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Jessica Ward



Operation Eagle Claw: a Failure of Policy, a Failure of Desperation


It is April 24, 1980. For 170 days, nearly six months, Iranian students have held
Americans hostage in the American embassy in Tehran. There seems to be no diplomatic solution
to the problem in sight. For 170 days President Carter has been trying to free the hostages,
including severing all relations with Iran and calling on allies to do the same. In a frantic move,
he ordered the U.S. special forces to go into Iran and rescue the hostages. This mission failed to
even reach Tehran due to weather condtions. Two helicopters collided in the Iranian desert,
killing eight Americans. At 1 AM the next morning the White House announced the failure of the
mission. Later in the day, Carter, in a press conference, claimed full responsibility to the
American public.
Operation Eagle Claw was a desperate act from a desperate President Carter. With an
upcoming election, Carter needed to solve a problem that had become a thorn in his side,
damaging his political reputation, to which he had tried every possible solution. Trying to keep
Operation Eagle Claw secret, the President failed to inform congress, despite the fact that it had
been in planning since shortly after the beginning of this crisis (The Situation in Iran 3). The
mission, which aimed to get all 53 hostages out of Iran without being caught was serious risk
both the lives of the hostages and members of the Delta Force and the possibility of future
diplomatic relations with Iran .
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For Carter, 1980 was a turbulent time. Within one month of Operation Eagle Claw,
Iranian students took over the Iranian Embassy in London; the Yugoslavian president died,
resulting in his funeral being the largest diplomatic meeting until the funeral of Pope John Paul II
in 2005; a Liberian ship crashed into a bridge in Florida, killing 35; race riots occurred in Miami;
Mt. St. Helens would erupt in Washington, an unprecedented natural disaster in the continental
United States, killing 57 and causing $1.1 billion in damage. In addition, Carter was running for
re-election, first for the Democratic nomination against the formidable Edward Kennedy, and
then against the eventual winner Ronald Reagan. Carter did not gain the democratic nomination
until the Democratic National convention in August.
The Iranian hostage crisis had a huge impact on the American voters psyche. Every night
at the end of the daily news broadcast Walter Cronkite would end with the count of the number
of days the hostages had been held in Iran and the ABC television network aired a show every
night on the crisis called America Held Hostage, making the crisis an everyday issue, an issue
that would seep into the minds of Americans and effect the opinions of Americans towards the
competency of their current president (Goodman). With his approval ratings sinking below 40%
in 1980 Carter had the to solve the crisis in order to regain the support of the American public in
time for the rapidly approaching November election (Gallup).
Meanwhile, the Iranian government was unstable and was adamant that the issue would
only be addressed by the Majilis, which had not yet been fully formed, a date that kept slipping
further and further backward (The Situation in Iran 3). Other international methods for
mediation had been tried and failed to produce any result. On December 4, 1979, the United
Nations security council passed unanimously Resolution 457 which called for the release of the
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hostages, a peaceful settlement of U.S. - Iranian differences, and participation by the Secretary-
General to implement the resolution (The Iran Hostage Crisis 50). On the 15
th
of December the
International Court of Justice ruled in favor of the United States and ordered Iran to release the
hostages. A second resolution was soon passed by the United Nations Security Council,
Resolution 461, which enforced this ruling but recalled the previous Resolution 457
The Carter Administration had tried every possible avenue it saw for diplomatic
solutions:
We took economic and other actions- cutting off purchases of oil from them,
freezing their assets, blocking the sale of military equipment and parts. We pressed
the United Nations, in the International Court of Justice, anywhere we could find,
for clear international expressions of condemnation that would underscore the
isolation that Iran is warranted in feeling over this situation (Situation in Iran 2).

