under which the *ssistant 2ity 9iscal
conducted the preliminary investigation the statement of the complainant was sworn
to before the aforesaid Investigating 9iscal% *ssuming that the recitals in said worn
statement contain all those re8uired of a complaint under the rules in copy of said
verified < statement of the complainant should be filed 4ith respondent 2ourt in
order to comply with the re8uirements of *rticle B;@ of the +evised (enal 2ode.
otherwise, the respondent 9iscal should file with said court a verified complaint of
the offended party%
"eole o! the "hiliines v. Bugtong
G.R. No. $*8*3
!a"ua#y 31, 1989

8ernan, %.J.<

Facts:
Irene 2utiam, the minor complainant with a mental age of between five ,3- and
eight ,/- years and a numerical I%O% of 47, was sent by her mother =uisa 2utiam to
the house of *ndres !ugtong, the herein accused, to pay her account to the latter in
the amount of (1@%@@-% 4itness claimed that when she handed the money to *ndres
!ugtong, the latter grabbed her other hand and placed her on the bed, and when she
tried to shout, the accused covered her mouth with his hand and allegedly threatened
her by saying> LIf you will report the matter, I will ill you, anyway our house are
near each otherG% *fter having uttered those threatening words, Irene was apparently
released from the hold of the accused% )he incident only surfaced when the mother of
the complainant learned of the pregnancy of the victim% &ence, a complaint for rape
was filed against !ugtong% "n the contrary, !ugtong alleged that the se5ual
intercourse was consented and that it was the victim who initiated the same% )he
lower court convicted !ugtong and sentenced him to a penalty of reclusion perpetua%
*ppellant then contended that as rape is a personal offense which, under *rticle BB4
of the +evised (enal 2ode and #ection 4, +ule 11@ of the +ules of 2ourt, now
#ection 3, +ule 11@ of the 19/3 +ules on 2riminal (rocedure, must be prosecuted
upon a complaint filed by the offended party, the trial court erred in assuming
6urisdiction over the instant case on the basis of the Information signed by the fiscal
alone%

Issues:
I% 4hether or not the lower court erred in taing 6urisdiction of the case.
II% 4hether or not the lower court erred in convicting the accused as defined in
art% BB3 ,1- and ,0-, as amended, of the +evised (enal 2ode. and
III% 4hether or not the lower court erred in not dismissing the case%
Held:
1- No% It is true that pursuant to the third paragraph of *rt% B44 of the +evised
(enal 2ode, the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall
not be prosecuted e5cept upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents%
)he provision does not determine, however, the 6urisdiction of our courts over the
offenses therein enumerated% It could not affect said 6urisdiction, because the same is
governed by the Judiciary *ct of 194/, not by the +evised (enal 2ode, which deals
primarily with the definition of crimes and the factors pertinent to the punishment of
the culprit% )he complaint re8uired in said *rticle is merely a condition precedent to
the e5ercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties%
*nd such condition has been imposed out of consideration for the offended woman
and her family who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go
through, with the scandal of a public trial%

0- 7es. 4hile the conviction of accused<appellant under paragraphs ,1- and
,0- of *rticle BB3 of the +evised (enal 2ode appears to be an innocuous error as
these paragraphs refer merely to the modes of commission of the same crime of rape
punishable by the same penalty of relusion perpetua, the harm inflicted upon
accused<appellant gains considerable proportion when we consider not only the no
win situation in which appellant was placed by reason of such conviction, but more
importantly, the surprise attendant to his conviction for a crime under a mode of
commission different from that alleged in the information% *s herein appellant was
04
tried on an information charging him with rape committed thru force and
intimidation, his conviction for rape committed when the woman is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious would be violative of his constitutional right as an
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him%

B- No. )he conviction of accused<appellant should not be set aside
altogether% "nly his conviction under par% ,0- of *rticle BB3 of the +evised (enal
2ode is nullified as his guilt of the crime of rape committed thru force and
intimidation, as charged in the Information, has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt%
"eole o! the "hiliines v. Atienza
G.R. No. 131820
Fe&#ua#y 29, 2000

Bellosillo, J.:

Facts:
+olando *tienAa was charged before the +egional )rial 2ourt of #an Jose,
2amarines #ur, with rape through force and intimidation against Maria )heresa
"bias, a 1B<year old minor having a mental capacity of an eight year old child% )he
trial court found the testimony of private complainant more credible than the denial
of the accused after noting the simple manner by which private complainant testified,
with no sign of shuffling or falsehood% Moreover, in addition to finding that rape was
indeed committed through force the trial court concluded that the accused would still
be liable for rape, even if no such force was e5erted, considering the mental age of
private complainant which was that of an eight ,/-<year old child% *ccordingly, the
he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of relusion perpetua and ordered to pay
private complainant (3@,@@@%@@ as civil indemnity, plus the costs%
*ccused<appellant contends in this appeal that the trial court erred in finding
him guilty of rape as defined in par% ,0-, *rt% BB314 of the +evised (enal 2ode,
providing for a mode of commission different from that charged in the Information,
i%e%, while the Information charged him with rape committed through force and
intimidation as defined in par% ,1-, *rt% BB3, he was nevertheless eventually convicted
of rape under par% ,0- thereof, i%e%, rape of a woman who was deprived of reason,
including those with the mental capacity of a child below twelve ,10- years old%

Issue:
4hether or not the accused was deprived of his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him

Held:
No. )he trial court did not find him guilty solely of rape committed under
par% ,0-, *rt% BB3, of the +evised (enal 2ode%1; "n the contrary, a plain reading of
the appealed 'ecision readily shows that the primary basis of his conviction was the
finding that he had carnal nowledge of the thirteen ,1B-<year old private
complainant through force and intimidation as properly charged in the Information%
Cven though private complainantLs subnormal mental capacity was not alleged in the
Information, hence, conviction under par% ,0-, *rt% BB3, of the +evised (enal 2ode
would normally be violative of accused<appellantLs constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,17 it cannot be denied
however that he did not ob6ect to the presentation of the doctor who was precisely
called by the prosecution as its first witness to testify on private complainantLs
subnormal mental capacity, that is, although the latter was already thirteen ,1B- years
old at the time of the incident, her mental capacity was e8uivalent only to that of an
eight ,/-<year old child% instead of ob6ecting outright to the aforementioned
prosecution evidence on the ground that private complainantLs alleged subnormal
mental capacity was not properly alleged in the Information, the defense in fact
waived this procedural infirmity by presenting evidence of its own to prove the
contrary, that is, that private complainant was normal as shown by her Clementary
#chool (ermanent +ecord or 'C2# 9orm No% 1B7<*%

Cven assuming arguendo that accused<appellantLs conviction under par% ,0-
of *rt% BB3 of the +evised (enal 2ode should be set aside, he is nevertheless still
liable for rape committed through force and intimidation since his guilt thereof, as
properly charged in the Information, has been proved beyond reasonable doubt%

"eole o! the "hiliines v. %aglente
G.R. Nos. 124**9-66
A(#.l 30, 1999

Mendoza, J.:

Facts:
*ccused<appellant Criberto Maglente was found guilty of eight ,/- counts of
rape as committed against his eldest daughter Maylene Maglente and was sentenced
in each case, to suffer the penalty of death%
"n appeal, accused<appellant claimed that the prosecutionDs evidence was
contradictory and was flawed due to serious inconsistencies and improbabilities in
material points% &e cites the testimony of complainant on direct e5amination that she
remembered the dates she was allegedly raped by accused<appellant because she
03
wrote them down and her answer to the 8uestion of the court that the dates were
written on the piece of paper% *ccused<appellant also alleged the insufficiency of the
evidence which should have ac8uitted him instead including that presented for the
special 8ualifying circumstances of age and relationship%

Issue:
4hether or not the special 8ualifying circumstances of age and relationship of
the accused and the victim be admitted despite them not being alleged in the
information

Held:
No. )hat the trial court erred in applying in these cases the provision of *rt%
BB3 of the +evised (enal 2ode, as amended by 11 of +%*% No% 7;39, that the penalty
of death shall be imposed on the offender in rape cases if the victim is under eighteen
,1/- years of age and the offender is a parent of the victim% )he concurrence of the
minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender is a special 8ualifying
circumstance which should be both alleged and proved11U170 with certainty in order
to warrant the imposition of the death penalty% In these cases, complainant never said
she was below 1/ years of age when she was allegedly raped by her father on any of
the dates stated in her complaints%

*t all events, it is the burden of the prosecution to prove with certainty the
fact that the victim was below 1/ when the rapes were committed in order to 6ustify
the imposition of the death penalty% )he fact that accused<appellant has not denied
the allegation in the complaints that Mylene was below 1/ years of age when any of
the crimes was committed cannot mae up for the failure of the prosecution to
discharge its burden% !ecause of its failure to discharge this burden and the
corresponding failure of the trial court to mae a categorical finding as to the
minority of the victim, we are constrained to hold that the 8ualifying circumstance of
minority and relationship cannot be appreciated in these cases% It is different with
regard to the relationship of the offended party and accused<appellant, because the
latter admitted that complainant is his daughter% (erforce, the death penalty imposed
by the trial court in each of the eight ,/- cases should be reduced to relusion
perpetua as provided in the second paragraph of *rt% BB3 of the +evised (enal 2ode,
as amended%
"eole o! the "hiliines v. A.uino
G.R. Nos. 144340-42
Auust 6, 2002
Per %uria$:

Facts:
*ppellant +odelio *8uino filed a motion for reconsideration and ased before
the #upreme 2ourt to reconsider its 'ecision of *pril 17, 0@@0, which &eld him
guilty of 8ualified rape committed against his 3 year old niece% *ccording to *8uino,
he should only be convicted of simple rape because while the age of the complainant
as well as her relationship to the accused<appellant were stated in the Information,
the same were not alleged particularly to 8ualify the offense charged% *ppellant
contends that this failure to charge him specifically with the 8ualified offense bars
the imposition of the death penalty upon him%

Issue:
4hether or not the failure in the Information to indicate the special
8ualifying circumstances of age and relationship is tantamount to the modification of
the offense from 8ualified rape to simple rape

Held:
No. Oualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words
such as 8ualifying or 8ualified by to properly 8ualify an offense% )he #upreme 2ourt
has repeatedly 8ualified cases of rape where the twin circumstances of minority and
relationship have been specifically alleged in the Information even Cit1out the use of
the descriptive words F8ualifyingG or F8ualified byG% *rticle 0;;<! of the +evised
(enal 2ode, as amended by +* No% /B3B, states that the death penalty shall be
imposed in the crime of rape if any of the aggravating?8ualifying circumstances
mentioned in *rticle 0;;<! is present% (rior to +* No% /B3B, *rticle BB3 of the
+evised (enal 2ode, as amended by +* No% 7;39, penaliAed 8ualified rape with the
death penalty when any of the attendant circumstances mentioned in *rticle BB3 was
present% )he present law uses the words aggravating?8ualifying circumstances in
referring to the attendant circumstances that 8ualify rape to a heinous crime
punishable by death% )he old law referred to these circumstances as the attendant
circumstances%
#ection / of +ule 11@ re8uires that the Information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting
the offense, and spei2y its Buali2ying and aggravating iru$stanes. #ection /
merely re8uires the Information to spei2y the circumstances% #ection / does not
re8uire the use of the words 8ualifying or 8ualified by to refer to the circumstances
which raise the category of an offense% It is not the use of the words 8ualifying or
0;
8ualified by that raises a crime to a higher category, but the specific allegation of an
attendant circumstance which adds the essential element raising the crime to a higher
category% In the instant case, the attendant circumstances of minority and relationship
were specifically alleged in the Information precisely to 8ualify the offense of simple
rape to 8ualified rape% )he absence of the words 8ualifying or 8ualified by cannot
prevent the rape from 8ualifying as a heinous crime provided these two
circumstances are specifically alleged in the Information and proved beyond
reasonable doubt%

#ections / and 9 of +ule 11@ merely re8uire that the Information allege,
spei2y or enu$erate the attendant circumstances mentioned in the law to 8ualify the
offense% )hese circumstances need not be preceded by the words
aggravating?8ualifying, 8ualifying, or 8ualified by to be considered as 8ualifying
circumstances% It is sufficient that these circumstances be specified in the
Information to apprise the accused of the charges against him to enable him to
prepare fully for his defense, thus precluding surprises during the trial% 4hen the
prosecution specifically alleges in the Information the circumstances mentioned in
the law as 8ualifying the crime, and succeeds in proving them beyond reasonable
doubt, the 2ourt is constrained to impose the higher penalty mandated by law% )his
includes the death penalty in proper cases% )he words Faggravating?8ualifyingG,
F8ualifyingG, F8ualified byG, FaggravatingG, or Faggravated byG need not be
e5pressly stated as long as the particular attendant circumstances are specified in the
Information%
"eole o! the "hiliines v. Sandoval
G.R. Nos. 13262*-31
/ece)&e# 18, 2000

Dnares-Santiago, J.:

Facts:
9or ravishing his two ,0- minor step<daughters, Noel #andoval was charged
in seven ,7- separate Informations with seven ,7- counts of +ape, five of which were
committed against )eresa Micu, then thirteen ,1B- years old, and two counts of
statutory rape committed against $ictoria +hea Micu, then only eleven ,11- years old
as evidenced by her !irth 2ertificate% *ccused<appellant was arraigned on July 0B,
1997 for the first five ,3- counts of rape, wherein he pleaded not guilty% )he
following day, the (ublic (rosecutor filed a Motion for =eave to *mend the five ,3-
criminal complaints to allege the relationship of the victim and the accused% "n July
B1, 1997, accused<appellant was scheduled to be arraigned for the other two ,0-
counts of rape but he failed to appear because of lac of notice on the (rovincial
4arden% *t this point, the (ublic (rosecutor called the attention of the 2ourt to the
*mended Informations he filed in the first five ,3- cases, to which accused<appellant
has already been arraigned and has pleaded not guilty on July 0B, 1997% 2ounsel for
the defense ob6ected on the ground that the amendment would pre6udice the right of
accused<appellant%
Issue:
4hether or not the 8ualifying circumstance of relationship should be
appreciated notwithstanding the fact that, at the time of the alleged commission of
the rape, the accused was not yet married to the victimDs mother

Held:
No. *rticle BB3 of the +evised (enal 2ode, as amended by #ection 11 of +%*%
7;39 that where the victim of the crime of rape is under eighteen ,1/- years of age
and the offender is a common<law spouse of the parent of the victim, the death
penalty shall be imposed% )his is one of the seven ,7- modes enumerated in #ection
11 of +%*% No% 7;39 which are considered special circumstances specifically
applicable to the crime of rape% In the subse8uent cases of People v. =lao and People
v. Medina, it was ruled that the seven new attendant circumstances in #ection 11 of
+%*% No% 7;39 partae of the nature of 8ualifying circumstances and not merely
aggravating circumstances, since said 8ualifying circumstances are punishable by the
single indivisible penalty of death and not by relusion perpetua to death% *
8ualifying circumstance increases it to a higher penalty while an aggravating
circumstance affects only the period of the penalty but does not increase it to a
higher degree% Enlie a generic aggravating circumstance which may be proved even
if not alleged, a 8ualifying aggravating circumstance cannot be proved as such unless
alleged in the information%

* reading of the Information for the rape of )eresa Micu filed against
accused<appellant reveals that he was merely charged with the crime of simple rape%
)he fact that accused<appellant is the common<law spouse of the victims parent is
not alleged in the Information% 4hat was stated therein was only the minority of the
victim% )he elements of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender
must be both alleged% *s such, the special 8ualifying circumstance stated in #ection
11 of +* 7;39 was not properly pleaded in the Information% )hus, the penalty of
death prescribed in +* 7;39 cannot be imposed on accused<appellant% Indeed, it
would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against
him and, conse8uently, a denial of due process if he is charged with simple rape and
be convicted of its 8ualified form punishable with death although the attendant
07
circumstances 8ualifying the offense and resulting in the capital punishment was not
alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned%
)he amendment sought by the prosecution of the five informations, in order to
allege the relationship of accused<appellant to the victim, were clearly substantial in
character as they had the effect of changing the crime charged, thereby e5posing
accused<appellant to a higher penalty% #uch amendment can no longer be done after
accused<appellant has pleaded to the Information for simple rape without violating
his constitutional rights%

"eole o! the "hiliines v. "eralta
G.R. No. +-6$$02
!a"ua#y 18, 1991

8ernan, %.J.:

Facts:
*ntonio (eralta alias I)oniongI was &eld by the lower court guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the comple5 crime of murder with double less serious physical
in6uries for shooting several times Margarita )alleser, Maura )alleser and Jonalyn
)alleser, resulting to the death of Margarita )alleser and less serious physical in6uries
to Maura )alleser and Jonalyn )alleser% )he lower court considered treachery and
evident premeditation as 8ualifying circumstances but found that no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the crime% (eralta sought the
reversal of the 6udgment on the ground that contrary to the provisions of the +ules of
2riminal (rocedure, he was charged with more than one offense in the information%
&e asserted that the one grave and two less grave offenses charged against him were
not the result of a single act but of several separate and independent acts as shown by
the recovery at the scene of the crime of eleven empty shells and a slug, and the
resulting in6uries suffered by the three victims in the different parts of their bodies%

"n the other hand, the #olicitor :eneral opined that appellant may not now
on appeal raise the issue of the defect in the information% *ppellant waived his right
to ob6ect thereto when he went to trial and presented evidence on his behalf without
raising said ob6ection% &owever, the #olicitor :eneral states that in imposing the
single penalty of reclusion perpetua, the lower court in effect convicted appellant of
the crime of murder only% &e agreed with the appellant that the crime committed was
not the comple5 crime of murder with double less serious physical in6uries% &e noted
that the in6uries sustained by the three victims were not the result of a single act as
there is no evidence that the carbine used was an automatic one% &e therefore
recommended additional separate penalties for the in6uries sustained by Maura and
Jonalyn )alleser, and an increase of the indemnity to the heirs of Margarita )alleser%

Issue:
4hether or not failure to mae timely ob6ection to information charging
several offenses constitutes waiver if said defec
Held:
7es. )his otherwise simple case is complicated by the fact that the
information charges the accused with the comple5 crime of murder with double less
serious physical in6uries% *nd yet, in describing the commission of the crime, the
information states that appellant Ifeloniously attac, assault and Fshoot for several
timesI the victims. in effect charging accused appellant with several distinct and
separate crimes, as it is the allegations or actual recitals in the information rather than
the technical description of the crime that controls% )he defective information not
having been timely ob6ected to, however, said defect of duplicity of charges cannot
be heard belatedly on appeal and accused<appellant may be convicted of as many
offenses as are charged therein and proved beyond reasonable doubt%
2ontrary to the trial courtLs ruling, the evidence presented at the trial negates
the e5istence of a comple5 crime which, under *rticle 4/ of the +evised (enal 2ode,
e5ists Iwhen a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other%I 9or where the
illing are not shown to have been committed by a single discharge of firearms, the
crime cannot be comple5ed%
Loney v. "eole o! the hiliines
G.R. No. 1*2644
Fe&#ua#y 10, 2006

%arpio, J%>

Facts:
(etitioners John Cric =oney, #teven (aul +eid, and (edro !% &ernandeA are the
(resident and 2hief C5ecutive "fficer, #enior Manager, and +esident Manager for
Mining "perations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining 2orporation ,IMarcopperI-, a
corporation engaged in mining in the province of Marindu8ue% Marcopper had been
storing tailings from its operations in a pit in Mt% )apian, at the base of the pit ran a
drainage tunnel leading to the !oac and Maalupnit rivers% "n 04 March 1994,
tailings gushed out of or near the tunnelDs end% In a few days, the Mt% )apian pit had
discharged millions of tons of tailings into the rivers%
0/
"n *ugust 199;, the 'epartment of Justice separately charged petitioners in
the Municipal )rial 2ourt of !oac, Marindu8ue with violation of *rticle 91,!-, sub<
paragraphs 3 and ; of the 4ater 2ode of the (hilippines ,(%'% 1@;7-, #ection / of the
National (ollution 2ontrol 'ecree of 197; ,(%'% 9/4-, #ection 1@/ of the (hilippine
Mining *ct of 1993 ,+%*% 7940-, and *rticle B;3 of the +evised (enal 2ode ,+(2-
for +ecless Imprudence +esulting to 'amage to (roperty% (etitioners moved to
8uash the Informations on the ground that the Informations were IduplicitousI as the
'epartment of Justice charged more than one offense for a single act%

Issue:
4hether or not there is duplicity of charges made against petitioners

Held:
No. )here is no duplicity of charges in the present case% 'uplicity of charges
simply means a single complaint or information charges more than one offense, as
#ection 1B of +ule 11@ of the 19/3 +ules of 2riminal (rocedure% In short, there is
duplicity of charges when a single Information charges more than one offense%
(etitionerDs contention that they should be charged with one offense only for
+ecless Imprudence +esulting in 'amage to (roperty because all the charges filed
against them Iproceed from and are based on a single act or incident of polluting the
!oac and Maalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailingsI has no merit because this
2ourt had ruled that a single act or incident might offend against two or more
entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus 6ustifying the prosecution of the
accused for more than one offense% )he only limit to this rule is the 2onstitutional
prohibition that no person shall be twice put in 6eopardy of punishment for Ithe same
offense%G &ere, double 6eopardy is not at Issue because not all of its elements are
present% "n petitionersD claim that the charge for violation of *rticle B;3 of the +(2
IabsorbsI the charges for violation of (' 1@;7, (' 9/4, and +* 7940, suffice it to
say that a mala in se felony ,such as +ecless Imprudence +esulting in 'amage to
(roperty- cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes ,such as those violating (' 1@;7, ('
9/4, and +* 7940-% 4hat maes the former a felony is criminal intent ,dolo- or
negligence ,culpa-. what maes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them%
#e!ensor)Santiago v. /architorena
G.R. No. 1280**
A(#.l 18, 2001
'itug, J.:
Facts:
)he case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of the
2ommission of Immigration and 'eportation ,2I'- against petitioner, then 2I'
2ommissioner, for alleged violation of the *nti<:raft and 2orrupt (ractices *ct%
"n "ctober 17, 19//, MI+I*M 'C9CN#"+<#*N)I*:", a public officer,
being then the 2ommissioner of the 2ommission on Immigration and 'eportation,
approves the application for legaliAation for the stay of the aliens alleged in this case%
)his is in violation of C5ecutive "rder No% B04 which prohibits the legaliAation of
said dis8ualified aliens nowing fully well that said aliens are dis8ualified thereby
giving unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose stay in the (hilippines was
unlawfully legaliAed by said accused%
Issue:
4hether or not #andiganbayan is en6oin from preceding this criminal case
for violation of +%*% B@19
Held:
No. )he pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed
against petitioner, behooved #andiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to
forthwith Issue the order of preventive suspension% )he order of suspension
prescribed by +epublic *ct No% B@19 is distinct from the power of 2ongress to
discipline its own rans% )he suspension contemplated in the above constitutional
provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the #enate or
the &ouse of +epresentatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member% )he 2ourt
ruled> F (etitionerLs invocation of #ection 1; ,B-, *rticle $I of the 2onstitution W
which deals with the power of each &ouse of 2ongress inter alia to Lpunish its
Members for disorderly behavior,L and Lsuspend or e5pel a MemberL by a vote of two<
thirds of all its Members sub6ect to the 8ualification that the penalty of suspension,
when imposed, should not e5ceed si5ty days W is unavailing, as it appears to be
8uite distinct from the suspension spoen of in #ection 1B of +* B@19, which is not a
penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the
latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the &ouse
of +epresentatives%I
)he doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have
effectively e5cluded members of 2ongress from +epublic *ct No% B@19 nor from its
sanctions% )he ma5im simply recogniAes each of the three co<e8ual and independent,
albeit coordinate, branches of the government W the =egislative, the C5ecutive and
the Judiciary W has e5clusive prerogatives and cogniAance within its own sphere of
influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal
affairs of either branch%
09
,n re0 "etition !or 'abeas Corus+
1uan "once Enrile v. 1udge 1ai*e Salazar+ et al.
G.R. No. 92163
!u"e *, 1990
4arvasa, J.:
Facts:
"n 9ebruary 07, 199@, #enate Minority 9loor =eader Juan (once Cnrile was
arrested by law enforcement officers led by 'irector *lfredo =im of the National
!ureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant Issued by &on% Jaime #alaAar of
the +egional )rial 2ourt of OueAon 2ity !ranch 1@B, in 2riminal 2ase No% 9@1@941%
2harging #enator Cnrile, the spouses +ebecco and Crlinda (anlilio, and :regorio
&onasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder
allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 09
to 'ecember 1@, 199@% #enator Cnrile was taen to and &eld overnight at the N!I
head8uarters on )aft *venue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended
in the information and none fi5ed in the arrest warrant% )he following morning,
9ebruary 0/, 199@, he was brought to 2amp )omas Jaringal in OueAon 2ity where
he was given over to the custody of the #uperintendent of the Northern (olice
'istrict, !rig% :en% Cdgardo 'ula )orres%)hrough counsel Cnrile then filed a petition
for &abeas 2orpus alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights%
Issue:
4hether or not there is an imputed error or omission on the part of the
prosecuting panel or of the respondent Judge in dealing with the charges against
Cnrile
Held:
No. )here was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these
8uestions was beyond the ability or competence of the respondent Judge<indeed such
an assumption would be demeaning and less than fair to our trial courts. none
whatever to hold them to be of such comple5ity or transcendental importance as to
dis8ualify every court, e5cept this 2ourt, from deciding them. none, in short that
would 6ustify by passing established 6udicial processes designed to orderly move
litigation through the hierarchy of our court% (arenthetically, this is the reason behind
the vote of four Members of the 2ourt against the grant of bail to petitioner> the view
that the trial court should not thus be precipitately ousted of its original 6urisdiction
to grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that matter, denied an opportunity to correct its
error% It maes no difference that the respondent Judge here Issued a warrant of arrest
fi5ing no bail% Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the prosecutorLs
recommendation regarding bail, though it may be perceived as the better course for
the 6udge $otu proprio to set a bail hearing where a capital offense is charged% It is,
in any event, incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has been recommended
or fi5ed to claim the right to a bail hearing and thereby put to proof the strength or
weaness of the evidence against him%
=et it be made very clear that hereafter the 2ourt will no longer
countenance, but will give short shrift to, pleas lie the present, that clearly short<
circuit the 6udicial process and burden it with the resolution of Issues properly within
the original competence of the lower courts% 4hat has thus far been stated is e8ually
applicable to and decisive of the petition of the (anlilio spouses ,:%+% No% 901;4-
which is virtually Identical to that of petitioner Cnrile in factualmilieu and is
therefore determinable on the same principles already set forth% #aid spouses have
uncontestedly pleaded that warrants of arrest Issued against them as co<accused of
petitioner Cnrile in 2riminal 2ase No% 9@<1@941, that when they appeared before
N!I 'irector *lfredo =im in the afternoon of March 1, 199@, they were taen into
custody and detained without bail on the strength of said warrants in violation<they
claim<of their constitutional rights% It is enough to give anyone pause<and the 2ourt
is no e5ception<that not even the crowded streets of our capital 2ity seem safe from
such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and stymies every
effort at national economic recovery% )here is an apparent need to restructure the law
on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefore or to clearly define and delimit the
other offenses to be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently
utiliAed as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity undertaen in its name% )he
2ourt has no power to effect such change, for it can only interpret the law as it stands
at any given time, and what is a needed lie beyond interpretation% &opefully,
2ongress will perceive the need for promptly seiAing the initiative in this matter,
which is properly within its province%
Agote v. 'on. %anuel Lorenzo
G.R. No. 1426$*
!uly 22, 200*
B@
Garia, J.:
Facts:
(etitioner was earlier charged before the sala of respondent 6udge with
Illegal (ossession of 9irearms under (residential 'ecree No% 1/;;14U and violation
of 2"MC=C2 +esolution No% 0/0;13U ,:un !an-% "n *pril 07, 199; in Manila,
election period, the said accused have in possession and under his custody and
control, "ne ,1- %B/ cal% +ev% without serial no% with four ,4- live bullets% &e has no
license for the said firearms%
Issue:
4hether or not +epublic *ct /094 can be retroactively applied to *gote
Held:
7es. )he solemn power and duty of the 2ourt to interpret and apply the law
does not include the power to correct by reading into the law what is not written
therein% 4hile we understand respondent (eopleLs contention that the Luse of the
firearm seemed to have been the main consideration during the deliberations of the
sub6ect provision of +ep% *ct No% /094, the fact remains that the word Luse never
found its way into the final version of the bill which eventually became +ep% *ct No%
/094% )he 2ourtLs hands are now tied and it cannot supply the perceived deficiency
in the final version without contravening the most basic principles in the
interpretation of penal laws which had always leaned in favor of the accused% Ender
our system of government where powers are allocated to the three ,B- great branches,
only the =egislature can remedy such deficiency, if any, by proper amendment of
#ec% 1 of +ep% *ct No% /094% *s written, #ec% 1, +ep% *ct No% /094 restrains the
2ourt from convicting petitioner of the separate crime of illegal possession of
firearm despite the fact that, as in *lmeida, the unlicensed firearm was not actually
Lused% 9or sure, there is, in this case, closer relation between possession of unlicensed
firearm and violation of the 2"MC=C2 gun<ban than the illegal possession of
unlicensed firearm to the crime of illegal possession of prohibited drugs in *lmeida%
Teehan$ee v. %adayag
G.R. No. 103102
Ma#c, 6, 1992
Regalado, J.:
9acts>
"n July 1B, 1991, in Maati, the above<named accused, while armed with a
handgun, assault and shoot one Maureen Navarro &ultman on the head, thereby
inflicting gunshot wounds, which ordinarily would have caused the death of said
Maureen Navarro &ultman, thereby performing all the acts of e5ecution which
would have produced the crime of Murder as a conse8uence, but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of cause or causes independent of her will, that is, due to the
timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Maureen Navarro &ultman
which prevented her death%
Issues:
I% 4hether or not an amended information involving a substantial amendment,
without preliminary investigation, after the prosecution has rested on the
original information, may legally and validly be admitted.
II% 4hether or not a counsel de o2iio may legally and validly be appointed to
represent an accused who is represented by counsel of choice who refuses to
participate in the proceedings because of a perceived denial of due process and
after a plea for appellate remedies within a short period is denied by the trial
court.
Held:
I% No. )he first paragraph of #ection 14 +ule 11@ of the +evised +ules on
2riminal (rocedure provides the rules for amendment of the information or
complaint, while the second paragraph refers to the substitution of the information or
complaint% It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of
the information may be made before or after the defendant pleaded, but they differ in
the following respects> ,1- *mendment may involve either formal or substantial
changes, while substitution necessarily involves a substantial change from the
original charge. ,0- *mendment before plea has been entered can be effected without
leave of court, but substitution of information must be with leave of court as the
original information has to be dismissed. ,B- 4here the amendment is only as to
form, there is no need for another preliminary investigation and the retaing of the
plea of the accused. in substitution of information, another preliminary investigation
is entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the new information. and ,4- *n
amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original information
or to an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the original
charge, hence substantial amendments to the information after the plea has been
taen cannot be made over the ob6ection of the accused, for if the original
information would be withdrawn, the accused could invoe double 6eopardy% "n the
other hand, substitution re8uires or presupposes that the new information involves a
B1
different offense which does not include or is not necessarily included in the original
charge. hence the accused cannot claim double 6eopardy%
In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the
first paragraph of #ection 14, +ule 11@, or a substitution of information under the
second paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the second information involves the
same offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the first information, and amendment of the information is sufficient. otherwise,
where the new information charges an offense which is distinct and different from
that initially charged, a substitution is in order%
4e repeat that after arraignment and during the trial, amendments are
allowed, but only as to matters of form and provided that no pre6udice is caused to
the rights of the accused% 13 )he test of whether an amendment is only of form and
an accused is not pre6udiced by such amendment has been said to be whether or not a
defense under the information as it originally stood would be e8ually available after
the amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence the accused might have
would be e8ually applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. if the
answer is in the affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of substance%
II% No% 4e find nothing irregular in the appointment by the trial court of a
counsel de o2iio for herein petitioner whose counsel of record refused to participate
in the proceedings because of an alleged legal Issue% #uch Issue having been
demonstrated herein as baseless, we apprehend his refusal to participate in the trial
as causative of or contributive to the delay in the disposition of the case% *nd,
finally, for as long as the substantial rights of herein petitioner and other persons
charged in court are not pre6udiced, the scheduling of cases should be left to the
sound discretion of the trial court%
"eole o! the "hiliines v. /orose
G.R. No. +-*1*13
May 1*, 1984
!bad-Santos, J%>
Facts:
"n #eptember 03, 1974, *nastacia de Jesus, a 14 year<old girl at the time of
the incident, was in front of the 2alte5 #tation in (laridel, !ulacan, intending to
cross the street to buy a boo% )wo persons passed by, one of whom was appellant
+ufino !ulanadi, who waived a handerchief across her face, which affected her
consciousness and she felt diAAy but felt that she was being &eld and boarded into a
motor vehicle% 4hen she regained consciousness she was forced to drin a strange
tasting +oyal soft drin by :orospe and !ulanadi who &eld her hands% *fter
drining the soft drin, complainant lost consciousness% #he woe up only the ne5t
morning with aches and pains all over her body especially her private part% #he found
herself naed as well as the accused therewith% &e was &eld by the latter for 9 days%
Issues:
I% 4hether or not the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime
of rape which the prosecution alleges to have been committed in )alavera,
(rovince of Nueva Cci6a and not in the (rovince of !ulacan.
II% 4hether or not the &on% Judge 'C $C:*, presiding 6udge of the 29I of
!ulacan !ranch II, erred in rendering the decision appealed from when he
has no authority to do so because this case was entirely tried in the 29I of
!ulacan !ranch I, presided over by &on% Judge (urisima. and
III% 4hether or not the court erred in admitting the testimony of 9a6ardo whose
cross<e5amination was not finished due to his failure to appear inspite of a
warrant for his arrest%

