Sec.

26

Subject and title of bills - general prohibition of "riders"

(Par.1)

Philippine Judges Association vs Prado

FACTS:

The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No.
7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal
Corporation through its Circular No. 92-28. These
measures withdraw the franking privilege from the SC,
CA, RTC, MTC, MeTC and the Land Registration
Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with
certain other government offices.

The petitioners are members of the lower courts who
feel that their official functions as judges will be
prejudiced by the above-named measures.

ISSUES:

1) W/N Section 35 of R.A. 7354 is not expressed in the
title of the law, thereby unconstitutional.

NO.

R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippines
Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, functions and
Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry
and of Other Purposes Connected Therewith."

Section 35 of R.A. 7354, which is the principal target of
the petition is the "Repealing Clause" of the said law.
The second paragraph covers the repeal of the franking
privilege from the petitioner and this Court under E.O.
207, P.D. 1882 and P.D. 26.

The petitioners' contention is untenable.

The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the
body of the act, or to be comprehensive as to cover
every single detail of the measure. It has been held that
if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and
reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is
not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people,
there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement.

The reason is where a statute repeals a former law,
such repeal is the effect and not the subject of the
statute; and it is the subject not the effect of law, which
is required to be briefly expressed in its title.

The Court is convinced that the withdrawal of the
franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the
accomplishment of the principal objective of RA 7354,
which is the creation of a more efficient and effective
postal service system.













































Sec. 26

Subject and title of bills - general prohibition of "riders"

(Par. 1) (supra, Sec. 5)

Tobias vs. Abalos

FACTS:

Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of
Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7675, also known as An
Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a
Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Mandaluyong.

Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the
municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged
to only one legislative district.

With a plebiscite held on April 10, 1994, people of
Mandaluyong voted to for the conversion of
Mandaluyong to a highly urbanized city ratifying RA
7675 and making it in effect.

ISSUES:

1) W/N RA 7675 is in violation of Article VI, Section
26(1) of the Constitution regarding 'one subject one bill
rule"

NO.

Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed
Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter
embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city;
and (2) the division of the congressional district of San
Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.

Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject
is not germane to the subject matter of RA 7675 since
the said law treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong
into a highly urbanized city, as expressed in the title of
the law.

Contrary to the petitioners' assertion, the creation of a
separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a
subject separate and distinct from the subject of its
conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural
and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city.

Verily, the title of RA 7675, "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized
City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and
contemplates the subject treated under Section 49
regarding the creation of a separate congressional
district for Mandaluyong.

Applying liberal construction the Supreme Court
dismissed the contention of constitutionality pertaining
to Art VI 26(1) saying "should be given a practical rather
than a technical construction. It should be sufficient
compliance with such requirement if the title expresses
the general subject and all the provisions are germane
to that general subject."






































Sec. 26

Subject and title of bills - general prohibition of "riders"

(supra, Art. 6, Sec. 2)

Tatad vs. Secretary of the Department of Energy

FACTS:

The petitions challenge the constitutionality of RA No.
8180 entitled An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil
Industry and For Other Purposes.

This law allows that any person or entity may import or
purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum
products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or
own and operate refineries and other downstream oil
facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for
his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by the
Department of Energy.

Petitioner Francisco S. Tatad contentds that Section 5(b)
of R.A. No. 8180 on tariff differential violates the
provision of the constitution requiring every law to have
one subject which should be expressed in its title.

ISSUES:

1)W/N Section 5(b) violates the one title-one subject
requirement of the Constitution.

NO.

The Court does not concur with petitioner's contention.

As a policy, the Court has adopted a liberal construction
of the one title - one subject rule. The title need not
mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute
details of a law. A law having a single general subject
indicated in the title may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long
as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the
general subject, and may be considered in furtherance
of such subject by providing for the method and means
of carrying out the general subject.

The Court ruled that section 5(b) providing for tariff
differential is germane to the subject of RA 8180 which
is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. The
Section is supposed to sway prospective investors to
put up refineries in our country and make them rely less
on imported petroleum.





















































Sec. 26

Subject and title of bills - general prohibition of "riders"

(par. 1)

De Guzman vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

At bar is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
urgent prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order, assailing
the validity of Section 44 of RA 8189 otherwise known
as "The Voter's Registration Act of 1996"

Section 44 thereof provides:

"SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers - No Election
Officer shall hold office in a particular city or
municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election
officer who, either at the time of the approval of this
Act or subsequent thereto, has served for at least four
(4) years in a particular city or municipality shall
automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a
new station outside original congressional district."

By Virtue of the aforequoted provision of law, COMELEC
promulgated Res. Nos. 97 - 0002 and 92 - 0610 for the
implementation thereof. Thereafter, the COMELEC
issued several directives reassigning the petitioners,
who are either City of Municipal Election Officers, to
different stations.

Aggrieved by the issuance of the aforesaid directives
and resolutions, the petitioners found their way to the
Court via the present petition.

ISSUES:

1) W/N Section 44 of RA 8189 violates the one title-one
subject requirement of the Constitution.

NO.