On April 7, all diplomatic relations with Iran were cut and all Iranian diplomats and military
students were ordered out of the country by midnight (The Iran Hostage Crisis 148). Americas
allies wavered on following these harsh actions. The first major ally to ban all trade with Iran
was Portugal 10 days later on April 17 with Australia following on April 21 (The Iran Hostage
Crisis 158 and 162). Other allies, particularly Europe and Japan favored the U.S. actions but did
not go so far as to ban trade entirely.
As the situation continued, Carters approval ratings continued to drop to levels that were
the among lowest ever recorded, only a few percentage points away from post-Watergate Nixon
approval ratings (Gallup). As the election came ever closer the options for reconciliation
diminished. Carter was described as driven to the end of his patience by a situation he could
not win (Beckwith and Knox 258). Diplomatic actions like economic sanctions will take time to
have an effect on Iran (The Situation in Iran 3). There was considerable concern for how long
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the hostages could stand being held, as Warren Christopher explained to congress following the
failed rescue mission time is hard on the hostages, for as time goes by, the psychological and
physical strain on the hostages grows (The Situation in Iran 3). Throughout the official reports
to Congress, six hostages are reported to be missing in the few and far between accounts from
inside the embassy, typically by members of the clergy performing holiday services for the
hostages. It was later reports state that the Iranians singled out [them] as spies, and may even
have moved them from the embassy compound (The Iran Hostage Crisis 70). As time
continued to pass it seemed as though the only option left was a military intervention.
Despite the warning that students at the embassy said the hostages would be killed if
the United States attempted any military action against Iran Operation Eagle Claw was ordered
(The Iran Hostage Crisis 151). In November, after the beginning of the crisis, when Delta Force
Special Forces began preparations for a rescue mission in Iran, ground commander Con. Charlie
Beckwith reports being asked about the chances of success, and replying zero (Beckwith and
Knox 199). This mission was one of the first to be performed by the Delta Force, and it presented
not only a difficult problem, but an unprecedented one as well. While the Delta Force was
designed as a counterterrorist unit, the situation of state-sanctioned terrorism was one that they
had not thought to prepare for, it had always been assumed, in establishing a counterterrorist
unit, that when Delta was needed overseas, the country in which it would operate would be
friendly or at least neutral (Beckwith and Knox 200).
The problem of how to get special forces into Tehran, take the embassy, and get out of
Iran was a difficult one. The city of Tehran is inland from the Persian Gulf. In order reach it vast
distances, nearly 1,000 miles of Iranian wasteland... had to be crossed and the embassy itself
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was a heavily guarded building complex stuck in the middle of a city of 4,000,000 hostile folks
(Beckwith and Knox 188). In order to get to Tehran from the Persian Gulf, Delta Forces would
have to cross either a vast desert or a mountain range with enough men and equipment to free the
hostages. In addition to these geographic barriers, the Delta forces were aware of their eventual
downfall: the weather. Because of certain weather conditions the mission was to happen very
soon after it was ordered because of a number of seasonal weather conditions... these include
wind, temperature and hours of darkness (The Situation in Iran 3).
The final plan involved Delta Force, with 132 men going to Wadi Kena, Egypt, and then
fly from the small island of Masirah in the Gulf of Oman to Desert One in the middle of the
Iranian desert, the last stop before Tehran (Bowden). At Desert One, they would be met by
helicopters flown in from the Gulf of Oman on the USS Nimitz. Along the way, the helicopters
encountered a haboob, a dust cloud, in the desert. causing the helicopters and plans to land in the
middle of the desert, where, honoring an absolute law of military operations: the inevitability of
the unexpected, they encountered a bus with forty Iranians traveling from Yazd to Taba as well
as two trucks, one of which was shot by an anti-tank weapon and the other ed (Bowden). In the
process of going through the haboob, Operation Eagle Claw had been reduced from eight to ve
helicopters, one was too damaged and two had not shown up. The planned minimum to make
continuing to Tehran possible was six. Colonel Beckwith made the difcult decision to turn back
and abort the mission, to which Carter reportedly responded Damn. Damn. (Bowden). In the
process of this failed mission two of the helicopters collided, resulting in the deaths of eight
Americans and one Iranian.
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One of the primary reasons for the failure of Operation Eagle Claw was an intentional
lack of information for security purposes. Very few people within the government were aware of
the Operation, including no one in Congress. There was no rm contingency plan on when to
inform members of Congress on the operation only that it was the Presidents intention to call a
group of people to the White House so late that the compromise of secrecy would not have been
so great (The Situation in Iran 4). Without the leaders of the nation, particularly those guiding
the nations foreign relations, informed of a crucial intrusion into enemy territory, there was
much more room for hasty decision making and human error. Through these rushed and secret
policy decisions, which were primarily conducted with higher-ups in the Cater administration
and military ofcials with high motivation to take the mission forward and little or no knowledge
of foreign policy, moments were not taken to explore the possible diplomatic fallout of the
mission (such as the meeting described in Beckwith and Knox 4-10).
This lack of information is also extended to the duration of Operation Eagle Claw itself,
which remained secret to the members of Delta Force until after their arrival in Egypt, I told the
troops on Thursday that we were moving forward to Egypt, but not that the mission was a
go, (Beckwith and Knox 259). The problems encountered in Iran, particularly the loss of the
helicopters, were amplified by the desire to keep the mission as secret as possible. The planes
forced to land in the desert were aware of the presence of the haboobs, but radio communication
was not possible because it was only allowed through secure lines for fear of being overheard by
Iranians. If communication had been made possible during the operation it may have been
possible to avoid the collision of the two helicopters, save the lives of Americans, and continue
on to Tehran to rescue the hostages.
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In its aftermath, Operation Eagle Claw proved to be as much of a policy failure as it was
a technical failure while being carried out. Close and important allies, such as Japan condemned
the military intervention into Iran and asked the United States to refrain from military action in
the future (The Iran Hostage Crisis 167). So did Saudi Arabia, one of the most important allies
in the region, who view the operation with the greatest concern and much regret (The Iran
Hostage Crisis 168). Secretary of State Cyrus Vance resigned out of disagreement with the act,
originally submitting his letter of resignation on the 21
st
of April, but waiting until after the
operation to make his resignation ofcial, adding unneeded turmoil to the already frenzied State
Department. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, disapproving of not being involved,
launched an investigation into whether the operation was legal because the president had not
consulted with Congress as required by law. Because of the resignation of Secretary Vance,
Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher was called to testify at the hearing as the representative of
the administration and the State Department.
The attempted military rescue mission did not help the diplomatic negotiation process
with Iran. It severely endangered the lives of the hostages in the hands of the students, who had
threatened to kill them should the United States attempt a military rescue. It also further
deteriorated the image of the United States in the rhetoric of the revolutionaries in Iran, who
called the mission everything from an act of war to all lies and connected to unrest at the
universities (The Iran Hostage Crisis 168). This profound insult to Iran and its sovereignty was
likely one of the causes of the extension of the crisis for its full 444 days. Whether this was the
reason for Ayatollah Khomeinis seeming unwillingness to work with the Carter administration
to nd and end to the hostage crisis is uncertain, but it could have been a factor in his waiting
until minutes after Ronald Reagan was sworn in as president to release the hostages.
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In his press conference the following day, concerning Operation Eagle Claw, Jimmy
Carter said:
It was my decision to attempt the rescue operation. It was my decision to
cancel it when problems developed in the placement of our rescue team for a
future rescue operation. The responsibility is fully my own. (Carter)