Held:
I% No. *bduction is a persistent and continuing offense% &ence it may be
Itried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed
or any one of the essential ingredients thereof too place% ,+ules of 2ourt, +ule 11@,
#ec% 141aU-% )he Municipal 2ourt of (ulilan had 6urisdiction because the abductors
and their captive passed (ulilan on their way from (laridel to )alavera% *nd the 29I
of !ulacan 1as well as the 29I of Nueva Cci6aU had 6urisdiction because essential
elements of the offense too place in !ulacan 1and also in Nueva Cci6aU%
II% No. 4e hold that Judge de $ega had the power to decide the case%
I4here a court of first instance is divided into several branches, each of the branches
is not a court distinct and separate from the others% Jurisdiction is vested in the court,
not in the 6udges, so that when a complaint or information is filed before one branch
or 6udge, 6urisdiction does not attach to said branch or 6udge alone, to the e5clusion
of the others% )rial may be had or proceedings may continue by and before another
branch or 6udge%I
III% No% )he trial court committed no error in admitting the testimony of
9a6ardo although the defense had not finished its cross<e5amination% *n e5amination
of the transcript of 9a6ardoLs testimony shows that he was sub6ected to detailed cross<
e5amination on material points% In fact, the cross<e5amination was lengthier than the
B0
direct e5amination% 4e adopt with approval the statement of the court a 8uo on this
point> )he records show that the counsel for the accused has e5tensively cross<
e5amined 9a6ardo% )he 2ourt could not help but wonder what other matters not yet
touched during the cross<e5amination of 9a6ardo could still be elicited from him that
would probably destroy or affect his testimony in<chief% If the counsel for the
accused e5pected 9a6ardo to testify further on material matters favorable to the cause
of the defense, he should have proffered such further testimony and entered into the
records how the absent witness would have testified if he were available for further
cross<e5amination% )he failure of the said counsel to do so indicates that every
material point has been ased from 9a6ardo during the time he was under
e5amination%
4hile cross<e5amination is a right available to the adverse party, it is not
absolute in the sense that a cross<e5aminer could determine for himself the length
and scope of his cross<e5amination of a witness% )he court has always the discretion
to limit the cross<e5amination and to consider it terminated if it would serve the ends
of 6ustice% )he 2ourt, therefore, hereby resolves to admit the testimony of 9a6ardo%
)his resolution finds support, though indirectly, from #ection ;, +ule 1BB of the
+ules of 2ourt, which empowers the court to stop the introduction of further
testimony upon a particular point when the evidence upon it is already so full that
more to the same point cannot reasonably be e5pected to be additionally persuasive%
)he position herein taen by the 2ourt in brushing aside technicalities is in
accordance with a fundamental rule that the provisions of the +ules of 2ourt shall be
liberally construed in order to promote their ob6ect and assist the parties in obtaining
a 6ust, speedy and ine5pensive determination of every action or proceeding%
Li* v. Court o! Aeals
GR 10$898
/ece)&e# 19 199*
Bellosillo, J.:
Facts:
#pouses =im were charged with estafa and violations of !(00 for allegedly
purchasing goods from =inton 2ommercial 2orporation and issuing checs as
payment thereof% )he checs when presented to the ban were dishonored for
insufficiency of funds or the payment for the checs has been stopped%

Issue:
4hether or not the 2ourt of *ppeals have a 6urisdiction over this case

Held:
It is settled that venue in criminal cases is a vital ingredient of 6urisdiction%
It shall be where the crime or offense was committed or any one of the
essential ingredients thereof too place% In determining the proper venue for these
cases, the following are material factsWthe checs were issued at the place of
business of =inton. they were delivered to =inton at the same place. they were
dishonored in 2aloocan 2ity. petitioners had nowledge of the insufficiency of funds
in their account%
Ender #ection 191 of the Negotiable Instruments =aw, issue means the
first delivery of the instrument complete in its form to a person who taes it as
holder% )he term holder on the other hand refers to the payee or indorsee of a bill or
note who is in possession of it or the bearer thereof% )he important place to consider
in the consummation of a negotiable instrument is the place of delivery% 'elivery
is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation%
Ra*iscal v. Sandiganbayan et.al.+
G.R. Nos. 140*$6-99
/ece)&e# 13, 2004
%allejo, Sr. J.:
Facts:
)he *rmed 9orces of the (hilippines +etirement and #eparation !enefits
#ystem ,*9(<+#!#- was created under (residential 'ecree ,(%'%- No% B;1, as
amended, the *9(<+#!# was designed to establish a separate fund to guarantee
continuous financial support to the *9( military retirement system as provided for in
+epublic *ct No% B4@% Ender the decree, the *9(<+#!# was to be funded from three
principal sources> ,a- congressional appropriations and compulsory contributions
from members of the *9(. ,0- donations, gifts, legacies, be8uests and others to the
system. and ,B- all earnings of the system which shall not be sub6ect to any ta5
whatsoever% Its funds are in the nature of public funds%
=uwalhati +% *ntonino, then alleged that anomalous real estate transactions
involving the Magsaysay (ar at :eneral #antos 2ity and 8uestionable payments of
transfer ta5es pre6udicial to the government had been entertained into between
certain parties% #he then re8uested the "mbudsman to investigate the petitioner,
+etired !rig% :en% Jose #% +amiscal, Jr%, then (resident of the *9(<+#!# together
with twenty<seven ,07- other persons for conspiracy in misappropriating *9(<+#!#
BB
funds and in defrauding the government millions of pesos in capital gains and
documentary stamp ta5es%
Issues:
I% 4hether or not, by nature, the sub6ect criminal indictments for violations of
sec% ,B- +epublic *ct no% B@19 and *rticle 170, in relation to *rticle 171, of
the revised penal code give rise to civil liability in favor of any private
party. and
II% 4hether or not *:9"I as represented by *lbano and *ssociates are private
in6ured parties entitled to intervene as the private prosecutor in the sub6ect
case
Held:
I% 7es. )he offended party may be the #tate or any of its instrumentalities,
including local governments or government<owned or controlled corporations, such
as the *9(<+#!#, which, under substantive laws, are entitled to restitution of their
properties or funds, reparation, or indemnification% 9or instance, in malversation of
public funds or property under *rticle 017 of the +evised (enal 2ode, frauds under
*rticle 01BU of the +evised (enal 2ode, and violations of the 9orestry 2ode of the
(hilippines, (%'% No% 7@3, as amended, to mention a few, the government is the
offended party entitled to the civil liabilities of the accused% 9or violations of
#ection B,e- of +ep% *ct No% B@19, any party, including the government, may be the
offended party if such party sustains undue in6ury caused by the delictual acts of the
accused% In such cases, the government is to be represented by the public prosecutor
for the recovery of the civil liability of the accused% Ender #ection 1;, +ule 11@ of
the +evised +ules of 2riminal (rocedure, the offended party may also be a private
individual whose person, right, house, liberty or property was
actually or directly in6ured by the same punishable act or omission of the accused or
that corporate entity which is damaged or in6ured by the delictual acts complained
of% #uch party must be one who has a legal right. a substantial interest in the sub6ect
matter of the action as will entitle him to recourse under the substantive law, to
recourse if the evidence is sufficient or that he has the legal right to the demand and
the accused will be protected by the satisfaction of his civil liabilities% #uch interest
must not be a mere e5pectancy, subordinate or inconse8uential% )he interest of the
party must be personal. and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional
right of some third and unrelated party%
II% No. 4e agree with the contention of the petitioner that the *:9"I, and
even 2ommodore *parri and !rig% :en% Navarro, are not the offended parties
envisaged in #ection 1;, +ule 11@, in relation to #ection 1, +ule 111 of the +evised
+ules of 2riminal (rocedure% Ender #ection 3, +ule 11@ of the +ules, all criminal
actions covered by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direct
supervision and control of the public prosecutor% )hus, even if the felonies or
delictual acts of the accused result in damage or in6ury to another, the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability based on the said criminal acts is impliedly
institutedU and the offended party has not waived the civil action, reserved the right
to institute it separately or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action, the
prosecution of the action inclusive of the civil action remains under the control and
supervision of the public prosecutor% )he prosecution of offenses is a public function%
Ender #ection 1;, +ule 11@ of the +ules of 2riminal (rocedure, the offended party
may intervene in the criminal action personally or by counsel, who will act as private
prosecutor for the protection of his interests and in the interest of the speedy and
ine5pensive administration of 6ustice% * separate action for the purpose would only
prove to be costly, burdensome and time<consuming for both parties and further
delay the final disposition of the case% )he multiplicity of suits must be
avoided% 4ith the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the
two actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action
predominating the civil% )he prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the
offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar
offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to
maintain social order%

%accay v. 2obela
G.R. No. 14*823
Ma#c, 31, 200*
%arpio, J%>
Facts:
"n May, 199@, *delaida C% (otenciano went to the public maret of (asig,
Metro Manila, to loo for a prospective buyer or mortgagee of a parcel of land
belonging to "scar Maccay% #he was introduced by a vendor, =ydia +eyes, to the
spouses (rudencio and #erlina Nobela who were engaged in lending money to
maret vendors on a daily basis% *fter pooling together their savings, the Nobelas
decided to purchase the property% )hey advised Maccay and (otenciano that they
were ready to buy the property%
"n May 17, 199@, (otenciano with #erlina went to !arbaDs lawyer, *tty%
*lfonso JimeneA, at =as (iXas where she had the 'eed of #ale prepared and
notariAed% #he signed it there and goes to the house of #erlina afterwards and pays
B4
B@@,@@@%@@% "n June 19, 199@, the ta5es to the purchased property had to be paid%
)he title had not been transferred to the names of the Nobelas%
Issues:
I% 4hether or not the )rial 2ourt may rule on the civil liability of complainant
in a criminal case where the civil action was not reserved or filed
separately.
II% 4hether or not a witness, who is not a party to the case, may be &eld liable
for damages%
Held:
I% No. * court trying a criminal case cannot award damages in favor of the
accused% )he tas of the trial court is limited to determining the guilt of the accused
and if proper, to determine his civil liability% * criminal case is not the proper
proceedings to determine the private complainantDs civil liability, if any% )he trial
court erred in ordering complainant petitioner Maccay and prosecution witness
(otenciano, as part of the 6udgment in the criminal case, to reimburse the (B@@,@@@
and pay damages to the accused respondent spouses% )his 2ourt ruled in 2abaero v%
&on% 2antos that a court trying a criminal case should limit itself to the criminal and
civil liability of the accused, thus> )he trial court should confine itself to the criminal
aspect and the possible civil liability of the accused arising out of the crime% )he
counterclaim ,and cross<claim or third<party complaint, if any- should be set aside or
refused cogniAance without pre6udice to their filing in separate proceedings at the
proper time%
II% No. )he trial court also erred in holding prosecution witness petitioner
(otenciano, together with complainant petitioner Maccay, liable for damages to
respondent spouses% * 6udgment cannot bind persons who are not parties to the
action% * decision of a court cannot operate to divest the rights of a person who is not
a party to the case% )he records clearly show that petitioner (otenciano is not a party
to this case% )he Information filed by the prosecutor had only petitioner Maccay as
its complainant% )he $erification attached to the Information had only petitioner
Maccay signing as complainant% Nothing in the records shows that petitioner
(otenciano played a role other than being a witness for the prosecution% )o rule
otherwise would violate petitioner (otencianoDs constitutional right to due process%
(etitioners admit that title to the lot is now in the name of respondent spouses%
(etitioners admit the validity of the cancellation of )2) No% 47B3/4 and the issuance
of )2) No% 1//0/9 in favor of respondent spouses% (etitioners argue that since
respondent spouses already ac8uired the lot in e5change for (B@@,@@@, there is no
basis for the order re8uiring petitioners to reimburse respondent spouses
the (B@@,@@@%
Ace 'aulers Cororation v. Court o! Aeals
G.R. No. 12$934
Auust 23, 2000
Pardo, J.:
Facts:
)he case was an action for damages arising from a vehicular mishap which
too place on June 1, 19/4, involving a truc owned by petitioner *ce &aulers
2orporation and driven by its employee, Jesus dela 2ruA, and a 6eepney owned by
Isabelito +ivera, driven by +odolfo (arma% * third vehicle, a motorcycle, was
bumped and dragged by the 6eepney, and its rider, 9idel *biva, was run over by the
truc owned by petitioner *ce &aulers 2orporation, causing his death% Epon his
untimely demise, 9idel *biva left behind a wife, respondent Crderlinda *biva and
their three ,B- children%
Issues:
I% 4hether or not in an action for damages arising from a vehicular accident
plaintiff may recover damages against the employer of the accused driver
both in the criminal case ,delict- and the civil case for damages based on
8uasi delict, but not recover twice for the same act.
II% 4hether or not the 2ourt of *ppeals erred in not lifting the order declaring
petitioner as in default for failure to appear at the pre<trial conference. and
III% 4hether the damages awarded in the civil case were e5cessive, much more
than the previous award in the criminal case%
Held:
I% 7es. F2ivil liability coe5ists with criminal responsibility% In negligence
cases, the offended party ,or his heirs- has the option between an action for
enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under *rticle 1@@ of the
+evised (enal 2ode and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa
a8uiliana under *rticle 017; of the 2ivil 2ode% *rticle 0177 of the 2ivil 2ode,
B3
however, precludes recovery of damages twice for the same negligent act or
omission%G 2onse8uently, a separate civil action for damages lies against the offender
in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
ac8uitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged
also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the
two cases vary%
&ence, in this case, respondent *biva shall have the choice which of the awards to
tae, naturally e5pecting that she would opt to recover the greater amount% It has not
been shown that she has recovered on the award in the criminal case, conse8uently,
she can un8uestionably recover from petitioner in the civil case%
II% No. )he #upreme 2ourt find that petitioner was rightly declared as in
default for its failure to appear during the pre<trial conference despite due
notice% )his is a factual 8uestion resolved by the 2ourt of *ppeals which we cannot
review%
III% 7es. )he #upreme 2ourt find the award of actual damages to be
supported by preponderant evidence% F!asic is the rule that to recover actual
damages, the amount of loss must not only be capable of proof but must actually be
proven with reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or best
evidence obtainable of the actual amount thereof%G &owever, there is no basis for the
award of moral damages, which is hereby deleted% )he person claiming moral
damages must prove the e5istence of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence for
the law always presumes good faith% It is not enough that one merely suffered
sleepless nights, mental anguish, and serious an5iety as the result of the actuations of
the other party% Invariably such action must be shown to have been willfully done in
bad faith or with ill motive% )he attorneyLs fees awarded is reduced to (0@,@@@%@@
which is ten ,1@Q- percent of the amount of actual damages%
Reyes v. Se*io)#y
G.R. No. +-$1914
!a"ua#y 29, 1986
Patajo, J.:
Facts:
2ristina Malicsi was charged with the crime of intriguing against honor% )he
aggrieved party therein was Kenaida 2ruA +eyes, the herein petitioner% In said case
Kenaida 2ruA +eyes was represented by a private prosecutor, *tty% !arayang% )he
accused pleaded guilty to the information and was sentenced by the 2ourt to a fine of
(3@%@@% !ecause of her plea of guilty, the aggrieved party was unable to present
evidence to prove damages against the accused% Neither was she able to mae a
reservation of her right to file a separate civil action for damages% Instead, she filed a
new action against 2ristina Malicsi and her husband with the +egional )rial 2ourt
for damages arising from the defamatory words uttered against her by 2ristina
Malicsi which was the sub6ect of the information filed against the latter for intriguing
against honor%
*t the pre<trial plaintiff admitted that she was represented by a private prosecutor in
the criminal case against defendant 2ristina Malicsi and in said case she did not
reserve the right to file a separate action for damages% #he further admitted that the
appearance of said private prosecutor was for the purpose of proving damages
against the accused%
Issue:
4hether or not the appearance of a private prosecutor in the criminal case
against the herein respondent constitute an intervention on the part of the aggrieved
party
Held:
No% )he #upreme 2ourt find and so hold that the mere appearance of a
private prosecutor in the criminal case against the herein private respondents did not
necessarily constitute such intervention on the part of the aggrieved party as could
only import an intention on her part to press her claim for damages in said criminal
case and a waiver of her right to file a separate civil action for damages% !ecause the
accused had pleaded guilty upon arraignment and was immediately sentenced, there
was no chance for the aggrieved party to present evidence in support of her claim for
damages and to enter a reservation in the record to file a separate civil action%
Moreover, the failure of petitioner to mae a reservation to file a separate
civil action did not foreclose her right to file said separate complaint for damages%
Ender *rticle BB of the 2ivil 2ode there is no re8uirement that as a condition to the
filing of a separate civil action for damages a reservation to file said civil action be
first made in the criminal case and such reservation is not necessary, the provision of
+ule 111, #ection 0 notwithstanding% MendoAa v% *rrieta, 91 #2+* 11B, where this
2ourt, 8uoting from :arcia v% 9lerido, 30 #2+* 40@, said> Lthe proviso in #ection 0
of +ule 111 with reference to %%% *rticles B0, BB and B4 of the 2ivil 2ode is contrary
to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted % % % and are
intended to constitute as e5ceptions to the general rule stated in what is now #ection
1 of +ule 111% )he proviso, which is procedural, may also be regarded as an
B;
unauthoriAed amendment of substantive law, *rticles B0, BB and B4 of the 2ivil
2ode, which do not provide for the reservation re8uired in the proviso%
Casuanan v. Laroya
G.R. No. 14*391
Auust 26, 2002
%arpio, J%>
Facts:
)wo vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario =lavore =aroya and the other
owned by petitioner +oberto 2apitulo and driven by petitioner *velino 2asupanan,
figured in an accident% =aroya filed a criminal case against 2asupanan for recless
imprudence resulting in damage to property% "n the other hand, 2asupanan and
2apitulo filed a civil case against =aroya for 8uasi<delict% 4hen the civil case was
filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage% =aroya,
defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of
forum<shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case% "n Motion for
+econsideration, 2asupanan and 2apitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate
civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal case%
Issue:
4hether an accused in a pending criminal case for recless imprudence can
validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for 8uasi<delict
against the private complainant in the criminal case%
Held:
7es. )he crucial 8uestion now is whether 2asupanan and 2apitulo, who are
not the offended parties in the criminal case, can file a separate civil action against
the offended party in the criminal case% Ender #ection 1 of the present +ule 111, the
independent civil action in *rticles B0, BB, B4 and 017; of the 2ivil 2ode is not
deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the
offended party even without reservation% )he commencement of the criminal action
does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles
of the 2ivil 2ode% )he suspension in #ection 0 of the present +ule 111 refers only to
the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before
the commencement of the criminal action%
#imilarly, the accused can file a civil action for 8uasi<delict for the same act
or omission he is accused of in the criminal case% )his is e5pressly allowed in
paragraph ;, #ection 1 of the present +ule 111 which states that the counterclaim of
the accused Imay be litigated in a separate civil action%I )his is only fair for two
reasons% 9irst, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil
aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case% )he accused is therefore forced
to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party% If the accused does
not file a separate civil action for 8uasi<delict, the prescriptive period may set in
since the period continues to run until the civil action for 8uasi<delict is filed%
#econd, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoe *rticle 0177 of
the 2ivil 2ode, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy
which is independent of the criminal action% )o disallow the accused from filing a
separate civil action for 8uasi<delict, while refusing to recogniAe his counterclaim in
the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and e8ual
protection of the law%
Reublic o! the "hiliines v. Court o! Aeals
G.R. No. 116463
!u"e 10, 2003
%arpio, J%>
Facts:
(rivate respondent Navotas Industrial 2orporation is a corporation engaged
in dredging operations throughout the (hilippines% )he '(4& awarded NI2 (194,
434,@@@%@@ worth of dredging wor in four contracts% NI2 alleges that the dredging
wor proceeded pursuant to specific wor schedules and plan approved by '(4&%
NI2 contends that it accomplished 93%@; percent of the re8uired total volume of
wor and maintains that '(4& paid only 79%00 percent of the accomplished wor%
NI2 filed a complaint for sum of money with the Malabon trial court against the
+epublic of the (hilippines, thru the '(4&% (etitioner contends that upon
verification and investigation, the '(4& fact<finding committee discovered that the
dredging contracts of NI2 with '(4& were null and void% '(4& discovered that
NI2, through its corporate officers, connived with some '(4& officials in
falsifying certain public documents to mae it appear that NI2 had completed a
ma6or portion of the pro6ect, when no dredging wor was actually performed% )he
'(4& fact<finding committee filed with the "ffice of the )anodbayan a case for
estafa thru falsification of public documents and for violation of +epublic *ct No%
B@19% )he "mbudsman filed the corresponding Informations with the 9irst 'ivision
B7
of the #andiganbayan against all the respondents% (etitioner filed before the Malabon
trial court a Motion to 2onsolidate 2ivil 2ase with 2riminal 2ases in the
#andiganbayan% (etitioner argued that the civil case for collection and the criminal
cases arose from the same incidents and involves the same facts%
Issue:
4hether the civil and the criminal cases may be consolidated
Held:
No% It was held that consolidation cannot be ordered of the civil case for
collection with the criminal cases for two reasons% (irst, the #andiganbayan has no
6urisdiction over the collection case% )he #andiganbayan was created as a special
court to hear graft cases against government officials of a particular salary grade for
violations of specific laws% In cases where none of the accused are occupying
positions corresponding to #alary :rade L07L or higher, as prescribed in the said
+epublic *ct No% ;73/, or military and (N( officers mentioned above, e5clusive
original 6urisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the
case may be% Second, the +ules of 2ourt do not allow the filing of a counterclaim or
a third<party complaint in a criminal case% 4e cannot order the consolidation of the
civil action filed by NI2 with the criminal cases in the #andiganbayan because the
civil case amounts to a counterclaim or a third<party complaint in a criminal case%
4hile NI2, as a corporate entity, is not an accused in the criminal cases, a
consolidation of NI2s collection case with the criminal cases will have the same
effect of a counterclaim or a third<party complaint against petitioner and '(4&% In
such case, the rule against counterclaims and third<party complaints in criminal cases
may be applied by analogy%
)he counterclaim of the accused cannot be tried together with the criminal
case because it will unnecessarily complicate and confuse the criminal proceedings%
)hus, the trial court should confine itself to the criminal aspect and the possible civil
liability of the accused arising out of the crime% )he counterclaim and cross<claim or
third party complaint, if any, should be set aside or refused cogniAance without
pre6udice to their filing in separate proceedings at the proper time%
Salazar v. "eole o! the "hiliines
G.R. No. 1*1931.
'e(te)&e# 23, 2003
%allejo, Sr., J.:
Facts:
(etitioner was charged with the crime of estafa% (etitioner *namer #alaAar
purchased B@@ cavans of rice from J%7% !rothers Mareting 2orporation, through Mr%
Jerson 7ao% *s payment for these cavans of rice, the petitioner gave the private
complainant a chec which was later dishonoured% (etitioner replaced the chec with
a chec drawn against the #olid !an, =egaApi !ranch, which, however, was
returned with the word '*E' ,'rawn *gainst Encollected 'eposit-% *fter the
prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a 'emurrer to Cvidence with =eave of
2ourt alleging that she could not be guilty of the crime as charged% )he trial court
rendered 6udgment ac8uitting the petitioner of the crime charged but ordering her to
remit to the private complainant the amount of the chec as payment for her
purchase% )he trial court ruled that the evidence for the prosecution did not establish
the e5istence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt% )he petitioner assails the
orders of the trial court claiming that after her demurrer to evidence was granted by
the trial court, she was denied due process as she was not given the opportunity to
adduce evidence to prove that she was not civilly liable to the private respondent%
Issue:
4hether the accused was denied of due process for not being given the
opportunity to adduce evidence that she was not civilly liable
Held:
7es. If demurrer is granted and the accused is ac8uitted by the court, the
accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the
court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not e5ist% If the trial court issues an order or renders 6udgment not only granting
the demurrer to evidence of the accused and ac8uitting him but also on the civil
liability of the accused to the private offended party, said 6udgment on the civil
aspect of the case would be a nullity for the reason that the constitutional right of the
accused to due process is thereby violated% If the accused is granted leave to file a
demurrer to evidence, he has the right to adduce evidence not only on the criminal
aspect but also on the civil aspect of the case if his demurrer is denied by the court%
)he petitioner was granted leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence% )he court
Issued an order granting the demurrer on its finding that the liability of the petitioner
was not criminal but only civil% &owever, the court rendered 6udgment on the civil
aspect of the case and ordered the petitioner to pay for her purchases from the private
complainant even before the petitioner could adduce evidence thereon% (atently,
therefore, the petitioner was denied her right to due process%
B/

Elcano v. 'ill
G.R. No. +-24803
May 26, 19$$
Barredo, J.:

Facts:
'efendant< appellee +eginald &ill was prosecuted criminally in the 2ourt
of 9irst Instance of OueAon 2ity% *fter due trial, he was ac8uitted on the ground that
his act was not criminal because of Ilac of intent to ill, coupled with mistae%I
)his case is an appeal of the plaintiff<appellants to the decision of the 2ourt of 9irst
Instance in dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of
plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant +eginald &ill, a minor, married at
the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin &ill, with whom he
was living and getting subsistence%
Issue:
4hether the present civil action for damages is barred by the ac8uittal of
+eginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed%
Held:
No% )o find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is re8uired, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is
sufficient to mae the defendant pay in damages% *c8uittal from an accusation of
criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a
subse8uent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but
for damages due to a 8uasi<delict or culpa a8uiliana% * separate civil action lies
against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and
found guilty or ac8uitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is
actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards
made in the two cases vary% 2ivil liability for the same act considered as a 8uasi<
delict only and not as a crime is not e5tinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused% It results, therefore, that the ac8uittal of +eginald &ill in
the criminal case has not e5tinguished his liability for 8uasi<delict, hence that
ac8uittal is not a bar to the instant action against him%

"eole o! the "hiliines v. Bayotas
G.R. No. 10200$
'e(te)&e# 2, 1994
Ro$ero, J.:
Facts:
+ogelio !ayotas y 2ordova was charged with +ape and eventually
convicted thereof in a decision penned by Judge Manuel C% *uta6ay% (ending appeal
of his conviction, !ayotas died at the National !ilibid &ospital% 2onse8uently, the
#upreme 2ourt in its +esolution dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal% )he
#olicitor :eneral e5pressed his view that the death of accused<appellant did not
e5tinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged%
2ounsel for the accused<appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the
#olicitor :eneral arguing that the death of the accused while 6udgment of conviction
is pending appeal e5tinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties%

Issue:
4hether the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
e5tinguishes his civil liability
Held:
No% It should be stressed that the e5tinction of civil liability follows the
e5tinction of the criminal liability under *rticle /9, only when the civil liability
arises from the criminal act as its only basis% #tated differently, where the civil
liability does not e5ist independently of the criminal responsibility, the e5tinction of
the latter by death, ipso facto e5tinguishes the former, provided, of course, that death
supervenes before final 6udgment% )he survival of the civil liability depends on
whether the same can be predicated on sources of obligations other than delict%
#tated differently, the claim for civil liability is also e5tinguished together with the
criminal action if it were solely based thereon% If the private offended party, upon
e5tinction of the civil liability e5 delicto desires to recover damages from the same
act or omission complained of, he must file a separate civil action, this time
predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation%
B9
)he source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised determines
against whom the same shall be enforced% If the same act or omission complained of
also arises from 8uasi<delict or may, by provision of law, result in an in6ury to person
or property ,real or personal-, the separate civil action must be filed against the
e5ecutor or administrator%
Tuanda v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 110*44
%cto&e# 1$, 199*
#apunan, J.:
Facts:
+espondents 'elia Cstrellanes and !artolome !inaohan were designated as
industrial labor sectoral representative and agricultural labor sectoral representative
respectively, for the #angguniang !ayan of Jimalalud, (rovince of Negros "riental%
#ubse8uently, petitioners filed an undated petition with the "ffice of the (resident
for review and recall of said designations% )he latter, however, denied the petition
and en6oined Mayor +eynaldo )uanda to recogniAe private respondents as sectoral
representatives% (etitioners then filed an action with the +egional )rial 2ourt of
'umaguete 2ity to declare null and void the designations of private respondents as
sectoral representatives% 4hile the civil case was pending, an information against
petitioner was filed before the #andiganbayan% )his was due to petitionersD alleged
refusal to pay private respondentsL salaries and per diems as sectoral representatives%
(etitioners filed a motion with the #andiganbayan for suspension of the proceedings
in the criminal case on the ground that a pre6udicial 8uestion e5ists in civil case
pending before the +egional )rial 2ourt of 'umaguete 2ity%
Issue:
4hether a pre6udicial 8uestion e5ists in this case%
Held:
7es. * pre6udicial 8uestion is defined as that which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the Issue involved therein, and the
cogniAance of which pertains to another tribunal% )he pre6udicial 8uestion must be
determinative of the case before the court but the 6urisdiction to try and resolve the
8uestion must be lodged in another court or tribunal% It is a 8uestion based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused%
*ll the elements of a pre6udicial 8uestion are clearly and unmistaably
present in this case% )here is no doubt that the 9acts and Issues involved in the civil
action and the criminal case are closely related% )he filing of the criminal case was
premised on petitionersL alleged partiality and evident bad faith in not paying private
respondentsL salaries and per diems as sectoral representatives, while the civil action
was instituted precisely to resolve whether or not the designations of private
respondents as sectoral representatives were made in accordance with law%
(etitioners were criminally charged under the *nti<:raft P 2orrupt (ractices *ct
due to their refusal, allegedly in bad faith and with partiality, to pay private
respondentsL salaries as sectoral representatives% )his refusal, however, was anchored
on petitionersL assertion that said designations were made in violation of the =ocal
:overnment 2ode and thus, were null and void% )herefore, should the 2ourt of
*ppeals uphold the trial courtLs decision declaring null and void private respondentsL
designations as sectoral representatives for failure to comply with the provisions of
the =ocal :overnment 2ode the charges against petitioners would no longer, have a
leg to stand on%
#onato v. Luna
G.R. No. +-*3642
A(#.l 1*, 1988
Ganayo, J.:
Facts:
*n information for bigamy against herein petitioner was filed against herein
petitioner =eonilo 'onato% !efore the petitionerLs arraignment, private respondent
filed with the Juvenile and 'omestic +elations 2ourt of Manila a civil action for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner% #aid civil case was based on the
ground that private respondent consented to entering into the marriage, which was
petitioner 'onatoLs second one, since she had no previous nowledge that petitioner
was already married% (rior to the date set for the trial on the merits on the criminal
case, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of said case contending
that the civil case seeing the annulment of his second marriage filed by private
respondent raises a pre6udicial 8uestion which must first be determined or decided
before the criminal case can proceed%
Issue:
4hether a pre6udicial 8uestion e5ists in this case
Held:
4@
No. * pre6udicial 8uestion has been defined to be one which arises in a case,
the resolution of which 8uestion is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said
case, and the cogniAance of which pertains to another tribunal% B It is one based on a
fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal
action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those
upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of
the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined% In order that the case of annulment of marriage be
considered a pre6udicial 8uestion to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be
shown that the petitionerLs consent to such marriage must be the one that was
obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the
second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for
the crime of bigamy%
)he situation in the present case is maredly different% *t the time the
petitioner was indicted for bigamy on 9ebruary 07, 19;B, the fact that two marriage
ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable% *nd it was the second
spouse, not the petitioner who filed the action for nullity on the ground of force,
threats and intimidation% *nd it was only on June 13, 19;B, that petitioner, as
defendant in the civil action, filed a third<party complaint against the first spouse
alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null and void on the ground of
force, threats and intimidation% *ssuming that the first marriage was null and void on
the ground alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the outcome of the
case% (arties to the marriage should not be permitted to 6udge for themselves its
nullity, for the same must be submitted to the 6udgment of the competent courts and
only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so
long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage e5ists%
'onato cannot apply the rule on pre6udicial 8uestions since a case for annulment of
marriage can be considered as a pre6udicial 8uestion to the bigamy case against the
accused only if it is proved that the petitionerLs consent to such marriage was
obtained by means of duress, violence and intimidation in order to establish that his
act in the subse8uent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot
be the basis for conviction% )he preceding elements do not e5ist in the case at bar%
Tenebro v. Court o! Aeals
G. R. No. 1*0$*8
Fe&#ua#y 18, 2004
Dnares-Santiago, J.:
Facts:
$eronico )enebro, contracted marriage with private complainant =eticia
*nca6as% )enebro informed *nca6as that he had been previously married to a certain
&ilda $illareyes% Invoing this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the
con6ugal dwelling which he shared with *nca6as, stating that he was going to cohabit
with $illareyes% (etitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain
Nilda $illegas% 4hen *nca6as learned of this third marriage, she verified from
$illareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner% In a handwritten letter,
$illareyes confirmed that petitioner, $eronico )enebro, was indeed her husband%
*nca6as thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner% (etitoner denied
that he and $illareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage
ceremony too place to solemniAe their union and that there was no record of said
marriage in the 2ivil register of Manila% &e also argues that the declaration of the
nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an
alleged indicator that his marriage to *nca6as lacs the essential re8uisites for
validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated%
Issues:
I% 4hether there was enough evidence to prove that the first marriage e5isted.
and
II% 4hether the declaration of the second marriage as void ab initio due to
psychological incapacity shall wor in petitionerDs favor%
Held:
I% 7es. )he prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary
and oral, to prove the e5istence of the first marriage between petitioner and
$illareyes% 'ocumentary evidence presented was in the form of a copy of a marriage
contract between )enebro and $illareyes, and a handwritten letter from $illareyes to
*nca6as dated informing *nca6as that $illareyes and )enebro were legally married%
)he certified copy of the marriage contract, Issued by a public officer in custody
thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its contents% )he marriage contract
plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner and $illareyes, it
should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents% )he
marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the
e5istence of the marriage between )enebro and $illareyes, which should be given
greater credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the
marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no re8uirement in the law
41
that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition
precedent for the validity of a marriage%
II% No. *s a subse8uent marriage contracted during the subsistence of
petitioners valid marriage to $illareyes, petitioners marriage to *nca6as would be
null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or
incapacity% #ince a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for
the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy% (ertinently, *rticle B49 of the +evised
(enal 2ode criminaliAes Iany person who shall contract a second or subse8uent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a 6udgment rendered in
the proper proceedingsI% * plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the
provision penaliAes the mere act of contracting a second or a subse8uent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid marriage%
/o v. Court o! Aeals
G.R. No. 10183$
Fe&#ua#y 11, 1992
8eliiano, J.:
Facts:
Cldon Maguan was driving his car and entered 4ilson #t%, a one<way street
and started travelling in the opposite or IwrongI direction% *t the corner of 4ilson
and J% *bad #antos #ts%, petitionerLs and MaguanLs cars nearly bumped each other%
(etitioner alighted from his car, waled over and shot Maguan inside his car%
(etitioner presented himself before the #an Juan (olice #tation to verify news reports
that he was being hunted by the police. he was accompanied by two lawyers% )he
police forthwith detained him% )he (rosecutor, instead of filing an information for
frustrated homicide, filed an information for murder before the +egional )rial 2ourt%
No bail was recommended% *t the bottom of the information, the (rosecutor certified
that no preliminary investigation had been conducted because the accused did not
e5ecute and sign a waiver of the provisions of *rticle 103 of the +evised (enal
2ode% 2ounsel for petitioner filed with the (rosecutor an omnibus motion for
immediate release and proper preliminary investigation, alleging that the warrantless
arrest of petitioner was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been
conducted before the information was filed% (etitioner also prayed that he be released
on recogniAance or on bail%
Issues:
I% 4hether there was a valid warrantless arrest. and
II% 4hether petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary
investigation%
Held:
I% No. (etitionerLs arrest too place si5 days after the shooting of Maguan%
)he arresting officers obviously were not present, at the time petitioner had allegedly
shot Maguan% Neither could the arrest effected si5 days after the shooting be
reasonably regarded as effected when the shooting had in fact 6ust been committed%
Moreover, none of the arresting officers had any personal nowledge of 9acts
indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan% )he information
upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged
eyewitnesses to the shooting% )hat information did not, however, constitute personal
nowledge% Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all% 4hen he waled into #an Juan
(olice #tation, accompanied by two lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal
of the police authorities% &e did not state that he was surrendering himself, in all
probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he had slain Cldon Maguan
or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime% (etitioner was entitled to a preliminary
investigation and that right should have been accorded him without any conditions%
II% No. (etitioner had from the very beginning demanded that a
preliminary investigation be conducted% *s earlier pointed out, on the same day that
the information for murder was filed with the +egional )rial 2ourt, petitioner filed
with the (rosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary
investigation% #ince petitioner in his omnibus motion was asing for preliminary
investigation and not for a re<investigation and since the (rosecutor himself did file
with the trial court, on the 3th day after filing the information for murder, a motion
for leave to conduct preliminary investigation, we conclude that petitionerLs omnibus
motion was in effect filed with the trial court% 4hat was crystal clear was that
petitioner did as for a preliminary investigation on the very day that the information
was filed without such preliminary investigation, and that the trial court was five
days later apprised of the desire of the petitioner for such preliminary investigation%
&owever failure to accord preliminary investigation, while constituting a denial of
the appropriate and full measure of the statutory process of criminal 6ustice, did not
impair the validity of the information for murder nor affect the 6urisdiction of the
trial court%

