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Emissary/or "Btiknt'e" in the Middle East • 275

from his religious role within Islam. His formal title was Custodian of the
Two Holy Mosques, and he was a devout Muslim and strictly observed all the
dictates of his religion.
The al-Sauds regarded their country as a family economic enterprise,
and Faisal's principal duty was managing the large and fractious royal fam-
ily. To keep them loyal and satisfied, Faisal distributed the first 20 percent of
oil revenues among the six hundred or so members of his family before mak-
ing the remainder available to the government. There was more than
enough to go around. In 1969, with oil selling at $2 a barrel, Faisal had al-
most a billion dollars a year to distribute among his relatives, an amount
that would rise to almost $24 billion by the early 1980s. Even this was not
enough to maintain family peace; Faisal was assassinated by a deranged
nephew in 1975.
Faisal greeted me warmly when I arrived. We exchanged gifts, and he
reminisced about the lunch I had given him at Pocantico in 1966 at the time
of his state visit to the United States. I told him I was interested in hearing
his views about the current situation in the region and that I would report
them directly to President Nixon upon my return to the United States.
Faisal was even more emphatic than Nasser about the disastrous conse-
quences of U.S. Middle Eastern policy. His opinions were inflexible and his
language unrestrained, and his dark, piercing eyes seemed to bore right
through me. My notes from that meeting read, in part:

Faisal feels our policy in the Middle East is dictated by U.S. Zionists and
is entirely pro-Israel. It is driving more and more of the Arab nations
away from us. He is convinced that it is this policy which has given the
Soviets a growing foothold in the Middle East. He feels we have actu-
ally encouraged radical elements in countries to overthrow more con-
servative regimes.. .. Faisal is convinced the U.S. is steadily losing
friends and influence in the Middle East. Our only friends now are
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Lebanon. Tunisia, and Morocco. If the
war with Israel persists, we will soon have none at all. "••
(35,
Faisal's views on Israel were, frankly, bizarre: ]

Faisal believes that all the troubles in the Middle East stem from \
Zionism and Israel. He says most of the Jews in Israel come from
Russia, that Communism is a product of Zionism, that the Israelis are 1
a Godless people, that Israel is a socialist state which only pretends >
friendship with the United States, and that Israel and the Soviets have
 276 • Memoirs

a secret understanding whereby all of the Arab xvorld is to fall into

Communist hands.
%•"-"
Faisal dismissed my attempt to counter his argument. But Faisal also said
he had no desire "to push Israel into the sea." There was now an element.of
flexibility in the Saudi ruler's position that had been missing previously.
As I left the meeting. I reminded Faisal that I would report the essence of
our com'ersation to President Nixon. The King responded by saying that the
former governor of Pennsylvania^ William Scranton.Jiad_rnade_the^arne
offer to him a year;.earlier and hadpublicly supported a more even-handed_
U.S._MLddie Eastern policv. The public outcrv. Faisal noted, had all but ended
^ ^.-^*JJ.*J«! -*JT,_™^, ;!_.,.,_ ,.J£_~_~-"*-—«———**^~—— — £- : „,———=—™-- : ,--^^_.^ , .

Scrantoivspolitical career. He hoped I would not suffer the same fate^

I N F O R M I N G THE PRESIDENT

I returned to New York deeply concerned about what I had learned. Both
Nasser and Faisal had been clear and unambiguous. They perceived D.S.
policy as actively hostile in tone and substance toward the Arabs. They saw
Soviet penetration of the area as the direct consequence of this policy and
beliei'ed its continuation might have an adverse effect on the global flow of
oil. On the other hand, both men seemed willing to compromise and negoti-
ate if the United States would modify its unwavering support of Israel. It was
this message I felt obligated to convey to President Nixon.
A few days after my return from the Middle East, I saw Henry Kissinger in
Washington and informed him of the substance of my conversations.
Henry told me the administration was well along in the process of reassess-
1 ing its Middle East policy and would announce a more balanced position in
the near future in an effort to bring the Israelis to the bargaining table. He
thought it might be valuable for President Nixon to hear my assessment
firsthand.
A month later I was invited to the White House, but I was surprised to dis-
cover that the Oval Office meeting \vould also include Jack McCloy, Standard
Oil chairman Kenneth Jamieson. Mobil chairman Rawleigh Warner, Amoco
chairman John Swearingeri, and Robert Anderson, a former Secretary oi
the Treasury, who had developed extensive and somewhat controversial
business interests in the Middle East, I had hoped for a private meeting to
candidly report what I had learned from Faisal and Nasser, but found myself
part of a larger group concerned primarily with oil, which gave the meeting
a very different cast from the one I would have chosen.