Petitioners' contention that Section 44 has an isolated
and different subject from that of RA 8189 and that the
same is not expressed in the title of the law, is equally
untenable.

Section 26 (1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is
sufficiently complied with where, as in this case, the
title is comprehensive enough to embrace the general
objective it seeks to achieve, and if all parts of the
statute are related and germane to the subject matter
embodied in the title or so long as the same are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and
title.

Section 44 of RA 8189 is not isolated to the general
subject matter stated in the title of the law.

The title of RA 8189 is "The Voter's Registration of
1996."

Section 44 which provides for the reassignment of
election officers, is relevant to the subject matter of
registration as it seeks to ensure the integrity of the
registration process by providing a guideline for the
COMELEC to follow in the reassignment of election
officers.

It is not an alien provision but one which is related to
the conduct and procedure of continuing registration of
voters.

It bears stressing that the Constitution does not require
Congress to employ in the title of an enactment,
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or
catalogue, all the contents and minute details therein.


























Sec. 26

Subject and title of bills - general prohibition of "riders"

(par. 1)

Cawaling vs COMELEC

FACTS:

Before the Court are two (2) separate petitions
challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
8806 which created the City of Sorsogon and the
validity of the plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto.

On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada
signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an "Act Creating The City
Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon
And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And
Appropriating Funds Therefor." The COMELEC
conducted a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon
and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for ratification
proclaimed the creation of the City of Sorsogon as
having been ratified and approved by the majority of
the votes cast in the plebiscite.

Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer, the
petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari
seeking the annulment of the plebiscite.

ISSUES:

1) W/N RA 8806 violates the one title-one subject
requirement of the Constitution.

NO.

Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 8806 actually
embraces two principal subjects which are: (1) the
creation of the City of Sorsogon, and (2) the abolition of
the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon. While the
title of the Act sufficiently informs the public about the
creation of Sorsogon City, petitioner claims that no such
information has been provided on the abolition of the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon.

Contrary to petitioners assertion, there is only one
subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the
creation of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation
of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of
Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject
separate and distinct from the creation of Sorsogon
City.
Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural
and inevitable consequence of the merger. Otherwise
put, it is the necessary means by which the City of
Sorsogon was created.

Hence, the title of the law, An Act Creating the City of
Sorsogon by Merging the Municipalities of Bacon and
Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon, and
Appropriating Funds Therefor, cannot be said to
exclude the incidental effect of abolishing the two
municipalities, nor can it be considered to have
deprived the public of fair information on this
consequence.

It is well-settled that the one title-one subject rule
does not require the Congress to employ in the title of
the enactment language of such precision as to mirror,
fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute
details therein.

The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the general object
which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here,
the persons interested are informed of the nature,
scope and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation.

Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal
rather than technical construction of the rule so as not
to cripple or impede legislation.























Sec. 26

Subject and title of bills - general prohibition of "riders"

(par. 1)

Abakada vs. Ermita

FACTS:

Mounting budget deficit, revenue generation,
inadequate fiscal allocation for education, increased
emoluments for health workers, and wider coverage for
full value-added tax benefits these are the reasons
why Republic Act No. 9337 (R.A. No. 9337) was enacted.
Reasons, the wisdom of which, the Court even with its
extensive constitutional power of review, cannot probe.
The petitioners in these cases, however, question not
only the wisdom of the law, but also perceived
constitutional infirmities in its passage.

R.A. No. 9337 is a consolidation of three legislative bills
namely, House Bill Nos. 3555and 3705, and Senate Bill
No. 1950. Because of the conflicting provisions of the
proposed bills the Senate agreed to the request of the
House of Representatives for a committee conference.
The Conference Committee on the Disagreeing
Provisions of House Bill recommended the approval of
its report, which the Senate and the House of the
Representatives did.

On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law the
consolidated House and Senate versions as Republic Act
9337. Before the law was to take effect on July 1, 2005,
the Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining government from implementing the law in
response to a slew of petitions for certiorari and
prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new
law.

Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a
petition for prohibition on May 27, 2005 questioning
the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No.
9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108,
respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC).

Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and
properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation
of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of
services and use or lease of properties.

These questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso
authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the
Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%,
effective January 1, 2006, after specified conditions
have been satisfied.

Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not there is a violation of Article VI,
Section 24 of the Constitution.

2) Whether or not there is undue delegation of
legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28(2) of
the Constitution.

3) Whether or not there is a violation of the due process
and equal protection under Article III Sec. 1 of the
Constitution.

1. Since there is no question that the revenue bill
exclusively originated in the House of Representatives,
the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to
introduce amendments to the House bill when it
included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending
corporate income taxes, percentage, and excise and
franchise taxes.

2. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but
only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This
is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not
abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it
describes what job must be done, who must do it, and
what is the scope of his authority; in our complex
economy that is frequently the only way in which the
legislative process can go forward.

3. The power of the State to make reasonable and
natural classifications for the purposes of taxation has
long been established. Whether it relates to the subject
of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied,
or the amounts to be raised, the methods of
assessment, valuation and collection, the States power
is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the
judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a
clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or
arbitrariness.