Bautista v. Court o! Aeals
G.R. No. 1433$*
!uly 6, 2001
40
Bellosillo, J.:
Facts:
(etitioner +uth '% !autista Issued to private respondent #usan *loXa
Metroban * chec which was later dishonored% (rivate respondent filed a
complaint<affidavit with the 2ity (rosecutor of 2avite 2ity% )he investigating
prosecutor Issued a resolution recommending the filing of an Information against
petitioner for violation of !( 00, which was approved by the 2ity (rosecutor%
(etitioner filed with the "ffice of the +egional #tate (rosecutor for +egion I$ a
petition for review which was denied% (etitioner filed with the 2ourt of *ppeals a
petition for review of the resolution of the "+#( but it was dismissed%
Issue:
4hether the decision of the office of the prosecutor is appealable to the
court of appeals
Held:
No. (etitioner submits that a prosecutor conducting a preliminary
investigation performs a 8uasi<6udicial function, hence its decision is appealable to
the court of appeals% !ut this statement holds true only in the sense that, lie 8uasi<
6udicial bodies, the prosecutor is an office in the e5ecutive department e5ercising
powers ain to those of a court% &ere is where the similarity ends% * closer scrutiny
will show that preliminary investigation is very different from other 8uasi<6udicial
proceedings% * 8uasi<6udicial body has been defined as Ian organ of government
other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of private
parties through either ad6udication or rule<maing%I )he prosecutor in a preliminary
investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused% &e does not
e5ercise ad6udication or rule<maing functions% (reliminary investigation is merely
in8uisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be
reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or
information% 4hile the fiscal maes that determination, he cannot be said to be
acting as a 8uasi<court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass 6udgment on the
accused, not the fiscal%
He.#s o0 1ote"c.a"o 1ad.lla 2. 3ou#t o0 A((eals
G.R. No. 14$20*
Ma#c, 10, 2004
!zuna, J:
Facts:
'r% 2onrado (otenciano was the recogniAed occupant of the property which,
through the years and even long after his death in 1934, remained for ta5 purposes
under his name% (ending the settlement of his estate before the +)2 of Manila, his
6udicial administrator sold the disputed property to spouses 2oson% )he 2osons then
sold the lot to )uaAon, who, in turn, sold the same to C#*=I, represented by Crnesto
#% *ure, respondent herein% +espondent filed a free patent application for the said
property with the 2ommunity Cnvironment and Natural +esources "ffice ,2CN+"-
of the 'epartment of Cnvironment and Natural +esources ,'CN+-, =os !aXos,
=aguna% &e based his claim of ownership on a deed of sale e5ecuted by C#*=I
conveying the property to him% (etitioners, who are the legal heirs of (otenciano,
protested respondentDs application% )hey claimed that the property has been
ad6udicated to them by virtue of an e5tra<6udicial partition approved by the +)2 of
Manila% (etitioners also manifested that they applied for the original titling of the
disputed lot before the +egional )rial 2ourt of !iXan, =aguna% *fter an investigation,
finding the protest unfounded, 'CN+ +egional C5ecutive 'irector *ntonio :%
(rincipe Issued an "rder dismissing petitionersD protest% =iewise, it denied the
motion for reconsideration% (etitioners thereafter appealed the case to the "ffice of
the 'CN+ #ecretary, which affirmed the assailed "rder% *gain, petitioners filed a
Motion for +econsideration and the same was denied% (etitioners thereafter sought
relief from the "ffice of the (resident% 'eparting from the preceding rulings, the
"ffice of the (resident reversed the 'ecision and "rder of the 'CN+% 9rom the
aforesaid 'ecision, respondent filed a Motion for +econsideration, which the same
office denied% Ender +ule 4B of the 1997 +ules of 2ivil (rocedure, respondent had
13 days within which to appeal from the aforesaid decision and resolution% &owever,
instead of perfecting an appeal, he opted to file with the 2ourt of *ppeals a special
civil action for ertiorari% )he 2ourt of *ppeals rendered a 'ecision reversing the
'ecision and +esolution of the "ffice of the (resident%
Issue:
4hether or not the 2ourt of *ppeals erred in giving due course to and in
granting the petition for ertiorari filed by respondent
Held:
7es. )he availability to respondent of the remedy of a petition for review
under +ule 4B of the +ules of 2ourt to appeal the 'ecision and +esolution of the
"ffice of the (resident effectively foreclosed his right to resort to a special civil
action for ertiorari% It bears emphasis that the special civil action for ertiorari is a
limited form of review and is a remedy of last recourse% )he 2ourt has often
4B
reminded members of the bench and bar that this e5traordinary action lies only
where there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and ade8uate remedy in the ordinary
course of law% It cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a 6udgment
despite the availability of that remedy, ertiorari not being a substitute for a lapsed
or lost appeal% )o reiterate, a petition for review is a mode of appeal, while a special
civil action for ertiorari is an e5traordinary process for the correction of errors of
6urisdiction% )he two remedies are distinct, mutually e5clusive and not alternative or
successive% In the instant case, there was no urgency or need for respondent to resort
to the e5traordinary remedy of ertiorari% )he records are bereft of any showing that
petitioners misled, prevented, or obstructed respondent from pursuing an appeal% *s
borne out by the records, respondent still had ample time and opportunity to file an
appeal under +ule 4B of the +ules of 2ourt% It is, therefore, obvious that respondent
interposed the special civil action for ertiorari with the 2ourt of *ppeals not
because it is the speedy and ade8uate remedy, but to mae up for the loss, through
omission or oversight, of the right of ordinary appeal% )here was thus no compelling
reason for the 2ourt of *ppeals to have treated the petition for ertiorari filed by
respondent as an ordinary appeal% )his is especially true considering that respondent
filed the petition well beyond the reglementary period for filing a petition for review,
without offering any reason therefore% 2oncomitant to a liberal application of the
rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoing liberality at
least to e5plain its failure to comply with the rules%

3ebb v. #e leon
G.R. No. 121234
Auust 23, 199*
Puno, J.:
Facts:
)he National !ureau of Investigation ,N!I- filed with the 'epartment of
Justice ,'"J- a letter<complaint charging petitioners with the crime of +ape with
&omicide% 9orthwith, the '"J formed a panel of prosecutors to conduct the
preliminary investigation% 'uring the preliminary investigation, the N!I presented
several sworn statements e5ecuted by the witnesses together with the autopsy and
genital reports% !efore submitting his counter<affidavit, petitioner 4ebb filed with
the '"J (anel a Motion for (roduction and C5amination of Cvidence and
'ocuments to produce documents% )he motion was granted by the '"J (anel and
the N!I submitted photocopies of the documents% =ater on, the '"J (anel Issued a
0;<page +esolution Ifinding probable cause to hold respondents for trialI and
recommending that Information for rape with homicide be filed against petitioners
and their co<respondents% "n the same date, it filed the corresponding Information
against petitioners and their co<accused with the +egional )rial 2ourt of (araXa8ue%
)he case was doceted and raffled to the sala of respondent 6udge Cscano% It was,
however, respondent 6udge +aul de =eon, pairing 6udge of Judge Cscano, who Issued
the warrants of arrest against the petitioners% Judge Cscano voluntarily inhibited
himself from the case to avoid any suspicion about his impartiality considering his
employment with the N!I before his appointment to the bench% )he case was re<
raffled to the sala of Judge *melita )olentino who Issued new warrants of arrest
against the petitioners and their co<accused% &owever, petitioner 4ebb voluntarily
surrendered to the police authorities at 2amp +icardo (apa #r%, in !icutan, )aguig%
(etitioners :atchalian and =e6ano liewise gave themselves up to the authorities
after filing their petitions before us%

Issue:
I% 4hether or not +espondent Judges de =eon and )olentino gravely
abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary
e5amination before issuing warrants of arrest against them.
II% 4hether or not the '"J (anel liewise gravely abused its discretion
in holding that there is probable cause to charge them with the crime
of rape with homicide.
III% 4hether or not the '"J (anel denied them their constitutional right
to due process during their preliminary investigation. and
I$% 4hether or not the '"J (anel unlawfully intruded into 6udicial
prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica *lfaro in the Information
as an accused%
Held:
I% No. In #oliven v% Maasiar, the addition of the word IpersonallyI after
the word IdeterminedI and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 197B
2onstitution to Issue warrants to Iother responsible officers as may be authoriAed by
law,I has apparently convinced petitioner !eltran that the 2onstitution now re8uires
the 6udge to personally e5amine the complainant and his witnesses in his
determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest% )his is not an
accurate interpretation% E1at t1e %onstitution undersores is t1e eAlusive and
personal responsibility o2 t1e issuing judge to satis2y 1i$sel2 o2 t1e eAistene o2
probable ause% =n satis2ying 1i$sel2 o2 t1e eAistene o2 probable ause 2or t1e
issuane o2 a Carrant o2 arrest, t1e judge is not reBuired to personally eAa$ine t1e
o$plainant and 1is Citnesses% 9ollowing established doctrine and procedure, he
shall> ,1- personally evaluate the report and the documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the e5istence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, Issue a warrant.
44
or ,0- if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscalLs
report and re8uire the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusions as to the e5istence of probable cause% #ound policy dictates
this procedure. otherwise 6udges would be unduly laden with the preliminary
e5amination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on
hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts% 2learly then, the 2onstitution,
the +ules of 2ourt, and our case law repudiate the submission of petitioners that
respondent 6udges should have conducted Isearching e5amination of witnessesI
before issuing warrants of arrest against them% )hey also re6ect petitionersL
contention that a 6udge must first Issue an order of arrest before issuing a warrant of
arrest% )here is no law or rule re8uiring the issuance of an "rder of *rrest prior to a
warrant of arrest%
II% No% :iven these conflicting pieces of evidence of the N!I and the
petitioners, we hold that the '"J (anel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
found probable cause against the petitioners% * finding of probable cause needs only
to rest on evidence showing that $ore li@ely t1an not a crime has been committed
and was committed by the suspects% (robable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of
guilt% *s well put in Brinegar v% Fnited States, while probable cause demands more
than Ibare suspicion,I it re8uires Iless than evidence which would 6ustify % % %
conviction%I * finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial%
It is not a pronouncement of guilt% 2onsidering the low 8uantum and 8uality of
evidence needed to support a finding of probable cause, we also hold that the '"J
(anel did not, gravely abuse its discretion in refusing to call the N!I witnesses for
clarificatory 8uestions% )he decision to call witnesses for clarificatory 8uestions is
addressed to the sound discretion of the investigator and the investigator alone% If the
evidence on hand already yields a probable cause, the investigator need not hold a
clarificatory hearing% )o repeat, probable cause merely implies probability of guilt
and should be determined in a summary manner% (reliminary investigation is not a
part of trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full e5ercise of
his rights, such as the right to confront and cross<e5amine his accusers to establish
his innocence% In the case at bar, the '"J (anel correctly ad6udged that enough
evidence had been adduced to establish probable cause and clarificatory hearing was
unnecessary%
III% No. )he records will show that the '"J (anel did not conduct the
preliminary investigation with indecent haste% (etitioners were given fair opportunity
to prove lac of probable cause against them% )he fairness of this opportunity is well
stressed in the 2onsolidated 2omment of the #olicitor :eneral% (etitioners cannot
also assail as premature the filing of the Information in court against them for rape
with homicide on the ground that they still have the right to appeal the adverse
resolution of the '"J (anel to the #ecretary of Justice% )he filing of said Information
is in accord with 'epartment of Justice "rder No% 00B, series of 199B, dated June 03,
199B% 4e 8uote its pertinent sections, viz%> #ec% 4% 4on-!ppealable
%ases. 5Aeptions% W No appeal may be taen from a resolution of the 2hief #tate
(rosecutor?+egional #tate (rosecutor?(rovincial or 2ity (rosecutor finding probable
cause eAept upon s1oCing o2 $ani2est error or grave abuse o2
disretion% 4otCit1standing t1e s1oCing o2 $ani2est error or grave abuse o2
disretion, no appeal s1all be entertained C1ere t1e appellant 1ad already been
arraigned% If the appellant is arraigned during the pendency of the appeal, said
appeal shall be dismissed $otu propio by the #ecretary of Justice%
!n appealG$otion 2or reinvestigation 2ro$ a resolution 2inding probable ause,
1oCever, s1all not 1old t1e 2iling o2 t1e in2or$ation in ourt% 4ithout doubt then, the
said '"J "rder No% 00B allows the filing of Information in court after the
consummation of the preliminary investigation even if the accused can still e5ercise
the right to see a review of the prosecutorLs recommendation with the #ecretary of
Justice%
I$% No. )he non<inclusion of *lfaro is anchored on +epublic *ct No% ;9/1,
entitled I*n *ct (roviding 9or * 4itness (rotection, #ecurity *nd !enefit (rogram
*nd 9or "ther (urposesI enacted on *pril 04, 1991% *lfaro 8ualified under its
#ection 1@% (etitionerLs argument lacs appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption
that the decision whom to prosecute is a 6udicial function, the sole prerogative of
courts and beyond e5ecutive and legislative interference% In truth, the prosecution of
crimes appertains to the e5ecutive department of government whose principal
power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully e5ecuted% * necessary
component of this power to e5ecute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators%
)he right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion W the
discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the e5ercise of which depends on
a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors% 4e thus hold
that it is not constitutionally impermissible for 2ongress to enact +%*% No% ;9/1
vesting in the 'epartment of Justice the power to determine who can 8ualify as a
witness in the program and who shall be granted immunity from
prosecution% #ection 9 of +ule 119 does not support the proposition that the power
to choose who shall be a state witness is an inherent 6udicial prerogative% Ender this
provision, the court is given the power to discharge a state witness only because it
has already ac8uired 6urisdiction over the crime and the accused% )he discharge of
43
an accused is part of the e5ercise of 6urisdiction but is not a recognition of an
inherent 6udicial function%
Roberts v. Court o! Aeals
G.R. No. 113930
Ma#c, *, 1996
"avide , Jr., J.:
Facts:
#everal thousand holders of IB49I (epsi crowns in connection with the (epsi
Number 9ever (romotion filed with the "ffice of the 2ity (rosecutor of OueAon 2ity
complaints against the petitionerLs in their respective capacities as officers of (C(#I,
and also against other officials of (C(#I% )he complaints respectively accuse the
petitioners and the other (C(#I officials of the following crimes> ,a- estafa. ,b-
violation of +%*% No% 7B94, otherwise nown as the 2onsumer *ct of the
(hilippines. ,c- violation of C%"% No% 91B. and ,d- violation of *ct No% 0BBB, entitled
I*n *ct +elative to Entrue, 'eceptive and Misleading *dvertisements,I as amended
by *ct No% B74@% *fter appropriate proceedings, the investigating prosecutor, +amon
M% :erona, released a Joint +esolution where he recommended the filing of an
information against the petitioners and others for the violation of *rticle B1/ of the
+evised (enal 2ode and the dismissal of the complaints for the violation of *rticle
B13, 0,d- of the +evised (enal 2ode. +%*% No% 7B94. *ct No% 0BBB, as amended by
*ct No% B74@. and C%"% No% 91B% 2ity (rosecutor 2andido $% +ivera approved the
recommendation with the modification% )he information for estafa attached to the
Joint +esolution was approved by Ismael (% 2asabar, 2hief of the (rosecution
'ivision, upon authority of the 2ity (rosecutor of OueAon 2ity, and was filed with
the +)2 of OueAon 2ity% )he petitioners filed with the "ffice of the 2ity (rosecutor
a motion for the reconsideration of the Joint +esolution% )he petitioners filed with
the '"J a (etition for +eview wherein, for the same grounds adduced in the
aforementioned motion for reconsideration, they prayed that the Joint +esolution be
reversed and the complaints dismissed% )he petitioners filed Motions to #uspend
(roceedings and to &old in *beyance Issuance of 4arrants of *rrest on the ground
that they had filed the aforesaid (etition for +eview% *cting on the (etition for
+eview, 2hief #tate (rosecutor Kenon =% 'e :uia Issued a 9irst
Indorsement, directing the 2ity (rosecutor of OueAon 2ity to inform the '"J
whether the petitioners have already been arraigned, and if not, to move in court for
the deferment of further proceedings in the case and to elevate to the '"J the entire
records of the case, for the case is being treated as an e5ception pursuant to #ection 4
of 'epartment 2ircular No% 7 dated 03 January 199@% In the morning of 07 *pril
199B, private prosecutor Julio 2ontreras filed an 5A-Parte Motion for Issuance of
4arrants of *rrest% In the afternoon of that same day, petitioner (aul +oberts, Jr%,
filed a #upplemental Ergent Motion to hold in *beyance Issuance of 4arrant of
*rrest and to #uspend (roceedings% &e stressed that the '"J had taen cogniAance
of the (etition for +eview by directing the 2ity (rosecutor to elevate the records of
I%#% No% (<44@1 and its related cases and asserted that the petition for review was an
essential part of the petitionersD right to a preliminary investigation% )he ne5t day,
respondent Judge *suncion, (residing Judge of !ranch 1@4 of the +)2 of OueAon
2ity, Issued an order advising the parties that his court would Fbe guided by the
doctrine laid down by the #upreme 2ourt in the case of %respo v. Mogul, and not by
the resolution of the 'epartment of Justice on the petition for review undertaen by
the accused% "n B@ *pril 199B, *ssistant 2ity (rosecutor )irso M% :avero filed with
the trial court a Motion to 'efer *rraignment wherein he also prayed that Ffurther
proceedings be &eld in abeyance pending final disposition by the 'epartment of
Justice%G :avero filed an *mended Information, accompanied by a corresponding
motion to admit it% )he trial court admitted the amended information on the same
date% =ater, the attorneys for the different private complainants filed, respectively, an
"pposition to Motion to 'efer *rraignment, and "b6ection and "pposition to
Motion to #uspend (roceedings and to &old in *beyance the Issuance of 4arrants of
*rrest% "n 14 May 199B, the petitioners filed a Memorandum in support of their
Motion to #uspend (roceedings and to &old in *beyance the Issuance of the
4arrants of *rrest% "n 17 May 199B, respondent Judge *suncion Issued the
challenged order ,1- denying the petitionersD Motion to #uspend (roceedings and to
&old In *beyance Issuance of 4arrants of *rrest and the public prosecutorDs Motion
to 'efer *rraignment and ,0- directing the issuance of the warrants of arrest
Fafter 01 June 199BG and setting the arraignment on 0/ June 199B%

Issue:
I% 4hether public respondent Judge *suncion committed grave abuse
of discretion in denying, on the basis of %respo v. Mogul, the
motions to suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance the issuance
of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment until after the
petition for review filed with the '"J shall have been resolved.
4;
II% 4hether public respondent Judge *suncion committed grave abuse
of discretion in ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest without
e5amining the records of the preliminary investigation.
III% 4hether the '"J, through its FB49G 2ommittee, gravely abused its
discretion in dismissing the petition for review on the following
bases> ,a- the resolution of public respondent 2ourt of *ppeals
denying the application for a writ of preliminary in6unction and ,b-
of public respondent *suncionDs denial of the abovementioned
motions.
I$% 4hether public respondent 2ourt of *ppeals committed grave
abuse of discretion ,a- in denying the motion for a writ of
preliminary in6unction solely on the ground that public respondent
*suncion had already before him the Joint +esolution of the
investigating prosecutor when he ordered the issuance of the
warrants of arrest, and ,b- in ultimately dismissing the petition on
the ground of mootness since the '"J has dismissed the petition
for review. and
$% 4hether this 2ourt may determine in these proceedings the
e5istence of probable cause either for the issuance of warrants of
arrest against the petitioners or for their prosecution for the crime
of estafa%

Held:
I% 7es. )here is nothing in %respo v. Mogul which bars the '"J from
taing cogniAance of an appeal, by way of a petition for review, by an accused in a
criminal case from an unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor% It merely
advised the '"J to, Fas far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for
review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has
already been filed in 2ourt%G Nothing in the said ruling forecloses the power or
authority of the #ecretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in
criminal cases% )he #ecretary of Justice is only en6oined to refrain as far as
practicable from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the
prosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in court% In any case, the grant of
a motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the #ecretary of Justice
reverses an appealed resolution, is sub6ect to the discretion of the court% )he real and
ultimate test of the independence and integrity of this court is not the filing of the
aforementioned motions at that stage of the proceedings but the filing of a motion to
dismiss or to withdraw the information on the basis of a resolution of the petition for
review reversing the Joint +esolution of the investigating prosecutor% &owever, once
a motion to dismiss or withdraw the information is filed the trial 6udge may grant or
deny it, not out of subservience to the #ecretary of Justice, but in faithful e5ercise of
6udicial prerogative% 4hether to approve or disapprove the stand taen by the
prosecution is not the e5ercise of discretion re8uired in cases lie this% )he trial 6udge
must himself be convinced that there was indeed no sufficient evidence against the
accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at only after an assessment of the
evidence in the possession of the prosecution% 4hat was imperatively re8uired was
the trial 6udgeDs own assessment of such evidence, it not being sufficient for the valid
and proper e5ercise of 6udicial discretion merely to accept the prosecutionDs word for
its supposed insufficiency%
II% 7es. 9irst, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge%
It is not for the (rovincial 9iscal or (rosecutor nor the Clection #upervisor to
ascertain% :nly t1e Judge and t1e Judge alone $a@es t1is deter$ination. #econd, the
preliminary in8uiry made by a (rosecutor does not bind the Judge% It merely assists
him to mae the determination of probable cause% )he Judge does not have to follow
what the (rosecutor presents to him% !y itself, the (rosecutorDs certification of
probable cause is ineffectual% It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of
stenographic notes ,if any-, and all other supporting documents behind the
(rosecutorDs certification which are material in assisting the Judge to mae his
determination% 4e reiterate the ruling in Soliven v. Ma@asiar that the Judge does not
have to personally e5amine the complainant and his witnesses% )he (rosecutor can
perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taing of the evidence%
&owever, there should be a report and neessary dou$ents supporting t1e 8isalHs
bare erti2iation. !ll o2 t1ese s1ould be be2ore t1e Judge. )he e5tent of the JudgeDs
personal e5amination of the report and its anne5es depends on the circumstances of
each case% 4e cannot determine beforehand how cursory or e5haustive the JudgeDs
e5amination should be% )he Judge has to e5ercise sound discretion for, after all, the
personal determination is vested in the Judge by the 2onstitution% It can be as brief as
or detailed as the circumstances of each case re8uire% )o be sure, the Judge must go
beyond the (rosecutorDs certification and investigation report whenever, necessary%
&e should call for the complainant and witnesses themselves to answer the courtDs
probing 8uestions when the circumstances of the case so re8uire%
III% 7es. )he '"J committed grave abuse of discretion when it e5ecuted
on 0B July 199B a unilateral volte-2ae, which was even unprovoed by a formal
pleading to accomplish the same end, by dismissing the petition for review% It
dismissed the petition simply because it thought that a review of the Joint +esolution
would be an e5ercise in futility in that any further action on the part of the
'epartment would depend on the sound discretion of the trial court, and that the
latterDs denial of the motion to defer arraignment filed at the instance of the '"J was
clearly an e5ercise of that discretion or was, in effect, a signal to the 'epartment that
47
the determination of the case is within the courtDs e5clusive 6urisdiction and
competence% )his infirmity becomes more pronounced because the reason adduced
by the respondent Judge for his denial of the motions to suspend proceedings and
hold in abeyance issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment finds, as yet,
no support in %respo.
I$% 7es. It merely assumes at least two things> ,1- that respondent Judge
*suncion had read and relied on the Joint +esolution and ,0- he was convinced that
probable cause e5ists for the issuance of the warrants of arrest against the petitioners%
Nothing in the records provides reasonable basis for these assumptions% In his
assailed order, the respondent Judge made no mention of the Joint +esolution, which
was attached to the records of 2riminal 2ase No% O<9B<4B19/ on 00 *pril 199B%
Neither did he state that he found probable cause for the issuance of warrants of
arrest% *nd, for an undivinable reason, he directed the issuance of warrants of
arrest only Fafter June 01, 199B%G If he did read the Joint +esolution and, in so
reading, found probable cause, there was absolutely no reason at all to delay for
more than one month the issuance of warrants of arrest% )he most probable
e5planation for such delay could be that the respondent Judge had actually wanted to
wait for a little while for the '"J to resolve the petition for review%
$% No. "rdinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with
this 2ourt% Its duty in an appropriate case is confined to the Issue of whether the
e5ecutive or 6udicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done
without or in e5cess of 6urisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
want of 6urisdiction% )his is consistent with the general rule that criminal
prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by in6unction, preliminary or final%
)here are, however, e5ceptions to this rule% *mong the e5ceptions are enumerated
in Bro@a v. 5nrile as follows> ,a- to afford ade8uate protection to the constitutional
rights of the accused. ,b- 4hen necessary for the orderly administration of 6ustice or
to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions. ,c- when there is a pre<6udicial
8uestion which is sub judie< ,d- when the acts of the officer are without or in
e5cess of authority. ,e -where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or
regulation. ,f- when double 6eopardy is clearly apparent. ,g- where the court has no
6urisdiction over the offense. ,h- where it is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution. ,i- where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance. ,6- when there is clearly no pri$a 2aie case against the accused and a
motion to 8uash on that ground has been denied. and ,- preliminary in6unction has
been Issued by the #upreme 2ourt to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of
petitioners% In these e5ceptional cases, this 2ourt may ultimately resolve the
e5istence or non<e5istence of probable cause by e5amining the records of the
preliminary investigation, as it did in Salonga v. PaIo, !llado, and Eebb.
Co**unity Ban$ o! /ui*ba v. Talavera
AM No. R-!-0*-1909
A(#.l 6, 200*
Panganiban, J.:
Facts:
(etitioner charged Judge )omas !% )alavera of the +egional )rial 2ourt of
2abanatuan 2ity, Nueva Cci6a, with serious misconduct and?or gross inefficiency and
violation of +ules 1%@1, B%@1 and B%@0 of the 2ode of Judicial 2onduct% )he factual
antecedents are as follows> )he respondent 6udge was the 6udge sitting on the case
lodged by the petitioners against several accused for the crime of estafa% )he accused
appealed the findings of the Investigating 9iscal to the '"J which denied the
petition% )hen, the accused filed a Motion for +econsideration, which the '"J also
denied% &ence, respondent Issued a 4arrant of *rrest fi5ing no bail against the
accused% )he accused then filed a Motion for +einvestigation and to =ift the Issuance
of 4arrant of *rrest ,Motion for +einvestigation, for brevity-% &owever, neither the
!an nor its counsel was furnished a copy of said Motion% )here was also no
hearing on the said motion to afford the !an an opportunity to oppose the same%
+espondent granted the Motion for +einvestigation without any hearing thereon%
)hus, a reinvestigation proceeding was conducted by *ssistant (rovincial
(rosecutor% *gain, the !an was not notified of said proceedings% )he *ssistant
(rovincial (rosecutor, in his Joint +esolution, reversed the earlier findings of the
previous Investigating 9iscal and on the same day filed a Motion to 'ismiss% Neither
the ban nor its counsel was notified about the said Motion and no hearing thereon
was &eld to afford the !an an opportunity to oppose the same% +espondent granted
the Motion to 'ismiss and ordered the release of the accused%
4/
Issue:
4hether the 6udge erred in granting the Motion for +einvestigation and
Motion to 'ismiss despite lac of notice to the !an
Held:
7es. F.#st, respondent should not have entertained the Motion for
+einvestigation filed by the accused% )he former was fully aware that the latter had
appealed the unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor to the 'epartment of
Justice ,'"J-% +espondent 6udge must have in fact taen that appeal into
consideration when he Issued a warrant of arrest against all the accused only on
#eptember 19, 0@@@, after Justice #ecretary #erafin +% 2uevas had denied their
(etition for +eview and affirmed the presence of prima facie evidence against them%
#ubse8uently, on *ugust 13, 0@@@, the secretary also denied with finality the Motion
for +econsideration filed by the accused% Inasmuch as the +esolution of the
provincial prosecutor has been affirmed by the secretary of 6ustice, the e5istence of
probable cause to hold the accused for trial may be deemed to be the finding of the
secretary himself, not merely of the prosecutor who had first investigated the
case% )herefore, what the prosecutor reviewed and overruled in the reinvestigation
was not the actuation and resolution of his predecessor, but of the secretary of 6ustice
no less% )he actions of prosecutors are not unlimited. they are sub6ect to review by
the secretary of 6ustice who may affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their actions or
opinions% 2onse8uently the secretary may direct them to file either a motion to
dismiss the case or an information against the accused% In short, the secretary of
6ustice, who has the power of supervision and control over prosecuting officers, is
the ultimate authority who decides which of the conflicting theories of the
complainants and the respondents should be believed% )he provincial or city
prosecutor has neither the personality nor the legal authority to review or overrule
the decision of the secretary% )his principle is elementary% In the present case, the
accused filed their Motion for +einvestigation on November 09, 0@@@, about three
months after the *ugust 13, 0@@@ +esolution of the secretary denying with finality
their Motion for +econsideration of the denial of their (etition for +eview% 2learly,
therefore, it was grossly erroneous for respondent 6udge to order the reinvestigation
of the case by the prosecutor% )his action enabled the latter to reprobate and reverse
the secretaryDs +esolution% In granting the Motion for +einvestigation, respondent
effectively demolished the '"JDs power of control and supervision over prosecutors%
Second, in granting the Motion to 'ismiss, respondent relied solely on the
+esolution of the prosecutor who had conducted the reinvestigation and
recommended the dismissal of the case for alleged insufficiency of evidence% )his
2ourt also observes that respondent acted with undue haste when he granted the
Motion on 'ecember 09, 0@@@, only a day after the reinvestigation was concluded on
'ecember 0/, 0@@@% 2oupled with the absence of the re8uired evaluation in the
+esolution granting the dismissal of the case, this hasty action leads to the
indubitable conclusion that the 6udge did not personally evaluate the partiesD
evidence before acting on the Motion% #ettled is the legal doctrine that the discretion
to accede to a Motion to 'ismiss filed by the prosecutor rests solely with the court%
Mere approval of the position taen by the prosecution is not e8uivalent to the
discretion re8uired in cases lie this% )he trial 6udge must be convinced that there
was indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused% #uch a conclusion can be
arrived at only after a thorough assessment of the prosecution evidence% 9or a valid
and proper e5ercise of 6udicial discretion, accepting the prosecutionDs word that the
evidence is insufficient is not enough. strictly re8uired of the order disposing of the
motion is the trial 6udgeDs own evaluation of such evidence% "nce a complaint or an
information is filed in court, the 6udge << not the prosecutor << assumes full control of
the controversy% )hus, a grant of the motion to dismiss is e8uivalent to a disposition
of the case itself, a sub6ect clearly within the courtDs e5clusive 6urisdiction and
competence% 9urthermore, when respondent 6udge Issued the warrants of arrest
without bail against all the accused, it is presumed that he had studied the
Information and the +esolution of the prosecutor and agreed with the latterDs findings
of probable cause% 2onse8uently, the grant of the Motion for +einvestigation and of
the Motion to 'ismiss for alleged insufficiency of evidence posed a serious
contradiction of the earlier finding of probable cause%
Third, respondent granted the Motions despite the obvious lac of notice to
complainant ,the private offended party in the criminal case- and lac of hearing%
)his lapse effectively deprived it of its day in court% )he +ules of 2ourt re8uire that,
with the e5ception of motions that the court may act upon without pre6udicing the
rights of the adverse party, every written motion should be set for hearing by the
movant% #ections 4, 3 and ; of +ule 13 of the +ules of 2ourt e5plicitly re8uire that
notices be sent at least three days before the hearing and directed at the parties
concerned. and that they state the time and place of hearing of the motion, with
proper proof of notice thereof% 4ithout such proof, the motion is considered pro
2or$a< thus, the court cannot act upon it% )he purpose of the notice is to enable the
adverse party to appear for its own protection and to contest the motion% Clementary
due process mandates that the other party be notified of the adverse action of the
opposing party, so as to avoid a capricious change of mind and to ensure impartiality
of the trial% &ere, the Motions for +einvestigation and to 'ismiss were fatally
defective, as neither contained any proper notice of hearing% +espondent thus
grossly erred in taing cogniAance of these Motions% In criminal proceedings, the
word IpartyI is &eld to mean not only the government and the accused, but also
49
other persons who may be affected by the orders Issued and?or 6udgment rendered
therein%
Lu*anla- v. "eralta
G.R No. 164*93
Fe&#ua#y 13, 2006
Panganiban, %.J:
Facts:
(etitioner was apprehended by police for illegal possession of a dangerous
drug% &e was charged in an Information filed with +)2 of Manila% * 2ommitment
"rder was conse8uently Issued by (residing Judge directing the detention of
petitioner in the Manila 2ity Jail and setting the latterDs arraignment% &owever, his
arraignment was postponed for several times for the following reasons which
happened on different occasions> 1- absence of the public prosecutor. 0- absence of
the petitionerDs counsel. B- scheduled meeting of the presiding 6udges. 4- failure of
the warden to produce him in court because notice was not served. 3- failure of the
court to Issue a produce order ;- respondent 6udgeDs absence 7- semestral inventory
of cases% (etitioner remained uninformed of the charges against him, while
continuing to be in detention and despair for one year, nine months and 4 days%

Issues:
I% 4hether or not violation of the right to speedy trial, warranting a
8uashal of the Information against petitioner. and
II% 4hether mandamus is the proper remedy
Held:
I% 7es. :iven the length and the unreasonableness of the ma6ority of the
delays, a violation of the right of petitioner to speedy trial becomes manifest% *lmost
two years elapsed from the filing of the Information against him until the filing of
this (etition. incredibly, he has not been arraigned% *n arraignment taes, at most,
ten minutes of the courtDs business and does not normally entail legal gymnastics% It
consists simply of reading to the accused the charges leveled against them, ensuring
their understanding of those charges, and obtaining their plea to the charges% *
prudent and resolute 6udge can conduct an arraignment as soon as the accused are
presented before the court% In fact, by fi5ing a period of only thirty days from the
filing of the information to the conduct of an arraignment, +* /49B recogniAes that
this fundamental right should and can be done with minimal delay% 9or this reason
alone, we are astonished that the court a 8uo could not complete such a simple but
fundamental stage in the proceedings% )he protracted delay became all the more
oppressive and ve5atious when viewed from the perspective that the liberty of the
accused was being curtailed for the entire duration% )he appointment of a counsel de
oficio in the absence of the defendantDs counsel de parte is not prohibited, not even
by the 2onstitution, especially when the accused themselves re8uest that
appointment% In fact, the court has a mandatory duty to appoint a counsel de oficio
when the accused have no counsel of choice at the time of their arraignment%
II% 7es. It is established that a writ of mandamus may be Issued to control
the e5ercise of discretion when, in the performance of duty, there is undue delay that
can be characteriAed as a grave abuse of discretion resulting in manifest in6ustice% In
view of our finding of unwarranted delays in the conduct of the arraignment of
petitioner, he has indeed the right to demand << through a writ of mandamus <<
e5peditious action from all officials tased with the administration of 6ustice% )hus,
he may not only demand that his arraignment be &eld but, ultimately, that the
information against him be dismissed on the ground of the violation of his right to
speedy trial% Mandamus is a proper recourse for citiAens who see to enforce a public
right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when the
public right involved is mandated by the 2onstitution% !esides, it has long been
established in this 6urisdiction that the writ of mandamus is available to the accused
to compel a dismissal of the case%