By emphasizing the amount of personal blame on himself, Carter demonstrates how much
Operation Eagle Claw was his own decision and own mistake. In his desperation to solve the
crisis, Carter ignored the many other stakeholders and walked the line of legality, specifically
section 3 of the War Powers Resolution by not consulting congress on the matter.
As the crisis unfolded, so did many other events around the United States and throughout
the world. Not only was Carter desperate to solve the crisis by the nature of it being a crisis,
every day the hostages stayed in Tehran was another day the American public saw him as a
failure, and every day put the future of his own political career in jeopardy. Having exhausted all
foreseeable diplomatic channels and having cut relations with Iran off completely, an action that
still defines U.S. relations with Iran today, Carter saw few solutions.
Without fully consulting the experts outside of the military field, Operation Eagle Claw
failed not only as a mission but as a policy. The mentality of secrecy created an environment
where even members of congress could not be trusted with state secrets. This same mentality led
to the deaths of eight Americans. Because of the failure of the mission, and its undermining of
the sovereignty of Iran, the U.S. action was condemned by the international community when it
had previously been fully favored in the situation.
Operation Eagle Claw serves as an example of how not to carry out foreign policy in an
international crisis. By learning from the failure of Operation Eagle Claw, the United States can
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avoid such action in the future. This mission highlights the importance of consultation of
multiple agencies, experts, and officials, instead of placing such a decision in the hands of one
man, who may have motivations outside of solely solving the crisis. Even the president of the
United States is not fully capable of making a policy decision that could affect the future of
relations indefinitely if he has not been advised to the fullest extent possible. From Operation
Eagle Claw, the United States has learned that decisions made in desperation lead to desperate
and not fully thought out actions.

Works Cited

Beckwith, Charlie A, and Donald Knox. Delta Force. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
1983.

Bowden, Mark, The Desert One Debacle. Atlantic Magazine. May 2006

Carter, Jimmy. Statement on the Iran Rescue Mission. April, 25, 1980

Gallup Polls, Presidential Approval Ratings -- Gallup Historical Statistics and Trends, http://
www.gallup.com/poll/116677/presidential-approval-ratings-gallup-historical-statistics-
trends.aspx#1. Accessed 1 December 2010.
Goodman, Ellen. And Thats the Way It Is-- Or Is It? Washington Post. July 17, 1980.

The Iran Hostage Crisis : a Chronology of Daily Developments : Report Prepared for the
Committee On Foreign Affairs, U.s. House of Representatives / by the Foreign Affairs
and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.
Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1981.

The Situation In Iran : Hearing Before the Committee On Foreign Relations, United States
Senate, Ninety-sixth Congress, Second Session, May 8, 1980. Washington: U.S. G.P.O.,
1980-1981