Sec. 26

Subject and title of bills - general prohibition of "riders"

BANAT vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

At bar is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction filed by petitioner Barangay
Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) assailing the constitutionality of
RA 9369 and enjoining respondent COMELEC from
implementing the statute.

RA 9369 is a consolidation of SB 2231 and HB 5352. Less
than four months before the 14 May 2007 local
elections, the President signed RA 9369.

On 7 May 2007, petitioner, a duly accredited multi-
sectoral organization, filed this petition for prohibition
alleging that RA 9369 violated Section 26(1), Article VI
of the Constitution. Petitioner also assails the
constitutionality of Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 of RA
9369. According to petitioner, these provisions are of
questionable application and doubtful validity for failing
to comply with the provisions of the Constitution.

ISSUES:

1) W/N RA 9369 violates Section 26 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution.

NO.

Both the COMELEC and the OSG maintain that the title
of RA 9369 is broad enough to encompass topics which
deal not only with the automation process but with
everything related to its purpose encouraging a
transparent, credible, fair, and accurate elections.

The constitutional requirement that every bill passed
by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof has always been
given a practical rather than a technical construction.
The requirement is satisfied if the title is comprehensive
enough to include subjects related to the general
purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. The title of
a law does not have to be an index of its contents and
will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are
relevant to each other and may be inferred from the
title. Moreover, a title which declares a statute to be an
act to amend a specified code is sufficient and the
precise nature of the amendatory act need not be
further stated.

RA 9369 is an amendatory act entitled An Act
Amending Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled An Act
Authorizing the Commission on Elections to Use an
Automated Election System in the May 11, 1998
National or Local Elections and in Subsequent National
and Local Electoral Exercises, to Encourage
Transparency, Credibility, Fairness and Accuracy of
Elections, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881, as Amended, Republic Act No. 7166 and Other
Related Election Laws, Providing Funds Therefor and For
Other Purposes.

Clearly, the subject matter of RA 9369 covers the
amendments to RA 8436, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (BP
881),[15] Republic Act No. 7166 (RA 7166),[16] and
other related election laws to achieve its purpose of
promoting transparency, credibility, fairness, and
accuracy in the elections.

The provisions of RA 9369 assailed by petitioner deal
with amendments to specific provisions of RA 7166 and
BP 881, specifically:

(1) Sections 34, 37 and 38 amend Sections 26, 30 and 15
of RA 7166, respectively; and

(2) Section 43 of RA 9369 amends Section 265 of BP
881. Therefore, the assailed provisions are germane to
the subject matter of RA 9369 which is to amend RA
7166 and BP 881, among others.




















Sec. 26

Subject and title of bills - general prohibition of "riders"

(supra. Sec. 16) reiterates Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance

Kida vs. Senate of the Philippines

FACTS:

On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled
An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the
Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local
Elections and for Other Purposes was enacted.

The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of
August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and
every three (3) years thereafter, to coincide with the
countrys regular national and local elections.

Accordingly, the law granted the President the power to
appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office of the
Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who
shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices
until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections
shall have qualified and assumed office", which are the
subject of the petition.

In G.R. No. 197280, petitioners also challenge the
validity of RA 10153 for its alleged failure to comply
with Section 26(2) Article VI of the Constitution.

ISSUES:

1) W/N RA No. 10153 violate Sec. 26(2), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.

NO.

The general rule that before bills passed by either the
House or the Senate can become laws they must pass
through three readings on separate days. The
EXCEPTION is when the President certifies to the
necessity of the bills immediate enactment.

The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,
explained the effect of the Presidents certification of
necessity in the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of reading
the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the
two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i]
the bill has passed three readings on separate days and
[ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed
three days before it is finally approved.

In the present case, the records show that the President
wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a
law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the
national and local elections.

Following the Tolentino ruling, the Presidents
certification exempted both the House and the Senate
from having to comply with the three separate readings
requirement.

































Sec. 27 Procedure in Law-Making

Passage of bills

(supra.) (Bicameral Conference Committee - BCC)

Arroyo vs. De Venecia

FACTS:

A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240,
which amends certain provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members
of the House of Representatives, charged that there is
violation of the rules of the House which petitioners
claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their
violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The
Senate approved it with certain amendments. A
bicameral conference committee was formed to
reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and
Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee
submitted its report to the House. During the
interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and
moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll
call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The
interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos
interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report,
Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and
ratification of the conference committee report. The
Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the
Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the
same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was
asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep.
Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although
Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority
Leaders motion, the approval of the conference
committee report had by then already been declared by
the Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of
the House of Representatives and the President of the
Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of
both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed
into law by President Ramos.

ISSUE:

1) W/N RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed
in violation of the rules of the House.

Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent
in character. They are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts
ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does
not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the
requisite number of members has agreed to a particular
measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the
construction to be given to a rule affects person other
than members of the legislative body, the question
presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its
validity is open to question in a case where private
rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved
but only those of a member who, instead of seeking
redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to
the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal
procedure of the House with which the Court should
not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no
quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively
prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.
Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of
quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call
established the existence of a quorum. The question of
quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when
the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of
delaying the business of the House.