%endoza)Arce v. O!!ice o! the O*buds*an
G.R No. 149148
A(#.l *, 2002
Mendoza, J.:
Facts:
#usan MendoAa<*rce is the 2ler of 2ourt $I of the +egional )rial 2ourt of
+o5as 2ity% #he prepared a =etter of *dministration ,="*- after receiving the copy
of Judge (estanoDs order% )he ="* was based on the form prescribed in the Manual
for 2lers of 2ourt% *ccordingly, administrator Nicolas !% $illaruA, Jr%, accompanied
by three armed security guards and respondentDs 'eputy #heriff 2harles *guiling,
too possession of the entire estate of the decedent, including the nipa lands which
had been leased to respondent #antiago !% $illaruA% )his gave rise to the present
action% In a letter<complaint to the "mbudsman, dated March 03, 1999, respondent
#antiago !% $illaruA alleged that petitioner committed two crimes in issuing the
="*, to wit> 9alsification by a public officer under *rticle 171, par% B of the +evised
3@
(enal 2ode and 2orrupt practice in violation of YB,e- of the *nti<:raft and 2orrupt
(ractices *ct ,+%*% No% B@19-% In his affidavit, respondent accused petitioner of
acting Fwith manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross ine5cusable negligenceG
by falsely attributing to Judge (estaXo the appointment of Nicolas !% $illaruA as new
administrator and investing him with Ffull authority to tae possession of all
propertiesG of the decedent, because the fact was that it was Judge (atricio who had
appointed Nicolas administrator of the estate sub6ect to the terms and conditions of
the lease agreement in favor of respondent #antiago !% $illaruA%

Issues:
I% 4hether the criminal prosecution of the petitioner should be en6oined.
II% 4hether the petitioner is guilty of the crime charged. and
III% 4hether the "mbudsman is correct in finding probable cause of the crime
of falsification
Held:
I% 7es. )o begin with, in Posadas v. :$buds$an, we &eld> F)he rule, of
course, is that a criminal prosecution cannot be en6oined% !ut as has been &eld,
infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal
procedure is respect for the citiAenDs right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest
and punishment but also from unwarranted and ve5atious prosecution%G In that case,
the "mbudsman ordered the prosecution of certain officials of the Eniversity of the
(hilippines in 'iliman, OueAon 2ity for preventing the National !ureau of
Investigation from arresting without warrants student<suspects in the illing of a
fraternity member% )he 8uestion was whether there was probable cause for violation
of (%'% No% 1/09, which maes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the apprehension
and prosecution of criminal offenders% )he 2ourt found none and en6oined the
"mbudsman and his agents from prosecuting the E%(% officials% )he attempted arrest
was declared illegal and petitioners to be simply protecting the rights of the students%
Indeed, while this 2ourtDs policy is one of non<interference in the conduct of
preliminary investigations, leaving the investigating officers with a latitude of
discretion in the determination of probable cause, nonetheless e5ceptions to the
general rule have been recogniAed, to wit> ,1- when necessary to afford ade8uate
protection to the constitutional rights of the accused. ,0- when necessary for the
orderly administration of 6ustice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions. ,B-
when there is a pre6udicial 8uestion which is sub 6udice. ,4- when the acts of the
officer are without or in e5cess of authority. ,3- where the prosecution is under an
invalid law, ordinance or regulation. ,;- when double 6eopardy is clearly apparent.
,7- where the court has no 6urisdiction over the offense. ,/- where it is a case of
persecution rather than prosecution. ,9- where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by the lust for vengeance. ,1@- when there is clearly no pri$a 2aie case
against the accused and a motion to 8uash on that ground has been denied% In this
case, we hold that the "ffice of the "mbudsman ,$isayas- acted without or in e5cess
of its authority when it ordered the filing of informations against petitioner for
violation of +%*% No% B@19, YB,e- and the +evised (enal 2ode, *rt% 171, par% B,
despite the absence of probable cause, defined as such ground as engenders a well<
founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, warranting the filing of the case in court%
II% No% In this case, there is no basis for the finding that in issuing the ="*
in 8uestion petitioner acted with Fpartiality,G or bias which e5cites a disposition to
see and report matters as they are wished for rather than as they are, with Fbad
faith,G which connotes not only bad 6udgment or negligence but also a dishonest
purpose or conscious wrongdoing, a breach of duty amounting to fraud, nor with
Fgross negligence,G which is negligence characteriAed by the want of even slight
care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to
conse8uences as far as other persons are concerned% )he Manual for 2lers of 2ourt
describes the cler of court as Fan officer of the 2ourt, a public officer, and an
Hofficer of the law,D 1althoughU the position is not that of a 6udicial officer, nor is it
synonymous with the 2ourt% % % % )he office is essentially a ministerial
one%G (etitioner performed a ministerial duty in preparing the letter of
administration based on the dispositive portions of the orders dated #eptember 00,
199/ and "ctober 10, 199/% #he merely copied substantially the form for letters of
administration prescribed in the Manual for 2lers of 2ourts% )he ="* may not be
accurate for lac of reference to the lease agreement in favor of respondent #antiago
!% $illaruA, but it cannot be said with certainty that she acted either with gross
negligence or from some corrupt motive% )he fact is that, instead of employing her
own words, she used phrases in the Manual prescribed by this 2ourt%
III% No. 2riminal intent must be shown in felonies committed by means
of dolo, such as falsification% In this case, there is no reasonable ground to believe
that the re8uisite criminal intent or $ens rea was present% (etitioner prepared the
letter of administration on the basis of the order of Judge (estaXo, dated "ctober 10,
199/, approving the administratorDs bond filed by Nicolas !% $illaruA, Jr% !y the
approval of his bond, Nicolas !% $illaruA, Jr% 8ualified as administrator so that in a
sense, therefore, the statement in the letter of administration F1tUhat by order of this
2ourt dated "ctober 10, 199/, Issued by &onorable #ergio (estaXo, Judge of the
+egional )rial 2ourt, !ranch 19, +o5as 2ity, Nicolas !% $illaruA, Jr% has been
appointed *dministrator of the estate of +emedios !erme6o<$illaruA, deceasedG is
31
correct% )here was nothing willful or felonious in petitionerDs act warranting her
prosecution for falsification%
Ching v. Secretary o! 1ustice
G. R No. 16431$
Fe&#ua#y 6, 2006
%allejo, Sr., J:
Facts:
)hirteen informations of estafa were filed against the petitioner, senior vice<
president of (!MI, for failing to return, after the trust receipts matured, the goods to
respondent ban or their value despite demands% (etitioner appealed the resolution of
the 2ity (rosecutor to the then Minister of Justice% )he appeal was dismissed and
petitioner moved for its reconsideration% )he Minister of Justice granted the motion,
thus reversing the previous resolution finding probable cause against petitioner% )he
2ity (rosecutor was ordered to move for the withdrawal of the Informations% In the
meantime, the 2ourt rendered 6udgment in *llied !aning 2orporation v%
"rdoXeA, holding that the penal provision of (%'% No% 113 encompasses any act
violative of an obligation covered by the trust receipt. it is not limited to transactions
involving goods which are to be sold ,retailed-, reshipped, stored or processed as a
component of a product ultimately sold% +espondent ban re<filed the criminal
complaint for estafa against petitioner before the "ffice of the 2ity (rosecutor of
Manila% (reliminary investigation ensued% )he 2ity (rosecutor ruled that there was
no probable cause to charge petitioner with violating (%'% No% 113, as petitionerDs
liability was only civil, not criminal, having signed the trust receipts as
surety% +espondent ban appealed the resolution to the 'epartment of Justice ,'"J-
via petition for review% )he #ecretary of Justice Issued +esolution No% 03@ granting
the petition and reversing the assailed resolution of the 2ity (rosecutor% (etitioner
then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the 2*, assailing
the resolutions of the #ecretary of Justice% )he 2* rendered 6udgment dismissing the
petition for lac of merit, and on procedural grounds% "n the procedural Issue, it
ruled that ,a- the certification of non<forum shopping e5ecuted by petitioner and
incorporated in the petition was defective for failure to comply with the first two of
the three<fold undertaings prescribed in +ule 7, #ection 3 of the +evised +ules of
2ivil (rocedure. and ,b- the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was
not the proper remedy of the petitioner%
Issues:
I% 4hether or not the 2* erred in dismissing the petition on the ground that
the certification for non<forum shopping was defective. and
II% 4hether or not the 2* erred when it ruled that no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lac or e5cess of 6urisdiction was committed by the #ecretary
of Justice in coming out with the assailed resolutions
Held:
I% )he petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a sworn
certification that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the
same Issues in the #upreme 2ourt, the 2ourt of *ppeals or different divisions
thereof, or any other tribunal or agency. if there is such other action or proceeding,
he must state the status of the same. and if he should thereafter learn that a similar
action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the #upreme 2ourt, the
2ourt of *ppeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he
undertaes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency
thereof within five ,3- days therefrom% 2ompliance with the certification against
forum shopping is separate from and independent of the avoidance of forum
shopping itself% )he re8uirement is mandatory% )he failure of the petitioner to
comply with the foregoing re8uirement shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of
the petition without pre6udice, unless otherwise provided% Indubitably, the first
paragraph of petitionerDs certification is incomplete and unintelligible% (etitioner
failed to certify that he Ihad not heretofore commenced any other action involving
the same Issues in the #upreme 2ourt, the 2ourt of *ppeals or the different divisions
thereof or any other tribunal or agencyI as re8uired by paragraph 4, #ection B, +ule
4; of the +evised +ules of 2ourt%
II% No. In MendoAa<*rce v% "ffice of the "mbudsman ,$isayas-, this 2ourt
&eld that the acts of a 8uasi<6udicial officer may be assailed by the aggrieved party
via a petition for certiorari and en6oined ,a- when necessary to afford ade8uate
protection to the constitutional rights of the accused. ,b- when necessary for the
orderly administration of 6ustice. ,c- when the acts of the officer are without or in
e5cess of authority. ,d- where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the
lust for vengeance. and ,e- when there is clearly no prima facie case against the
accused% )he 2ourt also declared that, if the officer conducting a preliminary
investigation ,in that case, the "ffice of the "mbudsman- acts without or in e5cess of
his authority and resolves to file an Information despite the absence of probable
cause, such act may be nullified by a writ of certiorari% Indeed, under #ection 4, +ule
110 of the 0@@@ +ules of 2riminal (rocedure, the Information shall be prepared by
the Investigating (rosecutor against the respondent only if he or she finds probable
cause to hold such respondent for trial% )he Investigating (rosecutor acts without or
30
in e5cess of his authority under the +ule if the Information is filed against the
respondent despite absence of evidence showing probable cause therefore% If the
#ecretary of Justice reverses the +esolution of the Investigating (rosecutor who
found no probable cause to hold the respondent for trial, and orders such prosecutor
to file the Information despite the absence of probable cause, the #ecretary of Justice
acts contrary to law, without authority and?or in e5cess of authority% #uch resolution
may liewise be nullified in a petition for certiorari under +ule ;3 of the +evised
+ules of 2ivil (rocedure%
Tatad v. Sandiganbayan
No. +-$233*-39
Ma#c, 31, 1988
Dap, J.:
Facts:
)he complainant, *ntonio de los +eyes, originally filed what he termed
Ia reportI with the =egal (anel of the (residential #ecurity 2ommand ,(#2- on
"ctober 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of +ep% *ct No% B@19 against
then #ecretary of (ublic Information 9rancisco #% )atad% )he IreportI was made to
IsleepI in the office of the (#2 until the end of 1979 when it became widely nown
that #ecretary ,then Minister- )atad had a falling out with (resident Marcos and had
resigned from the 2abinet% "n 'ecember 10, 1979, the 1974 complaint was
resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the )anodbayan% )he
)anodbayan acted on the complaint on *pril 1, 19/@ which was around two months
after petitioner )atadLs resignation was accepted by (res% Marcos by referring the
complaint to the 2I#, (residential #ecurity 2ommand, for investigation and report%
"n June 1;, 19/@, the 2I# report was submitted to the )anodbayan,
recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former
Minister )atad and *ntonio =% 2antero% !y "ctober 03, 19/0, all affidavits and
counter<affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the )anodbayan%
&owever, it was only on June 3, 19/3 that a resolution was approved by the
)anodbayan% 9ive criminal informations were filed with the #andiganbayan on June
10, 19/3, all against petitioner )atad alone% ,1- #ection B, paragraph ,e- of +*% B@19
for giving 'L :roup, a private corporation controlled by his brother<in<law,
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
functions. ,0- $iolation of #ection B, paragraph ,b- for receiving a chec of
(103,@@@%@@ from +oberto $allar, (resident?:eneral Manager of *mity )rading
2orporation as consideration for the release of a chec of (3//,@@@%@@ to said
corporation for printing services rendered for the
2onstitutional 2onvention +eferendum in 197B. ,B- $iolation of #ection 7 on three
,B- counts for his failure to file his #tatement of *ssets and =iabilities for the
calendar years 197B, 197; and 197/% * motion to 8uash the information was made
alleging that the prosecution deprived accused of due process of law and of the right
to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him% It was denied hence the appeal%

Issue:
4hether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused

Held:
7es. 'ue process ,(rocedural- and right to speedy disposition of trial were
violated% 9irstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner )atad had
a falling out with (resident Marcos% #econdly, departing from established procedures
prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which re8uire the submission of
affidavits and counter<affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their
witnesses, the )anodbayan referred the complaint to the (residential #ecurity
2ommand for finding investigation and report% )he law ,(%'% No% 911- prescribes a
ten<day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by
him from its termination% 4hile we agree with the respondent court that this period
fi5ed by law is merely Idirectory,I yet, on the other hand, it cannot be disregarded or
ignored completely, with absolute impunity% * delay of close to three ,B- years
cannot be deemed reasonable or 6ustifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining
in the case at bar%
'o v. "eole o! the "hiliines
GR No. 106632
%cto&e# 9, 199$
Panganiban, J.:
Facts:
)he *nti<:raft =eague of the (hilippines, represented by its chief prosecutor
and investigator filed with the "ffice of the "mbudsman a complaint against
petitioners% )he complaint was for alleged violation of #ection B ,g- of +epublic *ct
B@191BU prohibiting a public officer from entering into any contract or transaction on
behalf of the government if it is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the latter,
3B
whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby% *fter due notice, all
respondents therein filed their respective counter<affidavits with supporting
documents% )he :raft Investigation "fficer ,:I"- submitted his resolution%
&owever, after a review of the above resolution, the #pecial (rosecution "fficer
recommended that both +olando Narciso and 'oris )eresa &o be charged with
violation of #ection B ,e- of +%*% B@19% )he resolution of :I" was approved by
"mbudsman 2onrado M% $as8ueA% )hus, herein petitioners were charged
accordingly before the #andiganbayan in an information% *cting on the foregoing
information, the #andiganbayan Issued the now 8uestioned warrant of arrest against
(etitioners &o and Narciso% )hey alleged that the #andiganbayan, in determining
probable cause for the issuance of the warrant for their arrest, merely relied on the
information and the resolution attached thereto, filed by the "mbudsman without
other supporting evidence, in violation of the re8uirements of #ection 0, *rticle III of
the 2onstitution, and settled 6urisprudence% +espondent #andiganbayan denied said
motion in the challenged +esolution% )he #andiganbayan 6ustified the issuance of the
warrant by stating> F!ut in this particular case we believe there is a pri$a 2aie case
based on our e5amination of the resolution because we believe, we thin the
"mbudsman will not approve a resolution 6ust lie that, without evidence to bac it
up%G
Issue:
4hether or not a 6udge may issue a warrant of arrest solely on the basis of the
report and recommendation of the investigating prosecutor, without personally
determining probable cause by independently e5amining sufficient evidence
submitted by the parties during the preliminary investigation
Held:
No% (irst, as held in inting, the determination of probable cause by the
prosecutor is for a purpose different from that which is to be made by the
6udge% whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the
offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon% )he
6udge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued
against the accused, i.e. whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of 6ustice%104U )hus, even if both should
base their findings on one and the same proceeding or evidence, there should be no
confusion as to their distinct ob6ectives%
Second, since their ob6ectives are different, the 6udge cannot rely solely on
the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to 6ustify the issuance of a
warrant of arrest% "bviously and understandably, the contents of the prosecutorDs
report will support his own conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused of
an offense and hold him for trial% &owever, the 6udge must
decide independently. &ence, he must have supporting evidence, ot1er t1an the
prosecutorDs bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the
e5istence ,or none5istence- of probable cause to Issue an arrest order% )his
responsibility of determining personally and independently the e5istence or
none5istence of probable cause is lodged in him by no less than the most basic law
of the land% (arenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the burden of the 6udge and
speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the latter not only the information
and his bare resolution finding probable cause, but also so much of the records and
the evidence on hand as to enable &is &onor to mae his personal and separate
6udicial finding on whether to Issue a warrant of arrest%103U
Lastly, it is not re8uired that the o$plete or entire records of the case
during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and e5amined by the 6udge% It is
not intended to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to e5amine the complete
records of every case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an
accused% 4hat is re8uired, rather, is that the 6udge must have su22iient supporting
documents ,such as the complaint, affidavits, counter<affidavits, sworn statements of
witnesses or transcripts of stenographic notes, if any- upon which to mae his
independent 6udgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the
prosecutor as to the e5istence of probable cause% )he point is> he cannot rely solely
and entirely on the prosecutorDs recommendation, as +espondent 2ourt did in this
case% *lthough the prosecutor en6oys the legal presumption of regularity in the
performance of his official duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the
presumption of accuracy, the 2onstitution, we repeat, commands the 6udge
to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest% )his
2ourt has consistently held that a 6udge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely
on the certification or the report of the investigating officer%
Larranaga v. Court o! Aeals
GR No. 130644
Ma#c, 13, 1998
Panganiban, J.:
Facts:
It appears that some (N( 2I: authorities went to the 2enter for 2ulinary
*rts to arrest 9rancisco Juan =arranaga% =arranaga, thru his lawyer, *tty% *rmovit
remonstrated against the warrantless arrest% )he police did not carry out the arrest on
the assurance that =arranaga would be brought to 2ebu 2ity by his lawyer for
preliminary investigation% *tty% *rmovit attended the preliminary investigation
34
conducted by the "ffice of the 2ity #tate (rosecutor of 2ebu% 9orthwith, he moved
that his client be given a regular preliminary investigation% )he motion was denied
by the city prosecutor on the ground that =arranaga should be treated as a detention
prisoner, hence entitled only to an in8uest investigation% *tty% *rmovit was ordered
to present =arranaga in person% &e was warned that his failure would be treated as
waiver of his clientDs right to a preliminary investigation and he would be proceeded
against pursuant to section 7, +ule 110 of the +ules of 2ourt% *tty% *rmivitDs verbal
motion for reconsideration was denied by the city prosecutor%

Issue:
4hether the action of the 2ity #tate (rosecutor should be sustained
Held:
No. (etitioner is entitled not to a mere in8uest investigation but to a regular
preliminary investigation% #ection 7 of +ule 110 cannot be invoed to 6ustify
petitionerDs in8uest investigation% #aid section clearly provides that Fwhen a person
is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cogniAable by the +egional )rial
2ourt, the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer
or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on the basis
of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person%G)he records do
not show that petitioner was Ilawfully arrestedG% 9or one, the petitioner was not
arrested on #eptember 13, 1997, as his counsel persuaded the arresting officers that
he would instead be presented in the preliminary investigation to be conducted in
2ebu 2ity on #eptember 17, 1997% 9or another, the arresting officers had no legal
authority to mae a warrantless arrest of the petitioner for a crime committed some
two ,0- months before% It then follows that the right of petitioner to a regular
preli$inary investigation pursuant to section B of +ule 110 cannot stand any
diminution% (etitioner, a minor, is charged with a capital offense V idnapping and
serious illegal detention% Its filing in court means his arrest and incarceration as in
all probability he would not be allowed bail% &is conviction will bring him face to
face with the death penalty% )hus, petitionerDs counsel was fart from being
unreasonable when he demanded from the city prosecutors that he be furnished
copies of the affidavits supporting the complaint and that he be given a non<
e5tendible period of twenty ,0@- days to submit defense affidavit% 9airness dictates
that the re8uest of petitioner for a chance to be heard in a capital offense case should
have been granted by the 2ebu 2ity prosecutor% In Eebb v. de 9eon, we emphasiAed
that Fattuned to the times, our +ules have discarded the pure in8uisitorial system of
preliminary investigation% Instead, +ule 110 installed a 8uasi<6udicial type of
preliminary investigation conducted by one whose high duty is to be fair and
impartial% *s this 2ourt emphasiAed in Rolito Go v. %ourt o2 !ppeals, Hthe right to
have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over for trial for a
criminal offense and hence formally at ris of incarceration or some other penalty, is
not a mere formal or technical right. it is a substantive right%D * preliminary
investigation should therefore be scrupulously conducted so that the constitutional
right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any material damage%

"eole o! the "hiliines v. %olina
G.R. No. 13391$
Fe&#ua#y 19, 2001

Dnares-Santiago, J.

Facts:
#ometime in June 199;, #("1 (aguidopon received an information
regarding the presence of an alleged mari6uana pusher in 'avao 2ity% &is informer
pointed to the motorcycle driver, accused<appellant Mula, as the pusher% *s to
accused<appellant Molina, #("1 (aguidopon had no occasion to see him before the
arrest% Moreover, the names and addresses of the accused<appellants came to the
nowledge of #("1 (aguidopon only after they were arrested% In the morning of
*ugust /, 199;, #("1 (aguidopon received an information that the alleged pusher
will be passing at N&*, Ma<a, 'avao 2ity% &e called (N( for assistance% )hey
proceeded to the house of #("1 (aguidopon where they would wait for the alleged
pusher to pass by% *t around 9>B@in the morning of *ugust /, 199;,
a FtrisiadG carrying the accused<appellants passed by% *t that instance, #("1
(aguidopon pointed to the accused<appellants as the pushers% )he police officers then
ordered the FtrisiadG to stop% #("1 (amplonaintroduced himself as a police officer
and ased accused<appellant Molina to open the bag% Molina replied, F!oss,
if possible we will settle this%G #("1 (amplona insisted on opening the bag, which
revealed dried mari6uana leaves inside% )hereafter, accused<appellants Mula and
Molina were handcuffed by the police officers% *ccused<appellants contended that
the mari6uana allegedly seiAed from them is inadmissible as evidence for having
been obtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable searches
and seiAures%
33

Issue:
4hether or not the mari6uana allegedly seiAed from accused<appellants is an
inadmissible evidence for having been seiAed in violation of their constitutional
rights against unreasonable searches and seiAures%

Held:
7es% In the case at bar, accused<appellants manifested no outward indication
that would 6ustify their arrest% In holding a bag on board a trisiad, accused<
appellants could not be said to be committing, attempting to commit or have
committed a crime% )he response of Molina that F!oss, if possible we will settle
thisG is an e8uivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute probable
cause to effect an in 2lagrante delito arrest% Note that were it not for #("1 Marino
(aguidopon ,who did not participate in the arrest but merely pointed accused<
appellants to the arresting officers-, accused<appellants could not be the sub6ect of
any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise% #("1 (aguidopon only learned MulaDs name
and address after the arrest% It is doubtful that #("1 (aguidopon indeed recogniAed
accused<appellant Mula% It is worthy to note that, before the arrest, he was able to see
Mula in person only once, pinpointed to him by his informer while they were on the
side of the road% )hese circumstances could not have afforded #("1 (aguidopon a
closer loo at accused<appellant Mula, considering that the latter was then driving a
motorcycle when #("1 (aguidopon caught a glimpse of him% 4ith respect to
accused<appellant Molina, #("1 (aguidopon admitted that he had never seen him
before the arrest% )he 2ourt holds that the arrest of accused<appellants does not fall
under the e5ceptions allowed by the rules% &ence, the search conducted on their
person was liewise illegal% 2onse8uently, the mari6uana seiAed by the peace officers
could not be admitted as evidence%

"eole o! the "hiliines v. Saycon
G.R. No. 11099*
'e(te)&e# *, 1994

8eliiano, J.:

Facts:
"n or about July /, 1990, at about ;>@@ in the morning, the 2oastguard
personnel received an information from N*+2"M agent +uben =addaran that a
suspected FshabuG courier by the name of *lvaro #aycon was on board the M$
'oXa$irginia, which was arriving at that moment in 'umaguete 2ity% Epon receipt
of the information, the 2oastguard chief officer 2(" )olin, instructed them to
intercept the suspect% * combined team of N*+2"M agents and (hilippine
2oastguard personnel consisting of 2(" )olin, a certain Miagme, and #enior (olice
"fficers +uben =addaran and 4inifredo Noble of N*+2"M posted themselves at
the gate of (ier 1% )he M$ 'oXa $irginia doced at ;>@@ a%m% that same morning at
(ier 1 in 'umaguete 2ity% *lvaro #aycon alighted from the boat carrying a blac bag
and went through the checpoint manned by the (hilippine 2oastguard where he was
identified by police officer 4inifredo Noble of N*+2"M% #aycon was then invited
to the 2oastguard &ead8uarters at the (ier area% &e willingly went with them% *t the
head8uarters, the coastguard ased #aycon to open his bag, and the latter willingly
did% In it were personal belongings and a maong wallet% Inside that maong wallet,
there was a Marlboro pac containing the suspected FshabuG% 4hen police officer
4inifredo Noble ased #aycon whether the Marlboro pac containing the suspected
FshabuG was his, #aycon merely bowed his head% )hen #aycon, his bag and the
suspected FshabuG were brought to the N*+2"M office for booing% 4hen *lvaro
#aycon was arrested, the N*+2"M agents did not have a warrant of arrest% )he
(N(Ls 9orensic *nalyst declared in court that she had conducted an e5amination of
the specimens and found out that the specimens weighed 4%0 grams in total, consisted
of methamphetamine hydrochloride, more widely nown as Fshabu%G

Issue:
4hether or not the warrantless search was valid%

Held:
7es. )he general rule, therefore, is that the search and seiAure must be carried
out through or with a 6udicial warrant. otherwise, such search and seiAure becomes
IunreasonableI within the meaning of the above constitutional provisions% )he
evidence secured in the process of search and seiAure W i%e%, the IfruitsI thereof W
will be inadmissible in evidence Ifor any purpose in any proceeding%
)he re8uirement that a 6udicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying
out of a search and seiAure is, however, not absolute% )he e5ception which appears
most pertinent in respect of the case at bar is that relating to the search of moving
vehicles%

"eole o! the "hiliines v. A*innudin
G.R. No. $4869
!uly 6, 1988

2ruA, J%

Facts:
3;
Idel *minnudin, accused<appellant, was arrested on June 03, 19/4, shortly
after disembaring from the M?$ 4ilcon 9 at about />B@ in the evening in Iloilo 2ity%
)he (2 officers, who were in fact waiting for him because of a tip from one of their
informers, simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looed lie
mari6uana leaves, too him to their head8uarters for investigation% )he two bundles
of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taen to the N!I laboratory
for e5amination% It was found to contain three ilos of what were later analyAed as
mari6uana leaves by an N!I forensic e5aminer% *n information for violation of the
'angerous 'rugs *ct was filed against him% =ater, the information was amended to
include 9arida *li y &assen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening
and liewise investigated% !oth were arraigned and pleaded not guilty% #ubse8uently,
the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against *li on the basis of a sworn
statement of the arresting officers absolving him after a Fthorough investigation%G
)he motion was granted and trial proceeded only against the accused<appellant, who
was eventually convicted% In his defense, *minnudin disclaimed the mari6uana,
averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a 6acet, two shirts
and two pairs of pants% &e alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately
handcuffed% &is bag was confiscated without a search warrant% *t the (2
head8uarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit that he was carrying the
mari6uana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood on the chest and arms
even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed% &e insisted that he did
not even now what mari6uana looed lie and that his business was selling watches
and sometimes cigarettes% &owever the +)2 re6ected his allegations saying that he
only had two watches during that time and that he did not sufficiently prove the
in6uries allegedly sustained%

Issue:
4hether or not the search of defendantDs bag is legal

Held:
No. In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant Issued
by a 6udge after personal determination by him of the e5istence of probable cause%
2ontrary to the averments of the government, the accused<appellant was not caught
in 2lagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had 6ust been committed to
6ustify the warrantless arrest allowed under +ule 11B of the +ules of 2ourt%

"eole o! the "hiliines v. Tangliben
G.R. No. +-63630
A(#.l 6, 1990

Gutierrez, Jr., J.

Facts:
(atrolmen #ilverio and +omeo (unAalan were conducting surveillance at the
#an 9ernando $ictory =iner )erminal% *t around 9>B@ pm, they noticed a person,
Medel )angliben, carrying a traveling bag, who acted suspiciously% )hey confronted
him, inspected his bag, and there they found mari6uana leaves% )he accused was then
taen to the (olice &ead8uarters for further investigations% )he +)2 found )angliben
guilty of violating sec%4 art% 0 of the +* ;403 or the 'angerous 'rugs *ct of 1970%

Issue:
4hether or not there was an unlawful search due to lac of search warran
Held:
No. )he case before us presented urgency% *lthough the trial courtLs decision
did not mention it, the transcript of stenographic notes reveals that there was an
informer who pointed to the accused<appellant as carrying mari6uana% ,)#N, pp% 30<
3B- 9aced with such on<the<spot information, the police officers had to act 8uicly%
)here was not enough time to secure a search warrant% 4e cannot therefore apply the
ruling in *minnudin to the case at bar% )o re8uire search warrants during on<the<spot
apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors,
smugglers of contraband goods, robbers, etc% would mae it e5tremely difficult, if
not impossible to contain the crimes with which these persons are associated%

U*il v. Ra*os
G.R. No. 81*6$
!uly 9, 1990

Per %uria$,

Facts:
"n 9ebruary 1, 19//, military agents were dispatched to #t% *gnes &ospital,
+oosevelt *venue, OueAon 2ity, to verify a confidential information which was
received by their office, about a Isparrow manI ,N(* member- who had been
admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound% )hat the wounded man in the
said hospital was among the five male IsparrowsI who murdered two 2apcom
mobile patrols the day before, or on January B1, 19// at about 10>@@ oLcloc in the
afternoon, before a road hump along Macanining #t%, !agong !arrio, 2aloocan 2ity%
)he wounded manLs name was listed by the hospital management as +onnie
Javellon, twenty<two years old of !loc 1@, =ot 4, #outh 2ity &omes, !iXan,
=aguna% It was disclosed later that the true name of the wounded man was +olando
37
'ural% In view of this verification, +olando 'ural was transferred to the +egional
Medical #ervices of the 2*(2"M, for security reasons% 4hile confined thereat, he
was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the two
2*(2"M mobile patrols%

Issue:
4hether or not +olando was lawfully arrested%

Held:
7es. +olando 'ural was arrested for being a member of the New (eopleDs
*rmy ,N(*-, an outlawed subversive organiAation% #ubversion being a continuing
offense, the arrest of +olando 'ural without warrant is 6ustified as it can be said that
he was committing an offense when arrested% )he crimes of rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in
furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the
#tate and are in the nature of continuing crimes%
"eole o! the "hiliines v. %al*stedt
G.R. No. 9110$
!u"e 19, 1991

Padilla, J.:

Facts:
Miael Malmstedt, a #wedish national, entered the (hilippines for the third
time in 'ecember 19// as a tourist% &e had visited the country sometime in 19/0 and
19/3% In the evening of May 7, 19/9, Malmstedt left for !aguio 2ity% Epon his
arrival thereat in the morning of the following day, he too a bus to #agada and
stayed there for 0 days% "n May 11, 19/9, 2apt% *len $asco of N*+2"M, stationed
at 2amp 'angwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checpoint at Jilometer 14,
*cop, )ublay, Mountain (rovince, for the purpose of checing all vehicles coming
from the 2ordillera +egion% )he order to establish a checpoint in the said area was
prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from #agada were transporting
mari6uana and other prohibited drugs% Moreover, an information was received by the
2ommanding "fficer of N*+2"M that a 2aucasian coming from #agada had in his
possession prohibited drugs% *t about 1>B@ pm, the bus where Malmstedt was riding
was stopped% #gt% 9ider% 2I2 :alutan boarded the bus and announced that they were
members of the N*+2"M and that they would conduct an inspection% 'uring the
inspection, 2I2 :alutan noticed a bulge on MalmstedtDs waist% #uspecting the bulge
on MalmstedtDs waist to be a gun, the officer ased for MalmstedtDs passport and
other identification papers% 4hen Malmstedt failed to comply, the officer re8uired
him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist% 4hen Malmstedt
opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed 4 suspicious<looing ob6ects
wrapped in brown pacing tape, which turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of
mari6uana% Malmstedt stopped to get two travelling bags from the luggage carrier,
each containing a teddy bear, when he was invited outside the bus for 8uestioning% It
was observed that there were also bulges inside the teddy bears% Malmstedt was then
brought to the head8uarters of the N*+2"M at 2amp 'angwa for further
investigation% *t the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they
were found to also contain hashish% #amples were taen from the hashish found
among the personal effects of Malmstedt and the same were brought to the (2 2rime
=aboratory for chemical analysis, which established the ob6ects e5amined as hashish%
Malmstedt claimed that the hashish was planted by the N*+2"M officers in his
pouch bag and that the two traveling bags were not owned by him, but were merely
entrusted to him by an *ustralian couple whom he met in #agada% &e further claimed
that the *ustralian couple intended to tae the same bus with him but because there
were no more seats available, they decided to tae the ne5t ride and ased Malmstedt
to tae charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the 'angwa
#tation% *n information was filed against Malmstedt for violation of the 'angerous
'rugs *ct% 'uring the arraignment, Malmstedt entered a plea of Fnot guilty%G *fter
trial and on "ctober 10, 19/9, the trial court found Malmstedt guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of #ection 4, *rticle II of +* ;403 and sentenced him
to life imprisonment% Malmstedt sought for the reversal of the decision of the trial
court%

Issue:
4hether or not the personal effects of Malmstedt may be searched without an
Issued warrant

Held:
7es% )he 2onstitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seiAures%
&owever, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to
obtain a search warrant% * lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace
officer or a private person under the following circumstances% #ection 3 provides that
Fa peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person ,a- 4hen,
in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. ,b- 4hen an offense has in fact 6ust been
committed, and he has personal nowledge of 9acts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it. and ,c- 4hen the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
3/
has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final 6udgment
or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another% In cases falling under paragraphs ,a-
and ,b- hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to
the nearest police station or 6ail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance
with +ule 110, #ection 7%G &erein, Malmstedt was caught in flagrante delicto, when
he was transporting prohibited drugs% )hus, the search made upon his personal
effects falls s8uarely under paragraph ,1- of the foregoing provisions of law, which
allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest%


"eole o! the "hiliines v. Evaristo
G.R. No. 93828
/ece)&e# 11, 1992

Padilla, J.:

Facts:
(olice were on routine patrol duty when successive bursts of gunfire were
heard% (roceeding to the scene, they found +osillo firing a gun into the air% +osillo
ran to CvaristoDs house and was pursued by police% (olice ased Cvaristo but saw a
bulge around companion 2arilloDs waist, was frised and it turned out to be a
revolver% (olice ased permission from Cvaristo to scour through the house and the
latter consented% In the sala, police found firearms and paraphernalia for repair and
manufacture of firearms%

Issue:
4hether or not the warrantless search was valid

Held:
7es. 4ith respect to the firearms seiAed from the appellant 2arillo, the 2ourt
sustains the validity of the firearmLs seiAure and admissibility in evidence, based on
the rule on authoriAed warrantless arrests% #ection 3, +ule 11B of the 19/3 +ules on
2riminal (rocedure provides>
#ec% 3% *rrest without warrant. when lawful% < * peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person>
a- 4hen, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
b- 4hen an offense has in fact 6ust been committed, and he has
personal nowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it. and virtual law library
c- 4hen the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
6udgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another%
9or purposes of the present case, the second circumstance by which a
warrantless arrest may be undertaen is applicable% 9or, as disclosed by the records,
the peace officers, while on patrol, heard bursts of gunfire and this proceeded to
investigate the matter% )his incident may well be within the IoffenseI envisioned by
par% 3 ,b- of +ule 11B, +ules of 2ourt% *s the 2ourt &eld in (eople of the
(hilippines v% #ucro, Ian offense is committed in the presence or within the view of
an officer, within the meaning of the rule authoriAing an arrest without a warrant,
when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances
created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof%I

"eole o! the "hiliines v. Salvatierra
G.R. No. 104663
!uly 24, 199$

#apunan, J.

Facts:
4hile 2harlie 9ernandeA was waling towards Ouiapo, appellant and the two
accused lunged a pointed instrument at 2harlie, hitting the latter at the left breast%
)his resulted to his death% "n November 13, 199@, the police received a complaint
that appellant was creating a commotion% &e was thereafter taen in custody%
*ppellant put up the defense of alibi alleging that he was having merienda with his
wife and children when the incident occurred% &e also alleged that he had an
altercation with a woman on that day who caused his arrest for the crime of
malicious mischief, wherein he was detained after% 4hen police arrived, they brought
him to the &omicide #ection where he was investigated for the stabbing of
9ernandeA% *ppellant claimed that the arrest was made almost B months after the
commission of the crime and no warrant had been obtained during the B<month
intervening period between the commission of the crime and his apprehension, thus
maing the arrest illegal%

Issue:
39
4hether or not the arrest is violative of accused<appellantDs constitutional
rights

Held:
No. 4hile these arguments may be valid, appellants claim that the case
against him should be dismissed for violation of his constitutional rights, must fail%
*ppellant is estopped from 8uestioning the legality of his arrest considering that he
never raised this before entering his plea% *ny ob6ection involving a warrant of arrest
or the procedure in the ac8uisition of 6urisdiction over the person of an accused must
be made before he enters his plea, otherwise, the ob6ection is deemed waived% )his is
the first time that appellant is raising this Issue as he did not even move for the
8uashal of the information before the trial court on the ground of illegal arrest%
2onse8uently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest, if any, had been cured by his
voluntary submission to the 6urisdiction of the trial court when he entered his plea
and participated during the trial% $erily, the illegal arrest of appellant is not a
sufficient cause for setting aside a valid 6udgment rendered upon a sufficient
complaint and where the trial was free from error%

/overn*ent o! 'ong 4ong v. Olalia
G.R. No. 1*36$*
A(#.l 19, 200$

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.:

Facts:
(rivate respondent MuXoA was charged before the &ong Jong 2ourt with
three counts of the offense of Iaccepting an advantage as agent,I in violation of
#ection 9 ,1- ,a- of the (revention of !ribery "rdinance, 2ap% 0@1 of &ong Jong%
&e also faces seven ,7- counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penaliAed by
the common law of &ong Jong% 4arrants of arrest were Issued against him% If
convicted, he faces a 6ail term of seven ,7- to fourteen ,14- years for each charge%
"n #eptember 1B, 1999, the '"J received from the &ong Jong 'epartment
of Justice a re8uest for the provisional arrest of private respondent% )he +)2, !ranch
19, Manila Issued an "rder of *rrest against private respondent% )hat same day, the
N!I agents arrested and detained him% (rivate respondent filed a petition for bail
which was opposed by petitioner% *fter hearing, Judge !ernardo, Jr% Issued an "rder
denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no (hilippine law granting bail in
e5tradition cases and that private respondent is a high Iflight ris%I Judge !ernardo,
Jr% inhibited himself from further hearing the case, it was then raffled off to !ranch /
presided by respondent 6udge% (rivate respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
of the "rder denying his application for bail and this was granted by respondent
6udge%

(etitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above "rder, but it was
denied by respondent 6udge%&ence, the instant petition%

Issue:
4hether or not respondent 6udge acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lac or e5cess of 6urisdiction as there is no provision in the
2onstitution granting bail to a potential e5traditee

Held:
No. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no 6ustification why it
should not also be allowed in e5tradition cases% =iewise, considering that the
Eniversal 'eclaration of &uman +ights applies to deportation cases, there is no
reason why it cannot be invoed in e5tradition cases% *fter all, both are
administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not
in issue% 2learly, the right of a prospective e5traditee to apply for bail in this
6urisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the
(hilippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights%
Ender these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty% )hus, the
(hilippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not
impaired% 2ase is remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent
is entitled to bail on the basis of clear and convincing evidence% If not, the trial court
should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention. and
thereafter, conduct the e5tradition proceedings with dispatch%
"adilla v. Court o! Aeals
G.R. No. 12191$
Ma#c, 12, 199$

8raniso, J.:

Facts:
(adilla figured in a hit and run accident in "ctober 0;, 1990% &e was later on
apprehended with the help of a civilian witness% Epon arrest, the following high
powered firearms were found in his possession>
1% B37 caliber revolver with ; live ammunition.
;@
0% M<1; !aby *rmalite magaAine with ammo.
B% B/@ pietro beretta with / ammo.and
4% ; live double action ammo of %B/ caliber revolver
(adilla claimed papers of guns were at home% &is arrest for hit and run
incident modified to include grounds of Illegal (ossession of firearms% "n 'ecember
B, 1994, (adilla was found guilty of Illegal (ossession of 9irearms under (' 1/;; by
the +)2 of *ngeles 2ity% &e was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty from 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum to 01
years of reclusion perpetua as ma5imum% )he 2ourt of *ppeals confirmed decision
and cancelled bail bond% +)2 of *ngeles 2ity was directed to Issue order of arrest%
Motion for reconsideration was denied by 2ourt of *ppeals% (adilla filed lots of
other petitions and all of a sudden, the #olicitor :eneral made a complete turnaround
and filed FManifestation in =ieu of 2ommentG praying for ac8uittal%

Issues:
I% 4hether or not (adillaDs arrest was illegal and conse8uently, the firearms
and ammunitions taen in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence
under the e5clusionary rule. and
II% 4hether or not the petitioner is authoriAed, under a Mission "rder and
Memorandum +eceipt, to carry the sub6ect firearms%
Held:
I% No. *nent the first defense, petitioner 8uestions the legality of his arrest%
)here is no dispute that no warrant was Issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per
se did not mae his apprehension at the *bacan !ridge illegal% 4arrantless arrests
are sanctioned in #ec% 3, +ule 11B of the +evised +ules on 2riminal (rocedure< a
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person ,a- when in
his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense% 4hen caught in flagrante delicto with possession
of an unlicensed firearm and ammo, petitionerDs warrantless arrest was proper since
he was actually committing another offence in the presence of all those officers%
)here was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and
run and the actual apprehension% !ecause arrest was legal, the pieces of evidence are
admissible%

Instances when warrantless search and seiAure of property is valid>
F#eiAure of evidence in Fplain view,G elements
of which are ,a- prior valid intrusion based on valid
warrantless arrest in which police are legally present in
pursuit of official duties, ,b- evidence inadvertedly
discovered by police who had the right to be there, ,c-
evidence immediately apparent, and ,d- plain view
6ustified mere seiAure of evidence without further search.
#earch of moving vehicleG.
4arrantless search incidental to lawful arrest recogniAed under section 10,
+ule 10; of +ules of 2ourt and by prevailing 6urisprudence where the test of
incidental search ,not e5cluded by e5clusionary rule- is that item to be searched must
be within arresteeDs custody or area of immediate control and search
contemporaneous with arrest%
(etitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing
that the policemen who actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run%
)he court begs to disagree% It is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more success
when law enforcers function in collaboration with private citiAens% 9urthermore, in
accordance with settled 6urisprudence, any ob6ection, defect or irregularity attending
an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea%
II% No. In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two re8uisites
must be established, viA%> ,1- the e5istence of the sub6ect firearm and, ,0- the fact that
the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding
license or permit to possess% )he first element is beyond dispute as the sub6ect
firearms and ammunitions were seiAed from petitionerDs possession via a valid
warrantless search, identified and offered in evidence during trial% *s to the second
element, the same was convincingly proven by the prosecution% Indeed, petitionerDs
purported Mission "rder and Memorandum +eceipt are inferior in the face of the
more formidable evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous review of the records
reveals that the Mission "rder and Memorandum +eceipt were mere afterthoughts
contrived and Issued under suspicious circumstances% "n this score, we lift from
respondent courtDs incisive observation% 9urthermore, the Memorandum +eceipt is
also unsupported by a certification as re8uired by the March 3, 19// Memorandum of
the #ecretary of 'efense% (etitioner is not in the (lantilla of Non<Eniform personnel
or in list of 2ivilian *gents of Cmployees of the (N(, which would 6ustify issuance of
mission order ,as stated in (' 1/;;-% =astly, the M<1; and any short firearms higher
than @%B/ caliber cannot be licensed to a civilian%

Co*endador v. #e 5illa
G.R. No. 931$$
Auust 2, 1991
;1

%ruz, J.

Facts:
)he petitioners in :%+% Nos% 9B177 and 9;94/ who are officers of the *9(
were directed to appear in person before the (re<)rial Investigating "fficers for the
alleged participation the failed coup on 'ecember 1 to 9, 19/9% (etitioners now
claim that there was no pre<trial investigation of the charges as mandated by *rticle
of 4ar 71% * motion for dismissal was denied% Now, they filed a motion for
reconsideration alleging denial of due process% In :%+% No% 93@0@, =t% Jacinto =igot
applied for bail on June 3, 199@, but the application was denied by :2M No%14% &e
filed with the +)2 a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional
liberty and a writ of preliminary in6unction% Judge of :2M then granted the
provisional liberty% &owever he was not released immediately% )he +)2 now
declared that even military men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right
to bail% )he private respondents in :%+% No% 97434 filed with #2 a petition for
habeas corpus on the ground that they were being detained in 2amp 2rame without
charges% )he petition was referred to +)2% 9inding after hearing that no formal
charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest,
the trial court ordered their release%

Issues:
I% 4hether or not there was a denial of due process.
II% 4hether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail.
and
III% 4hether or not respondent courts have no authority to order the
release and otherwise interfere with the court<martial proceedings%
Held:
I% No. 'ue process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an
opportunity to be heard% If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited
without violation of the !ill of +ights%
II% No. )he right to bail invoed by the private respondents has
traditionally not been recogniAed and is not available in the military, as an e5ception
to the general rule embodied in the !ill of +ights% )he right to a speedy trial is given
more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not e5ist%
III% No. )here was in our view substantial compliance with *rticle of 4ar
71 by the ()I (anel% Moreover, it is now settled that Ieven a failure to conduct a pre<
trial investigation does not deprive a general court< martial of 6urisdiction%G !ut even
a failure to conduct a pre<trial investigation does not deprive a general court<martial
of 6urisdiction% )he better accepted concept of pre<trial investigation is that it is
directory, not mandatory, and in no way affects the 6urisdiction of a court<martial%

)he +egional )rial 2ourt has concurrent 6urisdiction with the 2ourt of
*ppeals and the #upreme 2ourt over petitions for ertiorari, prohibition
or $anda$us against inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions for 1abeas
orpus and Buo Carranto% In the absence of a law providing that the decisions, orders
and ruling of a court<martial or the "ffice of the 2hief of #taff can be 8uestioned
only before the 2ourt of *ppeals and the #upreme 2ourt, we hold that the +egional
)rial 2ourt can e5ercise similar 6urisdiction%
* petition for ertiorari, in order to prosper, must be based on 6urisdictional
grounds because, as long as the respondent acted with 6urisdiction, any error
committed by him or it in the e5ercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an
error of 6udgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal% Cven an
abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to 6ustify the issuance of a writ of
ertiorari%

Santos v. O!ilada
A.M. R-!-94-121$
!u"e 16, 199*

Regalado, J.
Facts:
)he matter stems from the filing of two separate informations for murder
for the illing of complainantLs son and for illegal possession of firearm, doceted as
2riminal 2ases Nos% 14BB<M<94 and 14B4<M<94 respectively, against accused
+olando =opeA before !ranch 13, +egional )rial 2ourt of Malolos, !ulacan,
presided over by respondent Judge% In 2riminal 2ase No% 14BB<M<94, no bail was
recommended by the public prosecutor, while in 2riminal 2ase No% 14B4<M<94, a
bail of (0@@,@@@%@@ was recommended% )hereafter, counsel for the accused filed a
IMotion )o +einstate 9ormer !ail and +eduction of the *mount of New !ail !ond%I
+espondent 6udge granted said motion, fi5ing the bail bond in 2riminal 2ase No,
14BB<M<94 at (4@,@@@%@@ and reducing the recommended (0@@,@@@%@@ bail in
2riminal 2ase No% 14B4<M<94 to (4@,@@@%@@% #ubse8uently, the present
administrative complaint, was filed, assailing the said order of respondent 6udge on
the contention that the grant of said motion without hearing or notice to the
provincial prosecutor constitutes a clear violation of the +ules of 2ourt% 2omplainant
;0
further alleged that respondent 6udge manifested unusual interest, in the case by
rudely and arrogantly ordering the deletion of the names of the prosecutionLs
witnesses when there was no appearance for the prosecution during the arraignment
of the accused, which is a clear indication of his unfairness and that the IMotion for
+econsideration and 'is8ualificationI of respondent 6udge filed by the provincial
prosecutor was denied by the former by merely writing on the face thereof the
notation IdeniedI without the corresponding written order% +espondent Judge denies
all allegations%
Issue:
4hether or not the respondentLs act in granting bail to the accused amounts
to a whimsical and arbitrary e5ercise of 6urisdiction
Held:
7es. )he general rule is that all persons in custody shall, before final
conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right% )he e5ception thereto is when the
accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the
time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable
by relusion perpetua, when the evidence of guilt is strong%
4here admission to bail is a matter of discretion, a hearing is mandatory
before an accused can be granted bail% )herefore, discretion must be e5ercised
regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due process, that is, after
evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution% *ny order Issued in the
absence thereof is not a product of sound 6udicial discretion but of whim, caprice and
outright arbitrariness% Cven if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to
interpose any ob6ection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to
conduct a hearing or as searching and clarificatory 8uestions from which it may
infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lac of it, against the accused%
)hus, although the provincial prosecutor had interposed no ob6ection to the
grant of bail to the accused, the respondent 6udge therein should nevertheless have
set the petition for bail for hearing and diligently ascertained from the prosecution
whether the latter was not in fact contesting the bail application% In addition, a
hearing, was also necessary for the court to tae into consideration the guidelines set
forth in the then #ection ;, +ule 114 of the 19/3 +ules of 2riminal (rocedure for
fi5ing the amount of bail% "nly after respondent 6udge had satisfied himself that
these re8uirements have been met could he then proceed to rule on whether or not to
grant bail%
Borinaga v. Ta*in
A.M. R-!-93-936
'e(te)&e# 10, 1993

Regalado, J.:
Facts:
&erein respondent Judge 2amilo C% )amin of the +egional )rial 2ourt of
Molave, Kamboanga del #ur, !ranch 0B was charged with grave incompetence and
ignorance of the law in connection with a murder case, entitled I(eople v% *ntonio
+uaya, et al%,I pending before said court% In said case, petition for bail was filed by
accused +uaya before the court praying that bail be fi5ed at (0@, @@@%@@% )he 6udge
ordered the public prosecutor to appear and present evidence that the guilt of the
petitioner for the crime charged is strong% &owever, the public prosecutor failed to
appear, prompting the respondent 6udge to order the granting of bail to said accused%
)hereafter, an information for murder was filed against all the accused including
+uaya, with no bail recommended, after preliminary investigation was conducted at
the Municipal 2ircuit )rial 2ourt of 'umingag<Mahayag by Judge *rriesgado and
affirmed by the (rovisional (rosecutor%
#ubse8uently, the public prosecutor, together with complainantLs counsel,
filed a IMotion to 2ancel !ail bond and to *rrest the *ccused,I on the ground that
said accused is charged with a capital offense, the evidence of guilt is strong, and no
bail was recommended in the information% &owever, respondent Judge Issued an
order denying said motion without conducting a hearing thereon%
Issue:
4hether or not the respondent Judge erred in resolving that the right to bail
given to an accused charged for murder can no longer be recalled by the court after
its conferral and did so with lac of 6urisdiction%
Held:
7es. )he 19/7 2onstitution provides that all persons, e5cept those charged
with offenses punishable by relusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties or be released on
recogniAance as may be provided by law% 2orollary, the +ules of 2ourt, under
#ection B, +ule 114 thereof, provides for the same right%
)he rules on availability of bail to an accused may be restated as follows>
,1- *dmission to bail is a matter of right at any stage of the action where the charge
is not for a capital offense or is not punishable by relusion perpetua. ,0- +egardless
of the stage of the criminal prosecution, no bail shall be allowed if the accused is
charged with a capital offense or of an offense punishable by relusion perpetua and
;B
the evidence of guilt is strong. ,B- Cven if a capital offense is charged and the
evidence of guilt is strong, the accused may still be admitted to bail in the discretion
of the court if there are strong grounds to apprehend that his continued confinement
will endanger his life or result in permanent impairment of health, but only before
6udgment in the regional trial court. and ,4- No bail shall be allowed after final
6udgment, unless the accused has applied for probation and has not commenced to
serve sentence, the penalty and offense being within the purview of the probation
law%
In addition, #ection 14 of +ule 114 pertinently provides> F#ec% 14% Bail,
C1ere 2iled% W ,a- !ail in the amount fi5ed may be filed with the court where the
case is pending, or, in the absence or unavailability of the 6udge thereof, with another
branch of the same court within the province or city% If the accused is arrested in a
province, city or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may be filed
also with any regional trial court of said place, or, if no 6udge thereof is available,
with any metropolitan trial 6udge, municipal trial 6udge or municipal circuit trial
6udge therein. ,b- E1enever t1e grant o2 bail is a $atter o2 disretion, or the accused
sees to be released on recogniAance, the application therefore may be filed only in
t1e partiular ourt C1ere t1e ase is pending whether for preliminary investigation,
trial, or on appeal. ,c- *ny person in custody who is not yet charged in court may
apply for bail with any court in the province, city or municipality where he is &eld% F
/i*enez v. 2azareno
G.R. No. +-3$933
A(#.l 1*, 1988

Ganayo, J.:
Facts:
+espondent de la $ega, along with five others, was charged with murder,
arraigned and pleaded not guilty% !efore the scheduled date of the first hearing, he
escaped from detention% )he prosecutors filed a motion to proceed with the hearing
in absentia, invoing #ec 19, *rt I$ of the 197B 2onstitution provided as follows>
F#C2% 19% In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, and shall en6oy the right to be heard by himself and counsel,
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf% &owever, after arraignment trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified
and his failure to appear is un6ustified%G )he lower court proceeded with the trial
which dismissed the case against the five accused while proceedings against de la
$ega were &eld in abeyance% )he lower court denied reconsideration of the
Fabeyance portionG of the decision% &ence, prompting a petition with the 2ourt%
Issues:
I% 4hether or not the court loses 6urisdiction over an accused who escapes
from detention after arraignment. and
II% 4hether or not an accused who has been tried in absentia retains his right to
present evidence and cross e5amine witnesses%

Held:
I% No. In criminal cases, 6urisdiction over the person of the accused is
ac8uired either by his arrest for voluntary appearance in court% #uch voluntary
appearance is accomplished by appearing for arraignment as what accused<private
respondent did in this case% 4here the accused appears at the arraignment and pleads
not guilty to the crime charged, 6urisdiction is ac8uired by the court over his person
and this continues until the termination of the case, notwithstanding his escape from
the custody of the law%
II% No% )he re8uisites for trial in absentia are as follows> ,a- that there has
been an arraignment. ,b- that the accused has been notified. and ,c- that he fails to
appear and his failure to do so is un6ustified% )he right to present evidence and cross<
e5amine witnesses is a personal right and can be waived% 9ailure to appear during
trial, after due notice, constitutes a waiver of these rights% #ec 1,c-, +ule 113, of the
19/3 +ules of 2ourt provides> F% % % )he absence of the accused without any
6ustifiable cause at the trial on a particular date of which he bad notice shall be
considered a waiver of his right to be present during that trial% 4hen an accused
under custody had been notified of the date of the trial and escapes, he shall be
deemed to have waived his right to be present on said date and on all subse8uent trial
dates until custody is regained%%%%I +endering 6udgment for a trial in absentia is not a
violation of the right to be presumed innocent% )he accused is still presumed to be
innocent, and his conviction must be based on evidence showing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt%
"eole o! the "hiliines v. Serzo+ 1r.
G.R. No. 11843*
!u"e 20, 199$

;4
Panganiban, J.
Facts:
*ccused<appellant was charged with the crime of murder before the
+egional )rial 2ourt of *ntipolo, +iAal% *tty% =ina<ac was appointed by the court as
counsel de officio for the accused who appeared without counsel, wherein accused
entered the plea of Fnot guilty%G *tty% =ina<ac was relieved as counsel de officio in
view of appellantDs manifestation of his intention to secure the services of a counsel
de parte and refusal to cooperate with said counsel% "n different occasions, the court
appointed *tty% *ntonano and *tty% :arcia individually, as counsel for appellant in
view of the proceedings for the scheduled trials and appellantDs refusal to sign the
minutes of the proceeding% )he trial court rendered 6udgment convicting appellant of
the crime charged, also noting that appellant simply refused to secure the services of
a counsel de parte and to present evidence in his defense despite ample opportunity
accorded to him%
Issue:
4hether or not the trial court erred in not giving appellant time to engage
counsel of his own choice, depriving him of legal representation and effectively
depriving him of the chance to present evidence in his defense%
Held:
No. *ccordingly, an accused may e5ercise his right to counsel by electing to
be represented either by a court<appointed lawyer or by one of his own
choice% 4hile his right to be represented by counsel is immutable, his option to
secure the services of counsel de parte, however, is not absolute% )he court is
obliged to balance the privilege to retain a counsel of choice against the #tateDs and
the offended partyDs e8ually important right to speedy and ade8uate 6ustice%
*lso, the right to counsel de parte is, lie other personal rights, waivable so
long as ,1- the waiver is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or
good customs. or pre6udicial to a third person with a right recogniAed by law and ,0-
the waiver is une8uivocally, nowingly and intelligently made%
)he facts of this case do not constitute a deprivation of appellantDs
constitutional right to counsel because he was ade8uately represented by three court<
appointed lawyers% 2ourts are not re8uired to await indefinitely the pleasure and
convenience of the accused as they are also mandated to promote the speedy and
orderly administration of 6ustice% Nor should they countenance such an obvious
trifling with the rules% Indeed, public policy re8uires that the trial continue as
scheduled, considering that appellant was ade8uately represented by counsels who
were not shown to be negligent, incompetent or otherwise unable to represent him%

Telan v. Court o! Aeals
G.R. No. 9*026
%cto&e# 4, 1991

Sar$iento, J.:

Facts:
)he case stems from a property dispute between herein petitioners and
private respondents in the +egional )rial 2ourt of Ilagan, Isabela, wherein said court
awarded possession of the property to private respondents% (etitioners wanted to
appeal the case to the 2ourt of *ppeals, but their counsel, *tty% (aguiran, was
disposed not to do so% &ence petitioners hired the services of Crnesto (alma who
represented himself to be a lawyer and petitioners paid his FlawyerDs fees%G Months
after, the 2ourt of *ppeals Issued a +esolution considering the appeal interposed by
petitioners as abandoned and dismissed for failure to file an appeal brief within the
reglementary period% &owever, it was only five months after that petitioners came to
now of the said +esolution% F*tty% (almaG could no longer be found and upon
verification of petitioners in the +oll of *ttorneys with the !ar 2onfidantDs "ffice,
petitioners realiAed said FlawyerG was a fae%
Issue:
4hether or not the representation of the petitioner by a fae lawyer
amounts to a deprivation of his right to counsel and hence a lac of due process
Held:
7es. )he right to counsel in civil cases e5ists 6ust as forcefully as in criminal
cases, especially so when as a conse8uence, life, liberty, or property is sub6ected to
restraint or in danger of loss% In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to be
assisted by a member of the bar is immutable% "therwise, there would be a grave
denial of due process% )hus, even if the 6udgment had become final and e5ecutory, it
may still be recalled, and the accused afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself
and counsel%
)he right to counsel is absolute and may be invoed at all times% More so, in
the case of an on<going litigation, it is a right that must be e5ercised at every step of
the way, with the lawyer faithfully eeping his client company% No arrangement or
;3
interpretation of law could be as absurd as the position that the right to counsel e5ists
only in the trial courts and that thereafter, the right ceases in the pursuit of the appeal%
"eole o! the "hiliines v. Ayson
G.R. No. 8*21*
!uly $, 1989

4arvasa, J.:
Facts:
9elipe +amos was a ticet freight cler of the (hilippine *irlines, assigned
at its !aguio 2ity station% It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the
sales of plane ticets% )he (*= management notified him of an investigation to be
conducted which was scheduled in accordance with (*=Ls 2ode of 2onduct and
'iscipline and the 2ollective !argaining *greement signed by it with the (hilippine
*irlines CmployeesL *ssociation ,(*=C*- to which +amos pertained% * letter was
sent by +amos stating his willingness to settle the amount of (7;,@@@% )he findings
of the *udit team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused the proceeds of
ticets and that he was prevented from settling said amounts% &e proffered a
compromise, but did not ensue% )wo months after, a crime of estafa was charged
against +amos where the latter pleaded not guilty% Cvidence by the prosecution
contained +amosD written admission and statement, to which defendants argued that
the confession was taen without the accused being represented by a lawyer%
+espondent Judge did not admit those stating that accused was not reminded of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel% * motion for
reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied%
Issue:
4hether or not the respondent Judge is correct in maing inadmissible as
evidence the admission and statement of the accused
Held:
No. #ection 0@ of the 19/7 constitution provides that the right against self<
incrimination ,only to witnesses other than accused, unless what is ased is relating
to a different crime charged< not present in case at bar-%
)his is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or
under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding%
)he right is not to Ibe compelled to be a witness against himself%G It prescribes an
Ioption of refusal to answer incriminating 8uestions and not a prohibition of
in8uiry%I the right can be claimed only when the specific 8uestion, incriminatory in
character, is actually put to the witness% It cannot be claimed at any other time% It
does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before
the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether% It is a right that a
witness nows or should now% &e must claim it and could be waived%
+ights in custodial interrogation as laid down in Miranda v% *riAona> the
rights of the accused include> ,a- he shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right. ,b- nor force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him. ,c- any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in
evidence%
)he individual may nowingly and intelligently waive these rights and
agree to answer or mae a statement% !ut unless and until such rights and waivers are
demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of
interrogation can be used against him%

'errera v. Alba
G.R. No. 148220
!u"e 1*, 200*
%arpio, J%>

Facts:
)hirteen<year<old +osendo *lba, represented by his mother *rmi *lba, filed
before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages
against petitioner% (etitioner denied that he is the biological father of respondent%
+espondent filed a motion to direct the taing of 'N* paternity testing to abbreviate
the proceedings, presenting the testimony of #aturnina 2% &alos, (h%', who
described the process for 'N* paternity testing and asserted that the test had an
accuracy rate of 99%9999Q in establishing paternity% (etitioner opposed 'N*
paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability% (etitioner further
argued that 'N* paternity testing violates his right against self<incrimination%
)he trial court granted respondentDs motion to conduct 'N* paternity
testing on petitioner and denied the motion for reconsideration of the respondent
thereafter% "n appeal by the respondent to the 2ourt of *ppeals, the appellate court
Issued a decision denying the petition and affirmed the "rders of the trial court%
;;
Issues:
I% 4hether or not a 'N* test is a valid probative tool, admissible as evidence,
in the 6urisdiction of the 2ourt to determine filiation. and
II% 4hether or not the proposed 'N* paternity testing violates petitionerDs
right against self<incrimination%
Held:
I% 7es. In assessing the probative value of 'N* evidence, courts should
consider, among other things, the following data> how the samples were collected,
how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the
procedure followed in analyAing the samples, whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the 8ualification of the
analyst who conducted the tests%

It is not enough to state that the childDs 'N* profile matches that of the
putative father% * complete match between the 'N* profile of the child and the
'N* profile of the putative father does not necessarily establish paternity% 9or this
reason, following the highest standard adopted in an *merican 6urisdiction, trial
courts should re8uire at least 99%9Q as a minimum value of the (robability of
(aternity ,F4G- prior to a paternity inclusion% 4 is a numerical estimate for the
lielihood of paternity of a putative father compared to the probability of a random
match of two unrelated individuals%
II% No. #ection 17, *rticle B of the 19/7 2onstitution provides that Fno
person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself%G )he policy of the 9amily
2ode to liberaliAe the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of
children, especially of illegitimate children, is without pre6udice to the right of the
putative parent to claim his or her own defenses% 4here the evidence to aid this
investigation is obtainable through the facilities of modern science and technology,
such evidence should be considered sub6ect to the limits established by the law, rules,
and 6urisprudence%
%
/arcia v. #o*ingo
G.R. No. +-30104
!uly 2*, 19$3

8ernando, J.:
Facts:
9ourteen ,14- trial dates ,e5cept for three- were all scheduled on a #aturday,
as per re8uest of the respondents 2alo and 2arbonnel in criminal cases against the
latter% 9or the convenience of the parties and with the conformity of the accused and
their counsel, the trial was &eld in the air conditioned chamber of the respondent
Judge :arcia% +espondents 2alo and 2arbonnel had not ob6ected to any supposed
irregularity in the proceedings until 6udgment was rendered on their case% )he
present complaint hereforth initiated by petitioners is under the premise that such act
is in violation of the right to hold a public trial%
Issue:
4hether or not such proceeding of holding trial in the chamber of the
respondent Judge is in violation to the principle of right to a public trial%
Held:
No. It is not in violation of the right to a public trial since the trial was still
open to public and there is no showing that the public was deprived to witness the
trial proceeding% )he 2onstitution guarantees an accused the right to a public trial%
)he trial must be public% It possesses that character when anyone interested in
observing the manner a 6udge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so%
)here is to be no ban on such attendance% )he thought that lies behind this safeguard
is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further protection, that his trial is
liely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted with any impropriety% 4here a
trial taes place, as is 8uite usual, in the courtroom and a calendar of what cases are
to be heard is posted, no problem arises% It is the usual course of events that
individuals desirous of being present are free to do so% )here is the well recogniAed
e5ception though that warrants the e5clusion of the public where the evidence may
be characteriAed as Ioffensive to decency or public morals%
'espite the fact that the trial was &eld in the respondent JudgeDs chambers
for the convenience of the parties, there is no showing that the public was thereby
e5cluded% It is to be admitted that the siAe of the room allotted the Judge would
reduce the number of those who could be our present% #uch a fact though is not
indicative of any transgression of this right% +eference may also be made to the
undisputed fact at least fourteen hearings had been &eld in chambers of the city court
Judge, without ob6ection on the part of respondent

"eole o! the "hiliines v. Bartulay
G.R. No. 83696
/ece)&e# 21, 1990

Medialdea, J.
;7
Facts:
#ub6ect of the appeal is the decision of the +egional )rial 2ourt, !ranch 49,
(uerto (rincesa 2ity, in a criminal case entitled I(eople v% 'ante !artulayI
convicting appellant 'ante !artulay of the crime of robbery with homicide under an
amended information which reads> I)he undersigned accuses +"#*=I"
=*:E*+'I* alias I+"==7I, '*N)C !*+)E=*7 alias I)")"7I, !*=)*K*+
!C+*N alias I!"7 !EN:*=I, as principals, and +*7MEN'" !*+)E=*7 alias
IM*N'IN:I, as accessory, of the crime of II==C:*= ("##C##I"N "9
9I+C*+M 4I)& +"!!C+7 4I)& &"MI2I'C,I committed as follows> 5 5 5 5%G
*t the arraignment, appellant made the following pleas> :EI=)7 to the
crime of robbery and N") :EI=)7 to homicide. hence, a conditional plea of N")
:EI=)7 was entered into the records%
Issues:
I% 4hether or not the information herein is violative of #ection 1B +ule 11@ of
the +ules on 2riminal (rocedure. and
II% 4hether or not the trial court erred in convicting accused of robbery with
homicide only despite the fact that the amended information charged all the
accused of the crime of illegal possession of firearm with robbery with
homicide%
Held:
I% 7es. #ection 1B +ule 11@ of the +ules on 2riminal (rocedure which
states that a complaint or information must charge but one offense e5cept in certain
cases% )he four accused are charged with two separate offenses of illegal possession
of firearms and robbery with homicide% 4hen each one of two offenses committed
is punishable by two different laws, they cannot be charged in one information as a
comple5 crime but must be regarded as two separate and distinct offenses, each one
to be the sub6ect of separate informations% 4hen duplicity of offenses e5ists in
information, the accused must present his ob6ection by filing a motion to 8uash the
information on the ground of duplicity of offenses% If the accused fails to ob6ect and
goes to trial under the information which contains a description of more than one
offense, the general rule is he thereby waives the ob6ection and may be found guilty
of and should be sentenced for, as many offenses as are charged in the information
and proved during trial% )his rule however shall apply only if the accused is
formally arraigned and re8uired to plead on all the offenses as are charged in the
information% "therwise, the accused cannot be convicted of the offenses with
respect to which he was not properly arraigned% )he information wrongly
comple5ed the robbery with homicide with the special offense of illegal possession
of firearm% In effect, the accused is charged with two distinct offenses% &e should
therefore be arraigned and re8uired to plead to the two offenses%
II% No. )he information alleges that the four accused by conspiring and
confederating together, unlawfully have in their possession one %B/@ cal% automatic
pistol and one 00 cal% revolver with #erial No% ;4;1/ without the necessary license
or permit from the proper authorities and that while in the possession of said
firearms, the four accused, by conspiring together, committed robbery with
homicide%
"eole o! the "hiliines v. Alicando
GR No. 11$48$
/ece)&e# 2, 199*
Puno, J.:
Facts:
*ccused was convicted with a crime of rape with homicide of a 4 year old
girl% &e was arrested and during the interrogation he made a confession of the crime
without the assistance of a counsel% !y virtue of his uncounseled confession, the
police came to now where to find the evidences consisting of the victimDs personal
things lie clothes stained with blood which was admitted to court as evidences% )he
victim pleaded guilty during the arraignment and was convicted with the death
penalty% )he case was forwarded to the #upreme 2ourt for automatic review%
Issue:
4hether or not due process during the custodial investigation was accorded
to the accused
Held:
No. 'ue process was not observed in the conduct of the custodial
investigation for the accused% &e was not informed of his right to a counsel upon
maing his e5tra6udicial confession and the information against him was written in a
language he could not understand and was not e5plained to him% )his is in violation
of #ection 1,a- of +ule 11;, the rule implementing the constitutional right of the
appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him% )he
lower court also violated #ection B of +ule 11; when it accepted the plea of guilt of
the appellant without conducting a search in8uiry on the voluntariness and full
understanding of the accused of the conse8uences of his plea% Moreover the
evidences admitted by the court that warranted his conviction were inadmissible
because they were due to an invalid custodial investigation that did not provide the
;/
accused with due process of the law% )hus, the #upreme 2ourt annulled the decision
of the imposition of the death penalty and remanded the case bac to the lower court
for further proceedings%
"eole o! the "hiliines v. %endoza
GR No. 8084*
Ma#c, 14, 1994
Bellosillo, J.:
Facts:
"n 0@ January 19/7, the storeroom of the !uidnon National #chool of
&ome Industries ,!N#&I- in Maramag !uidnon was ransaced% )he value of the
missing articles was estimated at (13, 09/%13% Cventually, responsibility for the
robbery with force upon things was laid on accused Juan Magalop, (etronillo
9ernandeA, and +icarte 'ahilan% *ll three were represented by *tty% Isidro 2aracol%
*t the arraignment, Magalop pleaded FguiltyG while 9ernandeA pleaded Fnot guiltyG%
)he arraignment of 'ahilan was deferred as he was Fnot mentally well%G )rial
ensued% "n / "ctober 19/7, respondent Judge ac8uitted the accused 9ernandeA as
well as Magalop% )he prosecution moved for reconsideration but it was denied% )he
(rovincial (rosecutor of Malaybalay, !uidnon, directly filed a petition for certiorari
before the #upreme 2ourt and submits that the accused Magalop, who was assisted
by counsel, had voluntarily, spontaneously and intelligently pleaded guilty to the
crime% )hus, the trial court had no alternative but to pronounce 6udgment and impose
the proper penalty%
Issues:
4hether or not the (rovincial (rosecutor is correct in>
I% filing before the #upreme 2ourt a petition for certiorari
without coursing to the "ffice of )he #olicitor :eneral. and
II% insisting that with the accused voluntary plea of guilt, the trial
court had no other recourse but to pronounce 6udgment and
impose the proper penalty
Held:
I% No. )he petition is defective since it was filed by the (rovincial 9iscal
and *ssistant provincial 9iscal of Malaybalay, !uidnon and not by the #olicitor
:eneral% )he #upreme 2ourt have ruled in a number of cases that only the #olicitor
:eneral may bring or defend actions on behalf of the (eople of the (hilippines once
such actions are brought before the 2ourt of *ppeals or the #upreme 2ourt%
Nonetheless, even if we overloo this procedural lapse and treat the case on the
merits, the petition should, 6ust the same, be dismissed%
II% No. Ender the 19/3 New +ules on 2riminal (rocedure, as amended,
when the accused pleads guilty to a non<capital offense, the court may receive
evidence from the parties to determine the penalty to be imposed% )his rule is at most
directory% It will certainly be a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the 6udge to
persist in holding the accused bound to his admission of guilt and sentencing him
accordingly when the totality of the evidence points to his ac8uittal% )here is no rule
which provides that simply because the accused pleaded guilty to the charge that his
conviction automatically follows% *dditional evidence independent of the plea may
be considered to convince the 6udge that it was intelligently made% +espondent Judge
proceeds to pass 6udgment without re8uiring Magalop to plead anew to the charge% In
the interest of substantial 6ustice, we cannot allow such procedural error to prevail
over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved% 9rom the evidence of the prosecution, there is no way by which
accused Magalop could have been implicated% It is for this fundamental reason that,
even pro 1a vie, his ac8uittal must be sustained%
"eole o! the "hiliines v. 1abien
GR Nos. 133068-69
May 31, 2000
Per %uria$:
Facts
Cfren Jabien was charged with the crime of rape against his minor daughter%
*tty% Manuel 9elicia of the (ublic *ttorneyDs "ffice ,(*"- assisted the accused
during the arraignment on January 0@, 199/% &e pled guilty but did not present
evidence for the defense% )hereafter, the trial court re8uired the prosecution to
present its evidence% *fter trial on the merits of the case, the trial court found the
accused guilty of the crime charged and was penaliAed to suffer two death penalties%
)he case was elevated to the #upreme 2ourt for automatic review%
;9
Issue:
4hether or not the trial court erred in accepting accused<appellantDs
improvident plea of guilty to a capital offense and in failing to conduct a searching
in8uiry to determine whether the accused<appellant fully understood the
conse8uences of his plea
Held:
No. )he trial court was not remiss in its duty to conduct a searching in8uiry
after accused<appellant pled guilty% #ection B, +ule 11; of the +ules of 2ourt
provides the procedure that the trial court should follow when an accused pleads
guilty to a capital offense% ?1e ourt s1all ondut a sear1ing inBuiry into t1e
voluntariness and 2ull o$pre1ension o2 t1e onseBuenes o2 1is plea and reBuire t1e
proseution to prove 1is guilt and t1e preise degree o2 ulpability. ?1e aused $ay
also present evidene in 1is be1al2. )his is mandatory% )he primordial purpose then
is to avoid improvident pleas of guilt on the part of the accused where grave crimes
are involved since he might be admitting his guilt before the court and thus forfeit his
life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning, significance, and
conse8uences of his plea% In the case at bar, accused<appellant Jabien was neither
coerced nor intimidated in entering his plea of guilty to the charge that he raped his
minor daughter% )hat he understood the conse8uences of his plea and was aware that
he will be meted the death penalty% *lthough the plea of guilt of the accused<
appellant may be taen as a mitigating circumstance, the same will not affect the
imposable penalty% In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible
penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed%
#elgado v. Court o! Aeals
No. +-4$2$6
No2e)&e# 10, 1986
Paras, J.:
Facts:
Cmma 'elgado and three others were charged of Cstafa causing the
frustration of one Crlinda +ueda, a medical student% 'elgado was assisted by one
*tty% =amberto :% 7co% )he said lawyer has filed for multiple postponement of trial
and one time he failed to appear in court by reason of him being allegedly sic% No
medical certificate was furnished% )he court was not impressed with such actuation
and has considered the same as 'elgadoDs waiver of her right to trial% )he lower
court convicted her and the others% #he appealed before the 2ourt of *ppeals and the
2ourt of *ppeals sustained the decision of the lower court% 'elgado later found out
that *tty% =amberto 7co is not a member of the bar%
Issue:
4hether or not due process was observed
Held:
No. )he #upreme 2ourt ruled in favor of 'elgado% *n accused is entitled to
be represented by a member of the bar in criminal cases filed against her before the
+egional )rial 2ourt% Enless she is represented by a lawyer, there is a great danger
that any defense presented in her behalf will be inade8uate considering the legal
per8uisites and sills needed in the court proceedings% )his would certainly be a
denial of due process% &ence, the #upreme 2ourt remanded the case to the lower
court for a new trial%
,lo+ et.al. v. Court o! Aeals
No. +-11241
!uly 8, 1960
Bautista-!ngelo, J.:
Facts:
4hile in the house of Kosimo )aghoy, $alentin Ilo had 8uarreled with one
+estituto !ona% *s a result, +estituto !ona filed a criminal charge against Ilo% Ilo
warned Kosimo )aghoy not to testify in favor of his accuser% &owever, Kosimo
)aghoy still testified% *s a revenged, Ilo with seven ,7- others burned the house of
Kosimo )aghoy% $alentin Ilo et al were charged before the 2ourt of 9irst Instance of
2amarines #ur with the crime of arson under *rticle B01, paragraph 3 of the +evised
(enal 2ode% *fter trial, only $alentin Ilo and one #ilvestre !uela were found guilty%
)hey appealed the decision before the 2ourt of *ppeals% )he 2ourt of *ppeals,
however, is of a different opinion% It averred that the defendants were guilty of the
offense under paragraph 1 of the same article, and thereafter modified the penalty
imposed upon them% )he counsel for appellants brought the case before the #upreme
2ourt stating that the information does not contain any allegation that the building
burned is used as a dwelling and is located in an uninhabited place to mae it come
under *rticle B01 ,3- nor the proof adduced that the accused saw two occupants of
the house at the time of the burning cannot convert the crime charged into a more
serious one, or one under paragraph 1 of the same article%
Issue:
7@
4hether or not the petitioners were guilty of arson as defined and penaliAed
under *rticle B01 ,1- of the +evised (enal 2ode
Held:
No. It would be an error to find an accused guilty of the form of arson under
*rticle B01 ,1- of the +evised (enal 2ode if the information fails to allege that the
accused new the house was inhabited because Fnowledge on the part of the
accused that the building set fire to, is occupied is an essential element of form of
arson defined in the aforesaid article of the said 2ode% )herefore, the information
must contain allegations to that effect that the accused had such nowledge at the
time of the commission of the crime in order to sustain a conviction under that
article% 2onviction of an accused cannot rest on a mere presumption but upon a clear
proof, while a substantial defect in information cannot be cured by evidence for that
would 6eopardiAe their right to be informed of the true nature of the offense he is
being charged%
Arroyo+ 1r. v. Court o! Aeals
GR Nos. 96602 a"d 96$1*
No2e)&e# 19, 1991
8eliiano, J.:
Facts:
'r% Jorge Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery before the +egional
)rial 2ourt, !ranch 4 of !enguet against his wife, +uby $era Neri and Cduardo
*rroyo committed on November 0, 199@ in the 2ity of !aguio% !oth defendants
pleaded no guilty and after trial, the +)2 convicted petitioner and Mrs% +uby $era
Neri of adultery as defined under *rticle BBB of the +evised (enal 2ode% It was
affirmed by the 2ourt of *ppeals% (etitioner *rroyo filed a motion for
reconsideration o the 2ourt of *ppealsD decision% (etitioner +uby $era Neri also
moved for reconsideration or a new trial, contending that a pardon had been
e5tended by her husband and that her husband had later contracted marriage with
another woman% )hese petitions were denied% )hereafter, petitioner *rroyo filed a
(etition for +eview ,:+ No% 9;;@0-, while petitioner +uby $era<Neri filed a
separate (etition for +eview% )he 2ourt ordered for the consolidation of these cases%
"n *ugust 0;, 1991, 'r% Neri filed a manifestation, dated May 14, 1991, praying that
the case against petitioners be dismissed as he had Ftacitly consentedG to his wifeDs
infidelity% (etitioners then filed their respective motions praying for the dismissal or
for granting of new trial based on 'r% NeriDs manifestation%
Issues:
I% 4hether or not 'r% NeriDs affidavit of desistance is sufficient to cast
reasonable doubts on his credibility.
II% 4hether or not Mrs% NeriDs constitutional right against self<incrimination
had been violated. and
III% 4hether or not 'r% NeriDs manifestation is sufficient basis for the granting
of new trial%
Held:
I% No. In certiorari proceeding under +ule 43, the findings of the fact of the
lower court as well as its conclusion on credibility o! -itnesses are generally 4ot
disturbed+ the 8uestion before the court being limited to 8uestions of law%
#pecifically the conclusions o! the trial court on the credibility o! -itnesses are
given considerable -eight+ since said court is in the best position to observe the
demeanor, conduct and attitude of witnesses at the trial% )he claim that 'r% NeriDs
testimony is incredible is unavailing at this stage% !esides, the 2ourt does not believe
that such an admission by an unfaithful wife was inherently improbable or
impossible%
II% No. )he 2ourt, in a +esolution dated *pril 04, 1991, had liewise ruled
on the claim that Mrs% NeriDs constitutional right against self<incrimination had been
disregarded when her admission to her husband in the privacy of their con6ugal home
that she had indeed lain with petitioner *rroyo was taen into account by the trial
court% )he right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, when the
investigating o22ier starts to as 8uestions to elicit information and?or confession or
admissions from respondent<accused% In the present case, 'r% Neri was not a peace
officer nor an investigating officer conducting a custodial interrogation, hence,
petitioner cannot now claim that Mrs% NeriDs admission should have been re6ected%
&owever, in !balle v. People, the 2ourt held that Jt1e rule is t1at any person,
ot1erCise o$petent as Citness, C1o 1eard t1e on2ession+ is co*etent to testi!y as
to substance o! -hat he heard i! he heard and understood all o! it. !n oral
on2ession need not be repeated verbati$, but in su1 ase it $ust be given in its
substane. Co*liance -ith the constitutional rocedures on custodial
investigation is 4ot alicable to a sontaneous state*ent, not eliited t1roug1
Buestioning, but given in an ordinary $anner% )he 2ourt also note that the husband
is not precluded under +ules of 2ourt from testifying against his wife in criminal
cases for a crime committed by one against the other% ,#ection 00, +ule 109, +evised
+ules of 2ourt-
71
III% No. 'r% NeriDs manifestation amounts in effect to an attempted
recantation of testimony given by him before the trial court% It is settled that not all
recantations by witnesses should result in the granting of a new trial% )he 8uestion
whether a new trial shall be granted on this ground depends on all circumstances of
the case, including the testimony of the witnesses submitted on the motion for the
new trial% Moreover, recanting testi*ony is exceedingly unreliable and it is the
duty o! the court to deny a ne- trial -here it is 4ot satis!ied that such testi*ony is
true.
"eole o! the "hiliines v. 2i!atan
GR No. 10$964-66
Fe&#ua#y 1, 1999
Martinez, J.:
Facts:
)hree ,B- criminal informations for violation of #ection 4 of the 2entral
!an 2ircular No% 9;@, in relation to #ection B4 of +epublic *ct No% 0;3 were filed
against private respondent Imelda +% Marcos before !ranch 13/ of the +)2 of (asig%
*fter arraignment, where private respondent pleaded Fnot guiltyG, the petitioner filed
a motion for the consolidation of the three ,B- Informations pending before !ranch
13/<(asig with the 01 other cases pending before the +)2 !ranch 0;<Manila% )he
+)2 of (asig granted the motion for consolidation provided there is no ob6ection
from the presiding 6udge of !ranch 0;<Manila% &owever, the cases were re<raffled
and re<assigned to !ranch 30<Manila in the sala of respondent 6udge wherein the
three informations were re<numbered as 2riminal 2ase Nos% 90<1@7940, 90<1@794B,
and 90<1@7944% )hen, without private respondent yet taing any action or filing any
motion to 8uash informations, respondent 6udge Issued an order re8uiring the
petitioners to show cause why criminal case number 90<1@7940 should not be
dismissed on the ground that it violates private respondentDs right against eA post
2ato law% +espondent 6udge also Issued an order re8uiring the prosecution to show
cause why the two other criminal informations ,90<1@794B, and 90<1@7944- should
not be dismissed on the ground that private respondentDs right to double 6eopardy
was violated% "n *ugust 7, 1990, respondent 6udge Issued an order dismissing
criminal case no% 90<1@7940 on the ground that it violates the right of the private
respondent against eA post 2ato law% )hree days after, respondent 6udge ordered the
dismissal of the two other cases on the ground that these cases had placed private
respondent in double 6eopardy% (etitioners sought for reconsideration but it was
denied by the respondent 6udge% &ence, petitioner elevated the case via petition for
certiorari before the #upreme 2ourt%
Issue:
4hether or not a 6udge can $otu proprio, initiate the dismissal and
subse8uently dismissed a criminal information or complaint without any motion to
that effect being filed by the accused based on the alleged violation of the latterDs
right against eA post 2ato law and double 6eopardy
Held:
No. )here is nothing in the rules which authoriAes the court or 6udge to
$otu proprio initiate a motion to 8uash if no such motion to 8uash was filed by the
accused% If the 6udge initiates the motion to 8uash, then he is not only pre<6udging the
case of the prosecution but also taes side with the accused% )his would violate the
right to a hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal% =t is also lear 2ro$
Setion ,, Rule ,,. that the right to !ile a *otion to .uash belongs only to the
accused. It is clear from the rule that the accused may file a motion to 8uash an
information at any time before entering a plea or before arraignment% In the case at
bar, private respondent pleaded to charges without filing any motion to 8uash% *s
such, she is deemed to have waived and abandoned her right to avail of any legal
ground which she may have properly and timely invoed to challenge the complaint
or information%
*ssuming arguendo that a 6udge has the power to $otu proprio dismiss a
criminal charge, yet contrary to the findings of respondent 6udge, the grounds of eA
post 2ato law and double 6eopardy invoed by him are not applicable% "n eA post
2ato laC, suffice it to say that every law carries with it the presumption of
constitutionality until otherwise declared by this court% )o rule that the 2! 2ircular is
an eA post 2ato law is to say that it is unconstitutional% It is not within the province
of the lower court to pass upon the constitutionality of a statute or rule or even to
declare it void% 4ith respect to the ground of double 6eopardy, the same is improper
and has neither legal nor factual basis in this case% It was wrong to say that the
further prosecution of private respondent under the three informations pending
before !ranch 3;<Manila would violate the formerDs right against double 6eopardy%
Cruz+ 1r. v. Court o! Aeals
GR No. 83$*4
Fe&#ua#y 18, 1991
70
%ruz, J.:
Facts:
(etitioner was charged before the +egional )rial 2ourt in Maati, along
with several others, in four separate informations of estafa thru falsification of public
documents% Epon arraignment, petitioner and his co<accused entered a plea of not
guilty% #ubse8uently, the petitioner files a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
four informations did not charge an offense% )he petitioner submitted testimonial
and documentary evidence which is not refuted by the prosecution, while the
prosecution submitted no evidence at all but later moved to deny the motion%
&owever, it was denied% )hey filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was
also denied% )he petitioner 8uestioned the denial of the motions before the #upreme
2ourt but the latter referred the case to the respondent court% )he respondent court
also dismissed the petition% )his prompted the petitioner to file a petition for review
on certiorari before the #upreme 2ourt%
Issue:
I% 4hether or not the case will be dismissed because the information do not
charge an offense.
II% 4hether or not the trial 6udge abused hid discretion when he denied the
motion to dismiss on the grounds that ,a- interest of substantial 6ustice that
the prosecution could adduce evidence during the trial, and ,b- to avoid
technicalities that may arise later. and
III% 4hether or not the prosecution is estopped to 8uestion said proceedings%
Held:
I% No% It is a5iomatic that a complaint or information must state every
single fact necessary to constitute the offense charged% The !unda*ental test in
considering a *otion to .uash on this ground is -hether the (acts alleged+ i!
hyothetically ad*itted+ -ill establish the essential ele*ents o! the o!!ense as
de!ined in the la-. 4here it is clear that the information does not really charge an
offense, the case against the accused must be dropped immediately instead of
sub6ecting him to the an5iety and inconvenience of a useless trial% )he accused is
entitled to such consideration% Moreover, there is no point in proceeding under a
defective information that can never be the basis of a valid conviction% !ut such is
not the situation in the case at bar% *s already observed, the challenged informations
are not insufficient on their face and neither did the evidence presented at the
preliminary hearing 6ustify their dismissal even before the trial had commenced%
II% No. It is clear that the trial 6udge did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when he denied the motion to dismiss on the grounds that ,a- interest of
substantial 6ustice that the prosecution could adduce evidence during the trial, and
,b- to avoid technicalities that may arise later% &is action was authoriAed by FS v.
Barred, where the 2ourt said> FEpon motion of the provincial fiscal to dismiss a
complaint upon which an accused person has been remanded for trial by a 6ustice of
the peace, it rests in the sound discretion o! the 6udge -hether to accede to such
*otion or 4ot. "rdinarily, of course, he will dismiss the action in accordance with
the suggestion of an e5perienced fiscal who has personally investigated the 9acts%
But i2 1e is not satis2ied Cit1 t1e reason assigned by t1e 2isal, or i2 it appears to
1i$ 2ro$ t1e reord o2 t1e proeedings in t1e ourt o2 t1e justie o2 t1e peae, or as
a result o2 in2or$ation 2urnis1ed by t1e private proseutor, or ot1erCise, t1at t1e
ase s1ould not be dis$issed, 1e $ay deny t1e $otion.G
III% No. Cstoppel does not lie against the government because of the
supposedly mistaen acts or omission of its agents% *s the 2ourt declared in People
v. %astaneda, Fthere is the long familiar rule that erroneous application and
enforcement of the law by public officers do not bloc subse8uent correct
application of the statute and that the government is never estopped by mistae or
error on the part of its agents%G
"eole o! the "hiliines v. 5elasco
GR No. 12$444
'e(te)&e# 13, 2000
Bellosillo, J.:
Facts:
)hree ,B- criminal Informations V one ,1- for murder, two ,0- for frustrated
murder V were filed against #an Ildefonso Mayor, &onorato :alveA, and :odofredo
'iego, a municipal employee% Mayor &onorato :alveA was charged, in addition,
with violation of (' 1/;; for unauthoriAed carrying of firearm outside his residence%
*fter a series of legal maneuvers by the parties, venue of the cases was transferred to
the +)2 of OueAon 2ity, Metro Manila, in the sala of Judge )irso '%2% $elasco%
*fter trial, the lower court found the accused :odofredo 'iego guilty beyond
reasonable ground of the crimes of murder and double frustrated murder% &owever, it
ac8uitted Mayor &onorato :alveA of the same charges due to insufficiency of
evidence% It also absolved him from the charge of illegal carrying of firearm upon its
finding that the act was not a violation of law% )he ac8uittal of accused &onorato
:alveA is now challenged by the :overnment before the #upreme 2ourt in a (etition
7B
for 2ertiorari under +ule ;3 of the +ules of 2ourt% (etitioner proposes that the
patently gross 6udicial indiscretion and arbitrariness should be rectified by a re<
e5amination of the evidence by the 2ourt upon a determination that a review of the
cases will not transgress the constitutional guarantee against double 6eopardy%
Issue:
4hether or not the prosecution was correct
Held:
No% )he doctrine that 7double 6eoardy *ay 4ot be invo$ed a!ter trial8
may apply only when the 2ourt finds that the Jri$inal trial Cas a s1a$K because
the prosecution representing the sovereign people in the criminal case was denied
due process% )he petition at hand which sees to nullify the decision of respondent
6udge ac8uitting the accused &onorable &onorato :alveA goes deeply into the trial
courtDs appreciation and evaluation in esse of the evidence adduced by the parties% *
reading of the 8uestioned decision shows that respondent 6udge considered the
evidence received at trial% 4hile the appreciation thereof may have resulted in
possible lapses in evidence evaluation, it nevertheless does not detract from the fact
that the evidence was considered and passed upon% )his conse8uently e5empts the
act from the writDs limiting re8uirement of e5cess or lac of 6urisdiction% *s such, it
becomes an improper ob6ect of and therefore non<reviewable by certiorari% )o
reiterate, errors o2 judg$ent are not to be on2used Cit1 errors in t1e eAerise o2
jurisdition.
"hiliine Savings Ban$ v. Ber*oy
GR No. 1*1912
'e(te)&e# 26, 200*
%arpio, J%>
Facts:
#pouses (edrito and :loria !ermoy allegedly Issued a forged and falsified
transfer certificate of title of a parcel of land located in Malate, Manila to obtain a
loan in the sum of 1,@@@,@@@ from (hilippine #avings !an% #pouses !ermoy were
charged with estafa thru falsification of a public document before the +egional )rial
2ourt in Manila% +espondent spouses pleaded Fnot guiltyG to the charge% )rial
ensued% )he defense filed, with leave of court, a demurrer of evidence on the ground
that petitioner failed to identify respondent spouses as the accused% )his was granted
by the lower court and ordered the dismissal of the case% (etitioner filed a petition for
certiorari with the 2ourt of *ppeals% &owever, the 2ourt of *ppeals affirmed the
decision of the lower court and e5plained that even assuming that the trial court
erred, the ac8uittal of the accused can no longer be reviewed whether on appeal or on
petition for certiorari for it would violate the right of the accused against double
6eopardy% &ence, the petitioner assailed the decision thru a petition for review before
the #upreme 2ourt%
Issue:
4hether or not the 2ourt of *ppeals erred in holding that double 6eopardy
had allegedly attached in the case
Held:
No. !y mandate of the 2onstitution and #ection 7, +ule 117, the courts are
barred from entertaining such appeal as it sees an in8uiry into the merits of the
dismissal% 9or double 6eopardy to apply, #ection 7 re8uires the following elements in
the first criminal case> &a7 t1e o$plaint or in2or$ation or ot1er 2or$al 1arge Cas
su22iient in 2or$ and substane to sustain onvition< &b7 t1e ourt 1as jurisdition<
&7 t1e aused 1ad been arraigned and 1ad pleaded< and &d7 1e Cas onvited or
aBuitted or t1e ase Cas dis$issed Cit1out 1is eApress onsent. )he elements
re8uired in #ection 7 were all present in the case at bar% )hus, the Information for
estafa thru falsification of a public document against the respondent spouses was
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction% )he trial court had
6urisdiction over the case and the persons of respondent spouses% +espondent spouses
were arraigned during which they entered Fnot guiltyG pleas% 9inally, the case was
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence% 2onse8uently, the right not to be placed
twice in 6eopardy of punishment for the same offense became vested on respondent
spouses%
Olaguer v. %ilitary Co**ission
G.R. No. +-*4**8 a"d No. +-69882
May 22, 198$
Ganayo, J.:
Facts:
In 1979, "laguer and some others were detained by military personnel and
they were placed in 2amp !agong 'iwa% =ogauer and his group are all civilians%
)hey were charged with ,1- unlawful possession of e5plosives and incendiary
devices. ,0- conspiracy to assassinate (resident and Mrs% Marcos. ,B- conspiracy to
assassinate cabinet members Juan (once Cnrile, 9rancisco )atad and $icente
74
(aterno. ,4- conspiracy to assassinate Messrs% *rturo )angco, Jose +oXo and "nofre
2orpus. ,3- arson of nine buildings. ,;- attempted murder of Messrs% =eonardo
(ereA, )eodoro $alencia and :enerals +omeo Cspino and 9abian $er. and ,7-
conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion% "n *ugust
19, 19/@, the petitioners went to the #2 and filed the instant (etition for prohibition
and habeas corpus% "n January 17, 19/1, (resident 9erdinand C% Marcos issued
(roclamation No% 0@43 officially lifting martial law in the (hilippines% )he same
(roclamation revoed :eneral "rder No% / ,creating military tribunals- and directed
that Fthe military tribunals created pursuant thereto are hereby dissolved upon final
determination of caseDs pending therein which may not be transferred to the civil
courts without irreparable pre6udice to the state in view of the rules on double
6eopardy, or other circumstances which render prosecution of the cases difficult, if
not impossible%G
Issue:
I% 4hether or not the petition for habeas corpus could be granted.
II% 4hether or not military commissions have 6urisdiction to try civilians for
offenses alleged to have been committed during the period of martial law%
Held:
I% No% )he sole issue in habeas corpus proceedings is detention% 4hen the
release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was
filed is effected, the (etition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and
academic% Inasmuch as the herein petitioners have been released from their
confinement in military detention centers, the instant (etitions for the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed for having become moot and academic%
II% No% 'ue process of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions
,where the accused stands to lose either his life or his liberty-, the accused shall be
entitled to, among others, a trial% )he trial contemplated by the due process clause of
the 2onstitution, in relation to the 2harter as a whole, is a trial by 6udicial process,
not by e5ecutive or military process% Military commissions or tribunals, by whatever
name they are called, are not courts within the (hilippine 6udicial system%* military
commission or tribunal cannot try and e5ercise 6urisdiction, even during the period of
martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the
civil courts are open and functioning, and that any 6udgment rendered by such body
relating to a civilian is null and void for lac of 6urisdiction on the part of the military
tribunal concerned%
/al*an v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. $26$0
'e(te)&e# 12, 1986
?ee1an@ee, %.J.:
Facts:
9ormer #enator !enigno INinoyI *8uino, Jr% was illed from his plane that
had 6ust landed at the Manila International *irport% )he military investigators
reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot *8uino ,whose identity
was then supposed to be unnown and was revealed only days later as +olando
:alman- was a communist<hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him
down in turn% (resident was constrained to create a 9act 9inding !oard to investigate
due to large masses of people who 6oined in the ten<day period of national mourning
yearning for the truth, 6ustice and freedom% )he fact is that both ma6ority and
minority reports were one in re6ecting the military version stating that Ithe evidence
shows to the contrary that +olando :alman had no subversive affiliations% "nly the
soldiers in the staircase with #en% *8uino could have shot him. that NinoyLs
assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot% "nly
difference between the two reports is that the ma6ority report found all the twenty<si5
private respondents above<named in the title of the case involved in the military
conspiracy. Iwhile the chairmanLs minority report would e5clude nineteen of them%
)hen (res% Marcos stated that evidence shows that :alman was the iller%
(etitioners prayer for issuance of a )+" en6oining respondent court from
rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before it was granted by the 2ourt%
)he 2ourt also granted petitioners a five<day period to file a reply to respondentsL
separate comments and respondent )anodbayan a three<day period to submit a copy
of his /4<page memorandum for the prosecution% !ut ten days later, the 2ourt by the
same nine<to<two<vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the
)+" issued ten days earlier en6oining the #andiganbayan from rendering its
decision% )he same 2ourt ma6ority denied petitionersL motion for a new 3<day period
counted from receipt of respondent )anodbayanLs memorandum for the prosecution
,which apparently was not served on them-%
)hus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the
dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be
set for a full hearing on the merits that the people are entitled to due process%
&owever, respondent #andiganbayan issued its decision ac8uitting all the accused of
the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil
liability% +espondents submitted that with the #andiganbayanLs verdict of ac8uittal,
the instant case had become moot and academic% )hereafter, same 2ourt ma6ority
73
denied petitionersL motion for reconsideration for lac of merit% &ence, petitioners
filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging that
respondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in
miscarriage of 6ustice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the
petitioners and the sovereign people of the (hilippines to due process of law%
Issues:
4hether or not there was a violation of the double 6eopardy clause
Held:
No %It is settled doctrine that double 6eopardy cannot be invoed against this
2ourtLs setting aside of the trial courtsL 6udgment of dismissal or ac8uittal where the
prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due
process% *s the 2ourt stressed in the 19/3 case of (eople vs% !ocar,
4here the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and
prove its case its right to due process is thereby violated%
)he cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional
rights, courts are ousted of their 6urisdiction% )hus, the violation of the #tateLs right to
due process raises a serious 6urisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will% 4here the denial of the fundamental right of due process is
apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lac of 6urisdiction%
*ny 6udgment or decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may be regarded
as a Ilawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored
wherever it e5hibits its headI%
=egal 6eopardy attaches only ,a- upon a valid indictment, ,b- before a
competent court, ,c- after arraignment, ,d- a valid plea having been entered. and ,e-
the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the e5press consent of the
accused% )he lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its 6urisdiction when
it violated the right of the prosecution to due process%
In effect the first 6eopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the
criminal case for further hearing and?or trial before the lower courts amounts merely
to a continuation of the first 6eopardy, and does not e5pose the accused to a second
6eopardy%
More so does the rule against the invoing of double 6eopardy hold in the
cases at bar where as we have held, the sham trial was but a moc trial where the
authoritarian president ordered respondents #andiganbayan and )anodbayan to rig
the trial and closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the pre<determined
final outcome of ac8uittal and total absolution as innocent of an the respondents<
accused% Notwithstanding the laudable efforts of Justice &errera which saw him near
the end IdeactivatingI himself from the case, as it was his belief that its eventual
resolution was already a foregone conclusion, they could not cope with the misuse
and abuse of the overwhelming powers of the authoritarian (resident to weaen the
case of the prosecution, to suppress its evidence, harass, intimidate and threaten its
witnesses, secure their recantation or prevent them from testifying% 9ully aware of
the prosecutionLs difficulties in locating witnesses and overcoming their natural fear
and reluctance to appear and testify, respondent #andiganbayan maintained a
IdiAAying tempoI of the proceedings and announced its intention to terminate the
proceedings in about ; months time or less than a year, pursuant to the scripted
scenario% )he prosecution complained of Ithe (residing JusticeLs seemingly hostile
attitude towards ,it-I and their being the sub6ect of warnings, reprimand and
contempt proceedings as compared to the nil situation for the defense% &errera
liewise complained of being Ica6oled into producing witnesses and pressed on
maing assurances that if given a certain period, they will be able to produce their
witnesses &errera pleaded for Ia reasonable period of preparation of its evidenceI
and cited other pending cases before respondent court that were pending trial for a
much longer time where the IdiAAying tempoI and Ifast paceI were not maintained
by the court% Manifestly, the prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due
process of law with a partial court and biased )anodbayan under the constant and
pervasive monitoring and pressure e5erted by the authoritarian (resident to assure
the carrying out of his instructions% * dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of
ac8uittal such as that in the case at bar is a void 6udgment% In legal contemplation, it
is no 6udgment at all% It neither binds nor bars anyone% #uch a 6udgment is Ia lawless
thing which can be treated as an outlawI% It is a terrible and unspeaable affront to
the society and the people% )o paraphrase !randeis> If the authoritarian head of the
government becomes the law<breaer, he breeds contempt for the law, he invites
every man to become a law unto himself, he invites anarchy% No double 6eopardy
attaches, therefore% * void 6udgment is, in legal effect, no 6udgment at all !y it no
rights are divested% )hrough it, no rights can be attained% !eing worthless, all
proceedings founded upon it are e8ually worthless% It neither binds nor bars anyone%
*ll acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void%
"eole v. Salico
G.R. No. +-1*6$
7;
%cto&e# 13, 1949
8eria, J.:
Facts:
*n appeal was made by the provincial fiscal from the order of the 2ourt of
9irst Instance of "ccidental Negros which, upon the petition of the defendant before
the latter has presented his evidence, dismissed the criminal action against the
defendant charged with homicide on the ground that the fiscal was not able to prove
that the offense was committed within the territorial 6urisdiction of the court, or that
the town or municipality of $ictorias in which it was committed is within the
(rovince of Negros "ccidental%
Issue:
4hether or not, the appeal by the prosecution from the order of the 2ourt of
9irst Instance in the present case would place the defendant in double 6eopardy
Held:
No% #ection 9, +ule 11B of the +ules of 2ourt, provides>
#C2% 9% 9ormer conviction or ac8uittal or
former 6eopardy% < 4hen a defendant shall have been
convicted or ac8uitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
e5press consent of a defendant, by a court of
competent 6urisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction, and after the
defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction
or ac8uittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the
case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the
offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the
same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the complaint or information%
*ccording to the above<8uoted provisions, when a defendant has been
convicted or ac8uitted or the case against him is dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his e5press consent, upon a valid complaint or information by a court of
competent 6urisdiction and after he has pleaded to the charge, the conviction or
ac8uittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense% !ut when the case id dismissed with the e5press
consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for
the same offense. because, his action in having the case dismissed constitutes a
waiver of his constitutional rights or privilege, for the reason that he thereby prevents
the court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a 6udgment of
conviction against him%
It may be stated as a general rule that where an indictment is 8uashed at the
instance of the defendant, though after 6eopardy has attached, he cannot thereafter
plead former 6eopardy when placed on trial on another indictment for the same
offense% &is action in having the indictment 8uashed constitute a waiver of his
constitutional privilege%
!esides, under section 0, +ule 11/ of the +ules of 2ourt the prosecution may appeal
because the defendant would not be placed in double 6eopardy, not only when the
defendant has not yet been placed in 6eopardy in the court below, but also when,
although a defendant had already been in former 6eopardy, the appeal by the
prosecution would no place him in danger again of being convicted by the appellate
court by the same offense, because the 8uestion for the appellate court to decide is
not the guilt or innocence of the defendant% 9or e5ample, when after a 6udgment of
conviction rendered by the lower court had become final the court reconsiders its
decision and renders another ac8uitting the defendant, in which the 8uestion raised in
the appeal is not the guilt or innocence of the appellee, but the 6urisdiction of the
court to render the second 6udgment% "r, as in the present case, when the 8uestion
involved in the appeal is whether or not the lower court erred in dismissing the case
on the ground that the evidence for the prosecution does not show that the place
where the offense was committed was within the territorial 6urisdiction of the court%
)his court by reversing the appealed decision in such cases can not convict the
appellee, but only remand the case to the lower court for further proceeding% )he fact
that the lower court has to proceed to the trial of the case against the defendant on the
merits and may after the trial either ac8uit or convict him, would not place the
defendant in double 6eopardy, because the further proceeding by the court below is
not a new trial of a case against the defendant, but a mere continuation of the former
trial in order that the lower court may decide the case on the merits or the guilt or
innocence of the defendant%
"eole o! the "hiliines v. Acierto
G.R. Nos. +-2$08 a"d +-33**-60
!a"ua#y 30, 19*3
?uason, J.:
77
Facts:
*cierto was employed by the *rmy of the Enited #tates as court martial
reporter on piece<wor arrangement% *s such he was paid for so much wor of
reporting and transcribing as he performed% In 194/, he was said to have made false
claims and received compensation for services not rendered% "n March 0@, 194/, in
the belief that defendant was still an employee of, or serving with, the *rmy and
sub6ect to its 6urisdiction, he was placed under arrest by the Enited #tates Military
authorities and brought to trial before a general court martial appointed and
convened by the 2ommanding :eneral on *pril 7, 194/ for violation of the 94th
*rticle of 4ar% "n *pril /, 194/ he was found guilty and sentenced to be confined at
hard labor for si5ty months% "n June 1/, 194/ the 2ommanding :eneral as
reviewing authority disapproved decision stating that *cierto was not sub6ect to
military law% "n June 19, he was directed to the 2ity *ttorney of OueAon 2ity for
prosecution under the penal laws of the (hilippines% *cierto contested the
6urisdiction of the military courts when his case was being tried upon the said court%
4ith the transfer of said case to the regular courts he reversed his contention and is
now stating that the case is within the court martialDs 6urisdiction%
Issues:
I% 4hether or not, the 2ourt of 9irst Instance of OueAon 2ity has 6urisdiction
to decide on the case
II% 4hether or not, the plea of double 6eopardy by *cierto is availing at the
present case%
Held:
I% 7es% !y the agreement, it should be noted, the (hilippine :overnment
merely consents that the Enited #tates e5ercise 6urisdiction in certain cases% )he
consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or e5pediency% )he
(hilippine :overnment has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of
the (hilippine territory or divested itself completely of 6urisdiction over offenses
committed therein% Ender the terms of the treaty, the Enited #tates :overnment has
prior or preferential but not e5clusive 6urisdiction of such offenses% )he (hilippine
:overnment retains not only 6urisdictional rights not granted, but also all such
ceded rights as the Enited #tates Military authorities for reasons of their own
decline to mae use of% )he first proposition is implied from the fact of (hilippine
sovereignty over the bases. the second from the e5press provisions of the treaty% )he
treaty e5pressly stipulates that offenses included therein may be tried by the proper
(hilippine courts if for any special reason the Enited #tates waives its 6urisdiction
over them% )hen carrying out of the provisions of the bases *greement is the
concern of the contracting parties alone% 4hether, therefore, a given case which by
the treaty comes within the Enited #tates 6urisdiction should be transferred to the
(hilippine authorities is to a matter about which the accused has nothing to do or
say% In other words, the rights granted to the Enited #tates by the treaty insure
solely that country and can not be raised by the offender% ,9un vs% #tate, 0@/ #% 4%,
3@9%- !y the same taen, non<compliance with any of the conditions imposed on the
Enited #tates cannot benefit the offender%
)he !ases *greement provides in *rticle TIII, paragraph B, that in case the
Enited #tates renounce the 6urisdiction reserved to it in paragraphs 1 and ; of this
*rticle, the officer holding the offender in custody shall so notify the fiscal of the
city or province in which the offense has been committed within 1@ days after his
arrest% )he #olicitor :eneral invites attention to the fact that Iappellant was arrested
by the Enited #tates *rmy on March 0@, 194/, and confined until June 1/, 194/,
pending final decision of this case,I and, lie the appellant, he believes that Ithis
delay of three months does not obviously comply with the re8uirement of the
foregoing section, which is e5plicit on its terms and provides for no e5ceptions%I In
their opinion this delay was fatal%
)he appellant and the #olicitor :eneral labor, we believe, under a
misapprehension as to the purpose and meaning of the treaty provision 6ust cited%
)his provision is not, and cannot on principle or authority be construed as a
limitation upon the rights of the (hilippine :overnment% If anything, it is an
emphatic recognition and reaffirmation of (hilippine sovereignty over the bases and
of the truth that all 6urisdiction rights granted to the Enited #tates and not e5ercised
by the latter are reserved by the (hilippine for itself%
)he ten<day re8uirement is of directory character relating to procedure,
inserted merely for the convenience of the (hilippine :overnment% It cannot and
does not pretend to diminish or impair the fundamental rights of 6urisdiction reserved
by the treaty for this :overnment% It is an obligation imposed on the Enited #tates
precisely with a view to enabling the (hilippine :overnment the better to e5ercise its
residual authority% )he offender has no interest in this clause of the treaty beyond the
right to demand that whoever is to try him should proceed with reasonable dispatch%
)o say that failure on the part of the Enited #tates to turn the offender over to the
(hilippine authorities within ten days wors as a forfeiture of the (hilippine
:overnmentLs 6urisdiction is a parado5% !y the appellantLs and the #olicitor :eneralLs
theory, this :overnment would be penaliAed by the fault of the other signatory to the
treaty over whose action it has no control% In effect, the idea is not much unlie
divesting a lender of the ownership to his property by reason of the borrowerLs
neglect to return it within the time promised% 4hat is more serious, offenses not
7/
purely military in character perpetrated in military or naval reservations would be
left unpunished where the military or naval authorities in appropriate cases fail or
refuse to act%
II% No% Irrespective of the correctness of the views of the Military
authorities, the defendant was estopped from demurring to the (hilippine courtLs
6urisdiction and pleading double 6eopardy on the strength of his trial by the court
martial% * party will not be allowed to mae a mocery of 6ustice by maing
inconsistent position which if allowed would result in braAen deception% It is trifling
with the courts, contrary to the elementary principles of right dealing and good faith,
for an accused to tell one court that it lacs authority to try him and, after he has
succeeded in his effort, to tell the court to which he has been turned over that the first
has committed error in yielding to his plea%
Cven if it be granted that the court martial did have 6urisdiction, the military
trial in the instant cases has not placed the appellant in 6eopardy such as would bar
his prosecution for violation of the (hilippine penal laws or, for that matter, a second
trial under the *rticles of 4ar% *lthough under +ev% #tat% sec% 1B40, art% 0, it has been
held that a former trial may be pleaded when there has been a trial for the offense,
whether or not there has been a sentence ad6udged or the sentence has been
disapproved, the rule is and should be otherwise when the disapproval was made in
response to the defendantLs plea based on lac of 6urisdiction% In such case the former
trial may not be pleaded in bar in the second trial%
"eole o! the "hiliines v. Casiano
G.R. No. +-1*309
Fe&#ua#y 16, 1961
%oneption , J.:
Facts:
2asiano was charged with estafa for selling a chec nown to be spurious
and false% Epon arraignment on November 1;, 193;, defendant entered a plea of not
guilty% )he hearing was postponed several times until 2asiano secured herself a new
counsel% * Imotion to dismissI which was filed on November 04, 193/, on the
ground that there had been no preliminary investigation of the charge of illegal
possession and use of a false ban note, and that the absence of such preliminary
investigation affected the 6urisdiction of the court% )he motion was granted and, a
reconsideration of the order to this effect having been denied, the prosecution
interposed the present appeal% 'efendant<appellee maintains, and the 2ourt of 9irst
Instance held, that the waiver made by the defendant in the 6ustice of the peace court
did not deprive her of the right to a preliminary investigation of the crime of illegal
possession and use of a false ban note, for this offense does not include, and is not
included in, that of IestafaI, to which her aforementioned waiver referred, the latter
offense being covered by *rticle B13 of the +evised (enal 2ode, which article forms
part of )itle )en thereof entitled I2rimes *gainst (ropertyI, whereas the former is
the sub6ect matter of *rticle 1;/ of said 2ode, which is part of )itle 9our thereof,
entitled I2rimes *gainst (ublic InterestI%
Issue:
4hether or not, 2asiano had waived her constitutional right against double
6eopardy%
Held:
7es% 'efendant herein has filed a brief in which she limited herself to a
discussion of the merits of the appeal% )hus, she not only failed to 8uestion, in her
brief, either e5pressly or impliedly, the right of the prosecution to interpose the
present appeal, but, also, conceded, in effect the e5istence of such right% #he should
be deemed, therefore, to have waived her aforementioned constitutional immunity%
Epon arraignment, the defendant may move to 8uash the information, upon the
ground, among others, that he Ihas been previously %%% in 6eopardy of being convicted
%%% of the offense chargedI ,+ule 11B, #ections 1 and 0, paragraph 1hU-% &owever, if
he Idoes not move to 8uash the %%% information before he pleads thereto, he shall be
taen to have waived all ob6ections which are grounds for a motion to 8uash, e5cept
when the complaint or information does not charge an offense, or the court is without
6urisdiction of the sameI ,+ule 11B, section 1@-% &ence, if he pleads to the charge,
without invoing his immunity from a second 6eopardy, the same is deemed waived%
*gain, Imaterial averments in the complaint, other than those as to the
amount of damages, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically deniedI in the
answer filed by the defendant ,+ule 9, section /-% #imilarly, sub6ect to specified
e5ceptions, Idefenses and ob6ections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in
the answer are deemed waivedI by defendant ,+ule 9, section 9-% )hus, the foregoing
waivers and admission by the defendant re8uire a previous plea or answer by him%
No such waiver or admission is deemed made in the absence of a plea% If the
defendant fails to answer plaintiffLs complaint, the allegations thereof are deemed
denied and plaintiff is bound, therefore, to prove them% )he same rule applies to
defendants in a counterclaim, or cross<claim, or third<party, complaint% #o, too,
79
where plaintiff doesnot file a reply, Iall the new matters alleged in the answerI filed
by the defendant Iare deemed controvertedI by the plaintiff ,+ule 11 and +ule B3,
section ;-% In other words, when no answer to the pleading of an opponent is filed, all
material allegations made or new matters contained in said pleading are, under our
+ules of 2ourt, deemed denied% 2onversely, if an answer is filed, such allegations or
new matters in said pleading of the opponent as have not been specifically
controverted in the aforementioned answer, are deemed admitted, and such personal
defenses as could have been or should have been set up therein are, in general,
waived%
It is true that briefs in appellate courts are not IpleadingsI in the technical
legal meaning of this term% In such courts, there are no IpleadingsI, in the sense of
formal concise statements of the ultimate facts constituting plaintiffLs cause or causes
of action, and specifying the relief sought, or on which the defendant relies for his
defense ,+ule ;, section 1, and +ule 9, section 1, +ules of 2ourt-% )he appellant files
with the appellate court a brief specifying the Ierrors intended to be urgedI and the
arguments in support of such assignment of error ,+ule 4/, section 17-, whereas the
appellee sets forth in his brief Ihis arguments %%% on each assignment of errorI ,+ule
4/, section 1/-% &owever, the briefs, lie the pleadings, define and limit the issues
submitted for determination, and, accordingly, should be sub6ect to the general
principles governing pleadings, insofar as the admission or denial of the claims of an
opponent, as well as the waiver of defenses, are concerned% &ence, when the
defendant<appellee in a criminal case does not file a brief, he < lie a defendant who
fails to answer the complaint < may, perhaps, be deemed to controvert the claim of
plaintiff<appellant in all respects% &owever, if the defendant<appellee files a brief
contesting the merits of the contention of plaintiff<appellant in his brief, without
ob6ecting to plaintiffLs appeal, which plaintiff may tae if the defendant consents or
does not ob6ect thereto, said defendant<appellee < lie the defendant who pleads not
guilty in the lower court, without invoing his immunity from a second 6eopardy <
must be deemed to have waived such immunity%
"eole o! the "hiliines v. #ori.uez
G.R. Nos. +-24444-4*
!uly 29, 1968
%astro, J.:
Facts:
"n *pril 00, 19;4 'ori8ueA loudly spoe against *ttorney #i5to 'emaisip%
)he translation is as follows> I7ou are a foolish class of person, you had to lose my
case, I spent thousands of pesos and later you allowed yourself to be sold to (urita.
you had been telling people that I paid you only (B@%@@ when I spent thousand of
pesos for my case,I and other similar words of import% #i5 days later, 'ori8ueA
having a revolver at his possession released two shots aimed at *ttorney 'emaisip%
)wo informations were filed against him. one for grave oral defamation and the other
for discharge of firearm% !oth cases were filed before the 2ourt of 9irst Instance of
Iloilo% *nother case, this time for alarm and scandal, was filed against 'ori8ueA for
discharging his =icense +evolver caliber %00 #N<B;/B/B one on the ground and one
into the air at the gate in front of the Municipal !uilding of (oblacion, !atad, Ilolilo
on *pril 01, 19;4%
Issues:
I% 4hether or not, the municipal court of !atad, Iloilo, not the 2ourt of 9irst
instance of Iloilo, has original e5clusive 6urisdiction over the offense of
grave oral defamation which, under article B3/ of the +evised (enal 2ode,
is punishable by arresto mayor in its ma5imum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, reasoning that the e5clusive original
6urisdiction of municipal and city courts has been enlarged by +epublic *ct
No% B/0/ to include offenses for which the penalty provided by law is
imprisonment for not more than three years, or a fine of not more than three
thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine.
II% 4hether or not, the filing of the information for discharge of firearm has
placed 'ori8ueA in peril of double 6eopardy as he had previously been
charged with the offense of alarm and scandal in a complaint filed in the
municipal court of !atad, Iloilo%
Held:
I% No% *s therein provided the court of first instance was given original
6urisdiction over cases where the penalty prescribed by law is imprisonment for fore
more than ; months or fine of more than (0@@%@@. the 6ustices of the peace and
municipal or city courts of chartered cities, over cases where the penalty is
imprisonment for not more than B years, and fine of not more than (B,@@@%@@% In
other words, where the prescribed penalty is imprisonment for more than ; months,
but not e5ceeding B years, or fine of more than (0@@%@@ but not e5ceeding (B,@@@%@@
the 6ustice of the peace or municipal court only has concurrent ,and not e5clusive-
original 6urisdiction with the court of first instance% *nd, it may be stated that this
concurrent 6urisdiction between the inferior courts, and the court of first instance was
not provided for the first time in +epublic *ct No% B/0/% Ender +epublic *ct 0;1B,
crimes the penalties for which do not e5ceed B years, or fine of not more than
(B,@@@%@@, were specifically placed within the 6urisdiction of the 6ustice of the peace
and municipal courts, concurrent with the court of first instance%
/@
It follows, therefore, that the e5clusive original 6urisdiction of the 6ustice of
the peace and municipal courts is confined only to cases where the prescribed
penalty is imprisonment for ; months or less, or fine of (0@@%@@ or less, whereas, the
e5clusive original 6urisdiction of the court of first instance covers cases where the
penalty is incarceration for more than B years ,or ; years in the case of city courts
and municipal courts in provincial capitals-, or fine of more than (B,@@@%@@ ,or
(;,@@@%@@ in proper cases-, or both such imprisonment and fine% !etween these
e5clusive 6urisdictions lies a Aone where the 6urisdiction is concurrent% )his is the
proper construction to be placed on the provisions involved herein, regardless of
what may have been the prior rulings on the matter% )he offense of grave oral
defamation which carries a ma5imum penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
period ,or incarceration not e5ceeding 0 years and 4 months- falls within the above<
described Aone of concurrent 6urisdiction% 2onse8uently, the court a 8uo did not err
in assuming 6urisdiction%
II% No% 9or double 6eopardy to attach in his favor, the accused must prove,
among other things, that there is Iidentity of offenses,I so that, in the language of
section 9, +ule 117 of the +evised +ules of 2ourt, his Iconviction or ac8uittal %%% or
the dismissal of the case ,without his e5press consent- shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense charged or for any attempt to, commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information%I It is
altogether evident, however, that the offense of discharge of firearm is not the crime
of alarm and scandal, nor is it an attempt or a frustration of the latter felony% Neither
may it be asserted that every crime of discharge of firearm produces the offense of
alarm and scandal% Nor could the reverse situation be true, for the less grave felony
of discharge of firearm does not include or subsume the offense of alarm and scandal
which is a light felony% In the case at bar, granting that the two indictments arose
from the same act < a contention traversed by the #tate < they describe and constitute,
nevertheless, essentially different felonies having fundamentally diverse
indispensable elements% &ence, there can be no such Iidentity of offensesI as would
support the suggestion that double 6eopardy has ensued% )he trial 6udge, therefore,
did not commit abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the information for
discharge of firearm% )he plea of double 6eopardy cannot therefore be accorded
merit, as the two indictments are perfectly distinct in point of law howsoever closely
they may appear to be connected in fact%
Torres v. Aguinaldo
G.R. No. 164268
!u"e 28, 200*
Dnares-Santiago, J.:
Facts:
* case for falsification of public document was filled against )orres for
the alleged forged of a 'eed of #ale dated July 01, 1979% #aid 'eed transferred the
*guinaldoDs properties to )orres without their nowledge and consent% )orres denied
the allegations of forgery and claimed that *guinaldo sold the sub6ect properties to
him as evidenced by the March 1@, 1991 'eed of *bsolute #ale% 9inding probable
cause, the "2( recommended the filing of an information for falsification of public
document against )orres, which was filed before the Metropolitan )rial 2ourt of
Manila ,M)2-, !ranch /, on "ctober B, 0@@1% )orres moved for reconsideration but
was denied% "n appeal, the #ecretary of Justice reversed the findings of the
investigating prosecutor and ordered the withdrawal of the information% )he motion
for reconsideration filed by *guinaldo was denied% * Motion to 4ithdraw
Information was filed which the M)2 granted on June 11, 0@@B% It should be noted
that petitioner has not been arraigned% Meanwhile, *guinaldo filed before the 2ourt
of *ppeals a petition for certiorari which was granted in the assailed decision dated
March 00, 0@@4% )orresL motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, the instant
petition for review on certiorari%
Issues:
I% 4hether or not, the order of the M)2<Manila dated June 11, 0@@B
granting the motion to withdraw the information rendered moot the
petition for certiorari filed by *guinaldo for the purpose of reinstating
the *pril B@, 0@@1 resolution of the "2( of Manila. and in the
alternative, whether the rule on provisional dismissal under #ection /,
+ule 117 applies.
II% 4hether or not, *guinaldo committed forum shopping. and
III% 4hether or not, the #ecretary of Justice gravely abused his discretion in
reversing the investigating prosecutorLs findings on the e5istence of
probable cause%
Held:
I% )he contention is untenable% * motion to withdraw information differs
from a motion to dismiss% 4hile both put an end to an action filed in court, their
legal effect varies% )he order granting the withdrawal of the information attains
finality after fifteen ,13- days from receipt thereof, without pre6udice to the re<filing
of the information upon reinvestigation% "n the other hand, the order granting a
/1
motion to dismiss becomes final fifteen ,13- days after receipt thereof, with pre6udice
to the re<filing of the same case once such order achieves finality% In !aares II v%
!alising, a motion to dismiss was filed thus putting into place the time<bar rule on
provisional dismissal% In the case at bar, a motion to withdraw information was filed
and not a motion to dismiss% &ence,!aares II v% !alising would not apply% Enlie a
motion to dismiss, a motion to withdraw information is not time<barred and does not
fall within the ambit of #ection /, +ule 117 of the +evised +ules of 2riminal
(rocedure which provides that the law on provisional dismissal becomes operative
once the 6udge dismisses, with the e5press consent of the accused and with notice to
the offended party> ,a- a case involving a penalty of imprisonment not e5ceeding si5
,;- years or a fine of any amount, or both, where such provisional dismissal shall
become permanent one ,1- year after issuance of the order without the case having
been revived. or ,b- a case involving a penalty of imprisonment of more than si5 ,;-
years, where such provisional dismissal shall become permanent two ,0- years after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived%
)here is provisional dismissal when a motion filed e5pressly for that
purpose complies with the following re8uisites, viA%> ,1- It must be with the e5press
consent of the accused. and ,0- )here must be notice to the offended party% #ection /,
+ule 117 contemplates the filing of a motion to dismiss, and not a motion to
withdraw information% )hus, the law on provisional dismissal does not apply in the
present case% Cven assuming that the Motion to 4ithdraw Information is the same as
a Motion to 'ismiss, we do not find that it complied with the above re8uisites% )he
Motion to 4ithdraw Information was filed by the *ssistant 2ity (rosecutor and
approved by the 2ity (rosecutor without the conformity of the accused, herein
petitioner )orres% )hus, it cannot be said that the motion was filed with his e5press
consent as re8uired under #ection /, +ule 117%
II% No% +espondent<spouses are not guilty of forum shopping% )he cases they
filed against petitioner are based on distinct causes of action% !esides, a certificate of
non<forum shopping is re8uired only in civil complaints under #ection 3, +ule 7 of
the +evised +ules of 2ivil (rocedure% In (eople v% 9errer, we held that such
certificate is not even necessary in criminal cases and distinct causes of action%
III% No% #ection 1, +ule 110 of the +evised +ules of 2riminal (rocedure
defines preliminary investigation as an in8uiry or proceeding to determine whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well<founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial% )he officers authoriAed to conduct a preliminary investigation are the> ,a-
(rovincial or city fiscals and their assistants. ,b- Municipal )rial 2ourts and
Municipal 2ircuit )rial 2ourts Judges. ,c- National and +egional state prosecutors.
and ,d- #uch other officers as may be authoriAed by law% (reliminary investigation is
e5ecutive in character% It does not contemplate a 6udicial function% It is essentially an
in8uisitorial proceeding, and often, the only means of ascertaining who may be
reasonably charged with a crime% It is not a trial on the merits and has no purpose
e5cept to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof% LIt does not place the
person against whom it is taen in 6eopardy%

)hus, in determining the e5istence or absence of probable cause, the
investigating officer shall e5amine the complaint and documents in support thereof
as well as the controverting evidence presented by the defense% 4hile the validity
and merits of a partyLs defense or accusation and the admissibility of the testimonies
and evidence are best ventilated in a full blown trial, still, in a preliminary
investigation, a proper consideration of the complaint and supporting evidence as
well as the controverting evidence, is warranted to determine the persons who may
be reasonably charged with the crime% )he determination must be based on the
totality of evidence presented by both parties%
(ule v. Court o! Aeals
G.R. No. $9094
!u"e 22, 1988
Melenio-Herrera, J.:
Facts:
Manalo 9ule, an agent of )owers *ssurance 2orporation, issued on
January 01, 19/1 chec No% 0;741, dated January 04, 19/1 in the sum of (0,341%@3
to +oy Nadera for remittance of collection% Epon presentation of the chec on
January 04, 19/1 it was dishonored for the reason that the said checing account was
already closed% *t the hearing of *ugust 0B, 19/3, only the prosecution presented its
evidence consisting of C5hibits I*,I I!I and I2%I *t the subse8uent hearing on
#eptember 17, 19/3, 9ule waived the right to present evidence and, in lieu thereof,
submitted a Memorandum confirming the #tipulation of 9acts% )he )rial 2ourt
convicted 9ule for $iolation of !atas (ambansa !lg% 00 ,)he !ouncing 2hecs
=aw-% "n appeal the 2* affirmed the decision of the lower court%
Issue:
/0
4hether or not, the 2ourt of *ppeals erred in the decision of the +egional
)rial 2ourt convicting the petitioner of the offense charged, despite the fact that the
conviction was based solely on the stipulation of facts made during the pre<trial on
*ugust /, 19/3, which was not signed by the petitioner, nor by his counsel
Held:
7es% )he 19/3 +ules on 2riminal (rocedure, which became effective on
January 1, 19/3, applicable to this case since the pre<trial was held on *ugust /,
19/3, provides>
#C2% 4% (re<trial agreements must be signed% < No agreement or admission made or
entered during the pre<trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused
unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel% ,+ule 11/-
!y its very language, the +ule is mandatory% Ender the rule of statutory
construction, negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while
those in the affirmative are merely directory% )he use of the term IshallI further
emphasiAes its mandatory character and means that it is imperative, operating to
impose a duty which may be enforced% *nd more importantly, penal statutes whether
substantive and remedial or procedural are, by consecrated rule, to be strictly applied
against the government and liberally in favor of the accused%
)he conclusion is inevitable, therefore, that the omission of the signature
of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily re8uired by the +ules, renders the
#tipulation of 9acts inadmissible in evidence% )he fact that the lawyer of the accused,
in his memorandum, confirmed the #tipulation of 9acts does not cure the defect
because +ule 11/ re8uires both the accused and his counsel to sign the #tipulation of
9acts% 4hat the prosecution should have done, upon discovering that the accused did
not sign the #tipulation of 9acts, as re8uired by +ule 11/, was to submit evidence to
establish the elements of the crime, instead of relying solely on the supposed
admission of the accused in the #tipulation of 9acts% 4ithout said evidence
independent of the admission, the guilt of the accused cannot be deemed established
beyond reasonable doubt%
"eole o! the "hiliines v. Lobos
G.R. No. 10$$98
No2e)&e# 16, 199*
Puno, J.:
Facts:
"n the eve of 'ecember 01, 199@ spouses *rturo and =ourdes #iervo
were robbed of their money worth 4,@;@ pesos% 9our of the culprits then proceeded
to tae se5ual advantage of =ourdes while the other one held *rturo at gun point%
*fter the horrifying ordeal of the family they decided to eep 8uiet about the
incident since the perpetrators were members of the 2ivilian *rmed 9orces and
:eographic Enit ,2*9:E-% )hey finally mustered courage and reported the crime to
the Mondragon (olice #tation on 'ecember B1, 1991% 'r% Melodia Nerida, the
Medical "fficer of Northern #amar :eneral &ospital, certified that there was no
trace of irritation, sperm cells, and se5ual coition in the genitalia of =ourdes% #he,
however, opined that the victimLs menstrual flow could have washed<out the semen%
#he added that it was difficult to detect the se5ual assault since the victimLs organ
already e5perienced four ,4- pregnancies and childbirth% "n the part of Medera, he
alleged that he was on guard duty at the time of the incident% )his alibi was baced
up by =t% 'ayaon, 2pl% *nata and 2pl% Mabascog% "n June B@, 1990 the trial court
convicted the accused<appellants of the crime of +obbery in !and with Multiple
+ape%
Issue:
4hether or not, spouses #iervo failed to positively identify the accused in
court
Held:
No% )he 8uestion of whether accused<appellants are the persons actually
accused in the case at bar is a non<issue% )he issue was settled during the pre<trial of
the case where the parties agreed that the accused<appellants on trial are "rlando
=utao y =obos and Julio Medera y )urcido% )hey were even described as members of
the 2*9:E under the command of =t% *rismindo 'ayaon of the (hilippine *rmy
and stationed in !arangay Malobago, Municipality of #an +ogue, Northern #amar%
!y their admission that they are the "rlando =utao and the Julio Medera accused of
committing the crime at bar, the prosecution witnesses were relieved of the burden of
maing an in court identification of accused<appellants as the malefactors%
)hroughout the proceedings, they never claimed that their admission was an error%
Indeed, they did not claim as defense that they are not the persons accused of the
crime at bar% )heir defense is alibi < that they were at another place when the crime
was committed% In checered contrast, Medera self<destructed when he testified% &e
unabashedly admitted in court that =t% 'ayaon did not order them on Ired alertI from
'ecember 0;, 1991 to January 1, 1990 for the perceived N(* raid% &e was with the
other soldiers patrolling !arangay Malobago%
/B
)he probability that the #iervo spouses erred in identifying the accused<
appellants is nil% *ccused<appellants were not strangers to the spouses% )hey often
patrolled !arangay Malobago% Medera was the coupleLs barriomate and a regular
buyer of their chicen% )here was also a erosene lamp which illuminated the locus
delicti% *ccused<appellants wore no mas to hide their identity% =oose alibi must
yield to and cannot prevail over the positive identification made by the spouses%
Chua v. Court o! Aeals
G.R. No. 10339$
Auust 28, 1996

Her$osisi$a, Jr., J.:
Facts:
* criminal case for 9alsification of (rivate 'ocuments was filed against
2hua and Cnri8ueA% )he In8uest (rosecutor dismissed the complaint on 'ecember
19, 19/9, on the ground of lac of probable cause% 2omplainant )*2 appealed to the
'epartment of Justice% )he prosecutor was ordered to file the corresponding
information on the ground that Ithere e5ists a prima facie case of 9alsification of
(rivate 'ocuments%I "n July 07, 199@, the (rovincial (rosecutor filed the
information with the +egional )rial 2ourt% "n November 0;, 199@, the prosecution
filed a motion to discharge accused *rcadio Cnri8ueA so that he can be utiliAed as a
state witness% "n 'ecember 3, 199@, the court a 8uo issued an "rder denying the
motion to discharge accused Cnri8ueA as a state witness on two grounds, viA> ,1- the
prosecution failed to adduce evidence to the effect that all the re8uirements for the
discharge of Cnri8ueA had been complied with. and ,0- that accused Cnri8ueA, whose
discharge is sought, appears to be in possession of the documents in 8uestion and has
admitted that he was the one who falsified the same% )hus, the trial court was of the
belief that Cnri8ueA was the most guilty% )he issue of discharge was elevated to the
2ourt of *ppeals by way of a petition for certiorari and mandamus% "n #eptember
13, 1991, the 2ourt of *ppeals granted the said petition% #ubse8uently, a motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied on dated January 7, 1990% &ence, this
petition%
Issues:
I% 4hether or not, the respondent court erred ordering the discharge of
accused *rcadio Cnri8ueA in the face of the fact that prosecution has not, up
to the present time, presented any of its five witnesses listed in the
information.
II% 4hether or not, the respondent court erred in not upholding the e5clusive
responsibility of the trial court in the matter of discharging an accused for
use as a state witness.
III% 4hether or not, the respondent court erred in holding that accused *rcadio
Cnri8ueA does not appear to be the most guilty%

Held:
I% No% In the case at bar, the Information charges only two defendants of
having committed the offense of falsification of private documents, to wit> petitioner
and *rcadio Cnri8ueA% )he allegations in the information show that the two had
conspired to commit the crime charged% In the 9lores case, the crime of ban robbery
was done in public and was witnessed by several persons% In this case, the crime of
falsification of private documents was done clandestinely% In fact, only two persons
petitioner and *rcadio Cnri8ueA had nowledge of the criminal conspiracy%
2learly then, only one person can supply the 'I+C2) evidence re8uired
by #ection 9, +ule 119 of the +evised +ules on 2riminal (rocedure and that is
*rcadio Cnri8ueA% &ence, the principle that, where a crime is contrived in secret,
then the discharge of one of the conspirators is essential so he can testify against the
other conspirators, is applicable in this case% 4ith regard to the other witnesses listed
in the Information who have not yet been called to the witness stand, they would not
constitute 'I+C2) evidence of petitioners guilt% )his is because none of these
witnesses was privy to the conspiracy between petitioner and *rcadio Cnri8ueA%
)heir testimony would merely corroborate the testimony of Cnri8ueA although such
corroborative testimony is necessary to fulfill one of the conditions for the discharge
of an accused as stated in #ection 9, +ule 119 of the +evised +ules of 2ourt, viA>
Ithat the testimony of the discharge accused Ican be substantially corroborated in its
material points%I 9urthermore, the said +ule does not re8uire the prosecution to
present all its other evidence before an accused can be discharged% *n accused may
be discharged at any time before the defendants have entered upon their defense%
II% No% 4hile it is true that, as a general rule, the discharge or e5clusion of a
co<accused from the Information, in order that he may be utiliAed as a prosecution
witness rests upon the sound discretion of the trial court, this discretion should be
e5ercised by it strictly on the basis of the conditions therein set forth in +ule 119,
/4
#ection 9 of the +ules on 2riminal (rocedure% )he courts discretion is not absolute
and arbitrary% #ound 6udicial discretion should be e5ercised with due regard to the
proper administration of 6ustice%
*s regards the re8uisite that there must be absolute necessity for the
testimony of the defendant whose discharge is re8uested, the trial court has to rely on
the suggestions and the information presented by the public prosecutor% )he reason is
obvious% )he public prosecutor should now better than the court, and the defense
for that matter, as to which of the accused would best 8ualify to be discharged to
become a state witness% &e is also supposed to now the evidence in his possession
and whom he needs to establish his case%
III% If one induces another to commit a crime, the influence is the determining
cause of the crime% 4ithout the inducement, the crime would not have been
committed% 1/ Indeed, it is the inducer who sets into motion the e5ecution of the
criminal act% 4ithout the inducement, accused Cnri8ueA would not have falsified the
records of the company% )hus, on the basis of the specific acts done by the two
accused and bearing in mind the elements constitutive of the crime of falsification of
private documents, petitioner is the Imost guiltyI as between the two accused%
Moreover, the rules do not dis8ualify an accused sought to be discharged
as witness for the state based on the ground that he has committed the falsification
himself or that he had actually committed the crime charged% )he rules merely say
that it is necessary that the said accused appears to be not the most guilty% 4e can
only conclude that the guilt of an accused of the crime charged is not a basis why he
may not be e5cluded as a witness for the state% *s a matter of fact, the candid
admission of the accused of his participation in a crime is a guaranty that he will
testify truthfully in court% #o, even if an accused actually participated in the offense
charged in the information, he still 8ualifies as a state witness%
/onzales v. Court o! Aeals
G.R. No. 108811
May 31, 1994

'itug, J.:

Facts:
)his appeal for certiorari rooted from a criminal complaint for Oualified
#eduction% #aid complaint was filed before the Municipal )rial 2ourt of "bando,
!ulacan% Epon the arraignment, :onAales pleaded not guilty to the charge mentioned
above% &owever, when the defense was about to rest its case, the prosecution filed a
motion so that the accused would answer to a charge for rape since the evidence
submitted indicated that rape and not
8ualified seduction% )he lower court dismissed the case on the ground that there is no
sufficient evidence to prove the crime of Oualified #eduction as charge in the
complaint%

Issue:
4hether or not the dismissal is proper

Held:
No. )he dismissal of the charge for 8ualified seduction is clearly sanctioned
by the above<8uoted rule in order to pave the way for the filing of the proper offense
for the crime of rape% )he accused cannot invoe double 6eopardy. for that ind of
6eopardy to arise, the following re8uisites must be e5tant> ,1- )he previous complaint
or information or other formal charge is sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction. ,0- )he court has 6urisdiction to try the case. ,B- )he accused has been
arraigned and has pleaded to the charge. and ,4- )he accused is convicted or
ac8uitted or the case is dismissed without his e5press consent%
4hen all the above elements concur, a second prosecution for ,a- the same
offense, or ,b- an attempt to commit the said offense, or ,c- a frustration of the said
offense, or ,d- any offense which necessarily includes, or is necessarily included in,
the first offense charged, can be rightly barred%
&ere, there is no 8uestion that the Municipal )rial 2ourt did not have the
re8uisite 6urisdiction to try the offense of rape, a crime that lies instead within the
province of the +egional )rial 2ourt to tae cogniAance of% Moreover, the dismissal
of 2riminal 2ase No% 03;@ for 8ualified seduction by the Municipal )rial 2ourt not
only was provisional but liewise with the e5press consent of the accused ,herein
petitioner-%
"eole o! the "hiliines v. /aligao
G.R. Nos. 140961-63
!a"ua#y 14, 2003
Dnares-Santiago, J.:

Facts:
/3
!obby :aligao was charged with rape before the +egional )rial 2ourt of
2alapan 2ity, "riental Mindoro% Epon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty
of the charge% )hereafter, the lower court found :aligao guilty of the charge against
him and sentences him to suffer three ,B- death penalties%

Issue:
4hether or not the lower court erred in sentencing the accused<appellant
with death penalty for the three ,B- rapes when rape as a heinous crime was not yet
punishable by death when he committed the same
Held:
No. )he death penalty could thus be decreed. nevertheless, #ection 00 of
+epublic *ct No% 7;39, amending *rticle 47 of the +evised (enal 2ode, recogniAes
that in death penalty cases the &igh )ribunal puts to a vote not only the Issue of guilt
of an appellant but also the 8uestion on the imposition of the death penalty itself% )he
law provides thusly>
#ec% 00% *rticle 47 of the same 2ode is hereby amended to read as follows> *+)%
47% =n C1at ases t1e deat1 penalty s1all not be i$posed< !uto$ati revieC o2 "eat1
Penalty %ases% V )he death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be
imposed under e5isting laws, e5cept when the guilty person is below eighteen ,1/-
years of age at the time of the commission of the crime or is more than seventy years
of age or when upon appeal or automatic review of the case by the #upreme 2ourt,
the re8uired ma6ority vote is not obtained for the imposition of the death penalty, in
which cases, the penalty shall be relusion perpetua% *ll told, we are convinced of
the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of accused<appellant for two counts of rape
committed against his daughters, 'orivie and 'eborrah% !ut given the circumstances
attendant to this case, there is sufficient 6ustification in imposing on accused<
appellant the reduced penalty of relusion perpetua for each count of rape%
"eole o! the "hiliines v. C(, o! 9uezon
G.R. No. 4881$
%cto&e# 29, 1993
Bellosillo, J.:

Facts:
)he instant petition rooted from the validity of the 6udgment of ac8uittal
penned by a trial 6udge detailed to a vacant branch of the court but promulgated after
a permanent 6udge has been duly appointed to the vacancy% :regorio Malco was
charged with attempted rape before the 2ourt of 9irst Instance of OueAon% Judge
Montecillo, (residing Judge of !ranch III, was designated pro te$pore to tae over
!ranch T% &owever, on June 9, 197/, Judge *ntona was appointed (residing Judge
of !ranch T% &e too his oath and assumed office the following
day, terminating ipso 2ato the temporary designation of Judge Montecillo% )he latter
ac8uitted Malco of attempted rape% #pecial 2ounsel Ouintana moved to set aside the
6udgment of ac8uittal, however, Judge *ntona denied the same on the ground that the
trial court was without 6urisdiction Ito review and declare illegal the actuation of a
co<e8ual 2ourt%I

Issue:
4hether or not the decision of Judge Montecillo was null and void
inasmuch as he was no longer 6udge<designate of !ranch T when his decision was
promulgated

Held:
No. 2onse8uently, in the instant case, the 6udgement of ac8uittal penned by
Judge Montecillo must be declared valid% It is not necessary that he be the presiding
6udge of !ranch T at the time his decision was promulgated since even after the
e5piration of his temporary designation at !ranch T he continued to be an incumbent
of !ranch III% *fter all, where a 2ourt of 9irst Instance ,now +egional )rial 2ourt- is
divided into several branches, each of the branches is not a court distinct and
separate from the others% Jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the 6udges, so that
when a complaint or information is filed before one branch or 6udge, 6urisdiction
does not attach to said branch of the 6udge alone, to the e5clusion of the others%

Sadio v. Regional Trial Court o! Anti.ue
G.R. No. 94143
'e(te)&e# 24, 1991
%ruz, J.:

Facts:
Judge !onifacio #anA Maceda of the +egional )rial 2ourt of *nti8ue
declared the small town lottery in said province as illegal% &ence, Cdgar #adio filed
with the Municipal )rial 2ourt of #an Jose, *nti8ue, a criminal complaint against
&on% Maceda for issuance of an un6ust interlocutory order in violation of *rticle 0@;
of the +evised (enal 2ode%
/;
Issue:
4hether or not the offended party in a criminal case has a right to appeal if
the case is dismissed
Held:
No. )he 2ourt has held that ac8uittal in a criminal case does not bar
continuation of the civil case connected therewith where> ,1- the ac8uittal is based on
reasonable doubt. ,0- the decision contains a declaration that the liability of the
accused is not criminal but only civil. or ,B- the civil liability is not derived from or
based on the criminal act of which the accused is ac8uitted%
)he case at bar does not come under any of the above e5ceptions% )he
petitionerLs criminal complaint alleged that Judge Maceda had Issued the
interlocutory order in violation of #adioLs right to due process under *rticle III,
#ection 1, of the 2onstitution% Judge Misa6on declared in her order dismissing the
charge that #adio was in fact given the opportunity to be heard and offered
testimonial and documentary evidence on 9ebruary 0; and 0/, 199@, Iwhich ,Judge
Maceda- considered in issuing his order of March 1;, 199@%I In finding that the
petitioner had not been denied due process, Judge Misa6on in effect completely
e5onerated Judge Maceda and thus also e5tinguished the civil action connected with
the criminal case% In this situation, the petitioner could not have, as a mere
complaining witness, appealed the dismissal of the criminal action even on its civil
aspect only% )he civil action was deemed dismissed with the criminal action% )he
criminal aspect of the order could have been appealed since double 6eopardy had not
yet attached because the accused had not yet been arraigned% !ut only the prosecutor
could have done this because he had complete direction and control of the
prosecution of the case, as we have &eld in several cases% No appeal having been
filed by him, the order of dismissal became final and unappealable after the lapse of
the reglementary 13<day period%
Su*along v. Court o! Aeals
G.R. No. 123404
Fe&#ua#y 26, 199$

8raniso, J.:
Facts:
*urelio #umalpong was charged with the crime of attempted homicide% )he
accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment and trial on the merits followed%
)hereafter, the lower court found the accused guilty of the crime charged% *ccused<
appellant contends that the petitionerLs appeal where he endeavors to weaen the
complainantLs credibility by pointing out an alleged inconsistency between the latterLs
sworn statement and his testimony in open court%
Issue>
4hether or not inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses affect their
credibility

Held:
No. )ime and again this 2ourt has held that inconsistencies in the testimony
of witnesses when referring only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect
either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their
testimony% #uch inconsistencies reinforce rather than weaen their credibility and
suggest that they are telling the truth% 9 )he aforesaid rule finds application to the
case at bench for the matter of who was shot first by the petitioner is clearly
insignificant and does not change the established fact that the petitioner had indeed
fired at both the complainant and the latterLs wife% *lthough there may be
inconsistencies on minor details, the same do not impair the credibility of the witness
where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive
identification of the assailant%
"eole o! the "hiliines v. Subingsubing
G.R. Nos. 104942-43
No2e)&e# 2*, 1993

Padilla, J.:

Facts:
Napoleon #ubingsubing was charged with the crime of rape in three ,B-
separate informations% Epon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to the
charge% &e interposed that there was no rape since the complainant consented to the
se5ual congress between them% )he lower court found #ubingsubing guilty of the
crime of rape in view of the complainantDs testimony%

Issue
4hether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of rape

Held:
No. *ppellantLs e5culpation from the offense of rape does not mean,
however, that his responsibility is merely moral and not penal in character% If that
/7
were so, considering the 9acts of this case, it may be cause for right<thining men
and women to discern a gap or fissure in the legal order, one that cries moreover to
be bridged%
*s things stand, for failing to meet the e5acting test of moral certainty, it is
incumbent upon us to set aside the trial courtLs 6udgments of conviction for rape%
&owever, the 2ourt must state that it finds onlusive evidene ,no less than the
accused<appellantLs admission- that on 03 November 19/9, the accused Napoleon
#ubingsubing had se5ual intercourse with Mary Jane Cspilan when she was only 1;
years of age% )he complainant and the accused were living in the same house% )he
accused is the uncle of the complainant, brother of her own mother%
Oualified seduction is the act of having carnal nowledge of a virgin over
10 years to 1/ years of age and committed by any of the persons enumerated in *rt%
BB7 of the +evised (enal 2ode, to wit> any person in public authority, priest, home<
servant, domestic, guardian, teacher, or any person who, in any capacity, shall be
entrusted with the education and custody of the woman seduced% *buse of
confidence is the 8ualifying circumstance in the offense%
Estrada v. "eole o! the "hiliines
G.R. No. 1623$1
Auust 2*, 200*

!ustria-Martinez, J.:

Facts:
)his case rooted from an information charging Mary &elen Cstrada with
Cstafa before the +)2 of =as (iXas 2ity% )he petitioner 6umped bail, thus said lower
court Issued an "rder considering the same to have waived her right to present
evidence% &ence, the lower court rendered a decision based only on prosecution
evidence% )he case was then appealed to the 2ourt of *ppeals via certiorari and?or
mandamus% *ccordingly, while the case was in the lower court, said petitioner signed
an undertaing stating that in case of her failure to appear during the trial despite due
notice, her absence would constitute as an e5press waiver of her right to be present
during trial and promulgation of 6udgment and the lower court would then proceed
with the hearing in absentia%
Issue:
4hether or not the promulgation of 6udgment in absentia is allowed by the
+ules of 2ourt
Held:
7es% 2learly, promulgation of 6udgment in absentia is allowed under the
+ules% &ence, in Pasua v. %ourt o2 !ppeals,114U it was &eld that such promulgation
is valid provided the following essential elements are present> ,a- that the 6udgment
be recorded in the criminal docet. and ,b- that a copy thereof be served upon the
accused or counsel% )he factual circumstances in said case are analogous to the case
at bar% It is presumed that official duties are regularly performed and that the
proceedings are made of record% )his serves as a substantial compliance with the
procedural re8uirement of the recording of the 6udgment in the criminal docet of the
court% *t any rate, petitioner does not 8uestion non<compliance of the re8uirement of
the recording of the 6udgment in the criminal docet%
(etitionerLs first argument is devoid of merit% In the first place, her non<
receipt of the notice of promulgation was due to her own failure to immediately file a
notice of change of address with the trial court, which she clearly admitted% !esides,
promulgation could be properly done even in her absence, sub6ect to the service of a
copy of the decision upon her or her counsel and the recording of the 6udgment in the
criminal docet% In the present case, therefore, since the records bear out the fact that
copies of the decision were sent by registered mail to the given addresses of
petitioner and her counsel, *tty% &erenio MartineA, and there is no 8uestion that the
6udgment was indeed recorded in the criminal docet of the court, the promulgation
was valid%
#e 5illa v. #irector o! "risons
G.R. No. 1*8802
No2e)&e# 1$, 2004

Dnares-Santiago, J.:

Facts:
+eynaldo 'e $illa was convicted with the crime of +ape and is currently
serving his sentence at the New !ilibid (rison at Muntinlupa 2ity% &is son, June 'e
$illa filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that
during the trial of the case, he was unaware that 'N* was used to determine if he is
the father of the victimDs child% )he petitioner ased the 2ourt for a new trial to
consider newly discovered evidence such as a 'N* test%
Issue:
4hether or not the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus can be utiliAed to
collaterally attac his conviction
Held:
//
No. * record must be allowed to remain e5tant, and cannot be revised,
modified, altered or amended by the simple e5pedient of resort to 1abeas
orpus proceedings% 2learly, mere errors of fact or law, which did not have the effect
of depriving the trial court of its 6urisdiction over the case and the person of the
defendant, are not correctible in a petition for the issuance of the writ of 1abeas
orpus. if at all, these errors must be corrected on ertiorari or on appeal, in the form
and manner prescribed by law%
In the past, this 2ourt has disallowed the review of a courtDs appreciation of
the evidence in a petition for the issuance of a writ of 1abeas orpus, as this is not
the function of said writ% * survey of our decisions in 1abeas orpus cases
demonstrates that, in general, the writ of 1abeas orpus is a high prerogative writ
which furnishes an e5traordinary remedy. it may thus be invoed only under
e5traordinary circumstances% 4e have been categorical in our pronouncements that
the writ of 1abeas orpus is not to be used as a substitute for another, more proper
remedy% +esort to the writ of 1abeas orpus is available only in the limited instances
when a 6udgment is rendered by a court or tribunal devoid of 6urisdiction% If, for
instance, it can be demonstrated that there was a deprivation of a constitutional right,
the writ can be granted even after an individual has been meted a sentence by final
6udgment%
%artinez v. Court o! Aeals
G.R. No. 1$0409
!a"ua#y 28, 2008
?inga, J. :
Facts:
+espondents are the heirs of the late Melanio Medina, #r% who during his
lifetime inherited the properties from his mother, +osa MartineA Cmita, who in turn
inherited them from her own mother, 2eledonia MartineA ,2eledonia-% )he
complaint alleged that sometime in 1990, petitioner, whose real name as appearing in
her birth certificate is :regoria Mer8uines, represented herself as :regoria MartineA
and as thus one of the descendants of 2eledonia, and under that name applied for
free patents over the properties with the 2ommunity Cnvironmental and Natural
+esources "ffice of !acoor, 2avite% Enbenownst to private respondents, the
corresponding "2)s were thus Issued in the name of :regoria MartineA% 4hen
private respondents later filed an application for land registration over the same
properties, petitioner opposed the same% )his impelled private respondents to file the
instant complaint%

Issue:
4hether or not the free patents and land titles should be annulled due to
fraud and misrepresentation in their procurement
Held:
No% It is a well<settled principle that points of law, theories, issues and
arguments not ade8uately brought to the attention of the trial court need not be, and
ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal because this would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play,
6ustice and due process% "n this point alone, the petition could be denied outright%
(ublic lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only by homestead
patent, sale, and lease, 6udicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, and
administrative legaliAation or free patent% "ne claiming private rights as basis of
ownership must prove compliance with the (ublic =and *ct which prescribes the
substantive as well as the procedural re8uirements for ac8uisition of public lands%
Cach mode of disposition is appropriately covered by a separate chapter of the (ublic
=and *ct% )here are specific re8uirements and application procedures for every
mode%
"eole o! the "hiliines v. Calo+ 1r.
G.R. No. 88*31
!u"e 18, 1990
Bidin, J.:
Facts:
Mariano 2orvera, #r% ,father of private petitioner-, was gunned down inside
the courtroom of the +)2 of !utuan 2ity, !r% II% )he following day, a complaint was
filed before the "ffice of the 2ity 9iscal of !utuan 2ity, charging the alleged
assailant, (ablo Macapas ,at large-, the herein private respondents and two ,0-
unidentified persons, with murder% Investigating 2ity 9iscal Mariano !alansag found
a prima facie case and prepared the corresponding Information for Murder against
private respondents as accused% (rivate respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration% "n *ugust 19, 19//, 9iscal Mariano !alansag was gunned down
near his residence as he was about to report to his office% *n information for murder
was eventually filed in connection with the death of Mariano 2orvera, #r%
recommending Ino bailI for the accused<respondents% C5ecutive Judge +osarito
'abalos Issued an order directing a re<raffle, and at the same time, fi5ing the amount
of bail for private respondents at (3@,@@@%@@ each% )he 2ourt of *ppeals set aside the
assailed order and directed the trial court> I,a- to immediately Issue and serve new
/9
warrants of arrest against private respondents as wen as the accused at<large (ablo
Macapas. ,b- to determine without delay by conducting the re8uisite hearing whether
the evidence of guilt is strong. and thereafter ,e- to resolve whether or not bail should
be granted, and in the affirmative, to fi5 the same in accordance with law%
Issue:
4hether or not the granting of bail to the accused be null and void
Held:
7es% 4hile the rule is, as &eld by the 2ourt of *ppeals, only the #olicitor
:eneral may bring or defend actions on behalf of the +epublic of the (hilippines or
the #tate in criminal proceedings pending in this 2ourt and the 2ourt of *ppeals, the
ends of substantial 6ustice would be better served, and the Issues in this action could
be determined in a more 6ust, speedy and ine5pensive manner, by entertaining the
petition at bar% *s an offended party in a criminal case, private petitioner has
sufficient personality and a valid grievance against Judge *daoLs order granting bail
to the alleged murderers of his ,private petitionerLs- father% )he order dated 9ebruary
04, 19/9 granting bail to accused<respondents should have been declared null and
void and in violation of procedural due process% )he prosecution in the instant case
was not given ade8uate opportunity to prove that there is strong evidence of guilt and
to present within a reasonable time all the evidence it desired to present%
Obosa v. Court o! Aeals
G.R. No. 1143*0
!a"ua#y 16, 199$
Panganiban, J.:
Facts:
"n 'ecember 4, 19/7, #enior #tate (rosecutor *urelio 2% )rampe charged
the accused Jose )% "bosa three others with murder on two counts, by separate
amended informations filed with the +egional )rial 2ourt of Maati, !ranch 3;, for
the ambush<slaying of #ecretary of =ocal :overnments Jaime N% 9errer and his
driver Jesus '% 2alderon, which occurred on *ugust 0, 19/7, at about ;>B@ in the
evening, at =a &uerta, (araXa8ue, Metro Manila, as #ecretary 9errer was riding in
his car, going to the #t% *ndrew 2hurch near the plaAa of =a &uerta, to hear #unday
mass% Cach information alleged that the illing was with the attendance of the
following 8ualifying?aggravating circumstances, to wit> treachery, evident
premeditation, abuse of superior strength, nighttime purposely sought, disregard of
the respect due to the victim on account of his ran and age ,as to #ecretary 9errer-,
and by a band% )he (rosecutor recommended no bail, as the evidence of guilt was
strong%
Issue:
4hether or not "bosa, who was charged with two ,0- counts of murder ,a
capital offense- for the ambush slaying of former #ecretary of Interior and =ocal
:overnments Jaime N% 9errer and his driver Jesus '% 2alderon, but who was
convicted only of two ,0- counts of homicide may be granted bail after such
conviction for homicide, a non<capital offense%
Held:
No% 4hile the accused, after conviction, may upon application be bailed at
the discretion of the 2ourt, that discretion W particularly with respect to e5tending
the bail W should be e5ercised not with la5ity, but with caution and only for strong
reasons, with the end in view of upholding the ma6esty of the law and the
administration of 6ustice% *nd the grave caution that must attend the e5ercise of
6udicial discretion in granting bail to a convicted accused is best illustrated and
e5emplified in *dministrative 2ircular No% 10<94 amending +ule 114, #ection 3
which now specifically provides that, although the grant of bail is discretionary in
non<capital offenses, nevertheless, when imprisonment has been imposed on the
convicted accused in e5cess of si5 ,;- year and circumstances e5ist ,inter alia, where
the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement or evaded
sentence, or there is an undue ris that the accused may commit another crime while
his appeal is pending- that point to a considerable lielihood that the accused may
flee if released on bail, then the accused must be denied bail, or his bail previously
granted should be cancelled%
"eole o! the "hiliines v. (ernandez
GR No. 80481
!u"e 2$, 1990
Regalado, J.:
Facts:
*ccused<appellant 4ilfredo 9ernandeA y Malinao, alias *lfredo 9ernandeA
y Malinao ,hereafter 4I=9+C'"-, was found guilty of raping the daughter of his
common law spouse and sentencing him to suffer the e5treme penalty of death% "n
or about 'ecember 0@, 199; in )aguig, Metro Manila and within the 6urisdiction of
9@
this &onorable 2ourt, the said accused, with lewd design and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have se5ual
intercourse with one Melissande (asasala y !ohol, a minor, fifteen years of age,
against her will and consent% Epon arraignment, 4I=9+C'" entered a plea of not
guilty%
Issue:
4hether or not the crime committed by the accused is simple rape
Held:
7es. It is simple rape, with the penalty of reclusion perpetua% although
art%BB3 of the rpc says that death penalty shall be imposed when the victim is under
1/ and the offender is the common<law spouse of the parent of the victim having
been charged only of simple rape in the information, the accused is held guilty only
of simple rape with the penalty of reclusion perpetua%
)he information clearly indicates that there is no allegation therein that
wilfredo is the common<law spouse of the victimDs mother% in other words, the actual
relationship e5isting between the offender and the offended party was not alleged%
we have been steadfast in our pronouncements that the circumstances under the
amendatory provisions of #ection 11 of +% *% No% 7;39, the e5istence of which
would mandate the imposition of the death penalty, are in the nature of special
8ualifying circumstances which must be alleged in the information and if not so
alleged cannot be proven as such% 4here any of said special 8ualifying circumstance
is proven alone without the concurrent allegation thereof in the information, the
constitutional and statutory right of the accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him is violated%G &aving been charged in the
information with simple rape only, and no other modifying circumstance having been
proven, the penalty that should be imposed on 4I=9+C'" pursuant to *rticle ;B of
the +evised (enal 2ode would be reclusion perpetua, the lesser of the penalties
prescribed by *rticle BB3 of the +evised (enal 2ode, as amended by +%*% No% 7;39%
%alaloan v. Court o! Aeals
GR No. 1048$9
May 6, 1994
Regalado, J.:
Facts:
=t% *bsalon $% #alboro of the 2*(2"M filed with the +)2 of Jalooan
2ity an application for search warrant% )he search warrant was sought for in
connection with an alleged violation of (%'% 1/;; ,Illegal (ossession of 9irearms and
*mmunitions-% 9irearms, e5plosive materials and subversive documents were seiAed
and taen during the search% (etitioners presented a Motion for 2onsolidation,
Ouashal of #earch 4arrant and 9or the #uppression of *ll Illegally *c8uired
Cvidence% &owever, the court denied the 8uashal of the search warrant and the
validity of which warrant was up&eld invoing paragraph B,b- of the Interim +ules
and :uidelines which provides that search warrants can be served not only within the
territorial 6urisdiction of the issuing court but anywhere in the 6udicial region of the
issuing court%
Issue:
4hether or not a court may tae cogniAance of an application for a search
warrant in connection with an offense committed outside its territorial boundary and,
thereafter, issue the warrant to conduct a search on a place outside the courtLs
supposed territorial 6urisdiction
Held:
* warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely
constitutes process% * search warrant is defined in our 6urisdiction as an order in
writing issued in the name of the (eople of the (hilippines signed by a 6udge and
directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and
bring it before the court%3 * search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process ain
to a writ of discovery% It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and
made necessary because of a public necessity% * 6udicial process is defined as a writ,
warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issues by authority of law% It is clear,
therefore, that a search warrant is merely a 6udicial process designed by the +ules to
respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has already been instituted, or in
anticipation thereof% #ince a search warrant is a 6udicial process, not a criminal
action, no legal provision, statutory or reglementary, e5pressly or impliedly provides
a 6urisdictional or territorial limit on its area of enforceability% Moreover, in our
6urisdiction, no period is provided for the enforceability of warrants of arrest, and
although within ten days from the delivery of the warrant of arrest for e5ecution a
return thereon must be made to the issuing 6udge, said warrant does not become
functus officio but is enforceable indefinitely until the same is enforced or recalled%
Burgos+ Sr. v. The Chie! O! Sta!!) A("+ et. al.
G.R.No. +-64261
91
/ece)&e# 26, 1984
5solin, J.:
Facts:
*ssailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory in6unction is the validity of two 10U search
warrants issued on 'ecember 7, 19/0 by Judge Crnani 2ruA<(ano of the then 29I of
+iAal 1OueAon 2ityU, under which the premises of the IMetropolitan MailI and I4e
9orumI newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines,
e8uipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing,
publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, boos and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and
control of petitioner Jose !urgos, Jr% publisher<editor of the I4e 9orumI newspaper,
were seiAed% (etitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory in6unction be issued for the return of the seiAed articles, and that
respondents be en6oined from using the articles thus seiAed as evidence against
petitioner Jose !urgos, Jr% and the other accused in 2riminal 2ase No% O< @007/0 of
the +egional )rial 2ourt of OueAon 2ity, entitled (eople v% Jose !urgos, Jr% et al%

Issue:
4hether or not the closure of 4C 9orum a case of prior restraint

Held:
7es. *s heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and
printing offices of the IMetropolitan MailI and the I4e 9orum newspapers% *s a
conse8uence of the search and seiAure, these premises were padloced and sealed,
with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were
discontinued% #uch closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship
abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and
constitutes a virtual denial of petitionersL freedom to e5press themselves in print%
)his state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framewor where a free,
alert and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of
the citiAenry%
"eole o! the "hiliines v. 'uang &heen 'ua
G.R. No. 139301
'e(te)&e# 29, 2004
%allejo, Sr. J.:

Facts:
(olice operatives of the (ublic *ssistance and +eaction *gainst 2rime
,(*+*2- under the 'epartment of Interior and =ocal :overnment received word
from their confidential informant that (eter 2han and &enry =ao, and appellants
Jogy =ee and &uang Khen &ua were engaged in illegal drug trafficing% )he
policemen also learned that appellant =ee was handling the payments and accounting
of the proceeds of the illegal drug trafficing activities of =ao and 2han% ("B
!elliardo *nciro, Jr% and other police operatives conducted surveillance operations
and were able to verify that =ao and appellant =ee were living together as husband
and wife% )hey once spotted 2han, =ao, the appellants and two others, in a seafood
restaurant in !ocobo #treet, Crmita, Manila, late in the evening% "n another
occasion, the policemen saw 2han, =ao, and the appellants, at the 2elicious
+estaurant along +% #ancheA #treet, Crmita, Manila, at about />B@ p%m% )hey were
spotted the third time at the Midtown &otel% )he police operatives also verified that
2han and =ao resided at +oom Nos% 1043 and 1047, 2ityland 2ondominium, 'e la
+osa #treet, Maati 2ity, and in a two<storey condominium unit at No% 19 *tlantic
'rive, (acific :rand $illa, #to% NiXo, (araXa8ue, Metro Manila% #("0 2esar N%
)eneros of the (*+*2 secured #earch 4arrant No% 9;</@1 for violation of
(residential 'ecree ,(%'%- No% 1/;; ,illegal possession of firearms and e5plosives-
and #earch 4arrant No% 9;</@0, for violation of #ections 10, 14 and 1; of +ep% *ct
No% ;403% )hereafter, the police operatives received information that =ao and 2han
would be delivering shabu at the 9urama =aser Jaraoe +estaurant% *s the two men
alighted, one of the men approached them and introduced himself, but 2han and =ao
fired shots% )hus, a shoot<out ensued between the members of the raiding team and
the two suspects% 2han and =ao were shot to death during the encounter% )he
policemen found two plastic bags, each containing one ilo of shabu, in =aoDs car%

Issue:
90
4hether or not Khen &ua conspire with appellant =ee and 2han or =ao in
committing the crime

Held:
)here is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a crime and
decide to commit it% 2onspiracy cannot be presumed% 2onspiracy must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt lie the crime sub6ect of the conspiracy% 2onspiracy may be
proved by direct evidence or by proof of the overt acts of the accused, before, during
and after the commission of the crime charged indicative of a common design%
)he bare fact that on two or three occasions after the arrival of appellant from 2hina,
and before the search conducted in =aoDs condominium unit, appellant had been seen
with =ao, 2han and appellant =ee% &aving dinner or lunch at a restaurant does not
constitute sufficient proof that he had conspired with them or with any of them to
possess the sub6ect<regulated drug% Mere association with the principals by direct
participation or mere nowledge of conspiracy, without more, does not suffice%
*nciro, Jr% even admitted that during his surveillance, he could have mistaen
appellant for another group of 2hinese persons who were also being watched%
*ppellant should, thus, be ac8uitted%
"eole o! the "hiliines v. (igueroa
G.R. No. 1340*6
!uly 6, 2000
"avide, Jr., %.J.:
Facts:
*ccused was convicted of violating #ec 14<* of the 'angerous 'rugs *ct
of 970 V EnauthoriAed manufacture of regulated drugs% &e contends that since his
alleged co<conspirator was ac8uitted due to insufficiency of evidence to prove that
she conspired with him, he should liewise be ac8uitted%
Issue:
4hether the act of the accused constitutes conspiracy
Held:
No% "nce a conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all, and
each of the conspirators is liable for the crimes committed by the other conspirators%
It follows then that if the prosecution fails to prove conspiracy, the alleged
conspirators should be held individually responsible for their own respective acts%
*ccordingly, appellantDs criminal liability in this case must be 6udged on the basis of
his own acts as established by the 8uantum of proof re8uired in criminal cases%
"eole o! the "hiliines v. 2uevas
GR No. 1$0233
Fe&#ua#y 22, 200$
?inga, J.:
Facts:
(olice officers 9ami and 2abling, during a stationary surveillance and
monitoring of illegal drug trafficing in "longapo 2ity, came across Jesus Nuevas,
who they suspected to be carrying drugs% Epon in8uiry, Nuevas showed them a
plastic bag which contained mari6uana leaves and brics wrapped in a blue cloth% &e
then informed the officers of 0 other persons who would be maing mari6uana
deliveries% )he police officers then proceeded to where Nuevas said his associates,
+eynaldo 'in and 9ernando Inocencio, could be located% 'in was carrying a plastic
bag which contained mari6uana paced in newspaper and wrapped therein% 4hen the
police officers introduced themselves, 'in voluntarily handed the plastic bag over to
them% *fter the items were confiscated, the police officers too the three men to the
police office%
Issue:
4hether or not 'in and Inocencio waived their right against unreasonable
searches and seiAures%
Held:
No. )he search conducted in NuevasD case was made with his consent%
&owever, in 'inDs case, there was none% )here is reason to believe that Nuevas
indeed willingly submitted the plastic bag with the incriminating contents to the
police officers% It can be seen that in his desperate attempt to e5culpate himself from
any criminal liability, he cooperated with the police, gave them the plastic bag, and
even revealed his associates, offering himself as an informant% &is actuations were
consistent with the lamentable human inclination to find e5cuses, blame others, and
9B
save oneself even at the cost of othersD lives% )hus, the 2ourt would have affirmed
NuevasD conviction had he not withdrawn his appeal% "n the other hand, with respect
to the search conducted in the case of 'in, the 2ourt finds that no such consent had
actually been given% )he police officers gave inconsistent, dissimilar testimonies
regarding the manner by which they got hold of the plastic bag% Neither can 'inDs
silence at the time be that when the receipt of the evidence was prepared, all B
accused were not represented by counsel% &e liewise disclosed that he was the one
who escorted all the accused during their physical e5amination% &e also escorted all
B to the 9iscalDs office where they were informed of the charges against them% )he B
were found guilty by the trial court, and the case was automatically elevated to the
2* for review% &owever, Nuevas withdrew his appeal% )hus, the case was considered
closed and terminated as to him%
"osadas v. Court o! Aeals
G.R. No. 89139
Auust 2, 1990
Ganayo, J.:
Facts:
Members of the Integrated National (olice ,IN(- of the 'avao
Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence )as 9orce, (at% Ersicio Engab and (at%
Embra Empar conducted surveillance along Magallanes #treet, 'avao 2ity% 4hile in
the vicinity of +iAal Memorial 2olleges they spotted petitioner carrying a IburiI bag
and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously% )hey approached the petitioner and
identified themselves as members of the IN(% (etitioner attempted to flee but his
attempt to get away was unsuccessful% )hey then checed the IburiI bag of the
petitioner where they found one ,1- caliber %B/ #mith P 4esson revolver with #erial
No% 77@19;, two ,0- rounds of live ammunition for a %B/ caliber gun, a smoe ,tear
gas- grenade, and two ,0- live ammunitions for a %00 caliber gun% )hey brought the
petitioner to the police station for further investigation% In the course of the same, the
petitioner was ased to show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms
and ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so% &e was then taen to
the 'avao Metrodiscom office and the prohibited articles recovered from him were
indorsed to M?#gt% 'idoy the officer then on duty% &e was prosecuted for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions in the +egional )rial 2ourt of 'avao 2ity%
Issue:
4hether or not the warrantless search is valid
Held:
In 6ustifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carried by the
petitioner, argues that under #ection 10, +ule 1B; of the +ules of 2ourt a person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything used as proof
of a commission of an offense without a search warrant% It is further alleged that the
arrest without a warrant of the petitioner was lawful under the circumstances%
In the case at bar, there is no 8uestion that, indeed, it is reasonable
considering that it was effected on the basis of a probable cause% )he probable cause
is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag
there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it
was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same%
It is too much indeed to re8uire the police officers to search the bag in the
possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for
the purpose% #uch an e5ercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too late%
2learly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the e5ceptions
heretofore discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seiAures has not been violated%
"eole o! the "hiliines v. %ateo
G.R. No. 14$6$8-8$
!uly $, 2004
!ustria-Martinez, J.:
Facts:
*ppellant Cfren Mateo was charged with ten counts of rape by his step<
daughter Imelda Mateo% 'uring the trial, ImeldaDs testimonies regarding the rape
incident were inconsistent% #he said in one occasion that incident of rape happened
inside her bedroom, but other times, she told the court that it happened in their sala%
#he also told the court that the appellant would cover her mouth but when ased
again, she said that he did not% 'espite the irreconcilable testimony of the victim, the
trial court found the accused guilty of the crime of rape and sentenced him the
penalty of reclusion perpetua% )he #olicitor :eneral assails the factual findings of the
trial and recommends an ac8uittal of the appellant%
Issue:
4hether or not this case is directly appeallable to the #upreme 2ourt
94
Held:
4hile the 9undamental =aw re8uires a mandatory review by the #upreme
2ourt of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment,
or death, nowhere, however, has it proscribed an intermediate review% If only to
ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment is imposed, the 2ourt now deems it wise and compelling to provide in
these cases a review by the 2ourt of *ppeals before the case is elevated to the
#upreme 2ourt% 4here life and liberty are at stae, all possible avenues to determine
his guilt or innocence must be accorded an accused, and no case in the evaluation of
the 9acts can ever be overdone% * prior determination by the 2ourt of *ppeals on,
particularly, the factual issues, would minimiAe the possibility of an error of
6udgment% If the 2ourt of *ppeals should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, it could then render 6udgment imposing the
corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant, refrain from entering
6udgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the #upreme 2ourt for its final
disposition%
Ender the 2onstitution, the power to amend rules of procedure is
constitutionally vested in the #upreme 2ourt V
*rticle $III, #ection 3% )he #upreme 2ourt shall have the following powers> F,3-
(romulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts%G
(rocedural matters, first and foremost, fall more s8uarely within the rule<
maing prerogative of the #upreme 2ourt than the law<maing power of 2ongress%
)he rule here announced additionally allowing an intermediate review by the 2ourt
of *ppeals, a subordinate appellate court, before the case is elevated to the #upreme
2ourt on automatic review is such a procedural matter%
(ertinent provisions of the +evised +ules on 2riminal (rocedure, more
particularly #ection B and #ection 1@ of +ule 100, #ection 1B of +ule 104, #ection of
+ule 103, and any other rule insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the
+egional )rial 2ourts to the #upreme 2ourt in cases where the penalty imposed is
death reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as well as the resolution of the
#upreme 2ourt en banc, dated 19 #eptember 1993, in FInternal +ules of the #upreme
2ourtG in cases similarly involving the death penalty, are to be deemed modified
accordingly%
93